Iran: US Crafts Miseries and Blames Clergy

Washington continues to promote a convenient narrative that Iran’s clergy-led political system alone is responsible for the economic suffering of its people. Recent street protests—driven by inflation, unemployment, and a weakening currency—are being projected as evidence of regime failure. What remains largely unspoken is the decisive role the United States has played in shaping Iran’s economic distress.

Since the 1979 Islamic Revolution, Iran has lived under successive waves of US-led sanctions. These measures were neither symbolic nor limited. These systematically targeted banking channels, energy exports, trade flows, and foreign investment, effectively isolating Iran from the global economy. The consequences are visible: a battered currency, chronic inflation, supply shortages, and restricted access to essential imports. Blaming the clergy while ignoring decades of economic strangulation is a selective reading of reality.

The sanctions regime has been justified primarily by allegations that Iran is developing an atomic bomb. Yet these claims remain unproven. Iran has repeatedly denied seeking nuclear weapons, and international inspections conducted under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) found no evidence of active weaponization before the agreement was unilaterally abandoned by Washington in 2018. The parallel with Iraq is difficult to ignore. There, too, unverified claims about weapons of mass destruction were treated as established facts, with disastrous consequences.

Pressure on Iran has also extended beyond economics. Cyberattacks, sabotages operations, and strikes on strategic installations—widely attributed to the United States and Israel—suggest a shift from coercion to destabilization. Such actions have not altered Iran’s strategic behavior; instead, these have increased regional volatility and reduced space for diplomacy.

If concern for the Iranian people were genuine, sanctions relief would be the starting point. Economic normalization offers a more credible path to internal reform than perpetual punishment. Five decades of pressure have neither collapsed the state nor moderated policy, but these have deepened public suffering.

The recent attempt to externally reshape Venezuela’s political order has further fueled fears in Tehran. Many now worry that Iran’s leadership could face similar tactics—arrest, assassination, or engineered collapse.

History offers a blunt lesson: sanctions punish societies, not regimes. Until this reality is acknowledged, the misery of ordinary Iranians will continue to be manufactured abroad and misattributed at home.

Will Iran Be the Next Target?

The reported capture of Venezuela’s president should not be seen as an isolated incident. It resembles a full-dress rehearsal—a live demonstration of how far the United States is willing to go to impose political outcomes beyond its borders. For those still clinging to the illusion of sovereign immunity in the international system, this episode should serve as a sobering wake-up call.

Washington has a long record of attempting regime change in Venezuela through sanctions, covert operations, and diplomatic isolation. These efforts largely failed to unseat the government, but they steadily weakened the country’s economy and institutions. When economic strangulation did not deliver political submission, escalation appeared inevitable. The capture of a sitting president marks a dangerous new threshold, one that blurs the line between foreign policy and outright coercion.

History offers unsettling parallels. One may recall the failed attempt by the US in 1980 to free its embassy staff held hostage in Iran. Though framed as a rescue mission, it underscored Washington’s readiness to violate sovereign territory when strategic or political pressure mounts.

More recently, Sheikh Hasina’s transfer to India can be viewed through a similar prism: political outcomes shaped not by domestic consensus but by external facilitation. Different contexts, same method—power over process.

Labeling such actions as “state terrorism” may sound provocative, but the term merits serious consideration. When a powerful state uses fear, coercion, and force to compel political change in weaker nations, the distinction between counterterrorism and terror itself becomes dangerously thin.

The irony is striking, the very actor positioning itself as the global guardian of democracy increasingly relies on methods that undermine international law.

Iran inevitably enters this conversation. Long under sanctions, diplomatically cornered, and persistently portrayed as a threat, Tehran fits the familiar profile. If Venezuela was the rehearsal, Iran could well be the main act. The lesson is stark - resistance invites escalation; sovereignty offers no guarantee.

The world must condemn the US actions unequivocally. Silence today signals consent tomorrow. If such precedents stand unchallenged, no regime—friend or foe—can consider itself safe. The erosion of international norms does not stop with adversaries; it eventually consumes the system itself.

US will intervene if Iran kills protesters, Trump

US President Donald Trump has warned Iran's authorities against killing peaceful protesters, saying Washington "will come to their rescue".

In a brief post on social media, he wrote: "We are locked and loaded and ready to go." He gave no further details.

A senior adviser to Iran's Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei responded by saying Trump should "be careful" if he intervened, warning of potential chaos across the Middle East.

At least six people are reported to have been killed in Iran on Thursday after almost a week of mass protests sparked by worsening economic conditions.

In Friday's post on Truth Social, Trump wrote: "If Iran shots [sic] and violently kills peaceful protesters, which is their custom, the United States of America will come to their rescue."

Ali Larijani, secretary of the Supreme National Security Council, condemned Trump’s remarks, saying he “should know that American interference in this internal issue is equivalent to chaos across the entire region and the destruction of American interests”.

“We consider the positions of the protesting merchants separate from those of the destructive elements,” Larijani added in a post on X.

“The people of the US should know that Trump began the adventurism. They should take care of their own soldiers.”

Larijani’s remarks likely referenced the US’s wide military footprint in the region. In June, Iran attacked Al Udeid airbase in Qatar after the US strikes on three Iranian nuclear sites during Israel’s 12-day war with Iran.

In his post, the US president did not specify what action Washington could take against the Iranian authorities.

Iranian officials earlier said a member of the country's securities forces had been killed on Wednesday in the western city of Kouhdasht.

Footage posted on social media showed cars set on fire during running battles between protesters and security forces.

The protests began on Sunday in Tehran among shopkeepers angered by another sharp fall in the value of the Iranian currency, the rial, against the US dollar on the open market.

President Masoud Pezeshkian has said he will listen to the "legitimate demands" of the protesters.

The protests have been the most widespread since an uprising in 2022 sparked by the death in custody of Mahsa Amini, a young woman accused by morality police of not wearing her veil properly. 

 

Western Media’s Selective Outrage on Iran

Protests are a natural and fundamental part of any society whose citizens care about their future and believe they can influence it. They are not a sign of systemic failure, but an indicator of civic health and the practice of free speech, assembly, and association. For Western states, their media, and their politicians, all of this holds true—except when the protests occur in Iran.

The unprecedented volatility in the currency market and the rapid devaluation of the Iranian Rial in recent weeks compelled business owners (known as bazaaris) to shutter their shops, go on strike, and gather in several of Tehran’s central squares to voice their discontent. Reports from journalists on the scene and footage shared by participants indicate the protests—spanning several days—remained largely peaceful.

Demonstrators refrained from vandalizing public property, kept pathways open for vehicles, and directed their slogans toward improved economic management. Anti-riot forces monitored the gatherings and seldom intervened. None of what has emerged from Iran would be unfamiliar in the regular protests seen across European capitals or American cities.

Yet this manner of protest does not sit well with the West or with Israel. Circulated videos show unidentified individuals urging bazaaris to vandalize property and block streets. In one instance, a young woman addressing a crowd fled after protesters refused to escalate into violence. In another, a man attempted to set a municipal trash bin ablaze before bystanders intervened and security forces arrested him. None of the bazaaris recognized him afterward.

Simultaneously, an online influence campaign has emerged, editing videos and fabricating audio to falsely suggest protesters are demanding the return of the deposed Shah’s son. A widely circulated image symbolizing the protests was later exposed as AI-generated.

Israel has openly admitted deploying agents to steer these peaceful demonstrations toward chaos. Mossad’s Persian-language account urged Iranians to “hit the streets,” while an Israeli television reporter openly called for organizing protests to justify a wider war. Iran International echoed similar narratives, promoting escalation as a pathway to foreign military action.

Political figures joined in. Former Israeli Prime Minister Naftali Bennett declared his readiness to help Iranians achieve “freedom,” while US President Donald Trump warned Iran of further “turmoil,” without acknowledging that Iran’s economic distress stems largely from the “maximum pressure” sanctions he imposed in 2018.

Iranian authorities acknowledged the protests and announced steps to stabilize the Rial. President Masoud Pezeshkian and Parliament Speaker Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf both described the demonstrations as legitimate while cautioning against foreign exploitation.

Ultimately, these events reveal a clear double standard - peaceful assembly is praised in one context yet exploited when it occurs in a country opposed by Western and Israeli interests. The true measure of these protests lies not in sensationalized narratives from abroad, but in the legitimate and orderly spirit shown by the Iranian people themselves.

Netanyahu’s Washington Visit: Strategy, Sponsorship, and Shared Responsibility

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s visit to the United States is being portrayed as routine strategic coordination. In reality, it reflects a deeper convergence in which Washington is no longer a distant mediator but a principal enabler of Israel’s expanding regional agenda. The visit highlights not only Israeli ambitions, but also America’s sustained military, intelligence, and diplomatic sponsorship.

At the center of discussions lies Iran. Israel’s objective has clearly shifted from containment to systematic degradation of Iran’s strategic capabilities—nuclear latency, missile production, drones, and proxy networks. This transition would be impossible without continued US arms supplies, intelligence sharing, and political cover. While Washington publicly warns against escalation, its steady flow of advanced weaponry and repeated shielding of Israel at international forums effectively signal consent rather than restraint.

Regime change in Iran remains a sensitive phrase in Washington, but prolonged destabilization appears to be the preferred substitute. Cyber operations, economic pressure, and covert actions designed to exploit Iran’s internal vulnerabilities fit comfortably within a grey-zone strategy that allows plausible deniability. Western intelligence agencies may not openly own such operations, but coordination and silence often speak louder than formal declarations.

Saudi normalization remains another Israeli objective, though the Gaza war has made recognition politically costly for Riyadh. Netanyahu’s calculation is that the United States can again absorb the pressure—offering security guarantees and strategic incentives to Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman. In doing so, Washington risks further eroding its credibility across the Arab and Muslim world by prioritizing geopolitical bargains over public sentiment.

In Syria, Israel already enjoys near-unrestricted freedom of action, facilitated by US political backing and Russia’s strategic distraction. The goal now is to institutionalize strategic denial—preventing Iranian re-entrenchment and treating Syrian sovereignty as expendable in the pursuit of regional dominance.

Lebanon presents a similar pattern. Israel’s posture toward Hezbollah appears to be shifting from deterrence to attrition, with Washington focused on managing escalation rather than preventing it. Proposals to revise UNIFIL’s mandate or force Hezbollah north of the Litani risk dragging Lebanon into another devastating cycle.

Ultimately, Netanyahu’s visit is less about crisis management than about reaffirming a permissive American environment—one that allows Israel to act forcefully while the United States absorbs diplomatic costs. As Washington continues to arm, shield, and enable Israel, it also assumes responsibility for the instability that follows.

From Superpowers to a Super Syndicate

This writeup discusses a proposition that may appear unconventional but is rooted in long-term observation. After more than a decade of writing on geopolitics in South Asia and the Middle East and North Africa, it has become increasingly evident that the traditional concept of regional and global superpowers no longer adequately explains contemporary international politics. Power today is exercised less through overt state rivalry and more through a coordinated, transnational arrangement that may best be described as a Super Syndicate.

This emerging order is not ideological in nature. It is driven by strategic convergence among states possessing advanced intelligence capabilities and sustained by powerful economic interests. The principal beneficiaries include the global military-industrial complex, energy exploration and production companies, major financial institutions, and international shipping networks. These actors provide the financial backbone, while intelligence agencies of aligned states facilitate operational coordination, risk management, and narrative control.

Unlike the bipolar or unipolar systems of the past, the Super Syndicate does not thrive on direct confrontation among its members. Instead, it functions through a tacit division of strategic space. Countries and regions are assigned defined spheres of influence, minimizing direct competition while maximizing collective gain. Conflicts, when they occur, are managed rather than resolved, ensuring continuity rather than closure.

The Russia-Ukraine conflict illustrates this dynamic. While Ukraine has suffered extensive human and infrastructural losses and Europe has faced economic and security disruptions, the broader global system remains intact. Arms manufacturers have recorded unprecedented growth, energy markets have been restructured, and financial systems have adjusted without systemic shock. The conflict persists not because resolution is unattainable, but because prolonged instability serves entrenched interests.

The situation in Gaza further exposes the asymmetries of this order. Israel’s military campaign has continued despite widespread international criticism and humanitarian concern. Yet institutional accountability has remained elusive. This is not merely a failure of diplomacy; it reflects a structural imbalance in which certain actors operate with effective immunity due to their strategic positioning within the broader system.

Iran’s experience offers additional insight. Despite its aspirations for regional influence, Tehran has remained constrained by prolonged economic sanctions. The recent escalation involving Israel revealed a notable regional alignment. Several Middle Eastern states, while publicly maintaining neutrality, actively supported Israel through intelligence cooperation and defensive measures. The episode underscored the limitations faced by states attempting to operate outside the prevailing strategic framework.

For Pakistan and other developing states, these trends carry important implications. Sovereignty in the contemporary international system is increasingly conditional, shaped by economic leverage, intelligence alignment, and narrative positioning rather than formal equality among states. Moral appeals and legal arguments, while important, rarely translate into decisive outcomes without strategic backing.

The conclusion is not conspiratorial but analytical - global power is no longer exercised solely through identifiable superpowers. It is mediated through a coordinated network of state and non-state actors whose interests converge across military, financial, and strategic domains. Recognizing this reality is essential for policymakers, analysts, and scholars seeking to navigate an international order that is less visible, more complex, and increasingly resistant to traditional frameworks of analysis.

Iranian efforts to improve relations with Afghanistan

Iran will make every effort to give fresh impetus to its interactions with Afghanistan along the border. Masoud Pezeshkian made the comment in a televised address to the people at the close of his trip to the eastern Iranian province of South Khorasan, which borders Afghanistan.

“Many of the needs could be met, and this is possible,” he explained.

He said the provincial governor has been authorized to expedite engagement with neighboring Afghanistan.

Iran’s trade volume with Afghanistan is currently described as decent by economic reports, with Tehran investing significant effort into maintaining commerce since the Afghan government was toppled in 2021. The Taliban, who were ousted by US forces in 2001 and faced a 20-year occupation, swiftly returned to power following the American withdrawal. 

Since then, the new rulers have managed to improve security, with terrorist attacks becoming less frequent. Yet, the country remains burdened by the remnants of the occupation, facing escalating poverty and unemployment.

Although trade continues, Iran has yet to officially recognize the Taliban. Tehran remains at odds with the group over a host of issues, including the withholding of Iran’s water rights from the Hirmand River, the ongoing influx of refugees, and the lack of inclusivity within the new government. Nevertheless, Iranian officials have kept their embassy in Kabul active and continue to engage in regular discussions with Taliban leadership.

Tehran has also been working to establish deeper ties between the Taliban and Afghanistan’s other neighbors, none of whom have officially recognized the group’s government. 

To this end, Iran hosted a meeting in Tehran last week involving representatives from Afghanistan’s neighboring countries and Russia. During the summit, Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi emphasized the significance of stability and security, noting that Afghanistan’s integration into the region would be mutually beneficial. He described Afghanistan as possessing unique human, economic, and natural potential, historically serving as a bridge between neighboring regions.

Afghanistan’s relationship under the Taliban has been specially friction-ridden with Pakistan. The two countries engaged in a brief military conflict earlier this year; while a ceasefire is currently in effect, it is widely considered to be fragile.

 

China backs expanding Iran-Saudi ties

Iran, China, and Saudi Arabia have wrapped up their third Trilateral Committee Meeting, with Beijing once again underscoring its commitment to strengthening relations between Tehran and Riyadh.

The meeting was held Tuesday at Iran’s Foreign Ministry in Tehran and was chaired by Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister Majid Takht-Ravanchi. Saudi Deputy Foreign Minister Walid al-Kharaji and China’s Deputy Foreign Minister Miao Deo also took part.

During the session, the three sides issued a joint statement outlining key commitments and recent progress.

They reaffirmed Iran and Saudi Arabia’s dedication to fully implementing the 2023 Beijing Agreement, the China-brokered deal that restored diplomatic ties between the two nations. Both countries stressed the importance of upholding sovereignty, territorial integrity, independence, and security in line with the UN Charter, the Charter of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), and international law.

The statement also praised China’s “continued positive role” in facilitating dialogue and overseeing the agreement’s implementation.

For its part, China reiterated its willingness to support and encourage further cooperation between Tehran and Riyadh in political, economic, cultural, and security areas.

The joint statement highlighted progress in consular coordination, noting that this cooperation helped ensure the safe travel of more than 85,000 Iranian Hajj pilgrims and over 210,000 Umrah pilgrims in 2025.

It also welcomed the expanding exchanges between Iranian and Saudi research centers, universities, media outlets, and cultural institutions.

Addressing regional issues, the three countries called for an immediate end to Israeli military operations in Palestine, Lebanon, and Syria, and condemned violations of Iranian sovereignty.

Iran’s representative expressed appreciation for the steadfast support shown by Saudi Arabia and China during Israel’s June aggression against Iran.

The parties further reaffirmed their backing of a comprehensive, UN-led political solution in Yemen.

Iran and Saudi Arabia restored diplomatic ties in March 2023 after a seven-year break, following a China-mediated agreement that led to the reopening of embassies.

Earlier rounds of the trilateral committee were held in Beijing and Riyadh, where all sides restated their commitment to respecting sovereignty and non-interference, and acknowledged China’s ongoing mediation in support of regional dialogue.

 

Can Iran Revive a Dormant ECO?

Iran’s renewed diplomatic activity suggests a determined effort to resuscitate the long-underperforming Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO). The arrival of Iranian Minister for Industry, Mining and Trade, Seyed Mohammad Atabak in Istanbul—where ECO ministers gathered at this level for the first time in two decades—reflects a deliberate push by Tehran to reposition the bloc as a relevant regional economic platform. For Iran, this moment is less about protocol and more about strategic necessity.

At the heart of the Istanbul discussions is a long-awaited effort to revisit trade agreements, especially tariff reductions aimed at boosting intra-ECO commerce. For Iran, which has endured years of Western sanctions and now sees minimal prospects for diplomatic relief, regional economic arrangements have become a priority. The US-Israeli strikes on Iranian infrastructure earlier this year further hardened Tehran’s conviction that Western partners cannot be relied upon for economic stability.

The second Iran-ECO Conference held in Tehran in September clearly signaled Iran’s aspirations. Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi openly stated that the current level of ECO cooperation “does not match the enormous capacities” of its member states. His remarks were not diplomatic rhetoric— but a candid assessment of a bloc that has failed to convert geography into economic strength. Stretching across South, Central, and West Asia, ECO should have been a natural trade corridor. Instead, it has remained largely dormant.

This renewed push comes amid a shifting global economic order. As economist Majid Shakeri points out, the US — once the world’s “demander of last resort”—no longer plays its traditional role. Washington’s declining appetite for foreign goods and its reliance on punitive tariffs have weakened the post-WWII economic framework. For ECO members, this creates both a void and an opportunity: if global structures are eroding, regional alliances must step in.

Iran seems ready to do the heavy lifting. By pushing for tariff reforms, expanded connectivity, and practical cooperation, Tehran aims to keep ECO from fading into geopolitical irrelevance. Whether the other member states share the same urgency remains uncertain. But one thing is clear: Iran is positioning itself as the driving force behind ECO’s overdue revival.

Pak–Afghan trade standoff: Self-Inflicted Losses for Both Sides

The Pakistan–Afghanistan trade standoff is fast turning from a political dispute into an economic disaster. Both sides claim victory, yet both are bleeding revenue, jobs, and regional influence — while Iran and Central Asia quietly collect the gains.

The disruption in Pak–Afghan transit trade has become a contest of blame and bravado, but beneath the rhetoric lies a shared economic loss. Both countries are paying the price for political posturing.

Pakistan’s Defence Minister Khawaja Asif has termed the situation a “blessing in disguise,” arguing that reduced cross-border movement will curb smuggling, terrorism, and market distortion. Yet, the security argument offers little comfort to exporters whose businesses now stand still.

Since mid-October, border crossings have remained closed, leaving thousands of trucks stranded and trade worth over US$45 million in limbo. Exporters of cement, textiles, footwear, fruits, and food items in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Punjab, and Sindh are bearing the brunt. With more than 60 percent of Afghan imports already diverted to Iran, Central Asia, and Turkey, Pakistan risks losing both the Afghan and Central Asian markets.

For Afghanistan, Deputy Prime Minister Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar’s call to find alternate routes may project defiance and independence, but the costs are real. Afghan traders rely on Pakistan’s ports and goods, especially for food and medicines. Turning to Iran or Central Asia will lengthen routes and raise costs, pushing prices higher for Afghan consumers.

Meanwhile, Iran, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan quietly emerge as the real beneficiaries. Their ports and overland routes are gaining traction as Afghanistan diversifies its trade options.

In the end, neither Islamabad nor Kabul wins. The prolonged standoff damages trade, jobs, and investor confidence on both sides. What could have been a bridge of mutual economic gain has turned into another front of economic self-destruction.

The message is clear: political posturing may please leaders, but it impoverishes nations.

Twin Blasts, One Message: Terror Strikes India and Pakistan on Same Day

The recent terrorist attacks in both India and Pakistan on the same day have once again exposed how terrorism in South Asia is not just a domestic issue but a geopolitical tool. The eerie similarity in timing, targets, and messaging hints at a coordinated design — possibly the work of a single network or external orchestrator seeking to inflame regional tensions.

In Pakistan, militants struck security personnel and civilians alike, highlighting the persistent threat of regrouped extremist factions that exploit porous borders and instability in Afghanistan. For ordinary citizens already burdened by inflation and political disarray, such attacks deepen despair and erode confidence in the state’s security apparatus.

Across the border, India too was hit by near-simultaneous blasts, swiftly followed by political rhetoric blaming Pakistan. Yet the mirrored nature of both attacks raises unsettling questions. Are regional spoilers deliberately staging violence to keep Islamabad and New Delhi locked in hostility? Are unseen actors manipulating both nations for broader strategic gains?

Both countries have long traded accusations, but the uncomfortable truth is that terrorism has become an instrument in regional power games — sustained by ideological indoctrination, foreign funding, and political opportunism. Whenever prospects for dialogue or trade improvement appear, a major terror incident resets the equation, serving those who profit from perpetual enmity.

The victims are the same — ordinary citizens on both sides. Each attack reinforces division and fear, allowing extremists and opportunists to thrive. South Asia cannot afford to remain hostage to these cycles of violence and suspicion.

It is time for India and Pakistan to approach such tragedies with restraint and wisdom. A cooperative, fact-based investigation into the coordinated nature of these attacks could help expose the true perpetrators and prevent further bloodshed. Only through calm dialogue and shared resolve can both nations hope to deny terrorism the political space it continues to exploit.

Have All Abandoned Hamas?

The question of whether Hamas has been completely abandoned by its allies deserves a nuanced answer. While the militant-political organization is under unprecedented isolation and financial strain, it has not been left entirely friendless. What has changed is not the existence of support, but the depth and nature of it. The few remaining backers are more pragmatic and cautious than ideological.

Iran remains the most steadfast supporter of Hamas, but even Tehran’s approach has shifted from enthusiasm to calculation. The Islamic Republic continues to provide limited training, intelligence, and weapons through its network that includes Hezbollah and the IRGC. Yet, Hamas no longer occupies the central role it once did in Iran’s “Axis of Resistance.” Tehran’s strategic priority today is containing Israel through Hezbollah in Lebanon and maintaining deterrence in Syria and Iraq. In that equation, Hamas has become an auxiliary, not a frontline force.

Qatar, long seen as Hamas’s financial lifeline, has also recalibrated its policy. The unmonitored cash deliveries to Gaza that sustained Hamas’s governance structure are now being rerouted through the United Nations and humanitarian agencies. Doha seeks to retain its role as a mediator rather than an outright patron. That shift leaves Hamas with a smaller and more conditional stream of funds — insufficient to maintain administrative control in a war-torn enclave.

Turkey’s support, meanwhile, has settled into the realm of rhetoric. President Erdoğan continues to speak forcefully for Palestinian rights, but Ankara avoids concrete steps that could jeopardize its economic and diplomatic relations with the West. Turkey’s relationship with Hamas has become largely symbolic — a political shield rather than a material one.

Across the Arab world, the mood has changed dramatically. Egypt views Hamas as a destabilizing factor on its Sinai frontier; Jordan and the Gulf monarchies see it as a residue of the Muslim Brotherhood; and Saudi Arabia, pursuing strategic normalization with Israel, has little appetite for association. The UAE, a key Arab power, treats Hamas as a security threat rather than a liberation movement. This new regional consensus marks a profound isolation for the group.

Yet, Hamas is not entirely defeated. It continues to command thousands of fighters, retains limited weapons stockpiles, and still projects control over parts of Gaza. More importantly, popular sympathy for the Palestinian cause across the Muslim world remains deeply rooted. But sympathy does not translate into resources. Without substantial state sponsorship, Hamas is now sustained mainly by resilience, underground networks, and a sense of defiance rather than structured external support.

In essence, Hamas stands at a crossroads. Its godfathers have not fully abandoned it, but their backing has turned conditional and cautious. The movement survives, but in a diminished, more isolated form — powerful enough to persist, yet too constrained to dominate. The age of ideological patronage is ending; what remains is a movement fighting for relevance amid the ruins it once ruled.

 

United States Still Eyes Afghanistan

Washington’s withdrawal ended its military presence, not its strategic ambitions in the heart of Asia

When the United States hurriedly withdrew from Afghanistan in August 2021, it claimed to have ended its “forever war.” Yet, Afghanistan has not slipped off Washington’s strategic radar. The methods have changed, but the motives remain. The US still views Afghanistan as a vital piece on the Eurasian chessboard — prized for its geography, intelligence value, and economic undercurrents.

First, Afghanistan’s narcotics economy remains an unspoken factor. Despite Taliban claims of banning poppy cultivation, UN data confirms continued opium production, which fuels regional criminal networks. For decades, allegations have persisted that Western intelligence agencies — especially the CIA — have tolerated or even exploited the drug trade to fund covert operations. Renewed US engagement, framed as “counter-narcotics cooperation,” could restore informal oversight of these financial flows.

Second, the chaotic exit left behind billions of dollars’ worth of military hardware — aircraft, vehicles, ammunition, and advanced surveillance systems. Much of it reportedly fell into Taliban hands or black-market networks. Washington would prefer to track, retrieve, or neutralize sensitive technologies before they reach Iran, China, or Russia. A covert re-entry, through intelligence operations or private contractors, serves this purpose well.

Third, Afghanistan’s location remains uniquely strategic. It borders Iran, China’s Xinjiang region, and several Central Asian states under Russian influence. For US planners, it is an ideal observation post to monitor three rivals simultaneously. Hence the growing emphasis on “over-the-horizon” intelligence operations launched from Gulf or Central Asian bases.

Fourth, China’s expanding Belt and Road Initiative through Pakistan and Central Asia heightens Washington’s unease. Beijing’s efforts to stabilize Afghanistan and integrate it into regional connectivity projects threaten to edge the US out of Eurasia. Re-engagement under humanitarian, counterterrorism, or anti-drug programs provides Washington a convenient pretext to retain influence.

Finally, a chronically unstable Afghanistan serves certain geopolitical interests. It prevents regional integration and complicates projects like Iran’s Chabahar port or China’s CPEC. Controlled instability ensures continued leverage without the burdens of occupation.

In essence, the US may not reoccupy Afghanistan with troops, but it seeks reassertion through intelligence, proxies, and influence networks. The 2021 withdrawal ended one phase of occupation but opened another — quieter, subtler, and more strategic. Afghanistan remains too valuable for Washington to abandon — not for peace, but for power.

Trump’s Knesset Speech: A Performance of Power and Paradox

US President, Donald Trump’s much-anticipated address to the Israeli Knesset was as dramatic as expected — part peace declaration, part political theatre. He declared the Gaza war “over,” calling it the “historic dawn of a new Middle East.” Yet beneath the triumphal tone lay a familiar Trumpian paradox - big claims, limited substance, and a heavy dose of personal politics.

Trump’s first major announcement — declaring the Gaza conflict “a painful nightmare finally over” — aimed to project him as the peacemaker who ended a bloody chapter. But the reality on the ground tells a murkier story: Gaza remains shattered, its future uncertain, and Israel’s hold over its security unresolved.

For all his talk of peace, Trump’s narrative was built more on optics than on outcomes.

In one of the most controversial moments, he called on Israel’s president to pardon Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, dismissing his corruption charges as “trivial.” That plea blurred the line between diplomacy and political favoritism. It was a gesture that played well to Netanyahu’s loyalists but jarred with those who still value judicial independence.

Equally striking was Trump’s unexpected olive branch to Iran. Saying the US was ready for a deal “when Tehran is,” he tried to reposition himself as the only leader capable of balancing hostility with negotiation. Yet the statement raised eyebrows — could Trump really reconcile his pro-Israel stance with outreach to Iran, a country that views Israel as its sworn enemy?

He also insisted Gaza must be “completely demilitarized” and that Israel’s security “will never be compromised.” The phrasing underscored his alignment with Israel’s long-standing narrative: security first, sovereignty later.

In the end, Trump’s Knesset speech was less about the Middle East and more about reclaiming his image as the global dealmaker.

It blended symbolism with self-promotion, leaving unanswered whether his “new dawn” will bring genuine peace or simply another round of political grandstanding.

Is Pakistan Being Pushed into a ‘US Proxy War’ in Afghanistan?

Behind the new wave of border clashes may lie an old script — one written in Washington and played out in Islamabad and Kabul. Has Pakistan once again been cast in the role of America’s proxy?

The recent spike in Pak-Afghan border tensions has once again pushed the region to the edge of confrontation. Reports suggest that armed militants crossing from Afghanistan have attacked Pakistani security posts, prompting Islamabad’s “severe retaliation.” Yet, beneath the visible smoke of gunfire lies a far more intricate and disturbing reality — one that hints at the shadow of global power politics.

Following the US withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2021, Washington appeared to have lost its strategic foothold in the region. The Taliban’s refusal to hand over the Bagam Air Base — once a vital hub of American military operations — was not merely a symbolic rejection; it was a strategic rebuff. The superpower lost a vantage point near China, Iran, and Central Asia.

It is no coincidence that within months of that refusal, Afghanistan began facing renewed instability, and Pakistan started encountering an inexplicable surge in cross-border attacks.

My hypothesis is simple: when Washington cannot re-enter Afghanistan directly, it may seek to create circumstances that justify intervention. The most effective way to do that is to provoke conflict. The pattern fits. Anonymous “operators” — possibly non-state actors with advanced intelligence capabilities — carry out attacks inside Pakistan, inviting a retaliatory strike. The resulting escalation allows the US to portray the region as unstable and Taliban-controlled Afghanistan as a “global threat.” A familiar pretext for yet another intervention is thus created.

Ironically, Pakistan — which has already paid an enormous price in blood and economy during the first “War on Terror” — now risks being drawn into another one, this time as an unwilling participant in someone else’s geopolitical chessboard. The tragedy is that Islamabad still struggles to draw a clear line between its national interests and Washington’s regional ambitions. History, it seems, is repeating itself — and not for the better.

What complicates matters further is the deep mistrust between Islamabad and Kabul. The Taliban government, already under economic sanctions and political isolation, accuses Pakistan of toeing the American line. Pakistan, on the other hand, blames Afghanistan for harboring militants of the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). Yet neither side seems willing to see how external forces might be manipulating both.

The strategic question Pakistan must ask is: Whose war are we fighting this time? If recent cross-border provocations are indeed part of a larger plan to destabilize the region, Islamabad must avoid taking the bait. A measured, intelligence-based response — not blind retaliation — is the need of the hour. Pakistan’s security cannot depend on reaction; it must rest on foresight.

The lesson from the past two decades is painfully clear. Every time Pakistan has fought on behalf of someone else, it has lost — in lives, in reputation, and in internal cohesion. If history is repeating itself, the least we can do is refuse to play the same role again.

Iran's rise to regional powerhouse rattles friends and foes alike

Iran’s steady emergence as a regional powerhouse is reshaping the Middle East’s strategic landscape — and not everyone is comfortable with it. What makes Tehran’s ascent intriguing is that it unsettles both adversaries and allies, blurring traditional fault lines and forcing recalculations from Riyadh to Washington, and from Moscow to Beijing.

For decades, Iran was viewed through the prism of sanctions, isolation, and revolutionary zeal. Despite economic constraints and diplomatic pressure, it has built robust influence through a mix of ideology, resilience, and strategic alliances. Its regional proxies in Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, and Yemen — once dismissed as militant networks — now form a formidable web of influence, capable of shaping outcomes from the Gulf to the Mediterranean.

Iran’s growing clout has not only alarmed its foes. Even its supposed friends find Tehran’s assertiveness unnerving. The Gulf states, after years of rivalry, cautiously reopened diplomatic channels, realizing that confrontation is costly. Yet normalization is driven more by necessity than trust.

Saudi Arabia’s rapprochement, brokered by China, underscores this pragmatic shift — acknowledging Iran’s influence while seeking to contain it through diplomacy rather than confrontation.

The United States, meanwhile, remains entangled in a paradox. Washington cannot ignore Iran’s expanding regional reach, but its policy of maximum pressure has yielded minimal results.

The European powers, too, find themselves frustrated — wanting engagement on nuclear and energy fronts but constrained by American sanctions.

Russia and China, while cultivating ties with Tehran, remain wary of an overconfident Iran that might complicate their own regional interests.

Domestically, Iran’s leadership is projecting its defiance as strength — a message that resonates in a region weary of Western intervention. Yet, its economy remains fragile, and social unrest continues to simmer beneath the surface.

Iran’s rise is not just about military might or regional leverage; it is a reminder that power in today’s Middle East comes with contradictions.

Tehran’s growing assertiveness has turned it into both a symbol of resistance and a source of regional anxiety — a paradoxical power that leaves neither friends nor foes at ease.

 

Israel Propping Up Clerics, It Wants to Topple

Israel loves to project itself as the master strategist of the Middle East, but its obsession with weakening Iran’s clergy-led regime has turned into a textbook case of shooting oneself in the foot. Every strike, every sanction pushed through Western allies, every act of aggression meant to undercut Tehran’s clerics only hardens their grip on power. Far from collapsing, the system feeds off Israel’s hostility.

Nationalism is a powerful weapon. Iranians who may loathe the suffocating theocracy often rally behind it when Israel rattles its sabers. The clergy has perfected the art of turning external threats into political oxygen. By painting Israel as an existential menace, the clerics recast themselves as the sole guardians of sovereignty. Instead of cracking the system, Tel Aviv provides its clergy foes with the ultimate justification for survival.

Worse still, Israel’s strategy systematically silences the only real alternative inside Iran: reformists. Moderates who advocate engagement with the world are mocked as naïve or treacherous whenever Israel ups the ante. The hardliners gleefully point to every strike and sanction to prove that diplomacy is a fool’s game. In doing so, Israel eliminates any space for evolution from within, ensuring that Iran remains dominated by the most rigid voices.

And then there’s the economic side. Sanctions and isolation have not strangled the clergy; they’ve enriched it. The opponents often allege, the Revolutionary Guards and clerical networks thrive on smuggling, black markets, and sanction-busting schemes. Ordinary Iranians pay the price with rising prices and shrinking opportunities, while the very elites Israel wants to weaken grow stronger.

Israel’s strategy is not just flawed — it is counterproductive. Instead of destabilizing Iran’s clerical establishment, it props it up, fuels its legitimacy, and crushes dissent. Tel Aviv claims to be undermining its greatest enemy; in reality, it is handing the clergy the very tools it needs to endure.

The truth is brutal: Israel’s war against Iran’s clerics may be the biggest gift it has ever given them.

 

Triple Whammy of Crude Uncertainty

Oil prices rose slightly on Friday after four straight sessions of declines but were on track for their steepest weekly decline since late June due to market expectations that the OPEC Plus could hike output further despite oversupply concerns. If prices do not further recover in this session, Brent could close at the lowest level since the week ended May 30, while WTI would finish at a level not seen since May 02. On a weekly basis, Brent has plunged 8.3%, while WTI is 7.6% lower.

Oil markets thrive on stability, yet today they stand at the crossroads of three unpredictable forces: OPEC’s internal calculations, China’s demand swings, and the broader geopolitical turmoil stretching from the Middle East to Eastern Europe. Together, these factors create a triple whammy of uncertainty that is shaking investor confidence and distorting price forecasts.

First, OPEC remains the central player, but its cohesion is under strain. Saudi Arabia’s output discipline often clashes with the fiscal needs of smaller producers desperate for higher revenues. The cartel’s recent production adjustments reflect less a unified strategy and more a fragile balancing act between market control and survival. Traders now treat OPEC announcements with skepticism, wary that compliance may fracture under pressure.

Second, China—the world’s largest crude importer—casts a long shadow. Its slowing economy, punctuated by property sector woes and uneven industrial growth, has dampened energy consumption. Yet at the same time, Beijing stockpiles aggressively when prices dip, injecting volatility into the market. A single policy shift in China, from stimulus measures to green energy acceleration, can ripple through global demand curves in weeks, leaving analysts scrambling to adjust projections.

Finally, geopolitics adds combustible uncertainty. Wars in Ukraine and the Middle East, sanctions on Russia and Iran, and maritime tensions in the South China Sea all threaten supply chains and shipping lanes. Insurance premiums on crude shipments rise, pipelines face sabotage risks, and diplomatic fractures widen the unpredictability. Energy markets are not just reacting to supply and demand—they are hostage to political brinkmanship.

What makes this triad dangerous is their intersection. OPEC’s decisions are influenced by geopolitical rivalries; China’s demand patterns intersect with U.S. foreign policy and sanctions regimes. The market is no longer shaped by economics alone—it is choreographed by power struggles, both overt and hidden.

For investors, refiners, and consumers alike, the message is clear: crude is no longer just a commodity. It is a barometer of global instability. Until OPEC, China, and geopolitics align toward predictability—a highly unlikely prospect—oil will remain the most uncertain asset of our time.

 

Can Washington Buy Hezbollah Guns?

Washington believes US$230 million can buy stability by disarming Hezbollah and empowering Lebanon’s army. In a country where weapons are seen as survival, and aid is tied to political strings, dollars may deepen divisions rather than deliver sovereignty.

United States is betting big on Lebanon. Its latest US$230 million aid package, funneled into the army and security forces, comes with one not-so-hidden agenda: disarm Hezbollah. For Washington, the formula is simple—dollars for sovereignty. Strengthen the Lebanese Armed Forces, dismantle weapons caches, tie reconstruction money to compliance, and Hezbollah will finally be forced under state control.

But Hezbollah is not a street gang waiting to be bought out. It is Lebanon’s most powerful political and military force, one that commands loyalty, provides services, and—above all—wields arms that many see as the only shield against Israel. When bombs fell on Beirut in 2006, it was not the Lebanese army that stood firm, but Hezbollah. To expect the group to trade rockets for US money is to misunderstand its very identity.

The US plan hinges on a fragile bargain: Hezbollah hands over weapons, Israel halts incursions, and Lebanon begins to rebuild. Yet history says otherwise. Israeli jets still scream across Lebanese skies with impunity. Promises of restraint ring hollow to a movement born from decades of occupation and war. In Hezbollah’s calculus, surrendering arms is not reform—it is suicide.

Washington frames this as state-building. Hezbollah calls it blackmail. By tying basic recovery—electricity, infrastructure, reconstruction—to disarmament, the US is accused of holding Lebanon’s survival hostage. Aid, in this view, is just another weapon of war, designed to weaken “the resistance” where bombs failed.

The clash is stark: United States believes money can buy stability; Hezbollah insists weapons guarantee it. In between stands a broken Lebanon, desperate for relief yet divided over who really protects it.

If Washington thinks $230 million will unravel a militia that survived wars, sanctions, and sieges, it may soon discover that in Lebanon, guns are worth more than dollars—and sovereignty is not for sale.

 

Israel’s Obsession with Iran: Supremacy, Not Survival

Israel presents its confrontation with Iran as a fight for survival. It propagates Tehran seeks its destruction, and therefore preemptive action is necessary. Yet behind this rhetoric lies a harder reality—Israel’s true concern is not annihilation but the erosion of its strategic supremacy.

At the center of this tension is Iran’s nuclear program. Israel is the Middle East’s only nuclear power, though it never admits it officially. For decades it has enjoyed this monopoly as the ultimate insurance policy.

Iran, even without a bomb, is branded an existential menace. What alarms Tel Aviv is not that Tehran would attack with nuclear weapons, but that a nuclear-capable Iran would undermine Israel’s unrivaled leverage. In other words, it is not fear of destruction, but fear of parity.

The second driver is Iran’s support for resistance groups. Hezbollah in Lebanon, Hamas and Islamic Jihad in Gaza—these are not armies that can topple Israel, but they have repeatedly punctured its aura of invincibility. Each rocket barrage, each fortified position along the border, is viewed in Tel Aviv as an extension of Iranian influence, shrinking Israel’s space for unchecked action.

Ideology intensifies the clash. Iran refuses to recognize Israel, while Israeli leaders—from Netanyahu onward—frame Tehran as the new Nazi Germany. This absolutist narrative forecloses compromise and justifies covert assassinations, cyber sabotage, airstrikes in Syria, and endless lobbying for harsher sanctions.

The deeper layer is geopolitical. Among Middle Eastern states, only Iran possesses the population, resources, and regional reach to contest Israel’s dominance. Neutralizing Tehran means securing Israel’s role as the region’s undisputed military power—backed by Washington, tolerated by Arab monarchies, and free to redraw the political map to its liking.

Israel’s Iran obsession is not about survival. It is about ensuring that no other state can balance its power. By disguising this pursuit of supremacy as self-defense, Israel sustains a cycle of hostility that makes genuine peace impossible.

The world buys the existential threat narrative, but the truth is starker - Israel seeks not containment of Iran, but its permanent crippling.