The Iran War: Is the Real Target Saudi Arabia?

The US-Israel war on Iran has exposed a harsh reality: American military dominance does not necessarily translate into political acceptance in the Middle East. More importantly, the conflict has raised a fundamental question about whose security Washington is really protecting.

For decades, the United States has justified its military bases across Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries as essential to protecting Arab monarchies against external threats, particularly Iran. Yet the use of these bases during the war has reinforced a perception that American military power serves Israeli security interests, potentially at the expense of the host countries. Instead of providing an unquestionable security umbrella, these arrangements risk exposing Arab states to retaliation.

China’s mediation of the 2023 Saudi-Iran rapprochement had already challenged Washington’s longstanding narrative that Iran posed a greater threat to Arab interests than Israel. Riyadh’s decision to restore diplomatic relations with Tehran demonstrated that regional security could be pursued through engagement rather than permanent confrontation.

The prolonged disruption of shipping through the Strait of Hormuz, attacks on oil tankers and energy infrastructure, and mounting pressure on Gulf economies have further exposed the vulnerabilities of Arab oil producers. These developments raise a critical question, are GCC states merely collateral victims of the war, or are they also facing strategic pressure to reconsider their regional alignments?

President Donald Trump’s reported request for Russia to supply 300,000 tons of diesel highlights the conflict’s wider energy repercussions. Although this does not establish a hidden agenda, it illustrates how the consequences extend far beyond Iran.

The larger strategic question is whether the conflict is also being used to advance Israel’s regional integration through the Abraham Accords. Saudi Arabia’s recognition of Israel and establishment of diplomatic relations would represent a major diplomatic victory for Benjamin Netanyahu and strengthen Israel’s regional position.

My interpretation is that the war may be evolving into a pressure campaign against GCC monarchies, particularly Saudi Arabia, compelling them to succumb to American pressure: recognize Israel, establish diplomatic relations and accept its regional supremacy.

This remains a strategic hypothesis, not a proven war objective. Nevertheless, it deserves serious scrutiny. The ultimate irony would be that a war ostensibly directed against Iran ends up pressuring Arab monarchies to accept a regional order shaped around Israeli supremacy—while simultaneously weakening confidence in American protection.

Are Houthis Attacking Saudi Oil Tankers - or Is There a Bigger Story?

The reports that Yemen’s Houthis are attacking Saudi oil tankers deserve closer examination. Not because such attacks are impossible, but because the emerging narrative may be more complicated than it appears.

During the height of Israel’s assault on Gaza, the Houthis declared that their maritime campaign was directed primarily against Israeli-owned or Israel-linked vessels and ships carrying goods to and from Israel. Their stated objective was to pressure Israel over Gaza. Against this background, the reported targeting of Saudi tankers represents a significant development.

There is little doubt that Houthi military operations have disrupted commercial shipping in the Red Sea and surrounding waters. But disruption of Saudi shipping does not necessarily mean that every incident represents a deliberate Houthi campaign against Saudi Arabia. The Red Sea, Bab el-Mandeb and Suez Canal form one interconnected maritime corridor. Once security deteriorates, vessels of different nationalities become exposed.

This distinction matters because the dominant Western narrative - “Iran-backed Houthis are attacking Saudi oil tankers and installations” - can simplify a complex regional conflict. Attribution should be based on evidence, while the political context surrounding each incident deserves equal attention.

There is another question that cannot simply be dismissed as conspiracy theory, who benefits from heightened insecurity around Saudi Arabia?

A prolonged Houthi threat could encourage Riyadh to deepen its security relationship with Washington, strengthen arguments for a US security umbrella, increase American arms sales to Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states, and potentially create greater pressure for Saudi Arabia to move closer to the Abraham Accords.

None of these possibilities proves that another actor is secretly attacking Saudi ships. Claims about covert operations or CIA-linked groups require evidence and should not be presented as established fact.

Yet history demonstrates that major geopolitical confrontations rarely involve only the actors appearing on the battlefield. Different powers can exploit the same crisis to advance their own strategic interests.

Therefore, the real issue may not simply be whether Houthis are attacking Saudi oil tankers. The more important question is whether Houthi attacks—and the narrative surrounding them—are becoming instruments in a much larger struggle over Saudi Arabia’s security choices, regional alignments and America’s continuing influence in the Gulf.

Is Saudi Arabia Being Attacked to Recognize Israel

The growing friction between US President Donald Trump and Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MBS) surfaced when Washington sought to pressure Riyadh over the killing of Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi. Although the issue was eventually hushed up, US pressure on MBS continued, with Washington increasingly seeking Saudi recognition of Israel.

Israel's devastating military campaign in Gaza, however, complicated the American strategy. For MBS, moving toward normalization with Israel became politically difficult while Palestinians continued to suffer. Riyadh instead maintained that recognition must be linked to Palestinian statehood and a credible two-state solution.

China's mediation of the Saudi-Iran rapprochement delivered another strategic message to Washington. If two traditional regional rivals could overcome decades of hostility through Chinese diplomacy, America's traditional dominance in the Middle East could gradually weaken. The development also demonstrated that Saudi Arabia had alternatives to exclusive dependence on Washington.

When the US-Israeli war against Iran began on February 28, 2026, the regional equation changed dramatically. As Trump decided to escalate the conflict, Iranian retaliation against American military installations and interests across the Gulf became increasingly predictable. Saudi Arabia, with its enormous energy infrastructure and strategic importance, was inevitably exposed.

The US blockade of the Strait of Hormuz also threatened oil and gas exports from Gulf Arab states. Attempts to reroute Saudi oil through the Red Sea created additional vulnerabilities, particularly as attacks attributed to the Houthis increased. Drone attacks and threats to oil infrastructure have further complicated Saudi Arabia's security environment.

The conventional explanation is that Iran and its allies are responsible for these attacks. But another question deserves serious examination, who ultimately benefits from keeping Saudi Arabia under sustained security pressure?

Could regional proxy groups be operating in ways that serve a broader strategic objective? The purpose would not necessarily be to destabilize Saudi Arabia, but to increase its dependence on American security guarantees and make closer alignment with Washington appear unavoidable.

The United States has long sought normalization between Saudi Arabia and Israel. If Riyadh is repeatedly confronted with threats to its oil infrastructure, maritime routes and national security, pressure for a strategic accommodation with Israel could become stronger.

The crucial question, therefore, is not simply who is attacking Saudi Arabia. It is whether insecurity itself is being exploited to influence Riyadh's strategic choices.

Is Saudi Arabia being attacked because of its rivalry with Iran—or is the pressure ultimately intended to push the Kingdom toward recognizing Israel?

Time for Riyadh to Reassess Its Security Doctrine

For decades, Arab states have been persuaded that Iran poses the greatest threat to their security. Yet the region is arguably less secure today than at any time in recent history. This paradox deserves serious reflection, particularly in Riyadh.

The "Iran threat" narrative has shaped the Middle East's security architecture for more than four decades. Whether entirely justified or deliberately amplified, it has undeniably served several strategic objectives. It reinforced Arab-Iranian hostility, justified a sustained American military presence across the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), generated hundreds of billions of dollars in arms sales, and strengthened Washington's political leverage in the region. It also created an environment that facilitated the Abraham Accords, while discussions on US support for Saudi Arabia's civilian nuclear program have, at various stages, been linked to broader regional political considerations, including normalization with Israel.

Despite these arrangements, the Gulf today faces growing uncertainty. The Gaza war, the prolonged confrontation involving Iran and Israel, recurring tensions in the Strait of Hormuz, and instability around the Red Sea have exposed the vulnerability of the region's energy infrastructure and maritime trade routes. Some regional observers argue that these developments risk undermining the Gulf's position as the world's most dependable energy supplier, regardless of who initiates each crisis.

These realities call for a strategic reassessment. Security partnerships should ultimately be judged not by their longevity, but by their ability to deliver peace, stability and economic security.

The China-brokered rapprochement between Saudi Arabia and Iran demonstrated that diplomacy remains a credible alternative to perpetual confrontation. While the agreement did not eliminate longstanding differences, it showed that dialogue can reduce tensions more effectively than escalating military rivalry. Rather than relying exclusively on traditional security partners, Riyadh could broaden its strategic options by deepening cooperation with Beijing, including in the peaceful development of civilian nuclear technology. Given China's substantial economic interests in Gulf stability and its constructive relations with both Saudi Arabia and Iran, Beijing is well placed to facilitate confidence-building measures and encourage regional de-escalation.

Equally important, GCC states should gradually reduce excessive dependence on external military protection and work toward a regional security framework based on dialogue, mutual respect and shared responsibility. Foreign military partnerships may continue to play an important role, but they should complement—not define—the region's long-term security strategy.

History suggests that lasting peace cannot be achieved through military superiority alone. Sustainable security is built on diplomacy, balanced partnerships and regional ownership of regional challenges. For Saudi Arabia, the question is no longer whether its traditional security doctrine has served the Kingdom well. The more important question is whether that doctrine remains the best guarantee of peace and prosperity in an increasingly multipolar Middle East.

US-Saudi Nuclear Deal Built on Contradictions

The proposed US-Saudi nuclear deal is being portrayed as a landmark initiative capable of reshaping the Middle East. In reality, it appears to be a proposal burdened with so many political and strategic conditions that its chances of implementation remain slim. It promises much, yet delivers little that Saudi Arabia has sought for years.

The first obstacle is Washington itself. Any agreement of this magnitude must pass the US Senate, where Middle East policy has historically been heavily influenced by pro-Israel interests. It is difficult to envisage congressional approval for any arrangement that Israel believes could narrow its long-standing strategic and technological superiority in the region. Political resistance in Washington, therefore, remains the biggest hurdle.

Even if the agreement survives Congress, its strategic value for Riyadh is questionable. Saudi Arabia has consistently maintained that any civilian nuclear program must eventually include the right to enrich uranium. If enrichment is prohibited, the Kingdom would remain dependent on foreign suppliers for nuclear fuel. Such an arrangement falls well short of the strategic autonomy Riyadh has long pursued.

The proposal becomes even more complicated if it is linked to Saudi recognition of Israel through the Abraham Accords. The Kingdom faces strong domestic, Arab and wider Islamic pressure not to normalize relations with Israel in the absence of a credible and irreversible path toward Palestinian statehood. Without meaningful progress on that front, normalization carries significant political costs for Riyadh.

There is also an economic dimension. Saudi Arabia has invested heavily in the United States over several decades, yet many in Riyadh question whether Washington has fulfilled the security commitments expected from a strategic ally. The muted American response to attacks on Gulf energy infrastructure and its shifting regional priorities have inevitably weakened Saudi confidence in US security guarantees.

Above all, Saudi leaders understand that American policy in the Middle East is inseparable from its commitment to Israel. Whether justified or not, a growing perception across the Arab world is that Israeli security considerations increasingly shape Washington's regional decisions. That perception inevitably influences Saudi strategic calculations.

For these reasons, the proposed US-Saudi nuclear deal looks less like a transformative agreement and more like a diplomatic bargaining chip. It expects Saudi Arabia to make strategic, political and financial concessions while offering neither an independent nuclear capability nor security assurances that Riyadh considers fully credible. Until these fundamental contradictions are addressed, the deal is unlikely to move beyond diplomatic headlines.

Iran War Unlikely to End on US Terms

The longer the conflict with Iran drags on, the more difficult it becomes to accept Washington's claim that it genuinely seeks peace. Months after the ceasefire announcement, the region continues to witness periodic escalation, suggesting that the United States and Israel are still pursuing objectives that remain unfulfilled.

If the war were truly about eliminating an immediate threat, it should have ended by now. Instead, the persistence of tensions indicates that broader geopolitical ambitions remain at play.

First, despite years of sanctions, diplomatic isolation, and military pressure, Iran's status as a regional power remains largely intact. Far from being marginalized, Tehran continues to exert influence across the Middle East. This outcome falls well short of what United States and Israel had hoped to achieve.

Second, the US has failed in securing a major diplomatic breakthrough by bringing Saudi Arabia fully into the Abraham Accords framework. The ongoing conflict has made such an objective increasingly difficult, exposing the limitations of American diplomacy in the region.

Third, expectations of regime change in Tehran have once again proven unrealistic. Iranian institutions remain functional, and the leadership has survived a campaign designed to weaken its authority and legitimacy.

Fourth, despite repeated military operations, neither Iran's nuclear capabilities nor its missile program appears to have been decisively neutralized. The enormous costs incurred have not delivered the strategic victory that was promised.

Meanwhile, Israel has also struggled to achieve one of its key security objectives: the complete elimination of Hezbollah's military and political influence in Lebanon. The group's continued presence remains a source of concern for Israeli policymakers.

These shortcomings help explain why pressure persists against any settlement that does not fully satisfy American and Israeli demands. Iran is expected to make concessions, yet there is little willingness to discuss lifting decades-old sanctions or compensating Tehran for infrastructure damaged during the conflict.

The reality is becoming increasingly difficult to ignore. The war continues because its principal architects have not achieved their desired outcomes. Until Washington and Tel Aviv recognize the limits of military coercion and accept a genuinely negotiated settlement, the ceasefire will remain little more than a pause in a conflict that neither side has truly left behind.

Lebanon: Israel’s Last Strategic Frontier?

Lebanon continues to occupy a central place in Israel’s strategic calculus, not merely as a neighboring state but as the remaining unresolved frontier in its northern security doctrine. From this perspective, Israel’s sustained pressure on Lebanon is shaped by a mix of historical experience, security anxieties, and regional power competition.

At the core lies the belief in parts of Israeli strategic thinking that Lebanon represents the last major obstacle to achieving uncontested dominance along its northern arc. Unlike other Arab theatres where state structures have either been weakened or neutralized through normalization or conflict, Lebanon remains structurally resistant.

Secondly, Israel views Hezbollah as the most capable and disciplined non-state military actor on its borders. With its missile arsenal and battlefield experience, Hezbollah is seen not just as a border threat but as a strategic deterrent that constrains Israeli freedom of action.

Thirdly, the northern border security buffer remains a persistent concern. Israel’s strategic doctrine has long emphasized preventing hostile entrenchment along its immediate frontier, and southern Lebanon is viewed as an area where such entrenchment has already occurred.

Fourthly, the eastern Mediterranean energy equation adds another layer. Maritime boundaries, offshore gas fields, and economic corridors have turned Lebanon from a peripheral concern into a contested strategic space where economic and security interests increasingly overlap.

Finally, Lebanon is viewed through the wider prism of Iran’s regional influence. Israel’s strategic planners often interpret Hezbollah’s presence as part of a broader deterrence network linked to Tehran, making Lebanon not just a bilateral issue but a node in a wider regional rivalry.

Taken together, these factors explain why Lebanon remains a focal point in Israeli strategic thinking — not necessarily as a target for territorial expansion, but as an unresolved security frontier that continues to shape regional dynamics.

Ceasefire Diplomacy or Managed Conflict?

Every morning brings fresh reports suggesting that the United States and Iran are inching closer to a ceasefire understanding. Yet, by evening, contradictory statements emerge, once again clouding the picture with uncertainty and strategic ambiguity. The pattern has now become too repetitive to ignore. It increasingly appears that both Washington and Tehran are buying time rather than genuinely pursuing peace, while carefully concealing their actual strategic objectives.

The initial justification for the US-Israel military campaign against Iran centered on Tehran’s refusal to accept Washington’s conditions regarding its nuclear and missile programs. However, the conflict narrative now appears to be evolving. The focus increasingly seems linked to reshaping the political architecture of the Middle East through expansion of the Abraham Accords, effectively compelling key Muslim countries, including Saudi Arabia, toward formal recognition of Israel.

Simultaneously, the continued tension surrounding the Strait of Hormuz raises another critical question. Despite repeated calls for de-escalation, there appears to be little urgency in Washington to fully restore normal maritime stability in the region.

Such instability serves multiple strategic purposes for the United States. It constrains oil exports from Gulf producers, complicates China’s energy security calculations, and strengthens Washington’s leverage in global energy markets by enhancing demand for American oil and gas supplies.

The domestic political environment inside the United States also adds another dimension. Repeated but unsuccessful attempts to politically weaken or impeach Donald Trump suggest that influential power centers may still consider him indispensable in managing an increasingly volatile geopolitical environment. His aggressive foreign policy posture, particularly towards Iran and the broader Middle East, continues to align with powerful strategic interests within Washington.

Taken together, these developments indicate that the current crisis may not be moving toward immediate resolution. Instead, the world may be witnessing the management of a prolonged controlled confrontation designed to gradually exhaust Iran economically, diplomatically, and militarily until Tehran is pushed toward accepting terms that resemble unconditional surrender. Until then, ambiguity itself may remain the most effective weapon in this conflict.

Oman: Next Phase of Washington’s Strategy

After failing to secure a decisive strategic victory against Iran despite months of escalation and military pressure, Washington appears determined to restore its geopolitical credibility elsewhere in the Gulf. In this evolving power contest, Oman may increasingly find itself exposed to external pressure disguised as regional “security management.”

For decades, Oman has maintained a delicate diplomatic balance. Unlike many regional actors, Muscat preferred mediation over confrontation and dialogue over military adventurism. Yet geography has transformed the Sultanate into one of the most strategically valuable locations in the region.

The Port of Duqm and surrounding naval infrastructure are dangerously close to the Strait of Hormuz — the world’s most critical oil transit corridor. At the same time, the location places Oman within immediate strategic proximity of Iran’s Chabahar Port and Pakistan’s Gwadar Port, two emerging nodes in regional trade and connectivity. This triangle alone explains why global powers increasingly view Oman not merely as a Gulf state, but as a geopolitical gateway.

Washington’s expanding military footprint across the Gulf is often presented as a mechanism for maintaining stability and protecting maritime trade. However, history suggests that foreign military presence rarely remains temporary. Strategic access gradually evolves into political leverage, while security dependency slowly weakens national sovereignty.

Donald Trump’s confrontational posture toward Iran reflects more than ideological hostility. It also represents an attempt to demonstrate American dominance after Tehran resisted enormous economic sanctions, diplomatic isolation, and military intimidation. Direct confrontation with Iran carries enormous risks, but smaller Gulf states may appear easier arenas where Washington can project strength without triggering full-scale regional war.

This should concern every Arab emirate. The Gulf monarchies must recognize that fragmented security policies only increase dependence on outside powers. No state, regardless of wealth, can indefinitely preserve sovereignty while outsourcing its strategic defense architecture to foreign military forces.

Today the pressure may revolve around Oman and the Strait of Hormuz. Tomorrow the same logic could be applied elsewhere in the Gulf under another security pretext.

The lesson is becoming impossible to ignore - Arab states must either develop a collective regional security framework based on mutual defense and strategic independence, or continue watching external powers shape the future of the Gulf according to their own geopolitical interests.

Pushing Iran to Edge a Dangerous Gamble

The recent US strikes on Iran during Eid ul Adha have intensified a growing perception across the Muslim world that Washington is no longer merely seeking deterrence, but is steadily pushing Tehran toward a position where unconditional surrender becomes the only acceptable outcome. Rightly or wrongly, this perception is gaining traction because of the open and silent backing extended by several regional allies, particularly some Arab states that view Iran primarily through the lens of strategic rivalry.

However, history shows that when powerful nations attempt to corner adversaries without offering a credible political exit, the consequences often become unpredictable and dangerous. States under extreme pressure rarely capitulate quietly. More often, they resort to asymmetric retaliation before losing the capability to respond altogether.

Iran’s leadership is fully aware that its strategic infrastructure, military facilities, energy assets, and regional influence networks remain under increasing pressure. If Tehran reaches the conclusion that its long-term survival is at stake, it may decide that escalation carries fewer risks than submission. That is the point where the entire region could enter a far more dangerous phase.

The uncomfortable reality is that the United States, because of geography, may remain relatively insulated from direct retaliation. The immediate exposure instead lies with neighboring Gulf countries hosting American military bases, intelligence facilities, naval deployments, and logistical infrastructure. In any expanded confrontation, these locations could rapidly transform into frontline targets.

Such a development would not only threaten regional security but could also severely disrupt global energy markets, maritime trade routes, and already fragile economies across the Middle East. Investors, energy importers, and governments around the world would all pay the price for a conflict that may initially appear limited but could spiral beyond control.

This is reason the present trajectory demands urgent diplomatic intervention rather than continued escalation. Strategic pressure may weaken an adversary temporarily, but humiliation-driven conflict rarely produces lasting stability. The Middle East has already witnessed enough wars born from miscalculation, proxy rivalries, and excessive military confidence.

The world must recognize the danger before events move beyond diplomacy. Pushing Iran to the edge may not produce surrender; it may instead trigger a retaliatory spiral whose consequences no regional actor can fully contain.

Trump’s Mirage of Iranian Surrender

The recent US military strikes in southern Iran—executed precisely as Iranian diplomats converged on Doha for peace talks—expose a calculated strategy that goes far beyond traditional non-proliferation.

While Washington publicly frames its objectives around Iran’s nuclear stockpile and the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz, the true epicenter of American foreign policy has shifted.

Under the current US administration, the conflict is no longer just about disarming Tehran; it is about leveraging military pressure to enforce a fundamental geopolitical restructuring of the Middle East.

This strategy became clear when President Donald Trump explicitly linked an Iranian ceasefire to a "mandatory" expansion of the Abraham Accords. By demanding that heavyweight Muslim nations like Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and Turkey immediately normalize ties with Israel, Washington is using the Gaza and Iran conflicts as diplomatic leverage. The underlying ambition is not a balanced regional equilibrium, but rather the creation of a US-backed, Israel-centric architecture that permanently sidelines Palestinian statehood and curtails sovereign dissent.

The "Great Deal" being offered to Tehran begins to resemble a demand for unconditional surrender. By weaponizing sanctions, frozen funds, and periodic airstrikes, the US is signaling that any relief for Iran is contingent on its capitulation to a new regional order.

However, attempting to fuse an Iran peace deal with a mandatory expansion of the Abraham Accords is a dangerous gamble. As regional analysts note, trading the fantasy of total Iranian capitulation for the illusion that a fragile ceasefire can anchor a brand-new Middle East order is highly unstable. Regional powers like Pakistan have already signaled that these issues cannot be artificially interlinked.

If Washington continues to condition maritime security and nuclear diplomacy on an ideological restructuring of the Muslim world, it will achieve neither peace nor stability. Instead of a "Great Deal," this heavy-handed approach risks collapsing ongoing diplomacy, leaving behind a more volatile, fractured, and deeply polarized Middle East.

MBS Silence and Strategic Pressure

The unusually restrained posture of Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MBS) during the ongoing US-Israel war on Iran reflects a deeper geopolitical shift unfolding across the Middle East. For decades, Washington’s regional strategy relied heavily on portraying Iran as the principal threat to Arab security. However, the China-brokered rapprochement between Saudi Arabia and Iran weakened that narrative and signaled growing strategic independence within the Gulf.

Equally significant is Riyadh’s continued reluctance to join the Abraham Accords despite persistent pressure from the United States. Several Gulf states now appear increasingly cautious about unconditional alignment with Washington’s regional priorities.

Against this backdrop, the renewed legal attention to the Jamal Khashoggi case in France carries significance beyond the human rights dimension alone. A French anti-terrorism judge has been tasked with investigating allegations linked to Khashoggi’s killing inside the Saudi consulate in Istanbul in 2018 — years after Turkey transferred proceedings to Saudi authorities and the United States effectively closed related civil litigation by granting immunity protections to MBS.

There is no evidence of direct political coordination behind the French inquiry. Yet, in geopolitics, timing often shapes perception as much as facts themselves. The reopening of a dormant controversy at a moment of visible divergence between Washington and Riyadh inevitably invites broader strategic interpretation.

Whether the renewed focus on Khashoggi is purely judicial or partly geopolitical may become clearer in the months ahead, particularly if tensions between the United States and Saudi Arabia continue to widen.

UAE and Fractured Middle East

Since endorsing the Abraham Accords, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) has recast itself as a forward-looking state prioritizing economic opportunity over ideological rigidity. Normalization with Israel opened avenues in trade, technology, and finance, but it also stirred unease across sections of the Muslim world, where the move is still viewed as a departure from collective positioning on Palestine.

The discomfort is not merely rhetorical. Within parts of the Arab region, policy circles continue to debate whether such outreach weakens negotiating leverage on longstanding geopolitical disputes. Even in the United States—a principal architect of the accords—analysts have quietly flagged the risks of accelerated realignments that outpace regional stability.

Dubai’s rise as a global financial hub adds complexity to this equation. Increased capital flows, including those linked to Israeli networks, have energized its economy, but they also expose it to heightened scrutiny in an era of sanctions enforcement and financial transparency. Longstanding discussions in compliance circles about the emirate’s role in facilitating trade with Iran further underscore the delicate balance it must maintain.

Recent regional tensions have brought these vulnerabilities into sharper focus. Reports of attacks targeting strategic assets in Dubai—amid conflicting narratives about their origin—highlight a critical reality, economic hubs cannot remain insulated from geopolitical rivalries.

The UAE’s strategy reflects ambition and pragmatism, but also risk. In a region where alliances shift rapidly, economic integration without parallel security insulation may prove a fragile proposition.

Israel: Promise of Stability Remains Fragile

At 78, Israel remains a study in contrasts—secure yet unsettled, integrated yet isolated within its immediate neighborhood. Its relations with bordering states reveal a pattern shaped less by reconciliation and more by necessity.

With Egypt and Jordan, Israel has maintained durable—if cold—peace. The framework established after the Camp David Accords continues to hold, anchored in security coordination and shared concerns over militancy and border stability. These ties are transactional, not transformative, reflecting mutual restraint rather than genuine normalization.

On its northern front, the equation turns volatile. Lebanon remains locked in a cycle of tension with Israel, largely driven by the influence of Hezbollah. Deterrence has prevented full-scale war in recent years, but the absence of a political settlement ensures that the border remains one miscalculation away from escalation.

In Syria, hostility persists in a more fragmented form. Israel’s periodic strikes targeting Iranian-linked assets underscore a broader contest with Iran for regional influence. Syria’s internal disarray has limited direct confrontation but has also entrenched a shadow conflict that resists closure.

The most enduring and consequential relationship remains with Palestine. Here, there is neither peace nor stable deterrence—only recurring cycles of confrontation. The unresolved status of Palestinians continues to define Israel’s regional image and constrains its acceptance among Arab publics, regardless of evolving state-level ties.

At 78, Israel has achieved military superiority and economic resilience, yet its neighborhood tells a more restrained story. Peace exists, but without warmth. Conflict is contained, but not resolved.

The result is a strategic environment where coexistence is managed, not embraced—and where the promise of stability remains persistently fragile.

US–Riyadh Dialogue Enters a New Phase

The meeting between Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman and US President Donald Trump signals not just a diplomatic engagement but a recalibration of one of the most consequential bilateral relationships in modern geopolitics. Both sides arrive with clear agendas, yet the regional landscape they must navigate has changed dramatically. As Washington pushes for investments, defence arrangements, and normalization with Israel, Riyadh appears more cautious, more self-assured, and far less willing to accept old formulas.

For Trump, the objectives are straightforward: 1) secure a massive US$500 billion Saudi investment, 2) persuade the Kingdom to join the Abraham Accords, and 3) lock in lucrative arms deals. His administration is presenting the visit as an opportunity to “broaden ties,” spanning commerce, technology, and even nuclear cooperation.

It is MBS’s first US trip since Jamal Khashoggi’s killing in 2018 — an event that caused global outrage but has now been diplomatically “moved past” in Washington’s narrative. Trump is expected to again sidestep human rights concerns, focusing instead on transactional gains.

Saudi investment on the scale of half a trillion dollars carries inherent risks for the Kingdom. Such deep financial exposure would place Riyadh firmly within Washington’s strategic orbit, making it vulnerable to political pressure from the US and, by extension, from Israel. The Kingdom knows that once its capital becomes entrenched in the American economy, it loses critical room for maneuver in foreign policy.

The second US priority — coaxing Riyadh into the Abraham Accords — remains far more complex. Saudi Arabia has outlined clear conditions for recognizing Israel, yet Trump’s approach relies more on pressuring Riyadh than moderating Israeli policies. MBS is acutely aware of the domestic, religious, and geopolitical sensitivities tied to formal ties with Israel. Entering the Accords without significant concessions from Tel Aviv would carry unpredictable consequences at home and across the Muslim world.

Washington’s third objective, securing large defence deals, is no longer guaranteed. The longstanding US narrative portraying Iran as the Kingdom’s chief threat justified decades of American arms sales. But with Riyadh and Tehran now engaged in détente — shifting from “foes” to “friends” — the rationale for massive weapons purchases has eroded. The Kingdom today sees no imminent adversary that requires US arsenals.

The old oil-for-security arrangement has weakened. Saudi Arabia now seeks more — a formal defence pact ratified by Congress, nuclear cooperation, and access to advanced AI technologies central to its Vision 2030 aspirations. Washington may instead offer a limited executive-order commitment, far from the ironclad guarantee Riyadh desires.

MBS arrives United States with ambition but also clarity. Trump may push hard, but the Kingdom is no longer willing to operate under outdated assumptions. The Washington–Riyadh dialogue is indeed entering a new phase — one defined not by dependence, but by negotiation, recalibration, and a shifting balance of power.

A Careful Moment for US–Saudi Diplomacy

Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s upcoming visit to Washington promises to be one of the most closely watched diplomatic engagements of the year. President Donald Trump has already framed the event as an occasion to “honor Saudi Arabia, the Crown Prince,” signalling both warmth and strategic intent. The White House is preparing pageantry normally reserved for a full state visit—an unmistakable sign of the value Washington places on Riyadh. Yet amid the ceremony and high-level meetings, a measure of prudence will serve both sides well.

The Crown Prince’s itinerary reflects the depth of the US–Saudi partnership. Tuesday begins with a formal welcome on the South Lawn, followed by an Oval Office meeting and the signing of important economic and defense agreements. A high-profile dinner in the East Room and a major US-Saudi Business Council gathering the following day underscore the widening scope of cooperation. President Trump has repeatedly spoken of his “very special relationship” with Prince Mohammed, calling him an “incredible man” and even a friend. That message alone sets a favourable tone for the visit.

However, American political culture is uniquely sensitive to past controversies—particularly those amplified by the media. The tragic killing of a Saudi journalist several years ago generated intense debate in Washington, some of which still lingers in parts of the political class. Although the matter has long been addressed at the state level, it has not entirely faded from public memory. In such an environment, even the most ceremonial visits can attract renewed scrutiny.

It is in this context that a gentle reminder becomes relevant - diplomatic engagements at this level benefit immensely from careful messaging, coordinated outreach, and an awareness of how quickly narratives can be revived. Such caution is not a criticism of either leader; rather, it is a recognition of the complexities of contemporary geopolitics.

Ultimately, the Crown Prince’s visit offers a valuable opportunity to reaffirm a partnership that remains central to Gulf stability and global economic cooperation. By keeping the focus on shared goals and forward-looking dialogue, both Riyadh and Washington can ensure that the visit strengthens ties, reinforces mutual respect, and avoids distractions that serve neither side.

Israel’s Obsession with Iran: Supremacy, Not Survival

Israel presents its confrontation with Iran as a fight for survival. It propagates Tehran seeks its destruction, and therefore preemptive action is necessary. Yet behind this rhetoric lies a harder reality—Israel’s true concern is not annihilation but the erosion of its strategic supremacy.

At the center of this tension is Iran’s nuclear program. Israel is the Middle East’s only nuclear power, though it never admits it officially. For decades it has enjoyed this monopoly as the ultimate insurance policy.

Iran, even without a bomb, is branded an existential menace. What alarms Tel Aviv is not that Tehran would attack with nuclear weapons, but that a nuclear-capable Iran would undermine Israel’s unrivaled leverage. In other words, it is not fear of destruction, but fear of parity.

The second driver is Iran’s support for resistance groups. Hezbollah in Lebanon, Hamas and Islamic Jihad in Gaza—these are not armies that can topple Israel, but they have repeatedly punctured its aura of invincibility. Each rocket barrage, each fortified position along the border, is viewed in Tel Aviv as an extension of Iranian influence, shrinking Israel’s space for unchecked action.

Ideology intensifies the clash. Iran refuses to recognize Israel, while Israeli leaders—from Netanyahu onward—frame Tehran as the new Nazi Germany. This absolutist narrative forecloses compromise and justifies covert assassinations, cyber sabotage, airstrikes in Syria, and endless lobbying for harsher sanctions.

The deeper layer is geopolitical. Among Middle Eastern states, only Iran possesses the population, resources, and regional reach to contest Israel’s dominance. Neutralizing Tehran means securing Israel’s role as the region’s undisputed military power—backed by Washington, tolerated by Arab monarchies, and free to redraw the political map to its liking.

Israel’s Iran obsession is not about survival. It is about ensuring that no other state can balance its power. By disguising this pursuit of supremacy as self-defense, Israel sustains a cycle of hostility that makes genuine peace impossible.

The world buys the existential threat narrative, but the truth is starker - Israel seeks not containment of Iran, but its permanent crippling.

 

Arab Silence on Iran Sanctions: Hypocrisy at Its Peak

When Western powers tighten the noose of sanctions on Iran, one would expect Muslim nations—bound by faith and shared history—to object. Yet the Arab capitals remain silent, some even nodding in approval. Why? Because geopolitics has conveniently buried the idea of the Ummah.

For decades, Arab regimes have painted Iran not as a fellow Muslim state but as a sectarian rival, a destabilizing Shia power encroaching on their Sunni domains. From Hezbollah in Lebanon to the Houthis in Yemen, Tehran’s fingerprints unsettle Arab rulers. For them, US-led sanctions are not injustice—these are containment.

Add to this the dependency on Washington. The Gulf monarchies thrive on American protection, arms, and trade. To defy US diktats is to risk the very foundations of their security. So they remain mute, even when sanctions cripple ordinary Iranians.

These same states cry foul over Palestine, condemn Western double standards in Gaza, and rally Muslim solidarity—only to abandon it when it comes to Iran. The truth is simple - Arab rulers see a weakened Iran as good for oil markets, good for their regimes, and good for their new friends in Tel Aviv.

Sanctions on Iran are discriminatory, yes. But the bigger betrayal is the silence of Arab leaders who claim to defend Muslim dignity yet quietly cheer when one of their own is strangled.

Time for Muslims to take collective actions against Israel

For more than 700 days killing of Gazans has continued unabated, but the Muslim rulers have not gone beyond condemnation of Israeli attacks. Now, Israel has killed the political leaders of Hamas in the Qatari capital Doha on Tuesday and only condemnation in very soft words has come. Let us find why can't Muslim rulers go beyond condemnation of Israeli terrorism?

In our opinion, it is a pertinent and important question. The repeated condemnations without meaningful action by most Muslim-majority states in response to Israeli aggression—especially in Gaza—stem from a complex mix of geopolitical, economic, and internal factors. Some of the main reasons are:

Dependence on the West

Many Muslim countries, particularly in the Middle East, rely heavily on the United States and Europe for security, trade, investment, and military technology. They fear, taking decisive action against Israel risks sanctions, aid cuts, or political isolation.

Deep Split

The Muslim world is deeply fragmented—Sunni vs Shia, Arab vs non-Arab, monarchies vs republics. This has resulted in rivalries (Saudi Arabia vs Iran, Turkey vs Gulf monarchies) those prevent a unified front.

Normalization and Hidden Ties with Israel

Several Arab states (UAE, Bahrain, Morocco, and Sudan) have normalized relations through the Abraham Accords, and many others maintain covert cooperation.

Economic Vulnerabilities

Oil-rich states depend on stable exports, foreign investment, and dollar-based trade. Poorer Muslim countries (Pakistan, Bangladesh, Egypt, etc.) face IMF pressure and debt traps, limiting foreign policy freedom.

Fear of Internal Unrest

Leaders worry that pushing too hard against Israel, in other words the United States could invite political or regime change attempts. Authoritarian governments fear that pro-Palestine activism could spill over into broader dissent.

Lack of Unanimity

The Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) has been reduced to a symbolic forum, issuing statements but lacking enforcement mechanisms or collective security structures.

Strategic Silence

Some leaders prefer Israel as a silent partner in intelligence, cyber, and defense, especially against Iran, Hezbollah, or Islamist movements that threaten their regimes.

Therefore, Muslim countries remain stuck between public outrage and private interests. Condemnation is the safest path—it appeases their populations without risking ties with Washington or destabilizing their regimes.

Enough is enough, now the time has come to take concrete steps. Here are some realistic and concrete steps Muslim countries could take—short of direct war—if they truly wanted to go beyond mere condemnation of Israeli aggression:

Economic Measures

Oil & Gas Leverage:

Gulf states could coordinate an oil embargo or selective supply restrictions targeting Israel’s allies, similar to the 1973 Arab oil embargo.

Boycott and Divestment:

Governments could ban trade with Israeli firms and pressure companies operating in Israel to disengage.

Sanctions on Israeli Goods: Restrict imports of Israeli agricultural, tech, or defense products.

Diplomatic Pressure

Expel Ambassadors:

Muslim countries with relations (UAE, Bahrain, Morocco, Turkey, Egypt, Jordan) could downgrade or cut diplomatic ties.

Global Legal Action:

Refer Israel to the International Criminal Court (ICC) collectively, instead of leaving it to NGOs.

Block Normalization:

States like Saudi Arabia could halt normalization talks, signaling that Palestine remains a red line.

Political Unity

Revitalize the OIC:

Transform it from a talk shop into an action body: joint resolutions, emergency summits with binding decisions.

Joint Palestine Fund:

Pool resources into a sovereign fund for Gaza reconstruction and Palestinian self-sufficiency.

Collective Lobbying at UN:

Use numbers (57 Muslim countries) to push binding UN resolutions, even if the U.S. vetoes in the Security Council.

Strategic Non-Military Support

Humanitarian Corridors:

Use leverage with Egypt and Jordan to ensure permanent aid corridors into Gaza.

Technology and Cyber Support:

Provide Palestinians with communication tools, cybersecurity, and medical technology to resist siege conditions.

Intelligence Sharing:

Quietly pass on information that can protect Palestinian civilians from strikes.

Symbolic but High-Impact Moves

Suspend Flights to Tel Aviv:

Muslim-majority airlines could suspend services, disrupting Israel’s connectivity.

Cultural and Sports Boycotts:

Ban Israeli teams from participating in sporting events in Muslim countries.

Public Accountability:

Name and shame Muslim leaders who maintain cozy ties with Israel while condemning it publicly.

Trump urges Syrian President to sign Abraham Accords with Israel

According to media reports, US President Donald Trump urged Syrian President Ahmed Al-Sharaa to sign the Abraham Accords with Israel during their meeting ahead of the GCC summit in Riyadh on Wednesday.

The US leader added that he is also looking to normalize relations with Sharaa. The meeting between the two comes one day after Trump said that the US was lifting sanctions on Syria.

Trump told the Syrian leader he has "a tremendous opportunity to do something historic in his country," according to an official statement by White House Press Secretary Karoline Leavitt.

Trump also urged Sharaa to tell all foreign terrorists to leave Syria, deport Palestinian terrorists, help the US to prevent the resurgence of ISIS, and assume responsibility for ISIS detention centers in the northeastern parts of the country.

Shaara affirmed his commitment to the 1974 disengagement with Israel, the White House statement continued, recognized the opportunities of Iranians leaving Syria, and expressed interest in joint US-Syrian efforts in combating terrorism and eliminating chemical weapons.

Trump also said that his Middle East trip doesn't push Israel aside, saying, "I think it's very good for Israel."

Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman was also present in the meeting, and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan joined by video conference. Erdogan and the Saudi Crown Prince praised Trump for lifting the sanctions on Syria, Leavitt said.

Saudi Foreign Minister Faisal bin Farhan Al Saud said that Saudi Arabia would support Syria's economic recovery and thanked Trump for lifting US sanctions on Syria. He said that there are many investment opportunities in Syria after lifting US sanctions, possibly a "breakthrough" in Saudi support for Syria.