Israel's October 27 Elections

Security, Iran and the Palestinian Question

Israel will hold parliamentary elections on October 27, 2026, to elect the 120-member Knesset. The contest will determine whether Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu retains power or an opposition coalition forms the next government. Beyond leadership, voters face questions about national security, the economy, judicial governance and Israel’s international standing after years of regional conflict.

Political parties and priorities

The principal contenders include Netanyahu’s Likud and its right-wing and religious allies, notably Otzma Yehudit, Religious Zionism, Shas and United Torah Judaism. The opposition includes Gadi Eisenkot’s Yashar, Naftali Bennett’s Beyachad, Yair Lapid’s Yesh Atid, Yair Golan’s Democrats and Avigdor Lieberman’s Yisrael Beiteinu. Arab-led Ra’am and the Joint List are also contesting seats.

Three major campaign priorities are security, governance and economic pressures. Netanyahu’s camp stresses military strength, confronting hostile regional forces and maintaining its security policies.

Opposition leaders promise to repair relations with international partners, curb extremist settler activity and improve governance. Economic concerns, the cost of living and the burden of military service also feature prominently. However, not every party has published a comprehensive election manifesto.

Iran: No easy policy shift

Iran remains a central security concern. Netanyahu has adopted a confrontational approach towards Tehran’s nuclear and military capabilities, while warning of retaliation against attacks by Iran and its regional allies. Opposition leaders also broadly support Israel’s military actions against Iran, although they criticize aspects of Netanyahu’s leadership and strategy. A change of government would therefore be unlikely to produce a fundamental reversal of Israel’s security posture.

Two states and Gaza’s reconstruction

The prospects for a two-state solution remain poor. Netanyahu and most major Zionist opposition leaders oppose Palestinian statehood or do not priorities it. The Democrats have left the possibility open as a longer-term objective, while Arab-led parties advocate Palestinian rights and self-determination.

Gaza’s reconstruction presents another challenge. Netanyahu’s government insists that Hamas must be disarmed and Israeli security concerns addressed. Far-right allies favour continued Israeli control and some advocate Palestinian emigration. Opposition leaders have signalled greater cooperation with international partners and the Palestinian Authority, but have not offered a unified plan guaranteeing Palestinian self-government.

The election may change Israel’s leadership and diplomatic tone, but a major shift on Iran, Palestinian statehood or Gaza’s future remains uncertain. Coalition arithmetic will determine how far campaign promises translate into policy.

 

Saudi Security Vulnerabilities or Lapses

Saudi Arabia’s decision to stop issuing public warnings of imminent missile and drone attacks shortly before deadly strikes hit Riyadh airport raises serious questions about the kingdom’s security preparedness and crisis management. According to Reuters, the attacks killed at least 18 people and wounded more than 300, exposing the challenges Riyadh faces in protecting its population and maintaining an image of stability amid an escalating regional conflict.

The central question is whether the attacks exposed inherent vulnerabilities in Saudi Arabia’s security arrangements or lapses in managing an emerging threat. The distinction matters because the remedies are different - structural weaknesses require stronger defensive capabilities, while operational failures demand better coordination, timely communication and accountability.

Riyadh appears to have faced competing priorities: acknowledging the growing threat while avoiding public anxiety and disruption to economic activity. However, withholding warnings cannot eliminate danger; it can leave residents and visitors less prepared to respond.

Reuters reported that Saudi Arabia’s early-warning system had remained silent despite mounting Houthi attacks. Officials reportedly told a Western ally that alerts were disruptive and that some citizens had complained about being awakened at night. If accurate, this explanation raises concerns about how public safety was weighed against convenience. An early warning cannot prevent every casualty, but it can give people precious time to seek shelter.

The contrast with Qatar, Bahrain and Kuwait is instructive. Their use of mobile alerts and sirens demonstrates the importance of communicating potential threats, even when warnings disrupt daily routines. Public information should be treated as an essential component of national defence rather than an obstacle to normal economic activity.

Saudi Arabia also faces a formidable structural challenge. Its vast territory contains airports, oil installations, pipelines and other strategic assets that cannot all be protected simultaneously. Limited interceptor supplies and air-defence capacity complicate the task. Strengthening early-warning systems, improving defensive coordination and prioritizing critical infrastructure must therefore go hand in hand.

The economic stakes are substantial. Saudi Arabia’s investment and diversification ambitions depend partly on investor confidence and perceptions of stability. The reported withdrawal of senior oil executives from a major energy conference in Riyadh illustrates how security concerns can disrupt international engagements despite official assurances that economic plans remain on track.

Ultimately, Saudi Arabia must demonstrate that its pursuit of normalcy does not come at the expense of public safety. Whether the problem lies in structural vulnerabilities, operational lapses or both, restoring confidence requires credible warnings, stronger defensive capabilities and effective crisis management. In an era of expanding missile and drone warfare, projecting stability is no substitute for delivering security.

Other GCC Members Must Listen to Qatar

Qatar’s call for a regional security framework bringing the Gulf states and Iran together deserves serious attention from all GCC members. Speaking at the Qatar Economic Forum on the sidelines of the 81st UN General Assembly in New York, Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Sheikh Mohammed bin Abdulrahman Al Thani described the recent regional war as a “wake-up call” for the region.

His argument is straightforward; Iran is a geographical reality and a permanent neighbour of the Gulf states. Sustainable security, therefore, cannot depend exclusively on military alliances or arrangements that leave one or more regional states permanently exposed to insecurity. Doha is advocating a framework based on sovereignty, non-aggression, confidence-building and dialogue.

This does not require the GCC to overlook Iran’s actions or security concerns. Rather, it recognizes that deterrence and diplomacy have different but complementary roles. Military preparedness may deter aggression, but it cannot by itself eliminate the sources of recurring confrontation.

Recent developments have demonstrated how quickly a regional conflict can affect energy supplies, shipping routes, investment, trade and global markets.

Sheikh Mohammed described the economic consequences of the US-Israel war on Iran as an “earthquake” whose shock waves extended far beyond the Middle East.

The Gulf states have strong reasons to coordinate their security policies. But coordination among GCC members alone cannot address every source of regional tension. Geography makes coexistence with Iran unavoidable, while economic interdependence makes prolonged instability increasingly costly.

Qatar has also emphasized mediation, maintaining communication channels and working with regional and international partners to reduce tensions. Such efforts may not resolve fundamental differences, but they can create mechanisms for managing them.

The real question is therefore not whether the GCC should abandon deterrence or its external security partnerships. It is whether these arrangements should be complemented by a regional security architecture in which Gulf states and Iran can address threats, build confidence and prevent crises from escalating into wider conflicts.

Other GCC members may indeed have much to consider in Qatar’s proposal. A durable Gulf security system will ultimately require regional ownership, mutual confidence and sustained communication—including with Iran.

Hormuz Shuttle Tankers: An Evolving Trend Amid the US-Israel war on Iran

According to a report by Seatrade Maritime News, the disruption of shipping through the Strait of Hormuz is creating a new pattern in the regional oil trade - shuttle tankers are increasingly moving crude from the Persian Gulf to the Gulf of Oman, where cargoes are transferred ship-to-ship (STS) for onward delivery.

The trend is illustrated by the Hong Kong-flagged VLCC Cospearl Lake, which recently reached Dalian, China, carrying about two million barrels of crude loaded through an STS transfer in the Gulf of Oman rather than directly from a Persian Gulf terminal. Such operations allow exporters and buyers to keep oil moving while reducing exposure to the increasingly risky and costly Hormuz transit.

The United Arab Emirates (UAE) has emerged as a key player in this shuttle trade. Regional exporters are using tankers to transport crude through the Strait and transfer it to waiting vessels outside the Gulf. This complements conventional voyages by tankers that continue directly to their destinations.

The Mombasa B provides an important example. The VLCC, chartered by UAE's ADNOC from Sinokor Maritime, entered the Persian Gulf in April and subsequently began shuttling between Gulf loading terminals and the Gulf of Oman. Since June, many of its voyages through Hormuz have been conducted as “dark transits,” with AIS signals switched off.

The risks, however, remain substantial. On July 13, Iranian forces targeted the Mombasa B with cruise missiles while it was transiting the waterway. One Indian crew member was killed and eight others injured. Although the tanker suffered material damage, it remained operational and subsequently resumed Hormuz crossings. The vessel has since been placed on Iran's list of “non-compliant” ships.

The UAE is nevertheless expanding its capacity. In August, ADNOC Logistics & Services announced the acquisition of six additional VLCCs. Other regional exporters, including Kuwait, are also using tankers in shuttle operations. Some ADNOC vessels have reportedly carried Iraqi Basrah crude, indicating that the system is evolving into a wider regional network rather than serving only UAE exports.

Kpler data shows that Persian Gulf crude and condensate loadings reached about 5.8 million barrels per day in August, including Gulf of Oman STS transfers, and have risen toward 8 million bpd in September. Iraq has also reportedly offered buyers the option of collecting crude through STS transfers outside Hormuz.

Yet shuttle tankers remain a wartime workaround rather than a replacement for normal trade routes. They require additional vessels, increase costs and operational complexity, and remain vulnerable to attack. With Iranian oil exports reportedly falling sharply and tensions continuing around the Omani corridor, Tehran may have greater incentive to disrupt these alternative supply chains.

The emerging shuttle trade therefore demonstrates the adaptability of the global oil market—but also highlights how deeply the Iran war has altered the economics, logistics and security of energy transportation through the Gulf.

Oman postpones Hormuz talks with Iran and Gulf states

According to Eurasia Media Network, Oman has postponed a regional meeting scheduled for Monday in Salalah between Iran and several Gulf countries on the future of the Strait of Hormuz.

Omani Foreign Minister Badr Albusaidi said the gathering was delayed “in the interests of consensus” to allow conditions for constructive dialogue that could support regional stability.

Iran’s Foreign Ministry said the postponement came at the request of some regional countries and was a joint decision with Muscat. No new date has been set.

The talks were meant to discuss an Iran-Oman framework for managing shipping through the vital waterway, which carries a large share of the world’s oil and gas.

Iran has maintained restrictions on transit since the wider Middle East conflict began in late February.

Tehran has floated ideas including passage fees and revised routes. Bahrain had already said it would not attend until diplomatic ties with Iran were restored.

The delay comes amid continued disruption to energy flows, recent attacks on vessels, and high oil prices.

Oman, which borders the southern side of the strait, has been mediating for weeks. Officials in Muscat and Tehran said they remain committed to dialogue.

BRICS Members Move to Reduce Reliance on the US Dollar

BRICS leaders have called for reforms to the global governance system, condemned unilateral tariffs and “acts of war”, and backed greater representation for developing countries at the United Nations Security Council (UNSC).

The positions were outlined in the New Delhi Declaration adopted on September 12 at the BRICS Summit in the Indian capital. Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi said the changing world could not be governed through outdated institutions and stressed the need for reforms in representation, responsiveness and rule-making.

The declaration called for a “structural update” of the UNSC, with greater representation for developing countries from Africa, Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean. China and Russia reiterated support for Brazil and India seeking a greater role at the United Nations, including on the Security Council.

A particularly significant development was the call for BRICS members to increase the use of local currencies in trade among themselves, reducing reliance on the US dollar. This reflects a broader effort to diversify international trade and financial transactions and gradually reduce dependence on the dollar-dominated global system.

BRICS also criticized unilateral tariffs and other trade restrictions, warning that they could disrupt supply chains, hamper global trade and deepen economic disparities. The bloc reaffirmed support for reforming the World Trade Organization to better address the needs of emerging and developing economies.

The declaration strongly condemned terrorism in all its forms and rejected attempts to associate terrorism with any religion, nationality, civilization or ethnic group. It also denounced “unilateral acts of war” and emphasized the protection of seafarers and commercial navigation amid continuing military tensions in the Middle East.

The expanding BRICS platform increasingly reflects the aspirations of the Global South for a more representative and multipolar international order.

What the US has lost in the War with Iran?

Wars are not won solely on the battlefield. They are also judged by whether they achieve their political objectives, strengthen deterrence and reinforce international credibility. By these measures, the United States appears to have emerged from its confrontation with Iran having paid a price that extends well beyond military expenditure.

The first casualty has been credibility. Washington's messaging shifted repeatedly—from demands for Iran's unconditional surrender to calls for de-escalation and negotiations. Such abrupt changes inevitably raise questions among allies and adversaries alike about the consistency of American strategy. A superpower derives much of its influence from predictability; when its objectives appear to change with circumstances, its deterrent value is diminished.

The second loss is strategic. Modern warfare has demonstrated that overwhelming military superiority does not automatically translate into decisive political success. The US has consumed vast quantities of sophisticated and expensive munitions while confronting an adversary capable of sustaining prolonged resistance through indigenous capabilities and asymmetric tactics. Wars of attrition are rarely favourable to even the strongest military powers if political objectives remain elusive.

Perhaps the most significant consequence has been Iran's enhanced regional standing. Despite facing coordinated military pressure and unprecedented economic sanctions, Tehran has demonstrated resilience that has strengthened its image among supporters and compelled regional actors to reassess its military and political influence. Whether one agrees with Iran's policies or not, its ability to withstand sustained pressure has altered regional perceptions.

The conflict has also exposed shortcomings in the strategic calculations of both Washington and Tel Aviv. Military power can destroy infrastructure, but it cannot easily compel political capitulation. Calls for unconditional surrender proved unrealistic against a state that had prepared for prolonged confrontation. Instead of projecting overwhelming dominance, the campaign underscored the limits of military coercion against a determined regional power.

History offers a consistent lesson: every great power eventually reaches a point where reassessing objectives becomes wiser than escalating a costly conflict. Strategic withdrawal is not necessarily a sign of weakness; it can be an act of prudence when the costs of continuing outweigh the prospects of success. Persisting with a flawed strategy merely compounds political, military and economic losses.

The US still possesses unmatched global military and economic capabilities. However, the Iran conflict serves as a reminder that power alone does not guarantee victory. Credibility, coherent strategy and realistic political objectives remain indispensable. When these are absent, even the world's strongest nation risks emerging from war with diminished influence rather than enhanced authority.

Strait of Hormuz: A Case for Regional Stewardship

The Strait of Hormuz is the world's most critical energy corridor, carrying nearly one-fifth of global oil and liquefied natural gas supplies. Any disruption in this narrow waterway sends shockwaves through energy markets, raises shipping and insurance costs, and threatens global economic stability. A disappointing fact is that due to decades of external military involvement, the Strait has remained vulnerable to recurring crises.

Recent diplomatic developments offer an opportunity to rethink its security architecture. Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi has called for closer regional cooperation, while Oman has proposed establishing a joint maritime mechanism involving Iran and the Gulf states. Inspired by the Strait of Malacca, the proposal envisages voluntary contributions from users of the waterway to finance navigation safety, environmental protection, search-and-rescue operations, and maritime coordination.

The Malacca model demonstrates that strategic waterways can be managed effectively through cooperation among the littoral states. A similar arrangement in the Gulf could bring together Iran, Oman, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Bahrain, Kuwait, and Iraq in a permanent institutional framework dedicated to ensuring safe and uninterrupted navigation.

Such a mechanism would coordinate vessel traffic, strengthen maritime safety, improve emergency response, protect the marine environment, and establish communication channels to prevent misunderstandings from escalating into conflict. More importantly, it would place responsibility in the hands of those with the greatest stake in preserving regional stability.

The economic case is equally compelling. Every Gulf state depends on secure sea lanes for energy exports, trade, and investment. A stable Strait would reduce insurance premiums, lower transportation costs, strengthen investor confidence, and enhance global energy security.

Regional stewardship should not be viewed as excluding the international community. Freedom of navigation is a shared global interest, and countries benefiting from the Strait can continue supporting its operations through voluntary financial contributions, as they do in the Strait of Malacca. Operational responsibility should rest with the littoral states.

The Strait of Hormuz should become a symbol of cooperation rather than confrontation. By establishing a credible regional maritime framework, Gulf nations can safeguard one of the world's most vital trade routes while demonstrating that regional challenges are best addressed through regional leadership, shared responsibility, and sustained diplomatic engagement.

Pakistan's Western Borders Need More Than Military Vigilance

The recent wave of terrorist attacks in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Baluchistan is a sobering reminder that Pakistan's western frontier remains one of the country's most complex and persistent security challenges. Every attack claims precious lives, weakens investors’ confidence, disrupts trade, and raises fresh concerns about regional stability. Yet the real question is not merely who carried out these attacks, but why they continue despite years of counterterrorism operations.

Pakistan shares long and difficult borders with Afghanistan and Iran. Rugged terrain, cross-border tribal linkages, and extensive movement of people and goods make these frontiers among the hardest to secure. Border security is not solely a military responsibility; it also demands effective diplomacy, sound governance, and close regional cooperation.

Pakistani authorities have repeatedly expressed concerns that militant groups exploit territory across the western border to launch attacks inside Pakistan. However, an important distinction must be made. The existence of terrorist sanctuaries does not automatically imply state sponsorship. In many border regions, weak administrative control, porous frontiers, criminal networks, and ungoverned spaces can provide militants with opportunities to operate without necessarily reflecting official government policy. Recognizing this distinction is essential for objective analysis and effective policymaking.

At the same time, neighboring countries also bear an important responsibility. Under international law, every state is expected to ensure that its territory is not used for hostile activities against another country. Effective intelligence sharing, coordinated border management, and timely action against militant networks are therefore indispensable for regional peace and stability.

Another dimension deserves equal attention. Pakistan provides the shortest and most economical land route connecting Afghanistan to the Arabian Sea and has the potential to become a vital gateway for regional trade extending into Central Asia and beyond. Persistent instability along these corridors discourages investment, disrupts commerce, and undermines regional connectivity. It is therefore reasonable to ask who ultimately benefits from keeping Pakistan's western border unstable.

Pakistan's response extends beyond kinetic operations. Military action can eliminate terrorists, but lasting peace requires stronger border management, improved governance in border districts, sustained economic development, effective intelligence, and constructive engagement with both Kabul and Tehran. Pakistan's long-term success will depend not only on eliminating terrorists but also on dismantling the political, financial, logistical, and ideological ecosystem that allows them to recruit, regroup, and strike again.

The Shifting Battle: From Oil to Shipping Corridors

For much of the twentieth century, oil was regarded as the world's most powerful geopolitical weapon. In the twenty-first century, however, control over global shipping corridors may prove equally—if not more—consequential. Whoever can influence the world's maritime chokepoints can shape not only energy supplies but also international trade, supply chains, and economic stability. Against this backdrop, the Red Sea appears to be emerging as the next major strategic battleground.

Following months of disruption around the Strait of Hormuz, growing concerns are now centered on the security of commercial shipping through the Red Sea. Together, the Strait of Hormuz, the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, and the Suez Canal constitute one of the world's most vital maritime corridors, carrying a substantial share of global trade, including oil, liquefied natural gas, manufactured goods, agricultural commodities, and containerized cargo. Any prolonged disruption would ripple across continents through higher freight costs, supply-chain bottlenecks, inflationary pressures, and increased energy prices.

The immediate question is not simply who is attacking commercial vessels, but who stands to gain from sustained instability in these strategic waterways.

Western governments and much of the international media have attributed recent attacks to Yemen's Houthi movement, arguing that the group continues to target maritime traffic as part of its confrontation with Israel and its Western allies. Given the Houthis' own public statements and previous operations, this explanation cannot be dismissed.

Yet geopolitics is rarely straightforward.

Military confrontations are increasingly accompanied by information warfare, where competing narratives emerge almost as rapidly as military events themselves. Some analysts caution against assigning responsibility before credible, independent investigations establish the facts. Premature conclusions can become powerful geopolitical tools, shaping public opinion and diplomatic responses long before evidence is fully examined.

Another line of analysis raises a different possibility. It suggests that if vessels linked to Saudi Arabia increasingly become targets, the objective may extend beyond disrupting commercial shipping. Such incidents could undermine the fragile rapprochement between Riyadh and Tehran, reviving regional rivalries that had begun to ease after years of confrontation. Those who favour a polarized Middle East would clearly benefit from renewed distrust between the region's two most influential powers.

There is also the Israeli dimension. Since the outbreak of the Gaza conflict, the Houthis have repeatedly declared that their maritime campaign is intended to pressure Israel by disrupting shipping linked to Israeli interests. If commercial traffic through the Red Sea becomes increasingly constrained, Israel's trade routes could face significant economic and logistical challenges. However, if the pattern of attacks shifts from Israeli-linked shipping toward Saudi-linked vessels, analysts will inevitably ask whether the conflict is being redirected by actors pursuing broader geopolitical objectives.

History suggests that great powers compete not only for natural resources but also for the routes that transport them. The struggle is no longer confined to controlling oil fields. Increasingly, the ability to influence strategic maritime corridors has become a source of geopolitical leverage. Disrupting a major shipping route can impose economic costs on multiple countries simultaneously without direct military confrontation.

Whether the current tensions represent an extension of the Israel-Houthi conflict, an attempt to derail Saudi-Iranian reconciliation, or a broader contest for influence over global shipping corridors remains an open question. What appears increasingly clear is that in today's interconnected world, strategic power lies not only beneath the ground in oil reserves but also on the sea lanes that connect continents.

The nation—or coalition—that can influence these maritime arteries possesses a powerful instrument of geopolitical leverage. In the twenty-first century, control of shipping corridors may prove even more valuable than control of the cargo itself.

Beyond Hormuz: Is Yemen the New Diversion?

The attempt by an Iranian aircraft to land in Houthi-controlled Yemen, and the swift response by Saudi-backed Yemeni forces to prevent it, should not be viewed as an isolated aviation incident. It may represent another chapter in the wider geopolitical contest unfolding across the Middle East. More importantly, it raises a strategic question: Is the focus on Yemen intended to shift international attention away from the Strait of Hormuz?

For decades, the Strait of Hormuz has remained the world's most critical maritime energy corridor. Roughly one-fifth of global oil and a significant share of liquefied natural gas exports pass through this narrow waterway. Any instability there has immediate consequences for energy prices, inflation, global trade and financial markets. It is also the one strategic chokepoint where Iran possesses considerable geographic leverage.

Against this backdrop, renewed attention to Yemen is unlikely to be accidental. By reigniting tensions around Sanaa, the Red Sea and Bab el-Mandeb, Washington and its regional partners can compel Iran to divide its strategic focus. Instead of concentrating on Hormuz, Tehran must also devote diplomatic, military and logistical resources to protecting its interests in Yemen.

For Saudi Arabia, preventing Iranian flights from landing in Houthi-held territory serves immediate security objectives. For the United States, the broader strategic benefit lies in expanding the theatre of competition. A conflict confined to Hormuz leaves Iran operating in its strongest geographic position. A conflict stretching from the Persian Gulf to the Red Sea forces Tehran to manage multiple fronts simultaneously, thereby diluting its leverage.

Whether this reflects a carefully coordinated strategy or the convergence of regional interests remains open to debate. Yet the cumulative effect is unmistakable: international attention shifts from Hormuz to Yemen, from energy security to aviation disputes, and from the Persian Gulf to the Red Sea.

The Middle East has long demonstrated that perception is as important as military capability. In modern geopolitics, shaping the narrative often shapes policy. The latest confrontation in Yemen may therefore be less about one aircraft than about redirecting the world's strategic gaze. While headlines focus on Sanaa, the Strait of Hormuz—the true center of the region's geopolitical gravity—risks fading into the background. That, in itself, may be the most significant development.

Who Governs Yemen?

The emergency meeting of Yemen's Presidential Leadership Council in Riyadh over Iran's direct flight to Sanaa raises a fundamental question, who actually governs Yemen today?

The Council described the flight as a violation of Yemen's sovereignty and international law. Yet the very fact that the country's internationally recognized leadership convened outside Yemen inevitably invites scrutiny.

Governments derive legitimacy not only from international recognition but also from their ability to exercise effective authority over their own territory. In practical terms, the Houthis control Sanaa and much of northern Yemen, while the Presidential Leadership Council continues to rely heavily on external political and security support.

This reality reflects the uncomfortable truth that Yemen has evolved into a battleground where competing regional and global powers pursue strategic interests through local actors. Iran openly backs the Houthis, while the internationally recognized government enjoys diplomatic and military support from a coalition led by Saudi Arabia and backed by the United States.

The strategic significance of Yemen extends far beyond its internal politics. Sitting at the entrance to the Red Sea through the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, Yemen occupies one of the world's most critical maritime chokepoints. Whoever influences this corridor can affect international trade, energy supplies, and naval movements linking Europe and Asia.

It is therefore unsurprising that many analysts believe the broader contest in Yemen is less about restoring democratic governance and more about securing geopolitical influence over one of the world's busiest shipping routes. In this interpretation, Washington's overriding objective is to maintain strategic leverage over the Red Sea, while regional allies inevitably become participants in a much larger geopolitical competition.

Saudi Arabia is frequently portrayed as the principal architect of Yemen's prolonged conflict. Such a characterization, however, overlooks the wider strategic calculations of global powers. Riyadh has undoubtedly made decisions that attract criticism, but reducing the conflict to a Saudi-Iran rivalry ignores the interests of larger actors whose strategic priorities extend well beyond Yemen itself.

The tragedy is that while external powers compete for influence over a vital maritime corridor, the Yemeni people continue to pay the highest price. The real battle may not simply be for Yemen, but for control of one of the world's most strategically important waterways.

Who Will Control Strait of Hormuz?

The debate over the future control of the Strait of Hormuz has moved beyond naval deployments and freedom of navigation. It has become a question of sovereignty, regional power balance, and who will shape the security architecture of one of the world’s most important maritime corridors.

The basic question is straightforward: who will provide security to ships and their crews, and in return, who will collect charges for ensuring safe passage? Geographically, the Strait lies between Iran and Oman, making these two coastal states the natural stakeholders in any future arrangement.

For decades, the Gulf security framework was built around a strong American military presence. The United States played a major role in protecting maritime routes and reassuring regional allies. However, the geopolitical landscape has changed. Past arrangements no longer fully reflect current realities.

Iran, despite years of sanctions and pressure, has emerged as a major regional power with significant influence over Gulf security dynamics. Its location at the Strait of Hormuz provides it with a strategic position that cannot be ignored. Any future framework governing the waterway will have to acknowledge Iran’s role as a neighbouring coastal state.

At the same time, Arab states are reassessing the assumption that their long-term security can depend entirely on external guarantees. The perception that Washington’s regional priorities are closely linked with Israel’s security interests has encouraged some Gulf countries to reconsider the balance between strategic partnerships and regional self-reliance.

This does not mean that the United States has lost its influence in the Gulf. Its military presence, diplomatic reach, and economic relationships remain significant. However, influence is different from ownership. A foreign security role does not automatically translate into authority over a waterway located within the jurisdiction of coastal states.

The discussion over Iran’s proposed transit charge — reportedly around one dollar per barrel — highlights the larger issue. Financially, such a fee may appear limited when compared with global oil prices. The real significance is political: accepting such an arrangement would symbolize recognition of a greater regional role for Iran.

The Strait of Hormuz carries a substantial share of global energy supplies. Any disruption affects oil, gas, fertilizer, food costs, and global inflation. Therefore, the world has a direct interest in stability and predictable rules.

The future of Hormuz may not be determined only by military strength. It will depend on whether a new regional understanding emerges — one that balances international navigation rights with the legitimate interests of countries bordering the Strait.

The central question is no longer whether Iran and Oman have influence over Hormuz. They already do. The real question is whether the world is prepared for a new security arrangement where regional powers play a greater role in managing regional affairs.

If Strait of Hormuz Reopens: Gainers and Loses

The reopening of the Strait of Hormuz marks more than the restoration of a critical energy route. It represents a strategic moment where the assumptions, calculations, and objectives of major stakeholders must be reassessed. In modern geopolitics, victory is not always measured by battlefield outcomes; sometimes it is determined by who achieves their strategic objectives after the crisis ends.

For Israel, the outcome may raise difficult questions. A key objective behind applying pressure on Iran was to weaken its regional influence and constrain its ability to support allied groups. However, the restoration of energy flows and economic activity reduces the effectiveness of any strategy based primarily on economic isolation. A pressured Iran may have suffered setbacks, but it retains the ability to rebuild influence through diplomacy, regional partnerships, and economic recovery.

Similarly, Iran’s regional allies, including Hezbollah, may find an opportunity to reassess and recover from recent challenges. A reduction in confrontation gives Tehran greater space to redirect resources and rebuild political and strategic networks. However, recovery will depend not only on external support but also on internal dynamics and changing regional realities.

The economic impact extends beyond the Middle East. A decline in oil prices following the reopening of the Strait could hurt profitability for some high-cost oil producers, including segments of the US energy industry that benefited from elevated prices. At the same time, cheaper energy provides relief to consumers and industries worldwide, demonstrating that geopolitical events create winners and losers simultaneously.

The broader challenge, however, concerns the perception of American strategic dominance. For decades, the United States has maintained significant influence in the Gulf through security partnerships, military presence, and arms relationships. If Iran emerges from the crisis with its core capabilities intact, questions will be raised about the effectiveness of pressure-based strategies.

Regional countries may increasingly seek a more balanced foreign policy, avoiding excessive dependence on any single power. This could accelerate a trend toward strategic autonomy and diversified alliances.

The reopening of the Strait of Hormuz should therefore not be viewed simply as a victory or defeat for any one country. It highlights a deeper reality: in a multipolar world, even the strongest powers face limits. The future of the Middle East will depend less on coercion and more on the ability of nations to negotiate, adapt, and coexist.

Iran-US sign MOU: Pause in Conflict, Not End

With the signing of the memorandum of understanding (MOU), attention is shifting from military confrontation to political interpretation. As details emerge, supporters and critics in all three capitals—Washington, Tel Aviv, and Tehran—are attempting to define the agreement on their own terms. Such reactions are hardly surprising. In geopolitical disputes, agreements are often judged less by what they contain than by how they are perceived.

For the United States, the immediate achievement is the avoidance of a wider regional conflict. Washington can argue that a combination of military pressure and diplomacy brought Iran to the negotiating table without requiring a prolonged war. The agreement also helps contain risks to global energy supplies and international markets. However, the US administration may still face difficult questions. If Iran retains substantial strategic capabilities, critics may argue that the objectives initially articulated by Washington have only been partially achieved.

Israel can claim that its security concerns have been elevated to the center of international diplomacy. Any restrictions on Iran's military or nuclear-related activities would be viewed as a tangible gain. Yet Israeli policymakers are likely to remain cautious. Their primary concern has never been the signing of an agreement but the effectiveness of its enforcement. For Israel, verification may prove more important than the commitments themselves.

Iran, meanwhile, appears to have secured what it has long sought: relief from mounting economic and military pressure while preserving national sovereignty. Reduced sanctions pressure and improved economic prospects could provide much-needed support to the Iranian economy. At the same time, Tehran must convince domestic audiences that any commitments undertaken do not compromise its strategic independence or regional standing.

The agreement therefore creates opportunities as well as dilemmas for all three stakeholders. The United States seeks stability without appearing weak. Israel seeks security without relying solely on diplomacy. Iran seeks economic relief without sacrificing strategic autonomy.

Ultimately, the significance of the MOU will not be determined by its wording but by its durability. If implemented in good faith, it could reduce tensions in one of the world's most volatile regions. If mistrust and competing interpretations prevail, the agreement may be remembered not as a settlement, but as a temporary pause between successive crises.

The Whole World Is Losing, Except the US

My point is clear, the United States must acknowledge defeat, ensure the full reopening of the Strait of Hormuz, lift economic sanctions on Iran, and compensate for the losses incurred during this war. Enough time has passed, and there is no justification for portraying defeat as victory.

The ongoing negotiations between the United States and Iran are increasingly becoming a rhetorical exercise rather than a strategic achievement. The ambitious campaign launched in coordination with Israel to curb Iran’s regional influence and nuclear development has failed to accomplish its stated objectives.

It would not be incorrect to say that Iran’s regional significance has increased, its negotiating posture has become more assertive, and its capacity to withstand economic pressure has proven far stronger than anticipated. After weeks of diplomacy, fundamental differences remain unresolved due to US intransigence, leaving the talks far from any meaningful breakthrough.

The situation in and around the Strait of Hormuz underscores US miscalculations and Iran’s leverage, while exposing the vulnerability of oil-exporting countries that rely heavily on American security guarantees. The US blockade of the Strait has reduced the daily movement of approximately 140 vessels to only a handful of oil and LNG carriers.

The consequences have been staggering. Oil-exporting Arab states are facing uncertain revenues, while energy-importing economies are grappling with inflationary pressures and severe supply disruptions.

Despite these grim realities, Washington’s rhetoric continues to speak of progress and opportunity. Such claims stand in stark contrast to the facts and appear to be an attempt to reframe strategic underperformance as diplomatic success. This only reinforces the perception of a policy being pursued without clear goals, direction, or achievable objectives.

The central point is now unmistakable - the longer the truth is denied, the greater the price the rest of the world will be forced to pay.

 

Israel’s Security Paradox: Strength Without Psychological Closure

Benjamin Netanyahu’s long political dominance has coincided with one of the most turbulent phases in Israel’s modern security history. For his supporters, he represents strategic clarity in a hostile region. For critics, his era reflects the entrenchment of a permanent conflict mindset. Both interpretations, in different ways, touch the same underlying reality - Israel’s security condition today is defined as much by perception as by power.

Militarily, Israel remains one of the most capable states in the Middle East. Its intelligence infrastructure, air power, and multi-layered defence systems have significantly strengthened deterrence. Several adversaries are either weakened, fragmented, or operating under constraints not seen in previous decades. From a purely conventional standpoint, Israel’s strategic position appears more secure than in many earlier phases of its history.

Yet this is only one side of the equation. On the ground, security is not experienced in abstract balances of power. It is experienced through sirens, shelters, alerts, and the unpredictability of escalation. For civilians—particularly children growing up amid periodic conflict—security becomes a lived rhythm rather than a stable condition. Even when attacks are intercepted or contained, the psychological imprint of uncertainty remains. This is where Israel’s central paradox emerges - growing military strength has not translated into a proportional sense of psychological security.

The reason lies in the changing nature of conflict. Traditional wars between defined states have increasingly been replaced by asymmetric threats—rockets, proxy forces, cross-border raids, and regional instability. These forms of confrontation do not require parity to create disruption; they require only unpredictability. As a result, even a militarily dominant state can remain socially alert, frequently mobilized, and psychologically exposed.

Within Israeli society, this produces a dual perception. One strand believes Israel is stronger than ever, capable of managing multiple fronts simultaneously. Another strand, equally present, sees a country that remains encircled not necessarily by conventional armies, but by persistent and evolving threats that rarely disappear entirely.

Netanyahu’s political approach has reinforced this condition of “managed insecurity”—a doctrine in which deterrence is maintained not by eliminating threats, but by continuously containing them. This may strengthen strategic positioning in the short term, but it also prevents a full transition from conflict management to post-conflict normalcy.

The result is a society that oscillates between confidence and anxiety. Military superiority coexists with civilian vulnerability. Tactical successes coexist with strategic uncertainty. And periods of calm are often interpreted not as resolution, but as interludes between escalations.

The question is not whether Israelis believe their enemies are weaker or stronger. The more accurate question is whether they believe threats can ever be fully removed from their horizon.

For many, the answer remains uncertain. And it is in that uncertainty—more than in battlefield outcomes—that Israel’s modern security condition is ultimately defined.

Blockade of Strait of Hormuz: A Symptom, Not the Disease

The rising tension surrounding the Strait of Hormuz is once again dominating global headlines. Yet portraying the crisis merely as a maritime security dispute risks missing the broader geopolitical picture. The threat of disruption in one of the world's most critical energy corridors is not an isolated event; it reflects deeper and long-standing strategic tensions in the Middle East. Military posturing at sea may be the visible manifestation of the crisis, but the roots extend far beyond naval deployments.

At the center of the dispute lies the decades-long confrontation between the United States and Iran, shaped by disagreements over Tehran's nuclear ambitions, missile capabilities, regional influence, and economic sanctions. Successive rounds of sanctions have sought to pressure Iran into altering its strategic behavior, while Iran has argued that these measures amount to economic coercion intended to weaken its sovereignty and limit its regional role.

Supporters of sanctions maintain that economic pressure remains an important instrument for preventing nuclear proliferation and deterring regional escalation.

Critics, however, argue that prolonged sanctions have often generated unintended consequences, hardening positions rather than creating space for sustainable diplomacy. This divergence reflects one of the most enduring debates in international relations - whether coercive pressure changes behavior or merely deepens confrontation.

Questions regarding global non-proliferation policies have further complicated the debate. Critics often point to perceived inconsistencies in the international system, particularly concerning different approaches toward regional nuclear capabilities. Such perceptions, whether fully justified or not, contribute to mistrust and reinforce narratives of unequal treatment.

The Strait of Hormuz therefore should not be viewed solely through the narrow lens of maritime access or freedom of navigation. Any temporary reduction in tensions at sea may provide immediate relief to energy markets, but lasting stability is unlikely to emerge without addressing the wider political and economic disputes that continue to fuel confrontation.

The lesson is straightforward - blockades and naval tensions are symptoms of deeper geopolitical fractures. Addressing the symptom may calm markets for a time, but durable stability requires resolution of the underlying political disputes that continue to shape the region's strategic landscape.

Dubai’s Dangerous Drift

For decades, Dubai built its prosperity on neutrality, commerce, and strategic pragmatism. It transformed itself into the Middle East’s leading financial and logistics hub by staying open to all sides. Today that carefully cultivated image appears increasingly at risk as the emirate seems to drift into a broader US-led confrontation with Iran.

Recent tensions with Saudi Arabia, speculation surrounding its future role in OPEC, and growing American pressure to assume a larger regional security role have created an uncomfortable perception that Dubai may be abandoning neutrality for geopolitical adventurism.

That could prove dangerously costly.

Dubai’s economic strength depends overwhelmingly on foreign investment, tourism, trade, and financial services. Unlike larger regional powers, it possesses limited industrial and manufacturing depth to absorb prolonged geopolitical shocks. The moment investors sense instability, capital flight can begin rapidly. Financial centers survive on confidence, not military alliances.

Geography further magnifies the risk. Iran lies directly across the Gulf. In any military escalation, ports, airports, financial districts, and energy infrastructure become exposed targets. Even limited retaliation could disrupt shipping lanes, damage investors’ sentiments, and undermine Dubai’s carefully built reputation as a safe commercial gateway.

Another uncomfortable reality is often overlooked. While Israel may welcome Gulf normalization politically, it also views regional influence competitively. Dubai’s emergence as a dominant commercial and logistics hub does not necessarily align with Israeli ambitions to become the region’s undisputed technological and economic powerhouse.

Critical assets such as Jebel Ali Port and Port of Fujairah are central not only to Gulf trade, but also to global supply chains. Dubai became successful by avoiding regional confrontations. Abandoning that balance may expose the emirate to consequences far beyond its calculations.

Dubai’s Departure from Strategic Neutrality

For decades, Dubai’s greatest strength was not oil, military power, or ideology. Its success rested on something far more valuable - strategic neutrality. Long before the Abraham Accords, Dubai had developed deep commercial relations with Iran. Iranian traders, investors, and businesses contributed significantly to Dubai’s emergence as the Gulf’s financial and trading hub. Geography, commerce, and pragmatism kept the relationship functional despite periodic political tensions. That balance now appears dangerously fragile.

The recent regional escalation involving Israel, backed firmly by the United States, has fundamentally altered Gulf dynamics. Once confrontation expanded beyond rhetoric, countries hosting American military infrastructure inevitably became exposed to Iranian retaliation. The message from Tehran was unmistakable - no state facilitating strategic pressure against Iran can expect complete immunity from the consequences.

Dubai today faces a strategic contradiction. On one hand, closer ties with Israel promise access to advanced technology, intelligence cooperation, and stronger alignment with Western security interests. On the other hand, this growing partnership risks eroding the very foundations of Dubai’s economic model.

Global investors do not merely seek modern infrastructure or luxury skylines; they seek predictability and stability. Dubai’s ports, aviation industry, tourism sector, and re-export businesses all depend upon the perception that the emirate remains insulated from regional conflict. Persistent hostility with Iran threatens that perception.

The Gulf cannot afford a prolonged environment where trade routes remain vulnerable, energy corridors uncertain, and geopolitical tensions permanently elevated. Iran, despite sanctions and diplomatic isolation, remains a pivotal regional actor with influence over critical maritime routes and strategic leverage that cannot simply be ignored.

The real danger for Dubai is not military confrontation alone. It is the gradual loss of its carefully cultivated identity as a neutral gateway between competing powers. History shows that commercial centers flourish when they build bridges, not when they become extensions of geopolitical rivalries.

Dubai’s growing closeness with Israel may deliver short-term strategic gains, but if it destroys regional economic equilibrium, the long-term costs could far outweigh the immediate benefits.