امریکہ کی افغانستان کے بعد ایران سے بھی شکست

ابھی افغانستان سے شکست کے زخم پوری طرح بھرے نہیں تھے کہ امریکہ کو ایران سے شکست کا صدمہ سہنا پڑھ رہاہے۔ امریکہ اس جنگ میں 25 بلین ڈالرسے زیادہ ڈبونے کے بعد بھی ناکام ہے۔ وہ اب آبناۓ ہرمز کی ناکہ بندی کرکے اپنا تیل اور گیس مہنگی قیمت پر بیچ رہا ہے۔ عربوں کے تیل کی ایکسپورٹ بند ہے اور چین جانے والے تیل کو روکا جارہا ہے۔ وقت نے ثابت کردیا کہ امریکہ کا صرف اور صرف ایک مقصد ہے تیل کی تجارت پر قبضہ۔

PSX benchmark index down 4.5%WoW

Pakistan Stock Exchange (PSX) remained in the grip of bears during the ended on April 30, 206. The benchmark index shed 7,677 points, down 4.5%WoW to close at 162,994 points, with average daily trading volume declining to 1.2 billion shares, down 30%WoW.

The most dominant factor contributing to this decline was the collapse of the Iran-US talks, where the US President cancelled a planned trip of his envoys to Pakistan. Consequently, oil prices remained elevated through the week, with the June’26 Brent contract hitting a high of US$126/ bbl.

Adding to this was decision by State Bank of Pakistan (SBP) to raise the policy rate by 100bps to 11.5% on Monday, the first rate hike in over two and half years.

The prolonged Middle East conflict was termed to be the primary driver for raising the policy rate, attributing inflation to remain above the target range in the next few quarters.

However, a positive development was the confirmation of the IMF Executive Board meeting scheduled for May 08, 2026 to consider approval of the US$1.2 billion tranche under the EFF and RSF programs.

Foreign exchange reserves held by SBP as of April 24, 2026 were reported at US$15.8 billion.

Other major news flow during the week included: 1) Pakistan clears US$3.45 billion loan to UAE, 2) Pakistan plans launch of Panda Bonds, 3) IMF okays 60% cut in gas levy, 4) No let-up in Pakistan’s efforts for US-Iran peace, and 5) Pakistan's weekly oil import bill rises to US$800 million amid US-Iran conflict.

Top performing sectors were: Textile Weaving, Tobacco, and Auto Assemblers, while laggards included: Vanaspati, Property, and Woolen.

Major selling was recorded by Mutual funds, and Brokers amounting to US$28.6 million and US$3.1 million respectively.

Major buyers were Individuals, and Companies with net buy of US$27.4 million and US$1.4 million respectively.

Top performing scrips were: HCAR, MEHT, INDU, PAKT, and MTL, while laggards included: YOUW, NBP, SSOM, GADT, and SSGC.

According to AKD Securities, a constructive resolution of US-Iran would remain the pivotal near-term catalyst for the market direction, with softening of oil prices to act as a trigger. Market continues to trade at attractive valuations.

Top picks of the brokerage house include: OGDC, PPL, UBL, MEBL, HBL, FFC, ENGROH, PSO, LUCK, FCCL, INDU, ILP and SYS.

Power Without Leverage

The rhetoric attributed to Donald Trump—of unilateral victory, a prolonged blockade of the Strait of Hormuz, and forcing Iran into submission—reads less like strategy and more like illusion dressed as resolve.

Start with the claim of “victory.” Wars are not won by declaration. If anything, the gap between stated objectives and actual outcomes after US-Israeli strikes on Iran underscores a harsher truth: overwhelming power no longer guarantees decisive results. The superpower looks less triumphant and more constrained.

The blockade argument is equally flawed. Closing the Strait of Hormuz for months is not a show of strength—it is an invitation to escalation. Iran retains the means to retaliate asymmetrically, while Gulf states would be unwilling passengers in a conflict that directly threatens their economic lifelines. What begins as pressure quickly mutates into regional instability.

Then comes the oil calculus. Squeezing Iranian exports may sound tactically appealing, but it is strategically self-defeating. The immediate consequence would be tighter supply, higher prices, and global economic stress. Washington’s Arab partners, far from benefiting, would absorb the shock. Punishing Iran ends up punishing the system.

Most unrealistic, however, is the expectation of Iran’s unconditional surrender. Tehran’s track record suggests the opposite: pressure entrenches resistance. Escalation does not compel compliance; it erodes space for negotiation.

The underlying problem is not intent but misreading leverage. Coercion without credible endgames risks exposing limits rather than enforcing outcomes. Each additional threat weakens, rather than strengthens, the credibility of US strategy.

A sustainable path demands restraint, not bravado—consolidating ceasefire arrangements, reopening diplomatic channels, and allowing all sides a face-saving exit. Power, when detached from realism, ceases to be power at all; it becomes noise with consequences.

Is UAE Risking Its Oil Exports by Leaving OPEC?

The reported move by the United Arab Emirates (UAE) to step away from OPEC signals a structural shift in global oil dynamics rather than a simple policy adjustment. The key question is whether this decision strengthens export potential or exposes the UAE to new risks.

At the core of the issue is production capacity. The UAE has invested heavily over the past decade, raising its installed capacity to nearly 5 million barrels per day, while its output quota under OPEC+ remained significantly lower, around 3–3.5 million barrels per day. This gap created sustained frustration in Abu Dhabi, where policymakers argue that constrained quotas prevent optimal monetization of long-term investments.

By exiting the OPEC framework, the UAE gains theoretical freedom to increase production and exports toward its full capacity. In normal market conditions, this would enhance revenue potential and strengthen its position as a flexible supplier. However, oil markets rarely operate in isolation from geopolitics.

Recent regional instability linked to tensions involving Iran has already demonstrated how quickly export routes through the Strait of Hormuz can be disrupted. Even without OPEC constraints, physical and security risks can limit actual export volumes. In such an environment, higher capacity does not automatically translate into higher realized exports.

The role of Saudi Arabia also remains central. Saudi Arabia has historically anchored OPEC’s production discipline to stabilize prices. A UAE exit weakens this coordinated structure and raises the possibility of more competitive output strategies among major producers. While this may benefit short-term volume expansion, it can also pressure global prices, ultimately reducing export revenue gains.

In the short term, the UAE’s export position is unlikely to change dramatically due to existing logistical and geopolitical constraints. Over the medium term, however, it gains greater autonomy to align production with market demand rather than quota allocation.

The outcome, therefore, is balanced but conditional. The UAE is not simply risking exports; it is trading coordinated stability for operational flexibility. Whether this proves advantageous will depend on how effectively it manages production discipline in an increasingly fragmented oil market.

The Shrinking Leverage of the United States

The visible frustration of Donald Trump over Iran’s negotiating posture is not merely diplomatic theatre—it is a signal of eroding leverage. What Washington presents as firmness increasingly looks like an inability to recalibrate.

The demand for unconditional concessions from Iran rests on a premise that no longer aligns with ground realities. Power, in this case, is not defined by military capability alone, but by the ability to translate pressure into outcomes. By that measure, the United States is struggling.

This conflict has exposed three uncomfortable truths. First, the United States chose to act without consolidating traditional alliances, thereby limiting both legitimacy and strategic depth. Second, its objectives remain ambiguous and unmet—maximum pressure has not yielded maximum compliance. Third, anticipated economic triggers, particularly in global energy markets, have failed to materialize in Washington’s favor.

More consequentially, Iran has demonstrated a capacity to absorb, adapt, and retaliate in calibrated ways. The costs, meanwhile, have spilled across the region - disrupted Gulf exports, strain on Qatar’s LNG infrastructure, and a dent in the UAE’s economic momentum. These are not peripheral effects—they redefine the strategic environment.

Having exited the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action negotiated under Barack Obama, Washington now operates without the diplomatic continuity it once discarded. Escalation remains an option, but increasingly an expensive one with diminishing returns.

Here the real disagreement begins. The prevailing narrative still assumes that time favors the United States. Evidence suggests otherwise. Prolonged pressure, instead of breaking Iran, may be normalizing its resistance.

This is not a call for capitulation—it is a recognition of limits. The United States may still possess overwhelming power, but it no longer commands automatic outcomes. Accepting that reality is not weakness; refusing to do so may prove strategically costlier.

Who holds the cards?

Having departed Pakistan on Saturday just as the US was preparing to send emissaries to discuss the war, Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi eventually popped up for talks with Vladimir Putin in St. Petersburg, where he said Tehran is committed to strengthening its partnership with Moscow, reports Bloomberg.

Araghchi’s geopolitical chess move came after a dissonant weekend of potential feints and false starts in the effort to end the US-Israel war with Iran. As news broke that the Iranian official was leaving Islamabad, Trump announced he was canceling the trip by Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner, in part because the US “has all the cards.”

Iran has told Pakistan, which is operating as an intermediary, that it would cease obstruction of the Strait of Hormuz if the US ended its naval blockade of Iranian shipping. Under its plan, negotiations over Iran’s nuclear research would be dealt with later, Axios reported.

While the White House said it hasn’t changed its position on “red lines” associated with Iran’s atomic program, the administration said it was nevertheless discussing the Iranian proposal.

None of this back and forth sat well with energy markets Monday, the eve of the war’s two-month anniversary. Brent crude prices rose for a sixth straight session to settle above US$108 a barrel. And at least one European leader angered by the high energy prices the continent is paying thanks to the conflict was less than diplomatic in his assessment.

The US “is being humiliated by the Iranian leadership,” German Chancellor Friedrich Merz said Monday, adding he didn’t see “what strategic exit the Americans are now choosing.” Tehran’s negotiators, the German leader said, are proceeding “very skillfully—or indeed very skillfully not negotiating.”

Blockade as a Weapon

The United States’ long-running pressure campaign against Iran raises a harder question: when does coercion begin to disrupt the global order? After decades of sanctions, the central objective remains unmet—Iran has not abandoned its nuclear program. Yet Washington appears to be escalating, moving beyond economic pressure toward actions that constrain passage through the Strait of Hormuz.

The demand that Iran halt uranium enrichment remains contested. As a signatory to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Iran retains the right to peaceful nuclear activity. Critics cite compliance and inspection concerns, but dismissing treaty entitlements outright risks eroding the credibility of the very frameworks meant to regulate nuclear conduct.

Washington justifies its posture through deterrence and regional security. Yet restrictions on Hormuz carry systemic consequences—disrupting energy flows, constraining oil exporters, and imposing costs on major importers such as China, turning a bilateral dispute into a broader geo-economic contest.

Equally significant is the human dimension. Merchant vessels and seafarers become entangled in strategic signaling, raising concerns about proportionality under maritime norms.

Framed as strategy, such measures still function as instruments of pressure on civilian economies and global trade—effectively turning blockade into a weapon that demands closer legal and academic scrutiny.

Security Scare at the White House

An alleged gunfire scare at the White House during a journalists’ dinner has triggered concern—but even more than concern, it has triggered doubt. In a place defined by airtight security, such an episode is either a serious breach or a serious failure of explanation. Both are equally damaging.

Let us begin with the obvious, the White House is among the most secure facilities in the world. Layers of intelligence, screening, and armed protection are designed precisely to prevent such scenarios. The suggestion that a weapon could be carried anywhere near a high-profile gathering strains belief. If this happened, it signals an alarming breakdown. If it did not happen as suggested, then clarity is being sacrificed.

The next line of failure lies in the vetting of invitees. Events involving journalists and senior officials are subject to rigorous checks. Entry is not casual; it is controlled, verified, and monitored. Any lapse here is not minor—it reflects systemic weakness in procedures that are assumed to be foolproof.

The communication surrounding the incident adds another layer of concern. The role of the Press Secretary is to provide facts with clarity. Yet the presentation of this episode appears carefully shaped, raising a legitimate concern that perception is being managed as much as information is being shared. In sensitive situations, even a hint of narrative control undermines trust.

Equally disappointing is the media’s response. Instead of interrogating inconsistencies, parts of the press seem content to amplify the spectacle. A potential security lapse should provoke scrutiny, not serve as a ratings opportunity. When journalism drifts toward dramatization, public confidence erodes further.

Finally, the silence of the educated elite stands out. Incidents of this magnitude demand questioning, debate, and accountability. The absence of critical engagement suggests a worrying complacency among those expected to challenge official narratives.

Whether this was a genuine breach or an exaggerated scare, the larger issue is credibility. Institutions weaken not only through failure, but through unanswered questions—and the unwillingness to confront them.

Recasting Failure in US–Iran Talks

My conclusion is stark - the United States must accept its defeat, ensure the full reopening of the Strait of Hormuz, withdraw the economic sanctions imposed on Iran, and pay for the damages caused during this war. Anything less would not be diplomacy—it would be denial repackaged as success.

The ongoing negotiations between the United States and Iran are increasingly shaped by narrative management rather than strategic success. What began as a forceful campaign—closely aligned with Israel—to curb Iran’s regional influence and nuclear trajectory has delivered outcomes far removed from its declared objectives.

Washington promised deterrence, rollback, and compliance. Instead, Iran’s regional posture remains intact, its negotiating leverage has hardened, and its capacity to absorb economic pressure has proven more resilient than anticipated. Even after weeks of conflict, talks remain “far from a breakthrough,” with fundamental disagreements unresolved.

Meanwhile, the situation around the Strait of Hormuz underscores the scale of miscalculation. Shipping through the strait has collapsed dramatically—from around 140 vessels a day to barely a handful—disrupting nearly a fifth of global oil and LNG flows and sending shockwaves through global markets.

The fallout has been indiscriminate: oil-exporting Arab states face revenue uncertainty, while energy-importing economies grapple with inflationary pressure and supply disruptions.

Yet, despite these outcomes, the language from Washington has shifted toward “progress” and “opportunity.” This is less a reflection of facts and more an attempt to reframe strategic underperformance as diplomatic achievement. The absence of a clear exit strategy, coupled with rising global economic costs, only reinforces the perception of a policy that has drifted without delivering.

This brings the debate to its unavoidable conclusion. Strategic overreach, when left unacknowledged, does not fade—it compounds. The longer reality is denied, the greater the cost imposed on others.

My conclusion is stark - the United States must accept its defeat, ensure the full reopening of the Strait of Hormuz, withdraw the economic sanctions imposed on Iran, and pay for the damages caused during this war. Anything less would not be diplomacy—it would be denial repackaged as success.

PSX benchmark index down 1.9%WoW

Pakistan Stock Exchange (PSX) witnessed reversal of momentum during this past week, the benchmark index shed 3,267 points, down 1.9%WoW to close at 170,672, as investors tried to understand more complex geopolitical realities following last week's ceasefire driven rally.

The average daily trading volume rose to 1,665 million shares - up 31.7%WoW, with investor risk appetite witnessing pullbacks as US-Iran diplomatic talks encountered fresh hiccups. However, sentiment returned during second half of Friday’s session as Iran confirmed the arrival of its foreign minister to Pakistan over the weekend.

Furthermore, US president’s indefinite extension of the ceasefire on Tuesday, hours before its expiry kept hopes of resolution alive and prevented a material selloff as well.

Oil prices rose 3.2%WoW to US$104.8/ bbl, as Iran's seizure of two container vessels attempting to transit the Strait of Hormuz reignited supply disruption fears.

On the macroeconomic front, IMF’s executive board is expected to consider approval of the fourth tranche of the 37-month program during May’26.

Foreign exchange reserves held by State Bank of Pakistan (SBP) rose to US$15.1 billion.

Other major news flow during the week included: 1) Pakistan ups Eurobond issuance to US$750 millio, 2) IMF to vet auto policy before cabinet, 3) IMF urges removal of non-tariff curbs, 4) Pakistan seeks LNG spot cargoes after December, and 5) First Central Asian shipment reaches Pakistan via China.

Top active sectors were: Textile Weaving, Refinery, Synthetic & Rayon, while lagged included: Jute, Pharmaceuticals, and Cement.

Major selling was recorded by Insurance, and Other Organization aggregating to US$16.9 million. Individuals and Companies emerged net buyers with US$17.2 million.

Top performing scrips included: YOUW, ATRL, GADT, IBFL, and MUREB, while laggards included: PIOC, DGKC, ISL, CPHL, and MLCF.

AKD Securities believes that a constructive resolution would remain the pivotal near-term catalyst for the market direction, with any positive developments over the weekend becoming the trigger.

According to the brokerage house, despite the recent recovery, market continues to trade at attractive values.

Top picks of the brokerage house include: OGDC, PPL, UBL, MEBL, HBL, FFC, ENGROH, PSO, LUCK, FCCL, INDU, ILP and SYS.

 

Israel: Promise of Stability Remains Fragile

At 78, Israel remains a study in contrasts—secure yet unsettled, integrated yet isolated within its immediate neighborhood. Its relations with bordering states reveal a pattern shaped less by reconciliation and more by necessity.

With Egypt and Jordan, Israel has maintained durable—if cold—peace. The framework established after the Camp David Accords continues to hold, anchored in security coordination and shared concerns over militancy and border stability. These ties are transactional, not transformative, reflecting mutual restraint rather than genuine normalization.

On its northern front, the equation turns volatile. Lebanon remains locked in a cycle of tension with Israel, largely driven by the influence of Hezbollah. Deterrence has prevented full-scale war in recent years, but the absence of a political settlement ensures that the border remains one miscalculation away from escalation.

In Syria, hostility persists in a more fragmented form. Israel’s periodic strikes targeting Iranian-linked assets underscore a broader contest with Iran for regional influence. Syria’s internal disarray has limited direct confrontation but has also entrenched a shadow conflict that resists closure.

The most enduring and consequential relationship remains with Palestine. Here, there is neither peace nor stable deterrence—only recurring cycles of confrontation. The unresolved status of Palestinians continues to define Israel’s regional image and constrains its acceptance among Arab publics, regardless of evolving state-level ties.

At 78, Israel has achieved military superiority and economic resilience, yet its neighborhood tells a more restrained story. Peace exists, but without warmth. Conflict is contained, but not resolved.

The result is a strategic environment where coexistence is managed, not embraced—and where the promise of stability remains persistently fragile.

What Next? Escalation not a solution

As the fragile truce nears its end, the diplomatic space between United States and Iran appears to be narrowing rather than expanding. Signals from both sides suggest that compromise remains elusive. If Tehran refuses to accept Washington’s terms—as appears likely—the question is no longer whether tensions will rise, but how far escalation might go.

Rhetoric from Donald Trump has reinforced a posture of maximum pressure, where the implicit belief is that overwhelming force can compel compliance. Yet history offers a more sobering lesson: coercion against resilient states rarely produces submission. Instead, it hardens positions and invites asymmetric responses.

Iran’s strategic doctrine is built precisely for such scenarios. Without matching conventional military strength, it retains the capacity to disrupt through missile reach, proxy networks, and its geographic proximity to critical energy corridors. Even a limited confrontation could unsettle the Gulf, placing key oil infrastructure at risk and sending shockwaves through global markets. In such a scenario, the very objective often attributed to US strategy—securing long-term influence over energy flows—would be undermined by instability and destruction.

The risks are not confined to the immediate theatre. Escalation in the Gulf increases the probability of miscalculation, where unintended actors or incidents widen the conflict. Not every escalation becomes global, but the absence of clear off-ramps makes containment far more difficult once hostilities resume.

This is the central contradiction - a strategy designed to enforce compliance may instead erode control. Military superiority does not automatically translate into political outcomes, particularly in conflicts where the adversary’s threshold for pain is structurally higher and its response options more diffuse.

For Washington, the more effective path lies not in testing the outer limits of force, but in recognizing the limits of coercion itself.

A calibrated approach—however politically inconvenient—offers a better chance of preserving stability than a conflict whose consequences would be both immediate and enduring.

موجودہ جنگ ایران نہیں بلکہ عرب ملکوں کی معاشی تباہی کے لیۓ

 گزشتہ سال جون میں امریکہ اوراسرائیل نے جب ایران پر ایک ساتھ حملہ کیا تو ویسٹرن میڈیا نے تاثردیا کہ یہ حملے ایران کے ایٹمی اورمیزائیل پروگرامز کو نقصان پہنچانے کے لیۓ تھے۔

 اس سال فروری میں ان دونوں ملکوں نے دوبارہ اور زیادہ شدت سے ایران پرحملے کیۓ اور ایٹمی اورمیزائیل پروگرامز کو نقصان پہنچانے کے ساتھ رجیم چینج کا نعرہ بھی شامل کیا گیا۔

 میرے خیال میں یہ غلط بیانی تھی، اصل مقصد تیل پیدا کرنے والے عرب ممالک کی معیشت کو تباہ کرنا ہے۔ ممکن ہے آپ میں سے بہت سے پڑھنے والے میرے موقف سے اختلاف کریں، لیکن میری ان سے گزارش ہے کہ ان چند لائنوں کوپڑھیں اور ٹھنڈے دل سے غور کریں:

آبناۓ ھورمزکی بندش کے بعد یہ بات کی کسی حد تک تصدیق ہوگئی۔ یہ خبریں بھی آگئیں کہ اب تک عرب ممالک کا 500 ملین بیرل کروڈ آئل ایکسپورٹ نہیں ہو سکا۔

جنگ کے دوران یہ تاثر دیا گیا کہ ایرانی حملوں کی وجہ سے عرب ملکوں کی تیل اور دوسری اہم تنصیبات کو نقصان پہنچاہے۔ کچھ تجزیہ کاروں کا یہ خیال ہے کہ یہ تباہی اسرائیلی حملوں کی وجہ سے ہوئ ہے، ایرانی حملوں کی وجہ سے نہیں۔

اب تو یہاں تک کہا جارہا ہے کہ عرب ملکوں میں امریکی اڈے مقامی آبادی کو بطور ہیومن شیلڈ استعمال کررہے ہیں اور یہ اڈے عرب ممالک نہیں بلکہ اسرائیل کی حفاظت کےلیۓہیں۔

مسلمانوں کی لیۓ ضروری ہے کہ اپنے اصل دشمن کو پہچھانیں۔

Merciless Use of Power: US-Israel War Doctrine

The language of security and deterrence is increasingly being tested against a stark and visible reality - widespread destruction, mounting civilian casualties, and deepening global economic strain. The ongoing conflicts in Gaza and Iran suggest that the use of power is no longer calibrated—it is being exercised with a level of intensity that raises fundamental questions about restraint.

Gaza today is emblematic of this shift. Entire neighborhoods lie in ruins. Critical infrastructure—schools, hospitals, water and electricity systems—has been devastated. Casualty estimates run into the tens of thousands, with women and children disproportionately affected. For survivors, the crisis persists in the form of displacement, hunger, and a fragile humanitarian environment that shows little sign of recovery.

This scale of destruction challenges the notion that civilian harm is incidental. Instead, it points to a pattern where overwhelming force becomes central to achieving strategic objectives.

The role of the United States in this dynamic is pivotal. Beyond diplomatic backing, Washington’s material and political support has enabled the continuation of military operations whose humanitarian consequences are globally visible. This alignment raises difficult questions about whether strategic partnerships are overriding considerations of proportionality and civilian protection.

Since February 28, 2026, the expansion of conflict into Iran has reinforced these concerns. Thousands of air strikes carried out by the United States and Israel mark a significant escalation. While framed within the context of security, the scale and persistence of these operations suggest a broader objective—one that risks pushing the region toward prolonged instability and humanitarian distress.

Ceasefire negotiations, though ongoing, have yet to inspire confidence. Previous patterns indicate that such pauses often serve as tactical interludes rather than genuine turning points. The concern is that they provide space not for resolution, but for regrouping before renewed and potentially more intense confrontation.

Compounding the crisis is the growing focus on the Strait of Hormuz. Any disruption to this critical energy corridor carries global consequences. Volatility in oil and gas prices has already translated into inflationary pressures, supply chain disruptions, and economic uncertainty far beyond the Middle East. For developing economies, this is not a distant geopolitical issue but an immediate and tangible burden.

What emerges is a troubling convergence - the normalization of large-scale military force in conflict zones and the externalization of its economic costs to the rest of the world.

At some point, the debate moves beyond intent. When outcomes repeatedly include devastated civilian infrastructure, mass suffering, and global economic strain, the nature of the strategy itself comes under scrutiny. The question is no longer whether power is being used—but how, and at what cost.

PSX benchmark index up 4.0%WoW

Pakistan Stock Exchange (PSX) remained positive during this past week ended on Friday April 17, 2026, supported by easing geopolitical tensions and softer oil prices. The benchmark Index surged by 6,748 points or 4.0%WoW to close at 173,939. Average daily trading increased to 1,264 million shares, from 918 million shares during the earlier week, up 37.6%WoW.

One of the key boosters of investors’ sentiments was an inflow of US$2.0 billion from Saudi Arabia, with an aggregate committed support of US$8.0 billion, including a rollover of US$5.0 billion.

Sentiments improved following the Prime Minister’s announcement of reduction in prices of motor spirit and high speed diesel.

Confidence was further supported by Pakistan’s role in in ceasefire in a US-Iran war on optimism around a second round of talks to take place in Islamabad.

Fertilizer and Autos remained in focus. Urea offtake increased by 86%YoY to 569,000 tons in March 2026, while DAP, CAN, and NP sales also surged.

Auto sales rose to 19,100 units in March 2026, up 46%YoY, primarily driven by strong tractor sales.

Pakistan posted a current account surplus of US$1.07 billion in March 2026, marking the third consecutive surplus.

Another important feature was reduction in T-Bills yield.

UBL’s higher than expected earnings for the first quarter supported the momentum.

Leather & Tanneries, Textile Weaving, and Vanaspati & Allied Industries emerged as top performing sectors, while, Woollen and Tobacco were the laggards.

Major buying was recorded by Individuals and Companies with a net buy of US$10.7 million and US$10.5 million. Banks and Insurance companies emerged as major seller with a net sell of US$22.1 million and US$9.6 million respectively.

Top performing scrips of the week were: GAL, GHNI, LOTCHEM, BOP, and SRVI, while laggards included: PTC, FATIMA, ATRL, MEBL, and BNWM.

 According to AKD Securities, going forward, upcoming negotiations in Islamabad on US-Iran war would remain a key focus for investors. Any positive development would likely keep the market robust.

Despite the recent recovery, market continues to trade at attractive valuations.

According to the brokerage house the benchmark index is expected to reach 263,800.

Top picks of the brokerage house include: OGDC, PPL, UBL, MEBL, HBL, FFC, ENGROH, PSO, LUCK, FCCL, INDU, ILP and SYS.

Chinese Deployment in South China Sea

According to media reports, China has deployed vessels and installed floating barriers at the entrance to the South China Sea, where it is engaged in a maritime territorial dispute with the Philippines. This move comes as the United States, which is at war with Iran, has positioned three aircraft carriers in the Middle East and withdrawn military assets and personnel from the Indo-Pacific region. In the past, when US carriers left the area, Beijing often tested the level of external pressure against it through various channels.

According to reports vessels presumed to be Chinese Navy or Coast Guard patrol ships, fishing boats, and floating barriers crossing the reef were detected near the Scarborough Shoal lately. The Scarborough Shoal is one of the most fiercely contested maritime territories in the Indo-Pacific, where Chinese Coast Guard ships frequently ram and spray water cannons at Philippine maritime patrol vessels.

In 2023, China had installed floating barriers in the waters around the Scarborough Shoal to block Philippine fishing boats, leading to a conflict when Philippine Coast Guard divers were dispatched to remove them.

China claims sovereignty over most of the South China Sea under its self-defined "nine-dash line," but the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) ruled in 2016 that this claim has no basis under international law. Despite this, Beijing has continued to dispatch patrol ships to the Philippines’ exclusive economic zone (EEZ), prolonging the dispute.

The US has pressured China since 2015 by conducting "Freedom of Navigation" operations in the South China Sea. Allies and partner nations advocating for a "Free and Open Indo-Pacific" (FOIP) have also participated in these exercises. However, a significant portion of US naval forces is currently deployed near Iran and the Strait of Hormuz.

The Washington Post has reported last month that the USS George H.W. Bush, which departed from the Norfolk base in Virginia, is expected to arrive in the Middle East around the April 21, 2026. This marks the third aircraft carrier to be deployed to the region, following the USS Abraham Lincoln, previously stationed in the South China Sea, and the USS Gerald R. Ford, which was deployed in the Caribbean Sea.

Additionally, part of the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system, a key component in South Korea’s defense against North Korean nuclear and missile threats, has been withdrawn, and the 31st Marine Expeditionary Unit, typically the first to respond to contingencies on the Korean Peninsula, has been redeployed from Japan to the Middle East.

 

Washington’s Strategic Ambiguity

The ongoing confrontation between the United States and Iran has raised a fundamental question: what justifies a war that reportedly consumes over a billion dollars a day while its objectives remain unclear? From the outset, the rationale has been fluid. Concerns over Iran’s nuclear ambitions, the need to degrade its missile capabilities, and broader ambitions of strategic dominance were all cited. Yet, none evolved into a clearly defined end-state. As the conflict progressed, these shifting justifications exposed a deeper problem—not just of policy, but of purpose.

Wars, particularly those financed by taxpayers, demand clarity. They require defined goals, measurable outcomes, and a realistic timeline. In this case, none appear firmly in place. Instead, what has emerged resembles a pattern seen in past conflicts: initial confidence giving way to strategic drift. The absence of a publicly articulated exit strategy suggests that the war was not designed with an end, but rather escalated in response to unfolding events.

Equally troubling is the economic dimension. At a time when millions within the United States face challenges in healthcare, education, and infrastructure, the allocation of vast financial resources to an open-ended conflict raises serious ethical and economic concerns. Public funds—collected with the promise of improving citizens’ lives—are being redirected into a war whose tangible benefits remain difficult to quantify.

The disruption of global oil flows and the broader economic fallout have further complicated the equation. If the objective was stability, the outcome appears to be the opposite. If it was deterrence, the persistence of tensions suggests limited success. In purely economic terms, the cost-benefit balance appears heavily skewed toward cost.

This is not merely a question of foreign policy; it is a question of accountability. Democracies derive legitimacy from the consent of their citizens, and that consent is strained when public resources are committed without transparent justification.

A ceasefire may pause the fighting, but it does not answer the central question: what was achieved, and at what cost? Until that question is convincingly addressed, this war risks being remembered not for its outcomes, but for its ambiguity—and for the taxpayers who ultimately paid the price.

Who Drives Washington’s War Decisions?

The decision by the United States Senate to reject resolutions aimed at halting arms sales to Israel has once again exposed the ever-present crisis in American policymaking - the gap between formal representation and the deeper forces that shape outcomes.

Elected officials in the United States are, without question, representatives of their citizens. Yet, modern governance operates within a dense web of lobbying, campaign financing, and strategic alliances that complicate this relationship.

To suggest that lawmakers are directly controlled by any foreign state would be an overreach. However, it is equally difficult to ignore the institutional weight of pro-Israel lobbying, long-standing security cooperation, and the domestic political incentives that reinforce this alignment.

Beyond this specific case lies a broader structural reality. Washington’s policy environment is influenced by a convergence of powerful sectors whose interests often align with sustained geopolitical tension.

The military-industrial complex—first cautioned against by Dwight D. Eisenhower—continues to benefit from robust defense spending and arms exports.

Energy companies operate in markets where instability can tighten supply dynamics and elevate prices.

Major media platforms, while diverse, play a critical role in framing conflicts and shaping public sentiment.

Meanwhile, financial institutions centered around Wall Street respond to—and often capitalize on—volatility and capital shifts triggered by global crises.

This is not a story of conspiracy, but of incentives. These sectors do not uniformly seek conflict; rather, they are positioned to benefit when instability arises. Policymakers, functioning within this ecosystem, may not act at the behest of these actors, but their decisions are rarely insulated from such pressures.

Crucially, US support for Israel is also anchored in strategic and ideological considerations—shared security objectives, regional calculations, and a deeply embedded bipartisan consensus. Ignoring this dimension oversimplifies a complex policy posture.

The Senate’s vote, therefore, reflects more than a single policy choice. It underscores how democratic representation coexists with layered influences—economic, strategic, and political.

The real question is not whether American lawmakers represent their people, but whether the system ensures that public interest remains the dominant force amid competing pressures.

American LNG Exporters Biggest Winner

The ongoing US-Israel war on Iran is reshaping more than regional geopolitics—it is quietly redrawing global energy markets. At the center of this shift are US liquefied natural gas (LNG) exporters, emerging as the biggest beneficiaries of the crisis.

The Strait of Hormuz, a vital artery for global energy flows, remains under severe strain amid heightened tensions and a US naval blockade on Iranian ports. At the same time, Qatar—responsible for nearly a fifth of global LNG supply—has seen its export capacity hit by attacks. Repairs could take months, while full restoration may take years.

This twin disruption has created a global gas shortage. With Qatar largely sidelined, buyers in Asia and Europe are scrambling for alternatives. The United States, already the world’s largest LNG exporter, has stepped in to fill the gap.

American LNG producers are capitalizing on a rare pricing advantage. Natural gas sourced domestically at around US$3/ MMBtu is being sold internationally at prices close to US$20/ MMBtu. Such margins are generating extraordinary cash flows, strengthening balance sheets, and accelerating expansion plans.

The market response has been swift. American LNG companies are raising financing, expanding export terminals, and recording gains in stock valuations. With capacity expected to grow significantly over the next five years, the current crisis is not just a short-term windfall—it is reinforcing America’s long-term position in global energy markets.

Yet, there are limits to this advantage. Persistently high LNG prices risk pushing developing economies toward cheaper alternatives such as coal or renewables. Countries like Pakistan have already reduced LNG imports in favor of solar and battery solutions, a trend that could widen if prices remain elevated.

The conclusion is clear. The disruption of Gulf energy supplies has created a vacuum—and American LNG exporters are filling it with remarkable speed and profitability. In a conflict defined by uncertainty, America’s LNG industry stands out as a decisive economic winner.

China slams US blockade of Iranian ports

China has slammed the US blockade of Iranian ports as dangerous and irresponsible, calling for an immediate and full ceasefire and for the Strait of Hormuz to be reopened.

Foreign ministry spokesman Guo Jiakun told reporters at a daily briefing in Beijing on Tuesday that the US action would only “inflame tensions, escalate the situation and undermine an already fragile ceasefire”, and that would further jeopardize the safety of navigation in the strait.

“We urge all parties to abide by the ceasefire arrangement, focus on the broader direction of dialogue and negotiations, take concrete actions to de-escalate the regional situation and restore normal navigation in the strait at an early date,” Guo said.

He added that the situation in the region was “at a critical stage” and said China would continue to work with the international community to promote peace talks and to strive for peace and stability in the Middle East.

The US began a naval blockade of Iranian ports on Monday after its marathon peace talks with Iran in Pakistan to reopen the Strait of Hormuz failed over the weekend.

The US Central Command on Monday issued a formal notice to seafarers outlining enforcement measures in waters around the strait, saying that not all maritime traffic would be halted. The blockade “will not impede neutral transit passage through the Strait of Hormuz to or from non-Iranian destinations”, it said.

Iran has warned of retaliation, vowing that “no port in the Persian Gulf and the Gulf of Oman will be safe”.

 

Emerging Cracks in US-Qatar Relations

The relationship between Qatar and the United States has long rested on a strategic bargain—energy security for military protection. Yet recent developments, even if contested, are beginning to test this understanding.

Speculation surrounding missile strikes that allegedly disrupted part of Qatar’s LNG capacity has created unease in Doha. While the scale and attribution remain unclear, the psychological impact is significant. For a country hosting Al Udeid Air Base, the largest American military installation in the region, security assurances are not optional—they are central.

What appears to have unsettled Qatari policymakers is less the incident itself and more the perceived absence of response. In a region where deterrence depends on visibility, the lack of any clear interception effort raises difficult questions about capability and intent.

The complexity deepens with Iran denying responsibility. This has fueled alternative narratives, including speculation of covert involvement by Israel. While unverified, such claims reflect a broader erosion of clarity in regional conflicts.

For Qatar, the implications are serious. As a leading LNG exporter, even perceived vulnerability can disrupt market confidence and long-term planning. More critically, it prompts a reassessment of its security dependence.

For the United States, the stakes extend beyond Qatar. Its regional credibility hinges on the confidence of its allies. If partners begin to question its willingness or ability to defend critical assets, Washington’s broader Middle East posture could weaken.

This is not a rupture—but it may signal recalibration. Qatar could quietly diversify its security options while strengthening its own defenses. The United States, in turn, may need to reinforce not just its presence, but its reliability.

In geopolitics, perception often shapes reality. The cracks may not yet be visible—but they are no longer dismissible.

ڈونلڈ ٹرمپ کا آبنائے ہرمز کی ناکابندی کا اعلان

امریکہ اور ایران کے درمیان وقتی جنگ بندی ایک نئے دور میں داخل ہوتی دکھائی دے رہی ہے۔ ناکام مذاکرات کے بعد، امریکی فوج نے ایرانی بندرگاہوں اور ساحلی علاقوں میں داخل ہونے اور جانے والی تمام سمندری ٹریفک کو نشانہ بناتے ہوئے ایک وسیع بحری ناکہ بندی کا اعلان کیا ہے۔

امریکی سینٹرل کمانڈ کے مطابق، یہ ناکہ بندی تمام اہم بندرگاہوں سمیت ایرانی پانیوں میں کام کرنے والے تمام ممالک کے جہازوں کے خلاف یکساں طور پر نافذ کی جائے گی۔ تاہم، آبنائے ہرمز سے غیر ایرانی مقامات تک جانے والے بحری جہازوں کو روکا نہیں جائے گا، جس سے عالمی تجارتی راستوں میں رکاوٹ کو محدود کرنے کی کوشش کی تجویز ہے۔

ڈونالڈ ٹرمپ کے تبصروں سے اس کشیدگی کو مزید واضح کیا گیا تھا، جس نے خبردار کیا تھا کہ امریکی افواج بین الاقوامی پانیوں میں کسی بھی بحری جہاز کو روکیں گی جو ایران کو ٹول ادا کرتا ہے۔

انہوں نے اعلان کیا کہ ایسے جہاز محفوظ راستے سے محروم ہو جائیں گے۔ ساتھ ہی ساتھ کسی بھی ایرانی جارحیت کے خلاف زبردست جوابی کارروائی کی دھمکی بھی دی۔

 ٹرمپ نے اس بات کی بھی تصدیق کی کہ امریکی بحریہ مبینہ طور پر آبنائے ہرمز میں ایران کی طرف سے نصب کی گئی بارودی سرنگوں کو صاف کرنا شروع کر دے گی جو کہ ایک اہم راستہ ہے جہاں سے دنیا کی توانائی کی سپلائی کا تقریباً پانچواں حصہ گزرتا ہے۔

تہران کا ردعمل بھی اتنا ہی سخت ہے۔ پاسداران انقلاب اسلامی نے خبردار کیا ہے کہ آبنائے کے قریب کسی بھی غیر ملکی فوجی کی موجودگی جنگ بندی کی خلاف ورزی ہوگی اور اس کا فیصلہ کن طاقت سے مقابلہ کیا جائے گا۔ دونوں فریقوں کی جانب سے اپنی پوزیشنوں کو سخت کرنے کے ساتھ، اب وسیع تر اور ممکنہ طور پر بے قابو ہونے کا خطرہ بڑھ گیا ہے۔

عرب ممالک امریکہ کو ایران سے جنگ بندی پر راضی کریں

ایران اور امریکہ کے درمیان اسلام آباد میں ہونے والے مذاکرات بغیرکسی نتیجہ کے ختم ہوگۓ اور دونوں ملکوں کے نمائندے اپنے اپنے وطن واپس چلے گۓ۔ یہ کوئ حیرت یا مایوسی کی بات نہیں بلکہ متوقع نتیجہ ہے۔

مجھے یہ کہنے کی اجازت دیں کی امریکہ ایران سے اپنی شرائط پر جنگ بندی کا معاہدہ کروانا چاہتا تھا جو صرف اس کا وہم تھا۔ وہ آخری وقت تک ایران کی کوئ شرط ماننے کے لیۓ تیار نہیں تھا۔

امریکہ آج بھی یہ بات ماننے کے لیۓ تیار نہیں کہ اس کی پوزیشن اس وقت کمزور ہے اور وہ اپنی شرائط پر کوئ معاہدہ نہیں کرسکتا اور اس کو ایران کی کچھ شرائط ماننا پڑیں گی۔ امریکی حکام کو یہ بھی یاد رکھنا چاہیۓ کہ ان کو آخری وقت میں افغانستان سے کس کسماپرسی میں بھاگنا پڑاتھا۔

ایران سے اس جنگ میں امریکہ اکیلا ہے اور ا س کے ماضی کی اتحادی اس کا ساتھ دینے کو تیار نہیں۔ حد تو یہ ہے کہ وہ عرب ممالک جہاں امریکی فوجی اڈے ہیں اب دبے لفظوں میں کوچ کا اشارہ دے رہے ہیں۔

اسرائیل نے امریکہ کو اس جنگ میں دھکیلا تھا اور وہ ایران کی مکمل شکست چاہتا ہے جو خواہش تو ہوسکتی ہے مگرقابل حصول ہدف نہیں۔

امکان تو نہیں کہ امریکہ آبناۓ ہرمز میں جہازوں کی آمدورفت بحال کرنے میں کامیاب ہوگا لیکن خطرات بڑھتے جارہے ہیں کہ اگرمڈل ایسٹ میں دوبارہ جنگ کی شعلے بھڑک اٹھے تو بربادی کے سوا کچھ نہ ملےگا اور کوئ بھی ملک محفوظ رہے گا۔

اب عرب حکمرانوں کی ذمہ داری ہے کہ وہ امریکہ کوآبناۓ ہرمز میں جہازوں کی آمدورفت بحال کرنے کے لیۓ جیو اور جینے دو کی بنیاد پر فوری طور پر راضی کریں۔ وہ یہ بھی سمجھنے کی کوشش کریں کہ ان کا تیل نہیں بک پارہا اور امریکہ اپنا تیل اور گیس مہنگے داموں بیچ رہا ہے۔

US Hegemony Under Strain in Middle East

The ongoing US–Israel confrontation with Iran offers a revealing snapshot of a shifting Middle Easternorder—one in which US supremacy, though still formidable, is no longer absolute. For decades, the United States functioned as the region’s ultimate security guarantor. Today, that position appears increasingly contested, not collapsed, but clearly under strain.

Washington’s long-standing security architecture in the Gulf—anchored in alliances with states such as Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates—was built on deterrence and protection. Yet recent developments have exposed its limitations. The extensive network of US military bases, once seen as stabilizing assets, now carries a dual risk: while projecting power, they also make host nations potential targets without guaranteeing immunity from escalation. This imbalance has quietly triggered reassessment among Arab leaderships.

More significantly, regional actors are no longer placing exclusive strategic bets on Washington. Instead, they are diversifying—engaging with China, Russia, and even recalibrating ties with Iran. This is not a rupture, but a hedge against uncertainty, reflecting diminished confidence in a single external guarantor.

The US–Israel dynamic further complicates the picture. Washington’s deep-rooted commitment to Israel, while strategic, increasingly constrains its diplomatic flexibility. Military escalations involving Iran—despite periods of active negotiation—have reinforced the perception that US policy is reactive rather than fully autonomous. This does not imply subservience, but it does highlight the narrowing space for independent maneuver.

Israel’s own trajectory underscores the limits of hard power. Despite prolonged operations in Gaza, it has struggled to convert military superiority into decisive political outcomes. Structural constraints remain evident: dependence on US military supplies and limitations in sustaining extended ground engagements. These realities complicate its aspiration to emerge as an uncontested regional power.

At the societal level, signs of fatigue within Israel are also becoming more pronounced. A prolonged state of conflict carries economic and psychological costs, raising questions about long-term sustainability. Meanwhile, the normalization of ties with Gulf economies has created new patterns of capital movement and opportunity that subtly redistribute regional economic gravity.

Iran, for its part, has proven more resilient than anticipated. Despite sustained pressure, it continues to assert itself diplomatically and militarily, ensuring that it remains central to any regional equation rather than isolated from it.

Against this backdrop, US–Iran negotiations appear inherently fragile. The persistence of parallel military escalations, coupled with deep-rooted mistrust, limits the prospects for any durable breakthrough.

The Middle East is no longer a theatre where outcomes can be dictated by a single power. What is emerging instead is a more complex, multipolar order—where American influence endures, but no longer defines the final word.

US–Iran Talks: Ceasefire or Strategic Pause?

Talks in Islamabad between the United States and Iran are being projected as a pathway to peace. In reality, this negotiation exposes a deeper contradiction - negotiations are underway, but the conditions necessary for trust remain absent. What is unfolding is less a breakthrough and more a managed pause in escalation.

At the core lies Iran’s insistence on uranium enrichment under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Legally, the framework does not prohibit civilian enrichment; politically, however, Washington treats it as non-negotiable. This divergence is not technical—it is strategic. If rights recognized under international agreements are selectively interpreted, the dispute ceases to be about compliance and becomes one of power.

Sanctions illustrate this imbalance more starkly. Years of economic restrictions have neither dismantled Iran’s nuclear capability nor altered its regional posture. What they have done is compress an entire economy, with ordinary citizens bearing the cost. If sanctions are retained as leverage while concessions are demanded upfront, the negotiation risks resembling coercion dressed as diplomacy.

The military backdrop further erodes credibility. Iran links any meaningful dialogue to a ceasefire in Lebanon, where conflict involving Hezbollah continues to inflict heavy casualties. The attempt by Washington to treat this as a separate theatre appears strategically convenient but analytically weak. Negotiations conducted in parallel with active conflict rarely produce durable outcomes.

Then comes the Strait of Hormuz—arguably the most consequential fault line. Iran’s proposal to assert control and impose transit tolls challenges long-standing norms of open navigation. For the US, unrestricted access is essential not just for energy flows but for sustaining its global strategic posture. This is not a peripheral dispute; it is a contest over who defines the rules of the region.

Missile capabilities and military presence complete the deadlock. Tehran views its arsenal as a deterrent necessity; Washington sees it as a destabilizing threat. Iran demands withdrawal of US forces; the US insists on maintaining them until compliance is secured. These positions are not negotiating gaps—they are opposing doctrines.

The uncomfortable conclusion is - unless both the United States and Israel move beyond maximalist frameworks, they risk reinforcing the perception that the objective is not behavioral change, but sustained strategic containment of Iran. If that perception hardens, demands for compensation, sovereignty, and security guarantees will only intensify.

مسلمانوں کو جاننا ضروری ہے امریکہ ایران کو کیوں تباہ کرنا چاہتا ہے؟

ایران میں اسلامی انقلاب کے بعد امریکہ اس کا سب سے بڑا دشمن بن کر سامنے آیا ہے۔ ایران پرلگ بھگ نصف صدی سے اقتصادی پابندیاں عائد ہیں۔ امریکہ اسرائیل کی مدد سے اس کےایٹمی سائنسدان اورملٹری اہلکار قتل کرچکا ہے اور حال ہی میں ایران کی اہم ترین ہستی کو شہید کیا گیا ہے۔

 ماضی میں عراق سے آٹھ سال جنگ لڑوائ گئی۔ گزشتہ سال جون میں امریکہ اوراسرائیل نے ایران کی اٹامک اوردیگراہم تنصیبات پر 12 دن حملے کیۓ اور اب سات ہفتوں سے امریکہ اوراسرائیل ایران کی اہم تنصیبات تباہ کر رہے ہیں۔ مسلمانوں کو جاننا ضروری ہے کہ امریکہ ایران کو کیوں تباہ کرنا چاہتا ہے؟

لگ بھگ تین چوتھائ صدی قبل فلسطین کی زمین پرغاصابنہ قبضہ کرکےاسرائیل قائم کیا گیا، وقت کے ساتھ اس کو وسعت دی گئی اور اب گریٹر اسرائیل کے منصوبے پر عمل کیا جارہا ہے۔ اس منصوبے میں ایران سب سے بڑی رکاوٹ بن کر سامنے آیا ہے۔ کئی عرب ممالک اسرائیل کو تسلیم کرچکے ہیں اور باقیوں سے ابراہیم اکارڈز کے تحت تسلیم کروایا جارہا ہے۔

اکثرعرب ممالک ایران کی تباہی میں امریکہ اوراسرائیل کے شریک کار بن چکے ہیں اور ان ممالک میں امریکی فوجی اڈے کام کررہے ہیں۔ ان عرب ممالک کو ذہن نشین کرایا گیا کہ ایران تمھارادشمن ہے اور یہ اڈے تمھاری حفاظت کے لیۓ ہیں۔

 اس وقت امریکہ اوراسرائیل کی ایران کےخلاف جاری جنگ میں یہ بات کھل کر سامنے آگئی کہ یہ اڈے عرب مملک نہیں بلکہ اسرائیل کی حفاظت کے لیۓ ہیں اور ان مملک کے لوگوں کو بطور ہیومن شیلڈ استعمال کیا جارہاہے۔

PSX benchmark index up 11.2%WoW

Pakistan Stock Exchange (PSX) witnessed bullish momentum during the week ended on April 10, 2026, driven by Pakistan-mediated two-week ceasefire between the United States and Iran. The benchmark index surged by 16,795 points or 11.2%WoW to close at 167,191, the highest weekly gain in 47 months.

Market participation also improved significantly, with average daily traded volumes rising by 52%WoW to 918 million shares.

This breakthrough is set to be followed by further round of negotiations in Islamabad over the weekend, aimed at reaching long-term peace solution.

The aforementioned diplomatic development led to a broad-based correction in international oil prices, which declined below the US$100/ bbl mark after 28-day streak with Arab Light prices declining by 13%WoW to US$97.6/ bbl.

Pakistan-Afghanistan peace talks, mediated by China, concluded with both sides agreeing to explore comprehensive solutions.

Remittance for March 2026 were reported at US$3.8 billion, down 6%YoY, but up 17%MoM, taking total for 9MFY26 to US$30.3 billion, up 8%YoY.

The GoP external debt declined by 1% FYTD to PKR23,203 billion as of end February 2026.

Foreign exchange reserves held by State Bank of Pakistan (SBP) increased to US$16.4 billion as of Apr 04, 2026.

Other major news flow during the week included: 1) IMF expects to provide vulnerable economies hit by Middle East war up to US$50 billion, 2) Prime Minister pushes currency swap deals, 3) Banking deposits increased by 20%YoY to PKR37 trillion be end February 2026, 4) Pakistan repays US$1.43 billion Eurobond in external debt, 5) World Bank cuts Pakistan’s GDP forecast to 3%, and 6) IMF to dispatch mission to Pakistan for budget for FY27 consultation next month.

Cement, Engineering, and Textile emerged as top performing sectors, while Leasing and Real Estate Investment Trust emerged laggards.

Major buying was recorded by Mutual Funds with a net buy of US$53.8 million. Banks and Insurance remained seller with a net sell of US$28.9 million and US$11.8 million.

Top performing scrips were: GAL, KTML, MLCF, DGKC, and FCCL, while laggards included: PGLC, NESTLE, and DCR.

Going forward, upcoming negotiations in Islamabad would remain a key focus for investors, with any positive developments likely to drive further market recovery; particularly given the improved diplomatic positioning of Pakistan.

According to AKD Securities, despite the recent recovery, market continues to trade at attractive valuations.

Top picks of the brokerage house include: OGDC, PPL, UBL, MEBL, HBL, FFC, ENGROH, PSO, LUCK, FCCL, INDU, ILP and SYS.

Trump Impeachment: Outrage is abundant, votes are not

The growing chorus in Washington demanding the removal of Donald Trump reflects outrage—but not reality. Impeachment in the United States is not a moral exercise; it is a numbers game rooted in raw political power. That is precisely why a third attempt continues to stall.

Democratic lawmakers, including Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez and Hakeem Jeffries, have framed Trump’s conduct—particularly his Iran policy—as unconstitutional and dangerously reckless. Their language is severe, invoking war crimes, constitutional violations, and a disregard for congressional authority. Yet, outrage alone cannot secure removal.

The structural barrier is clear: Congress remains divided, and the Republican Party continues to stand firmly behind Trump. Impeachment requires not just a majority in the House but a two-thirds conviction in the Senate—an insurmountable threshold without bipartisan support. Political loyalty, electoral calculations, and fear of alienating Trump’s base outweigh institutional accountability.

At the same time, the deeper question persists, ­­­­­­ who benefits? From oil giants to the military-industrial complex, from Wall Street to powerful media tycoons, the pattern is difficult to ignore—his decisions often align with entrenched power interests. This perceived alignment reinforces Democratic accusations but does little to shift Republican resolve.

Complicating matters further is the ambiguity surrounding “high crimes and misdemeanors.” Critics argue that unilateral military action violates the Constitution. Supporters counter that the president, as commander-in-chief, possesses broad authority in national security matters. This legal grey zone provides sufficient cover for allies to dismiss even serious allegations as partisan maneuvering.

The alternative route—the 25th Amendment—remains politically unrealistic, requiring an internal revolt within the administration. Instead, Democrats are turning to more viable tools like the War Powers Resolution to restrain policy rather than remove the president.

A third impeachment attempt, without the numbers, risks political self-harm—strengthening Trump’s narrative while weakening institutional credibility. In Washington, outrage is abundant. Votes are not.