Are Houthis Attacking Saudi Oil Tankers - or Is There a Bigger Story?

The reports that Yemen’s Houthis are attacking Saudi oil tankers deserve closer examination. Not because such attacks are impossible, but because the emerging narrative may be more complicated than it appears.

During the height of Israel’s assault on Gaza, the Houthis declared that their maritime campaign was directed primarily against Israeli-owned or Israel-linked vessels and ships carrying goods to and from Israel. Their stated objective was to pressure Israel over Gaza. Against this background, the reported targeting of Saudi tankers represents a significant development.

There is little doubt that Houthi military operations have disrupted commercial shipping in the Red Sea and surrounding waters. But disruption of Saudi shipping does not necessarily mean that every incident represents a deliberate Houthi campaign against Saudi Arabia. The Red Sea, Bab el-Mandeb and Suez Canal form one interconnected maritime corridor. Once security deteriorates, vessels of different nationalities become exposed.

This distinction matters because the dominant Western narrative - “Iran-backed Houthis are attacking Saudi oil tankers and installations” - can simplify a complex regional conflict. Attribution should be based on evidence, while the political context surrounding each incident deserves equal attention.

There is another question that cannot simply be dismissed as conspiracy theory, who benefits from heightened insecurity around Saudi Arabia?

A prolonged Houthi threat could encourage Riyadh to deepen its security relationship with Washington, strengthen arguments for a US security umbrella, increase American arms sales to Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states, and potentially create greater pressure for Saudi Arabia to move closer to the Abraham Accords.

None of these possibilities proves that another actor is secretly attacking Saudi ships. Claims about covert operations or CIA-linked groups require evidence and should not be presented as established fact.

Yet history demonstrates that major geopolitical confrontations rarely involve only the actors appearing on the battlefield. Different powers can exploit the same crisis to advance their own strategic interests.

Therefore, the real issue may not simply be whether Houthis are attacking Saudi oil tankers. The more important question is whether Houthi attacks—and the narrative surrounding them—are becoming instruments in a much larger struggle over Saudi Arabia’s security choices, regional alignments and America’s continuing influence in the Gulf.

Iran attacks damage US diplomatic facilities

US diplomatic facilities in four Gulf countries suffered around US$184 million in estimated damages from Iranian military strikes, reports The Hill.

These facilities are located in Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), says a Pentagon 44-page report, the first one since the US and Israel launched the war in late February. 

The heaviest damage was sustained in Iraq with over US$157 million in costs, followed by Kuwait with more than US$14 million in damages and US$11.5 million in Saudi Arabia.

In the UAE, the US diplomatic post suffered US$125,000 in damages.

The US mission in Iraq experienced over 600 Iranian attacks. 

The Iranian military has targeted various US military bases in the Gulf since Operation Epic Fury kicked off on February 28 this year.

Tehran has also inflicted heavy damages on diplomatic and intelligence outposts in those countries. 

From February 28 to June 29, the Pentagon has estimated the cost of war to be US$33.4 billion, but that does not include costs for infrastructure repairs.

In July, Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth told Senate lawmakers that the Iran war’s estimated cost was US$37.5 billion, a sum that some experts argued was a low estimate. 

The State Department, meanwhile, reported that as of June 2, it had incurred US$113 million in costs related to the war and “as it continues to assess damage, costs are likely to rise.”

In addition, 18 US service members have been killed and some 800 wounded in the more than six-month war.

About 50,000 American troops are still deployed to the region, with the Trump administration yet to provide a clear exit strategy from the deeply unpopular conflict. 

Top administration officials have at times downplayed the damages Iranian one-way attack drones and missiles have inflicted on US military bases, aircraft and other assets in the US Central Command (Centcom) theater. 

Last week, President Trump denied news reports that several US military jets were damaged in Iran’s attack on Muwaffaq Salti Air Base in Jordan. 

“None whatsoever. No damage. No nothing,” the president said in an interview with The Hill’s sister network NewsNation when asked about one A-10 Thunderbolt losing a wing and eight F-15s sustained light damage. 

More than 50 US aircraft have been damaged or destroyed since the Iran war began, according to the watchdog’s report, including 4 F-15Es, seven KC-135 refueling aircraft, four AH-6 helicopters and at least 30 MQ-9 Reaper drones. 

But some top officials were more candid. 

“They blew the hell out of Bahrain,” the acting US Navy Secretary Hung Cao said in an interview last week with The Epoch Times when asked about the level of damage Naval Support Activity Bahrain (NASB), which serves as the headquarters for US Naval Forces Central Command and the US Fifth Fleet, had sustained since the conflict began. 

The Navy has used the NASB as its main logistics hub in the Middle East. The service branch is weighing what to do with the base, including if it should be repaired. 

“I have a task force that’s looking at that,” Cao said.

 

Iran advises crew to abandon tankers in Bahrain and Kuwait

According to Seatrade Maritime news, following strikes on five Iranian tankers by US forces, Iran has announced to strike commercial tankers in Bahrain and Kuwait. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corp (IRGC) Navy issued what Iranian media described as an “urgent warning” in response to the US attacks.

The warning told all tanker crews in Bahraini and Kuwaiti to immediately abandon their vessels, whether at anchor or at berth in ports, as they would be targeted by the IRGC Navy.

Kuwait and Bahrain, hosting US military bases have come under consistent attack by Iran since the war with the US started at the end of February.

Maritime security firm Vanguard Tech said it assessed the warning as credible enough to require "immediate operational consideration", although an attack was not inevitable.

It noted the warning was unusually specific in terms of vessel type and location, it was consistent with past Iranian behaviour in terms of targeting Bahrain and Kuwait, and a widening of the rationale for attacks to cover vessels in particular port associated with the US military regardless of flag or ownership.

The threat to commercial tankers in Bahraini and Kuwaiti ports follows the US strikes on five Iranian owned or linked tankers which US Central Command described as having “destroyed the vessels” after crews were directed to abandon ship.

The Iranian-flagged NITC VLCC Derya was targeted near Kharg Island. US forces also fired on four vessels in the Gulf of Oman – the Aframaxes Kaviz and Riesco, the oil/ product tanker Charminar, and the LPG carrier Horizon 1. 

Video from US Central Command showed four of the vessels being struck towards the stern while the Riesco was shown with fires raging on its deck and around the accommodation block.

The strikes on the Iranian linked tankers were in response to two IRGC attacks on a US warship, which US Centcom said had failed.

The threat to commercial shipping in the region has ratcheted up significantly in recent weeks with the US striking eight Iranian owned or linked tankers and Iran attacking at least four commercial tankers in the Strait of Hormuz including the Bahri VLCC Sidr which resulted in the deaths of two Filipino seafarers and the Sinokor VLCC Senegal Prosperity which was abandoned and listing following an attack on August 30, 2026.

 

Oman postpones Hormuz talks with Iran and Gulf states

According to Eurasia Media Network, Oman has postponed a regional meeting scheduled for Monday in Salalah between Iran and several Gulf countries on the future of the Strait of Hormuz.

Omani Foreign Minister Badr Albusaidi said the gathering was delayed “in the interests of consensus” to allow conditions for constructive dialogue that could support regional stability.

Iran’s Foreign Ministry said the postponement came at the request of some regional countries and was a joint decision with Muscat. No new date has been set.

The talks were meant to discuss an Iran-Oman framework for managing shipping through the vital waterway, which carries a large share of the world’s oil and gas.

Iran has maintained restrictions on transit since the wider Middle East conflict began in late February.

Tehran has floated ideas including passage fees and revised routes. Bahrain had already said it would not attend until diplomatic ties with Iran were restored.

The delay comes amid continued disruption to energy flows, recent attacks on vessels, and high oil prices.

Oman, which borders the southern side of the strait, has been mediating for weeks. Officials in Muscat and Tehran said they remain committed to dialogue.

Pakistan Should Follow Indian FX Strategy

Reportedly, Indian foreign exchange reserves have reached a record US$785.7 billion. However, the more important lesson for Pakistan is not the size of India’s reserves, but the policy approach used to attract foreign currency. India has demonstrated that a country can actively mobilize foreign exchange through appropriate financial instruments instead of simply waiting for exports, remittances or external borrowing to increase reserves.

In June, the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) introduced measures to encourage dollar inflows, including discounted hedging facilities for overseas borrowings by state-run companies and banks, as well as free-of-cost hedging facilities for banks raising foreign-currency deposits from abroad.

The response was significant. Between June 5 and August 31, India received US$136.3 billion through these schemes, including US$127 billion in non-resident Indian deposits—far above initial expectations. Foreign exchange reserves subsequently increased by almost US$120 billion over ten consecutive weeks. The latest weekly increase alone was nearly US$45 billion.

The Indian experience raises an important question for Pakistan: can we develop a similar policy framework to mobilize foreign exchange rather than repeatedly seeking emergency financing?

Pakistan already has an important foundation through Roshan Digital Accounts and its large overseas Pakistani community. Millions of Pakistanis living abroad have strong economic and emotional links with the country. Yet the potential of this community as a stable source of foreign exchange remains considerably underutilized.

What is required is a more ambitious and coordinated foreign-exchange mobilization strategy.

First, overseas Pakistanis should be offered more attractive foreign-currency deposit and investment products, supported by competitive returns, predictable taxation and greater confidence in the financial system. The objective should be to encourage longer-term savings rather than merely short-term remittances.

Second, the banking sector could be provided carefully designed hedging facilities to attract longer-term foreign-currency deposits while managing exchange-rate risks. Such facilities should be transparent and market-oriented rather than creating an open-ended burden for the central bank.

Third, exporters should be encouraged to repatriate and retain a greater proportion of their foreign-exchange earnings within Pakistan. Export competitiveness should remain the priority, but the financial system can provide incentives for exporters to keep and invest their foreign-currency earnings domestically.

Fourth, financially sound Pakistani companies, banks and state-owned enterprises could be facilitated in raising foreign currency through international markets. A credible regulatory framework, stronger corporate governance and transparent disclosure would be essential to attract investors.

Pakistan could also explore mechanisms to channel part of its substantial diaspora wealth into infrastructure, energy, agriculture, technology and export-oriented industries. This would transform foreign exchange from a short-term financing source into productive capital.

Pakistan must avoid creating the appearance of stronger reserves through excessive short-term borrowing. The composition, maturity and sustainability of foreign-exchange inflows matter as much as the headline reserve figure. Borrowed dollars can provide temporary relief but cannot substitute for sustainable external earnings.

India’s experience demonstrates that foreign exchange does not always have to be passively accumulated. Appropriate incentives, financial instruments and institutional confidence can actively mobilize it.

The real question is no longer whether Pakistan needs more dollars. It is whether Pakistan is prepared to design a policy that makes those dollars come to Pakistan—and stay productively invested in the country.

 

BRICS Members Move to Reduce Reliance on the US Dollar

BRICS leaders have called for reforms to the global governance system, condemned unilateral tariffs and “acts of war”, and backed greater representation for developing countries at the United Nations Security Council (UNSC).

The positions were outlined in the New Delhi Declaration adopted on September 12 at the BRICS Summit in the Indian capital. Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi said the changing world could not be governed through outdated institutions and stressed the need for reforms in representation, responsiveness and rule-making.

The declaration called for a “structural update” of the UNSC, with greater representation for developing countries from Africa, Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean. China and Russia reiterated support for Brazil and India seeking a greater role at the United Nations, including on the Security Council.

A particularly significant development was the call for BRICS members to increase the use of local currencies in trade among themselves, reducing reliance on the US dollar. This reflects a broader effort to diversify international trade and financial transactions and gradually reduce dependence on the dollar-dominated global system.

BRICS also criticized unilateral tariffs and other trade restrictions, warning that they could disrupt supply chains, hamper global trade and deepen economic disparities. The bloc reaffirmed support for reforming the World Trade Organization to better address the needs of emerging and developing economies.

The declaration strongly condemned terrorism in all its forms and rejected attempts to associate terrorism with any religion, nationality, civilization or ethnic group. It also denounced “unilateral acts of war” and emphasized the protection of seafarers and commercial navigation amid continuing military tensions in the Middle East.

The expanding BRICS platform increasingly reflects the aspirations of the Global South for a more representative and multipolar international order.

Is Saudi Arabia Being Attacked to Recognize Israel

The growing friction between US President Donald Trump and Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MBS) surfaced when Washington sought to pressure Riyadh over the killing of Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi. Although the issue was eventually hushed up, US pressure on MBS continued, with Washington increasingly seeking Saudi recognition of Israel.

Israel's devastating military campaign in Gaza, however, complicated the American strategy. For MBS, moving toward normalization with Israel became politically difficult while Palestinians continued to suffer. Riyadh instead maintained that recognition must be linked to Palestinian statehood and a credible two-state solution.

China's mediation of the Saudi-Iran rapprochement delivered another strategic message to Washington. If two traditional regional rivals could overcome decades of hostility through Chinese diplomacy, America's traditional dominance in the Middle East could gradually weaken. The development also demonstrated that Saudi Arabia had alternatives to exclusive dependence on Washington.

When the US-Israeli war against Iran began on February 28, 2026, the regional equation changed dramatically. As Trump decided to escalate the conflict, Iranian retaliation against American military installations and interests across the Gulf became increasingly predictable. Saudi Arabia, with its enormous energy infrastructure and strategic importance, was inevitably exposed.

The US blockade of the Strait of Hormuz also threatened oil and gas exports from Gulf Arab states. Attempts to reroute Saudi oil through the Red Sea created additional vulnerabilities, particularly as attacks attributed to the Houthis increased. Drone attacks and threats to oil infrastructure have further complicated Saudi Arabia's security environment.

The conventional explanation is that Iran and its allies are responsible for these attacks. But another question deserves serious examination, who ultimately benefits from keeping Saudi Arabia under sustained security pressure?

Could regional proxy groups be operating in ways that serve a broader strategic objective? The purpose would not necessarily be to destabilize Saudi Arabia, but to increase its dependence on American security guarantees and make closer alignment with Washington appear unavoidable.

The United States has long sought normalization between Saudi Arabia and Israel. If Riyadh is repeatedly confronted with threats to its oil infrastructure, maritime routes and national security, pressure for a strategic accommodation with Israel could become stronger.

The crucial question, therefore, is not simply who is attacking Saudi Arabia. It is whether insecurity itself is being exploited to influence Riyadh's strategic choices.

Is Saudi Arabia being attacked because of its rivalry with Iran—or is the pressure ultimately intended to push the Kingdom toward recognizing Israel?