Trump Pushing China Towards Confrontation

Just before departing for China, US President Donald Trump imposed another round of sanctions targeting the movement of Iranian oil to China. Officially, Washington presents the move as part of its pressure campaign against Iran. In reality, the sanctions expose a far bigger strategic objective - tightening America’s economic grip around China.

This is not an isolated policy decision. Since returning to power, Trump has aggressively revived tariff wars, expanded restrictions on Chinese technology, intensified pressure on supply chains, and openly challenged Beijing’s growing influence across Asia and the Middle East. The latest sanctions simply add energy security to Washington’s expanding list of pressure tactics.

China’s economic machine depends heavily on uninterrupted energy imports. Iranian crude, often available at discounted prices, has remained an important component of China’s energy strategy despite Western sanctions. By attempting to choke these supplies, Washington is effectively signaling that no sector of the Chinese economy will remain outside the reach of American coercive power.

The message becomes even more provocative when discussions surrounding the Strait of Hormuz are taken into account. Any blockade or disruption in this critical maritime corridor would severely impact Chinese industry, exports, and economic stability. Whether openly stated or not, the strategic implication is unmistakable - the United States is demonstrating its capacity to threaten the economic lifelines of its principal global rival.

Washington may be dangerously misreading Beijing’s patience. Today, China is not a weak, inward-looking economy of the 1990s. It is a global economic giant, a technological competitor, and an emerging military power increasingly unwilling to bow before American pressure. Every new tariff, sanction, or strategic threat deepens Chinese mistrust and accelerates Beijing’s efforts to reduce dependence on Western-controlled financial and trade systems.

From a geopolitical perspective, Trump appears convinced that sustained pressure will force China into strategic compromise. Yet history often produces the opposite result. Major powers rarely surrender under humiliation; they retaliate when they conclude that confrontation has become unavoidable.

The danger is that Washington’s relentless pressure campaign may gradually transform economic rivalry into open geopolitical hostility. If that happens, the consequences will extend far beyond China and America, shaking global trade, energy markets, and already fragile international stability.

Significance of Upcoming Trump-Xi Summit

Since former US President Richard Nixon landed in Beijing in 1972 and redefined US-China relations, no countries have done as well as these two. Since then the US has generated more than US$23 trillion in additional GDP, while China lifted 800 million people out of extreme poverty, accounting for three-quarters of all global poverty reduction in the period. 

In 1990, China accounted for just 1.6% of global GDP; today it accounts for nearly 18%, meaning the two together now represent 44% of the world economy, up from 28% when globalization began in earnest.

A dollar invested in the S&P 500 the year Nixon landed in Beijing is worth over US$270 today. China, which had negligible industrial capacity in 1972, now produces more manufactured goods than the next nine countries combined.

This is not to say that the fruits of globalization were enjoyed equally within either economy. The CCP’s cultural genocide of the Uighurs and the slow-motion death of the US industrial heartland are the receipts: ruthless consolidation in China, hollowed-out communities, and rising inequality in America. But this was the deal both sides made.

The US told itself fairy tales about economic liberalization leading to a more democratic China; in fact, both populations simply got significantly richer than the rest of the world. And to quote the bard, therein lies the rub—in a US-China trade war, neither can win against the other. 

Victory in a US-China trade war is a competition about who can lose the least. The true winners are the countries that can stay out of the trade war, a difficult feat in a global economy so dominated by Washington and Beijing.

It’s easy to assign President Trump’s first term as the starting gun of the US-China trade conflict, since he ran on being tough on China back in 2015. But the fight began in 2009 when the Obama administration slapped a 35% tariff on tires from China.

Geopolitical forces were already well at work before Trump and Xi came to power. Trump speed things up, but his pressure was always in service of “the art of the deal.”

Then the pandemic hit. One doesn’t need to be a conspiracy theorist to see that Beijing’s stubbornness made it much harder for the world to control the virus.

The pandemic threw US-China relations off course and likely helped Biden win in 2020—and Biden had no interest in making a deal with China.

Instead, he doubled down on Trump 1.0’s tough talk. Trump 2.0 prefers to pick up where he left off. His administration has threatened, cajoled, and tariffed China to no end, but it was clear even on the campaign trail that President Trump does not ultimately want to fight with China; he wants to deal with China.

In the then-candidate’s own words in August 2024, “If they want to build a plant in Michigan, in Ohio, in South Carolina, they can—using American workers, they can.”

This is one of President Trump’s most maverick policy choices. The US national security establishment and the rest of the “swamp” are China hawks.

They see China as the next great peer competition to US power in the world… and the most serious threat the US has ever faced. In terms of sheer size, power, and wealth, they are correct.

Moreover, the hawks aim to use Trump’s threats, which Trump needs as leverage in his negotiations, to realize their own goals in blocking the rise of Chinese power.

China would also rather avoid a fight—the US is its single largest export market, and exports make up roughly 20% of China’s GDP. When Trump 2.0 tariffs hit in 2025, bilateral trade fell 29%, yet the US remained China’s top export destination.

China produces 28% of global manufactured goods but can’t absorb them domestically, making the US the key buyer keeping its factories running. Still, China is ready to fight if needed, knowing a nationalist dictatorship can weather economic pain better than a liberal democracy.

It is evident that while the US and China have been negotiating, China rolled out new trade rules that lay the legal groundwork for punishing foreign companies that seek to shift their sourcing away from China.

Over the weekend, China told five domestic refiners linked to Iranian oil trade to ignore explicit US sanctions based on a 2021 Chinese law.

 

Chinese Deployment in South China Sea

According to media reports, China has deployed vessels and installed floating barriers at the entrance to the South China Sea, where it is engaged in a maritime territorial dispute with the Philippines. This move comes as the United States, which is at war with Iran, has positioned three aircraft carriers in the Middle East and withdrawn military assets and personnel from the Indo-Pacific region. In the past, when US carriers left the area, Beijing often tested the level of external pressure against it through various channels.

According to reports vessels presumed to be Chinese Navy or Coast Guard patrol ships, fishing boats, and floating barriers crossing the reef were detected near the Scarborough Shoal lately. The Scarborough Shoal is one of the most fiercely contested maritime territories in the Indo-Pacific, where Chinese Coast Guard ships frequently ram and spray water cannons at Philippine maritime patrol vessels.

In 2023, China had installed floating barriers in the waters around the Scarborough Shoal to block Philippine fishing boats, leading to a conflict when Philippine Coast Guard divers were dispatched to remove them.

China claims sovereignty over most of the South China Sea under its self-defined "nine-dash line," but the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) ruled in 2016 that this claim has no basis under international law. Despite this, Beijing has continued to dispatch patrol ships to the Philippines’ exclusive economic zone (EEZ), prolonging the dispute.

The US has pressured China since 2015 by conducting "Freedom of Navigation" operations in the South China Sea. Allies and partner nations advocating for a "Free and Open Indo-Pacific" (FOIP) have also participated in these exercises. However, a significant portion of US naval forces is currently deployed near Iran and the Strait of Hormuz.

The Washington Post has reported last month that the USS George H.W. Bush, which departed from the Norfolk base in Virginia, is expected to arrive in the Middle East around the April 21, 2026. This marks the third aircraft carrier to be deployed to the region, following the USS Abraham Lincoln, previously stationed in the South China Sea, and the USS Gerald R. Ford, which was deployed in the Caribbean Sea.

Additionally, part of the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system, a key component in South Korea’s defense against North Korean nuclear and missile threats, has been withdrawn, and the 31st Marine Expeditionary Unit, typically the first to respond to contingencies on the Korean Peninsula, has been redeployed from Japan to the Middle East.

 

China slams US blockade of Iranian ports

China has slammed the US blockade of Iranian ports as dangerous and irresponsible, calling for an immediate and full ceasefire and for the Strait of Hormuz to be reopened.

Foreign ministry spokesman Guo Jiakun told reporters at a daily briefing in Beijing on Tuesday that the US action would only “inflame tensions, escalate the situation and undermine an already fragile ceasefire”, and that would further jeopardize the safety of navigation in the strait.

“We urge all parties to abide by the ceasefire arrangement, focus on the broader direction of dialogue and negotiations, take concrete actions to de-escalate the regional situation and restore normal navigation in the strait at an early date,” Guo said.

He added that the situation in the region was “at a critical stage” and said China would continue to work with the international community to promote peace talks and to strive for peace and stability in the Middle East.

The US began a naval blockade of Iranian ports on Monday after its marathon peace talks with Iran in Pakistan to reopen the Strait of Hormuz failed over the weekend.

The US Central Command on Monday issued a formal notice to seafarers outlining enforcement measures in waters around the strait, saying that not all maritime traffic would be halted. The blockade “will not impede neutral transit passage through the Strait of Hormuz to or from non-Iranian destinations”, it said.

Iran has warned of retaliation, vowing that “no port in the Persian Gulf and the Gulf of Oman will be safe”.

 

Iran sinks US Ship carrying 30,000 Interceptors

Please watch and save this video, because shortly it may be removed. This narrates a story of Iran sinking a US Supply Ship USNS Robert E. Peary in Red Sea, where 30,000 interceptors were lost in 20 minutes. To hear details click https://youtu.be/WqAPNl-36NU?si=f-2ngZJCnc96BVCt

Riyadh Returns to Iran Threat Narrative

In the aftermath of Iran’s 1979 Islamic Revolution, the United States recalibrated its regional strategy, increasingly presenting Tehran as the principal source of instability in the Middle East. Over time, this framing found resonance in several Arab capitals, particularly in Saudi Arabia, shaping a security outlook that continues to influence regional policy choices.

This perception was reinforced through tangible measures. The expansion of US military infrastructure across the Gulf—most prominently in Qatar—was justified largely on the premise of countering Iranian influence. Simultaneously, Washington sustained economic pressure on Tehran over its nuclear program, despite Iran’s status as a signatory to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, in contrast to Israel’s longstanding ambiguity.

Historical episodes added further complexity. The Iran-Iraq war entrenched regional rivalries, while later diplomatic efforts—including the nuclear agreement under President Barack Obama and the China-brokered rapprochement between Riyadh and Tehran—offered brief openings for recalibration. Yet such initiatives have struggled to overcome deeply embedded mistrust, particularly amid shifting US policies and competing geopolitical interests.

Recent remarks by Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Faisal bin Farhan reflect a return to a more cautious, if not hardened, posture. His assertion that trust in Iran has been “completely shattered,” alongside allegations of destabilizing activities across the region, underscores Riyadh’s growing concerns about security and sovereignty. These claims are rooted in reported attacks on energy infrastructure and maritime navigation, which Saudi Arabia and its partners attribute to Iran.

Tehran, however, has consistently rejected such accusations, framing its actions as defensive and, at times, suggesting that regional escalations are shaped by broader geopolitical contestation. Independent verification of specific incidents remains contested, contributing to a narrative environment marked as much by perception as by provable fact.

What emerges is not merely a dispute over actions, but over interpretation. Saudi Arabia’s current stance appears closely aligned with a long-standing US strategic framing that positions Iran as the central regional threat. While this perspective reflects genuine security concerns, it also risks narrowing the analytical lens through which complex regional dynamics are understood.

The persistence of this narrative suggests that, despite episodic diplomacy and shifting alliances, foundational perceptions remain largely intact. In effect, Riyadh’s position today echoes a familiar refrain—one shaped over decades—where Iran continues to be viewed as the primary challenge to regional stability.

War with Iran and the Question of America’s Global Power

As the United States–Israel war against Iran enters its third week, the expanding scope of the conflict is forcing the world to reassess the role of the United States in shaping the international order. What began as a military confrontation is increasingly being interpreted as part of a broader geopolitical strategy — one that echoes patterns seen in earlier American interventions.

The latest signal came when the administration of Donald Trump announced a US$10 million bounty for information on Mojtaba Khamenei, Iran’s newly elevated supreme leader. The reward, issued through Washington’s “Rewards for Justice” program, targets individuals whom the United States accuses of involvement in militant activities.

Such a move is unusual in modern diplomacy. Publicly placing a bounty on a serving leader of a sovereign state sends a strong political message and inevitably raises questions about Washington’s long-term objectives in the conflict. Critics argue that the step suggests the war may extend beyond military confrontation and could ultimately aim at weakening or reshaping Iran’s leadership.

The controversy unfolds against the backdrop of intense global criticism of Israel’s conduct in Gaza. The war there has produced devastating humanitarian consequences, with tens of thousands reported dead, many of them civilians. For much of the world, the expansion of conflict toward Iran reinforces the perception that the United States and Israel are pursuing a broader strategic agenda across the Middle East.

Historically, American interventions have frequently been framed in the language of security, democracy, or counter-terrorism. Yet several precedents are often cited by critics as examples where these interventions eventually evolved into attempts to alter political leadership. The invasion of Iraq in 2003, the NATO intervention in Libya in 2011, and sustained political pressure on governments in Venezuela are commonly referenced in this debate.

These precedents also revive a deeper question about the effectiveness of global governance institutions. The United Nations was established after the Second World War to prevent unilateral wars and protect the sovereignty of states. However, the structure of the Security Council — where the United States holds veto power — often limits the organization’s ability to act decisively when Washington itself is directly involved in a conflict.

This structural imbalance has created a persistent credibility dilemma. While the United Nations remains the central forum for international diplomacy, critics increasingly argue that its capacity to restrain the strategic ambitions of major powers remains limited.

As the war with Iran unfolds, the debate is no longer confined to the future of the Middle East alone. It now touches the credibility of the international system itself — and whether the global order is governed by collective rules or ultimately shaped by the interests of its most powerful states.

Election or Selection? Bangladesh at the Crossroads

The latest election in Bangladesh has delivered a result that few found surprising. The continuity of leadership has reinforced a long-standing perception: politics in the country remains shaped by dynastic gravity rather than competitive churn. This predictability has revived an uncomfortable question — was it an election defined by open contest, or a selection shaped by structural advantage?

Since independence, power has largely oscillated between two dominant political forces. Such concentration can project stability, yet it also risks creating democratic fatigue. When outcomes appear preordained and opposition participation limited, public trust in the electoral process inevitably comes under strain. Legitimacy in modern democracies is measured not only by victory margins but by the credibility of the contest itself.

However, Bangladesh’s political story cannot be separated from its geopolitical significance. The country sits at a strategic junction in South Asia, attracting the sustained attention of major powers.

For the United States, Bangladesh represents both an economic partner and a node in the Indo-Pacific calculus. Democratic standards, labour rights, and regional security form key pillars of engagement.

India views Bangladesh through the lens of neighbourhood stability, connectivity, and security cooperation. Political continuity in Dhaka often translates into policy predictability for New Delhi, particularly on trade routes and border management.

China’s expanding footprint reflects its broader Belt and Road ambitions. Infrastructure financing and investment ties have deepened, making Bangladesh an increasingly important partner in Beijing’s regional architecture.

Russia, while less visible, maintains interests in energy cooperation and strategic diversification, seeking relevance in a region marked by intensifying power competition.

This convergence of external interests complicates internal democratic debates. Stability is prized by international partners, yet excessive political closure can breed long-term fragility. A system perceived as exclusionary may preserve short-term order while quietly eroding institutional confidence.

The true test for Bangladesh is not merely electoral endurance but democratic resilience. Elections must be seen as credible mechanisms of choice rather than procedural formalities. Without broader participation and trust, even economic progress may struggle to anchor political legitimacy.

In the end, the question lingers: if elections secure continuity but weaken confidence, what exactly has been strengthened — governance, or doubt?

China-India rapprochement not a good omen for United States

President Xi Jinping’s description of China and India as “good neighbours, friends and partners” may sound ceremonial, but the timing and context carry far greater geopolitical weight. His Republic Day message to Indian President Droupadi Murmu signals more than diplomatic courtesy. It reflects a calculated recalibration in Asia—one that should deeply concern Washington.

After years of tension following the deadly 2020 Himalayan clash, Beijing and New Delhi are quietly rebuilding bridges. The resumption of direct flights in 2025, expanding trade ties, and a series of high-level visits suggest both sides are determined to move beyond confrontation. Xi’s evocative metaphor of the “dragon and the elephant dancing together” underscores a strategic reality: Asia’s two largest powers are rediscovering the value of coexistence.

For the United States, this rapprochement is not a welcome development.

Washington has invested heavily in positioning India as a counterweight to China through frameworks such as the Quad and broader Indo-Pacific strategy. A warming China–India relationship weakens this pillar. If New Delhi chooses pragmatism over alignment, America’s carefully constructed containment architecture in Asia begins to fray.

More importantly, the implications extend far beyond South Asia.

A coordinated or even cooperative China–India posture diminishes US leverage across the wider Global South. Both countries are major energy consumers, influential voices in BRICS, and key stakeholders in Middle Eastern stability. As their economic and diplomatic coordination deepens, Washington risks losing its ability to shape outcomes from Tehran to Riyadh.

Weakening US hegemony in South Asia will also loosen America’s grip on the Middle East.

This is not theoretical. China already brokers regional diplomacy, from Saudi–Iran reconciliation to infrastructure investments under the Belt and Road Initiative. India maintains historic ties with Gulf states while steadily expanding its economic footprint. Together, they offer regional actors alternatives to Western security and financial systems—precisely at a time when US foreign policy under President Donald Trump appears increasingly transactional and unpredictable.

To be sure, structural mistrust remains between Beijing and New Delhi. Their 3,800-kilometre disputed border is still heavily militarized, and strategic competition has not vanished. Yet both sides now seem willing to manage disputes rather than weaponize them.

That pragmatism carries consequences.

A stable China–India equation accelerates the shift toward a multipolar order, reducing Washington’s ability to divide and influence Asian powers. For the United States, the message is clear: when the dragon and the elephant learn to dance, America no longer leads the orchestra.

The emerging alignment may be fragile—but even a cautious rapprochement marks another step away from US-centric global dominance.

China’s muted response to US threats to attack Iran

China’s restrained reaction to fresh US threats against Iran is not a sign of indifference, weakness, or quiet acquiescence. Rather, it reflects a deliberate strategic calculation shaped by energy security, diplomatic doctrine, and Beijing’s evolving view of its role in the Middle East.

Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi’s recent phone call with his Iranian counterpart captured this posture succinctly. By opposing the “use or threat of force” and reaffirming dialogue over coercion, Beijing restated principles it has upheld for decades. What stood out was what China chose not to do: no sharp condemnation of Washington, no announcement of countermeasures, and no promise of tangible intervention.

This muted response is consistent with China’s long-standing policy of non-interference. Beijing has historically avoided entanglement in the internal politics of partner states, whether governed by hardliners or reformists. For China, regime type is secondary to sovereignty, stability, and continuity of cooperation. Iran is no exception.

Economic realities reinforce this caution. China buys over 80 percent of Iran’s oil exports and remains the world’s largest crude importer. Yet Beijing is acutely aware that overt political or security involvement could invite harsher Western sanctions at a time when it is already under pressure from Washington. Restraint, therefore, is not passivity but risk management.

Crucially, China has spent decades diversifying its energy sources precisely to reduce overdependence on politically volatile suppliers. As long as Iranian instability does not escalate into a blockade of the Strait of Hormuz or a collapse of Iran’s oil infrastructure, Beijing can absorb the shock. Iran’s reliance on shadow fleets and grey-zone trade has so far kept energy flows intact.

Beijing also appears relaxed about Iran’s internal political trajectory. A more pragmatic or even West-leaning leadership in Tehran would not necessarily undermine Chinese interests. Iran’s economic needs and China’s market size ensure a continued relationship, even if discounted oil disappears.

At a broader level, China is recalibrating its Middle East strategy. While its economic footprint is expanding amid a relative decline in US influence, Beijing remains unwilling to assume security responsibilities or confront Washington head-on. Verbal opposition, strategic ambiguity, and economic engagement remain its preferred tools.

In short, China is playing the long game. Its silence is not absence, but a calculated choice to protect interests without escalation — a reminder that in geopolitics, restraint can be as strategic as confrontation.

From Superpowers to a Super Syndicate

This writeup discusses a proposition that may appear unconventional but is rooted in long-term observation. After more than a decade of writing on geopolitics in South Asia and the Middle East and North Africa, it has become increasingly evident that the traditional concept of regional and global superpowers no longer adequately explains contemporary international politics. Power today is exercised less through overt state rivalry and more through a coordinated, transnational arrangement that may best be described as a Super Syndicate.

This emerging order is not ideological in nature. It is driven by strategic convergence among states possessing advanced intelligence capabilities and sustained by powerful economic interests. The principal beneficiaries include the global military-industrial complex, energy exploration and production companies, major financial institutions, and international shipping networks. These actors provide the financial backbone, while intelligence agencies of aligned states facilitate operational coordination, risk management, and narrative control.

Unlike the bipolar or unipolar systems of the past, the Super Syndicate does not thrive on direct confrontation among its members. Instead, it functions through a tacit division of strategic space. Countries and regions are assigned defined spheres of influence, minimizing direct competition while maximizing collective gain. Conflicts, when they occur, are managed rather than resolved, ensuring continuity rather than closure.

The Russia-Ukraine conflict illustrates this dynamic. While Ukraine has suffered extensive human and infrastructural losses and Europe has faced economic and security disruptions, the broader global system remains intact. Arms manufacturers have recorded unprecedented growth, energy markets have been restructured, and financial systems have adjusted without systemic shock. The conflict persists not because resolution is unattainable, but because prolonged instability serves entrenched interests.

The situation in Gaza further exposes the asymmetries of this order. Israel’s military campaign has continued despite widespread international criticism and humanitarian concern. Yet institutional accountability has remained elusive. This is not merely a failure of diplomacy; it reflects a structural imbalance in which certain actors operate with effective immunity due to their strategic positioning within the broader system.

Iran’s experience offers additional insight. Despite its aspirations for regional influence, Tehran has remained constrained by prolonged economic sanctions. The recent escalation involving Israel revealed a notable regional alignment. Several Middle Eastern states, while publicly maintaining neutrality, actively supported Israel through intelligence cooperation and defensive measures. The episode underscored the limitations faced by states attempting to operate outside the prevailing strategic framework.

For Pakistan and other developing states, these trends carry important implications. Sovereignty in the contemporary international system is increasingly conditional, shaped by economic leverage, intelligence alignment, and narrative positioning rather than formal equality among states. Moral appeals and legal arguments, while important, rarely translate into decisive outcomes without strategic backing.

The conclusion is not conspiratorial but analytical - global power is no longer exercised solely through identifiable superpowers. It is mediated through a coordinated network of state and non-state actors whose interests converge across military, financial, and strategic domains. Recognizing this reality is essential for policymakers, analysts, and scholars seeking to navigate an international order that is less visible, more complex, and increasingly resistant to traditional frameworks of analysis.

Bangladesh becoming “Panipat ka maidan”

Despite formidable odds, Bangladesh managed to script an enviable economic story over the past decade. Consistent GDP growth, export-led industrialization anchored by the ready-made garments sector, improving social indicators, and relative macroeconomic stability placed the country among Asia’s fastest emerging economies. Ironically, this very success appears to have turned Bangladesh into a theatre for competing global and regional ambitions.

Much like Panipat in South Asian history—where decisive battles were repeatedly fought by rival powers—Bangladesh is increasingly being reduced to a battleground for influence rather than a partner in prosperity. India, the United States, China and Russia have all attempted to secure strategic leverage in Dhaka. Each power has pursued its own interests, but none has prioritized long-term economic stability for the country itself.

The United States’ regime-change initiative ultimately succeeded. However, Washington’s engagement has remained narrowly political. Unlike past global interventions that at least carried economic reconstruction frameworks, there is no visible recovery plan, stabilization package or trade-driven agenda for Bangladesh. Regime change, without an accompanying economic roadmap, has only amplified uncertainty.

India continues to view Bangladesh largely through a strategic and security lens, while China’s engagement remains infrastructure-focused, tied to connectivity and supply chains. Russia’s role is limited and transactional. Yet none of these actors has articulated a comprehensive, people-centric recovery strategy for a nation now facing political paralysis.

The recent killing of a student leader has pushed the country into a state of standstill. Historically, student movements have been central to Bangladesh’s political evolution. Today, unrest is unfolding amid intense geopolitical rivalry risks prolonged instability. Investor confidence is weakening, export momentum is under pressure, and economic continuity is increasingly fragile.

The irony is unmistakable. Every power eager to influence Bangladesh shows little willingness to assume responsibility for economic recovery. Bangladesh does not need to become another Panipat—where outcomes are dictated by external forces and costs borne by the local population. Without a credible recovery plan rooted in stability and economic continuity, this power contest will exact a heavy price from the Bangladeshi people.

China backs expanding Iran-Saudi ties

Iran, China, and Saudi Arabia have wrapped up their third Trilateral Committee Meeting, with Beijing once again underscoring its commitment to strengthening relations between Tehran and Riyadh.

The meeting was held Tuesday at Iran’s Foreign Ministry in Tehran and was chaired by Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister Majid Takht-Ravanchi. Saudi Deputy Foreign Minister Walid al-Kharaji and China’s Deputy Foreign Minister Miao Deo also took part.

During the session, the three sides issued a joint statement outlining key commitments and recent progress.

They reaffirmed Iran and Saudi Arabia’s dedication to fully implementing the 2023 Beijing Agreement, the China-brokered deal that restored diplomatic ties between the two nations. Both countries stressed the importance of upholding sovereignty, territorial integrity, independence, and security in line with the UN Charter, the Charter of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), and international law.

The statement also praised China’s “continued positive role” in facilitating dialogue and overseeing the agreement’s implementation.

For its part, China reiterated its willingness to support and encourage further cooperation between Tehran and Riyadh in political, economic, cultural, and security areas.

The joint statement highlighted progress in consular coordination, noting that this cooperation helped ensure the safe travel of more than 85,000 Iranian Hajj pilgrims and over 210,000 Umrah pilgrims in 2025.

It also welcomed the expanding exchanges between Iranian and Saudi research centers, universities, media outlets, and cultural institutions.

Addressing regional issues, the three countries called for an immediate end to Israeli military operations in Palestine, Lebanon, and Syria, and condemned violations of Iranian sovereignty.

Iran’s representative expressed appreciation for the steadfast support shown by Saudi Arabia and China during Israel’s June aggression against Iran.

The parties further reaffirmed their backing of a comprehensive, UN-led political solution in Yemen.

Iran and Saudi Arabia restored diplomatic ties in March 2023 after a seven-year break, following a China-mediated agreement that led to the reopening of embassies.

Earlier rounds of the trilateral committee were held in Beijing and Riyadh, where all sides restated their commitment to respecting sovereignty and non-interference, and acknowledged China’s ongoing mediation in support of regional dialogue.

 

Winner and Loser of G20 Meeting in South Africa

Global summits rarely deliver thunderclaps, but they often reveal the silent shifts shaping the world. The G20 meeting in South Africa did exactly that. What appeared, on the surface, to be another routine gathering of world leaders actually exposed the changing geometry of global power—who is rising, who is tightening their grip, and who is quietly losing influence. Behind the polished protocol and diplomatic smiles, the summit told a far more compelling story.

The most surprising winner was South Africa itself. For decades, African hosts have been expected to simply provide the stage while major powers dominate the script. This time, Pretoria seized the pen. It pushed Africa’s priorities—climate financing, debt restructuring, fairer market access—onto the centre table with unusual assertiveness. South Africa didn’t just moderate the discussion; it shaped its direction. The message was unmistakable - Africa is no longer willing to play the audience in global decision-making.

China emerged as another strategic winner. While Western delegations appeared divided and preoccupied with their internal political headaches, Beijing arrived with clarity and purpose. Its emphasis on development partnerships and a more inclusive economic order resonated strongly with emerging economies hungry for alternatives. China did not need to dominate the summit; it simply positioned itself as the reliable, steady voice amid Western hesitation.

The United States found itself on the losing side. Its delegation carried the weight of domestic polarization, resulting in cautious, often diluted messaging. Washington struggled to offer bold commitments—on climate, investment, or economic cooperation. For a country accustomed to setting the global agenda, the lack of strategic energy was hard to ignore.

Europe performed slightly better but still fell short. Its rhetoric on rules-based order and environmental responsibility was admirable, yet it lacked the financial muscle to persuade. Fine principles without practical incentives seldom win followers.

In the end, the G20 meeting in South Africa did not merely debate global problems; it exposed a shifting world. Africa is stepping forward, China is consolidating influence, and traditional Western powers are wrestling with diminishing authority. The polite diplomacy could not hide that the global balance is changing—fast.

MI5 warns MPs they could be targeted by Chinese spies

According to the Independent, MI5 has warned MPs and peers that they face a significant espionage risk from the Chinese state. A new “espionage alert” has been circulated to members of the Commons and Lords, issued by the security services.

In a letter to MPs, Commons speaker Sir Lindsay Hoyle said Chinese state actors are “relentless" in their attempts to "interfere with our processes and influence activity at Parliament".

The Commons speaker claimed the Chinese Ministry of State Security (MSS) was "actively reaching out to individuals in our community", arguing they seek to "collect information and lay the groundwork for long-term relationships, using professional networking sites, recruitment agents and consultants acting on their behalf".

Security minister Dan Jarvis will address the House of Commons on Tuesday afternoon to outline measures the government is taking to combat Chinese espionage.

Pakistan efficient in seeking debt, pathetic in boosting exports

If Pakistan ever launches a “national skill inventory,” debt-seeking deserves pride of place—right next to cricket and political speeches. Few nations can match our talent for locating, negotiating, and securing loans at record speed. In fact, if there were global rankings for borrowing, Pakistan would be a top-tier performer. Our only handicap is that medals can’t be pledged as collateral.

Over the last few years, we have turned debt acquisition into a disciplined craft. China rolls over funds before we even finish the request. Saudi Arabia extends deposits faster than we can print press releases thanking them. And commercial banks? They happily oblige—charging interest rates so high they should come with a health warning. But we take the money anyway, proudly calling it “stabilization.”

Yet when it comes to boosting exports—the one activity that could actually reduce our dependency—we become painfully sluggish. The same state that can negotiate billions overnight cannot help exporters ship a container on time. Infrastructure collapses, policies flip, energy costs skyrocket, and bureaucratic hurdles stretch on longer than IMF conditionalities.

Our export basket still resembles a museum catalogue: textiles, some rice, a bit of leather, and heroic claims that IT exports will one day rescue us. Meanwhile, competitors raced ahead years ago. Bangladesh became a garment giant, Vietnam turned into a global manufacturing hub, and India climbed the tech value chain. Pakistan? We perfected the art of writing desperate letters requesting “emergency support.”

We do not lack vision—only execution. We produce policies like an assembly line but refuse to implement even the simplest reforms. Instead, we remain obsessed with “new inflows,” as if the nation is a smartphone constantly running on low battery and eternally plugged into someone else’s charger.

It is the grand irony of our economic life: we can sell our pleas faster than we can sell our products. Friendly countries trust us with their money more than global markets trust our goods.

Until Pakistan learns to earn instead of borrow, we will remain trapped in this cycle—experts at seeking debt, amateurs at creating value.

“Tariff Fassad” Initiated by Trump May Trigger Global Meltdown

The global economy today resembles a pressure cooker — silently building steam, waiting for the smallest policy misstep to explode. The “Tariff Fassad” initiated by US president, Donald Trump during is not an isolated episode but the beginning of a dangerous shift toward economic nationalism. Its aftershocks are now resurfacing as governments across continents flirt with protectionism, weaponized trade, and retaliatory tariffs. If not checked, this confrontation could unleash consequences far worse than “Subprime Loan Crisis of 2008”.

Unlike 2008 — which was rooted in irresponsible lending and Wall Street malpractice — this crisis is being fueled by deliberate political choices. Tariffs have distorted supply chains, raised input costs, and crippled export-oriented economies. From Chinese manufacturers to European automakers and Asian electronics exporters, uncertainty is eroding confidence. Global trade volumes are shrinking, and markets are reacting nervously.

The irony is striking, while tech giants continue to report record profits and soaring valuations, this growth stands on a very fragile foundation. Analysts are calling it a “Tech Bubble”, and not without reason. When one segment of the market inflates disproportionately banks, small businesses, and industrial shares come under pressure, it is not growth — it is imbalance. Traditional sectors are bleeding, consumer demand is weakening, and yet Big Tech is being priced as if the world economy is booming. This is speculation masquerading as optimism.

Banks, the backbone of any financial system, are showing worrying signs. Rising interest rates, tightening liquidity, and increasing defaults in trade-dependent industries have started to appear on their balance sheets. Loan growth has slowed, non-performing assets are rising, and confidence among lenders is eroding. Smaller financial institutions are especially at risk as their exposure to fragile sectors grows unchecked. This may not be a sudden collapse like Lehman Brothers — it could be a gradual suffocation, where trust quietly disappears from the system.

Emerging economies are caught in a chokehold. Currencies are under pressure, foreign exchange reserves are being depleted to manage imports, and inflation is creeping upward. For countries dependent on exports or imported raw materials, Trump-style tariff aggression has become an economic nightmare. Meanwhile, global institutions like the WTO and IMF remain spectators — issuing statements rather than solutions.

Markets do not collapse only due to bad economics; they collapse when confidence dies. Tariff wars, geopolitical brinkmanship, and speculative bubbles are collectively eroding that confidence. The threat today is not of a market crash alone — it is of a systemic disintegration of trust, credit, and cooperation.

The world must realize that economic wars have no winners. If this tariff-driven arrogance continues, the global economy will not fall off a cliff — it will slide slowly into chaos. Policymakers still have time to act, but the clock is ticking fast.

 

China’s key role in development of Asia Pacific rim

Ahead of the 32nd APEC Economic Leaders' Meeting, set to be held in Gyeongju, South Korea, from October 31 to November 01, CGTN has published an article highlighting how China has continuously injected stability and fresh momentum to the development of the Asia-Pacific region over the years.

Just days after the fourth plenary session of the 20th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (CPC) concluded in Beijing, Chinese President Xi Jinping is going to make his first overseas trip since the CPC plenum — to attend the 32nd APEC Economic Leaders' Meeting and to pay a state visit to South Korea from October 30 to November 01.

As the session reaffirmed China's long-term vision and steady commitment to sharing growth opportunities with the world, observers are watching closely to see how China's leadership will bring new energy to Asia-Pacific development and help guide the region through increasing geopolitical and economic challenges.

"There has never been a more critical time for APEC," said Eduardo Pedrosa, executive director of the APEC Secretariat, in a recent interview. He expressed his anticipation of President Xi's participation, emphasizing that China has long been a strong supporter and contributor to APEC.

Openness and connectivity for win-win cooperation

On the Pacific coast of Peru, the Chancay Port — South America's first smart and green port — will soon celebrate its first anniversary of operation. Described as a "New Inca Trail," the project has created new trade routes between Latin America and Asia, serving as a clear example of openness and connectivity in the Asia-Pacific.

When President Xi attended the 31st APEC Economic Leaders' Meeting in Lima in 2024, he watched the port's opening via video link. He has called for fully utilizing APEC's role as an "incubator of global economic and trade rules," promoting regional integration and connectivity, and removing barriers to the free flow of trade, investment, technology, and services.

For decades, China has been a positive force for openness in the Asia-Pacific. In the first three quarters of 2025, China's trade with other APEC economies increased by 2 percent year-over-year, reaching 19.41 trillion yuan (US$2.73 trillion), or 57.8 percent of its total trade. The ongoing growth of goods ranging from textiles to electronics and auto parts reflects the region's strong shared opportunities.

China's actions reflect its consistent stance against protectionism and unilateralism. From the high-quality implementation of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) to proactive steps toward joining the CPTPP and Digital Economy Partnership Agreement (DEPA), Beijing has been contributing Chinese strength to building an open Asia-Pacific economy.

Driving innovation to share development opportunities

At the 2023 APEC CEO Summit, President Xi urged regional economies to "seize the opportunities of the new technological revolution" and to work together to promote digital, intelligent, and green transformation. He emphasized the importance of strengthening scientific and technological cooperation and creating an open, fair, and non-discriminatory environment for innovation.

This vision is gaining ground across the region. At the 22nd China-ASEAN Expo, 62 projects involving new energy, artificial intelligence, and advanced materials were signed — many focused on joint R&D rather than just trade. In Chile, Chinese-made double-decker electric buses played a key role in transporting people during the 19th Pan American Games in Santiago, providing clean energy for a continental sporting event and demonstrating China's sustainable technologies on a global scale.

Herman Tiu Laurel, president of the Asian Century Philippines Strategic Studies Institute, a Manila-based think tank, observed that China's high-tech innovation and green transition open new frontiers for supply chains and create fresh opportunities for Asia-Pacific economies.

Fostering inclusive growth for shared prosperity

In late September, a China-supported Juncao and upland rice demonstration center was opened in Goroka, the capital of Papua New Guinea's Eastern Highlands Province. The project, a new achievement in China-Papua New Guinea collaboration on poverty reduction, is helping local communities boost food security and build sustainable livelihoods. It provides a glimpse into how China's development approach is changing lives across the Asia-Pacific.

President Xi has reaffirmed that common development remains the main goal of Asia-Pacific cooperation. Following this vision, China has been actively taking action rather than just promoting the idea.

From advancing initiatives within APEC to increase household income and promote cluster-based growth among small and medium-sized enterprises, to inviting Asia-Pacific partners to join the Global Development Initiative (GDI), China has consistently strengthened collaboration in poverty reduction, food security, industrialization, and development financing with regional economies to maintain steady momentum in the region's pursuit of shared prosperity.

Asia Pacific leaders meeting in South Korea

Leaders from 21 Pacific Rim economies will gather this week in Gyeongju, South Korea, for the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation, or APEC, forum.

Meetings have begun on Monday and will run through Saturday. Talks are expected to be overshadowed by US President Donald Trump's sweeping global tariffs and high-stakes trade standoffs with China and other nations.

Trump will arrive on Wednesday but is scheduled to depart before the APEC leaders' summit itself. He is expected to see Chinese President Xi Jinping for their first in-person meeting of Trump's second term, as the two countries seek to dial down trade tensions.

The following are facts about the APEC meeting:

APEC, which was founded in 1989, has 21 members that represent more than 50% of global GDP and are home to some 2.7 billion people, or 40% of the world's population. China, Russia and the United States are three of the group's largest members. The APEC region generated 70% of the world's economic growth during its first 10 years of existence.

Leaders of the countries meet annually. The last gathering was in November 2024 in Peru, dominated by worries over the incoming Trump administration's vows to enact tariffs and reverse course on issues like climate change.

The economic club aims to encourage cooperation and reduce trade and investment barriers, though decisions made at meetings are non-binding and consensus has been increasingly difficult. South Korea says it wants to use this year's forum to discuss supply chains, the World Trade Organization's role in fostering a free and fair-trade environment, as well as advancing the Free Trade Area of the Asia-Pacific, an agreement designed to eventually include all APEC members.

The agenda also includes topics like adapting to digital change, harnessing artificial intelligence, sustainable energy, food supplies, responding to demographic shifts and increasing opportunities for women and people with disabilities.

South Korea is hosting Trump and Xi for state visits and it is hoping to make progress on a trade deal with the US President, Lee Jae Myung has suggested Trump use the visit to engage with North Korean leader Kim Jong Un, but it is unclear whether a meeting will happen.

Trump’s Tariffs: Open Defiance of WTO Rules

“The WTO’s silence in the face of US defiance marks the slow death of multilateralism.”

When power tramples principle, the rulebook becomes meaningless. The United States, once the architect of global trade discipline, now stands as its most brazen violator. President Trump’s tariff crusade has reduced the WTO’s founding ideals to diplomatic theatre.

When the World Trade Organization (WTO) was created, it was supposed to end the era of arbitrary trade wars. Countries pledged to respect the Most-Favored-Nation principle — no discrimination, no selective punishment. Yet today, that rulebook lies in tatters, largely because the United States, the self-proclaimed guardian of free trade, has chosen to ignore it.

President Donald Trump’s latest wave of tariffs on steel, aluminum, and Chinese imports is nothing short of a declaration of defiance. Cloaked in the language of “national security,” these measures are neither lawful nor justified under WTO norms. These are pure economic bullying — a tactic to reassert American dominance under the guise of protecting domestic jobs.

Let’s be clear, the WTO’s Article XXI, which allows exceptions for national security, was never meant to give license for economic intimidation. Trump’s use of it is a cynical distortion, designed not to protect US borders but to weaponize trade policy. It exposes the hypocrisy of Washington preaching free markets abroad while practicing protectionism at home.

WTO panels have already ruled against such tariffs, but the US has paralyzed the system by blocking the appointment of judges to the Appellate Body — effectively ensuring no verdict can ever be enforced. This deliberate sabotage turns the WTO into a toothless watchdog, helpless against the very member it was meant to discipline.

The tragedy is not merely in Washington’s defiance but in the world’s silence. Each unjustified tariff erodes another layer of global trust, while the WTO watches from the sidelines, stripped of authority. If the international community fails to challenge US economic unilateralism now, the collapse of the multilateral trading order will not be a distant fear — it will be a fait accompli.