Iran faces dire energy crisis

According to a Saturday New York Times (NYT) report, Iran is facing a dire energy crisis, forcing schools, colleges, governmental offices, and shopping malls to operate at a reduced capacity. 

The report cited multiple reasons for the situation, including the sanctions imposed on Iran and an Israeli strike on the Islamic Republic.

According to the NYT, citing an official from the country's Petroleum Ministry and Hamid Hosseini, a member of the Chamber of Commerce’s energy committee, a covert Israeli attack last February, which struck two gas pipes belonging to the Islamic Republic, forced the country to use its emergency gas reserves.

Now, Iran reportedly faces a deficit of some 350 million cubic meters a day, with demands surging with the onset of winter.   

“We are facing very dire imbalances in gas, electricity, energy, water, money, and environment,” Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian said in a televised speech earlier in December, according to the NYT.

Hosseini told the NYT that the country was attempting to “contain the damage because this is like a ‘powder keg’ that can explode and create unrest across the country.”  

Chief of the Islamic Republic's Coordination Council of Industries Mehdi Bostanchi labeled the situation "catastrophic," according to the NYT. 

According to him, the recent week's deficit could cut production in the country by 30% to 50%, costing it billions of dollars. 

“Naturally, the damages from the widespread and abrupt power outage that has lasted all week will be extremely serious for industries,” Bostanchi reportedly noted.

 

Taming the Shrewd called Trump

It is as clear as day that the US president has incalculable powers. Despite being an elected president, he is a complete autocrat. He can take many decisions at his own without the approval of the Senate and can veto any decision of the Senate. This right is available to the president under the US Constitution.

In his first term, Donald Trump not only unilaterally withdrew from the nuclear agreement reached with Iran by the remaining superpowers, but also imposed more sanctions at his own. After Iran's protests and the superpowers' surrender, Joe Biden has also been imposing new sanctions on Iran.

After being re-elected as president in the recent elections, he has begun to hint at rare royal decrees to be issued after he takes oath on January 20, 2025.

The first decree is that the BRICS countries will not create their own currency and if they dare to make such a mistake, they will be subject to additional tariffs and will not be able to export their products to the United States.

Israel has broken the backs of Hamas, Hezbollah and Syria at the behest of the US, and today there are heavy attacks on Yemen. There is a growing fear that Iran will be the next target.

At the same time, Trump has announced to impose new tariffs on Mexican and Canadian products exported to the US.

The limit is that Trump has also announced new tariffs on his allies to undermine the European Union.

I have no qualms in saying that the continued silence of Russia and China and the criminal indifference of the oil-producing Arab countries have given the US the courage to do all this.

Remember, those countries that are silent spectators of the destruction of other countries today will have no one to shed tears over their destruction tomorrow.

Iran's economic relations with its neighbors

In recent years, the economic relationships between Iran and its neighboring countries have grown in both complexity and significance. This economic integration is crucial for the development of Iran’s non-oil sector and its broader economic strategy, especially considering the geopolitical challenges that the country faces.

In this article, an effort has been made to explore the current state and future prospects of Iran’s trade with its neighbors, examine key sectors, trade volumes, and strategic partnerships.

As of late 2024, Iran’s non-oil trade with its neighbors has seen a notable increase. Non-oil trade volumes reached US$55.3 billion in the first 11 months of the year, with exports constituting 67 million tons of goods valued at US$25.8 billion and imports amounting to 21.4 million tons valued at US$29.4 billion.

This represents a significant increase in trade flows, driven by an increase in exports of petrochemical products, minerals, and agricultural goods.

Iran’s primary trading partners in the region include Iraq, the UAE, Turkey, Pakistan, and Afghanistan. The UAE and Iraq are Iran’s two largest trade partners, especially in terms of exports.

For example, in the first seven months of 2024, Iran’s trade with Iraq was valued at US$7.6 billion, making it one of the most crucial destinations for Iranian goods. The major exports to Iraq include petrochemicals, cement, and agricultural products, while imports primarily consist of machinery and food items.

Turkey has also maintained its position as a key trading partner, with trade between the two countries amounting to US$9.9 billion in the same period. Iranian exports to Turkey largely consist of natural gas and petroleum products, while imports from Turkey are diverse, including electrical machinery and textiles.

Iran’s geopolitical location, bordered by 15 countries, gives it a strategic advantage in the trade of goods and services. This advantageous position allows Iran to serve as a key transit hub for goods moving between Central Asia, the Caucasus, and West Asia.

In particular, the development of international transport corridors, such as the North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC), which links Iran with Russia, India, and Central Asia, is expected to enhance Iran’s role in regional trade.

Furthermore, the expansion of special economic zones, such as the Lamerd Free Trade Zone, has created new opportunities for businesses to engage in regional trade. This diversification of trade routes and infrastructure investment is expected to foster deeper economic ties with countries in the Persian Gulf and beyond.

Despite challenges, such as global sanctions and regional instability, Iran’s government has focused on expanding its non-oil exports, particularly to its neighbors. This strategy is part of a broader effort to reduce Iran’s dependency on oil revenues and diversify its economy.

The Iranian government’s push for stronger trade relations with Central Asia, Russia, and even countries like Oman and Turkmenistan, is driven by the need for economic diversification and the potential to access new markets. Iran’s trade with Russia, for example, has grown steadily, with recent figures showing a trade volume of US$1.5 billion in 2024.

The economic outlook for Iran’s trade with neighboring countries is promising. The country’s strategic location, combined with increased infrastructure investment and a strong focus on non-oil exports, positions Iran as a key player in the regional economy.

However, the ongoing challenges of sanctions and geopolitical tensions remain factors to consider as Iran continues to navigate its path toward economic diversification.

If these trade relationships continue to strengthen, Iran could significantly enhance its role as a regional economic hub, ensuring long-term stability and growth for its economy.

 

Netanyahu eyes Iran, his arch foe

According to Reuters, 2025 will be a year of reckoning for Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. He is set to cement his strategic goals: tightening his military control over Gaza, thwarting Iran's nuclear ambitions and capitalizing on the dismantling of Tehran's allies - Palestinian Hamas, Lebanon's Hezbollah and the removal of Syrian president Bashar al-Assad.

Assad's collapse, the elimination of the top leaders of Hamas and Hezbollah and the destruction of their military structure mark a succession of monumental wins for Netanyahu.

Without Syria, the alliances Tehran has nurtured for decades have unraveled. As Iran's influence weakens, Israel is emerging as the dominant power in the region.

Netanyahu is poised to zero in on Iran's nuclear ambitions and missile program, applying an unyielding focus to dismantling and neutralizing these strategic threats to Israel.

Iran, Middle East observers say, faces a stark choice: Either continue its nuclear enrichment program or scale back its atomic activities and agree to negotiations.

"Iran is very vulnerable to an Israeli attack, particularly against its nuclear program," said Joost R. Hiltermann, Middle East and North Africa Program Director of the International Crisis Group. "I wouldn't be surprised if Israel did it, but that doesn't get rid of Iran."

"If they (Iranians) do not back down, Trump and Netanyahu might strike, as nothing now prevents them," said Palestinian analyst Ghassan al-Khatib, referring to President-elect Donald Trump. Khatib argued that the Iranian leadership, having demonstrated pragmatism in the past, may be willing to compromise to avert a military confrontation.

Trump, who withdrew from a 2015 agreement between Iran and six world powers aimed at curbing Tehran's nuclear goals, is likely to step up sanctions on Iran's oil industry, despite calls to return to negotiations from critics who see diplomacy as a more effective long-term policy.

Amid the turmoil of Iran and Gaza, Netanyahu's long-running corruption trial, which resumed in December, will also play a defining role in shaping his legacy. For the first time since the outbreak of the Gaza war in 2023, Netanyahu took the stand in proceedings that have bitterly divided Israelis.

With 2024 coming to an end, the Israeli prime minister will likely agree to sign a ceasefire accord with Hamas to halt the 14-month-old Gaza war and free Israeli hostages held in the enclave, according to sources close to the negotiations.

But Gaza would stay under Israeli military control in the absence of a post-war US plan for Israel to cede power to the Palestinian Authority (PA), which Netanyahu rejects. Arab states have shown little inclination to press Israel to compromise or push the decaying PA to overhaul its leadership to take over.

"Israel will remain in Gaza militarily in the foreseeable future because any withdrawal carries the risk of Hamas reorganizing. Israel believes that the only way to maintain the military gains is to stay in Gaza," Khatib told Reuters.

For Netanyahu, such a result would mark a strategic victory, consolidating a status quo that aligns with his vision: Preventing Palestinian statehood while ensuring Israel's long-term control over Gaza, the West Bank and East Jerusalem -- territories internationally recognised as integral to a future Palestinian state.

The Gaza war erupted when Hamas militants stormed into Israel on October 07, 2023, killing 1,200 people and taking 250 hostages, according to Israeli tallies. Israel responded with an air and land offensive that has killed 45,000 people, health authorities there say, displaced 1.2 million and left much of the enclave in ruins.

While the ceasefire pact would bring an immediate end to the Gaza hostilities, it would not address the deeper, decades-old Palestinian-Israeli conflict, Arab and Western officials say.

On the ground, prospects for a Palestinian state, an option repeatedly ruled out by Netanyahu's government, have become increasingly unattainable, with Israeli settler leaders optimistic that Trump will align closely with their views.

A surge in settler violence and the increasing confidence of the settler movement - highway billboards in some West Bank areas bear the message in Arabic "No Future in Palestine" - reflect a growing squeeze on Palestinians.

Even if the Trump administration were to push for an end to the conflict, "any resolution would be on Israel’s terms," said Hiltermann of the Crisis Group.

"It's over when it comes to a Palestinian state, but the Palestinians are still there," he said.

In Trump's previous term, Netanyahu secured several diplomatic wins, including the “Deal of the Century,” a US-backed peace plan which Trump floated in 2020 to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

The plan, if implemented, marks a dramatic shift in US policy and international agreements by overtly aligning with Israel and deviating sharply from a long-standing land for peace framework that has historically guided negotiations.

It would allow Israel to annex vast stretches of land in the occupied West Bank, including Israeli settlements and the Jordan Valley. It would also recognize Jerusalem as the "undivided capital of Israel" - effectively denying Palestinian claims to East Jerusalem as their capital, a central aspiration in their statehood goals and in accordance with UN resolutions.

SYRIA AT CRITICAL CROSSROADS

Across the border from Israel, Syria stands at a critical juncture following the overthrow of Assad by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) rebel forces, led by Ahmad al-Sharaa, better known as Abu Mohammed al-Golani.

Golani now faces the monumental task of consolidating control over a fractured Syria, where the military and police force have collapsed. HTS has to rebuild from scratch, securing borders and maintaining internal stability against threats from jihadists, remnants of the Assad regime, and other adversaries.

The greatest fear among Syrians and observers alike is whether HTS, once linked to al-Qaeda but now presenting itself as a Syrian nationalist force to gain legitimacy, reverts to a rigid Islamist ideology.

The group’s ability or failure to navigate this balance will shape the future of Syria, home to diverse communities of Sunnis, Shi'ites, Alawites, Kurds, Druze and Christians.

"If they succeed in that (Syrian nationalism) there's hope for Syria, but if they revert to their comfort zone of quite strongly ideologically-tainted Islamism, then it's going to be divisive in Syria," said Hiltermann.

"You could have chaos and a weak Syria for a long time, just like we saw in Libya and Iraq."

Pezeshkian to focus Makran coast development

Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian announced a major initiative to develop Iran's Makran coast, stating that necessary coordination has been made to employ top international consultants to prepare a comprehensive plan and roadmap for the development of the Makran region.

Speaking at a cabinet meeting on Wednesday, Pezeshkian emphasized the need to catch up with neighboring countries in exploiting the Makran coast's potential, aiming to "achieve a superior position in the region in line with the goals of the 20-Year Vision Document." 

He highlighted the lack of a previous overarching plan, noting, “We have not had a comprehensive and all-encompassing plan as a roadmap for the development of Makran, and various bodies have taken actions based on their missions and responsibilities in this regard.” 

Pezeshkian described the Makran coast as “the most important foundation for sustainable and long-term development in Iran,” asserting that the country's future is inextricably linked to its development. 

The new plan, he explained, will follow thorough studies and assessments to define the responsibilities of administrative bodies and ensure coordinated action.

The strategic importance of the Makran coast, located on the Oman Sea, has been underscored by Leader of the Islamic Revolution Ayatollah Seyyed Al Khamenei, prompting significant attention from Iranian decision-makers and military officials.

The Makran coast provides Iran with access to vital shipping lanes and crucial maritime trade routes connecting the Indian Ocean to the Persian Gulf.

 

Iran: Biggest loser after Assad’s fall

Among the central factors that led to the ouster of Bashar al Assad was Iranian and Russian decisions not to intervene yet again to prop him up. While Syria’s trajectory remains highly uncertain, its post-Assad posture is likely to be inimical to both the countries.    

Tehran had long used Syria as vector to project influence in the region and marshalled significant resources and manpower to keep Assad in power when the Syrian civil war erupted in 2011.

Moscow similarly saw its ties with Assad as a source of regional influence, and its 2015 intervention in Syria was decisive in Assad maintaining his stranglehold on power.

But with Russia bogged down in Ukraine, and Iran — and its allies like Hezbollah — severely weakened by the post October 07, 2023 conflict with Israel, neither patron was willing to rescue Assad once again.

USIP’s Garrett Nada explains what Assad’s ouster means for Iran: 

The toppling of the Assad regime is a major loss for Iran, which has not been so isolated or vulnerable in the region since the 1980-1988 war with Iraq. Syria was Iran’s only close state ally in the Middle East. It was a frontline against Iran’s archenemy Israel and the linchpin of Tehran’s ability to project power in the Levant. For four decades, Syria was the main conduit for Iran’s supply of weapons and equipment to Hezbollah in Lebanon, which became the world’s most heavily armed non-state actor.

Iran’s extensive support to Assad during the Syrian civil war, which broke out in 2011, reflected the country’s importance for Tehran’s regional strategy. Iran deployed thousands of military advisers and troops, mobilized tens of thousands of foreign Shiite fighters from as far away as Afghanistan and Pakistan to bolster regime forces, and organized a new Syrian paramilitary and provided billions of dollars in aid. Iran’s efforts, coupled with Russian air support, helped keep Assad in control of much of Syria until late 2024.  

Iranian officials quickly accepted the fate of the Assad regime despite all the blood and treasure invested. “It is the Syrian people who must decide on the future of their country and its political and governmental system,” President Masoud Pezeshkian said on December 08, 2024.

Iran’s foreign ministry expressed a willingness to engage with a new government. “The Iranian and Syrian nations have always had long-standing and friendly relationship,” it said on December 08.

“It is expected that this relationship will continue with a wise and forward-looking approach by both nations, based on mutual interests and adherence to international legal obligations.”

Iran asked HTS to protect Shiite holy sites in Syria, and HTS confirmed that it would protect the Sayyida Zeinab shrine in Damascus.

Yet Iran’s future relationship with Syria is dubious. Many of the players poised to play key roles in the transition hold Iran responsible for propping up the brutal Assad regime.

“This new triumph, my brothers, marks a new chapter in the history of the region, a history fraught with dangers (that left) Syria as a playground for Iranian ambitions, spreading sectarianism, stirring corruption,” Abu Mohammed al-Jolani, the leader of Hayat Tahrir al Sham, said in his victory speech on December 08.

On the same day, Iran’s embassy in Damascus, previously evacuated, was vandalized and looted. Posters of the supreme leader and other Iranians were torn and discarded on the floor.

The fall of Assad may push Iran to reconsider its “forward defense” strategy. For decades, Iran has relied on the “Axis of Resistance,” including Syria and militia allies across region, to pressure Israel and deter strikes on Iranian soil. The goal was to keep conflicts far from Iran’s borders. But the axis already faced severe setbacks before Assad’s departure.

Israel significantly weakened both Hamas in Gaza and Hezbollah in Lebanon during the war that erupted after the Hamas-led October 07 terrorist attacks. Israeli forces killed senior leaders and thousands of fighters and degraded both groups’ abilities to wage war. Iran will face significant logistical challenges to resupplying Hezbollah without the Syrian land bridge.

Meanwhile, Iran lacks credible mechanisms to deter Israel. Tehran launched unprecedented direct attacks on Israel, one in April 2024 including 170 drones, at least 30 cruise missiles, and more than 120 ballistic missiles, and one in October 2024 including more than 180 ballistic missiles. But neither caused significant damage or dissuaded Israel from launching counterattacks, the second of which crippled Iran’s air defenses and damaged missile production capabilities.

The remaining members of the “Axis of Resistance” are not much help in terms of deterring Israel. The Houthis in Yemen have proven resilient despite attacks by the US and Israel but have only carried out sporadic long-range missile and drone attacks.

The Iraqi militias backed by Iran, such as Kataib Hezbollah and Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba, are also relatively peripheral and have not caused much damage to Israeli targets.

With limited options, a growing number of Iranian officials have called for revising the country’s nuclear doctrine to allow the production of nuclear weapons. As of late 2024, Iran could produce enough highly enriched uranium to fuel one nuclear bomb in as little as one or two weeks.

Tehran would need several months or more than a year to assemble a warhead and marry it to a delivery system, such as a ballistic missile. But moving to weaponize would come with its own serious risks.

 

Need for unity among Muslim countries

A senior military adviser to the Leader of the Islamic Revolution, Ayatollah Seyyed Ali Khamenei, has proposed that unity among Muslim nations could play a transformative role in reshaping global dynamics.

“The convergence and unity of Muslim countries, forming a Muslim power bloc, is the only way to liberate Muslim nations from the hegemony of global arrogance, particularly the United States and Israel,” Major General Yahya Rahim Safavi asserted.  

The Iranian general accused the United States and Israel of being key drivers of instability, war, and human suffering across the region and the globe.

Safavi argued that Muslim nations must prioritize sustainable security, regional peace, and self-reliance to achieve true progress and independence.  

Safavi emphasized that the world is undergoing a profound geopolitical transformation, leading to the emergence of a new global order.

Speaking on the subject, he stated, “The current world is in a geopolitical transitional phase, and we are witnessing the shaping of a new world order on both regional and international scales.”  

According to Safavi, this evolving order is marked by the gradual decline of Western dominance and the rise of Eastern powers. He explained, “The global power system is slowly but surely shifting from the West to the East.”  

Safavi highlighted the growing influence of Asian and Eurasian powers, such as China, India, Russia, and Iran.

He noted that these nations are increasingly collaborating within frameworks like the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and BRICS to challenge the unilateral dominance of the United States and its NATO allies.

Their objectives, he said, include reducing global reliance on the US dollar in trade and countering Western-centric policies.  

The general also underscored the chaotic state of the world, attributing recent conflicts and wars to a 200-year long struggle among global and regional powers for political, economic, and cultural dominance over strategically significant regions.  

He stressed the need for greater collaboration and recognition among Muslim countries, stressing that their collective efforts could pave the way for a stronger, unified presence on the global stage.

 

 

JCPOA no longer relevant, says IAEA chief

Rafael Grossi, the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), has said that the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) is no longer viable, appearing to place sole responsibility for the 2015 nuclear deal's lame-duck state on Iran.

"The philosophy of the initial JCPOA agreement can be used as a basis, but the agreement itself is no longer necessary," Grossi remarked during his visit to Italy for discussions with the Foreign Ministry. 

The UN nuclear chief pointed out that Iran is now enriching uranium to levels of 60%, a threshold that he said brings the country close to the capability to produce military-grade uranium, which requires enrichment to 90%. "Iran is rapidly approaching the status of a nuclear state," he claimed. 

Grossi omitted any mention of the West's abandonment of the deal, the factor that prompted Iran to curtail some of its JCPOA commitments in the first place. 

The JCPOA was signed in 2015 between Iran and the P5+1 group of countries (the United States, Britain, France, Germany, Russia, and China). It aimed to limit Iran’s nuclear program in exchange for the termination of sanctions.

Washington unilaterally withdrew from the pact in 2018 and re-imposed sanctions against Iran. European signatories to the deal not only failed to take the sting out of US sanctions but also came up with anti-Iran bans of their own. 

Tehran began to scale back on some of its JCPOA commitments in 2020, under a new law passed by the Iranian parliament. 
 

 

 

Al-Jolani: A terrorist being used against Iran

The man who helped oust Syrian President Bashar al-Assad last week embodies a blend of traits drawn from some of Washington’s most infamous creations: The attire of Ukrainian President Vladimir Zelensky, the terrorist background of slain Al-Qaeda leader Osama Bin Laden, and the strident anti-Iranian rhetoric of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.

Washington’s US$10 million bounty on Abu Mohammad al-Jolani’s head hasn’t stopped Western media from trying to sanitize his image. In an interview with CNN a few days before the fall of Assad’s government, the Hayat Tahrir al-Sham leader was introduced as a misunderstood revolutionary, whose youthful exuberance somehow prompted him to behead civilians on a regular basis. 

“I never had the intent to do these things. [I was] at a certain state of consciousness and young age back then,” he told the CNN reporter, while the female journalist nodded her head in understanding.  The terror leader added that the only threats against Syria were Iran and Hezbollah.

As the world ponders whether it should give the Al-Qaeda and Daesh affiliate a second chance, Iran is likely to reach a clear conclusion sooner. The reason? Al-Jolani seems adamant about sticking to part of his character inspired by Netanyahu.

In similar remarks to his CNN interview on Saturday, al-Jolani said the HTS has no animosity towards the Iranian people, a line usually used by Netanyahu whose biggest dream is to pummel Iran and divide the country into different states.

While he also spoke about his intentions to “unite Syria” and respect all groups in his potential future government, al-Jolani failed to roll out any plans about the elephant in the room, Israel’s recent occupation of new regions in Syria, and its nonstop bombardment of the country in the past week.

The HTS leader said Syria will not be engaging in any military conflict with Israel because it is “not ready”. He did, however, say that Israel has no reason to attack Syria, as “Iranian forces have left the country”. Israel has bombed Syrian soil on over 2000 occasions since December 08.  According to the regime, over 80% of Syria’s military infrastructure now lies in ruins.

Elsewhere in his remarks, al-Jolani said he will not be joining the Axis of Resistance in support of Palestinians.

For the most part, so far, al-Jolani has acted as the perfect Western puppet. He has changed his looks to better fit Western TV, he demonizes Iran, and he has a phenomenon indifference to Israeli aggressions against his country.

Much to the dismay of Washington and Al-Jolani’s second biggest supporter, Turkey, however, nobody knows when this carefully constructed façade of a reformed terrorist is going to crack and backfire on all involved actors. Some believe that day might be right around the corner.

“The sudden regime change in Syria is a short-lived victory. How this all plays out moving forward is almost impossible to say, other than it looks like there will be considerable chaos in Syria for the foreseeable future,” said John Mearsheimer, a renowned political science professor and theorist before condemning Western media for whitewashing HTS’s leader. “These journalists understand full well, most Americans understand… that the US is supporting terrorists.”

 

 

Turkey violated Doha agreement on Syria

The Turkish Foreign Minister has claimed that Turkey successfully persuaded Iran and Russia not to intervene militarily during the Syrian rebels' offensive which led to the downfall of President Bashar al-Assad's government in the early hours of December 08. 2024.

The information obtained by the Tehran Times suggests that this assertion contradicts the terms agreed upon in Doha on December 07 between the foreign ministers of Turkey, Iran, and Russia.

In a recent interview with Turkey’s NTV, Hakan Fidan stated, "The most important thing we had to do was to talk to the Russians and Iranians to ensure they would not enter the (Syria) equation with military force. We spoke with the Russians and Iranians, and they understood the issue."

The information obtained by the Tehran Times shows the December 07 summit under the Astana platform saw Turkey agree to a framework enabling direct negotiations between the Syrian President and rebel forces, with Assad remaining in power.

“It was agreed that the Syrian conflict would be resolved through political means, with both the Assad government and the armed opposition entering into dialogue,” a source involved in the Doha talks told the Tehran Times.

“The agreement was signed by Iran's Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi, Turkey's Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan, and Russia's Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov. Yet, developments on the ground in Syria on Sunday, December 09, show that Turkey did not adhere to what it had signed.”

Armed factions led by the Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) rebels launched a surprise attack against Syria’s northwestern Aleppo Province on November 27. The militants quickly advanced towards Damascus in the face of the Syrian army’s refusal to resist. 

Reports and evidence show the HTS and its allied factions have been receiving substantial financial and military support from Turkey, the United States, and Israel.

 

Syria to face Libya or Sudan like situation

In a commentary published on December 09, 2024, a Middle East security expert at Princeton University says once the Syrian opposition gets rid of their common enemy and the process of shaping the future begins, their differences will surface, and it remains uncertain how reconcilable these differences will be. Even if there are no internal disagreements among the opposition, their conflicts with the Kurds and Turkey's stance on this issue alone pose a major obstacle to establishing a consensus-based order. This could keep Syria in a prolonged political and security crisis, similar to Libya and Sudan.

Following is the text of the article:

The Baathist system in Syria, after nearly 60 years of rule, has been overthrown and Bashar al-Assad has fled to Moscow. Syria stood alongside Iran during its invasion by Saddam Hussein, and Iran, in turn, stood with the Syrian and Iraqi governments during the assault by the Islamic State (IS) group and al-Qaeda on Syria and Iraq from 2011 to 2017.

The alliance of Russia, Iran and the Axis of Resistance led to the defeat of militant groups and the preservation of the sovereignty of these two Arab countries. However, at the same time, Assad's government had no alignment with democracy, and western and Arab leaders were fearful and angry about the extensive presence and influence of Iran and Russia in Syria. In any case, the overthrow of the Syrian political system has created a major shift in the region's geopolitics.

In the short term, Iran, Russia, Iraq and the Axis of Resistance will be the main losers from Assad's downfall. The collapse of the Assad government will be a major blow to the axis, weakening Iran's geopolitical influence in the region.

Syria has been the only land route for the supply and transfer of weapons to Hezbollah, and cutting off this route not only creates a strategic challenge for Hezbollah but also weakens Iran's leverage in the Palestinian issue. Moreover, the potential spread of insecurity to Iraq and Iran - and the weakening of Iran's diplomatic support - are significant consequences for Iran and the axis.

Turkey main winner

The fall of the Syrian government could also pose threats to Iraq's security, both in terms of the Kurdish region and from the aspirations of extremist groups for Sunni-majority areas in the country, as well as the potential activation of IS sleeper cells.

In the short term, Israel might find an opportunity to further weaken Hezbollah and the axis in the entire region. However, the activities of new Islamist armed groups at its borders, the rise of Islamist movements and the potential impact on Syria's future stance on the Palestinian issue and the occupied Golan Heights could increase long-term national security threats for Israel.

In the short term, the US and the West will be winners because the fall of Assad will significantly reduce Russian and Iranian influence in the region.

However, the Islamist group that seized Damascus and toppled Assad, Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), was proscribed as a terror organization by the Britain in 2017 and the US in 2018 because of its links to al-Qaeda. HTS is led by Abu Mohammad al-Jolani (real name Ahmed al-Sharaa), who was designated a terrorist by the US in 2013.

It is uncertain how the collapse of Syria's secular government and the rise of Islamists will impact the long-term interests of the US, with the differing perspectives between the US and Turkey on the Kurdish issue, the ambiguity surrounding the future actions of the opposition and the prospect of increasing instability in the region.

Turkey is the main winner. Ankara may hope to resolve the Syrian refugee crisis in Turkey, exert more effective control over the Kurds and strengthen its role in the Palestinian issue, as well as cement alliances with like-minded groups in the region.

While Arab countries are also pleased with the reduction of Iran's influence in Syria, the military operations of HTS and other militant groups were managed and organied by Turkey, all of which have an affiliation with the Muslim Brotherhood.

Several Arab countries, such as Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Jordan, are opponents of the Muslim Brotherhood and its ideology. Therefore, Turkey's power projection in the region and the Brotherhood's potential future dominance in Syria could be perceived as a new threat by some Arab countries.

Regarding the political future of Syria, two scenarios can be imagined: a peaceful transition to a new system; or a Libyan and Sudanese-style outcome.

A peaceful transition could be achieved if the opposition continues with its moderate rhetoric and actions. However, it is composed of diverse and fragmented groups that have united solely to eliminate a common enemy.

Once this shared enemy is removed and the process of shaping the future begins, their differences will surface, and it remains uncertain how reconcilable these differences will be.

Even if there are no internal disagreements among the opposition, their conflicts with the Kurds and Turkey's stance on this issue alone pose a major obstacle to establishing a consensus-based order. This could keep Syria in a prolonged political and security crisis, similar to Libya and Sudan.

Another important factor is the conflicting interests of the many external actors, who will each try to increase their influence over Syria's situation in various ways.

In any scenario, future developments in Syria will have a significant impact on the region's geopolitics. Therefore, finding a solution that is acceptable to both regional and global powers is crucial.

In April 2017, at the Carnegie Conference in Washington, I proposed 10 principles for resolving the Syrian crisis: 1) Resolving the Syrian crisis through diplomacy, not war; 2) A face-saving solution for all the main parties involved;  3) Serious and collective cooperation to eradicate terrorism from Syria; 4) Preserving Syria's territorial integrity and sovereignty; 5) Preventing the collapse of the Syrian army and security institutions; 6) Forming an inclusive government in Syria; 7) Building a new Syria based on the will and vote of the majority of the Syrian nation; 8) Ensuring the protection of minorities in Syria; 9) Holding free elections under the supervision of the United Nations regarding the new government and constitution of Syria; 10) A comprehensive package of economic aid for Syria's reconstruction, the return of refugees, and other humanitarian issues.

Although there was no receptive ear for these ideas at that time, today, these 10 principles could still be a comprehensive and sustainable package to resolve the Syrian crisis.

Courtesy: Tehran Times

Iran to lose oil sales to Syria

According to Argus, the removal of Syrian president Bashar al-Assad from power over the weekend has not only dealt a major blow to Iran and its designs for the Levant region, but it has also eliminated a critically important outlet for Tehran's sanctions-hit oil. Iran produced around 3.33 million bpd during September-November.

Long considered Iran's top Arab ally, Assad enjoyed significant military and economic support from Tehran over the past decade, as Iran saw him as the focal point for its regional influence. Syria also provided the main supply routes to Lebanon's Hezbollah militia, the crown jewel in Iran's so-called ‘Axis of Resistance'.

Part of Iran's assistance was in the form of shipments of crude and refined oil products to help Assad's regime meet fuel demand in the areas under its control.

Once more than a 600,000 barrels per day (bpd) producer, Syria's crude output has been on the decline over the past three decades. Just before the start of the civil war in 2011, production had already slipped below 400,000 bpd. lately, it was less than 100,000 bpd, and only around 16,000 bpd of that comes from fields in areas under the former government's control.

This left Assad's regime — itself restricted by western sanctions — critically short of crude to feed its two refineries in Banias and Homs, even though both have been operating below capacity because of damage sustained during the civil war.

Iran helped plug the gap by sending crude and products to the 140,000 bpd Banias refinery on Syria's Mediterranean coast on an ad hoc basis.

Iranian crude exports to Syria averaged around 55,000 bpd in January-November this year, down from 80,000 bpd in 2023 and 72,000 bpd in 2022, according to data from trade analytics firm Kpler.

Vortexa puts shipments higher at 60,000 to 70,000 bpd so far this year and 90,000 bpd in 2023. Iran has also been sending around 10,000 to 20,000 bpd of refined products to Syria in recent years, according to consultancy FGE. Iran's oil exports to Syria have mostly been in the form of grants to support the Assad regime. The government's collapse could put an end to these flows for the time being, while Tehran takes a wait and see approach to what comes next in Syria.

The first sign of that came over the weekend when the Iran-flagged Lotus, which left Kharg Island on November 11, destined for Banias, reversed course just as it was about to enter the Suez Canal. The tanker is now headed back through the Red Sea without specifying a destination.

Although supplies to Syria make up a very small share of Iran's overall 1.6 million to 1.8 million bpd of crude exports, Tehran may not want to lose it as an outlet for good, given the difficulties of finding a replacement while sanctions remain in place.

"The flow will stop, at least for the time being," said Iman Nasseri, managing director for the Middle East at FGE.

Iran will want to continue supplying this oil to Syria, or else it may be forced to cut production by anywhere between 50,000 to 100,000 bpd if it is unable to ultimately place those barrels in China. Alternatively, Iran could opt to build the volumes it holds offshore in floating storage.

"We usually see the same tankers shuttling between Iran and Syria," according to Vortexa's senior oil analyst Armen Azizian. "If that trade subsides, we could see some of these tankers unemployed or put into floating storage, which would rise, at least in the short-term," he said.

Lotus is one of these tankers, having made the trip to Syria and back five times in 2023, and twice so far in 2024. The crude cargo it is carrying now "could be returned to Iran and put into onshore tanks or go into floating storage off Iran," Azizian said.

 

What Ayatollah says on fall of Assad regime?

Leader of the Islamic Revolution Ayatollah Seyyed Ali Khamenei directly addressed thousands of Iranians from different walks of on Wednesday. He spoke on current regional matters, particularly the latest developments in Syria.

Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s government collapsed on Sunday after his army refrained from countering a new terror insurgency that began in the country’s northwestern Aleppo region.

Here are seven questions Ayatollah Khamenei answered on Syria during his Wednesday remarks:

1. Who is behind the latest resurgence of terrorism in Syria?

A neighbor of Syria has been involved. But the main architects have been the US and Israel

2. How did the US and Israel aid terrorists in their offensive?

A joint US and Israeli blockade effectively sealed Syria's land and air borders, preventing the entry of both people and humanitarian aid.

3. Could Syria have foreseen the insurgency that ousted Bashar al-Assad?

Iran's intelligence services warned Syria of the impending attacks months in advance of their execution in late November.

4. What will happen to the Syrian territories recently seized by the US and Israel?

They will eventually be liberated by the courageous youth of Syria.

5. How did the Syrian government collapse?

The Syrian government collapsed because of a lack of resistance from the country’s national army, which prevented volunteer forces from other areas from intervening.

6. Why did Iran maintain a presence in Syria in recent years?

Tehran’s goal was to eliminate Daesh terrorists who were a threat to not only Iran but the entire region. Iran was never supposed to replace the Syrian army.

7. What lessons can be learned from the recent developments in Syria?

One must not be heedless of the enemy. One must not underestimate its enemies either.

 

Shattering of Axis of Resistance

The recent collapse of Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Syria marks a significant and unexpected development for Iran, comparable in its surprise to the Taliban’s swift takeover of Kabul in 2021. Iran has been a steadfast ally of Assad, who thought the cost of resistance is less than the cost of compromise. Tehran provided Damascus with substantial military and financial support throughout the Syrian civil war. The sudden downfall of Assad’s government not only disrupts Iran’s strategic foothold in the Levant but also challenges its influence in the broader Middle East region.

The rapid fall of the Western-backed government in Kabul — with which Tehran had sought to engage diplomatically to maintain stability along Iran’s eastern border — similarly caught the Iranian leadership off guard. This event as well as Assad’s toppling both underscore the volatility of regional alliances and the complexities Iran faces in navigating its foreign policy objectives amid rapidly changing political landscapes.

While Iran had at least prepared for a scenario of the Taliban’s return and established some contacts and exchanges with the group even before the latter returned to power, the collapse of the Assad regime, described as a key link in the Axis of Resistance, came more suddenly.

Only a few days before the fall of Damascus to the Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), Iran started evacuating its key assets and personnel, including high-ranking military advisors and members of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), to save critical resources.

It is vital for Iran at this point to secure a role in shaping the future of Syria’s political landscape to prevent an adversarial government and to be able to preserve some level of strategic influence in the region.

Although the common border with Afghanistan is perhaps the number one security concern for Iran to the east, Syria’s strategic value cannot be overstated when it comes to Iran’s western flank.

Syria was the heart of the resistance, which provided a direct link to Hezbollah in Lebanon and supported Iran’s deterrence against Israel. Thus, losing Syria not only disrupts the Axis of Resistance but also weakens Iran’s ability to project power in the region.

In the absence of Iranian proxies on the ground, the resulting power vacuum is likely to be filled by Turkey or Saudi Arabia, which in turn could force Iran to redirect its focus to defending its interests in other places.

At home, the legitimacy of the Iranian regime was severely damaged by its violent crackdowns on the Mahsa Amini protests in late 2022-early 2023. At the same time, Iran’s broad and substantial investments in Syria and elsewhere, which many Iranians saw as a costly miscalculation, intensified public criticism and political dissent over neglected economic issues.

Fears that their country could follow a path toward civil war, similar to those in Syria and Libya, deterred some from advocating for regime change at any cost. If Syria now descends into another civil war with further destruction, it could validate these concerns. However, if Syria manages to form an inclusive and stable government free of revenge, it could inspire Iranians.

In the aftermath of Assad’s collapse, Tehran will likely recalibrate its regional strategy, strengthening its militia networks, particularly Hezbollah and Shi’a militias in Syria and Iraq as the primary focus. These will need to serve as Tehran’s primary tool for projecting power in the absence of a friendly Syrian government.

Iran may also attempt to expand its regional alliances with Russia and China to sustain its ambitions. However, given the outcome of its previous reliance on Moscow to protect the Assad regime, Iran may need to recalculate the level of Russian support it can truly expect.

Rethinking its Syria policy may additionally encourage Tehran to shift from overt to covert approaches — a potentially challenging aim due to Iran’s over-stretched resources.

Assad’s downfall marks a significant setback for Iran’s regional strategy, disrupting the latter’s network of alliances and diminishing its influence in the Levant.

Courtesy: Middle East Institute

 

 

 

Iranian strategy to keep its influence intact in Middle East

According to Reuters, Iran has opened a direct line of communication with rebels in Syria's new leadership after the ouster of Bashar al-Assad It is an attempt to "prevent a hostile trajectory" between the countries.

The lightning advance of a militia alliance spearheaded by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, a former al-Qaeda affiliate, marked one of the biggest turning points for the Middle East in generations. Assad's fall removed a bastion from which Iran and Russia exercised influence across the Arab world.

Hours after Assad's fall, Iran said it expected relations with Damascus to continue based on the two countries' "far-sighted and wise approach" and called for the establishment of an inclusive government representing all segments of Syrian society.

There is little doubt about Tehran's concern about how the change of power in Damascus will affect Iran's influence in Syria, the lynchpin of its regional clout.

But there is no panic as Tehran seeks diplomatic avenues to establish contact with people whom one of the officials called "those within Syria's new ruling groups whose views are closer to Iran's".

The main concern for Iran is whether Assad's successor will push Syria away from Tehran's orbit, a scenario Iran is keen to avoid.

A hostile post-Assad Syria would deprive Lebanese armed group Hezbollah of its only land supply route and deny Iran its main access to the Mediterranean and the front line with Israel.

After losing of an important ally in Damascus and the return of Donald Trump to the white House in January 2024, this engagement is key to stabilize ties and avoiding further regional tensions.

According to Reuters, Tehran has established contacts with two groups inside the new leadership and the level of interaction will be assessed in the coming days.

Tehran was wary of Trump using Assad's removal as leverage to intensify economic and political pressure on Iran, either to force concessions or to destabilize the Islamic Republic.

After pulling the United States out of Iran's 2015 nuclear deal with six major powers in 2018, then-President Trump pursued a "maximum pressure" policy that led to extreme economic hardship and exacerbated public discontent in Iran. Trump is staffing his planned administration with hawks on Iran.

In 2020, Trump, as president, ordered a drone strike that killed Qassem Soleimani, Iran's most powerful military commander and mastermind of overseas attacks on US interests and those of its allies.

Iran is now only left with two options: fall back and draw a defensive line in Iraq or seek a deal with Trump.

The fall of Assad exposed Tehran's dwindling strategic leverage in the region, exacerbated by Israel's military offensives against Hezbollah in Lebanon and the Palestinian militant group Hamas in Gaza.

Iran's clerical rulers spent billions of dollars propping up Assad during the civil war that erupted in Syria in 2011 and deployed its Revolutionary Guards to Syria to keep its ally in power and maintain Tehran's "Axis of Resistance" to Israel and US influence in the Middle East.

Assad's fall removes a critical link in Iran's regional resistance chain that served as a crucial transit route for Tehran to supply arms and fund its proxies and particularly Hezbollah.

 

 

Syria: Opportunities and Pitfalls for Israel

The fall of Assad, an implacable foe of Israel who turned Syria into a staging ground for Iranian threats and weapons transfers to Hezbollah, is not something Israel would lament. With Syrian rebel forces rapidly advancing south toward Damascus after already taking Aleppo and Hama, the ground in Syria is shifting.

This shift is due in no small measure to the twin blows Israel dealt Hezbollah and Iran since the launch of Operation Northern Arrows in mid-September, aimed at returning displaced Israeli residents to their homes along the northern border.

In its war in Lebanon, Israel decapitated Hezbollah’s leadership, killed and wounded thousands of its fighters, and significantly degraded its missile and rocket capabilities. Hezbollah, which once fought in Syria to prop up the dictatorial regime of President Bashar al-Assad, is in no position to help Assad today as his regime has crumbled.

Iran also suffered blows at the hands of Israel – most notably the destruction of much of its air defense network and critical missile manufacturing infrastructure during Jerusalem’s retaliatory raid on October 26.

With Hezbollah severely weakened and Hamas in Gaza also no longer an effective proxy, Iran – which has made an art form of sending others to be killed to further its own interests – finds itself unable to provide Assad with the same level of assistance it once did. It also struggles to project the same regional power if wielded just a few months ago.

Assad’s other ally, Russia, whose intervention in the civil war in 2015 tipped the scales in his favor, is also unable to give Assad what it did in the past, preoccupied and overextended with its own war in Ukraine.

With Hezbollah, Iran, and Russia weakened – two of them due to Israeli action – Syrian rebels seized the opportunity to advance, launching their offensive on the same day a ceasefire was implemented in Lebanon. Hezbollah, weary and depleted, was in no position to counter the rebel advance.

The fall of Assad, an implacable foe of Israel who turned Syria into a staging ground for Iranian threats and weapons transfers to Hezbollah, is not something Israel would lament. However, the composition of the rebel forces threatening Assad’s regime is not an alliance that the Jewish state can applaud.

They are led by Sunni jihadists recently aligned with al-Qaeda and who remain on America’s list of terrorist organizations and also include Turkish-backed Islamists.

Israel has a clear interest in seeing Syria removed from Iran’s “Axis of Resistance,” ending its role as a host for Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps operatives and Iranian-sponsored militias and as a potential launch-pad for attacks against Israel.

Syria under Assad was a crucial pillar of Hezbollah’s strength in Lebanon, serving as the main conduit for smuggling missiles and advanced weaponry into the country. If Syria is taken out of the equation, Hezbollah – already reeling from Israel’s onslaught – will face even greater difficulties rebuilding.

This would be welcome news for many in Lebanon seeking freedom from Hezbollah and Iran’s stranglehold. One significant side effect of Assad’s fall could be a chance for the Lebanese to finally regain control of their own country.

While these developments are largely positive for Israel, they come with complications. Jerusalem has no interest in seeing its neighbor to the northeast taken over by Sunni jihadists of the al-Qaeda ilk or Turkish-backed Islamists. Israel’s experience with such groups – like Hamas in Gaza – has been anything but encouraging.

What happens in Syria will most definitely have an impact on Israel in the future that is why Jerusalem must keep a vigilant eye there, sending messages to all concerned that there are two developments it will not tolerate. The first is chemical weapons depots falling into the hands of jihadist or Islamist rebels, and the second is the mass deployment of Iranian troops into the country.

Those are redlines that, if crossed, would severely compromise Israel’s national security and would necessitate immediate Israeli action to prevent.

Beyond these redlines, Israel can do little to positively impact developments inside Syria, other than working behind the scenes with the US to establish channels with more moderate elements in the opposition, hoping they will emerge as a constructive force in shaping Syria’s future. 

Courtesy: The Jerusalem Post

Shia-Sunni Conflict in Syria to Get Louder

The current situation in Syria presents three significant implications. First, the recruitment of fighters, motivated by financial incentives or sectarian affiliations, is expected to rise. Second, the majority of these recruits are likely to come from the South Asian region. Videos circulating on social media already show individuals with Pashto or Hazara accents celebrating the withdrawal of Bashar al-Assad’s forces from key cities, leaving behind military-grade weapons, ammunition, and vehicles. Third, existing foot soldiers in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iran may see new opportunities to leverage their combat experience, contributing to the rekindling of the Syrian conflict.

Shia militias, including the Zainabiyoun Brigade and other groups from Iraq, are also being drawn into the conflict. As a result, Syria is poised to become the site of escalating sectarian violence, with Sunni and Shia factions, supported by various regional and international actors, facing off.

What Impact Will This Have on the Gaza War?

How will these developments affect the ongoing conflict in Gaza? Will they weaken Hezbollah in Lebanon? And what strategic advantages might Israel and its regional or international allies gain?

Currently, Hamas is on the defensive, and the Syrian situation could demoralize its forces if Bashar al-Assad and his allies lose their grip on power, potentially drawing them into direct confrontation with rebel factions.

Iran and Russia are already evacuating some of their officials, but sectarian fighters loyal to the Assad regime will likely remain in Syria, continuing their resistance. Aerial support for Assad’s forces may still come from select countries, but unless a similar conflict arises in Iraq—where Sunni militias start pushing against Shia factions—a complete collapse of the Assad regime seems unlikely.

A Possible Escalation: Assad's Last Resort?

If Bashar al-Assad feels cornered and believes he must evacuate, he could resort to an extreme measure: launching a direct attack on Israel. What might such an assault look like?

First, a safe zone could be established for Iranian, Russian, or Syrian officials in the border region of Iraq, enabling them to continue strategizing and coordinating efforts in Syria and beyond.

Second, there would be a need for a large influx of Shia fighters into Syria and Lebanon to counteract new rebel offensives or Israeli airstrikes against Assad’s regime. These fighters could also act as conduits for weapons flowing into Lebanon, strengthening Hezbollah and other allies.

Coupled with aerial support, these forces could give Assad a better chance of reclaiming lost territories.

Wider Regional Implications: Yemen and Saudi Arabia

The sectarian tensions in Syria could also spill over into other parts of the region, particularly Yemen and Saudi Arabia, exacerbating existing conflicts there.

Critical Examination of Iranian Regional Policy

Despite continuous Israeli attacks targeting Iran's military doctrine in the wake of the regime’s brutal war in Gaza, the framework of that strategy remains largely intact and continues to operate across West Asia. However, in a recent article for Chatham House Bilal Y. Saab argues that the ceasefire in Lebanon has dealt a huge blow to Iran’s regional strategy. It may be said that the article fails to fully consider the current and delayed impacts of Israel’s unprecedented use of brute force on Tel Aviv. 

The military operations in the Gaza Strip and Lebanon have currently put huge burdens on the Israeli economy with long-term impacts expected to last for years. While unconditional US aid might temporarily alleviate investor concerns regarding Israel, the potential for renewed conflict poses a significant and lasting deterrent to investment.

The issue of settlers in northern occupied Palestine has not been yet solved and seems to be a problem in the foreseeable future for Israel. Also, the impacts of Israel’s action on Western public opinion cannot be undermined; this is being seen in some countries to put pressure on policymakers to take more progressive action against Israel. 

The author argues that Israel has achieved victory in its war with Hezbollah but the facts on the ground suggest differently. Tel Aviv since October 2023 has been targeting Hezbollah facilities and fighters across Lebanon but to no avail.

Hezbollah operations in northern occupied Palestine and even deeper in Haifa and Tel Aviv continued until the last moments before a ceasefire took effect last month. Israel’s limited, targeted operations in Southern Lebanon fell short of gaining significant territory and Hezbollah was successful in repelling those attacks. 

The Lebanon ceasefire, largely mirroring UN Resolution 1701, offers no significant changes. Hezbollah retains its weaponry and maintains the capacity to resume operations against Israel at any time. 

Bilal Y. Saab views the ceasefire as a setback for the Resistance Axis, arguing that it has left Hamas isolated. But this is not the case; factions in the Resistance Front have always contained autonomy in their decisions despite Western claims about Iran controlling it all. It is largely uncontested that Hamas started Operations Al-Aqsa Storm on its own without any prior notice to other groups and actors in the region yet, the whole front with a differentiating timetable joined Hamas in its fight against Israel.

For over a year, the conflict in Lebanon remained a relatively even exchange of attacks. Only after Israel significantly escalated its assaults, pursuing new objectives, none of which were achieved, did ceasefire talks commence. The ideology of creation of Hezbollah is based on confronting Israel and the current fragile ceasefire can be considered as a temporary tactical halt for the group in its fight against Tel Aviv. 

Furthermore, Saab prescribes renewed efforts for normalization of relations between Arab countries and Israel for what he calls a lasting victory for Tel Aviv. Saudi Arabia is one of the main players in the region which is reportedly eager to normalize ties with Israel. 

The regional landscape has shifted dramatically since the early Trump administration and the Abraham Accords. The Israeli onslaughts in Gaza and Lebanon have fueled widespread regional opposition to normalization with Israel. Also, Saudi Arabia's rapprochement with Iran suggests a decreased likelihood of Arab confrontation with Tehran.

Despite the author’s claims that an expanded Abraham Accords would lead to a Palestinian state, Israel has intensified settlement expansion in the occupied West Bank, particularly since the formation of the current far-right cabinet. All these factors point to one issue and that is the impossibility of a deal being in favor of Palestinians. 

Saab says “Iran also has to think twice about how Israel might react to even the attempt to resurrect its regional strategy.” However, Tehran’s response to Israeli provocations has been clear for over a year, any attack on Iran’s interests leads to retaliation. 

Contrary to Israeli actions, Iran's measured responses are not due to military concerns but rather reflect its defensive military doctrine—a fact often overlooked in Western assessments.

 Tehran does not seek regional war. Its doctrine which is based on two main pillars (inward and outward defense) has not wobbled despite being under constant attacks. Support for the Resistance Axis can be defined in outward defense and drone, missile advancements are in line with inward defense.

Should the regional status quo significantly change, Iran may employ alternative deterrent measures to counter threats to its national interests. This potential shift includes a reassessment of its nuclear doctrine, a subject of ongoing debate among Iranian scholars and policymakers.

 

What if Bashar government falls in Syria?

Donald Trump will formally take charge as president of United States on January 20, 2025. The strategic regions of the world are being trapped in a situation known as "tactical wars". These conflicts do not seek a definitive victory but rather aim to create a state of instability and uncertainty in key areas vital to US global interests.

The "America First" slogan, central to Trump's agenda, can only materialize if Washington succeeds in maintaining its hegemony over the major geostrategic regions. However, this dominance is only possible if one essential factor is guaranteed: an active and sustained military presence in these regions.

In these sensitive territories, the United States faces growing resistance from both local governments and popular movements demanding the withdrawal of American troops. If Washington were to yield to these demands and abandon Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, or the Persian Gulf; renounce its intervention in Ukraine and the Caucasus under the pretext of NATO; or reduce its activities in the South China Sea, it would risk becoming just another power, unable to maintain its global hegemony.

The United States deems it necessary to maintain its presence in these strategic regions to avoid the decline of hegemony. Its military deployments, although costly and often unpopular, are seen as the only means to ensure its position as a dominant power in an increasingly competitive world.

As explained by Iranian diplomat Mohammad Rasoul Mousavi, the strategy to preserve the United States' military presence is based on fueling what are known as "tactical wars." These wars do not seek a definitive resolution but rather aim to prolong the conflict. On one hand, they weaken the countries involved, and on the other, allow the United States to justify and impose its presence in those regions.

Mousavi interprets the resurgence of the conflict in Syria as a clear manifestation of the United States' strategic approach. In the current context, it is evident how Washington is attempting to consolidate its presence in the region. Despite avoiding responsibility for the war led by extremist militants backed by Turkey, the United States insists that the solution to the conflict is inevitably tied to its military presence in Syria— a presence that would be difficult to justify without the conflict serving as a pretext.

Additionally, there is a clear contradiction in the United States' stance. In the current offensive against the government of Bashar al-Assad, the main units fighting alongside anti-Assad forces are primarily affiliated with Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS). This group, which separated from Al-Qaeda in 2016, has maintained a strong presence in Syria.

Since 2018, the US State Department has designated HTS as a Foreign Terrorist Organization. HTS remains a central player in the Syrian conflict, particularly in the regions of Aleppo and Hama. The group is led by Abu Muhammed al-Golani, who previously led the Nusra Front, Al-Qaeda's affiliate in Syria. In 2016, al-Golani announced HTS's separation from Al-Qaeda, claiming a distance from the global terror network.

However, his ties with Al-Qaeda remain a burden, continuously attracting international attention. For example, the US still offers a US$10 million reward for the capture of al-Golani, reflecting the ongoing mistrust toward the group and its ideology.

In general, Syria is a stage where various geopolitical interests converge. In the case of Turkey, the potential fall of Bashar al-Assad would have significant strategic implications. Through its allied groups in Syria, such as the self-styled Syrian National Army and HTS, Turkey could consolidate and significantly expand its power and influence in a territory that was part of the Ottoman Empire from 1516 to 1918.

A withdrawal of Russia, its historical rival in the region, would represent a key political victory for Recep Tayyip Erdogan, while constituting a defeat for Vladimir Putin and weakening Russian influence in the Middle East. Additionally, the weakening or elimination of Kurdish forces in Syria, a constant point of friction for Ankara, would be one of Turkey's primary strategic objectives.

Finally, once Syria was "pacified" by HTS and its allies, Erdogan could seize the opportunity to facilitate the return of the millions of Syrian refugees currently in Turkey, presenting Assad’s fall as the end of the war. This measure could potentially boost support for the Justice and Development Party (AKP) in future elections.

The potential fall of Bashar al-Assad would have profound consequences for Russia, as it could redefine both its influence in Syria and its projection in the Middle East.

The loss of its main ally in Damascus would signal the end of its political influence in the country, marking a strategic defeat that would alter the regional balance.

Additionally, Russia would be surpassed by Turkey, which would solidify its power and influence in Syria, leading to a geopolitical reshaping in favor of Ankara.

Russia's military presence, essential to its influence in Syria, could be significantly reduced or even eliminated, representing a substantial loss of power in the region.

Moreover, Moscow would lose control of the naval base in Tartus, a strategic facility it has controlled since 1971 during the Soviet era and it serves as its only permanent military base in the Mediterranean. The loss of Tartus would deal a major blow to Russia’s ability to project power in the Middle East.

The potential fall of Bashar al-Assad would also bring a series of strategic implications for Israel, directly impacting its security in the region.

For Iran, the fall of Bashar al-Assad would have political and strategic consequences. First, Iran would lose a key ally in the region.

However, the rise of Turkey as a regional power would be a blow to Iran’s interests, as it would witness its rival expanding its power while Iran's own political and military presence in Syria and Lebanon crumbles. This scenario would lead to the weakening of Shia interests in Syria, Lebanon, and even Iraq, disrupting the regional balance and undermining Iran's influence in these key countries.

Finally, for the United States, the fall of Bashar al-Assad would have significant strategic implications. First, it would mean Russia's withdrawal from Syria, which would considerably weaken Moscow's influence in the region, reducing its projection of power in the Middle East.

Additionally, the United States would achieve a key victory by seeing the fall of Assad's government, considered one of Iran's main allies, with whom Washington maintains an openly adversarial relationship. This would mark the end of a long struggle to displace a government that has been an obstacle to US policy in the region, consolidating the influence of Washington and its allies in Syria and the Levant.