Asia takes step to move away from US dollar?

Asia’s largest economies made a decision that could signal a shift away from the US dollar on Sunday, as they approved a new rapid financing mechanism that will for the first time use regional currencies including the Chinese yuan.

The new scheme has been rapidly approved as countries across East and Southeast Asia look to shield themselves from the financial volatility unleashed by US President Donald Trump’s global tariff war, which has triggered turbulence in the US Treasuries market and an Asian currency rally in recent days.

It may also herald a deeper, longer-term shift towards a regional monetary mechanism that is less reliant on the dollar – and gives China a bigger role.

In this explainer, the South China Morning Post breaks down the details of the new financing mechanism, and what it means for the future of Asia and the dollar-based global financial system.

What is behind this decision?

The new rapid financing mechanism is part of a broader scheme known as the Chiang Mai Initiative Multilateralization (CMIM) – a currency swap arrangement among the 10-member Association of Southeast Asian Nations (Asean), China, Japan and South Korean.

The CMIM has its origins in the aftermath of the Asian Financial Crisis of the 1990s. It is designed to prevent a repeat of that crisis by providing emergency help to countries facing balance-of-payments issues and short-term liquidity difficulties.

The 13 member countries – collectively known as Asean+3 – first began setting up a network of bilateral currency swap arrangements in 2000, then the scheme expanded and evolved into the CMIM a decade later.

The lending capacity of the CMIM has since risen the US$240 billion, with Japan and China each contributing US$76.8 billion, South Korea US$38.4 billion and the 10 Asean countries a combined US$48 billion, according to the Asean+3 Macroeconomic Research Office.

To date, none of the member countries have ever requested CMIM funding.

What was decided on Sunday?

During a meeting of finance ministers and central bank governors from the Asean+3 nations in Milan, Italy, on Sunday, the attendees approved a new tool for providing swift financial help to economies facing urgent balance-of-payments issues called the CMIM Rapid Financing Facility.

Unlike previous mechanisms, which relied on the US dollar, the new facility will use the Chinese yuan and other regional currencies.

The yuan had been approved for use as a transaction currency in the CMIM pool just weeks earlier, during a meeting of the Asean+3 deputy finance ministers and central bank governors in April.

A joint statement released at the Milan meeting noted that the new facility was designed to “enhance regional resilience by offering members timely access to emergency financing during urgent balance of payments needs, in response to sudden exogenous shocks such as pandemics and natural disasters”.

In a press release published on Monday, China’s central bank governor Pan Gongsheng hailed the move as “a breakthrough in diversifying the international monetary system in the region” amid a period of global uncertainty.

In Milan, the financial officials also agreed to explore further improvements to the CMIM in line with the International Monetary Fund framework – a move seen as a step towards institutionalizing the initiative and making it more effective.

What it means for the US dollar?

“Yuan’s inclusion in the CMIM system reflects growing acceptance of the currency on the global stage and marks a step forward in its internationalization,” said Ding Shuang, chief Greater China economist at Standard Chartered Bank.

The move comes as Beijing accelerates its efforts to expand the yuan’s global influence by encouraging the use of the Chinese currency in trade settlement, commodity pricing and foreign exchange reserves.

Chinese authorities have also tried to boost cross-border use of its digital yuan through Project mBridge, a scheme launched in collaboration with the central banks of Hong Kong, Thailand, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates.

Ding, however, noted that the significance of the yuan’s inclusion in the CMIM was mainly symbolic, given that the mechanism has never before been activated and the member countries already had sufficient foreign exchange reserves.

“At this stage, the inclusion of the yuan is more of a structural move, and we will only see the actual impact when the CMIM funding pool is truly activated,” said Ding.

 

South Asia: More of a meow than a roar

In the bubble years of the late 1980s, the appreciation of the Japanese yen sent a flood of investment from corporate Japan to the fast-growing economies of Southeast Asia. That was before the rise of China as a manufacturing powerhouse in the 1990s. But today, the optimism accompanying China's ascent has waned ‑ China is more likely to compete with ASEAN economies than support them.

According to Nikkei Asia, such diverse national circumstances suggest that, sadly, Southeast Asia remains less than the sum of its parts -- its once-promising Tiger economies have mostly lost their roar.

Nowhere is this reversal in ASEAN's economic fortunes more apparent than in Thailand, where auto sales have collapsed. Indonesia, which has vast natural and mineral resources, should also be doing better than it is.

While Vietnam is struggling in finding enough workers, not all of Southeast Asia has lost its "Tiger" dynamism.

Laos sells hydropower to its neighbors at a time when cheap power is an increasingly valuable competitive advantage.

Malaysia has benefited from its proximity to Singapore.

Why a rush to join BRICS?

Last year, BRICS decided to expand its membership, inviting Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates to join the bloc.

BRICS is attracting Southeast Asian countries, with Thailand and Malaysia being the latest to express their interest in joining the bloc.

Last month, Thailand submitted a membership request, while Malaysian Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim said in an interview with Chinese news portal Guancha that his country would soon begin formal procedures.

“Being a member of BRICS would open up trade and investment opportunities, so the question is ‘why not?'” Piti Srisangam, the executive director of the ASEAN Foundation, told DW.

“The bloc has members from all over the world, but none from Southeast Asia yet,” he added.

According to James Chin, a professor of Asian Studies at the University of Tasmania, “both Thailand and Malaysia are seen as middle powers.”

“It’s better for them to join groups like BRICS so that they will have a larger voice in the international arena. But the major benefit will be trade,” he added.

Last year, BRICS — an acronym that was originally used to refer to Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa — decided to expand its membership, inviting Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates to join the bloc.

The name for the expanded group has not yet been officially announced, but it could be called “BRICS Plus”.

Combined, its members account for about 45% of the world population — around 3.5 billion people.

Their economies are worth around US$30 trillion (€28 trillion) — about 28% of the global economy, according to World Bank data.

The bloc “can help Malaysia’s digital economy grow faster by allowing it to integrate with countries that have strong digital markets and also take advantage of best practices from other members,” Rahul Mishra, associate professor at the Center for Indo-Pacific Studies at Jawaharlal Nehru University in New Delhi, told DW.

“Thailand would also be able to draw investments in important industries including services, manufacturing, and agriculture,” he added.

Chin believes the trade ties that Malaysia and Thailand already have with China have influenced their decisions to join BRICS.

China has been Malaysia’s largest trading partner for the past 15 years and Thailand’s biggest for 11 years, according to official data.

Both these Southeast Asian nations becoming BRICS members “will enhance their relationship with China,” Chin told DW.

Last month, Thai Foreign Minister Maris Sangiampongsa insisted that Bangkok did not view joining BRICS as an act of “choosing sides,” or as a way to counterbalance any other bloc.

“Thailand is unique in that we are friends with every country and enemies to none. We can act as a bridge between developing countries and BRICS members,” Maris said.

Apart from BRICS, Thailand has also applied to join the Paris-based Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), which has 38 mostly Western members.

“Small and middle powers do not have many options,” Piti said. “What Thailand is doing is a balancing act — one foot with the Western liberal democracy and the other foot with the emerging economies.”

In Malaysia, public sentiment is currently more in favor of China, the world’s second-largest economy after the United States, according to a recent survey by the ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute, a Singaporean think tank.

Nearly three-quarters of the survey’s respondents said ASEAN should favor China over the US if the bloc were forced to align with one of the two rival superpowers.

In June, during the three-day visit of Chinese Premier Li Qiang to Malaysia, Anwar criticized “the incessant propaganda that we should cast aspersions and fear the dominance of China economically, militarily, technologically.”

“We do not. We in Malaysia, having a neutral stance, have the resolve to work with all countries and with China,” he added.

Malaysia and Thailand are not the only countries in Southeast Asia interested in joining BRICS.

In May, Pham Thu Hang, Vietnam’s Foreign Ministry spokesperson, told a press briefing in Hanoi that “like many countries around the world, we are closely monitoring the process of BRICS membership expansion.”

Mishra believes Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia “could be the potential applicants” as they already have good ties with China, India, and Russia — all key players in BRICS.

“For Vietnam, which has been registering significant investments, it would be a good opportunity to further boost its trade beyond their traditional markets into the Middle East, Latin America, and Africa,” he added.

Ahead of the BRICS summit in South Africa last year, there had been speculation that Indonesia — the only G20 country in Southeast Asia that hopes to complete the accession process with the OECD within three years — could become a BRICS member.

But ultimately, Indonesian President Joko Widodo told the public that his government had decided not to submit a letter of interest. Indonesian Foreign Minister Retno Marsudi said at a press conference in January that Jakarta was still weighing the pros and cons of the BRICS membership.

 

Chinese President to skip G-20 meeting

Who shows up where can be very revealing 

According to Bloomberg, for the first time since he took power, Chinese President Xi Jinping will skip a Group of 20 summit. Instead, China is sending Premier Li Qiang to the event hosted by India’s Prime Minister Narendra Modi. That’s a clear signal of the relative value he places on the G-20 — set up with US backing in the late 1990s — versus the newly expanding BRICS grouping. 

Xi just made one of his rare 2023 overseas visits last month, to attend the BRICS summit in South Africa, where he successfully pressed for its expansion to include commodity powerhouses including Saudi Arabia, Argentina and the United Arab Emirates.

The new BRICS-11 will account for a major share of key global inputs, according to calculations by Center for Strategic and International Studies researchers Gracelin Baskaran and Ben Cahill: a) 42% of the world’s oil supply, b072% percent of rare earth minerals- with three of the five nations with the largest reserves, c) 75% of the world’s manganese, d) 50% of global graphite and e) 28% of nickel

“It is quite possible that a more coordinated approach” toward export restrictions to the rest of the world could now develop among the BRICS-11, the CSIS analysts wrote.

In the energy field, the group features both major oil and gas producers as well as two of the largest importers, in China and India.

Therefore, there is an incentive for members to set up mechanisms to trade commodities outside the reach of the G-7 financial sector, Baskaran and Cahill wrote.

Ex-Treasury Secretary Lawrence Summers — who was in government when the G-20 began — says the enlarged BRICS is a symptom of the US abdicating global leadership in the cause of economic nationalism. Whereas Washington once championed free-trade deals, now its focus is on import restrictions and a buy American bias, he says.

Whenever anybody says they care about producers, not low prices for consumers, they are adopting a negative sum, ‘all-against-all’ vision of international economic policy that invites challenges to the post-WWII vision the US once championed, says Summers, a paid contributor to Bloomberg Television.

The BRICS-11 has its own challenges. Bloomberg’s geo-economics team, led by Jennifer Welch, cautions that the dollar is unlikely to be dethroned by any push by the group to use alternatives.

India-China border tensions, part of the backdrop to Xi’s skipping the G-20, are a bar to BRICS-11 coordination. President Joe Biden, who will be showing up in New Delhi this week, has every incentive to keep Modi aloof from China. Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen’s attendance marks her fourth visit to India in 10 months, highlighting the US focus on that relationship.

Biden and Xi will both be no-shows at the Asean summit of Southeast Asian nations and key trading partners in Jakarta, Indonesia, this week, a missed chance for both.

Japan’s Prime Minister Fumio Kishida will be — a great opportunity for this key US ally to show support for the region in the wake of a provocative Chinese map that sowed acrimony there.

And to share a stage with regional counterparts as China tries to isolate Japan over its discharge of treated wastewater from wrecked Fukushima reactors into the Pacific.

 

ASEAN losing its composure

Southeast Asia is at a dangerous crossroads. Once regarded as a haven of relative stability and economic progress, today the region is buffeted by escalating geopolitical struggle between the United States and China, state fragmentation in Myanmar and internal political conflicts that are exposing the limits of democratic reform and the dangers of populism.

These issues will be on full display at the annual leaders' summit of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations next week in Jakarta and may well intensify as the group's rotating chairmanship passes afterward from Indonesia to Laos, the bloc's smallest and poorest member.

Civil society and the international community have long looked to ASEAN, which has reliably preserved regional peace for decades, to deal with major challenges.

But the bloc is now deeply divided. On Myanmar, for example, mainland states have put a premium on state integrity and security over political change and reform while more democratic maritime states, led by Indonesia, regard military rule as intolerable.

In an alarming public display of regional dissonance, Thailand recently directly engaged with Myanmar's military junta without informing Indonesia. By playing on such divisions, the junta has avoided complete ostracization.

The region is also divided over the extent to which China poses a threat and whether it should be contained by the United States and its allies.

Laos, Thailand and Cambodia have close ties with Beijing, reflecting proximity or long-standing political alignment. Vietnam views China with deep historical enmity but maintains a dual-track relationship sustained by ties between the two nations' ruling communist parties. Even so, Hanoi has drawn closer to the US.

The Philippines has effectively checked out of ASEAN because officials in Manila believe the group has done nothing to defend the country's maritime claims against Chinese intrusions, noting its failure to support the 2016 arbitral ruling by a court in The Hague affirming Philippine sovereignty over contested areas.

"We might as well be allied with Taiwan, Japan and South Korea," said a former official after the recent confrontation between a Chinese coast guard ship and Philippine vessels attempting to resupply troops on Second Thomas Shoal in the disputed Spratly Islands. Manila has indeed moved closer to the US since Ferdinand Marcos Jr. became president last year.

Compounding such rifts over external issues is a distinct political divide. The rise of democratic reform movements in Indonesia, Malaysia and even Thailand over the last 30 years has led to more frequent changes in national leadership.

As a result, the personal relationships that held ASEAN nations together under more authoritarian regimes have frayed. Some democratic leaders have begun to wonder why they need to spend so much time with tedious ASEAN meetings when their domestic constituents are more interested in social equality and food security than strengthening regional identity.

All this has made Southeast Asia more fragile and isolated than it appears. Great power leaders who once routinely attended regional summits now often skip them. The US and China prefer bilateral engagements during which they can press for alignment. While he will skip this month's ASEAN summit, US President Joe Biden will visit Vietnam right afterward, reportedly to sign a bilateral strategic partnership agreement.

ASEAN has lost its much-touted centrality and is frankly on life support as an autonomous multilateral platform, reflecting to some degree the decline of multilateralism globally.

What can be done to revive effective multilateral cooperation and rescue the region from fracture by competing great powers and division by political dispute?

Civil society has traditionally helped in quiet ways to build and sustain the sinews of connectivity in the region. Networks of academics and think tanks helped promote connections and address sensitivities among governments and offered regional policy ideas.

Many of those veteran scholars are now retired or deceased. The younger generation has not filled the void, in part because the rivalry of the great powers has polarized much of their ranks.

A possible new approach would be to launch a recovery process to help reconnect the 10 ASEAN states. This would involve identifying common challenges rather than relying on outdated institutionalized processes or weak mechanisms to manage conflicts and protect human rights.

There is clearly a need for cross-bloc dialogue about what can be done. A bottom-up approach could offer innovative ideas and help ease the acrimony that has built up over the past few years. Post-pandemic, there is an urgent need for more contact and understanding in a region vastly more challenged than it was even five years ago.

The US and China are locked in an epic, dangerous rivalry that treats Southeast Asia as a battleground, so they will not be of help. But midsized powers and traditional partners such as Australia, the EU and UK could support regional cohesion if they spent less time pushing Western values and seeding animosity toward China, which even if justified, generates further division.

Southeast Asian governments and their leaders could help by speaking with one voice on critical issues and maintaining traditional balancing approaches to great power competition. As things stand today, there is a real chance that the Philippines and China will come to blows over the Second Thomas Shoal.

That would bring the United States and China dangerously close to war. Will ASEAN leaders be able to combine and collaborate to prevent any crisis from escalating? Right now, that looks doubtful.