Israel: Promise of Stability Remains Fragile

At 78, Israel remains a study in contrasts—secure yet unsettled, integrated yet isolated within its immediate neighborhood. Its relations with bordering states reveal a pattern shaped less by reconciliation and more by necessity.

With Egypt and Jordan, Israel has maintained durable—if cold—peace. The framework established after the Camp David Accords continues to hold, anchored in security coordination and shared concerns over militancy and border stability. These ties are transactional, not transformative, reflecting mutual restraint rather than genuine normalization.

On its northern front, the equation turns volatile. Lebanon remains locked in a cycle of tension with Israel, largely driven by the influence of Hezbollah. Deterrence has prevented full-scale war in recent years, but the absence of a political settlement ensures that the border remains one miscalculation away from escalation.

In Syria, hostility persists in a more fragmented form. Israel’s periodic strikes targeting Iranian-linked assets underscore a broader contest with Iran for regional influence. Syria’s internal disarray has limited direct confrontation but has also entrenched a shadow conflict that resists closure.

The most enduring and consequential relationship remains with Palestine. Here, there is neither peace nor stable deterrence—only recurring cycles of confrontation. The unresolved status of Palestinians continues to define Israel’s regional image and constrains its acceptance among Arab publics, regardless of evolving state-level ties.

At 78, Israel has achieved military superiority and economic resilience, yet its neighborhood tells a more restrained story. Peace exists, but without warmth. Conflict is contained, but not resolved.

The result is a strategic environment where coexistence is managed, not embraced—and where the promise of stability remains persistently fragile.

Biden Middle East Policy: Need to disentangle United States from Iran-Saudi Arabia rivalry

The Biden administration will face a number of challenges in the Middle East over the next four years. The diplomatic landscape of the region offers the United States ample opportunities to offer peace initiatives. 

Some have been successful and enduring, like the 1978 Camp David Accords between Egypt and Israel. There have also been many more notable failed attempts, such as the stalled talks between Israelis and Palestinians during the Obama administration.

Diplomacy does not have to be big and bold to be successful. The Biden administration has an opportunity to stabilize the Middle East by disentangling from the regional rivalry between Iran and Saudi Arabia. This has the prospects of reducing the temperature of relations between these two regional rivals and possibly even prompting them to settle some of their differences on behalf of regional stability.

One may like it or not, the United States has become party to the rivalry between Iran and Saudi Arabia. Of course there are profound issues related to wars in Syria and Yemen and instability in Iraq and Lebanon that separate them. But much of the enmity they harbor for each other relates in no small way to Washington. Iran sees Saudi Arabia (and Israel) as the tip of the spear of US efforts to undermine it. Iran sponsored attacks on Saudi oil facilities in 2019 after Washington’s maximum pressure campaign is prima facie evidence of this.

Saudi Arabia has felt little incentive to even entertain diplomacy with Iran given the large US military footprint in the Persian Gulf and Trump’s hostility toward Iran. Not only is the United States a party to the Iran-Saudi rivalry, but it has hardened the resolve of both sides, driving them further away from diplomacy, with negative consequences for the entire region.

The United States lacks the capacity to persuade either of the regional rivals toward rapprochement. But Washington can play a constructive role by extricating itself from the role of central character in this conflict. This will require recalibrating relations with Saudi Arabia, supporting Riyadh but also making sure that it does not continue using Washington as a crutch for shunning diplomacy.

It also necessitates the United States working to ensure that the Abraham Accords between Israel and the UAE are used as a bridge for building further regional cooperation and not merely as a cudgel for deepening hostilities to Iran. And it will necessitate the United States moving toward a diplomatic track with Iran, starting with rejoining the 2015 nuclear deal, on the condition that Tehran reverts to compliance.

The US will need to use leverage to move a stubborn Iran into a more constructive regional role, but skillful diplomacy can deprive Iranian leaders of the narrative that their regional adventurism is a necessary defensive crouch for deterring a hostile Washington.

Disentangling the United States from the regional rivalry between Iran and Saudi Arabia won’t ensure peace between the two regional powers. But it can force Iran and Saudi Arabia to deal with each other on their own terms, and not hide behind relations with Washington.

If successful in cooling the temperature of relations between these two powers, it can also possibly have other benefits, such as sucking some of the oxygen out of the proxy conflict dimension of the civil wars roiling Syria and Yemen and helping stabilize Lebanon and Iraq.

While the United States can’t start a peace process between Iran and Saudi Arabia, peace should be the objective of the US diplomacy. Rebalancing relations with friends and foes would go a long way toward this objective. Steady resolve rather than bold diplomacy might be just what the region needs from Washington right now.