Linking Iran with 9/11: A Badly Woven Story

This morning, I burst into laughter when I read a report in The Hill quoting President Donald Trump and Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth linking the Iran war to the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks. What an extraordinary attempt to rewrite history!

For nearly a quarter of a century, the world has been told that Osama bin Laden, a Saudi national, and his al-Qaeda accomplices masterminded the 9/11 attacks. Yet the Trump administration now appears to be drawing Iran into that narrative by suggesting that the Islamic Republic’s hostility toward America is somehow a continuation of the war launched after 9/11.

Hegseth reportedly said that the United States has fought an Islamic theocracy that “cheered on 9/11.” Such a sweeping assertion demands evidence. Hostility toward the United States is not evidence of responsibility for an attack carried out by al-Qaeda. Nor does opposition to American foreign policy establish Iranian involvement in 9/11.

For those born after 9/11, a reminder of history is important. The United States imposed sanctions on Iran soon after the 1979 Islamic Revolution and subsequently supported Iraq during its nearly eight-year war against Iran. For decades, Washington maintained pressure on Tehran through sanctions, diplomatic isolation and military deployments, while Israel repeatedly targeted Iranian strategic installations and Iranian nuclear scientists.

Iran has therefore remained in Washington’s crosshairs for nearly half a century. But transforming this long-running confrontation into an extension of the 9/11 war is an entirely different matter.

The timing is equally revealing. Trump has indicated that the war with Iran, which began on February 28, 2026, could continue until the November midterm elections and then “end immediately.” This inevitably raises questions about the political utility of prolonged warfare.

The world should be extremely cautious about historical revisionism. The 9/11 tragedy was used to launch America’s “war on terror,” which lasted nearly two decades. Attempting now to rhetorically associate Iran with that tragedy, without presenting credible evidence of Iranian responsibility, risks turning history into a political instrument.

This is not merely an inaccurate narrative. It is a badly concocted story that deserves scrutiny rather than applause.

PSX benchmark index declines 2.7%WoW

Pakistan Stock Exchange (PSX) remained under pressure during the week ended on September 11, 2026. The benchmark Index declined 4,817 points or 2.7%WoW to close at 170,512 level. Market activity also weakened, with average daily trading volume declining by 17.5%WoW to 801 million shares.

Escalating attacks along key shipping routes by both US and Iran and Houthis targeting Saudi energy facilities, raised concerns about energy supplies and pushed global oil prices higher. Domestically, fuel prices also increased.

On a positive note, Moody’s highlighted that Pakistan absorbed the current conflict shock better than the 2022 crisis, supported by improved macroeconomic indicators.

The Workers’ Remittances in August 2026 rose by 17%YoY to US$3.7 billion.

Foreign exchange reserves held by State Bank of Pakistan (SBP) rose to US$18.3 billion as of September 4, 2026.

The Prime Minister approved the draft auto policy for FY27-31, although IMF approval remains pending.

RDA inflows rose 58%YoY to US$259 million in August 2026.

Other major news flow during the week included: 1) IMF review talks scheduled to start on September 22, 2026, 2) Qatari LNG cargo bound for Pakistan cleared Strait of Hormuz, 3) GoP cuts HSD refining margin cap to US$30/ bbl, 4) Pakistan signs cybersecurity cooperation agreement with Saudi Arabia, and 5) Pakistan- Australia likely to finalize investment agreement soon.

Major selling was recorded by Foreigners (US$7.2 million) and Mutual Funds (US$5.3 million), while the major buyers were Individuals (US$10.8 million) and Companies (US$5.5 million).

Top performing scrips were: PSEL, AICL, and LCI, while the laggards included: PGLC, SSGC, and CHCC.

AKD Securities expects the market to improve on the back of strengthening economic indicators.

Upcoming IMF review and monetary policy announcement to remain key near-term catalysts.

A potential US-Iran deal could moderate international oil prices from current elevated levels.

Market continues to trade at attractive valuations. The brokerage house forecasts the Index to reach 263,800 by end December 2026.

Top picks of the brokerage house include: OGDC, PPL, UBL, MEBL, HBL, FFC, ENGROH, PSO, LUCK, FCCL, INDU, ILP and SYS.

 

Trump’s Imprudent Policies Are Making Iran a Bigger Phantom

The latest US-Israel war on Iran, which began on February 28, 2026, appears to have produced an outcome very different from what Washington may have anticipated. Despite intense military and economic pressure, Iran has not capitulated. Instead, the conflict seems to have reinforced national cohesion and strengthened Tehran’s determination to resist external coercion.

Iran’s economy has certainly suffered. Years of sanctions have produced weak growth and high inflation, while the war has damaged critical industrial facilities and disrupted trade through the Strait of Hormuz. The IMF has estimated a sharp contraction in Iranian GDP, while inflation and currency depreciation have reached alarming levels. Yet economic pain has not translated into political surrender. Iranian businesses have spent years adapting to sanctions, maintaining substantial inventories and developing alternative trade channels. These practices have provided a degree of resilience even as supply chains and maritime trade have come under severe pressure.

Trump’s repeated appeals to Iranians to rise against their government may also be producing the opposite effect. External pressure can deepen public grievances, but it can simultaneously strengthen nationalist sentiment and resistance to perceived foreign interference. Iran’s leadership has demonstrated an ability to transfer much of the economic burden onto ordinary citizens while preserving the state’s capacity to resist.

There is another, potentially more consequential, dimension. Iranian attacks on US military facilities in Gulf countries have forced Arab states to reconsider the assumptions underlying their security arrangements. If the American military presence cannot prevent attacks on regional assets, questions naturally arise over whether Washington’s security architecture primarily serves Arab interests or Israel.

The Strait of Hormuz presents an equally serious dilemma. Disruptions may constrain Iranian oil exports, but Arab economies are also exposed through attacks on energy infrastructure, US-linked assets and reduced energy exports. A wider disruption extending toward the Red Sea, particularly through Houthi action, could impose an even heavier cost on regional economies.

The paradox is becoming increasingly clear - Washington may be capable of inflicting enormous pain on Iran, but pain alone has not delivered submission. Donald Trump’s imprudent policies may therefore be making Iran a “Bigger Phantom”—not necessarily more powerful, but more resilient, more unpredictable and increasingly costly to contain.

 

Xi’s Washington Visit: A Changing Balance of Power

Chinese President Xi Jinping’s upcoming visit to Washington for a summit with US President Donald Trump on September 24 comes at a critical juncture in global geopolitics. More than a bilateral engagement, the meeting could provide an insight into the changing balance of diplomatic influence between the world’s two largest economies.

Xi is arriving in Washington after an intensive diplomatic outreach covering the SCO, the Middle East and the wider Global South. His message is becoming increasingly clear - China’s foreign relations do not revolve around Washington. Beijing is building partnerships and expanding its diplomatic space while presenting itself as an advocate of dialogue, multilateralism and economic cooperation. The contrast with Washington is striking.

Trump has imposed punitive tariffs on a wide range of US trading partners, including traditional allies. These measures have generated retaliation, uncertainty and diplomatic friction rather than producing a corresponding surge in US exports. The broader issue is that unilateral tariff measures have also been challenged on grounds of their compatibility with the rules-based multilateral trading system.

Trump’s military confrontation with Iran has further complicated America’s international standing. The conflict has disrupted shipping through the Strait of Hormuz, one of the world’s most important energy arteries. The resulting disruption has affected oil and gas supplies, raised energy prices and created serious risks for commercial shipping and seafarers.

The crisis has also strained Washington’s relations with its traditional Middle Eastern partners. The China-brokered Saudi-Iran rapprochement had offered an opportunity to reduce regional confrontation. Renewed hostilities have undermined that spirit, leaving regional countries to reassess their dependence on Washington.

Meanwhile, Xi is using diplomacy to demonstrate that China has alternatives. His recent engagement with Egypt, alongside wider relations across Eurasia and the Global South, reinforces Beijing’s claim to a more multipolar international order.

This does not mean China has replaced the United States. America remains a formidable economic, technological and military power. But diplomatic influence cannot be sustained indefinitely through tariffs, pressure and military confrontation.

The Trump-Xi summit is being watched not merely for trade agreements, but for what it reveals about the future architecture of global power. One point is crystal clear; Donald Trump has antagonized relations with most of the countries around the world.

BRICS in Search of Purpose

When Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa expanded BRICS in the 2020s, the grouping appeared poised to become a major pillar of an emerging multipolar order. Today, with 11 full members and 10 partner countries, BRICS has considerable demographic, economic and diplomatic weight. Yet expansion has exposed a fundamental weakness - BRICS is better at expressing dissatisfaction with the existing international system than agreeing on what should replace it.

BRICS is not collapsing. It continues to attract countries seeking greater international influence, diversified partnerships and alternatives—or supplements—to Western-dominated institutions. The real question is whether its expanded membership can be converted into practical influence or whether internal rivalries and geopolitical contradictions will gradually erode its momentum.

The grouping contains democracies, monarchies and authoritarian states; energy exporters and importers; sanctioned countries and close Western partners. India and China remain strategic competitors, while Russia’s war in Ukraine and Iran’s confrontation with Israel and the United States complicate efforts to establish common security positions. BRICS has neither a collective defence commitment nor an effective mechanism for resolving disputes among its members.

This does not make BRICS irrelevant. Its greater value may lie in functioning as a consultative platform for countries that disagree on major geopolitical issues but cannot afford to ignore one another.

Under India’s 2026 presidency, security has moved higher on the agenda, including terrorism, cybersecurity, critical infrastructure, emerging technologies and other non-traditional threats. These areas offer greater scope for practical cooperation than contentious questions surrounding Ukraine, Gaza or US strategic power. Protecting ports, energy supplies, food systems and digital infrastructure can produce tangible benefits without requiring political unanimity.

Economic cooperation offers another opportunity. Despite years of talk about de-dollarization, a common BRICS currency remains unrealistic given members’ divergent monetary systems and political priorities. More achievable goals include expanding local-currency trade, improving cross-border payment systems and strengthening the New Development Bank.

BRICS should also clarify membership rules, distinguish the rights and responsibilities of full members and partners, and streamline decision-making. Consensus can remain essential for major declarations, while willing members should be allowed to pursue voluntary initiatives in infrastructure, food and energy security, climate adaptation, public health, cybersecurity and trade facilitation.

Ultimately, BRICS will not gain relevance simply by expanding or opposing Western dominance. Its longevity will depend on whether it can build institutions and deliver tangible benefits. Institutions do not last because of what they oppose; they last because of what they build.

Strait of Hormuz: Release the Seafarers Held Hostage

For months, entry and exit of merchant ships into/ from the Strait of Hormuz has remained at the lowest level due to the US blockade, though President Trump holds Iran responsible for this blockade.

The biggest losers are shipping companies because these ships are stuck and cannot be deployed on any other voyage. But even worse hit are the seafarers, who are stranded at sea for months, separated from their families and uncertain about when they will be able to return home.

The scale of this humanitarian crisis is staggering. According to the International Maritime Organization (IMO), around 6,000 seafarers remain stranded aboard vessels unable to leave the Persian Gulf safely. The UN human-rights office has reported that at least 6,000 seafarers aboard some 400 vessels remain stranded in and around the Strait of Hormuz.

These 6,000 people are not soldiers. They are not combatants. They are ordinary men and women doing their jobs to keep global trade moving. Yet they have become innocent victims of a geopolitical confrontation in which they have no stake.

These seafarers, stranded at sea, face disruption in food supplies, drinking water, medicines and other essential items. Prolonged confinement, uncertainty and separation from their families are placing an enormous psychological and physical burden on them.

A conclusion can be drawn that these ships and seafarers have been held “hostage” by the United States.

Iran, suffering from economic sanctions, has offered safe exit to these ships if they pay a toll. It is believed that shipping companies were willing to pay the toll for safe exit, but the US Navy denies exit even after payment of the toll.

Many analysts term US attacks on Iran illegal and the detention of ships and seafarers tantamount to “Maritime Terrorism.”

Whatever the legal or political arguments, one fact should concern the entire world - approximately 6,000 human beings are trapped at sea. They have families waiting for them. They have homes to return to. They have done nothing to become victims of this conflict.

The international community cannot remain silent while thousands of seafarers spend months trapped aboard ships.

May be the time has come for shipping companies to stop delivering cargo to, or taking cargo from, US ports unless the ships stranded at the Strait of Hormuz are allowed safe exit.

This is no longer merely a dispute between the United States and Iran. It is a humanitarian crisis.

All stakeholders - the US administration, Iran, shipping companies, maritime organizations, seafarers' unions and the international community—are requested to join hands for the immediate release and safe passage of these seafarers.

Political differences can wait. Economic disputes can wait. But human beings cannot wait indefinitely. The world must raise its voice for those who have no voice.

Release the ships. Release the seafarers.

OPEC Plus keeps oil output policy unchanged

OPEC Plus kept its oil output policy unchanged for ‌October at a meeting on Sunday, as the producer group needs to agree new quotas before deciding its next output steps.

The meeting of seven core OPEC+ members — Saudi Arabia, ​Russia, Iraq, Kuwait, Algeria, Kazakhstan and Oman — comes as the US-Israel war on Iran continues to ​disrupt oil exports through the Strait of Hormuz, limiting OPEC+'s influence over prices ⁠and market share.

In August, OPEC+ agreed its production boost for September, completing a phased rollback ​of a 1.65 million barrel per day supply cut first agreed in 2023.

Despite the agreed production increases, ​the group made up of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries and its allies, including Russia, still produces far below its targets because of the war.

"OPEC+ currently has ​very limited power over the physical oil market," said Jorge Leon of Rystad Energy. "The group ​can change production targets on paper, but it cannot guarantee that those barrels will be produced or ‌actually ⁠reach the market."

"The focus now shifts away from monthly production adjustments and towards the much more consequential debate over 2027."

OPEC+ still has another layer of production cuts in place, covering most members of the 21-country group until the end of 2026. Before the group decides ​how to unwind the ​cuts and return production ⁠to the market, it needs to review members' oil production capacity to set 2027 output baselines, which form the basis for quotas.

This ​debate will likely happen later in 2026 and hence OPEC+ is ​likely to pause ⁠its output increases for the fourth quarter, sources earlier told Reuters. The statement on Sunday made no mention of policy beyond October.

Only the seven OPEC+ members who met on Sunday, plus ⁠the United ​Arab Emirates until it left OPEC in May, have ​been involved in monthly output decisions in recent years.