Trump’s Knesset Speech: A Performance of Power and Paradox

US President, Donald Trump’s much-anticipated address to the Israeli Knesset was as dramatic as expected — part peace declaration, part political theatre. He declared the Gaza war “over,” calling it the “historic dawn of a new Middle East.” Yet beneath the triumphal tone lay a familiar Trumpian paradox - big claims, limited substance, and a heavy dose of personal politics.

Trump’s first major announcement — declaring the Gaza conflict “a painful nightmare finally over” — aimed to project him as the peacemaker who ended a bloody chapter. But the reality on the ground tells a murkier story: Gaza remains shattered, its future uncertain, and Israel’s hold over its security unresolved.

For all his talk of peace, Trump’s narrative was built more on optics than on outcomes.

In one of the most controversial moments, he called on Israel’s president to pardon Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, dismissing his corruption charges as “trivial.” That plea blurred the line between diplomacy and political favoritism. It was a gesture that played well to Netanyahu’s loyalists but jarred with those who still value judicial independence.

Equally striking was Trump’s unexpected olive branch to Iran. Saying the US was ready for a deal “when Tehran is,” he tried to reposition himself as the only leader capable of balancing hostility with negotiation. Yet the statement raised eyebrows — could Trump really reconcile his pro-Israel stance with outreach to Iran, a country that views Israel as its sworn enemy?

He also insisted Gaza must be “completely demilitarized” and that Israel’s security “will never be compromised.” The phrasing underscored his alignment with Israel’s long-standing narrative: security first, sovereignty later.

In the end, Trump’s Knesset speech was less about the Middle East and more about reclaiming his image as the global dealmaker.

It blended symbolism with self-promotion, leaving unanswered whether his “new dawn” will bring genuine peace or simply another round of political grandstanding.

Is Pakistan Being Pushed into a ‘US Proxy War’ in Afghanistan?

Behind the new wave of border clashes may lie an old script — one written in Washington and played out in Islamabad and Kabul. Has Pakistan once again been cast in the role of America’s proxy?

The recent spike in Pak-Afghan border tensions has once again pushed the region to the edge of confrontation. Reports suggest that armed militants crossing from Afghanistan have attacked Pakistani security posts, prompting Islamabad’s “severe retaliation.” Yet, beneath the visible smoke of gunfire lies a far more intricate and disturbing reality — one that hints at the shadow of global power politics.

Following the US withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2021, Washington appeared to have lost its strategic foothold in the region. The Taliban’s refusal to hand over the Bagam Air Base — once a vital hub of American military operations — was not merely a symbolic rejection; it was a strategic rebuff. The superpower lost a vantage point near China, Iran, and Central Asia.

It is no coincidence that within months of that refusal, Afghanistan began facing renewed instability, and Pakistan started encountering an inexplicable surge in cross-border attacks.

My hypothesis is simple: when Washington cannot re-enter Afghanistan directly, it may seek to create circumstances that justify intervention. The most effective way to do that is to provoke conflict. The pattern fits. Anonymous “operators” — possibly non-state actors with advanced intelligence capabilities — carry out attacks inside Pakistan, inviting a retaliatory strike. The resulting escalation allows the US to portray the region as unstable and Taliban-controlled Afghanistan as a “global threat.” A familiar pretext for yet another intervention is thus created.

Ironically, Pakistan — which has already paid an enormous price in blood and economy during the first “War on Terror” — now risks being drawn into another one, this time as an unwilling participant in someone else’s geopolitical chessboard. The tragedy is that Islamabad still struggles to draw a clear line between its national interests and Washington’s regional ambitions. History, it seems, is repeating itself — and not for the better.

What complicates matters further is the deep mistrust between Islamabad and Kabul. The Taliban government, already under economic sanctions and political isolation, accuses Pakistan of toeing the American line. Pakistan, on the other hand, blames Afghanistan for harboring militants of the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). Yet neither side seems willing to see how external forces might be manipulating both.

The strategic question Pakistan must ask is: Whose war are we fighting this time? If recent cross-border provocations are indeed part of a larger plan to destabilize the region, Islamabad must avoid taking the bait. A measured, intelligence-based response — not blind retaliation — is the need of the hour. Pakistan’s security cannot depend on reaction; it must rest on foresight.

The lesson from the past two decades is painfully clear. Every time Pakistan has fought on behalf of someone else, it has lost — in lives, in reputation, and in internal cohesion. If history is repeating itself, the least we can do is refuse to play the same role again.

Iran's rise to regional powerhouse rattles friends and foes alike

Iran’s steady emergence as a regional powerhouse is reshaping the Middle East’s strategic landscape — and not everyone is comfortable with it. What makes Tehran’s ascent intriguing is that it unsettles both adversaries and allies, blurring traditional fault lines and forcing recalculations from Riyadh to Washington, and from Moscow to Beijing.

For decades, Iran was viewed through the prism of sanctions, isolation, and revolutionary zeal. Despite economic constraints and diplomatic pressure, it has built robust influence through a mix of ideology, resilience, and strategic alliances. Its regional proxies in Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, and Yemen — once dismissed as militant networks — now form a formidable web of influence, capable of shaping outcomes from the Gulf to the Mediterranean.

Iran’s growing clout has not only alarmed its foes. Even its supposed friends find Tehran’s assertiveness unnerving. The Gulf states, after years of rivalry, cautiously reopened diplomatic channels, realizing that confrontation is costly. Yet normalization is driven more by necessity than trust.

Saudi Arabia’s rapprochement, brokered by China, underscores this pragmatic shift — acknowledging Iran’s influence while seeking to contain it through diplomacy rather than confrontation.

The United States, meanwhile, remains entangled in a paradox. Washington cannot ignore Iran’s expanding regional reach, but its policy of maximum pressure has yielded minimal results.

The European powers, too, find themselves frustrated — wanting engagement on nuclear and energy fronts but constrained by American sanctions.

Russia and China, while cultivating ties with Tehran, remain wary of an overconfident Iran that might complicate their own regional interests.

Domestically, Iran’s leadership is projecting its defiance as strength — a message that resonates in a region weary of Western intervention. Yet, its economy remains fragile, and social unrest continues to simmer beneath the surface.

Iran’s rise is not just about military might or regional leverage; it is a reminder that power in today’s Middle East comes with contradictions.

Tehran’s growing assertiveness has turned it into both a symbol of resistance and a source of regional anxiety — a paradoxical power that leaves neither friends nor foes at ease.

 

Israel Propping Up Clerics, It Wants to Topple

Israel loves to project itself as the master strategist of the Middle East, but its obsession with weakening Iran’s clergy-led regime has turned into a textbook case of shooting oneself in the foot. Every strike, every sanction pushed through Western allies, every act of aggression meant to undercut Tehran’s clerics only hardens their grip on power. Far from collapsing, the system feeds off Israel’s hostility.

Nationalism is a powerful weapon. Iranians who may loathe the suffocating theocracy often rally behind it when Israel rattles its sabers. The clergy has perfected the art of turning external threats into political oxygen. By painting Israel as an existential menace, the clerics recast themselves as the sole guardians of sovereignty. Instead of cracking the system, Tel Aviv provides its clergy foes with the ultimate justification for survival.

Worse still, Israel’s strategy systematically silences the only real alternative inside Iran: reformists. Moderates who advocate engagement with the world are mocked as naïve or treacherous whenever Israel ups the ante. The hardliners gleefully point to every strike and sanction to prove that diplomacy is a fool’s game. In doing so, Israel eliminates any space for evolution from within, ensuring that Iran remains dominated by the most rigid voices.

And then there’s the economic side. Sanctions and isolation have not strangled the clergy; they’ve enriched it. The opponents often allege, the Revolutionary Guards and clerical networks thrive on smuggling, black markets, and sanction-busting schemes. Ordinary Iranians pay the price with rising prices and shrinking opportunities, while the very elites Israel wants to weaken grow stronger.

Israel’s strategy is not just flawed — it is counterproductive. Instead of destabilizing Iran’s clerical establishment, it props it up, fuels its legitimacy, and crushes dissent. Tel Aviv claims to be undermining its greatest enemy; in reality, it is handing the clergy the very tools it needs to endure.

The truth is brutal: Israel’s war against Iran’s clerics may be the biggest gift it has ever given them.

 

Triple Whammy of Crude Uncertainty

Oil prices rose slightly on Friday after four straight sessions of declines but were on track for their steepest weekly decline since late June due to market expectations that the OPEC Plus could hike output further despite oversupply concerns. If prices do not further recover in this session, Brent could close at the lowest level since the week ended May 30, while WTI would finish at a level not seen since May 02. On a weekly basis, Brent has plunged 8.3%, while WTI is 7.6% lower.

Oil markets thrive on stability, yet today they stand at the crossroads of three unpredictable forces: OPEC’s internal calculations, China’s demand swings, and the broader geopolitical turmoil stretching from the Middle East to Eastern Europe. Together, these factors create a triple whammy of uncertainty that is shaking investor confidence and distorting price forecasts.

First, OPEC remains the central player, but its cohesion is under strain. Saudi Arabia’s output discipline often clashes with the fiscal needs of smaller producers desperate for higher revenues. The cartel’s recent production adjustments reflect less a unified strategy and more a fragile balancing act between market control and survival. Traders now treat OPEC announcements with skepticism, wary that compliance may fracture under pressure.

Second, China—the world’s largest crude importer—casts a long shadow. Its slowing economy, punctuated by property sector woes and uneven industrial growth, has dampened energy consumption. Yet at the same time, Beijing stockpiles aggressively when prices dip, injecting volatility into the market. A single policy shift in China, from stimulus measures to green energy acceleration, can ripple through global demand curves in weeks, leaving analysts scrambling to adjust projections.

Finally, geopolitics adds combustible uncertainty. Wars in Ukraine and the Middle East, sanctions on Russia and Iran, and maritime tensions in the South China Sea all threaten supply chains and shipping lanes. Insurance premiums on crude shipments rise, pipelines face sabotage risks, and diplomatic fractures widen the unpredictability. Energy markets are not just reacting to supply and demand—they are hostage to political brinkmanship.

What makes this triad dangerous is their intersection. OPEC’s decisions are influenced by geopolitical rivalries; China’s demand patterns intersect with U.S. foreign policy and sanctions regimes. The market is no longer shaped by economics alone—it is choreographed by power struggles, both overt and hidden.

For investors, refiners, and consumers alike, the message is clear: crude is no longer just a commodity. It is a barometer of global instability. Until OPEC, China, and geopolitics align toward predictability—a highly unlikely prospect—oil will remain the most uncertain asset of our time.

 

Can Washington Buy Hezbollah Guns?

Washington believes US$230 million can buy stability by disarming Hezbollah and empowering Lebanon’s army. In a country where weapons are seen as survival, and aid is tied to political strings, dollars may deepen divisions rather than deliver sovereignty.

United States is betting big on Lebanon. Its latest US$230 million aid package, funneled into the army and security forces, comes with one not-so-hidden agenda: disarm Hezbollah. For Washington, the formula is simple—dollars for sovereignty. Strengthen the Lebanese Armed Forces, dismantle weapons caches, tie reconstruction money to compliance, and Hezbollah will finally be forced under state control.

But Hezbollah is not a street gang waiting to be bought out. It is Lebanon’s most powerful political and military force, one that commands loyalty, provides services, and—above all—wields arms that many see as the only shield against Israel. When bombs fell on Beirut in 2006, it was not the Lebanese army that stood firm, but Hezbollah. To expect the group to trade rockets for US money is to misunderstand its very identity.

The US plan hinges on a fragile bargain: Hezbollah hands over weapons, Israel halts incursions, and Lebanon begins to rebuild. Yet history says otherwise. Israeli jets still scream across Lebanese skies with impunity. Promises of restraint ring hollow to a movement born from decades of occupation and war. In Hezbollah’s calculus, surrendering arms is not reform—it is suicide.

Washington frames this as state-building. Hezbollah calls it blackmail. By tying basic recovery—electricity, infrastructure, reconstruction—to disarmament, the US is accused of holding Lebanon’s survival hostage. Aid, in this view, is just another weapon of war, designed to weaken “the resistance” where bombs failed.

The clash is stark: United States believes money can buy stability; Hezbollah insists weapons guarantee it. In between stands a broken Lebanon, desperate for relief yet divided over who really protects it.

If Washington thinks $230 million will unravel a militia that survived wars, sanctions, and sieges, it may soon discover that in Lebanon, guns are worth more than dollars—and sovereignty is not for sale.

 

Israel’s Obsession with Iran: Supremacy, Not Survival

Israel presents its confrontation with Iran as a fight for survival. It propagates Tehran seeks its destruction, and therefore preemptive action is necessary. Yet behind this rhetoric lies a harder reality—Israel’s true concern is not annihilation but the erosion of its strategic supremacy.

At the center of this tension is Iran’s nuclear program. Israel is the Middle East’s only nuclear power, though it never admits it officially. For decades it has enjoyed this monopoly as the ultimate insurance policy.

Iran, even without a bomb, is branded an existential menace. What alarms Tel Aviv is not that Tehran would attack with nuclear weapons, but that a nuclear-capable Iran would undermine Israel’s unrivaled leverage. In other words, it is not fear of destruction, but fear of parity.

The second driver is Iran’s support for resistance groups. Hezbollah in Lebanon, Hamas and Islamic Jihad in Gaza—these are not armies that can topple Israel, but they have repeatedly punctured its aura of invincibility. Each rocket barrage, each fortified position along the border, is viewed in Tel Aviv as an extension of Iranian influence, shrinking Israel’s space for unchecked action.

Ideology intensifies the clash. Iran refuses to recognize Israel, while Israeli leaders—from Netanyahu onward—frame Tehran as the new Nazi Germany. This absolutist narrative forecloses compromise and justifies covert assassinations, cyber sabotage, airstrikes in Syria, and endless lobbying for harsher sanctions.

The deeper layer is geopolitical. Among Middle Eastern states, only Iran possesses the population, resources, and regional reach to contest Israel’s dominance. Neutralizing Tehran means securing Israel’s role as the region’s undisputed military power—backed by Washington, tolerated by Arab monarchies, and free to redraw the political map to its liking.

Israel’s Iran obsession is not about survival. It is about ensuring that no other state can balance its power. By disguising this pursuit of supremacy as self-defense, Israel sustains a cycle of hostility that makes genuine peace impossible.

The world buys the existential threat narrative, but the truth is starker - Israel seeks not containment of Iran, but its permanent crippling.

 

Arab Silence on Iran Sanctions: Hypocrisy at Its Peak

When Western powers tighten the noose of sanctions on Iran, one would expect Muslim nations—bound by faith and shared history—to object. Yet the Arab capitals remain silent, some even nodding in approval. Why? Because geopolitics has conveniently buried the idea of the Ummah.

For decades, Arab regimes have painted Iran not as a fellow Muslim state but as a sectarian rival, a destabilizing Shia power encroaching on their Sunni domains. From Hezbollah in Lebanon to the Houthis in Yemen, Tehran’s fingerprints unsettle Arab rulers. For them, US-led sanctions are not injustice—these are containment.

Add to this the dependency on Washington. The Gulf monarchies thrive on American protection, arms, and trade. To defy US diktats is to risk the very foundations of their security. So they remain mute, even when sanctions cripple ordinary Iranians.

These same states cry foul over Palestine, condemn Western double standards in Gaza, and rally Muslim solidarity—only to abandon it when it comes to Iran. The truth is simple - Arab rulers see a weakened Iran as good for oil markets, good for their regimes, and good for their new friends in Tel Aviv.

Sanctions on Iran are discriminatory, yes. But the bigger betrayal is the silence of Arab leaders who claim to defend Muslim dignity yet quietly cheer when one of their own is strangled.

Sanctions on Iran: A Weapon of Discrimination

The United Nations reinstated an arms embargo and other sanctions on Iran on Saturday following a process triggered by key European powers that Tehran has warned will be met with a harsh response.

Britain, France and Germany triggered the return of sanctions on Iran at the UN Security Council over accusations the country has violated a 2015 deal that aimed to stop it developing a nuclear bomb.

The most disappointing fact is that Iran has been persistently denying it seeks nuclear weapons.

The latest “snapback” sanctions on Iran are being propagated as a principled stand for global security. In reality, these are a textbook case of discriminatory politics masquerading as international law.

When European countries and the United Nations reimposed sweeping restrictions on Iran, they claimed it was about enforcing the nuclear deal. But anyone watching global affairs knows the truth - rules are not applied equally.

Some states, Israel being on the top, are allowed to violate treaties, wage wars, and commit human rights abuses without facing meaningful penalties. As against this, Iran is being punished relentlessly and disproportionately for nearly half a century.

This double standard makes the sanctions discriminatory. International law is supposed to be blind, yet it routinely blinks when powerful countries or their allies are in the dock. If a rule is enforced against one country but ignored for another, then it is not law at all—it is selective punishment.

The impact of these sanctions is another form of injustice. These do not primarily weaken Iran’s ruling regime. Instead, these strangle ordinary Iranians—families struggling to buy food, patients unable to access medicines, students cut off from opportunities abroad.

These sanctions drive inflation, hollow out the middle class, and breed resentment. Yet policymakers continue to inflict this suffering while pretending it advances diplomacy.

The legality of the move itself is shaky. Critics, including Russia and China, argue that the so-called snapback mechanism was triggered improperly. If great powers can bend procedures to suit their interests, then the credibility of international agreements collapses. Why would any state trust deals if enforcement depends on politics rather than principle?

Supporters of sanctions insist these are a peaceful alternative to war. But sanctions do not bring peace—these are economic warfare and are designed to coerce, to cripple, and to remind weaker nations of their place in a hierarchy where might makes right.

Scrutiny should come through fair, consistent, and negotiated mechanisms—not through discriminatory punishment imposed by those who selectively police the world. Otherwise, sanctions cease to be instruments of justice and become tools of domination.

Unless international sanctions are applied evenly, transparently, and with safeguards against humanitarian harm, these will continue to deepen global mistrust.

The sanctions will not be accepted as a neutral enforcement of law, but as another weapon of geopolitics. And the more the world tolerates selective justice, the more fragile the entire international order becomes.

If global powers truly want compliance and stability, they must abandon the hypocrisy of discriminatory sanctions. Anything less will only harden grievances, destabilize regions, and erode what little legitimacy international institutions still command.

While the sanctions should be about justice, at present these are about power. It will not be wrong to say that in case of Iran, the power is not being used to usher peace, but to punish the strongest opponent of Israel.

 

 

What options US can exercise if Afghans refuse to handover Bagram Air Base?

If Afghans refuse to handover Bagram Air Base back to the United States, Washington is likely to face a serious strategic dilemma. The response will likely depend on how far the super power is willing to push its military and political leverage in the region. Some of the likely options are:

1. Diplomatic Pressure

The first option would be to apply diplomatic pressure on the Taliban government, possibly through Qatar or Pakistan as intermediaries. The US may frame Bagram’s access as essential for counterterrorism monitoring, and push for a limited presence under international arrangements rather than outright US control.

2. Economic and Sanctions Leverage

If diplomacy fails, Washington could use financial levers that include:

Tightening sanctions on Taliban leaders.

Blocking international recognition of the Taliban government.

Cutting off humanitarian exemptions or aid that Afghanistan relies on.

This would make Kabul’s refusal costlier.

3. Regional Partnerships

The US might deepen military partnerships with neighbors instead. For instance:

Expanding use of bases in Central Asia (though Russia and China will resist this).

Strengthening presence in the Persian Gulf (Qatar, UAE).

Increasing over-the-horizon operations using drones and satellites.

This would reduce dependency on Bagram, though at a higher logistical cost.

4. Covert Operations

If Washington views Bagram as critical for counterterrorism, it could resort to covert methods—arming rival Afghan groups, intelligence penetration, or even destabilization strategies to pressure the Taliban into concessions.

5. Accept and Adapt

Though difficult, the US may accept that Afghanistan is now firmly outside its reach and adapt by monitoring from afar. This would reflect Washington’s reluctance to re-engage militarily in Afghanistan after two decades of war.

From RCD to ECO to Complete Dormancy

Regionalism has often been hailed as a path toward prosperity, but the trajectory of the Regional Cooperation for Development (RCD) and its successor, the Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO), tells a sobering story of missed opportunities. What began with promise in the 1960s has today slipped into near-complete irrelevance.

The RCD was founded in 1964 by Iran, Pakistan, and Turkey to strengthen economic, cultural, and technical cooperation. It emerged in a Cold War environment, where smaller powers sought to shield themselves from great-power dependency by building regional linkages.

On paper, the project had logic, three strategically located Muslim countries, with shared aspirations of modernization, pooling resources to advance trade, industry, and connectivity. In practice, RCD never went beyond symbolism.

The organization lacked institutional strength, faced political frictions, and struggled to overcome the dominance of external economic ties over intra-regional trade.

By the late 1970s, the Iranian Revolution and shifting geopolitical alignments sealed RCD’s fate. In 1979, it faded into history without leaving a substantial legacy.

A revival attempt came in 1985, when the same three countries launched the Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO). ECO promised a fresh start and greater ambition. Its major breakthrough came in 1992 with the admission of seven new members — Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan.

ECO spanned a vast geography bridging South, Central, and West Asia, with a market of nearly half a billion people and immense natural resources.

Observers predicted that ECO could become a Eurasian economic powerhouse, knitting together landlocked Central Asia with energy-rich Iran and Turkey, and consumer-rich Pakistan.

As decades passed, the promise remained unfulfilled. Member states pursued conflicting foreign policies, were more deeply tied to external trade partners than to each other, and often lacked political trust. Infrastructure gaps meant goods could not move freely.

Overlapping memberships — in the OIC, SCO, CIS, and other blocs — diluted ECO’s relevance.

High-sounding declarations at summits were rarely followed by implementation. Even flagship projects, such as the Islamabad-Tehran-Istanbul railway, never became viable trade corridors.

Today, ECO exists largely as a ceremonial body. Meetings are infrequent, agreements unenforced, and the organization invisible in global or even regional affairs.

Intra-ECO trade remains stuck around 7–8% of members’ total trade, a telling indicator of stagnation.

Compared to other regional blocs such as ASEAN or the EU, ECO demonstrates how political will, not geography, determines success.

The journey from RCD to ECO to dormancy offers a lesson ‑ regional cooperation cannot survive on rhetoric alone. Without trust, shared vision, and consistent follow-through, even the most promising initiatives collapse into irrelevance.

ECO still retains potential — its geography places it at the crossroads of major trade routes, including China’s Belt and Road Initiative. But unless member states move beyond statements and invest in genuine integration, ECO’s story will remain one of unrealized potential and organizational decay.

 

 

President Trump you cannot order Taliban to handover Bagram Air Base to the United States

It may be a wish of US President Donald Trump to get control of Bagram Air Base. However, he does not have any authority to demand the Afghan government to handover the base. Threatening bad things would happen to Afghanistan if it does not give back control of the base to the United States, is outright terrorism.

Here are several possible motives behind the Trump demand:

·        Restoring US influence in Afghanistan and the wider region, especially after the pull-out which many view as a strategic loss.

·        Countering rivals, particularly China and others by having a base close by.

·        Strengthening counterterrorism posture, ensuring that militant groups can't easily use Afghan territory to plan or launch attacks.

·        Leveraging domestic political pressure as the opponents say the withdrawal decision was a mistake.

·        Using it as a bargaining chip to secure concessions i.e. economic aid, diplomatic recognition, etc.

Being a sovereign county and also because the US does recognize the Taliban government of Afghanistan it is the inherent right of Taliban to outright rejected the US demand.

·        They rightly say Afghanistan’s territorial integrity cannot be compromised.

·        No foreign military presence will be allowed.

·        Taliban insists that political and economic relations with the US are possible without giving up land or allowing foreign bases.

Regaining control of Bagram will not an easy task for the US. It would likely require a major military deployment, security provisions, defense spending, etc. Experts say holding the base would be challenging militarily and politically.

Some analysts view the US demand as an attempt to restore hegemony over Afghanistan and adjoining countries.

They warn that pushing too hard might destabilize relations, reduce cooperation, or provoke negative responses from locals or other countries.

Under the Doha Agreement (2020) and other engagements, the US made certain commitments about respecting Afghanistan’s sovereignty, no foreign bases, etc. Returning to or demanding possession of Bagram is violation of these agreements.

Significance of Saudi Arabia-Pakistan defence pact

The Saudi Arabia-Pakistan defence pact is not just a military arrangement—it is a strategic partnership that underpins Pakistan’s economic security and Saudi Arabia’s military security. For Pakistan, it guarantees vital financial and diplomatic backing; for Saudi Arabia, it provides trusted military support and, indirectly, a nuclear-armed ally. Together, it represents one of the strongest security relationships in the Muslim world.

The Saudi Arabia- Pakistan defence pact carries deep strategic, political, and economic significance for both countries and the wider region. Its importance can be seen from multiple angles:

Strategic and Security Dimension

Mutual Security Guarantee:

Pakistan has historically provided military training, expertise, and manpower to Saudi Arabia, reinforcing the Kingdom’s defence at times of regional tension. In return, Saudi Arabia has been a security partner for Pakistan in times of external pressure.

Balancing Iran’s Influence:

For Saudi Arabia, Pakistan’s military cooperation is part of a broader strategy to counterbalance Iran in the Gulf and beyond. For Pakistan, it ensures strong backing from the Kingdom while maintaining a delicate balance in its own relations with Iran.

Nuclear Umbrella:

Although not formalized, Pakistan’s nuclear capability is sometimes seen as a potential backstop for Saudi security in case of existential threats, making the defence relationship symbolically powerful.

Military Cooperation

Training and Deployment:

Thousands of Pakistani military personnel have served in Saudi Arabia over the decades, providing training to Saudi forces. Even today, a contingent of Pakistani troops is stationed there for defence cooperation.

Arms and Defence Technology:

Pakistan has supplied small arms, ammunition, and defence equipment to Saudi Arabia. Joint ventures in defence production are under discussion.

Counterterrorism and Intelligence Sharing:

Both states have collaborated closely in intelligence sharing, counterterrorism operations, and combating extremist networks that threaten regional stability.

Economic and Political Significance

Financial Lifeline for Pakistan:

Saudi Arabia has been one of Pakistan’s most consistent financial supporters—providing oil on deferred payments, direct loans, and balance-of-payments support. The defence pact strengthens this bond by ensuring Pakistan’s military commitment in return.

Diplomatic Support:

Saudi Arabia often champions Pakistan’s stance on international platforms, including on Kashmir and economic cooperation within the OIC. Pakistan reciprocates by supporting Saudi positions on regional security and Islamic solidarity.

Regional and Global Context

Gulf Security:

Saudi Arabia views Pakistan as a reliable partner in securing the Gulf, especially in moments of instability.

Islamic Military Alliance:

Pakistan plays a central role in the Saudi-led Islamic Military Counter Terrorism Coalition (IMCTC), with former Pakistani Army Chief Gen. Raheel Sharif appointed as its first commander.

US–China Factor:

The pact also gives Saudi Arabia an alternative to over-reliance on Western defence support, while Pakistan uses it to diversify its security partnerships alongside China.

Symbolic and Religious Aspect

Custodianship of Holy Places:

Pakistan attaches special reverence to Saudi Arabia as the custodian of Islam’s holiest sites, and defence cooperation is also framed as protecting the sanctity of the Two Holy Mosques.

Soft Power and Legitimacy:

The pact signals unity of two major Muslim powers—Saudi Arabia with its economic and religious clout, and Pakistan with its military strength and nuclear capability.

Who is the true representative of Palestinians?

For more than 700 days Israel has been undertaking land and air attacks on Gaza enclave and killed more than 65,000 people, mostly women and children. The strip has been reduced to rubbles, with the destruction of infrastructure. In the latest UN resolution the two state formula has been endorsed, with minus Hamas involvement.

There is no denying to the fact that Hamas has been in virtual control of Gaza for nearly two decades. There is a suggestion to resolve Palestine issue without any role of Hamas, what so ever. It may be a wish of Israel, but do the ground realities support this?

Ironically Palestinians are represented by different bodies in different contexts:

Internationally (Diplomatic Representation)

Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO):

Recognized by the United Nations and over 130 countries as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. The PLO holds Palestine’s seat at the UN as a “non-member observer state.”

Within Occupied Palestinian Territories

Palestinian Authority (PA):
Established under the 1993 Oslo Accords, the PA governs parts of the West Bank. Its leadership is dominated by Fatah, a major faction of the PLO. President Mahmoud Abbas is both head of the PA and chairman of the PLO.

Hamas:
An Islamist movement that controls the Gaza strip since 2007, after winning the 2006 Palestinian legislative elections and subsequent conflict with Fatah. Hamas is not part of the PLO, and it does not support Oslo-style negotiations with Israel.

In Exile

Millions of Palestinians live outside the West Bank and Gaza, especially in Jordan, Lebanon, and elsewhere. They are formally represented by the PLO, but many feel underrepresented due to internal divisions.

United States

The US recognizes the PLO as the representative of Palestinians, but relations are tense. It does not recognize Hamas and designates it as a terrorist organization. Washington supports the PA (West Bank-based) but pressures it to cooperate on security with Israel.

European Union (EU)

The EU deals mainly with the PA/ PLO. Like the US, the EU also labels Hamas a terrorist group. Provides large amounts of financial aid to the PA for governance and humanitarian work.

Arab League and Arab States

Mostly Arabs recognize the PLO as the representative of the Palestinians. Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and UAE work with the PA and sometimes mediate between Fatah and Hamas. Qatar and Turkey maintain ties with Hamas, provide financial aid to Gaza, and give political space to its leadership.

Iran and Allies

This group strongly back Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) militarily and financially. Iran does not consider the PA effective against Israel and instead supports “resistance” factions. Hezbollah of Lebanon also aligns with Hamas and PIJ.

Russia and China

Both the leading super powers recognize the PLO/ PA officially, but also engage with Hamas as part of broader Middle East diplomacy, positioning themselves as mediators.

Let us explore how Hamas has attained popularity?

Hamas’s rise in popularity among Palestinians is rooted in a mix of social, religious, political, and resistance factors. Here’s a breakdown of how it became a powerful force:

Origins and Religious Roots

Founded in 1987, during the First Intifada (uprising against Israeli occupation), Hamas emerged from the Muslim Brotherhood network in Gaza, which already had credibility through mosques, schools, and charities. It gained early support by combining Islamic identity with nationalist resistance, offering an alternative to the more secular PLO/ Fatah.

Resistance against Israel

Hamas distinguished itself by armed resistance (rockets, suicide bombings, tunnels), presenting itself as uncompromising in the face of Israeli occupation. Many Palestinians saw Hamas as more effective in confronting Israel than the PA, which was engaged in negotiations that delivered little tangible progress. After the Second Intifada (2000–2005), Hamas gained credibility as the symbol of defiance, while the PA lost legitimacy due to corruption and security coordination with Israel.

Social Services & Grassroots Work

Hamas built extensive charitable networks that include schools, clinics, food distribution, orphan support and relief for families of prisoners and martyrs. These welfare programs won the loyalty of poorer Palestinians, especially in refugee camps and Gaza, where the PA and international aid were seen as insufficient.

Political Legitimacy through Elections

In 2006 Palestinian Legislative Elections, Hamas (running under the banner Change and Reform) won a majority of seats, defeating Fatah. Its victory was attributed to: 1) frustration with Fatah’s corruption and inefficiency, 2) Hamas’s reputation for integrity and discipline and above all 3) its hardline stance against Israel.

Regional and International Support

Iran, Qatar, and Turkey provided financial, political, and military backing that allowed Hamas to sustain governance in Gaza despite Israeli blockades. Egypt, while wary of Hamas, also engaged with it as a key player in Gaza.

Gaza Takeover (2007)

After a violent split with Fatah, Hamas seized control of Gaza Strip in 2007. Despite isolation and blockade, Hamas positioned itself as the de facto authority, further cementing its influence among Palestinians in Gaza.

Symbol of Resistance rather Compromise

Many Palestinians perceive the PA/ Fatah as compromised, weak, or too close to Israel and the United states. Hamas, despite the hardships in Gaza, is seen as authentic, incorruptible, and willing to sacrifice. Each confrontation with Israel (wars in 2008–09, 2012, 2014, 2021, and 2023–25) often boosts Hamas’s popularity, as it frames survival itself as victory. Hamas attained popularity by blending religion, resistance, social welfare, and political credibility at a time when the PA and Fatah were seen as corrupt and ineffective.

Let us also examine how its popularity differs between Gaza, the West Bank, and the Palestinian diaspora?

Gaza Strip

Hamas has emerged the strongest since beginning of its rule in Gaza in 2007.

The reasons for support include governance, security, and basic services despite blockade. The group has emerged as defender against Israel during repeated wars. Many people view Hamas as less corrupt as compared to Fatah.

The factors marring it popularity are said to be hardships from blockade, unemployment, and war destruction, at times fueling resentment. Some Gazans criticize Hamas’s authoritarian style and restrictions on freedoms. Despite suffering, many still rally behind Hamas in times of conflict with Israel.

West Bank

Hamas support is significant, but less than in Gaza. The reasons for support include: 1) frustration with the Palestinian Authority (PA) and its security coordination with Israel and 2) younger generation sees Hamas as more authentic and uncompromising. The challenges it faces include: 1) West Bank being under tight Israeli control and PA crackdowns, limits Hamas’s political space, and 2) fear of violence or arrest reduces open activism.

During escalations in Gaza, Hamas’s popularity spikes in the West Bank as people see them standing up against Israel.

Palestinian Diaspora

Support for Hamas is found mainly in Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, and the Gulf states as many refugees feel abandoned by the PA/ PLO, but Hamas keeps the “right of return” alive in its rhetoric. Hamas runs charities and schools in refugee camps (especially in Lebanon).

In Jordan, support is cautious, since the government fears Islamist influence.

In Lebanon, Hamas has networks in Palestinian refugee camps but competes with other factions.

In Gulf/ Turkey elite diaspora often back Hamas politically and financially.

Palestinian Citizens of Israel

Hamas has limited direct influence, since it is outlawed by Israel. Some Palestinians in Israel admire its stance against occupation, but most are engaged in civil rights struggles through legal political parties.

Keeping all these narratives in mind, it may be said that eliminating Hamas or bringing peace in the occupied territories or even creation of an independent Palestine will not be sustainable.  

Is Israel attacking countries under the US supervision?

With each passing day and the precision with which Israel attacked Qatar, Iran, Syria, Iraq and other countries, a question is getting louder, is Israel attacking countries under the US supervision?

It is a very important and sensitive question. Based on the strategic relationships between United States and Israel the probability just can’t be ruled out.

Here are the reasons that support the perception:

Military Support:

Israel is the largest cumulative recipient of the US foreign military aid, running into billions of dollars annually. Much of Israel’s military technology, intelligence systems, and weapons are supplied by the US.

Operational Coordination:

While not every Israeli attack is directly supervised by the US, Washington is usually informed in advance of major military operations—especially those with regional consequences like strikes in Gaza, Lebanon, Syria, or beyond.

Political Cover:

The US provides Israel with diplomatic protection, especially at the UN Security Council, often vetoing resolutions that condemn Israeli actions. This gives Israel confidence that it can continue operations without facing strong international consequences.

Shared Intelligence:

The CIA, Pentagon, and Israeli intelligence frequently share intelligence. In many cases, Israeli attacks—particularly on Iran linked targets—are planned with at least some level of US awareness, if not outright coordination.

Recent Pattern:

Analysts often describe Israeli military actions as being carried out with a “green light” from Washington, even if the US doesn’t control the tactical execution.

The US may not be giving step-by-step battlefield orders, Israel’s ongoing military actions—especially in Gaza—are effectively carried out under US strategic supervision and protection, both militarily and diplomatically.

Let us explore the incidents where US involvement was direct (like supplying bombs during Gaza wars, or joint planning against Iran), to show how this collaboration works.

Let us identify the situations where the US involvement was direct or so close that it’s hard to separate support from supervision:

1. Gaza Wars (2008–09, 2014, 2021, 2023–25)

Weapons Supply:

During heavy Israeli bombardments of Gaza, the US quickly replenished Israel’s stock of precision-guided bombs, artillery shells, and Iron Dome interceptors. For example, in 2014 and again in 2021, Washington quietly authorized emergency transfers of munitions while battles were still ongoing.

Political Cover:

At the UN, the US vetoed multiple ceasefire resolutions, allowing Israel to continue operations.

Supervision Aspect:

Without US weapons and diplomatic shields, Israel could not have sustained these long campaigns.

2. Lebanon and Hezbollah (2006 and beyond)

2006 War:

Israel’s month-long war with Hezbollah relied on US-supplied bunker-buster bombs and real-time intelligence from American surveillance assets.

Joint Planning:

US and Israeli militaries regularly war-game scenarios of a “multi-front” war with Hezbollah, meaning Israel’s current strategy is partly drawn up with Pentagon input.

3. Operations against Iran

Nuclear Program Attacks:

The famous Stuxnet cyberattack (2009–10) on Iran’s Natanz facility was a joint CIA-Mossad operation.

Targeted Killings:

Israel’s assassinations of Iranian nuclear scientists were carried out with US intelligence support, according to multiple reports.

Air Strikes in Syria:

Israeli strikes on Iranian convoys and depots in Syria often used US intelligence and were coordinated to avoid clashing with US troops stationed nearby.

Present Gaza War

Direct Weapons Pipeline:

US cargo planes flew precision bombs, tank shells, and artillery rounds directly to Israel while civilian casualties mounted in Gaza.

White House Green Light:

Leaks from Pentagon officials revealed Israel was asked to pause or minimize strikes, but not ordered to stop.

Embedded Coordination:

US military officers reportedly worked inside Israeli command centers to coordinate targeting and logistics — an unusually deep level of involvement.

Ongoing Strategic Framework

US and Israel have joint operations rooms for real-time intelligence sharing.

Israel’s most advanced fighter jets (F-35s) are co-produced with US technology, and software updates pass through Pentagon systems — meaning the US can monitor their use.

Israel does not fight wars in isolation; every major military campaign has US fingerprints, whether in weapons, intelligence, or diplomatic protection.

Bottom line:

While Israel pulls the trigger, the US is the one who supplies the gun, reloads it, and shields Israel from the world’s outrage. That is why many analysts argue Israeli attacks are effectively conducted under US supervision.

Significance of US base in Qatar

There are contrary responses to the Israeli attack on Hamas leaders in Qatar. These could be broadly clubbed in two categories: 1) Israel will have to pay a huge price and 2) Arabs have no spine to teach Israel a lesson. We invite the readers to first understand the significance of the US military base in Qatar. We should also keep in mind what some cynics say “Qatar is in total control of United States and the Arabs just can’t dare to think about causing even the smallest damage to the base”.

According to the details available about the US military base in Qatar (Al Udeid Air Base, near Doha) it holds very high strategic and geopolitical significance for both Washington and its regional allies.  Here’s why it matters:

1. Largest US Military Presence in the Middle East

Al Udeid hosts around 10,000–13,000 US and coalition troops. It is home to the US Air Force Central Command (AFCENT) forward headquarters. The base has one of the longest runways in the Gulf, capable of handling heavy bombers, cargo planes, and refueling aircraft.

2. Command and Control Hub

It houses the Combined Air Operations Center (CAOC), which directs US and allied air missions across the Middle East, including Iraq, Syria, Afghanistan, and the Persian Gulf. It provides real-time surveillance, intelligence, and command capabilities for regional operations.

3. Geostrategic Location

Qatar sits between Iran and Saudi Arabia, giving the US a vantage point to monitor both. Its Gulf location allows rapid deployment to hotspots in the Middle East, North Africa, and South Asia. It acts as a deterrent against Iran’s influence and provides a security guarantee to Gulf states.

4. Operations and Wars

It has played a central role in the 2001 invasion of Afghanistan and the 2003 Iraq War. It remains critical for ongoing counterterrorism, anti-ISIS missions, and monitoring the Strait of Hormuz.

5. Political Significance

The base signals a deep US-Qatar partnership, despite Qatar’s sometimes independent stance in Gulf politics (relations with Iran, hosting Hamas leaders, supporting Muslim Brotherhood).

It provides Qatar with security insurance against regional rivals (Saudi Arabia, UAE, Bahrain), especially after the 2017 Gulf blockade.

On top of all it helps the US project power without being fully dependent on bases in Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, or Turkey.

6. Energy Security

Qatar is the world’s leading LNG exporter. US presence protects not only Qatar’s infrastructure but also the global energy supply routes in the Gulf.

In short, the US base in Qatar is the backbone of American military power projection in the Middle East. It protects Gulf allies, counters Iran, secures energy flows, and anchors US influence in a volatile region.

The United States faces certain risks and vulnerabilities by relying so heavily on this base. Let us look at the risks and vulnerabilities:

1. Overdependence on a Single Hub

Al Udeid is the largest US forward operating base in the Middle East, so any disruption (attack, political fallout, or natural disaster) could cripple US operations in the region. To be precise, it acts as a “single point of failure” for command and control.

2. Exposure to Iran

Iran sees Al Udeid as a primary military threat on its doorstep. The base is well within range of Iranian ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and drones. In a war scenario, it would likely be one of the first targets.

3. Qatar’s Independent Foreign Policy

Unlike Saudi Arabia or UAE, Qatar often balances relations with both the U.S. and rivals like Iran, Turkey, and Islamist movements. Hosting Hamas leaders and maintaining ties with Tehran means Qatar could, in theory, restrict US operations if its own diplomacy is at risk. The 2017 Gulf blockade showed how fragile intra-GCC politics are, leaving Washington in an awkward position between allies.

4. Local Political Sensitivities

Presence of US troops in Muslim-majority countries can be a political flashpoint, supporting the narratives of foreign occupation. While Qatar welcomes the base for protection, its presence could become domestically unpopular in times of crisis.

5. Energy Infrastructure as Collateral

Qatar’s LNG facilities and shipping routes are near the base. Any attack on US forces risks spilling into global energy markets, creating vulnerabilities for both Qatar and the rest of world.

6. Shifting US Strategy

The US is trying to pivot to Asia and reduce military exposure in the Middle East. Heavy reliance on Al Udeid ties Washington to regional conflicts it may want to step back from. Over time, this dependency could look like a strategic liability rather than an asset.

Other US bases in the Middle East

While Al Udeid is a strategic jewel, it’s also a big, exposed target that ties US interests tightly to Gulf politics and risks. Let us compare it with other US military footholds in the Middle East (Bahrain, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Djibouti) — to show how it fits into the bigger US military puzzle?

1. Qatar – Al Udeid Air Base

Regional command-and-control hub that houses 10,000 to 13,000 troops. It houses Combined Air Operations Center (CAOC). Long runways for heavy bombers, refueling aircraft, and transports. Central location for quick reach to Gulf, Levant, Afghanistan. Its biggest Weaknesses are: 1) within easy range of Iranian missiles and 2) Qatar’s independent diplomacy (ties with Iran, Turkey and Hamas) can complicate US use in a crisis.

2. Bahrain – Naval Support Activity (NSA) Bahrain, Manama

It is home of the US Fifth Fleet with 7,000 troops. Its strengths include: 1) provides control to US naval operations in the Persian Gulf, Red Sea, Arabian Sea., it plays vital role in keeping the Strait of Hormuz and Gulf shipping lanes open.

Its weaknesses include: Bahrain is politically unstable; Shi’a majority often protests US presence, and 2) it is vulnerable to Iran-backed militias and unrest.

3. Kuwait – Camp Arifjan, Ali Al Salem Air Base

It is the army logistics hub that houses more than 13,000 troops and can be termed the largest US ground presence in Gulf).

Its strengths are: 1) key supply and logistics backbone for all Gulf operations and 2) it hosts pre-positioned equipment for rapid deployment. Its weaknesses are: 1) less glamorous than Qatar/ Bahrain but essential — if disrupted, US supply lines suffer.

4. Saudi Arabia – Prince Sultan Air Base (PSAB)

It is basically a backup air operations center where around 2,500 troops are kept.

Its strengths: 1) gives US redundancy in case Qatar base is hit or denied and 2) hosts missile defense systems, fighter jets, and ISR (intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance).

Its major weaknesses include: 1) US presence has been historically controversial in Saudi Arabia (linked to Bin Laden’s anti-US narrative) and Saudis prefer limited, rotational deployments, not permanent bases.

5. Djibouti – Camp Lemonnier (Horn of Africa)

It is primarily Africa and Red Sea operations hub with 4,000 troops.

Its strengths are: 1) key to anti-terror missions in Somalia and Yemen, and 2) strategic position on the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, choke point for global shipping.

It biggest weakness is proximity to China’s naval base (first overseas Chinese base).

6. Iraq & Syria – Smaller Outposts

This is primarily to counter-ISIS missions, with 2,500 troops in Iraq and 900 Syria. It is considered highly vulnerable to political backlash and militia attacks; not long-term sustainable.

In short, Qatar’s Al Udeid is the nerve center, but the US builds redundancy through Bahrain (navy), Kuwait (logistics), and Saudi (backup). If Al Udeid went offline, US operations could still continue — but far less smoothly.

The New World Disorder

French historian Fernand Braudel identified three cycles of history. The shortest is the day-to-day flow of events; Braudel called them “fireflies” on the stage. Next up are paradigm shifts — like the end of the Cold War — that can play out over decades or longer. Finally, there’s the longue durée: the bedrock of climate and geography that shapes everything else and changes only over centuries or millennia.

Six months into US President Donald Trump’s second term, it’s clear that the course of events has changed. What’s the collective noun for a group of fireflies? Probably not “paradigm shift,” but in this case that’s what it adds up to. 

The US pivot from free trade and global security to a sharper focus on the national interest has the makings of a decades-defining transformation, reversing the global integration supercharged by the end of the Cold War.

In the decades after World War II, the US was the champion of free trade, the anchor for global security and the gold standard on governance. Now, it has raised tariffs to the highest level since the 1930s, told allies they need to pay for protection and crossed red lines on independence for the Fed and statistical agencies.

That’s a major break, and an important moment for the global economy, shifting patterns of growth and inflation, borrowing and debt.

The geopolitical landscape has shifted just as decisively. Jolting though it is, Trump’s focus on America First is a reflection of a new reality where the US is no longer the world’s sole superpower. Regardless of who occupies the White House next, the US allies and adversaries will continue to reorient around that new state of affairs.

How about Braudel’s longue durée — the slowest moving cycle of history on which everything else rests? Could even that be at an inflection point? Maybe.

Trump has pulled the US out of the Paris climate agreement, again. The global fight against climate change will continue, but without the world’s second-largest emitter, it gets harder. The arrival of artificial general intelligence could also prove an epochal shift.

“History,” Braudel wrote, “may be divided into three movements: what moves rapidly, what moves slowly and what appears not to move at all.” Right now, events are moving almost too fast to track and the slow-moving Pax Americana is heading rapidly toward the dustbin of history. If global temperatures rise much further or machines start thinking for themselves, there will be movement even in the cycle that appears not to move at all.

Significance of Pezeshkian’s visit to China

Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian wrapped up a four-day visit to China on Wednesday, heading back to Tehran after attending a military parade in Beijing that marked 80 years since the end of World War II.

Pezeshkian's first stop in China was the northern port city of Tianjin, where he attended the 25th Meeting of the SCO Council of Heads of State, the largest gathering of the bloc to date. The Iranian president delivered a speech there, addressing the "unfair" global order led by the West and highlighting the need to create a new one through collaboration among the Global South.

A much-anticipated meeting between the presidents of Iran and China took place the next day. Pezeshkian told Xi Jinping that Iran was ready to work with China "under any circumstances" to elevate relations to their highest level, stressing that Beijing could count on Tehran as a "strong and determined friend and ally." Xi reciprocated, stating he sees Tehran as a "strategic partner" with a "forward-looking approach." Both sides agreed that more needed to be done to implement the 25-year cooperation plan signed in 2020.

Analysts in Iran hope that the president’s visit, during which he was accompanied by his foreign minister, economy minister, and defense minister, would lead to new military and financial deals.

This appears to be the case, as upon arriving in Tehran, Pezeshkian stated that "important," "strategic," and "vital" decisions had been made following his discussions with Xi.

"Additionally, discussions on security and defense equipment were held with the support of the defense minister, who was present during this trip, and necessary follow-ups will be carried out in this regard," Pezeshkian declared. It is believed that Iran is looking to buy air defense systems and fighter jets from China, although there is no official confirmation on what it seeks to purchase.

While Iranians have mostly focused on what the trip could bring about for Iran, the rest of the world has mainly been discussing how the SCO summit and the close interaction between India's Modi and Xi demonstrate that the split President Trump opened up between Washington and New Delhi is much larger than expected.

Trump’s former security advisor told American media that Trump has “shredded decades of effort” to pull India away from the Russian and Chinese orbit with his tariff policies. 

Furthermore, Modi's presence at the recent SCO meeting, along with other developments, is viewed as a sign that the new global order Pezeshkian has called for is approaching, or may already be in place.

"The new international order everyone has been talking about for years has almost arrived," said economic and trade analyst Majid Shakeri.

The expert said several factors point to this consolidation include: 1) the exclusion of Arab states from the Wednesday parade after their embrace of Trump during his West Asia tour earlier this year, 2) the Siberian Power Pipeline agreement signed between Russia and China this week, 3) and Beijing's announcement of its intention to establish an artificial intelligence cooperation center with the rest of the SCO.

"A crucial piece of the puzzle that is still incomplete and unclear is India's balancing act between China and America," Shakeri explained.

Pezeshkian's visit to China also included significant interactions with other world leaders. While there appeared to be no interaction with the Indian Prime Minister, Pezeshkian spent four hours in discussion with Russia's Vladimir Putin and a shorter amount of time speaking with Pakistan's Shehbaz Sharif, whose country's relationship with Iran is growing closer by the day.

Recep Tayyip Erdogan of Turkey was filmed holding onto Pezeshkian's hand while walking alongside him in a hall. The Iranian president expressed anticipation for Erdogan's visit to Tehran.

Despite recent tensions between Iran and Turkey regarding South Caucasus transportation plans and the situation in Syria, both nations appear in favor of maintaining their friendly relations.

Tajikistan’s Emomali Rahmon was also affectionate with Pezeshkian. The two countries share a significant part of their history and culture and view each other fondly.

 

The Fading Edge of Western Sanctions

Western sanctions were once the sharpest weapon in Washington and Brussels’ arsenal — a way to cripple adversaries without firing a shot. But today, their overuse and poor calibration are blunting their impact, most visibly in the case of Russia’s energy industry.

Take the recent arrival of the Arctic Mulan in southern China. On August 28, the sanctioned tanker unloaded liquefied natural gas from Russia’s Arctic LNG-2 plant — a facility buried under Western restrictions. That shipment, China’s first from the Siberian project, came just days before Vladimir Putin’s state visit to Beijing. The symbolism is unmistakable: Beijing is choosing energy security and strategic ties with Moscow over Washington’s disapproval.

Washington’s own missteps reinforce the sense that sanctions are losing their sting. In late August, President Donald Trump slapped a 25% “secondary tariff” on Indian imports of Russian crude, doubling existing duties. The gamble backfired. India not only kept buying Russian oil but also found common cause with China — a troubling development for US strategists who once counted on Delhi as a counterweight to Beijing.

The core problem is not intent but longevity. Sanctions work best when they are broad, swift, and temporary — delivering a shock that compels change before targets can adapt. But when restrictions drag on, industries build workarounds.

Russia has done so with astonishing speed, channeling crude through China and India, which now absorb 80% of its exports, and relying on “dark fleets” of tankers to bypass Western oversight. Iran and Venezuela, veterans of economic siege, have perfected similar tactics.

Meanwhile, the sheer scale of sanctions is undermining their effectiveness. Since 2017, the number of international sanctions has surged by 450%, according to LSEG Risk Intelligence. After Moscow’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, EU sanctions on Russia jumped from zero in 2013 to more than 2,500 by 2025. Washington blacklisted over 3,100 new entities last year alone, most of them Russian. The result, enforcement has become a bureaucratic quagmire, draining multinational firms with compliance costs while Russia and its partners adapt.

In short, the West is flooding the world with sanctions — but the more it leans on this tool, the less powerful it becomes. Economic warfare cannot be waged indefinitely without diminishing returns. If sanctions are to remain credible, they must be recalibrated: fewer, smarter, and more time-bound, backed by genuine multilateral coordination.

Otherwise, the very weapon once seen as a substitute for war may become just another dull instrument in an increasingly multipolar world.

China shows power at military parade

Chinese President Xi Jinping warned the world was facing a choice between peace or war at a massive military parade in Beijing on Wednesday, flanked by Russia's Vladimir Putin and North Korea's Kim Jong Un in an unprecedented show of force.

The event to mark 80 years since Japan's defeat at the end of World War Two was largely shunned by Western leaders, with Putin and Kim - pariahs in the West due to the Ukraine war and Kim's nuclear ambitions - the guests of honour.

Designed to project China's military might and diplomatic clout, it also comes as US President Donald Trump's tariffs and volatile policymaking strain its relations with allies and rivals alike.

"Today, mankind is faced with the choice of peace or war, dialogue or confrontation, win-win or zero-sum," Xi told a crowd of more than 50,000 spectators at Tiananmen Square, adding that the Chinese people "firmly stand on the right side of history".

Riding in an open-top limousine, Xi then inspected the troops and cutting-edge military equipment such as hypersonic missiles, underwater drones and a weaponized 'robot wolf'.

Helicopters trailing large banners and fighter jets flew in formation during a 70-minute showcase that culminated in the release of 80,000 'peace' birds.

Donning a tunic suit in the style worn by former leader Mao Zedong, Xi earlier greeted more than 25 leaders on the red carpet, including Indonesia's Prabowo Subianto who made a surprise appearance despite widespread protests at home.

Seated between Putin and Kim in the viewing gallery, Xi repeatedly engaged in conversations with both leaders as thousands of troops and materiel paraded before them. It marked the first time the trio have appeared together in public.

Putin later thanked his North Korean counterpart for his soldiers' courageous fighting in the war in Ukraine during a bilateral meeting at China's State Guesthouse. Kim said he was willing to do everything he can to help Russia.

"Please give my warmest regards to Vladimir Putin, and Kim Jong Un, as you conspire against the United States of America," Trump said in a post directed at Xi on Truth Social, as the event kicked off. He also highlighted the US role in helping China secure its freedom from Japan during World War Two.

Trump had earlier told reporters he did not see the parade as a challenge to the United States. Japan's top government spokesperson declined to comment on the parade, adding Asia's top two economies were building "constructive relations".

Democratically governed Taiwan, which China considers its own, has urged its people not to attend the parade, warning that attendance could reinforce Beijing's territorial claims. Taiwan does not commemorate peace with a barrel of a gun, its President Lai Ching-te said on Wednesday in pointed criticism of the event.

Xi has cast World War Two as a major turning point in the "great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation", in which it overcame the humiliation of Japan's invasion to become a global powerhouse.

Earlier this week, Xi unveiled his vision of a new world order at a regional security summit, calling for unity against "hegemonism and power politics", a thinly veiled swipe at his rival across the Pacific Ocean.

"Xi feels confident that the table has turned. It's China that is back in the driver's seat now," said Wen-Ti Sung, fellow at the Atlantic Council's Global China Hub, based in Taiwan.

"It's been Trumpian unilateralism rather than China’s wolf warrior diplomacy when people talk about the leading source of uncertainty in the international system."

At a lavish reception after the parade at the Great Hall of the People, Xi told his guests that humanity must not return to the "law of the jungle".

Beyond the pomp and propaganda, analysts are watching whether Xi, Putin and Kim may signal closer defence relations following a pact signed by Russia and North Korea in June 2024, and a similar alliance between Beijing and Pyongyang, an outcome that may alter the military calculus in the Asia-Pacific region.

Putin has already sealed deeper energy deals with Beijing during his China visit, while the gathering has given the reclusive Kim an opportunity to gain implicit support for his banned nuclear weapons.

It has been 66 years since a North Korean leader last attended a Chinese military parade.

Kim travelled to Beijing with his daughter Ju Ae, whom South Korean intelligence consider his most likely successor, although she was not seen alongside him at the parade.