Who Governs Yemen?

The emergency meeting of Yemen's Presidential Leadership Council in Riyadh over Iran's direct flight to Sanaa raises a fundamental question, who actually governs Yemen today?

The Council described the flight as a violation of Yemen's sovereignty and international law. Yet the very fact that the country's internationally recognized leadership convened outside Yemen inevitably invites scrutiny.

Governments derive legitimacy not only from international recognition but also from their ability to exercise effective authority over their own territory. In practical terms, the Houthis control Sanaa and much of northern Yemen, while the Presidential Leadership Council continues to rely heavily on external political and security support.

This reality reflects the uncomfortable truth that Yemen has evolved into a battleground where competing regional and global powers pursue strategic interests through local actors. Iran openly backs the Houthis, while the internationally recognized government enjoys diplomatic and military support from a coalition led by Saudi Arabia and backed by the United States.

The strategic significance of Yemen extends far beyond its internal politics. Sitting at the entrance to the Red Sea through the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, Yemen occupies one of the world's most critical maritime chokepoints. Whoever influences this corridor can affect international trade, energy supplies, and naval movements linking Europe and Asia.

It is therefore unsurprising that many analysts believe the broader contest in Yemen is less about restoring democratic governance and more about securing geopolitical influence over one of the world's busiest shipping routes. In this interpretation, Washington's overriding objective is to maintain strategic leverage over the Red Sea, while regional allies inevitably become participants in a much larger geopolitical competition.

Saudi Arabia is frequently portrayed as the principal architect of Yemen's prolonged conflict. Such a characterization, however, overlooks the wider strategic calculations of global powers. Riyadh has undoubtedly made decisions that attract criticism, but reducing the conflict to a Saudi-Iran rivalry ignores the interests of larger actors whose strategic priorities extend well beyond Yemen itself.

The tragedy is that while external powers compete for influence over a vital maritime corridor, the Yemeni people continue to pay the highest price. The real battle may not simply be for Yemen, but for control of one of the world's most strategically important waterways.

Who Will Control Strait of Hormuz?

The debate over the future control of the Strait of Hormuz has moved beyond naval deployments and freedom of navigation. It has become a question of sovereignty, regional power balance, and who will shape the security architecture of one of the world’s most important maritime corridors.

The basic question is straightforward: who will provide security to ships and their crews, and in return, who will collect charges for ensuring safe passage? Geographically, the Strait lies between Iran and Oman, making these two coastal states the natural stakeholders in any future arrangement.

For decades, the Gulf security framework was built around a strong American military presence. The United States played a major role in protecting maritime routes and reassuring regional allies. However, the geopolitical landscape has changed. Past arrangements no longer fully reflect current realities.

Iran, despite years of sanctions and pressure, has emerged as a major regional power with significant influence over Gulf security dynamics. Its location at the Strait of Hormuz provides it with a strategic position that cannot be ignored. Any future framework governing the waterway will have to acknowledge Iran’s role as a neighbouring coastal state.

At the same time, Arab states are reassessing the assumption that their long-term security can depend entirely on external guarantees. The perception that Washington’s regional priorities are closely linked with Israel’s security interests has encouraged some Gulf countries to reconsider the balance between strategic partnerships and regional self-reliance.

This does not mean that the United States has lost its influence in the Gulf. Its military presence, diplomatic reach, and economic relationships remain significant. However, influence is different from ownership. A foreign security role does not automatically translate into authority over a waterway located within the jurisdiction of coastal states.

The discussion over Iran’s proposed transit charge — reportedly around one dollar per barrel — highlights the larger issue. Financially, such a fee may appear limited when compared with global oil prices. The real significance is political: accepting such an arrangement would symbolize recognition of a greater regional role for Iran.

The Strait of Hormuz carries a substantial share of global energy supplies. Any disruption affects oil, gas, fertilizer, food costs, and global inflation. Therefore, the world has a direct interest in stability and predictable rules.

The future of Hormuz may not be determined only by military strength. It will depend on whether a new regional understanding emerges — one that balances international navigation rights with the legitimate interests of countries bordering the Strait.

The central question is no longer whether Iran and Oman have influence over Hormuz. They already do. The real question is whether the world is prepared for a new security arrangement where regional powers play a greater role in managing regional affairs.

If Strait of Hormuz Reopens: Gainers and Loses

The reopening of the Strait of Hormuz marks more than the restoration of a critical energy route. It represents a strategic moment where the assumptions, calculations, and objectives of major stakeholders must be reassessed. In modern geopolitics, victory is not always measured by battlefield outcomes; sometimes it is determined by who achieves their strategic objectives after the crisis ends.

For Israel, the outcome may raise difficult questions. A key objective behind applying pressure on Iran was to weaken its regional influence and constrain its ability to support allied groups. However, the restoration of energy flows and economic activity reduces the effectiveness of any strategy based primarily on economic isolation. A pressured Iran may have suffered setbacks, but it retains the ability to rebuild influence through diplomacy, regional partnerships, and economic recovery.

Similarly, Iran’s regional allies, including Hezbollah, may find an opportunity to reassess and recover from recent challenges. A reduction in confrontation gives Tehran greater space to redirect resources and rebuild political and strategic networks. However, recovery will depend not only on external support but also on internal dynamics and changing regional realities.

The economic impact extends beyond the Middle East. A decline in oil prices following the reopening of the Strait could hurt profitability for some high-cost oil producers, including segments of the US energy industry that benefited from elevated prices. At the same time, cheaper energy provides relief to consumers and industries worldwide, demonstrating that geopolitical events create winners and losers simultaneously.

The broader challenge, however, concerns the perception of American strategic dominance. For decades, the United States has maintained significant influence in the Gulf through security partnerships, military presence, and arms relationships. If Iran emerges from the crisis with its core capabilities intact, questions will be raised about the effectiveness of pressure-based strategies.

Regional countries may increasingly seek a more balanced foreign policy, avoiding excessive dependence on any single power. This could accelerate a trend toward strategic autonomy and diversified alliances.

The reopening of the Strait of Hormuz should therefore not be viewed simply as a victory or defeat for any one country. It highlights a deeper reality: in a multipolar world, even the strongest powers face limits. The future of the Middle East will depend less on coercion and more on the ability of nations to negotiate, adapt, and coexist.

Iran-US sign MOU: Pause in Conflict, Not End

With the signing of the memorandum of understanding (MOU), attention is shifting from military confrontation to political interpretation. As details emerge, supporters and critics in all three capitals—Washington, Tel Aviv, and Tehran—are attempting to define the agreement on their own terms. Such reactions are hardly surprising. In geopolitical disputes, agreements are often judged less by what they contain than by how they are perceived.

For the United States, the immediate achievement is the avoidance of a wider regional conflict. Washington can argue that a combination of military pressure and diplomacy brought Iran to the negotiating table without requiring a prolonged war. The agreement also helps contain risks to global energy supplies and international markets. However, the US administration may still face difficult questions. If Iran retains substantial strategic capabilities, critics may argue that the objectives initially articulated by Washington have only been partially achieved.

Israel can claim that its security concerns have been elevated to the center of international diplomacy. Any restrictions on Iran's military or nuclear-related activities would be viewed as a tangible gain. Yet Israeli policymakers are likely to remain cautious. Their primary concern has never been the signing of an agreement but the effectiveness of its enforcement. For Israel, verification may prove more important than the commitments themselves.

Iran, meanwhile, appears to have secured what it has long sought: relief from mounting economic and military pressure while preserving national sovereignty. Reduced sanctions pressure and improved economic prospects could provide much-needed support to the Iranian economy. At the same time, Tehran must convince domestic audiences that any commitments undertaken do not compromise its strategic independence or regional standing.

The agreement therefore creates opportunities as well as dilemmas for all three stakeholders. The United States seeks stability without appearing weak. Israel seeks security without relying solely on diplomacy. Iran seeks economic relief without sacrificing strategic autonomy.

Ultimately, the significance of the MOU will not be determined by its wording but by its durability. If implemented in good faith, it could reduce tensions in one of the world's most volatile regions. If mistrust and competing interpretations prevail, the agreement may be remembered not as a settlement, but as a temporary pause between successive crises.

The Whole World Is Losing, Except the US

My point is clear, the United States must acknowledge defeat, ensure the full reopening of the Strait of Hormuz, lift economic sanctions on Iran, and compensate for the losses incurred during this war. Enough time has passed, and there is no justification for portraying defeat as victory.

The ongoing negotiations between the United States and Iran are increasingly becoming a rhetorical exercise rather than a strategic achievement. The ambitious campaign launched in coordination with Israel to curb Iran’s regional influence and nuclear development has failed to accomplish its stated objectives.

It would not be incorrect to say that Iran’s regional significance has increased, its negotiating posture has become more assertive, and its capacity to withstand economic pressure has proven far stronger than anticipated. After weeks of diplomacy, fundamental differences remain unresolved due to US intransigence, leaving the talks far from any meaningful breakthrough.

The situation in and around the Strait of Hormuz underscores US miscalculations and Iran’s leverage, while exposing the vulnerability of oil-exporting countries that rely heavily on American security guarantees. The US blockade of the Strait has reduced the daily movement of approximately 140 vessels to only a handful of oil and LNG carriers.

The consequences have been staggering. Oil-exporting Arab states are facing uncertain revenues, while energy-importing economies are grappling with inflationary pressures and severe supply disruptions.

Despite these grim realities, Washington’s rhetoric continues to speak of progress and opportunity. Such claims stand in stark contrast to the facts and appear to be an attempt to reframe strategic underperformance as diplomatic success. This only reinforces the perception of a policy being pursued without clear goals, direction, or achievable objectives.

The central point is now unmistakable - the longer the truth is denied, the greater the price the rest of the world will be forced to pay.

 

Israel’s Security Paradox: Strength Without Psychological Closure

Benjamin Netanyahu’s long political dominance has coincided with one of the most turbulent phases in Israel’s modern security history. For his supporters, he represents strategic clarity in a hostile region. For critics, his era reflects the entrenchment of a permanent conflict mindset. Both interpretations, in different ways, touch the same underlying reality - Israel’s security condition today is defined as much by perception as by power.

Militarily, Israel remains one of the most capable states in the Middle East. Its intelligence infrastructure, air power, and multi-layered defence systems have significantly strengthened deterrence. Several adversaries are either weakened, fragmented, or operating under constraints not seen in previous decades. From a purely conventional standpoint, Israel’s strategic position appears more secure than in many earlier phases of its history.

Yet this is only one side of the equation. On the ground, security is not experienced in abstract balances of power. It is experienced through sirens, shelters, alerts, and the unpredictability of escalation. For civilians—particularly children growing up amid periodic conflict—security becomes a lived rhythm rather than a stable condition. Even when attacks are intercepted or contained, the psychological imprint of uncertainty remains. This is where Israel’s central paradox emerges - growing military strength has not translated into a proportional sense of psychological security.

The reason lies in the changing nature of conflict. Traditional wars between defined states have increasingly been replaced by asymmetric threats—rockets, proxy forces, cross-border raids, and regional instability. These forms of confrontation do not require parity to create disruption; they require only unpredictability. As a result, even a militarily dominant state can remain socially alert, frequently mobilized, and psychologically exposed.

Within Israeli society, this produces a dual perception. One strand believes Israel is stronger than ever, capable of managing multiple fronts simultaneously. Another strand, equally present, sees a country that remains encircled not necessarily by conventional armies, but by persistent and evolving threats that rarely disappear entirely.

Netanyahu’s political approach has reinforced this condition of “managed insecurity”—a doctrine in which deterrence is maintained not by eliminating threats, but by continuously containing them. This may strengthen strategic positioning in the short term, but it also prevents a full transition from conflict management to post-conflict normalcy.

The result is a society that oscillates between confidence and anxiety. Military superiority coexists with civilian vulnerability. Tactical successes coexist with strategic uncertainty. And periods of calm are often interpreted not as resolution, but as interludes between escalations.

The question is not whether Israelis believe their enemies are weaker or stronger. The more accurate question is whether they believe threats can ever be fully removed from their horizon.

For many, the answer remains uncertain. And it is in that uncertainty—more than in battlefield outcomes—that Israel’s modern security condition is ultimately defined.

Blockade of Strait of Hormuz: A Symptom, Not the Disease

The rising tension surrounding the Strait of Hormuz is once again dominating global headlines. Yet portraying the crisis merely as a maritime security dispute risks missing the broader geopolitical picture. The threat of disruption in one of the world's most critical energy corridors is not an isolated event; it reflects deeper and long-standing strategic tensions in the Middle East. Military posturing at sea may be the visible manifestation of the crisis, but the roots extend far beyond naval deployments.

At the center of the dispute lies the decades-long confrontation between the United States and Iran, shaped by disagreements over Tehran's nuclear ambitions, missile capabilities, regional influence, and economic sanctions. Successive rounds of sanctions have sought to pressure Iran into altering its strategic behavior, while Iran has argued that these measures amount to economic coercion intended to weaken its sovereignty and limit its regional role.

Supporters of sanctions maintain that economic pressure remains an important instrument for preventing nuclear proliferation and deterring regional escalation.

Critics, however, argue that prolonged sanctions have often generated unintended consequences, hardening positions rather than creating space for sustainable diplomacy. This divergence reflects one of the most enduring debates in international relations - whether coercive pressure changes behavior or merely deepens confrontation.

Questions regarding global non-proliferation policies have further complicated the debate. Critics often point to perceived inconsistencies in the international system, particularly concerning different approaches toward regional nuclear capabilities. Such perceptions, whether fully justified or not, contribute to mistrust and reinforce narratives of unequal treatment.

The Strait of Hormuz therefore should not be viewed solely through the narrow lens of maritime access or freedom of navigation. Any temporary reduction in tensions at sea may provide immediate relief to energy markets, but lasting stability is unlikely to emerge without addressing the wider political and economic disputes that continue to fuel confrontation.

The lesson is straightforward - blockades and naval tensions are symptoms of deeper geopolitical fractures. Addressing the symptom may calm markets for a time, but durable stability requires resolution of the underlying political disputes that continue to shape the region's strategic landscape.

Dubai’s Dangerous Drift

For decades, Dubai built its prosperity on neutrality, commerce, and strategic pragmatism. It transformed itself into the Middle East’s leading financial and logistics hub by staying open to all sides. Today that carefully cultivated image appears increasingly at risk as the emirate seems to drift into a broader US-led confrontation with Iran.

Recent tensions with Saudi Arabia, speculation surrounding its future role in OPEC, and growing American pressure to assume a larger regional security role have created an uncomfortable perception that Dubai may be abandoning neutrality for geopolitical adventurism.

That could prove dangerously costly.

Dubai’s economic strength depends overwhelmingly on foreign investment, tourism, trade, and financial services. Unlike larger regional powers, it possesses limited industrial and manufacturing depth to absorb prolonged geopolitical shocks. The moment investors sense instability, capital flight can begin rapidly. Financial centers survive on confidence, not military alliances.

Geography further magnifies the risk. Iran lies directly across the Gulf. In any military escalation, ports, airports, financial districts, and energy infrastructure become exposed targets. Even limited retaliation could disrupt shipping lanes, damage investors’ sentiments, and undermine Dubai’s carefully built reputation as a safe commercial gateway.

Another uncomfortable reality is often overlooked. While Israel may welcome Gulf normalization politically, it also views regional influence competitively. Dubai’s emergence as a dominant commercial and logistics hub does not necessarily align with Israeli ambitions to become the region’s undisputed technological and economic powerhouse.

Critical assets such as Jebel Ali Port and Port of Fujairah are central not only to Gulf trade, but also to global supply chains. Dubai became successful by avoiding regional confrontations. Abandoning that balance may expose the emirate to consequences far beyond its calculations.

Dubai’s Departure from Strategic Neutrality

For decades, Dubai’s greatest strength was not oil, military power, or ideology. Its success rested on something far more valuable - strategic neutrality. Long before the Abraham Accords, Dubai had developed deep commercial relations with Iran. Iranian traders, investors, and businesses contributed significantly to Dubai’s emergence as the Gulf’s financial and trading hub. Geography, commerce, and pragmatism kept the relationship functional despite periodic political tensions. That balance now appears dangerously fragile.

The recent regional escalation involving Israel, backed firmly by the United States, has fundamentally altered Gulf dynamics. Once confrontation expanded beyond rhetoric, countries hosting American military infrastructure inevitably became exposed to Iranian retaliation. The message from Tehran was unmistakable - no state facilitating strategic pressure against Iran can expect complete immunity from the consequences.

Dubai today faces a strategic contradiction. On one hand, closer ties with Israel promise access to advanced technology, intelligence cooperation, and stronger alignment with Western security interests. On the other hand, this growing partnership risks eroding the very foundations of Dubai’s economic model.

Global investors do not merely seek modern infrastructure or luxury skylines; they seek predictability and stability. Dubai’s ports, aviation industry, tourism sector, and re-export businesses all depend upon the perception that the emirate remains insulated from regional conflict. Persistent hostility with Iran threatens that perception.

The Gulf cannot afford a prolonged environment where trade routes remain vulnerable, energy corridors uncertain, and geopolitical tensions permanently elevated. Iran, despite sanctions and diplomatic isolation, remains a pivotal regional actor with influence over critical maritime routes and strategic leverage that cannot simply be ignored.

The real danger for Dubai is not military confrontation alone. It is the gradual loss of its carefully cultivated identity as a neutral gateway between competing powers. History shows that commercial centers flourish when they build bridges, not when they become extensions of geopolitical rivalries.

Dubai’s growing closeness with Israel may deliver short-term strategic gains, but if it destroys regional economic equilibrium, the long-term costs could far outweigh the immediate benefits.

Araghchi urges BRICS nations to condemn US-Israel aggression against Iran

Iranian foreign minister Abbas Araghchi on Thursday urged BRICS nations to condemn what he called violations of ‌international law by the United States and Israel, including "their illegal aggression" against his country.

His remarks at a two-day meeting in New Delhi underscore divisions within the expanded BRICS bloc, as the US-Israeli war on Iran casts a shadow over the gathering of foreign ministers.

Araghchi criticized Washington, describing the war as "illegal expansionism and warmongering," and said Iran remained open to diplomacy while being ready to defend itself "with ⁠all available means."

"Iran therefore calls upon BRICS member states and all responsible members of the international community to explicitly condemn violations of international law by the United States and Israel," he said.

The conflict, which began on February 28, has heightened geopolitical tensions and sparked a global energy crisis.

In his opening remarks, Indian Foreign Minister S. Jaishankar struck a cautious tone, avoiding direct criticism while stressing the importance of stability.

"The conflict in West Asia merits particular attention," Jaishankar said, without naming specific countries.

He said unimpeded maritime flows through international waterways, including the Strait of Hormuz ⁠and the Red Sea, were vital for global economic well-being.

He also flagged concerns over the growing use of unilateral sanctions, a longstanding point of contention among BRICS members.

"There is an increasing resort to unilateral ⁠coercive measures and sanctions inconsistent with international law and the UN Charter," he said. "Such measures disproportionately affect developing countries. These unjustifiable measures cannot substitute dialogue, nor can pressure replace diplomacy."

Jaishankar added that emerging economies expect BRICS to play a "constructive and stabilizing role" at a time of rising geopolitical fragmentation and economic uncertainty.

The grouping, originally comprising Brazil, Russia, India and China, was expanded to include South Africa in 2011, and more recently admitted Egypt, Ethiopia, Indonesia, Iran and the United Arab Emirates (UAE).

The expansion has boosted its global weight but also increased internal divergences on geopolitical issues. India holds the BRICS chair for 2026.

Iran's stance could make it difficult for BRICS — which operates by consensus — to agree on a joint statement, given the UAE’s presence on the opposing side.

Iran has launched numerous attacks on the UAE and other neighboring countries.

The effective closure of the Strait of Hormuz — a ‌critical artery ⁠that handles roughly a fifth of global oil shipments — has triggered one of the biggest supply disruptions in recent history.

The curbs on tanker traffic have pushed crude prices sharply higher, fuelling fears of renewed inflation, tighter financial conditions and a potential global economic slowdown, particularly for energy-importing economies such as India.

Separately, India's foreign ministry said on Thursday that an Indian-flagged ship was attacked off the coast of Oman on Wednesday and all crew on board were safe.

"The ⁠attack ... is unacceptable and we deplore the fact that commercial shipping and civilian mariners continue to be targeted."

However, two LPG tankers announcing India as their destination have crossed the Strait of Hormuz between Wednesday and Thursday, ship tracking data indicates.

The Marshall Islands-flagged Symi and Vietnam-flagged NV Sunshine are the first India-bound energy tankers to transit the fraught waters of the Strait of Hormuz in nearly two weeks. Both the LPG tankers have stated Gujarat’s Kandla port as their intended destination.

So far, 10 India-flagged vessels—nine LPG tankers and one crude oil tanker—have crossed the Strait of Hormuz since early March.

 

Trump: Diplomat, Opportunist, Hypocrite or Simply a Gambler?

The latest headline in Nikkei Asia — “Trump calls Xi ‘great leader,’ vows ties will be better than ever” — once again exposes the extraordinary contradictions that define the politics of US President, Donald Trump. Only recently, Trump had declared that the United States did not require Chinese cooperation to deal with a possible blockade of the Strait of Hormuz. At the same time, Washington continued tightening sanctions targeting the movement of Iranian oil to China while portraying Beijing as America’s principal strategic adversary.

The sudden shift in tone raises a serious question, who exactly is Donald Trump — a diplomat, an opportunist, a hypocrite, or simply a political gambler?

Diplomacy normally relies on consistency, credibility, and strategic clarity. Trump’s style appears fundamentally different. His statements often seem driven less by coherent long-term policy and more by immediate political or economic convenience. One-day China is accused of exploiting global trade, weakening American industry, and threatening international security. The next day, Xi Jinping is described as a “great leader” and bilateral relations are promised a bright future.

Such contradictions may energize domestic political audiences, but these simultaneously weaken America’s diplomatic credibility abroad. Allies struggle to understand Washington’s actual strategic direction, while rivals increasingly view American policy as transactional and unpredictable.

The contradiction becomes even sharper when examined alongside Trump’s broader policies. Sanctions on Chinese-linked Iranian oil trade, aggressive tariff rhetoric, restrictions on technology exports, and repeated efforts to economically isolate Beijing all reinforce the perception that Trump views China less as a business partner and more as a geopolitical foe. Yet whenever economic pressure begins unsettling American markets or threatening global supply chains, the rhetoric suddenly softens.

When a leader repeatedly alternates between portraying China as an existential threat and praising its leadership as indispensable, critics naturally begin questioning whether such statements reflect genuine policy or merely political convenience.

This is not classical diplomacy. It resembles high-stakes bargaining where confrontation and praise are alternated to maximize leverage. Trump appears convinced that unpredictability itself is a negotiating weapon. However, unpredictability may work in real estate deals; it becomes dangerous in global geopolitics.

Great powers can survive hostile rivals, but they struggle under inconsistent leadership. The real danger for America may not be China’s rise, but Washington’s inability to decide whether Beijing is an enemy to confront or a partner it ultimately cannot live without.

UAE and Fractured Middle East

Since endorsing the Abraham Accords, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) has recast itself as a forward-looking state prioritizing economic opportunity over ideological rigidity. Normalization with Israel opened avenues in trade, technology, and finance, but it also stirred unease across sections of the Muslim world, where the move is still viewed as a departure from collective positioning on Palestine.

The discomfort is not merely rhetorical. Within parts of the Arab region, policy circles continue to debate whether such outreach weakens negotiating leverage on longstanding geopolitical disputes. Even in the United States—a principal architect of the accords—analysts have quietly flagged the risks of accelerated realignments that outpace regional stability.

Dubai’s rise as a global financial hub adds complexity to this equation. Increased capital flows, including those linked to Israeli networks, have energized its economy, but they also expose it to heightened scrutiny in an era of sanctions enforcement and financial transparency. Longstanding discussions in compliance circles about the emirate’s role in facilitating trade with Iran further underscore the delicate balance it must maintain.

Recent regional tensions have brought these vulnerabilities into sharper focus. Reports of attacks targeting strategic assets in Dubai—amid conflicting narratives about their origin—highlight a critical reality, economic hubs cannot remain insulated from geopolitical rivalries.

The UAE’s strategy reflects ambition and pragmatism, but also risk. In a region where alliances shift rapidly, economic integration without parallel security insulation may prove a fragile proposition.

US remains an uninvited guest in Persian Gulf

I am pleased to share one of my blogs posted on May 06, 2020, nearly six years ago, arguing that the United States has no legitimate role in the Persian Gulf and is effectively an “uninvited guest.”

A key theme is historical legitimacy. Iranian officials draw parallels with past foreign powers such as Britain and Portugal, noting that they eventually left the region, implying the United States will also have to withdraw.

The Persian Gulf is framed not only as a strategic waterway but as part of Iran’s identity, with claims that it has been protected by Iranians for thousands of years.

The blog also highlights Iran’s emphasis on military readiness. Rouhani and others stress that Iran’s armed forces—including the Revolutionary Guards, army, and associated units—are fully capable of securing the region.

Iranian officials describe the US presence as a source of instability, tension, and insecurity, insisting that regional security should be handled by neighboring countries.

Overall, the blog reflects a coherent narrative aimed at delegitimizing US presence while asserting Iran’s dominance and responsibility in the Persian Gulf.

To read details please click https://shkazmipk.blogspot.com/2020/05/united-states-uninvited-guest-in.html

Trump’s China Visit Under Scrutiny

Two important questions arise regarding Donald Trump’s proposed visit to China: Is this the right time? And does the United States still retain strategic supremacy over China?

On timing, the moment appears sensitive. Beijing’s concerns have grown in light of tensions surrounding the Strait of Hormuz, a critical artery for global energy flows. Given Iran’s role as a key oil
supplier to China, any perceived threat to Iranian exports naturally raises strategic anxieties in Beijing. As a result, the relationship is no longer confined to trade disputes; it is increasingly shaped by energy security considerations.

The second question—whether the United States continues to enjoy clear supremacy—is more nuanced. Washington may still hold significant military, technological, and financial advantages, the recent developments, including pressures on munitions supplies and a relatively reduced naval presence in the South China Sea, may influence perceptions of its negotiating position. In diplomacy, perception often complements reality.

At the same time, China continues to pursue long-term structural adjustments. Its efforts to promote trade settlement mechanisms beyond the US Dollar reflect a gradual attempt to diversify financial dependencies. While such shifts are unlikely to produce immediate transformation, they do indicate a broader strategic direction.

Market signals, including movements in gold and energy prices, suggest a degree of global uncertainty. However, linking these directly to a decisive shift away from the dollar would require careful qualification, as currency realignments tend to evolve over extended periods.

In sum, the proposed visit may be better understood as a cautious diplomatic engagement rather than a demonstration of dominance. The United States remains a central global power, but its position is increasingly subject to scrutiny. Navigating this evolving landscape will require both restraint and strategic clarity.

Who Truly Dominates the Arabian Peninsula?

The idea of a “superpower” in the Arabian Peninsula is often shaped by wealth, alliances, and perception. Remove external backing—particularly that of the United States—and the equation changes dramatically. What remains is a test of self-reliance, endurance, and the ability to fight alone.

At first glance, Saudi Arabia appears dominant. With one of the world’s largest defense budgets and a formidable arsenal of advanced aircraft and missile systems, it projects overwhelming strength. Yet this power is structurally dependent. Its military ecosystem relies heavily on imported platforms, foreign maintenance, and external logistical support. Without these, its technological edge risks rapid erosion.

Qatar, though financially powerful, lacks strategic depth. Its military is modern but limited in size and sustainability. In a prolonged conflict without external guarantees, it cannot realistically compete for regional military supremacy.

Turkey presents a more complex case. Though geographically outside the Arabian Peninsula, its influence is undeniable. It combines a large standing army with a growing indigenous defense industry, particularly in drones and naval assets. Unlike Gulf states, Turkey possesses the capacity to produce and adapt independently. However, its strategic priorities are divided across multiple theaters, diluting its focus on the Gulf.

This leaves Iran—a country long constrained by sanctions, yet shaped by them. Before the recent one-month war, Iran’s strength lay in its missile arsenal, dispersed military infrastructure, and doctrine of asymmetric warfare. It was built not to dominate, but to deter through the certainty of retaliation.

One month of sustained conflict has altered—but not erased—this reality. Iran’s military infrastructure has been significantly degraded. Missile sites, production facilities, and air defenses have suffered visible damage. By conventional metrics, it is weaker today than it was at the outset.

Yet the defining outcome lies elsewhere.

Despite these losses, Iran continues to operate, retaliate, and maintain strategic coherence. Its domestically sustained and decentralized military architecture has allowed it to absorb sustained strikes without collapsing. The objective of decisively neutralizing it remains unmet.

The conclusion is therefore unavoidable. In a no-alliance scenario, power is not measured by what survives untouched, but by what continues to function under fire. Iran emerges not as the strongest because it is unscathed, but because it has proven it cannot be decisively subdued.

Iran sinks US Ship carrying 30,000 Interceptors

Please watch and save this video, because shortly it may be removed. This narrates a story of Iran sinking a US Supply Ship USNS Robert E. Peary in Red Sea, where 30,000 interceptors were lost in 20 minutes. To hear details click https://youtu.be/WqAPNl-36NU?si=f-2ngZJCnc96BVCt

Lebanon Remains Israel’s Perpetual Battlefield

At first glance, Israel’s continued military engagement in Lebanon appears excessive, even perplexing. If Hezbollah is widely seen as a proxy of Iran, why does the conflict endure despite constraints on Iranian support? The answer lies not in territorial ambition, but in a doctrine shaped by insecurity and hard-learned lessons.

The origins of this confrontation trace back to the 1982 Lebanon War—a campaign aimed at neutralizing threats, not annexing territory. Yet it produced an unintended outcome: the rise of Hezbollah, a force far more adaptive and deeply embedded within Lebanon’s socio-political fabric than any of its predecessors. Its resilience stems not merely from external backing, but from local legitimacy, making it difficult to dismantle through conventional warfare.

Israel, mindful of the costs of past entanglements, no longer seeks occupation. Its strategy is narrower, yet relentless: degrade Hezbollah’s military infrastructure, disrupt its operational capacity, and maintain distance between the group and its northern frontier. This is not victory in the traditional sense—it is the management of a persistent threat.

Geography reinforces this reality. Southern Lebanon offers terrain ideally suited for asymmetric warfare, enabling even a weakened Hezbollah to project force into Israeli territory. For Israeli planners, restraint carries risk; periodic military action becomes a calculated necessity rather than a choice.

At a broader level, Lebanon serves as a proxy arena in the rivalry between Israel and Iran. Each strike on Hezbollah is also a signal to Tehran—asserting limits without crossing into direct war. This calibrated tension sustains a fragile but enduring equilibrium.

The conclusion is uncomfortable but clear. Lebanon is unlikely to witness lasting peace in the near term—not because Israel seeks to occupy it, but because it remains central to a conflict that thrives on continuity. In this unresolved contest between deterrence and resistance, stability is not the objective—only its temporary illusion.

Trump faces fate worse than Bush faced in Iraq

On March 17, 2026, I posted a blog titled “Washington’s Miscalculation: War It Can't Win”. Its opening paragraph was, I quote “Since the Iranian Revolution, the United States has pursued not coexistence with Iran, but its submission. Nearly five decades of sanctions, covert operations, and proxy confrontations have produced results Washington resists admitting - Iran has not weakened — it has adapted, and in many respects, hardened”. Today, March 21, 2026 Reuters ran a story with a caption “How Trump's stated reasons, goals and timeline for Iran war have shifted”.

 According to the report, President Donald Trump and his top officials have offered shifting objectives and reasons for the US-Israeli war on Iran, which critics say shows a lack of planning for the conflict and its aftermath.

Stated objectives and expected timeline have varied, including toppling Iran's government, weakening Iran's military, security and nuclear capabilities and its regional influence, as well as supporting Israeli interests.

Here is how Trump described his ​war goals and timeline:

FEBRUARY 28: CALLS FOR IRANIANS TO TOPPLE THEIR GOVERNMENT

The Iranian people should "take over" governance of their country, Trump said in a video on ‌social media as the US and Israel launched their attacks. "It will be yours to take," he added. "This will be probably your only chance for generations."

Trump described the attacks as "major combat operations."

FEBRUARY 28: WEAKEN IRAN'S MILITARY, INFLUENCE

Trump said Washington would deny Iran the ability to have a nuclear weapon, although Tehran has insisted its nuclear program is for peaceful purposes. Iran does not have nuclear weapons while the United States does. Israel is also widely believed to ​be the only Middle Eastern country with nuclear weapons.

Trump insisted he would end what he described as Tehran's ballistic missile threat. "We're going to destroy their missiles and raze their missile ​industry to the ground," he said. "We're going to annihilate their navy."

Trump claimed Iran's long range missiles "can now threaten our very good friends and allies ⁠in Europe, our troops stationed overseas, and could soon reach the American homeland."

His remarks echoed the case of President George W. Bush for the Iraq war, which had false claims. Neither experts nor ​US intelligence support Trump's assertions and both assess that Iran's ballistic missile program was years from threatening the US homeland.

MARCH 2: SHIFTING TIMELINE

Trump said the war was projected to last four to five ​weeks but could go on longer.

"We're already substantially ahead of our time projections. But whatever the time is, it's okay. Whatever it takes," Trump said at the White House. In a social media post, Trump said there was a "virtually unlimited supply" of US munitions and that "wars can be fought 'forever,' and very successfully, using just these supplies."

In a notification to Congress, Trump provided no timeline. Trump earlier told the Daily Mail the war could take "four weeks, ​or less," then told The New York Times four to five weeks and subsequently said it could take longer.

MARCH 2: RUBIO SAYS US ATTACKED IRAN BECAUSE ISRAEL DID

Secretary of State Marco Rubio told ​reporters Israel's determination to attack Iran forced Washington to strike.

"We knew that there was going to be an Israeli action, we knew that that would precipitate an attack against American forces, and we knew that if ‌we didn't preemptively ⁠go after them before they launched those attacks, we would suffer higher casualties," Rubio said.

MARCH 3: TRUMP CONTRADICTS RUBIO

Trump said he ordered US forces to join Israel's attack on Iran because he believed Iran was about to strike first.

"I might have forced their (Israel's) hand," Trump said. "If we didn't do it, they (Iran) were going to attack first."

MARCH 04: CALL TO 'DESTROY' SECURITY INFRASTRUCTURE

Pentagon chief Pete Hegseth said the goal was to "destroy Iranian offensive missiles, destroy Iranian missile production, destroy their navy and other security infrastructure."

MARCH 06: 'UNCONDITIONAL SURRENDER' CALL

"There will be no deal with Iran except UNCONDITIONAL SURRENDER," Trump wrote on social ​media.

MARCH 8-11: JUST THE START BUT ALSO 'PRETTY MUCH ​COMPLETE'

Hegseth told CBS News in an interview aired ⁠March 08 strikes on Iran were "only just the beginning."

A day later, Trump told the same network "I think the war is very complete, pretty much."

"We've already won in many ways, but we haven't won enough," Trump told reporters later on the same day. When asked if the war was beginning ​or complete, he said: "Well, I think you could say both."

On March 11, Trump again said he thought the US had won but: "We've got ​to finish the job."

MARCH 13: ⁠SOFTENS CALL FOR INTERNAL UPRISING

In a March 13 interview, Trump told Fox News the war will end "when I feel it in my bones."

Trump softened his call for Iranians to topple their government. "So I really think that's a big hurdle to climb for people that don't have weapons," Trump said.

MARCH 19: HEGSETH SAYS NO TIME FRAME

Hegseth said Washington was not setting a time frame for the war and Trump would ⁠decide when to ​stop.

"We wouldn't want to set a definitive time frame," the Pentagon chief said. "It will be at the president's choosing, ​ultimately, where we say, 'Hey, we've achieved what we need to.'"

MARCH 20: TRUMP CONSIDERS WINDING DOWN BUT NO CEASEFIRE

Trump posted on Truth Social, "we are getting very close to meeting our objectives as we consider winding down our great Military efforts" in ​the Iran war. Earlier in the day, Trump told reporters "I don't want to do a ceasefire" when asked about the war.

 

Riyadh Returns to Iran Threat Narrative

In the aftermath of Iran’s 1979 Islamic Revolution, the United States recalibrated its regional strategy, increasingly presenting Tehran as the principal source of instability in the Middle East. Over time, this framing found resonance in several Arab capitals, particularly in Saudi Arabia, shaping a security outlook that continues to influence regional policy choices.

This perception was reinforced through tangible measures. The expansion of US military infrastructure across the Gulf—most prominently in Qatar—was justified largely on the premise of countering Iranian influence. Simultaneously, Washington sustained economic pressure on Tehran over its nuclear program, despite Iran’s status as a signatory to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, in contrast to Israel’s longstanding ambiguity.

Historical episodes added further complexity. The Iran-Iraq war entrenched regional rivalries, while later diplomatic efforts—including the nuclear agreement under President Barack Obama and the China-brokered rapprochement between Riyadh and Tehran—offered brief openings for recalibration. Yet such initiatives have struggled to overcome deeply embedded mistrust, particularly amid shifting US policies and competing geopolitical interests.

Recent remarks by Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Faisal bin Farhan reflect a return to a more cautious, if not hardened, posture. His assertion that trust in Iran has been “completely shattered,” alongside allegations of destabilizing activities across the region, underscores Riyadh’s growing concerns about security and sovereignty. These claims are rooted in reported attacks on energy infrastructure and maritime navigation, which Saudi Arabia and its partners attribute to Iran.

Tehran, however, has consistently rejected such accusations, framing its actions as defensive and, at times, suggesting that regional escalations are shaped by broader geopolitical contestation. Independent verification of specific incidents remains contested, contributing to a narrative environment marked as much by perception as by provable fact.

What emerges is not merely a dispute over actions, but over interpretation. Saudi Arabia’s current stance appears closely aligned with a long-standing US strategic framing that positions Iran as the central regional threat. While this perspective reflects genuine security concerns, it also risks narrowing the analytical lens through which complex regional dynamics are understood.

The persistence of this narrative suggests that, despite episodic diplomacy and shifting alliances, foundational perceptions remain largely intact. In effect, Riyadh’s position today echoes a familiar refrain—one shaped over decades—where Iran continues to be viewed as the primary challenge to regional stability.

Time Is on Iran’s Side

Despite the overwhelming military might of the United States and Israel, time may ultimately favor Iran in the ongoing conflict, as mounting political and economic pressures strain the Trump administration.

Since launching Operation Epic Fury, US forces have reportedly struck some 6,000 Iranian targets, damaging naval vessels, missile launch sites, and other military infrastructure. The US Central Command says more than 90 Iranian vessels have been neutralized. Experts argue that Iran anticipated such attacks and structured its defense around confronting conventionally superior foes.

Analysts note that Iran is deliberately prolonging the conflict, betting it can endure military pressure longer than the US can withstand domestic political fallout. Rising oil prices, disruptions in global energy markets, and attacks on US allies in the Gulf have intensified the economic and diplomatic costs of the war. The closure of the Strait of Hormuz has pushed oil prices near US$100 per barrel, adding further pressure on the global economy.

Military analysts suggest that Iran’s definition of victory is simple - survival. Removing the current leadership in Tehran would require far greater military commitment than the United States has so far deployed. Pentagon officials reported that the war cost over $11.3 billion in just the first six days. The conflict has also taken a human toll - seven American service members have died, and roughly 140 have been wounded.

In his first statement as Iran’s new supreme leader, Mojtaba Khamenei vowed to keep the Strait of Hormuz closed and continue military pressure on regional adversaries. The US is considering naval escorts for oil tankers through the waterway. Analysts warn that as the conflict drags on, rising economic costs, political divisions in Washington, and potential casualties could erode domestic support for what some critics describe as an “optional war.”

While US and Israeli forces dominate tactically, Iran’s endurance strategy could make the political and economic cost of the conflict unsustainable for the United States, leaving the regime in Tehran intact and the strategic balance in the Gulf uncertain.