Xi’s Washington Visit: A Changing Balance of Power

Chinese President Xi Jinping’s upcoming visit to Washington for a summit with US President Donald Trump on September 24 comes at a critical juncture in global geopolitics. More than a bilateral engagement, the meeting could provide an insight into the changing balance of diplomatic influence between the world’s two largest economies.

Xi is arriving in Washington after an intensive diplomatic outreach covering the SCO, the Middle East and the wider Global South. His message is becoming increasingly clear - China’s foreign relations do not revolve around Washington. Beijing is building partnerships and expanding its diplomatic space while presenting itself as an advocate of dialogue, multilateralism and economic cooperation. The contrast with Washington is striking.

Trump has imposed punitive tariffs on a wide range of US trading partners, including traditional allies. These measures have generated retaliation, uncertainty and diplomatic friction rather than producing a corresponding surge in US exports. The broader issue is that unilateral tariff measures have also been challenged on grounds of their compatibility with the rules-based multilateral trading system.

Trump’s military confrontation with Iran has further complicated America’s international standing. The conflict has disrupted shipping through the Strait of Hormuz, one of the world’s most important energy arteries. The resulting disruption has affected oil and gas supplies, raised energy prices and created serious risks for commercial shipping and seafarers.

The crisis has also strained Washington’s relations with its traditional Middle Eastern partners. The China-brokered Saudi-Iran rapprochement had offered an opportunity to reduce regional confrontation. Renewed hostilities have undermined that spirit, leaving regional countries to reassess their dependence on Washington.

Meanwhile, Xi is using diplomacy to demonstrate that China has alternatives. His recent engagement with Egypt, alongside wider relations across Eurasia and the Global South, reinforces Beijing’s claim to a more multipolar international order.

This does not mean China has replaced the United States. America remains a formidable economic, technological and military power. But diplomatic influence cannot be sustained indefinitely through tariffs, pressure and military confrontation.

The Trump-Xi summit is being watched not merely for trade agreements, but for what it reveals about the future architecture of global power. One point is crystal clear; Donald Trump has antagonized relations with most of the countries around the world.

BRICS in Search of Purpose

When Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa expanded BRICS in the 2020s, the grouping appeared poised to become a major pillar of an emerging multipolar order. Today, with 11 full members and 10 partner countries, BRICS has considerable demographic, economic and diplomatic weight. Yet expansion has exposed a fundamental weakness - BRICS is better at expressing dissatisfaction with the existing international system than agreeing on what should replace it.

BRICS is not collapsing. It continues to attract countries seeking greater international influence, diversified partnerships and alternatives—or supplements—to Western-dominated institutions. The real question is whether its expanded membership can be converted into practical influence or whether internal rivalries and geopolitical contradictions will gradually erode its momentum.

The grouping contains democracies, monarchies and authoritarian states; energy exporters and importers; sanctioned countries and close Western partners. India and China remain strategic competitors, while Russia’s war in Ukraine and Iran’s confrontation with Israel and the United States complicate efforts to establish common security positions. BRICS has neither a collective defence commitment nor an effective mechanism for resolving disputes among its members.

This does not make BRICS irrelevant. Its greater value may lie in functioning as a consultative platform for countries that disagree on major geopolitical issues but cannot afford to ignore one another.

Under India’s 2026 presidency, security has moved higher on the agenda, including terrorism, cybersecurity, critical infrastructure, emerging technologies and other non-traditional threats. These areas offer greater scope for practical cooperation than contentious questions surrounding Ukraine, Gaza or US strategic power. Protecting ports, energy supplies, food systems and digital infrastructure can produce tangible benefits without requiring political unanimity.

Economic cooperation offers another opportunity. Despite years of talk about de-dollarization, a common BRICS currency remains unrealistic given members’ divergent monetary systems and political priorities. More achievable goals include expanding local-currency trade, improving cross-border payment systems and strengthening the New Development Bank.

BRICS should also clarify membership rules, distinguish the rights and responsibilities of full members and partners, and streamline decision-making. Consensus can remain essential for major declarations, while willing members should be allowed to pursue voluntary initiatives in infrastructure, food and energy security, climate adaptation, public health, cybersecurity and trade facilitation.

Ultimately, BRICS will not gain relevance simply by expanding or opposing Western dominance. Its longevity will depend on whether it can build institutions and deliver tangible benefits. Institutions do not last because of what they oppose; they last because of what they build.

Trump Sinking Deeper into the Marsh

Donald Trump may have entered the war against Iran believing that overwhelming American and Israeli military power would deliver a quick and decisive victory. Instead, he appears to be sinking deeper into a strategic marsh. The more he struggles to secure the outcome he expected, the more complicated the consequences seem to become.

The first problem is that Trump joined Israel in a war against Iran without a sufficiently broad coalition of trusted American allies. What may have been conceived as an assertion of American power has increasingly exposed the limitations of unilateral action. Iran has suffered enormous damage, but it has also demonstrated a resilience that appears to have exceeded Washington’s expectations.

The second—and perhaps more serious—problem is Trump’s mindset. He appears reluctant to consider that his original assumptions may have been wrong. If Iran cannot be forced into submission, continuing the war carries mounting costs; yet accepting this reality could require Trump to acknowledge a strategic miscalculation.

The regional consequences are equally troubling. Arab governments may increasingly perceive that, when American and Arab interests diverge, Israel remains Washington’s first choice for protection. The confrontation around the Strait of Hormuz adds another layer of resentment. Gulf economies depend heavily on uninterrupted crude exports, and restrictions on shipping threaten their interests even when they are not parties to the conflict.

Meanwhile, Iran is not isolated. Israel’s claim that China is providing technical expertise to Tehran points to an increasingly important dimension of the conflict - America may be pushing Iran closer to a powerful strategic partner.

The consequences are spreading beyond the Middle East. The withdrawal of American aircraft carriers from the South China Sea has weakened Washington’s immediate naval posture in an area where China is the principal challenger.

At the same time, depleted US arsenals, after years of support for Ukraine and the demands of the Iran conflict, could constrain Washington’s ability to respond elsewhere.

Then comes oil. Despite the disruption surrounding the Strait of Hormuz, crude prices have not reached the dramatic US$200-per-barrel level that would have transformed the economic equation in America’s favor.

Trump therefore faces an increasingly difficult choice: continue the war and risk sinking deeper, or seek an exit that could be portrayed as retreat.

The marsh may no longer be Iran. It may be Trump’s own conviction that admitting a mistake is more dangerous than continuing to struggle.

Egypt–China: Is China Rewriting the Strategic Equation?

For decades, Egypt has been regarded as one of Washington’s most important partners in the Middle East. It was the first Arab state to establish diplomatic relations with Israel following the Camp David Accords and has remained a major recipient of US military assistance. Yet the strategic landscape appears to be changing.

The ongoing US-Iran war has forced countries across the Middle East to reassess their security and economic relationships. Against this backdrop, Chinese President Xi Jinping’s return to Egypt after a decade is more than a ceremonial visit. It comes as Beijing and Cairo celebrate 70 years of diplomatic relations and deepen cooperation in trade, investment, defence and technology.

The question, therefore, is not simply whether Egypt is moving away from Washington. Is China gradually rewriting Egypt’s strategic equation—and using Cairo as a gateway to a broader Middle Eastern and African presence?

Egypt occupies a unique geopolitical position. It connects the Arab world with Africa, the Mediterranean and the Red Sea, while the Suez Canal remains a critical artery of global commerce. Chinese investment around the canal has transformed this geography into a major industrial opportunity.

The relationship is also extending beyond economics. Joint military exercises and expanding defence cooperation indicate that Cairo is diversifying its strategic partnerships. At the same time, China’s growing engagement with Egypt reflects Beijing’s preference for influence through investment, infrastructure, technology and diplomacy rather than a conventional military footprint.

This does not necessarily mean Egypt is choosing China over America. Cairo may simply be seeking greater strategic autonomy at a time when regional countries are increasingly reluctant to depend exclusively on any single power, that may be the more significant development.

For decades, the Middle East operated largely within an American-led strategic framework. Today, China is emerging as an economic, diplomatic and technological alternative, while regional states appear increasingly comfortable cultivating relationships with multiple powers.

Perhaps, therefore, the real story is not Egypt moving from Washington to Beijing. It is the Middle East moving towards a new strategic equilibrium.

If so, the US-Iran war may ultimately be remembered not merely as another regional conflict, but as a catalyst that accelerated the transition from an old paradigm to a new one.

Nepal Floods: A Natural Disaster with a Human Fingerprint

Nature does not negotiate with governments. It does not respect borders or development targets.

The horrifying images of floods devastating Nepal’s border region and Tibet are not merely scenes of a natural calamity. These are a warning that when human intervention collides with nature’s power, the consequences can be catastrophic.

The immediate question is not simply what happened, but whether human actions helped turn a natural disaster into a far greater catastrophe.

Brahma Chellaney argues that the Himalayan floods were triggered by nature but intensified by human intervention. Chinese construction has narrowed river corridors, generated dangerous debris and created bottlenecks that may have produced secondary flood surges. If development projects alter natural waterways and fragile mountain landscapes without adequate environmental safeguards, they can magnify the destructive power of extreme weather.

This warning is particularly relevant as Southeast Asia confronts another looming threat: a major El Niño event. Florian Krampe and Mely Caballero-Anthony warn that it could bring drought, wildfires, food shortages and widespread supply-chain disruption.

The irony is that governments are not entirely unprepared. ASEAN already has forecasting mechanisms and disaster-financing instruments. Yet these remain inadequately funded and poorly coordinated. The problem, therefore, is not the absence of knowledge or tools, but the lack of political will and financial commitment to deploy them effectively.

The consequences could extend far beyond disaster zones. Drought can devastate agricultural production, food shortages can fuel inflation and social tensions, wildfires can disrupt economic activity, and damaged infrastructure can cripple supply chains across national borders.

The Himalayan floods also expose a dangerous contradiction in the pursuit of development. Roads, dams, hydropower projects and expanding settlements may deliver economic benefits, but when these disregard rivers, forests and fragile ecosystems, these can magnify the risks they are intended to overcome.

The Nepal floods should therefore be treated as a wake-up call. Natural disasters may be unavoidable, but their devastation is not always inevitable. When environmental safeguards are sacrificed for development, nature can leave a human fingerprint on a natural disaster.

Shrinking US aircraft carriers

The glory days of the world’s longest-serving aircraft carrier are over, reflecting fatigue in the broader US fleet amid a decline in the country’s shipbuilding capacity, according to official Chinese military analysts.

In a report on Wednesday, Chinese state broadcaster CCTV said the US Navy’s reliance on extended carrier deployments was a cause for concern, particularly in the case of the USS Nimitz.

The Nimitz was commissioned in 1975, making it the world’s longest-serving aircraft carrier still in active service, and its retirement has been pushed back repeatedly.

According to the US Navy, two aircraft operating from the Nimitz crashed in incidents in the South China Sea in October last year.

“Judging from the series of accidents that have occurred, the Nimitz is already being kept operational with difficulty. The glory days of the Nimitz aircraft carrier are over,” Li Yaqiang, a former senior colonel in the Chinese navy and a military commentator, said in an interview with CCTV.

The carrier was originally scheduled to be retired in 2026, but the US Navy said its decommissioning had been postponed until March next year to align with the expected delivery of the second Ford-class carrier, the USS John F. Kennedy.

“Once the Nimitz retires, any delay to the Ford-class carriers under construction would leave the fleet below the US legal requirement of 11 operational aircraft carriers,” the CCTV report said.

China’s most advanced aircraft carrier, the Fujian, enters service

Since 2006, US law has required that the US Navy’s maritime combat force include no fewer than 11 operational aircraft carriers.

CCTV military commentator Wei Dongxu also told the broadcaster that the US military’s carrier operations continued to be stretched “and it is now at a critical point in the transition between old and new aircraft carriers”.

“The Nimitz is too old and its technical state is no longer reliable enough, so it has to be retired. But the process of bringing the new Ford-class carriers into service has been plagued by problems,” Wei said.

Wei said unresolved problems with the introduction of the new US carriers could mean that the navy’s fleet of 11 aircraft carriers existed “largely on paper”.

“The combat capabilities of the first Ford-class carrier have still not been fully realized, and the F-35C, the important US carrier-borne fighter, has yet to be deployed aboard the ship,” he said.

“This means US carrier deployments must rely on a mix of new and ageing carriers, reducing its advantage at sea.”

Wei also said the problems were largely related to the decline of the US shipbuilding industry since the Cold War.

Extended maintenance cycles for US aircraft carriers are no longer uncommon. In 2017, the USS George Washington entered Newport News Shipbuilding for a planned four-year refuelling and complex overhaul, but it was not returned to the navy until May 2023, or two years after the intended deadline.

Meanwhile, the enormous scale of China’s shipbuilding industry has become a concern in Washington, joining technology, critical minerals and medical supply chains as areas in which US officials fear Beijing has gained a strategic advantage.

A Pentagon report released in December 2024 said the Chinese navy was the world’s largest numerically, with a battle force of more than 370 ships and submarines, including more than 140 major surface combatants. The report projected that the Chinese fleet would grow to 435 ships by 2030.

By comparison, the US Navy had 296 battle-force ships as of September 30, 2024. The fleet was projected to shrink further to 283 ships by 2027 as planned retirements outpaced the commissioning of new vessels.

 

Shanghai overtakes London in shipping hub rankings

According to Seatrade Maritime News Shanghai has taken second place in the 2026 Xinhua Baltic International Shipping Centre Development Index (ISCDI), breaking London’s six-year streak as runner in the ranking of global shipping hubs.

Singapore earned the top spot, a position it has held for all 13 years of the report’s history. With London slipping the third place, Hong Kong and Dubai rounded out the index’s top five cities.

Ningbo-Zhoushan overtook Rotterdam to become the sixth-highest-ranked shipping centre, while New York and New Jersey jumped up two places to eighth, overtaking Athens and Hamburg. There were no new entrants to the top 20.

Analyzing Shanghai’s ascendancy in the rankings, the report noted the city stood in seventh place in 2014 and has risen steadily since. Shanghai is home to the world’s busiest container port, which recorded strong growth in 2025, including at the world’s largest automated container terminal.

The opening of Maersk’s flagship logistics centre in Shanghai’s Lin-gang Special Area further strengthened the clusters’ case, as did the launch of The North Bund International Legal Service Port, a new international ship inspection operations team from China Classification Society, and the arrival of representative offices for both the International Chamber of Shipping (ICS) and London P&I Club.

The Index judges shipping centres based on three main weighted criteria: port inputs account for 20% of the total, business services 50%, and general environment inputs — which covers government transparency, customs tariffs, logistics performance, and the extent of e-government and administration — making up the remaining 30% of the score.

The report said Singapore’s grip on the top spot showed no signs of loosening, as container volume growth at its port outpaced Shanghai’s to remain the world’s second-busiest container port. Singapore’s bunkering industry also broke records in 2025 to remain the world’s largest bunkering destination crown with sales of 56.77 million tons. The report noted an increase in LNG deliveries and the issuing of bunkering licenses for methanol and groundwork for future ammonia developments.

Tonnage under the Singapore Registry of Ships rose 27% on-year to 137.46m gt and some 35 companies opened or expanded operations in the city in 2025.

“Singapore’s challenge heading into the latter part of the decade is less about defending its position as a leading shipping hub but about continuing to distinguish itself from other leading maritime cities across Asia. On the evidence of 2025, it is doing exactly that,” said the report.

The only shipping centre to gain two places this year was New York & New Jersey, which the report noted as home of private equity, law firms, brokerage firms, financial institutions and the New York Stock Exchange. The port recorded its third-busiest year ever, and the Xinhua-Baltic analysis highlighted long-term plans at the port, including completion of a harbour deepening project and the signing of two lease extensions of more than 30 years each.

The port’s long-term ambition is clear, as The port’s Master Plan 2050 projects cargo volumes through the port complex could double or triple by the middle of the century.

 

Eurasia: World's Largest Strategic Zone

Eurasia is the combined landmass of Europe and Asia, covering nearly 55 million square kilometers and accounting for about 70% of the world's population. It stretches from the Atlantic Ocean in the west to the Pacific Ocean in the east and includes some of the world's largest economies, energy producers, and transportation corridors.

The Eurasian region comprises major countries such as China, Russia, India, Pakistan, Kazakhstan, Türkiye, Germany, France, and several Central Asian republics. Due to its geographical position, Eurasia serves as a bridge connecting Europe, Asia, and the Middle East, making it one of the most strategically important regions in the world.

Historically, Eurasia has been the center of trade, cultural exchange, and geopolitical competition. Ancient trade routes, including the Silk Road, connected East Asia with Europe through Central Asia. These routes facilitated the movement of goods, technology, ideas, and civilizations for centuries.

Today, Eurasia remains a critical hub for global commerce and energy security. The region possesses vast reserves of oil, natural gas, coal, rare earth minerals, and agricultural resources. Russia and Central Asian countries are among the world's leading energy exporters, while China and India are among the largest energy consumers.

The importance of Eurasia has increased with the development of large-scale connectivity projects. China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC), and various regional railway and pipeline networks aim to improve trade links across the continent. These projects seek to reduce transportation costs, enhance regional integration, and strengthen economic cooperation.

Eurasia is also a focal point of geopolitical competition. Major powers, including China, Russia, the United States, the European Union, India, and Türkiye, seek to expand their economic and strategic influence across the region. Issues such as energy security, trade routes, technological development, and regional stability shape much of the political discourse surrounding Eurasia.

For countries located along Eurasian corridors, including Pakistan, the region offers significant opportunities. Improved connectivity, investment flows, industrial cooperation, and access to larger markets could support economic growth and regional integration.

As global economic activity increasingly shifts toward Asia, the significance of Eurasia is expected to grow further. The region's vast resources, strategic location, and expanding infrastructure networks are likely to make it a key driver of global trade, energy flows, and geopolitical developments in the coming decades.

 

Washington’s Flawed Energy Geopolitics

The persistent volatility in global energy markets is less a reflection of physical supply deficits and more a testament to weaponized energy supply. A cold analysis of data confirms there is no genuine global oil shortage. Instead, what the world is witnessing is a meticulously manufactured crisis, orchestrated by Washington in a desperate bid to dominate global oil production and its critical logistical chokepoints.

The centerpiece of this strategy relies heavily on calculated disruptions, particularly around the highly sensitive Strait of Hormuz. Yet, the Trump administration’s aggressive maneuvers have failed to achieve their ultimate economic target - driving crude prices up to US$200 per barrel mark. While the market remained resilient against these artificial supply shocks, the underlying motives of American interventionism have become glaringly obvious.

Through this manufactured instability, Washington has attempted to kill two birds with one stone. First, by keeping the market in perpetual anxiety without letting prices completely boil over to catastrophic levels, it successfully squeezed and manipulated the oil revenues of traditional Arab exporting nations, altering their fiscal leverage. Second, and perhaps more critically, the engineered friction along maritime routes are aimed at containing and throttling the steady flow of vital energy supplies to China’s industrial engine.

For developing economies, this artificial premium adds an unnecessary layer of import-led inflation. Global stakeholders must recognize that the current energy narrative is driven by geopolitical chess rather than the fundamentals of demand and supply. The international community must push for transparent, unhindered maritime logistics to insulate the global economy from unilateral hegemonic control.

Beijing’s Two Guests, Two Different Missions

China’s hosting of US President Donald Trump and Russian President Vladimir Putin in quick succession was more than a matter of diplomatic scheduling. Red carpets and ceremonial greetings often appear similar, but the political calculations behind state visits differ significantly. Beijing appeared to receive two major powers pursuing very different objectives.

Trump’s visit seemed driven largely by immediate economic and geopolitical concerns. Tariffs, trade access, supply chains and tensions surrounding the Middle East crisis appeared to dominate the agenda. Washington’s priorities also seemed linked to limiting disruptions in global energy markets and ensuring the reopening and security of the Strait of Hormuz. The United States understands that prolonged instability in this vital maritime route would have consequences not only for oil prices but also for global economic confidence.

Putin’s visit appeared to carry a different strategic character. Moscow’s engagement with Beijing looked less transactional and more structural. Energy cooperation, strategic coordination and strengthening a partnership that increasingly challenges Western influence seemed to occupy a central place. While Washington frequently engages China through competition mixed with cooperation, Moscow increasingly approaches China as a long-term geopolitical partner.

On the question of Middle East peace and the US-Israel confrontation with Iran, both leaders had reasons to seek Beijing’s attention but from opposite directions. Washington appears interested in preventing a wider regional escalation that could destabilize markets and alliances. Moscow, meanwhile, may view prolonged instability as another indicator of a changing global order where US influence faces growing challenges.

Even reception ceremonies can carry subtle diplomatic messages. Observers often read airport greetings as signals of political warmth and priority. Whether intentional or not, such gestures become subjects of interpretation.

The South China Sea dispute and tariffs also remain unresolved pressures between Washington and Beijing. China’s larger message appears increasingly clear: it no longer wishes merely to participate in global politics; it seeks to shape the environment in which global politics is conducted.

Taiwan Most Contentious Issue in China-US Relations

This week, US President Donald Trump visited China for the first time in nearly nine years, and met with Chinese President Xi Jinping. The summit, held at the Great Hall of the People, lasted for more than two hours. While China staged a grand ceremony and both sides exchanged diplomatic pleasantries, the substance of the leaders' talks remained unclear, at least through Thursday.

Against this backdrop, major media outlets, including Nikkei Asia, have highlighted a "warning" made by Xi. According to a readout published by state news agency Xinhua, Xi told Trump that the Taiwan question is "the most important issue" in US-China ties. "If handled well, bilateral relations can maintain overall stability," Xi was quoted as saying. If "handled poorly," the two countries risk a "clash" that could push "the entire China-US relationship into a very dangerous situation."

The term "clash" is far from mild. Notably, the US readout after the meeting did not mention Taiwan. While China has sought to project this message as a "warning" to the world, the US appears to have sidestepped what Xi described as the "most important" issue in the relationship, leaving the talks sounding inconclusive.

Trump's visit to China was accompanied by prominent business leaders, including Apple CEO Tim Cook and Nvidia CEO Jensen Huang, a central figure in the AI boom, who joined the trip at the last minute. Despite bringing along some of the country's most influential executives, who also have great influence on Asia's technology supply chains, the visit has so far resulted in no notable tech business announcements.

US-China talks, which were expected to have significant global implications, appear to have ended in ambiguity. It appears that Xi, through his warning on Taiwan, delivered the headline-making message. Having said he will host Xi in the US ahead of the country's midterm elections, Trump will likely seek to claim more tangible outcomes when the second round of the summit is on his home turf.

Trump: Diplomat, Opportunist, Hypocrite or Simply a Gambler?

The latest headline in Nikkei Asia — “Trump calls Xi ‘great leader,’ vows ties will be better than ever” — once again exposes the extraordinary contradictions that define the politics of US President, Donald Trump. Only recently, Trump had declared that the United States did not require Chinese cooperation to deal with a possible blockade of the Strait of Hormuz. At the same time, Washington continued tightening sanctions targeting the movement of Iranian oil to China while portraying Beijing as America’s principal strategic adversary.

The sudden shift in tone raises a serious question, who exactly is Donald Trump — a diplomat, an opportunist, a hypocrite, or simply a political gambler?

Diplomacy normally relies on consistency, credibility, and strategic clarity. Trump’s style appears fundamentally different. His statements often seem driven less by coherent long-term policy and more by immediate political or economic convenience. One-day China is accused of exploiting global trade, weakening American industry, and threatening international security. The next day, Xi Jinping is described as a “great leader” and bilateral relations are promised a bright future.

Such contradictions may energize domestic political audiences, but these simultaneously weaken America’s diplomatic credibility abroad. Allies struggle to understand Washington’s actual strategic direction, while rivals increasingly view American policy as transactional and unpredictable.

The contradiction becomes even sharper when examined alongside Trump’s broader policies. Sanctions on Chinese-linked Iranian oil trade, aggressive tariff rhetoric, restrictions on technology exports, and repeated efforts to economically isolate Beijing all reinforce the perception that Trump views China less as a business partner and more as a geopolitical foe. Yet whenever economic pressure begins unsettling American markets or threatening global supply chains, the rhetoric suddenly softens.

When a leader repeatedly alternates between portraying China as an existential threat and praising its leadership as indispensable, critics naturally begin questioning whether such statements reflect genuine policy or merely political convenience.

This is not classical diplomacy. It resembles high-stakes bargaining where confrontation and praise are alternated to maximize leverage. Trump appears convinced that unpredictability itself is a negotiating weapon. However, unpredictability may work in real estate deals; it becomes dangerous in global geopolitics.

Great powers can survive hostile rivals, but they struggle under inconsistent leadership. The real danger for America may not be China’s rise, but Washington’s inability to decide whether Beijing is an enemy to confront or a partner it ultimately cannot live without.

Trump Pushing China Towards Confrontation

Just before departing for China, US President Donald Trump imposed another round of sanctions targeting the movement of Iranian oil to China. Officially, Washington presents the move as part of its pressure campaign against Iran. In reality, the sanctions expose a far bigger strategic objective - tightening America’s economic grip around China.

This is not an isolated policy decision. Since returning to power, Trump has aggressively revived tariff wars, expanded restrictions on Chinese technology, intensified pressure on supply chains, and openly challenged Beijing’s growing influence across Asia and the Middle East. The latest sanctions simply add energy security to Washington’s expanding list of pressure tactics.

China’s economic machine depends heavily on uninterrupted energy imports. Iranian crude, often available at discounted prices, has remained an important component of China’s energy strategy despite Western sanctions. By attempting to choke these supplies, Washington is effectively signaling that no sector of the Chinese economy will remain outside the reach of American coercive power.

The message becomes even more provocative when discussions surrounding the Strait of Hormuz are taken into account. Any blockade or disruption in this critical maritime corridor would severely impact Chinese industry, exports, and economic stability. Whether openly stated or not, the strategic implication is unmistakable - the United States is demonstrating its capacity to threaten the economic lifelines of its principal global rival.

Washington may be dangerously misreading Beijing’s patience. Today, China is not a weak, inward-looking economy of the 1990s. It is a global economic giant, a technological competitor, and an emerging military power increasingly unwilling to bow before American pressure. Every new tariff, sanction, or strategic threat deepens Chinese mistrust and accelerates Beijing’s efforts to reduce dependence on Western-controlled financial and trade systems.

From a geopolitical perspective, Trump appears convinced that sustained pressure will force China into strategic compromise. Yet history often produces the opposite result. Major powers rarely surrender under humiliation; they retaliate when they conclude that confrontation has become unavoidable.

The danger is that Washington’s relentless pressure campaign may gradually transform economic rivalry into open geopolitical hostility. If that happens, the consequences will extend far beyond China and America, shaking global trade, energy markets, and already fragile international stability.

Significance of Upcoming Trump-Xi Summit

Since former US President Richard Nixon landed in Beijing in 1972 and redefined US-China relations, no countries have done as well as these two. Since then the US has generated more than US$23 trillion in additional GDP, while China lifted 800 million people out of extreme poverty, accounting for three-quarters of all global poverty reduction in the period. 

In 1990, China accounted for just 1.6% of global GDP; today it accounts for nearly 18%, meaning the two together now represent 44% of the world economy, up from 28% when globalization began in earnest.

A dollar invested in the S&P 500 the year Nixon landed in Beijing is worth over US$270 today. China, which had negligible industrial capacity in 1972, now produces more manufactured goods than the next nine countries combined.

This is not to say that the fruits of globalization were enjoyed equally within either economy. The CCP’s cultural genocide of the Uighurs and the slow-motion death of the US industrial heartland are the receipts: ruthless consolidation in China, hollowed-out communities, and rising inequality in America. But this was the deal both sides made.

The US told itself fairy tales about economic liberalization leading to a more democratic China; in fact, both populations simply got significantly richer than the rest of the world. And to quote the bard, therein lies the rub—in a US-China trade war, neither can win against the other. 

Victory in a US-China trade war is a competition about who can lose the least. The true winners are the countries that can stay out of the trade war, a difficult feat in a global economy so dominated by Washington and Beijing.

It’s easy to assign President Trump’s first term as the starting gun of the US-China trade conflict, since he ran on being tough on China back in 2015. But the fight began in 2009 when the Obama administration slapped a 35% tariff on tires from China.

Geopolitical forces were already well at work before Trump and Xi came to power. Trump speed things up, but his pressure was always in service of “the art of the deal.”

Then the pandemic hit. One doesn’t need to be a conspiracy theorist to see that Beijing’s stubbornness made it much harder for the world to control the virus.

The pandemic threw US-China relations off course and likely helped Biden win in 2020—and Biden had no interest in making a deal with China.

Instead, he doubled down on Trump 1.0’s tough talk. Trump 2.0 prefers to pick up where he left off. His administration has threatened, cajoled, and tariffed China to no end, but it was clear even on the campaign trail that President Trump does not ultimately want to fight with China; he wants to deal with China.

In the then-candidate’s own words in August 2024, “If they want to build a plant in Michigan, in Ohio, in South Carolina, they can—using American workers, they can.”

This is one of President Trump’s most maverick policy choices. The US national security establishment and the rest of the “swamp” are China hawks.

They see China as the next great peer competition to US power in the world… and the most serious threat the US has ever faced. In terms of sheer size, power, and wealth, they are correct.

Moreover, the hawks aim to use Trump’s threats, which Trump needs as leverage in his negotiations, to realize their own goals in blocking the rise of Chinese power.

China would also rather avoid a fight—the US is its single largest export market, and exports make up roughly 20% of China’s GDP. When Trump 2.0 tariffs hit in 2025, bilateral trade fell 29%, yet the US remained China’s top export destination.

China produces 28% of global manufactured goods but can’t absorb them domestically, making the US the key buyer keeping its factories running. Still, China is ready to fight if needed, knowing a nationalist dictatorship can weather economic pain better than a liberal democracy.

It is evident that while the US and China have been negotiating, China rolled out new trade rules that lay the legal groundwork for punishing foreign companies that seek to shift their sourcing away from China.

Over the weekend, China told five domestic refiners linked to Iranian oil trade to ignore explicit US sanctions based on a 2021 Chinese law.

 

Chinese Deployment in South China Sea

According to media reports, China has deployed vessels and installed floating barriers at the entrance to the South China Sea, where it is engaged in a maritime territorial dispute with the Philippines. This move comes as the United States, which is at war with Iran, has positioned three aircraft carriers in the Middle East and withdrawn military assets and personnel from the Indo-Pacific region. In the past, when US carriers left the area, Beijing often tested the level of external pressure against it through various channels.

According to reports vessels presumed to be Chinese Navy or Coast Guard patrol ships, fishing boats, and floating barriers crossing the reef were detected near the Scarborough Shoal lately. The Scarborough Shoal is one of the most fiercely contested maritime territories in the Indo-Pacific, where Chinese Coast Guard ships frequently ram and spray water cannons at Philippine maritime patrol vessels.

In 2023, China had installed floating barriers in the waters around the Scarborough Shoal to block Philippine fishing boats, leading to a conflict when Philippine Coast Guard divers were dispatched to remove them.

China claims sovereignty over most of the South China Sea under its self-defined "nine-dash line," but the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) ruled in 2016 that this claim has no basis under international law. Despite this, Beijing has continued to dispatch patrol ships to the Philippines’ exclusive economic zone (EEZ), prolonging the dispute.

The US has pressured China since 2015 by conducting "Freedom of Navigation" operations in the South China Sea. Allies and partner nations advocating for a "Free and Open Indo-Pacific" (FOIP) have also participated in these exercises. However, a significant portion of US naval forces is currently deployed near Iran and the Strait of Hormuz.

The Washington Post has reported last month that the USS George H.W. Bush, which departed from the Norfolk base in Virginia, is expected to arrive in the Middle East around the April 21, 2026. This marks the third aircraft carrier to be deployed to the region, following the USS Abraham Lincoln, previously stationed in the South China Sea, and the USS Gerald R. Ford, which was deployed in the Caribbean Sea.

Additionally, part of the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system, a key component in South Korea’s defense against North Korean nuclear and missile threats, has been withdrawn, and the 31st Marine Expeditionary Unit, typically the first to respond to contingencies on the Korean Peninsula, has been redeployed from Japan to the Middle East.

 

China slams US blockade of Iranian ports

China has slammed the US blockade of Iranian ports as dangerous and irresponsible, calling for an immediate and full ceasefire and for the Strait of Hormuz to be reopened.

Foreign ministry spokesman Guo Jiakun told reporters at a daily briefing in Beijing on Tuesday that the US action would only “inflame tensions, escalate the situation and undermine an already fragile ceasefire”, and that would further jeopardize the safety of navigation in the strait.

“We urge all parties to abide by the ceasefire arrangement, focus on the broader direction of dialogue and negotiations, take concrete actions to de-escalate the regional situation and restore normal navigation in the strait at an early date,” Guo said.

He added that the situation in the region was “at a critical stage” and said China would continue to work with the international community to promote peace talks and to strive for peace and stability in the Middle East.

The US began a naval blockade of Iranian ports on Monday after its marathon peace talks with Iran in Pakistan to reopen the Strait of Hormuz failed over the weekend.

The US Central Command on Monday issued a formal notice to seafarers outlining enforcement measures in waters around the strait, saying that not all maritime traffic would be halted. The blockade “will not impede neutral transit passage through the Strait of Hormuz to or from non-Iranian destinations”, it said.

Iran has warned of retaliation, vowing that “no port in the Persian Gulf and the Gulf of Oman will be safe”.

 

Iran sinks US Ship carrying 30,000 Interceptors

Please watch and save this video, because shortly it may be removed. This narrates a story of Iran sinking a US Supply Ship USNS Robert E. Peary in Red Sea, where 30,000 interceptors were lost in 20 minutes. To hear details click https://youtu.be/WqAPNl-36NU?si=f-2ngZJCnc96BVCt

Riyadh Returns to Iran Threat Narrative

In the aftermath of Iran’s 1979 Islamic Revolution, the United States recalibrated its regional strategy, increasingly presenting Tehran as the principal source of instability in the Middle East. Over time, this framing found resonance in several Arab capitals, particularly in Saudi Arabia, shaping a security outlook that continues to influence regional policy choices.

This perception was reinforced through tangible measures. The expansion of US military infrastructure across the Gulf—most prominently in Qatar—was justified largely on the premise of countering Iranian influence. Simultaneously, Washington sustained economic pressure on Tehran over its nuclear program, despite Iran’s status as a signatory to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, in contrast to Israel’s longstanding ambiguity.

Historical episodes added further complexity. The Iran-Iraq war entrenched regional rivalries, while later diplomatic efforts—including the nuclear agreement under President Barack Obama and the China-brokered rapprochement between Riyadh and Tehran—offered brief openings for recalibration. Yet such initiatives have struggled to overcome deeply embedded mistrust, particularly amid shifting US policies and competing geopolitical interests.

Recent remarks by Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Faisal bin Farhan reflect a return to a more cautious, if not hardened, posture. His assertion that trust in Iran has been “completely shattered,” alongside allegations of destabilizing activities across the region, underscores Riyadh’s growing concerns about security and sovereignty. These claims are rooted in reported attacks on energy infrastructure and maritime navigation, which Saudi Arabia and its partners attribute to Iran.

Tehran, however, has consistently rejected such accusations, framing its actions as defensive and, at times, suggesting that regional escalations are shaped by broader geopolitical contestation. Independent verification of specific incidents remains contested, contributing to a narrative environment marked as much by perception as by provable fact.

What emerges is not merely a dispute over actions, but over interpretation. Saudi Arabia’s current stance appears closely aligned with a long-standing US strategic framing that positions Iran as the central regional threat. While this perspective reflects genuine security concerns, it also risks narrowing the analytical lens through which complex regional dynamics are understood.

The persistence of this narrative suggests that, despite episodic diplomacy and shifting alliances, foundational perceptions remain largely intact. In effect, Riyadh’s position today echoes a familiar refrain—one shaped over decades—where Iran continues to be viewed as the primary challenge to regional stability.

War with Iran and the Question of America’s Global Power

As the United States–Israel war against Iran enters its third week, the expanding scope of the conflict is forcing the world to reassess the role of the United States in shaping the international order. What began as a military confrontation is increasingly being interpreted as part of a broader geopolitical strategy — one that echoes patterns seen in earlier American interventions.

The latest signal came when the administration of Donald Trump announced a US$10 million bounty for information on Mojtaba Khamenei, Iran’s newly elevated supreme leader. The reward, issued through Washington’s “Rewards for Justice” program, targets individuals whom the United States accuses of involvement in militant activities.

Such a move is unusual in modern diplomacy. Publicly placing a bounty on a serving leader of a sovereign state sends a strong political message and inevitably raises questions about Washington’s long-term objectives in the conflict. Critics argue that the step suggests the war may extend beyond military confrontation and could ultimately aim at weakening or reshaping Iran’s leadership.

The controversy unfolds against the backdrop of intense global criticism of Israel’s conduct in Gaza. The war there has produced devastating humanitarian consequences, with tens of thousands reported dead, many of them civilians. For much of the world, the expansion of conflict toward Iran reinforces the perception that the United States and Israel are pursuing a broader strategic agenda across the Middle East.

Historically, American interventions have frequently been framed in the language of security, democracy, or counter-terrorism. Yet several precedents are often cited by critics as examples where these interventions eventually evolved into attempts to alter political leadership. The invasion of Iraq in 2003, the NATO intervention in Libya in 2011, and sustained political pressure on governments in Venezuela are commonly referenced in this debate.

These precedents also revive a deeper question about the effectiveness of global governance institutions. The United Nations was established after the Second World War to prevent unilateral wars and protect the sovereignty of states. However, the structure of the Security Council — where the United States holds veto power — often limits the organization’s ability to act decisively when Washington itself is directly involved in a conflict.

This structural imbalance has created a persistent credibility dilemma. While the United Nations remains the central forum for international diplomacy, critics increasingly argue that its capacity to restrain the strategic ambitions of major powers remains limited.

As the war with Iran unfolds, the debate is no longer confined to the future of the Middle East alone. It now touches the credibility of the international system itself — and whether the global order is governed by collective rules or ultimately shaped by the interests of its most powerful states.

Election or Selection? Bangladesh at the Crossroads

The latest election in Bangladesh has delivered a result that few found surprising. The continuity of leadership has reinforced a long-standing perception: politics in the country remains shaped by dynastic gravity rather than competitive churn. This predictability has revived an uncomfortable question — was it an election defined by open contest, or a selection shaped by structural advantage?

Since independence, power has largely oscillated between two dominant political forces. Such concentration can project stability, yet it also risks creating democratic fatigue. When outcomes appear preordained and opposition participation limited, public trust in the electoral process inevitably comes under strain. Legitimacy in modern democracies is measured not only by victory margins but by the credibility of the contest itself.

However, Bangladesh’s political story cannot be separated from its geopolitical significance. The country sits at a strategic junction in South Asia, attracting the sustained attention of major powers.

For the United States, Bangladesh represents both an economic partner and a node in the Indo-Pacific calculus. Democratic standards, labour rights, and regional security form key pillars of engagement.

India views Bangladesh through the lens of neighbourhood stability, connectivity, and security cooperation. Political continuity in Dhaka often translates into policy predictability for New Delhi, particularly on trade routes and border management.

China’s expanding footprint reflects its broader Belt and Road ambitions. Infrastructure financing and investment ties have deepened, making Bangladesh an increasingly important partner in Beijing’s regional architecture.

Russia, while less visible, maintains interests in energy cooperation and strategic diversification, seeking relevance in a region marked by intensifying power competition.

This convergence of external interests complicates internal democratic debates. Stability is prized by international partners, yet excessive political closure can breed long-term fragility. A system perceived as exclusionary may preserve short-term order while quietly eroding institutional confidence.

The true test for Bangladesh is not merely electoral endurance but democratic resilience. Elections must be seen as credible mechanisms of choice rather than procedural formalities. Without broader participation and trust, even economic progress may struggle to anchor political legitimacy.

In the end, the question lingers: if elections secure continuity but weaken confidence, what exactly has been strengthened — governance, or doubt?