Ceasefire Diplomacy or Managed Conflict?

Every morning brings fresh reports suggesting that the United States and Iran are inching closer to a ceasefire understanding. Yet, by evening, contradictory statements emerge, once again clouding the picture with uncertainty and strategic ambiguity. The pattern has now become too repetitive to ignore. It increasingly appears that both Washington and Tehran are buying time rather than genuinely pursuing peace, while carefully concealing their actual strategic objectives.

The initial justification for the US-Israel military campaign against Iran centered on Tehran’s refusal to accept Washington’s conditions regarding its nuclear and missile programs. However, the conflict narrative now appears to be evolving. The focus increasingly seems linked to reshaping the political architecture of the Middle East through expansion of the Abraham Accords, effectively compelling key Muslim countries, including Saudi Arabia, toward formal recognition of Israel.

Simultaneously, the continued tension surrounding the Strait of Hormuz raises another critical question. Despite repeated calls for de-escalation, there appears to be little urgency in Washington to fully restore normal maritime stability in the region.

Such instability serves multiple strategic purposes for the United States. It constrains oil exports from Gulf producers, complicates China’s energy security calculations, and strengthens Washington’s leverage in global energy markets by enhancing demand for American oil and gas supplies.

The domestic political environment inside the United States also adds another dimension. Repeated but unsuccessful attempts to politically weaken or impeach Donald Trump suggest that influential power centers may still consider him indispensable in managing an increasingly volatile geopolitical environment. His aggressive foreign policy posture, particularly towards Iran and the broader Middle East, continues to align with powerful strategic interests within Washington.

Taken together, these developments indicate that the current crisis may not be moving toward immediate resolution. Instead, the world may be witnessing the management of a prolonged controlled confrontation designed to gradually exhaust Iran economically, diplomatically, and militarily until Tehran is pushed toward accepting terms that resemble unconditional surrender. Until then, ambiguity itself may remain the most effective weapon in this conflict.

Oman: Next Phase of Washington’s Strategy

After failing to secure a decisive strategic victory against Iran despite months of escalation and military pressure, Washington appears determined to restore its geopolitical credibility elsewhere in the Gulf. In this evolving power contest, Oman may increasingly find itself exposed to external pressure disguised as regional “security management.”

For decades, Oman has maintained a delicate diplomatic balance. Unlike many regional actors, Muscat preferred mediation over confrontation and dialogue over military adventurism. Yet geography has transformed the Sultanate into one of the most strategically valuable locations in the region.

The Port of Duqm and surrounding naval infrastructure are dangerously close to the Strait of Hormuz — the world’s most critical oil transit corridor. At the same time, the location places Oman within immediate strategic proximity of Iran’s Chabahar Port and Pakistan’s Gwadar Port, two emerging nodes in regional trade and connectivity. This triangle alone explains why global powers increasingly view Oman not merely as a Gulf state, but as a geopolitical gateway.

Washington’s expanding military footprint across the Gulf is often presented as a mechanism for maintaining stability and protecting maritime trade. However, history suggests that foreign military presence rarely remains temporary. Strategic access gradually evolves into political leverage, while security dependency slowly weakens national sovereignty.

Donald Trump’s confrontational posture toward Iran reflects more than ideological hostility. It also represents an attempt to demonstrate American dominance after Tehran resisted enormous economic sanctions, diplomatic isolation, and military intimidation. Direct confrontation with Iran carries enormous risks, but smaller Gulf states may appear easier arenas where Washington can project strength without triggering full-scale regional war.

This should concern every Arab emirate. The Gulf monarchies must recognize that fragmented security policies only increase dependence on outside powers. No state, regardless of wealth, can indefinitely preserve sovereignty while outsourcing its strategic defense architecture to foreign military forces.

Today the pressure may revolve around Oman and the Strait of Hormuz. Tomorrow the same logic could be applied elsewhere in the Gulf under another security pretext.

The lesson is becoming impossible to ignore - Arab states must either develop a collective regional security framework based on mutual defense and strategic independence, or continue watching external powers shape the future of the Gulf according to their own geopolitical interests.

Pushing Iran to Edge a Dangerous Gamble

The recent US strikes on Iran during Eid ul Adha have intensified a growing perception across the Muslim world that Washington is no longer merely seeking deterrence, but is steadily pushing Tehran toward a position where unconditional surrender becomes the only acceptable outcome. Rightly or wrongly, this perception is gaining traction because of the open and silent backing extended by several regional allies, particularly some Arab states that view Iran primarily through the lens of strategic rivalry.

However, history shows that when powerful nations attempt to corner adversaries without offering a credible political exit, the consequences often become unpredictable and dangerous. States under extreme pressure rarely capitulate quietly. More often, they resort to asymmetric retaliation before losing the capability to respond altogether.

Iran’s leadership is fully aware that its strategic infrastructure, military facilities, energy assets, and regional influence networks remain under increasing pressure. If Tehran reaches the conclusion that its long-term survival is at stake, it may decide that escalation carries fewer risks than submission. That is the point where the entire region could enter a far more dangerous phase.

The uncomfortable reality is that the United States, because of geography, may remain relatively insulated from direct retaliation. The immediate exposure instead lies with neighboring Gulf countries hosting American military bases, intelligence facilities, naval deployments, and logistical infrastructure. In any expanded confrontation, these locations could rapidly transform into frontline targets.

Such a development would not only threaten regional security but could also severely disrupt global energy markets, maritime trade routes, and already fragile economies across the Middle East. Investors, energy importers, and governments around the world would all pay the price for a conflict that may initially appear limited but could spiral beyond control.

This is reason the present trajectory demands urgent diplomatic intervention rather than continued escalation. Strategic pressure may weaken an adversary temporarily, but humiliation-driven conflict rarely produces lasting stability. The Middle East has already witnessed enough wars born from miscalculation, proxy rivalries, and excessive military confidence.

The world must recognize the danger before events move beyond diplomacy. Pushing Iran to the edge may not produce surrender; it may instead trigger a retaliatory spiral whose consequences no regional actor can fully contain.

Trump’s Mirage of Iranian Surrender

The recent US military strikes in southern Iran—executed precisely as Iranian diplomats converged on Doha for peace talks—expose a calculated strategy that goes far beyond traditional non-proliferation.

While Washington publicly frames its objectives around Iran’s nuclear stockpile and the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz, the true epicenter of American foreign policy has shifted.

Under the current US administration, the conflict is no longer just about disarming Tehran; it is about leveraging military pressure to enforce a fundamental geopolitical restructuring of the Middle East.

This strategy became clear when President Donald Trump explicitly linked an Iranian ceasefire to a "mandatory" expansion of the Abraham Accords. By demanding that heavyweight Muslim nations like Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and Turkey immediately normalize ties with Israel, Washington is using the Gaza and Iran conflicts as diplomatic leverage. The underlying ambition is not a balanced regional equilibrium, but rather the creation of a US-backed, Israel-centric architecture that permanently sidelines Palestinian statehood and curtails sovereign dissent.

The "Great Deal" being offered to Tehran begins to resemble a demand for unconditional surrender. By weaponizing sanctions, frozen funds, and periodic airstrikes, the US is signaling that any relief for Iran is contingent on its capitulation to a new regional order.

However, attempting to fuse an Iran peace deal with a mandatory expansion of the Abraham Accords is a dangerous gamble. As regional analysts note, trading the fantasy of total Iranian capitulation for the illusion that a fragile ceasefire can anchor a brand-new Middle East order is highly unstable. Regional powers like Pakistan have already signaled that these issues cannot be artificially interlinked.

If Washington continues to condition maritime security and nuclear diplomacy on an ideological restructuring of the Muslim world, it will achieve neither peace nor stability. Instead of a "Great Deal," this heavy-handed approach risks collapsing ongoing diplomacy, leaving behind a more volatile, fractured, and deeply polarized Middle East.

MBS Silence and Strategic Pressure

The unusually restrained posture of Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MBS) during the ongoing US-Israel war on Iran reflects a deeper geopolitical shift unfolding across the Middle East. For decades, Washington’s regional strategy relied heavily on portraying Iran as the principal threat to Arab security. However, the China-brokered rapprochement between Saudi Arabia and Iran weakened that narrative and signaled growing strategic independence within the Gulf.

Equally significant is Riyadh’s continued reluctance to join the Abraham Accords despite persistent pressure from the United States. Several Gulf states now appear increasingly cautious about unconditional alignment with Washington’s regional priorities.

Against this backdrop, the renewed legal attention to the Jamal Khashoggi case in France carries significance beyond the human rights dimension alone. A French anti-terrorism judge has been tasked with investigating allegations linked to Khashoggi’s killing inside the Saudi consulate in Istanbul in 2018 — years after Turkey transferred proceedings to Saudi authorities and the United States effectively closed related civil litigation by granting immunity protections to MBS.

There is no evidence of direct political coordination behind the French inquiry. Yet, in geopolitics, timing often shapes perception as much as facts themselves. The reopening of a dormant controversy at a moment of visible divergence between Washington and Riyadh inevitably invites broader strategic interpretation.

Whether the renewed focus on Khashoggi is purely judicial or partly geopolitical may become clearer in the months ahead, particularly if tensions between the United States and Saudi Arabia continue to widen.

UAE and Fractured Middle East

Since endorsing the Abraham Accords, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) has recast itself as a forward-looking state prioritizing economic opportunity over ideological rigidity. Normalization with Israel opened avenues in trade, technology, and finance, but it also stirred unease across sections of the Muslim world, where the move is still viewed as a departure from collective positioning on Palestine.

The discomfort is not merely rhetorical. Within parts of the Arab region, policy circles continue to debate whether such outreach weakens negotiating leverage on longstanding geopolitical disputes. Even in the United States—a principal architect of the accords—analysts have quietly flagged the risks of accelerated realignments that outpace regional stability.

Dubai’s rise as a global financial hub adds complexity to this equation. Increased capital flows, including those linked to Israeli networks, have energized its economy, but they also expose it to heightened scrutiny in an era of sanctions enforcement and financial transparency. Longstanding discussions in compliance circles about the emirate’s role in facilitating trade with Iran further underscore the delicate balance it must maintain.

Recent regional tensions have brought these vulnerabilities into sharper focus. Reports of attacks targeting strategic assets in Dubai—amid conflicting narratives about their origin—highlight a critical reality, economic hubs cannot remain insulated from geopolitical rivalries.

The UAE’s strategy reflects ambition and pragmatism, but also risk. In a region where alliances shift rapidly, economic integration without parallel security insulation may prove a fragile proposition.

Israel: Promise of Stability Remains Fragile

At 78, Israel remains a study in contrasts—secure yet unsettled, integrated yet isolated within its immediate neighborhood. Its relations with bordering states reveal a pattern shaped less by reconciliation and more by necessity.

With Egypt and Jordan, Israel has maintained durable—if cold—peace. The framework established after the Camp David Accords continues to hold, anchored in security coordination and shared concerns over militancy and border stability. These ties are transactional, not transformative, reflecting mutual restraint rather than genuine normalization.

On its northern front, the equation turns volatile. Lebanon remains locked in a cycle of tension with Israel, largely driven by the influence of Hezbollah. Deterrence has prevented full-scale war in recent years, but the absence of a political settlement ensures that the border remains one miscalculation away from escalation.

In Syria, hostility persists in a more fragmented form. Israel’s periodic strikes targeting Iranian-linked assets underscore a broader contest with Iran for regional influence. Syria’s internal disarray has limited direct confrontation but has also entrenched a shadow conflict that resists closure.

The most enduring and consequential relationship remains with Palestine. Here, there is neither peace nor stable deterrence—only recurring cycles of confrontation. The unresolved status of Palestinians continues to define Israel’s regional image and constrains its acceptance among Arab publics, regardless of evolving state-level ties.

At 78, Israel has achieved military superiority and economic resilience, yet its neighborhood tells a more restrained story. Peace exists, but without warmth. Conflict is contained, but not resolved.

The result is a strategic environment where coexistence is managed, not embraced—and where the promise of stability remains persistently fragile.

US–Riyadh Dialogue Enters a New Phase

The meeting between Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman and US President Donald Trump signals not just a diplomatic engagement but a recalibration of one of the most consequential bilateral relationships in modern geopolitics. Both sides arrive with clear agendas, yet the regional landscape they must navigate has changed dramatically. As Washington pushes for investments, defence arrangements, and normalization with Israel, Riyadh appears more cautious, more self-assured, and far less willing to accept old formulas.

For Trump, the objectives are straightforward: 1) secure a massive US$500 billion Saudi investment, 2) persuade the Kingdom to join the Abraham Accords, and 3) lock in lucrative arms deals. His administration is presenting the visit as an opportunity to “broaden ties,” spanning commerce, technology, and even nuclear cooperation.

It is MBS’s first US trip since Jamal Khashoggi’s killing in 2018 — an event that caused global outrage but has now been diplomatically “moved past” in Washington’s narrative. Trump is expected to again sidestep human rights concerns, focusing instead on transactional gains.

Saudi investment on the scale of half a trillion dollars carries inherent risks for the Kingdom. Such deep financial exposure would place Riyadh firmly within Washington’s strategic orbit, making it vulnerable to political pressure from the US and, by extension, from Israel. The Kingdom knows that once its capital becomes entrenched in the American economy, it loses critical room for maneuver in foreign policy.

The second US priority — coaxing Riyadh into the Abraham Accords — remains far more complex. Saudi Arabia has outlined clear conditions for recognizing Israel, yet Trump’s approach relies more on pressuring Riyadh than moderating Israeli policies. MBS is acutely aware of the domestic, religious, and geopolitical sensitivities tied to formal ties with Israel. Entering the Accords without significant concessions from Tel Aviv would carry unpredictable consequences at home and across the Muslim world.

Washington’s third objective, securing large defence deals, is no longer guaranteed. The longstanding US narrative portraying Iran as the Kingdom’s chief threat justified decades of American arms sales. But with Riyadh and Tehran now engaged in détente — shifting from “foes” to “friends” — the rationale for massive weapons purchases has eroded. The Kingdom today sees no imminent adversary that requires US arsenals.

The old oil-for-security arrangement has weakened. Saudi Arabia now seeks more — a formal defence pact ratified by Congress, nuclear cooperation, and access to advanced AI technologies central to its Vision 2030 aspirations. Washington may instead offer a limited executive-order commitment, far from the ironclad guarantee Riyadh desires.

MBS arrives United States with ambition but also clarity. Trump may push hard, but the Kingdom is no longer willing to operate under outdated assumptions. The Washington–Riyadh dialogue is indeed entering a new phase — one defined not by dependence, but by negotiation, recalibration, and a shifting balance of power.

A Careful Moment for US–Saudi Diplomacy

Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s upcoming visit to Washington promises to be one of the most closely watched diplomatic engagements of the year. President Donald Trump has already framed the event as an occasion to “honor Saudi Arabia, the Crown Prince,” signalling both warmth and strategic intent. The White House is preparing pageantry normally reserved for a full state visit—an unmistakable sign of the value Washington places on Riyadh. Yet amid the ceremony and high-level meetings, a measure of prudence will serve both sides well.

The Crown Prince’s itinerary reflects the depth of the US–Saudi partnership. Tuesday begins with a formal welcome on the South Lawn, followed by an Oval Office meeting and the signing of important economic and defense agreements. A high-profile dinner in the East Room and a major US-Saudi Business Council gathering the following day underscore the widening scope of cooperation. President Trump has repeatedly spoken of his “very special relationship” with Prince Mohammed, calling him an “incredible man” and even a friend. That message alone sets a favourable tone for the visit.

However, American political culture is uniquely sensitive to past controversies—particularly those amplified by the media. The tragic killing of a Saudi journalist several years ago generated intense debate in Washington, some of which still lingers in parts of the political class. Although the matter has long been addressed at the state level, it has not entirely faded from public memory. In such an environment, even the most ceremonial visits can attract renewed scrutiny.

It is in this context that a gentle reminder becomes relevant - diplomatic engagements at this level benefit immensely from careful messaging, coordinated outreach, and an awareness of how quickly narratives can be revived. Such caution is not a criticism of either leader; rather, it is a recognition of the complexities of contemporary geopolitics.

Ultimately, the Crown Prince’s visit offers a valuable opportunity to reaffirm a partnership that remains central to Gulf stability and global economic cooperation. By keeping the focus on shared goals and forward-looking dialogue, both Riyadh and Washington can ensure that the visit strengthens ties, reinforces mutual respect, and avoids distractions that serve neither side.

Israel’s Obsession with Iran: Supremacy, Not Survival

Israel presents its confrontation with Iran as a fight for survival. It propagates Tehran seeks its destruction, and therefore preemptive action is necessary. Yet behind this rhetoric lies a harder reality—Israel’s true concern is not annihilation but the erosion of its strategic supremacy.

At the center of this tension is Iran’s nuclear program. Israel is the Middle East’s only nuclear power, though it never admits it officially. For decades it has enjoyed this monopoly as the ultimate insurance policy.

Iran, even without a bomb, is branded an existential menace. What alarms Tel Aviv is not that Tehran would attack with nuclear weapons, but that a nuclear-capable Iran would undermine Israel’s unrivaled leverage. In other words, it is not fear of destruction, but fear of parity.

The second driver is Iran’s support for resistance groups. Hezbollah in Lebanon, Hamas and Islamic Jihad in Gaza—these are not armies that can topple Israel, but they have repeatedly punctured its aura of invincibility. Each rocket barrage, each fortified position along the border, is viewed in Tel Aviv as an extension of Iranian influence, shrinking Israel’s space for unchecked action.

Ideology intensifies the clash. Iran refuses to recognize Israel, while Israeli leaders—from Netanyahu onward—frame Tehran as the new Nazi Germany. This absolutist narrative forecloses compromise and justifies covert assassinations, cyber sabotage, airstrikes in Syria, and endless lobbying for harsher sanctions.

The deeper layer is geopolitical. Among Middle Eastern states, only Iran possesses the population, resources, and regional reach to contest Israel’s dominance. Neutralizing Tehran means securing Israel’s role as the region’s undisputed military power—backed by Washington, tolerated by Arab monarchies, and free to redraw the political map to its liking.

Israel’s Iran obsession is not about survival. It is about ensuring that no other state can balance its power. By disguising this pursuit of supremacy as self-defense, Israel sustains a cycle of hostility that makes genuine peace impossible.

The world buys the existential threat narrative, but the truth is starker - Israel seeks not containment of Iran, but its permanent crippling.

 

Arab Silence on Iran Sanctions: Hypocrisy at Its Peak

When Western powers tighten the noose of sanctions on Iran, one would expect Muslim nations—bound by faith and shared history—to object. Yet the Arab capitals remain silent, some even nodding in approval. Why? Because geopolitics has conveniently buried the idea of the Ummah.

For decades, Arab regimes have painted Iran not as a fellow Muslim state but as a sectarian rival, a destabilizing Shia power encroaching on their Sunni domains. From Hezbollah in Lebanon to the Houthis in Yemen, Tehran’s fingerprints unsettle Arab rulers. For them, US-led sanctions are not injustice—these are containment.

Add to this the dependency on Washington. The Gulf monarchies thrive on American protection, arms, and trade. To defy US diktats is to risk the very foundations of their security. So they remain mute, even when sanctions cripple ordinary Iranians.

These same states cry foul over Palestine, condemn Western double standards in Gaza, and rally Muslim solidarity—only to abandon it when it comes to Iran. The truth is simple - Arab rulers see a weakened Iran as good for oil markets, good for their regimes, and good for their new friends in Tel Aviv.

Sanctions on Iran are discriminatory, yes. But the bigger betrayal is the silence of Arab leaders who claim to defend Muslim dignity yet quietly cheer when one of their own is strangled.

Time for Muslims to take collective actions against Israel

For more than 700 days killing of Gazans has continued unabated, but the Muslim rulers have not gone beyond condemnation of Israeli attacks. Now, Israel has killed the political leaders of Hamas in the Qatari capital Doha on Tuesday and only condemnation in very soft words has come. Let us find why can't Muslim rulers go beyond condemnation of Israeli terrorism?

In our opinion, it is a pertinent and important question. The repeated condemnations without meaningful action by most Muslim-majority states in response to Israeli aggression—especially in Gaza—stem from a complex mix of geopolitical, economic, and internal factors. Some of the main reasons are:

Dependence on the West

Many Muslim countries, particularly in the Middle East, rely heavily on the United States and Europe for security, trade, investment, and military technology. They fear, taking decisive action against Israel risks sanctions, aid cuts, or political isolation.

Deep Split

The Muslim world is deeply fragmented—Sunni vs Shia, Arab vs non-Arab, monarchies vs republics. This has resulted in rivalries (Saudi Arabia vs Iran, Turkey vs Gulf monarchies) those prevent a unified front.

Normalization and Hidden Ties with Israel

Several Arab states (UAE, Bahrain, Morocco, and Sudan) have normalized relations through the Abraham Accords, and many others maintain covert cooperation.

Economic Vulnerabilities

Oil-rich states depend on stable exports, foreign investment, and dollar-based trade. Poorer Muslim countries (Pakistan, Bangladesh, Egypt, etc.) face IMF pressure and debt traps, limiting foreign policy freedom.

Fear of Internal Unrest

Leaders worry that pushing too hard against Israel, in other words the United States could invite political or regime change attempts. Authoritarian governments fear that pro-Palestine activism could spill over into broader dissent.

Lack of Unanimity

The Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) has been reduced to a symbolic forum, issuing statements but lacking enforcement mechanisms or collective security structures.

Strategic Silence

Some leaders prefer Israel as a silent partner in intelligence, cyber, and defense, especially against Iran, Hezbollah, or Islamist movements that threaten their regimes.

Therefore, Muslim countries remain stuck between public outrage and private interests. Condemnation is the safest path—it appeases their populations without risking ties with Washington or destabilizing their regimes.

Enough is enough, now the time has come to take concrete steps. Here are some realistic and concrete steps Muslim countries could take—short of direct war—if they truly wanted to go beyond mere condemnation of Israeli aggression:

Economic Measures

Oil & Gas Leverage:

Gulf states could coordinate an oil embargo or selective supply restrictions targeting Israel’s allies, similar to the 1973 Arab oil embargo.

Boycott and Divestment:

Governments could ban trade with Israeli firms and pressure companies operating in Israel to disengage.

Sanctions on Israeli Goods: Restrict imports of Israeli agricultural, tech, or defense products.

Diplomatic Pressure

Expel Ambassadors:

Muslim countries with relations (UAE, Bahrain, Morocco, Turkey, Egypt, Jordan) could downgrade or cut diplomatic ties.

Global Legal Action:

Refer Israel to the International Criminal Court (ICC) collectively, instead of leaving it to NGOs.

Block Normalization:

States like Saudi Arabia could halt normalization talks, signaling that Palestine remains a red line.

Political Unity

Revitalize the OIC:

Transform it from a talk shop into an action body: joint resolutions, emergency summits with binding decisions.

Joint Palestine Fund:

Pool resources into a sovereign fund for Gaza reconstruction and Palestinian self-sufficiency.

Collective Lobbying at UN:

Use numbers (57 Muslim countries) to push binding UN resolutions, even if the U.S. vetoes in the Security Council.

Strategic Non-Military Support

Humanitarian Corridors:

Use leverage with Egypt and Jordan to ensure permanent aid corridors into Gaza.

Technology and Cyber Support:

Provide Palestinians with communication tools, cybersecurity, and medical technology to resist siege conditions.

Intelligence Sharing:

Quietly pass on information that can protect Palestinian civilians from strikes.

Symbolic but High-Impact Moves

Suspend Flights to Tel Aviv:

Muslim-majority airlines could suspend services, disrupting Israel’s connectivity.

Cultural and Sports Boycotts:

Ban Israeli teams from participating in sporting events in Muslim countries.

Public Accountability:

Name and shame Muslim leaders who maintain cozy ties with Israel while condemning it publicly.

Trump urges Syrian President to sign Abraham Accords with Israel

According to media reports, US President Donald Trump urged Syrian President Ahmed Al-Sharaa to sign the Abraham Accords with Israel during their meeting ahead of the GCC summit in Riyadh on Wednesday.

The US leader added that he is also looking to normalize relations with Sharaa. The meeting between the two comes one day after Trump said that the US was lifting sanctions on Syria.

Trump told the Syrian leader he has "a tremendous opportunity to do something historic in his country," according to an official statement by White House Press Secretary Karoline Leavitt.

Trump also urged Sharaa to tell all foreign terrorists to leave Syria, deport Palestinian terrorists, help the US to prevent the resurgence of ISIS, and assume responsibility for ISIS detention centers in the northeastern parts of the country.

Shaara affirmed his commitment to the 1974 disengagement with Israel, the White House statement continued, recognized the opportunities of Iranians leaving Syria, and expressed interest in joint US-Syrian efforts in combating terrorism and eliminating chemical weapons.

Trump also said that his Middle East trip doesn't push Israel aside, saying, "I think it's very good for Israel."

Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman was also present in the meeting, and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan joined by video conference. Erdogan and the Saudi Crown Prince praised Trump for lifting the sanctions on Syria, Leavitt said.

Saudi Foreign Minister Faisal bin Farhan Al Saud said that Saudi Arabia would support Syria's economic recovery and thanked Trump for lifting US sanctions on Syria. He said that there are many investment opportunities in Syria after lifting US sanctions, possibly a "breakthrough" in Saudi support for Syria.

 

Trump’s Saudi visit and changing regional power dynamics

US President Donald Trump begins his second term with a symbolic return to Saudi Arabia, echoing his 2017 debut. His visit comes amid heightened regional tensions: the Gaza conflict, stalled Iran nuclear talks, and evolving alliances. Trump's hallmark approach—transactional diplomacy and personal ties with authoritarian leaders—aims to reposition US influence in West Asia.

Coinciding with the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) summit in Riyadh on May 14, the trip gathers Persian Gulf Arab leaders and the US president to discuss regional security, economic cooperation, and key geopolitical challenges.

Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MBS) sees the summit as an opportunity to bolster US ties while managing sensitive issues like the Israel-Palestine conflict and potential normalization with Israel.

A pivotal topic is a potential US-Saudi civil nuclear deal. Unlike past administrations, Trump reportedly dropped the requirement for Saudi-Israeli normalization before advancing nuclear talks.

This shift signals a pragmatic decoupling of nuclear cooperation from the Palestinian issue, aligning more closely with Saudi interests.

However, the move has alarmed Israel. Officials fear a nuclear-capable Saudi Arabia could destabilize the regional balance, particularly if Riyadh pursues uranium enrichment.

With insufficient Senate backing to block the deal, the Netanyahu government is wary of being sidelined, as the US seems poised to proceed despite objections.

This policy recalibration reflects Trump's broader strategy: strengthening ties with Riyadh while accepting friction with Israel. It may reshape the region’s power dynamics, compelling Israel to reassess its security posture.

Trump aims to expand the Abraham Accords, pushing for broader Arab-Israeli normalization. Yet, ongoing Gaza violence and accusations of Israeli genocide—echoed by MBS—have revived demands for Palestinian statehood as a precondition.

Choosing Saudi Arabia as his first post-reelection stop underscores the region’s centrality to US strategy. The trip aims to reset partnerships, advance nuclear and defense deals, and navigate the complex Israeli-Palestinian landscape.

More than a diplomatic visit, it marks a strategic shift with lasting implications for West Asia's security, politics, and economics.

 

 

 

 

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President Donald Trump is embarking on his first international trip of his second term, returning to Saudi Arabia—a symbolic echo of his 2017 debut on the world stage. The visit, however, unfolded against a backdrop of heightened regional tensions, including the ongoing Gaza conflict, the uphill Iran nuclear negotiations, and shifting alliances. 

Trump's approach, characterized by transactional diplomacy and personal rapport with authoritarian leaders, aimed to recalibrate U.S. influence in West Asia.

Trump's visit coincides with a major (Persian)Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) summit in Riyadh on May 14, bringing together Persian Gulf Arab leaders and the United States to address pressing regional issues. The summit serves as a platform for discussing security, economic cooperation, and the ongoing challenges facing the region.

Saudi Arabia's leadership, particularly Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MBS), views the summit as an opportunity to strengthen ties with the U.S. while cautiously navigating contentious topics such as the Israel-Palestine conflict and normalization with Israel.

 US nuclear strategy in West Asia 

The potential U.S.-Saudi civil nuclear deal emerging from President Trump's visit represents a major strategic development with far-reaching implications for regional security and U.S. influence in West Asia. Unlike previous U.S. administrations, the Trump administration has reportedly dropped the longstanding U.S. condition that Saudi Arabia must normalize relations with Israel before advancing nuclear cooperation talks.

This shift signals a pragmatic decoupling of the nuclear agreement from the contentious issue of an Israeli-Saudi normalization, which Riyadh has consistently linked to progress on Palestinian statehood.

However, the deal has raised significant concerns in Israel. Israeli officials fear that advancing a Saudi nuclear program without Israeli consent could undermine regional security, especially given Saudi ambitions to enrich uranium. The Netanyahu government, lacking enough support in the Senate to block the deal, has expressed unease about being sidelined, as Washington appears determined to proceed regardless of Israeli objections.

The situation complicates U.S.-Israel relations and could shift the regional power balance, pressuring Israel to recalibrate its diplomatic and security strategies in response to a more autonomous and nuclear-capable Saudi Arabia.

In sum, the U.S.-Saudi nuclear cooperation initiative reflects a bold recalibration of U.S. West Asia policy under Trump, prioritizing strategic and economic interests with Riyadh while risking heightened tensions with Israel and altering the delicate regional equilibrium.

In his second term as president, Trump seeks to expand the Abraham Accords to as many Arab states as possible in order to create a local peace framework that includes political, economic, and security cooperation. However, the conflict between Israel and Hamas and recent Israeli government activity have made this increasingly difficult. Saudi Arabia and neighboring Arab states condemned Israel's military actions in Gaza, and even MBS accused Israel of genocide, basically tripping down, bringing back the Saudi demand that Palestinian statehood be a precondition for normalization.

The significance of this trip, just after the start of Donald Trump's second term, is worth noting. His choice of Saudi Arabia as his first foreign destination indicates the importance of the Middle East in U.S. foreign policy and sends a strong signal that Washington intends to strengthen and enhance its engagement in the Persian Gulf region. The trip aims to redefine U.S. relations with key regional international partners and build the regional security architecture.

Ultimately, Trump's trip to Saudi Arabia runs much deeper than an ordinary diplomatic visit, containing key strategic messages and fundamental changes in U.S. foreign policy and regional dynamics. With a focus on two main pillars of major investments, advanced arms sales, nuclear cooperation, and necessary reconsideration of the Palestine-Israel issue, the trip could provide a new chapter to the extremely complicated and tense history of West Asia, making fundamental changes to its security, political, and economic equations.

 

 

Lebanon told to normalize relations with Israel

Following her previous provocative statement in Beirut that Hezbollah should have no share in the government, Morgan Ortagus, the deputy presidential special envoy to the Middle East, has said the outcome of current events is ultimately a “peace” agreement between Beirut and Tel Aviv.

In an exclusive interview with the Lebanese Al-Jadeed TV channel, Ortagus said the current goal is limited to launching diplomatic negotiations between three diplomatic working groups.

According to Ortagus, the goal of these negotiations is to address pressing issues such as the release of Lebanese prisoners, determining the fate of sites occupied by Israel, and demarcating the land border, which do not require diplomatic working groups and can be secured by the Supervisory Committee for the Implementation of Resolution 1701.

Regarding the Lebanese prisoners kidnapped by the Israeli enemy, there is no point in negotiation, as Lebanon has no Israeli prisoners to negotiate over.

Steve Witkoff, Donald Trump's special envoy, had previously noted Washington’s urgency in launching peace negotiations with both Lebanon and Syria. He had also expressed optimism about the possibility of Riyadh joining Abraham Accords.

Wittkoff firmly stated that the political transformations in the region could extend to Lebanon.

Prior to the election of Lebanon’s president and in the midst of the US-led Israeli aggression on Lebanon during September and November, the American “surveillance den” (embassy) in Beirut had interrogated several candidates regarding their positions on normalization with the Israeli occupation regime and weapons in possession of the Hezbollah resistance movement.

Lisa Johnson, the US ambassador to Beirut, informed prominent Lebanese figures that they must be prepared to secure a comprehensive and permanent solution with Tel Aviv.

The American witch frequently claimed that Hezbollah had – militarily and politically – collapsed and was barely able to manage its own affairs, and would therefore be unable to rebuild what her hostile country had destroyed.

As Washington is quite sure that there are just a few independent Lebanese officials who would reject American dictates, the White House will relentlessly go ahead with its imperialist and racist agenda.

Obviously, Washington has limited the mandate of the UN’s five-member committee to monitor Israeli violations of Lebanese sovereignty, while the committee repeatedly claims that Israeli procedures are in response to the violations by Hezbollah, which has not handed over its military arsenal or the coordinates of its military installations!

Accordingly, the shameful silence of Lebanon has made it easier for Washington to immediately jump to the stage of forming diplomatic working groups, as it claims.

These diplomatic working groups require violating the Lebanese constitution, which criminalizes any direct meeting between Lebanese diplomats and those from the Israeli colonial entity!

Naturally, the Lebanese leaders in power today must learn a lesson from the disastrous consequences of normalization for Egypt, Jordan, and even the Palestinian Authority in the West Bank. At the very least, they must learn a lesson from what is happening in neighboring Syria.

Courtesy: Tehran Times

Trump announces to takeover Gaza Strip

President Donald Trump said the United States would take over the war-ravaged Gaza Strip and develop it economically after Palestinians are resettled elsewhere. This announcement shattered decades of US policy toward the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

A question arises, how and under what authority the US can take over and occupy Gaza, a coastal strip 25 miles (45 km) long and at most 6 miles (10 km) wide, with a violent history. Successive US administrations, including Trump in his first term, had avoided deploying US troops there.

Trump unveiled his surprise plan, without providing specifics, at a joint press conference on Tuesday with visiting Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.

The announcement followed Trump's proposal earlier on Tuesday for the permanent resettlement of the more than two million Palestinians from Gaza to neighboring countries, calling the enclave - where the first phase of a fragile Israel-Hamas ceasefire and hostage release deal is in effect - a "demolition site."

Trump can expect allies and foes alike to strongly oppose any US takeover of Gaza, and his proposal raises questions whether Saudi Arabia would be willing to join a renewed US-brokered push for a historic normalization of relations with US ally Israel.

The US taking a direct stake in Gaza would run counter to longtime policy in Washington and for much of the international community, which has held that Gaza would be part of a future Palestinian state that includes the occupied West Bank.

"The US will take over the Gaza Strip, and we will do a job with it too," Trump told reporters. "We'll own it and be responsible for dismantling all of the dangerous unexploded bombs and other weapons on the site."

"We're going to develop it, create thousands and thousands of jobs, and it'll be something that the entire Middle East can be very proud of," Trump said. "I do see a long-term ownership position and I see it bringing great stability to that part of the Middle East."

Asked who would live there, Trump said it could become a home to "the world's people." Trump touted the narrow strip, where Israel's military assault in response to Hamas' October 07, 2023, cross-border attack has leveled large swaths, as having the potential to be “The Riviera of the Middle East.”

A question arises, how and under what authority the US can take over and occupy Gaza, a coastal strip 25 miles (45 km) long and at most 6 miles (10 km) wide, with a violent history. Successive US administrations, including Trump in his first term, had avoided deploying US troops there.

Several Democratic lawmakers quickly condemned the Republican president's Gaza proposals.

Netanyahu, referred to a few times by Trump by his nickname, “Bibi,” would not be drawn into discussing the proposal in depth other than to praise Trump for trying a new approach.

The Israeli leader, whose military had engaged in more than a year of fierce fighting with Hamas militants in Gaza, said Trump was "thinking outside the box with fresh ideas" and was "showing willingness to puncture conventional thinking."

Netanyahu may have been relieved that Trump, who forged close ties with the Israeli leader during his first term in the White House, did not pressure him publicly to maintain the ceasefire. He faces threats from far-right members of his coalition to topple his government unless he restarts the fighting in Gaza to destroy Iran-backed Hamas.

Some experts have suggested Trump sometimes takes an extreme position internationally to set the parameters for future negotiations. In his first term, Trump at times issued what were seen as over-the-top foreign policy pronouncements, many of which he never implemented.

A UN damage assessment released in January showed that clearing over 50 million tons of rubble left in Gaza in the aftermath of Israel's bombardment could take 21 years and cost up to US$1.2 billion.

 

 

Saudi Arabia: Unwavering stance on Palestine

Saudi Arabia has reaffirmed its unwavering and non-negotiable stance on the establishment of a Palestinian state, emphasizing that its position remains steadfast and is not subject to political bargaining.

In a statement on Wednesday, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs reiterated that the Kingdom's commitment to Palestinian statehood is deeply rooted and unshakable.

"This firm stance was explicitly affirmed by Crown Prince and Prime Minister Mohammed bin Salman during his address at the opening of the first year of the ninth session of the Shoura Council on September 18, 2024. In his speech, the Crown Prince made it clear that Saudi Arabia will not establish diplomatic relations with Israel unless an independent Palestinian state is established, with East Jerusalem as its capital."

The statement further highlighted that the Crown Prince reiterated this position at the Arab-Islamic Summit held in Riyadh on November 11, 2024. During the summit, he emphasized the urgent need to establish a Palestinian state based on the 1967 borders, end Israeli occupation, and mobilize the international community in support of Palestinian rights. He also called on more nations to recognize Palestine and underscored the significance of securing full United Nations membership for the Palestinian state, as reflected in UN General Assembly resolutions.

Saudi Arabia also firmly rejected any actions that undermine Palestinian rights, including Israeli settlement expansion, land annexation, and any attempts to forcibly displace Palestinians from their homeland.

The Kingdom called on the international community to take decisive action to alleviate the dire humanitarian conditions faced by the Palestinian people, who continue to stand resilient in defense of their land and rights.

The Kingdom reiterated that its stance is not open for negotiation or political bargaining. It stressed that a just and lasting peace cannot be achieved without ensuring the Palestinian people receive their full legitimate rights under international resolutions, a position Saudi Arabia has made clear to both the previous and current U.S. administrations.

 

Can Trump force Egypt and Jordan to accept Gazans?

US President has suggested to move Gazans to Egypt and Gaza. It depends on how serious Trump is about the idea and how far he is prepared to go. Let us explore the likely outcomes.

One of Trump’s favorite economic tools impositions of new tariffs or outright sanctions that could be devastating for Jordan and Egypt. The two countries receive billions of dollars in American aid each year, and Egypt is already mired in an economic crisis.

Allowing an influx of refugees could also be destabilizing. Egypt says it is currently hosting some 9 million migrants, including refugees from Sudan’s civil war. Jordan, with a population of less than 12 million, is hosting over 700,000 refugees, mainly from Syria.

US pressure would also risk alienating key allies in the region with whom Trump has had good relations — not only el-Sissi and Jordan’s King Abdullah II, but the leaders of Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Turkey, all of whom support the Palestinian cause.

That would potentially complicate efforts to broker a historic agreement between Saudi Arabia and Israel to normalize relations, something Trump tried to do during his previous term and expects to complete in his current one.

Trump’s suggestion that Egypt and Jordan take in Palestinians from the war-ravaged Gaza Strip is likely to be met with a hard “no” from the two US allies and the Palestinians themselves who fear Israel would never allow them to return.

 “I’d rather get involved with some of the Arab nations, and build housing in a different location, where they can maybe live in peace for a change,” Trump said.

The idea is likely to be welcomed by Israel, where Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s far-right governing partners have long advocated what they describe as the voluntary migration of large numbers of Palestinians and the reestablishment of Jewish settlements in Gaza.

Human rights groups have already accused Israel of ethnic cleansing, which United Nations experts have defined as a policy designed by one ethnic or religious group to remove the civilian population of another group from certain areas “by violent and terror-inspiring means.”

History of Displacement

Before and during the 1948 war surrounding Israel’s creation, some 700,000 Palestinians — a majority of the prewar population — fled or were driven from their homes in what is now Israel, an event they commemorate as the Nakba — Arabic for catastrophe.

Israel refused to allow them to return because it would have resulted in a Palestinian majority within its borders. The refugees and their descendants now number around 6 million, with large communities in Gaza, where they make up the majority of the population, as well as the Israeli-occupied West Bank, Jordan, Lebanon and Syria.

In the 1967 Mideast war, when Israel seized the West Bank and Gaza Strip, 300,000 more Palestinians fled, mostly into Jordan.

The decades-old refugee crisis has been a major driver of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and was one of the thorniest issues in peace talks that last broke down in 2009. The Palestinians claim a right of return, while Israel says they should be absorbed by surrounding Arab countries.

Many Palestinians view the latest war in Gaza, in which entire neighborhoods have been shelled to oblivion and 90% of the population of 2.3 million have been forced from their homes, as a new Nakba. They fear that if large numbers of Palestinians leave Gaza, then they too may never return.

Steadfastly remaining on one’s land is central to Palestinian culture, and was on vivid display in Gaza on Sunday, when thousands of people tried to return to the most heavily destroyed part of the territory.

Egypt and Jordan fiercely rejected the idea of accepting Gaza refugees early in the war, when it was floated by some Israeli officials.

Both countries have made peace with Israel but support the creation of a Palestinian state in the occupied West Bank, Gaza and east Jerusalem, territories Israel captured in the 1967 Mideast war. They fear that the permanent displacement of Gaza’s population could make that impossible.

Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sissi has also warned of the security implications of transferring large numbers of Palestinians to Egypt’s Sinai Peninsula, bordering Gaza.

Hamas and other militant groups are deeply rooted in Palestinian society and are likely to move with the refugees, which would mean that future wars would be fought on Egyptian soil, something that could unravel the historic Camp David peace treaty, a cornerstone of regional stability.

“The peace which we have achieved would vanish from our hands,” el-Sissi said in October 2023, after Hamas’ attack on southern Israel triggered the war. “All for the sake of the idea of eliminating the Palestinian cause.”

That’s what happened in Lebanon in the 1970s, when Yasser Arafat’s Palestine Liberation Organization, the leading militant group of its time, transformed the country’s south into a launchpad for attacks on Israel.

The refugee crisis and the PLO’s actions helped push Lebanon into a 15-year civil war in 1975. Israel invaded twice and occupied southern Lebanon from 1982 until 2000.

Jordan, which clashed with the PLO and expelled it under similar circumstances in 1970, already hosts more than 2 million Palestinian refugees, the majority of whom have been granted citizenship.

Israeli ultranationalists have long suggested that Jordan be considered a Palestinian state so that Israel can keep the West Bank, which they view as the biblical heartland of the Jewish people. Jordan’s monarchy has vehemently rejected that scenario.

Jimmy Carter a hawk or a dove

As Americans mourn the death of former president Jimmy Carter, the disastrous impacts of his legacy, particularly in the Middle East are thrust into the limelight. Carter died at the age of 100 on Sunday, forty-four years after he left the White House. His tenure as the 39th US president began with his inauguration on January 20, 1977, and ended on January 20, 1981.

Undoubtedly, the ongoing Israeli genocide in Gaza and its brutal crimes in the West Bank, Lebanon and beyond are rooted in the policies pursued by Carter. Carter played a key role in aiding and abetting the Israeli apartheid regime by brokering a seemingly peace deal between Egypt and Israel in 1978. 

Then Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin and then Egyptian president Anwar Sadat signed Camp David Accords on September 17, 1978, that led in the following year to a peace treaty between the two sides.  The agreements became known as the Camp David Accords because the negotiations took place at the US presidential retreat at Camp David, Maryland. 

The agreements were the first normalization deal between Israel and an Arab country. More than four decades on, it is crystal clear that the deals were a stab in the back of Palestinians and their cause. 

The Carter administration had painted a scenario to motivate Arab states to reduce their support for Palestine amid the Israeli occupation. He also wanted Arab leaders to consider their own interests separate from those of the Palestinians. So far, an overwhelming majority of the Arab public has not recognized Israel and remained opposed to normalizing ties with the regime.

Nonetheless, Carter’s political ploy led to the Abraham Accords. Despite rising sentiment against Israel’s atrocities against Palestinians, Donald Trump oversaw the signing of the Abraham Accords in 2020, which normalized relations between Israel and the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain as well as Morocco. Sudan joined the US-brokered deal a year later. 

The normalization deals not only failed to improve the situation of Palestinians, but also strengthened Israel's resolve to intensify its apartheid practices. With no doubts, Israel’s recent brutal war on Lebanon and the war of genocide in Gaza are the results of US-brokered normalization deals that began in the Carter era.  

Proponents of Carter, who earned the Nobel Peace Prize in 2002, characterize him as a champion of peace and democracy. However, the negative consequences of his policies on the Palestinian and Lebanese populations suggest that he may be more accurately remembered as a hawkish president rather than a dovish one. An examination of his statements regarding Iran further clarifies the debate over whether he should be classified as a hawk or a dove.

Carter served one term as president and lost his reelection bid to Ronald Reagan. His successes eclipsed at the polls by a stagnant economy and the 1979 US embassy takeover in Tehran.

In November 1979, a group of university students took over the US embassy in the Iranian capital. They believed Washington had turned its embassy into a center of espionage against the newly established Islamic Republic. Consequently, dozens of American diplomats were taken captive for 444 days.

Carter made futile attempts to secure the release of the Americans. 

On April 25, 1980, the US revealed it had attempted a military operation known as Operation Eagle Claw to rescue the release of the captives. But the operation failed and eight US servicemen were killed and several others were injured.

Carter explicitly demonstrated his enmity toward Iran in an interview 10 years ago.   

“I could have been re-elected if I had taken military action against Iran. It would have shown that I was strong and resolute and manly. ... I could have wiped Iran off the map with the weapons that we had,” he said in a 2014 interview with CNBC.

In the interview, Carter acknowledged his aspiration to entirely obliterate Iran, yet he had found himself unable to achieve this dream either through military or political means.

Courtesy: Tehran Times

 

Critical Examination of Iranian Regional Policy

Despite continuous Israeli attacks targeting Iran's military doctrine in the wake of the regime’s brutal war in Gaza, the framework of that strategy remains largely intact and continues to operate across West Asia. However, in a recent article for Chatham House Bilal Y. Saab argues that the ceasefire in Lebanon has dealt a huge blow to Iran’s regional strategy. It may be said that the article fails to fully consider the current and delayed impacts of Israel’s unprecedented use of brute force on Tel Aviv. 

The military operations in the Gaza Strip and Lebanon have currently put huge burdens on the Israeli economy with long-term impacts expected to last for years. While unconditional US aid might temporarily alleviate investor concerns regarding Israel, the potential for renewed conflict poses a significant and lasting deterrent to investment.

The issue of settlers in northern occupied Palestine has not been yet solved and seems to be a problem in the foreseeable future for Israel. Also, the impacts of Israel’s action on Western public opinion cannot be undermined; this is being seen in some countries to put pressure on policymakers to take more progressive action against Israel. 

The author argues that Israel has achieved victory in its war with Hezbollah but the facts on the ground suggest differently. Tel Aviv since October 2023 has been targeting Hezbollah facilities and fighters across Lebanon but to no avail.

Hezbollah operations in northern occupied Palestine and even deeper in Haifa and Tel Aviv continued until the last moments before a ceasefire took effect last month. Israel’s limited, targeted operations in Southern Lebanon fell short of gaining significant territory and Hezbollah was successful in repelling those attacks. 

The Lebanon ceasefire, largely mirroring UN Resolution 1701, offers no significant changes. Hezbollah retains its weaponry and maintains the capacity to resume operations against Israel at any time. 

Bilal Y. Saab views the ceasefire as a setback for the Resistance Axis, arguing that it has left Hamas isolated. But this is not the case; factions in the Resistance Front have always contained autonomy in their decisions despite Western claims about Iran controlling it all. It is largely uncontested that Hamas started Operations Al-Aqsa Storm on its own without any prior notice to other groups and actors in the region yet, the whole front with a differentiating timetable joined Hamas in its fight against Israel.

For over a year, the conflict in Lebanon remained a relatively even exchange of attacks. Only after Israel significantly escalated its assaults, pursuing new objectives, none of which were achieved, did ceasefire talks commence. The ideology of creation of Hezbollah is based on confronting Israel and the current fragile ceasefire can be considered as a temporary tactical halt for the group in its fight against Tel Aviv. 

Furthermore, Saab prescribes renewed efforts for normalization of relations between Arab countries and Israel for what he calls a lasting victory for Tel Aviv. Saudi Arabia is one of the main players in the region which is reportedly eager to normalize ties with Israel. 

The regional landscape has shifted dramatically since the early Trump administration and the Abraham Accords. The Israeli onslaughts in Gaza and Lebanon have fueled widespread regional opposition to normalization with Israel. Also, Saudi Arabia's rapprochement with Iran suggests a decreased likelihood of Arab confrontation with Tehran.

Despite the author’s claims that an expanded Abraham Accords would lead to a Palestinian state, Israel has intensified settlement expansion in the occupied West Bank, particularly since the formation of the current far-right cabinet. All these factors point to one issue and that is the impossibility of a deal being in favor of Palestinians. 

Saab says “Iran also has to think twice about how Israel might react to even the attempt to resurrect its regional strategy.” However, Tehran’s response to Israeli provocations has been clear for over a year, any attack on Iran’s interests leads to retaliation. 

Contrary to Israeli actions, Iran's measured responses are not due to military concerns but rather reflect its defensive military doctrine—a fact often overlooked in Western assessments.

 Tehran does not seek regional war. Its doctrine which is based on two main pillars (inward and outward defense) has not wobbled despite being under constant attacks. Support for the Resistance Axis can be defined in outward defense and drone, missile advancements are in line with inward defense.

Should the regional status quo significantly change, Iran may employ alternative deterrent measures to counter threats to its national interests. This potential shift includes a reassessment of its nuclear doctrine, a subject of ongoing debate among Iranian scholars and policymakers.