What options US can exercise if Afghans refuse to handover Bagram Air Base?

If Afghans refuse to handover Bagram Air Base back to the United States, Washington is likely to face a serious strategic dilemma. The response will likely depend on how far the super power is willing to push its military and political leverage in the region. Some of the likely options are:

1. Diplomatic Pressure

The first option would be to apply diplomatic pressure on the Taliban government, possibly through Qatar or Pakistan as intermediaries. The US may frame Bagram’s access as essential for counterterrorism monitoring, and push for a limited presence under international arrangements rather than outright US control.

2. Economic and Sanctions Leverage

If diplomacy fails, Washington could use financial levers that include:

Tightening sanctions on Taliban leaders.

Blocking international recognition of the Taliban government.

Cutting off humanitarian exemptions or aid that Afghanistan relies on.

This would make Kabul’s refusal costlier.

3. Regional Partnerships

The US might deepen military partnerships with neighbors instead. For instance:

Expanding use of bases in Central Asia (though Russia and China will resist this).

Strengthening presence in the Persian Gulf (Qatar, UAE).

Increasing over-the-horizon operations using drones and satellites.

This would reduce dependency on Bagram, though at a higher logistical cost.

4. Covert Operations

If Washington views Bagram as critical for counterterrorism, it could resort to covert methods—arming rival Afghan groups, intelligence penetration, or even destabilization strategies to pressure the Taliban into concessions.

5. Accept and Adapt

Though difficult, the US may accept that Afghanistan is now firmly outside its reach and adapt by monitoring from afar. This would reflect Washington’s reluctance to re-engage militarily in Afghanistan after two decades of war.

From RCD to ECO to Complete Dormancy

Regionalism has often been hailed as a path toward prosperity, but the trajectory of the Regional Cooperation for Development (RCD) and its successor, the Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO), tells a sobering story of missed opportunities. What began with promise in the 1960s has today slipped into near-complete irrelevance.

The RCD was founded in 1964 by Iran, Pakistan, and Turkey to strengthen economic, cultural, and technical cooperation. It emerged in a Cold War environment, where smaller powers sought to shield themselves from great-power dependency by building regional linkages.

On paper, the project had logic, three strategically located Muslim countries, with shared aspirations of modernization, pooling resources to advance trade, industry, and connectivity. In practice, RCD never went beyond symbolism.

The organization lacked institutional strength, faced political frictions, and struggled to overcome the dominance of external economic ties over intra-regional trade.

By the late 1970s, the Iranian Revolution and shifting geopolitical alignments sealed RCD’s fate. In 1979, it faded into history without leaving a substantial legacy.

A revival attempt came in 1985, when the same three countries launched the Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO). ECO promised a fresh start and greater ambition. Its major breakthrough came in 1992 with the admission of seven new members — Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan.

ECO spanned a vast geography bridging South, Central, and West Asia, with a market of nearly half a billion people and immense natural resources.

Observers predicted that ECO could become a Eurasian economic powerhouse, knitting together landlocked Central Asia with energy-rich Iran and Turkey, and consumer-rich Pakistan.

As decades passed, the promise remained unfulfilled. Member states pursued conflicting foreign policies, were more deeply tied to external trade partners than to each other, and often lacked political trust. Infrastructure gaps meant goods could not move freely.

Overlapping memberships — in the OIC, SCO, CIS, and other blocs — diluted ECO’s relevance.

High-sounding declarations at summits were rarely followed by implementation. Even flagship projects, such as the Islamabad-Tehran-Istanbul railway, never became viable trade corridors.

Today, ECO exists largely as a ceremonial body. Meetings are infrequent, agreements unenforced, and the organization invisible in global or even regional affairs.

Intra-ECO trade remains stuck around 7–8% of members’ total trade, a telling indicator of stagnation.

Compared to other regional blocs such as ASEAN or the EU, ECO demonstrates how political will, not geography, determines success.

The journey from RCD to ECO to dormancy offers a lesson ‑ regional cooperation cannot survive on rhetoric alone. Without trust, shared vision, and consistent follow-through, even the most promising initiatives collapse into irrelevance.

ECO still retains potential — its geography places it at the crossroads of major trade routes, including China’s Belt and Road Initiative. But unless member states move beyond statements and invest in genuine integration, ECO’s story will remain one of unrealized potential and organizational decay.

 

 

President Trump you cannot order Taliban to handover Bagram Air Base to the United States

It may be a wish of US President Donald Trump to get control of Bagram Air Base. However, he does not have any authority to demand the Afghan government to handover the base. Threatening bad things would happen to Afghanistan if it does not give back control of the base to the United States, is outright terrorism.

Here are several possible motives behind the Trump demand:

·        Restoring US influence in Afghanistan and the wider region, especially after the pull-out which many view as a strategic loss.

·        Countering rivals, particularly China and others by having a base close by.

·        Strengthening counterterrorism posture, ensuring that militant groups can't easily use Afghan territory to plan or launch attacks.

·        Leveraging domestic political pressure as the opponents say the withdrawal decision was a mistake.

·        Using it as a bargaining chip to secure concessions i.e. economic aid, diplomatic recognition, etc.

Being a sovereign county and also because the US does recognize the Taliban government of Afghanistan it is the inherent right of Taliban to outright rejected the US demand.

·        They rightly say Afghanistan’s territorial integrity cannot be compromised.

·        No foreign military presence will be allowed.

·        Taliban insists that political and economic relations with the US are possible without giving up land or allowing foreign bases.

Regaining control of Bagram will not an easy task for the US. It would likely require a major military deployment, security provisions, defense spending, etc. Experts say holding the base would be challenging militarily and politically.

Some analysts view the US demand as an attempt to restore hegemony over Afghanistan and adjoining countries.

They warn that pushing too hard might destabilize relations, reduce cooperation, or provoke negative responses from locals or other countries.

Under the Doha Agreement (2020) and other engagements, the US made certain commitments about respecting Afghanistan’s sovereignty, no foreign bases, etc. Returning to or demanding possession of Bagram is violation of these agreements.

Significance of Saudi Arabia-Pakistan defence pact

The Saudi Arabia-Pakistan defence pact is not just a military arrangement—it is a strategic partnership that underpins Pakistan’s economic security and Saudi Arabia’s military security. For Pakistan, it guarantees vital financial and diplomatic backing; for Saudi Arabia, it provides trusted military support and, indirectly, a nuclear-armed ally. Together, it represents one of the strongest security relationships in the Muslim world.

The Saudi Arabia- Pakistan defence pact carries deep strategic, political, and economic significance for both countries and the wider region. Its importance can be seen from multiple angles:

Strategic and Security Dimension

Mutual Security Guarantee:

Pakistan has historically provided military training, expertise, and manpower to Saudi Arabia, reinforcing the Kingdom’s defence at times of regional tension. In return, Saudi Arabia has been a security partner for Pakistan in times of external pressure.

Balancing Iran’s Influence:

For Saudi Arabia, Pakistan’s military cooperation is part of a broader strategy to counterbalance Iran in the Gulf and beyond. For Pakistan, it ensures strong backing from the Kingdom while maintaining a delicate balance in its own relations with Iran.

Nuclear Umbrella:

Although not formalized, Pakistan’s nuclear capability is sometimes seen as a potential backstop for Saudi security in case of existential threats, making the defence relationship symbolically powerful.

Military Cooperation

Training and Deployment:

Thousands of Pakistani military personnel have served in Saudi Arabia over the decades, providing training to Saudi forces. Even today, a contingent of Pakistani troops is stationed there for defence cooperation.

Arms and Defence Technology:

Pakistan has supplied small arms, ammunition, and defence equipment to Saudi Arabia. Joint ventures in defence production are under discussion.

Counterterrorism and Intelligence Sharing:

Both states have collaborated closely in intelligence sharing, counterterrorism operations, and combating extremist networks that threaten regional stability.

Economic and Political Significance

Financial Lifeline for Pakistan:

Saudi Arabia has been one of Pakistan’s most consistent financial supporters—providing oil on deferred payments, direct loans, and balance-of-payments support. The defence pact strengthens this bond by ensuring Pakistan’s military commitment in return.

Diplomatic Support:

Saudi Arabia often champions Pakistan’s stance on international platforms, including on Kashmir and economic cooperation within the OIC. Pakistan reciprocates by supporting Saudi positions on regional security and Islamic solidarity.

Regional and Global Context

Gulf Security:

Saudi Arabia views Pakistan as a reliable partner in securing the Gulf, especially in moments of instability.

Islamic Military Alliance:

Pakistan plays a central role in the Saudi-led Islamic Military Counter Terrorism Coalition (IMCTC), with former Pakistani Army Chief Gen. Raheel Sharif appointed as its first commander.

US–China Factor:

The pact also gives Saudi Arabia an alternative to over-reliance on Western defence support, while Pakistan uses it to diversify its security partnerships alongside China.

Symbolic and Religious Aspect

Custodianship of Holy Places:

Pakistan attaches special reverence to Saudi Arabia as the custodian of Islam’s holiest sites, and defence cooperation is also framed as protecting the sanctity of the Two Holy Mosques.

Soft Power and Legitimacy:

The pact signals unity of two major Muslim powers—Saudi Arabia with its economic and religious clout, and Pakistan with its military strength and nuclear capability.

Who is the true representative of Palestinians?

For more than 700 days Israel has been undertaking land and air attacks on Gaza enclave and killed more than 65,000 people, mostly women and children. The strip has been reduced to rubbles, with the destruction of infrastructure. In the latest UN resolution the two state formula has been endorsed, with minus Hamas involvement.

There is no denying to the fact that Hamas has been in virtual control of Gaza for nearly two decades. There is a suggestion to resolve Palestine issue without any role of Hamas, what so ever. It may be a wish of Israel, but do the ground realities support this?

Ironically Palestinians are represented by different bodies in different contexts:

Internationally (Diplomatic Representation)

Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO):

Recognized by the United Nations and over 130 countries as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. The PLO holds Palestine’s seat at the UN as a “non-member observer state.”

Within Occupied Palestinian Territories

Palestinian Authority (PA):
Established under the 1993 Oslo Accords, the PA governs parts of the West Bank. Its leadership is dominated by Fatah, a major faction of the PLO. President Mahmoud Abbas is both head of the PA and chairman of the PLO.

Hamas:
An Islamist movement that controls the Gaza strip since 2007, after winning the 2006 Palestinian legislative elections and subsequent conflict with Fatah. Hamas is not part of the PLO, and it does not support Oslo-style negotiations with Israel.

In Exile

Millions of Palestinians live outside the West Bank and Gaza, especially in Jordan, Lebanon, and elsewhere. They are formally represented by the PLO, but many feel underrepresented due to internal divisions.

United States

The US recognizes the PLO as the representative of Palestinians, but relations are tense. It does not recognize Hamas and designates it as a terrorist organization. Washington supports the PA (West Bank-based) but pressures it to cooperate on security with Israel.

European Union (EU)

The EU deals mainly with the PA/ PLO. Like the US, the EU also labels Hamas a terrorist group. Provides large amounts of financial aid to the PA for governance and humanitarian work.

Arab League and Arab States

Mostly Arabs recognize the PLO as the representative of the Palestinians. Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and UAE work with the PA and sometimes mediate between Fatah and Hamas. Qatar and Turkey maintain ties with Hamas, provide financial aid to Gaza, and give political space to its leadership.

Iran and Allies

This group strongly back Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) militarily and financially. Iran does not consider the PA effective against Israel and instead supports “resistance” factions. Hezbollah of Lebanon also aligns with Hamas and PIJ.

Russia and China

Both the leading super powers recognize the PLO/ PA officially, but also engage with Hamas as part of broader Middle East diplomacy, positioning themselves as mediators.

Let us explore how Hamas has attained popularity?

Hamas’s rise in popularity among Palestinians is rooted in a mix of social, religious, political, and resistance factors. Here’s a breakdown of how it became a powerful force:

Origins and Religious Roots

Founded in 1987, during the First Intifada (uprising against Israeli occupation), Hamas emerged from the Muslim Brotherhood network in Gaza, which already had credibility through mosques, schools, and charities. It gained early support by combining Islamic identity with nationalist resistance, offering an alternative to the more secular PLO/ Fatah.

Resistance against Israel

Hamas distinguished itself by armed resistance (rockets, suicide bombings, tunnels), presenting itself as uncompromising in the face of Israeli occupation. Many Palestinians saw Hamas as more effective in confronting Israel than the PA, which was engaged in negotiations that delivered little tangible progress. After the Second Intifada (2000–2005), Hamas gained credibility as the symbol of defiance, while the PA lost legitimacy due to corruption and security coordination with Israel.

Social Services & Grassroots Work

Hamas built extensive charitable networks that include schools, clinics, food distribution, orphan support and relief for families of prisoners and martyrs. These welfare programs won the loyalty of poorer Palestinians, especially in refugee camps and Gaza, where the PA and international aid were seen as insufficient.

Political Legitimacy through Elections

In 2006 Palestinian Legislative Elections, Hamas (running under the banner Change and Reform) won a majority of seats, defeating Fatah. Its victory was attributed to: 1) frustration with Fatah’s corruption and inefficiency, 2) Hamas’s reputation for integrity and discipline and above all 3) its hardline stance against Israel.

Regional and International Support

Iran, Qatar, and Turkey provided financial, political, and military backing that allowed Hamas to sustain governance in Gaza despite Israeli blockades. Egypt, while wary of Hamas, also engaged with it as a key player in Gaza.

Gaza Takeover (2007)

After a violent split with Fatah, Hamas seized control of Gaza Strip in 2007. Despite isolation and blockade, Hamas positioned itself as the de facto authority, further cementing its influence among Palestinians in Gaza.

Symbol of Resistance rather Compromise

Many Palestinians perceive the PA/ Fatah as compromised, weak, or too close to Israel and the United states. Hamas, despite the hardships in Gaza, is seen as authentic, incorruptible, and willing to sacrifice. Each confrontation with Israel (wars in 2008–09, 2012, 2014, 2021, and 2023–25) often boosts Hamas’s popularity, as it frames survival itself as victory. Hamas attained popularity by blending religion, resistance, social welfare, and political credibility at a time when the PA and Fatah were seen as corrupt and ineffective.

Let us also examine how its popularity differs between Gaza, the West Bank, and the Palestinian diaspora?

Gaza Strip

Hamas has emerged the strongest since beginning of its rule in Gaza in 2007.

The reasons for support include governance, security, and basic services despite blockade. The group has emerged as defender against Israel during repeated wars. Many people view Hamas as less corrupt as compared to Fatah.

The factors marring it popularity are said to be hardships from blockade, unemployment, and war destruction, at times fueling resentment. Some Gazans criticize Hamas’s authoritarian style and restrictions on freedoms. Despite suffering, many still rally behind Hamas in times of conflict with Israel.

West Bank

Hamas support is significant, but less than in Gaza. The reasons for support include: 1) frustration with the Palestinian Authority (PA) and its security coordination with Israel and 2) younger generation sees Hamas as more authentic and uncompromising. The challenges it faces include: 1) West Bank being under tight Israeli control and PA crackdowns, limits Hamas’s political space, and 2) fear of violence or arrest reduces open activism.

During escalations in Gaza, Hamas’s popularity spikes in the West Bank as people see them standing up against Israel.

Palestinian Diaspora

Support for Hamas is found mainly in Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, and the Gulf states as many refugees feel abandoned by the PA/ PLO, but Hamas keeps the “right of return” alive in its rhetoric. Hamas runs charities and schools in refugee camps (especially in Lebanon).

In Jordan, support is cautious, since the government fears Islamist influence.

In Lebanon, Hamas has networks in Palestinian refugee camps but competes with other factions.

In Gulf/ Turkey elite diaspora often back Hamas politically and financially.

Palestinian Citizens of Israel

Hamas has limited direct influence, since it is outlawed by Israel. Some Palestinians in Israel admire its stance against occupation, but most are engaged in civil rights struggles through legal political parties.

Keeping all these narratives in mind, it may be said that eliminating Hamas or bringing peace in the occupied territories or even creation of an independent Palestine will not be sustainable.  

Is Israel attacking countries under the US supervision?

With each passing day and the precision with which Israel attacked Qatar, Iran, Syria, Iraq and other countries, a question is getting louder, is Israel attacking countries under the US supervision?

It is a very important and sensitive question. Based on the strategic relationships between United States and Israel the probability just can’t be ruled out.

Here are the reasons that support the perception:

Military Support:

Israel is the largest cumulative recipient of the US foreign military aid, running into billions of dollars annually. Much of Israel’s military technology, intelligence systems, and weapons are supplied by the US.

Operational Coordination:

While not every Israeli attack is directly supervised by the US, Washington is usually informed in advance of major military operations—especially those with regional consequences like strikes in Gaza, Lebanon, Syria, or beyond.

Political Cover:

The US provides Israel with diplomatic protection, especially at the UN Security Council, often vetoing resolutions that condemn Israeli actions. This gives Israel confidence that it can continue operations without facing strong international consequences.

Shared Intelligence:

The CIA, Pentagon, and Israeli intelligence frequently share intelligence. In many cases, Israeli attacks—particularly on Iran linked targets—are planned with at least some level of US awareness, if not outright coordination.

Recent Pattern:

Analysts often describe Israeli military actions as being carried out with a “green light” from Washington, even if the US doesn’t control the tactical execution.

The US may not be giving step-by-step battlefield orders, Israel’s ongoing military actions—especially in Gaza—are effectively carried out under US strategic supervision and protection, both militarily and diplomatically.

Let us explore the incidents where US involvement was direct (like supplying bombs during Gaza wars, or joint planning against Iran), to show how this collaboration works.

Let us identify the situations where the US involvement was direct or so close that it’s hard to separate support from supervision:

1. Gaza Wars (2008–09, 2014, 2021, 2023–25)

Weapons Supply:

During heavy Israeli bombardments of Gaza, the US quickly replenished Israel’s stock of precision-guided bombs, artillery shells, and Iron Dome interceptors. For example, in 2014 and again in 2021, Washington quietly authorized emergency transfers of munitions while battles were still ongoing.

Political Cover:

At the UN, the US vetoed multiple ceasefire resolutions, allowing Israel to continue operations.

Supervision Aspect:

Without US weapons and diplomatic shields, Israel could not have sustained these long campaigns.

2. Lebanon and Hezbollah (2006 and beyond)

2006 War:

Israel’s month-long war with Hezbollah relied on US-supplied bunker-buster bombs and real-time intelligence from American surveillance assets.

Joint Planning:

US and Israeli militaries regularly war-game scenarios of a “multi-front” war with Hezbollah, meaning Israel’s current strategy is partly drawn up with Pentagon input.

3. Operations against Iran

Nuclear Program Attacks:

The famous Stuxnet cyberattack (2009–10) on Iran’s Natanz facility was a joint CIA-Mossad operation.

Targeted Killings:

Israel’s assassinations of Iranian nuclear scientists were carried out with US intelligence support, according to multiple reports.

Air Strikes in Syria:

Israeli strikes on Iranian convoys and depots in Syria often used US intelligence and were coordinated to avoid clashing with US troops stationed nearby.

Present Gaza War

Direct Weapons Pipeline:

US cargo planes flew precision bombs, tank shells, and artillery rounds directly to Israel while civilian casualties mounted in Gaza.

White House Green Light:

Leaks from Pentagon officials revealed Israel was asked to pause or minimize strikes, but not ordered to stop.

Embedded Coordination:

US military officers reportedly worked inside Israeli command centers to coordinate targeting and logistics — an unusually deep level of involvement.

Ongoing Strategic Framework

US and Israel have joint operations rooms for real-time intelligence sharing.

Israel’s most advanced fighter jets (F-35s) are co-produced with US technology, and software updates pass through Pentagon systems — meaning the US can monitor their use.

Israel does not fight wars in isolation; every major military campaign has US fingerprints, whether in weapons, intelligence, or diplomatic protection.

Bottom line:

While Israel pulls the trigger, the US is the one who supplies the gun, reloads it, and shields Israel from the world’s outrage. That is why many analysts argue Israeli attacks are effectively conducted under US supervision.

Significance of US base in Qatar

There are contrary responses to the Israeli attack on Hamas leaders in Qatar. These could be broadly clubbed in two categories: 1) Israel will have to pay a huge price and 2) Arabs have no spine to teach Israel a lesson. We invite the readers to first understand the significance of the US military base in Qatar. We should also keep in mind what some cynics say “Qatar is in total control of United States and the Arabs just can’t dare to think about causing even the smallest damage to the base”.

According to the details available about the US military base in Qatar (Al Udeid Air Base, near Doha) it holds very high strategic and geopolitical significance for both Washington and its regional allies.  Here’s why it matters:

1. Largest US Military Presence in the Middle East

Al Udeid hosts around 10,000–13,000 US and coalition troops. It is home to the US Air Force Central Command (AFCENT) forward headquarters. The base has one of the longest runways in the Gulf, capable of handling heavy bombers, cargo planes, and refueling aircraft.

2. Command and Control Hub

It houses the Combined Air Operations Center (CAOC), which directs US and allied air missions across the Middle East, including Iraq, Syria, Afghanistan, and the Persian Gulf. It provides real-time surveillance, intelligence, and command capabilities for regional operations.

3. Geostrategic Location

Qatar sits between Iran and Saudi Arabia, giving the US a vantage point to monitor both. Its Gulf location allows rapid deployment to hotspots in the Middle East, North Africa, and South Asia. It acts as a deterrent against Iran’s influence and provides a security guarantee to Gulf states.

4. Operations and Wars

It has played a central role in the 2001 invasion of Afghanistan and the 2003 Iraq War. It remains critical for ongoing counterterrorism, anti-ISIS missions, and monitoring the Strait of Hormuz.

5. Political Significance

The base signals a deep US-Qatar partnership, despite Qatar’s sometimes independent stance in Gulf politics (relations with Iran, hosting Hamas leaders, supporting Muslim Brotherhood).

It provides Qatar with security insurance against regional rivals (Saudi Arabia, UAE, Bahrain), especially after the 2017 Gulf blockade.

On top of all it helps the US project power without being fully dependent on bases in Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, or Turkey.

6. Energy Security

Qatar is the world’s leading LNG exporter. US presence protects not only Qatar’s infrastructure but also the global energy supply routes in the Gulf.

In short, the US base in Qatar is the backbone of American military power projection in the Middle East. It protects Gulf allies, counters Iran, secures energy flows, and anchors US influence in a volatile region.

The United States faces certain risks and vulnerabilities by relying so heavily on this base. Let us look at the risks and vulnerabilities:

1. Overdependence on a Single Hub

Al Udeid is the largest US forward operating base in the Middle East, so any disruption (attack, political fallout, or natural disaster) could cripple US operations in the region. To be precise, it acts as a “single point of failure” for command and control.

2. Exposure to Iran

Iran sees Al Udeid as a primary military threat on its doorstep. The base is well within range of Iranian ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and drones. In a war scenario, it would likely be one of the first targets.

3. Qatar’s Independent Foreign Policy

Unlike Saudi Arabia or UAE, Qatar often balances relations with both the U.S. and rivals like Iran, Turkey, and Islamist movements. Hosting Hamas leaders and maintaining ties with Tehran means Qatar could, in theory, restrict US operations if its own diplomacy is at risk. The 2017 Gulf blockade showed how fragile intra-GCC politics are, leaving Washington in an awkward position between allies.

4. Local Political Sensitivities

Presence of US troops in Muslim-majority countries can be a political flashpoint, supporting the narratives of foreign occupation. While Qatar welcomes the base for protection, its presence could become domestically unpopular in times of crisis.

5. Energy Infrastructure as Collateral

Qatar’s LNG facilities and shipping routes are near the base. Any attack on US forces risks spilling into global energy markets, creating vulnerabilities for both Qatar and the rest of world.

6. Shifting US Strategy

The US is trying to pivot to Asia and reduce military exposure in the Middle East. Heavy reliance on Al Udeid ties Washington to regional conflicts it may want to step back from. Over time, this dependency could look like a strategic liability rather than an asset.

Other US bases in the Middle East

While Al Udeid is a strategic jewel, it’s also a big, exposed target that ties US interests tightly to Gulf politics and risks. Let us compare it with other US military footholds in the Middle East (Bahrain, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Djibouti) — to show how it fits into the bigger US military puzzle?

1. Qatar – Al Udeid Air Base

Regional command-and-control hub that houses 10,000 to 13,000 troops. It houses Combined Air Operations Center (CAOC). Long runways for heavy bombers, refueling aircraft, and transports. Central location for quick reach to Gulf, Levant, Afghanistan. Its biggest Weaknesses are: 1) within easy range of Iranian missiles and 2) Qatar’s independent diplomacy (ties with Iran, Turkey and Hamas) can complicate US use in a crisis.

2. Bahrain – Naval Support Activity (NSA) Bahrain, Manama

It is home of the US Fifth Fleet with 7,000 troops. Its strengths include: 1) provides control to US naval operations in the Persian Gulf, Red Sea, Arabian Sea., it plays vital role in keeping the Strait of Hormuz and Gulf shipping lanes open.

Its weaknesses include: Bahrain is politically unstable; Shi’a majority often protests US presence, and 2) it is vulnerable to Iran-backed militias and unrest.

3. Kuwait – Camp Arifjan, Ali Al Salem Air Base

It is the army logistics hub that houses more than 13,000 troops and can be termed the largest US ground presence in Gulf).

Its strengths are: 1) key supply and logistics backbone for all Gulf operations and 2) it hosts pre-positioned equipment for rapid deployment. Its weaknesses are: 1) less glamorous than Qatar/ Bahrain but essential — if disrupted, US supply lines suffer.

4. Saudi Arabia – Prince Sultan Air Base (PSAB)

It is basically a backup air operations center where around 2,500 troops are kept.

Its strengths: 1) gives US redundancy in case Qatar base is hit or denied and 2) hosts missile defense systems, fighter jets, and ISR (intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance).

Its major weaknesses include: 1) US presence has been historically controversial in Saudi Arabia (linked to Bin Laden’s anti-US narrative) and Saudis prefer limited, rotational deployments, not permanent bases.

5. Djibouti – Camp Lemonnier (Horn of Africa)

It is primarily Africa and Red Sea operations hub with 4,000 troops.

Its strengths are: 1) key to anti-terror missions in Somalia and Yemen, and 2) strategic position on the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, choke point for global shipping.

It biggest weakness is proximity to China’s naval base (first overseas Chinese base).

6. Iraq & Syria – Smaller Outposts

This is primarily to counter-ISIS missions, with 2,500 troops in Iraq and 900 Syria. It is considered highly vulnerable to political backlash and militia attacks; not long-term sustainable.

In short, Qatar’s Al Udeid is the nerve center, but the US builds redundancy through Bahrain (navy), Kuwait (logistics), and Saudi (backup). If Al Udeid went offline, US operations could still continue — but far less smoothly.

The New World Disorder

French historian Fernand Braudel identified three cycles of history. The shortest is the day-to-day flow of events; Braudel called them “fireflies” on the stage. Next up are paradigm shifts — like the end of the Cold War — that can play out over decades or longer. Finally, there’s the longue durée: the bedrock of climate and geography that shapes everything else and changes only over centuries or millennia.

Six months into US President Donald Trump’s second term, it’s clear that the course of events has changed. What’s the collective noun for a group of fireflies? Probably not “paradigm shift,” but in this case that’s what it adds up to. 

The US pivot from free trade and global security to a sharper focus on the national interest has the makings of a decades-defining transformation, reversing the global integration supercharged by the end of the Cold War.

In the decades after World War II, the US was the champion of free trade, the anchor for global security and the gold standard on governance. Now, it has raised tariffs to the highest level since the 1930s, told allies they need to pay for protection and crossed red lines on independence for the Fed and statistical agencies.

That’s a major break, and an important moment for the global economy, shifting patterns of growth and inflation, borrowing and debt.

The geopolitical landscape has shifted just as decisively. Jolting though it is, Trump’s focus on America First is a reflection of a new reality where the US is no longer the world’s sole superpower. Regardless of who occupies the White House next, the US allies and adversaries will continue to reorient around that new state of affairs.

How about Braudel’s longue durée — the slowest moving cycle of history on which everything else rests? Could even that be at an inflection point? Maybe.

Trump has pulled the US out of the Paris climate agreement, again. The global fight against climate change will continue, but without the world’s second-largest emitter, it gets harder. The arrival of artificial general intelligence could also prove an epochal shift.

“History,” Braudel wrote, “may be divided into three movements: what moves rapidly, what moves slowly and what appears not to move at all.” Right now, events are moving almost too fast to track and the slow-moving Pax Americana is heading rapidly toward the dustbin of history. If global temperatures rise much further or machines start thinking for themselves, there will be movement even in the cycle that appears not to move at all.

Significance of Pezeshkian’s visit to China

Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian wrapped up a four-day visit to China on Wednesday, heading back to Tehran after attending a military parade in Beijing that marked 80 years since the end of World War II.

Pezeshkian's first stop in China was the northern port city of Tianjin, where he attended the 25th Meeting of the SCO Council of Heads of State, the largest gathering of the bloc to date. The Iranian president delivered a speech there, addressing the "unfair" global order led by the West and highlighting the need to create a new one through collaboration among the Global South.

A much-anticipated meeting between the presidents of Iran and China took place the next day. Pezeshkian told Xi Jinping that Iran was ready to work with China "under any circumstances" to elevate relations to their highest level, stressing that Beijing could count on Tehran as a "strong and determined friend and ally." Xi reciprocated, stating he sees Tehran as a "strategic partner" with a "forward-looking approach." Both sides agreed that more needed to be done to implement the 25-year cooperation plan signed in 2020.

Analysts in Iran hope that the president’s visit, during which he was accompanied by his foreign minister, economy minister, and defense minister, would lead to new military and financial deals.

This appears to be the case, as upon arriving in Tehran, Pezeshkian stated that "important," "strategic," and "vital" decisions had been made following his discussions with Xi.

"Additionally, discussions on security and defense equipment were held with the support of the defense minister, who was present during this trip, and necessary follow-ups will be carried out in this regard," Pezeshkian declared. It is believed that Iran is looking to buy air defense systems and fighter jets from China, although there is no official confirmation on what it seeks to purchase.

While Iranians have mostly focused on what the trip could bring about for Iran, the rest of the world has mainly been discussing how the SCO summit and the close interaction between India's Modi and Xi demonstrate that the split President Trump opened up between Washington and New Delhi is much larger than expected.

Trump’s former security advisor told American media that Trump has “shredded decades of effort” to pull India away from the Russian and Chinese orbit with his tariff policies. 

Furthermore, Modi's presence at the recent SCO meeting, along with other developments, is viewed as a sign that the new global order Pezeshkian has called for is approaching, or may already be in place.

"The new international order everyone has been talking about for years has almost arrived," said economic and trade analyst Majid Shakeri.

The expert said several factors point to this consolidation include: 1) the exclusion of Arab states from the Wednesday parade after their embrace of Trump during his West Asia tour earlier this year, 2) the Siberian Power Pipeline agreement signed between Russia and China this week, 3) and Beijing's announcement of its intention to establish an artificial intelligence cooperation center with the rest of the SCO.

"A crucial piece of the puzzle that is still incomplete and unclear is India's balancing act between China and America," Shakeri explained.

Pezeshkian's visit to China also included significant interactions with other world leaders. While there appeared to be no interaction with the Indian Prime Minister, Pezeshkian spent four hours in discussion with Russia's Vladimir Putin and a shorter amount of time speaking with Pakistan's Shehbaz Sharif, whose country's relationship with Iran is growing closer by the day.

Recep Tayyip Erdogan of Turkey was filmed holding onto Pezeshkian's hand while walking alongside him in a hall. The Iranian president expressed anticipation for Erdogan's visit to Tehran.

Despite recent tensions between Iran and Turkey regarding South Caucasus transportation plans and the situation in Syria, both nations appear in favor of maintaining their friendly relations.

Tajikistan’s Emomali Rahmon was also affectionate with Pezeshkian. The two countries share a significant part of their history and culture and view each other fondly.

 

The Fading Edge of Western Sanctions

Western sanctions were once the sharpest weapon in Washington and Brussels’ arsenal — a way to cripple adversaries without firing a shot. But today, their overuse and poor calibration are blunting their impact, most visibly in the case of Russia’s energy industry.

Take the recent arrival of the Arctic Mulan in southern China. On August 28, the sanctioned tanker unloaded liquefied natural gas from Russia’s Arctic LNG-2 plant — a facility buried under Western restrictions. That shipment, China’s first from the Siberian project, came just days before Vladimir Putin’s state visit to Beijing. The symbolism is unmistakable: Beijing is choosing energy security and strategic ties with Moscow over Washington’s disapproval.

Washington’s own missteps reinforce the sense that sanctions are losing their sting. In late August, President Donald Trump slapped a 25% “secondary tariff” on Indian imports of Russian crude, doubling existing duties. The gamble backfired. India not only kept buying Russian oil but also found common cause with China — a troubling development for US strategists who once counted on Delhi as a counterweight to Beijing.

The core problem is not intent but longevity. Sanctions work best when they are broad, swift, and temporary — delivering a shock that compels change before targets can adapt. But when restrictions drag on, industries build workarounds.

Russia has done so with astonishing speed, channeling crude through China and India, which now absorb 80% of its exports, and relying on “dark fleets” of tankers to bypass Western oversight. Iran and Venezuela, veterans of economic siege, have perfected similar tactics.

Meanwhile, the sheer scale of sanctions is undermining their effectiveness. Since 2017, the number of international sanctions has surged by 450%, according to LSEG Risk Intelligence. After Moscow’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, EU sanctions on Russia jumped from zero in 2013 to more than 2,500 by 2025. Washington blacklisted over 3,100 new entities last year alone, most of them Russian. The result, enforcement has become a bureaucratic quagmire, draining multinational firms with compliance costs while Russia and its partners adapt.

In short, the West is flooding the world with sanctions — but the more it leans on this tool, the less powerful it becomes. Economic warfare cannot be waged indefinitely without diminishing returns. If sanctions are to remain credible, they must be recalibrated: fewer, smarter, and more time-bound, backed by genuine multilateral coordination.

Otherwise, the very weapon once seen as a substitute for war may become just another dull instrument in an increasingly multipolar world.

China shows power at military parade

Chinese President Xi Jinping warned the world was facing a choice between peace or war at a massive military parade in Beijing on Wednesday, flanked by Russia's Vladimir Putin and North Korea's Kim Jong Un in an unprecedented show of force.

The event to mark 80 years since Japan's defeat at the end of World War Two was largely shunned by Western leaders, with Putin and Kim - pariahs in the West due to the Ukraine war and Kim's nuclear ambitions - the guests of honour.

Designed to project China's military might and diplomatic clout, it also comes as US President Donald Trump's tariffs and volatile policymaking strain its relations with allies and rivals alike.

"Today, mankind is faced with the choice of peace or war, dialogue or confrontation, win-win or zero-sum," Xi told a crowd of more than 50,000 spectators at Tiananmen Square, adding that the Chinese people "firmly stand on the right side of history".

Riding in an open-top limousine, Xi then inspected the troops and cutting-edge military equipment such as hypersonic missiles, underwater drones and a weaponized 'robot wolf'.

Helicopters trailing large banners and fighter jets flew in formation during a 70-minute showcase that culminated in the release of 80,000 'peace' birds.

Donning a tunic suit in the style worn by former leader Mao Zedong, Xi earlier greeted more than 25 leaders on the red carpet, including Indonesia's Prabowo Subianto who made a surprise appearance despite widespread protests at home.

Seated between Putin and Kim in the viewing gallery, Xi repeatedly engaged in conversations with both leaders as thousands of troops and materiel paraded before them. It marked the first time the trio have appeared together in public.

Putin later thanked his North Korean counterpart for his soldiers' courageous fighting in the war in Ukraine during a bilateral meeting at China's State Guesthouse. Kim said he was willing to do everything he can to help Russia.

"Please give my warmest regards to Vladimir Putin, and Kim Jong Un, as you conspire against the United States of America," Trump said in a post directed at Xi on Truth Social, as the event kicked off. He also highlighted the US role in helping China secure its freedom from Japan during World War Two.

Trump had earlier told reporters he did not see the parade as a challenge to the United States. Japan's top government spokesperson declined to comment on the parade, adding Asia's top two economies were building "constructive relations".

Democratically governed Taiwan, which China considers its own, has urged its people not to attend the parade, warning that attendance could reinforce Beijing's territorial claims. Taiwan does not commemorate peace with a barrel of a gun, its President Lai Ching-te said on Wednesday in pointed criticism of the event.

Xi has cast World War Two as a major turning point in the "great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation", in which it overcame the humiliation of Japan's invasion to become a global powerhouse.

Earlier this week, Xi unveiled his vision of a new world order at a regional security summit, calling for unity against "hegemonism and power politics", a thinly veiled swipe at his rival across the Pacific Ocean.

"Xi feels confident that the table has turned. It's China that is back in the driver's seat now," said Wen-Ti Sung, fellow at the Atlantic Council's Global China Hub, based in Taiwan.

"It's been Trumpian unilateralism rather than China’s wolf warrior diplomacy when people talk about the leading source of uncertainty in the international system."

At a lavish reception after the parade at the Great Hall of the People, Xi told his guests that humanity must not return to the "law of the jungle".

Beyond the pomp and propaganda, analysts are watching whether Xi, Putin and Kim may signal closer defence relations following a pact signed by Russia and North Korea in June 2024, and a similar alliance between Beijing and Pyongyang, an outcome that may alter the military calculus in the Asia-Pacific region.

Putin has already sealed deeper energy deals with Beijing during his China visit, while the gathering has given the reclusive Kim an opportunity to gain implicit support for his banned nuclear weapons.

It has been 66 years since a North Korean leader last attended a Chinese military parade.

Kim travelled to Beijing with his daughter Ju Ae, whom South Korean intelligence consider his most likely successor, although she was not seen alongside him at the parade.

 

China and Russia reject European move to restore sanctions on Iran

UN Security Council permanent members China and Russia backed Iran on Monday in rejecting a move by European countries to reimpose UN sanctions on Tehran loosened a decade ago under a nuclear agreement, reports Reuters.

A letter signed by the Chinese, Russian and Iranian foreign ministers said a move by Britain, France and Germany to automatically restore the sanctions under a so-called "snapback mechanism" was "legally and procedurally flawed".

China and Russia were signatories to Iran's 2015 nuclear deal with world powers, along with the three European countries, known as the E3. President Donald Trump pulled the United States out of the agreement in his first term in 2018.

The Europeans launched the "snapback mechanism" last week, accusing Iran of violating the deal, which had provided relief from international financial sanctions in return for curbs to Iran's nuclear program.

The letter published by Iran's Foreign Minister Abbas Araqchi in a post on X on Monday said that the course taken by Britain, France, and Germany "abuses the authority and functions of the UN Security Council".

Iran has long since broken through the limits on uranium production set under the 2015 deal, arguing that it is justified in doing so as a consequence of Washington having pulled out of the agreement. The deal expires in October this year, and the snapback mechanism would allow sanctions that were lifted under it to take effect again.

Iran and the E3 held talks aimed at a new nuclear agreement after Israel and the US bombed Iran's nuclear installations in mid-June. But the E3 deemed that talks in Geneva last week did not yield sufficient signals of readiness for a new deal from Iran.

"Our joint letter with my colleagues, the foreign ministers of China and Russia, signed in Tianjin, reflects the firm position that the European attempt to invoke snapback is legally baseless and politically destructive", Iran's foreign minister said in his post on X.

 

 

Houthis threat to kill Netanyahu

The Houthis (Ansar Allah) are primarily a Yemeni movement with their base of power in northern part of the country. More recently, its main conflict has been with the United States and its allies, particularly because of Red Sea shipping disruptions.

After the killing of the prime minister of Yemen's Houthi-run government and several other ministers, Houthis have expressed their intentions to kill Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. Can this be taken as a real threat to the life of Netanyahu?

In all the probability, the Houthis do not have the capability to directly target Netanyahu inside Israel. Their missile and drone reach has extended toward Israel during the Gaza war (some were intercepted by Israel, US, and allied forces), but striking the Israeli Prime Minister personally is far beyond their operational reach.

However, they can increase pressure on Israel by: 1) targeting Israeli linked ships and shipping lanes in the Red Sea, 2) launching long-range missiles or drones toward Israeli territory, and 3) deepening Israel’s regional isolation by linking the Gaza conflict with Yemen.

In reality, Netanyahu faces greater personal risk from inside Israel (domestic unrest, Palestinian militant groups) or from major regional actors (Hezbollah or Iran) rather than from the Houthis themselves.

While, it may be concluded that the Houthis are not a direct threat to Netanyahu, but they contribute to the overall regional security pressure on Israel that indirectly undermines his political standing and safety.

External threats to Netanyahu

Let us examine the structured hierarchy of external threats to Netanyahu’s life and political survival, ranked from most serious to least:

Hezbollah – Highest Direct Threat

The group has the capability, being the largest, most experienced armed group on Israel’s borders. It has tens of thousands of rockets, advanced drones, precision missiles. Its biggest advantage is proximity, right on Israel’s northern border. It may be said that the threat level to Netanyahu is very high – Hezbollah could, in theory, target Israeli leadership.

Iran – Indirect Threat

Iran enjoys capability, being the regional power with ballistic missiles, drones, cyber operations. While Iran may not directly target Netanyahu, it can facilitate proxies (Hezbollah, militias in Iraq/ Syria, and Houthis).

Palestinian Militants

Hamas, PIJ, and West Bank groups have the capability, having short-to-medium range rockets, cross-border raids, suicide missions. On top of all they enjoy proximity. Most of the resistance group consider Netanyahu directly responsible for Gaza destruction. Analysts believe it is difficult for them to reach him personally due to Israel’s heavy security.

Houthis (Yemen)

Houthis enjoy certain advantages like long-range drones and ballistic missiles, some have reached Israel’s southern airspace, others intercepted. Houthis position themselves as part of “Axis of Resistance” with Iran, Hezbollah, and Hamas. Target Israel-linked shipping and occasionally Israel itself. Their threat level is low, as they cannot realistically strike Netanyahu personally, but can harass Israel economically and militarily.

Other Regional Militias

Groups based in Iraq and Syria enjoy certain capabilities, rockets and drones, but usually confined to US or Israeli targets in Syria/ Iraq. Therefore, the real threat level to Netanyahu’s life may be low to moderate, but nuisance attacks are possible, though unlikely to reach Israeli leadership.

Iran arrests suspects having links with Mossad

Iran's Revolutionary Guards said on Saturday they had arrested eight people suspected of trying to transmit the coordinates of sensitive sites and details about senior military figures to Israel's Mossad, reports Iranian state media.

They are accused of having provided the information to the Mossad spy agency during Israel's air war on Iran in June, when it attacked Iranian nuclear facilities and killed top military commanders as well as civilians in the worst blow to the Islamic Republic since the 1980s war with Iraq.

Iran retaliated with barrages of missiles on Israeli military sites, infrastructure and cities. The United States entered the war on June 22 with strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities.

A Guard’s statement alleged that the suspects had received specialized training from Mossad via online platforms. It said they were apprehended in northeastern Iran before carrying out their plans, and that materials for making launchers, bombs, explosives and booby traps had been seized.

State media reported earlier this month that Iranian police had arrested as many as 21,000 "suspects" during the 12-day war with Israel, though they did not say what these people had been suspected of doing.

Security forces conducted a campaign of widespread arrests and also stepped up their street presence during the brief war that ended in a US-brokered ceasefire.

Iran has executed at least eight people in recent months, including nuclear scientist Rouzbeh Vadi, hanged on August 9 for passing information to Israel about another scientist killed in Israeli airstrikes.

Human rights groups say Iran uses espionage charges and fast tracked executions as tools for broader political repression.

 

Duality of standards for Iran and Israel

Many readers like me are unable to understand why the United States, Britain, France and Germany are adamant at imposing sanction on Iran, but are not asking Israel to stop bombarding Gaza?

The apparent contradiction reflects how strategic interests, alliances, and global optics intersect in United States and Britain, France and Germany foreign policy. Let me break it down:

Iran Nuclear Program

The United States, Britain France and Germany have long opposed Iran’s uranium enrichment, seeing it as a path to nuclear weapons. Sanctions are their primary leverage tool.

Regional Rivalries

Iran’s support for Hezbollah, Houthis, and other groups hostile to Israel and the West makes it a “destabilizer” in their eyes.

Alliance Pressures

Many Gulf Arab states are partners of Israel, US, Britain, France and Germany and they view Iran as a strategic threat, pushing Western powers to maintain maximum pressure.

Domestic Politics

In Washington and Europe, appearing “soft on Iran” is politically costly. Sanctions serve as a signal of toughness.

Israeli attacks on Gaza

Israel’s strikes in Gaza have caused massive civilian deaths. Western governments face pressure from international institutions (UN, ICC), NGOs, and their own publics.

The US, Britain France and Germany consider themselves defenders of international law. Unchecked Israeli bombing undermines their stance on Ukraine, human rights, and global order.

Escalation in Gaza risks dragging in Lebanon, Syria, and potentially Iran—threatening oil supplies and broader Middle East stability, which Europe especially fears.

In the US and Europe, large pro-Palestinian movements, especially among younger voters and immigrant communities are creating political pressure to rein in Israel.

Core Contradiction

On Iran, the West uses sanctions as a pressure tool because Iran is seen as an adversary.

On Israel, despite being an ally, the West uses diplomatic urging rather than sanctions—because Israel is a strategic partner, but its Gaza actions are politically damaging to the West’s global image.

In essence, Iran is a strategic opponent and super powers use sanctions as pressure

They consider Israel a strategic ally and want to save it from any external pressure, the statements are rhetoric only.

This double standard is being viewed in non-Western capitals (Beijing, Moscow, Global and South) as dual standard and Western stance weakens their credibility globally.

The non-Western world views this double standard of sanctions on Iran but “restraint pleas” for Israel.

China points out that the US, Britain, France and Germany are punishing Iran harshly for alleged destabilizing actions, but shield Israel diplomatically despite Gaza bombings.

By calling for ceasefires and humanitarian aid, China portrays itself as a “responsible global mediator,” contrasting with the West’s selective morality.

Iran is a vital energy partner for China under its Belt and Road Initiative. Sanctions make Tehran more dependent on Beijing, strengthening Chinese influence.

Russia

Russia terms the West’s “rules-based order” biased. They argue: “If bombing cities in Ukraine is a war crime, why not Gaza?”

Iran is often accused of supplying drones and partnering with Russia under sanctions, so Moscow benefits from Tehran’s isolation.

Russia frames itself as standing with the oppressed (Palestinians) against Western-backed aggression, resonating in Arab and African states.

Colonial Echoes

Many see the West’s defense of Israel and punishment of Iran as a continuation of imperial “divide and rule.”

Western claims about human rights and international law are viewed as selective—undermining their authority when they criticize others (African leaders, Asian governments).

Countries like Turkey, Brazil, and South Africa amplify calls for accountability against Israel, while trading more with Iran outside the dollar system.

Strategic Impact

The West’s inconsistency weakens its moral standing globally.

Non-Western powers gain diplomatic and economic space by filling the “justice gap.”

Iran, despite sanctions, finds sympathy in many Global South societies as a victim of Western double standards—while Israel risks becoming diplomatically isolated outside the Western bloc.

Moral of the story

The contradictory stances of US, Britain France and Germany may preserve short-term alliances, but they’re eroding their credibility in the long run, especially in the Global South.

 

Geopolitical stunts are created to maneuver oil prices

It may not be wrong to say that geopolitical stunts (or deliberate political maneuvers) are often used to influence oil prices. The time proves that oil is one of the most geopolitically sensitive commodities, and even the perception of instability can trigger price movements. Here are some ways this happens:

Military Conflicts and Threats

Tensions in oil-producing regions (Middle East, Russia, and Ukraine) raise fears of supply disruptions. Even without actual disruption, rhetoric, military drills, or strikes can cause speculative buying, lifting prices.

Sanctions and Embargoes

Sanctions on major producers (Iran, Venezuela, and Russia) reduce their exports, tightening supply. Announcements of new sanctions, even before implementation, often drive markets up.

OPEC Plus Announcements

OPEC and allies strategically announce production cuts or increases to move prices. Sometimes the timing is politically motivated — for example, cuts ahead of US elections or global summits.

Diplomatic Stunts

Leaders may signal alliances, threats, or peace talks to calm or unsettle oil markets. For instance, US–Saudi or US–Iran engagements often coincide with volatility in oil futures.

Domestic Politics

Countries that depend heavily on oil revenues (Russia, Saudi Arabia, Iran, Nigeria, and Venezuela) may trigger or amplify tensions abroad to keep oil prices high. Conversely, big consumers (United States, China, and European Union) may release strategic oil reserves to cool prices.

Media Amplification

Headlines about “possible war,” “pipeline sabotage,” or “shipping lane blockades” often move markets more than the actual underlying event. Traders react to expectations and fear, not just physical supply-demand.

Therefore, it could be concluded that oil markets are not purely economic — they are political battlegrounds, and states often use geopolitical stunts as levers to maneuver prices in their favor.

Here are three recent real world examples (2025) where geopolitical maneuvers clearly influenced oil prices—either via threat driven surges or optimism amid shifting sanctions and diplomacy.

Threat to Close the Strait of Hormuz

In June 2025, escalating attacks between Israel and Iran triggered a spike in oil prices—Brent crude climbed to US$70 per barrel amid concerns over supply disruptions and potential threats to the vital Strait of Hormuz.

On June 14, 2025, Iran explicitly threatened to close the Strait, which handles nearly 20% of global oil traffic. Analysts warned this could push prices even higher—possibly into the US$100 to US$150 per barrel range.

While a full closure didn’t materialize, the mere threat created a sharp short-term price shock, echoing how geopolitical risk can rapidly alter market sentiment.

Russia Ukraine Peace Talks

In August 2025, oil markets closely tracked developments—or lack thereof—in high-profile diplomatic efforts involving Russia, the United States, and Ukraine.

When President Trump proposed a trilateral summit (Putin–Zelenskiy–himself), Brent crude briefly climbed—markets anticipated that a ceasefire could eventually ease sanctions and boost supply.

Conversely, when the Trump–Putin summit yielded no binding oil or policy changes, markets cooled; analysts noted the event lacked the "magic lever" to relieve supply constraints.

Ongoing sanctions and inventory draws in the US—especially amid strong demand—continued to support prices amid supply uncertainty.

OPEC Plus Production Moves

In June 2025, OPEC Plus surprised markets by announcing a modest output increase of around 411,000 barrels per day, despite prevailing worries of oversupply. This unexpected move served as a geopolitical reminder of OPEC Plus ability to tweak supply—and kept oil prices elevated.

This came at a time when global crude production was running high, yet the announcement shaped expectations that geopolitical coordination could still swing the market.

Geopolitical Stunts Still Matter

Perception matters:

Markets often react more sharply to the fear of disruption—like threats to chokepoints—than to actual events.

Short-term risk channel:

As historical analyses show, geopolitical shocks typically drive short-term price spikes via risk premiums, though long-term economic slowdown may offset these gains.

Strategic signaling:

Diplomatic posturing—summits, threats, tariffs—can sway trader sentiment and pricing, even without concrete policy shifts.

Iran-Pakistan set ambitious agri trade target

Iran and Pakistan signed a joint statement pledging to expand cooperation in agriculture, trade, and food security, with a goal to raise bilateral agricultural trade to US$3 billion within two years.

Iran’s Agriculture Minister Gholamreza Nouri Ghezeljeh said current trade is around US$1.4 billion, noting both countries’ complementary strengths.

Iran will expand exports of dairy, nuts, fruits, and vegetables, while Pakistan will supply rice, corn, and 60% of Iran’s meat imports.

Both sides also agreed to collaborate on climate change research, food security, and establish a joint agricultural committee to meet biannually.

Pakistan’s Minister Rana Tanveer Hussain called the Tehran meeting “fruitful,” stressing that regional trade is cheaper than sourcing from distant markets like Brazil.

Both public and private sectors will participate, with barter and tailored facilities under consideration.

The Iran–Pakistan Business Conference opened in Islamabad on August 03, attended by President Masoud Pezeshkian and hosted by Senator Ishaq Dar.

Pakistan’s Commerce Minister Jam Kamal Khan highlighted the draft Free Trade Agreement, tariff issue resolution, and improved border infrastructure, including activation of the Pishin–Mand market and plans for a new Chadgi–Kouhak crossing.

Iran’s Trade Minister Mohammad Atabak emphasized the need to expand land terminals, rail connectivity, and port cooperation.

Dar underlined close ties under the Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO) and invited Iranian investors to Pakistan, citing reforms and a new investment facilitation council.

Reza Masrour, head of Iran’s Free Trade and Special Economic Zones, proposed joint paddy farming in Pakistan with rice processing in Iran’s Chabahar Free Zone to address water shortages.

He also suggested multi-entry visas, a joint free zone, and linking CPEC to Iran and the North–South Corridor. Pakistan welcomed these ideas.

According to Iran’s Trade Promotion Organization, trade reached US$3.129 billion in 2024–25, with Iran exporting US$2.423 billion (mainly petroleum products, milk powder, and dates) and importing US$706 million (primarily rice, oilseeds, and meat). However, trade in early 2025 dipped due to regional instability.

Officials stressed that better logistics, customs cooperation, and transport infrastructure are vital for sustaining growth and realizing the long-delayed promise of free trade.