China to support Bangladesh in achieving energy security

The United States and China have signalled support for Bangladesh’s economic recovery and energy security, Beijing expressing interest in expanding investment in the country’s power and energy sectors and Washington offering cooperation on debt management.

The assurances came during separate meetings between Bangladesh’s delegation and officials from the US Treasury Department and the Export-Import Bank of China (China Exim Bank) on the sidelines of the IMF-World Bank annual meetings in Bangkok, Thailand.

A member of the Bangladesh delegation said China Exim Bank had expressed interest in increasing investment in Bangladesh’s energy and power sectors.

The bank also informed the delegation that its chairman would visit Dhaka next week, raising the prospect of further engagement on investment.

The US Treasury Department, meanwhile, assured Bangladesh of cooperation in several areas, including debt management and bilateral relations.

Washington’s support is seen particularly important to Bangladesh’s efforts to secure financing from the International Monetary Fund (IMF), given the United States’ veto power over the institution’s decisions.

After meeting US Treasury officials, Finance Minister Amir Khosru Mahmud Chowdhury said Bangladesh had received less support from the United States than it had expected in the past, but hoped closer bilateral ties would lead to greater assistance.

The discussions covered debt management, bilateral relations and other issues, he said, adding that the improvement in relations had raised the government’s expectations of further US support.

Pointing to Bangladesh’s purchases of aircraft from the US and imports of goods including soybeans, the finance minister said the country should receive greater American support in advancing its development and economic interests.

Prime Minister’s Economic Adviser Dr Rashed Al Mahmud Titumir said the IMF, World Bank and US Treasury Department, among others, had acknowledged that the current government had inherited economic difficulties and high inflation.

The conflict in the Middle East had added to the pressure on the economy, he said.

They also said the current government was working sincerely to resolve the problems. As a result, the World Bank, IMF, US Treasury Department and other organizations have assured Bangladesh of their support.

According to Titumir, international financial institutions and US officials recognized the government’s sincere efforts to address these challenges. As a result, the World Bank, IMF, US Treasury Department and other organizations had assured Bangladesh of their support, he said.

The government expects confirmation of the assistance within the next two to three months, he added.

Saudi Security Vulnerabilities or Lapses

Saudi Arabia’s decision to stop issuing public warnings of imminent missile and drone attacks shortly before deadly strikes hit Riyadh airport raises serious questions about the kingdom’s security preparedness and crisis management. According to Reuters, the attacks killed at least 18 people and wounded more than 300, exposing the challenges Riyadh faces in protecting its population and maintaining an image of stability amid an escalating regional conflict.

The central question is whether the attacks exposed inherent vulnerabilities in Saudi Arabia’s security arrangements or lapses in managing an emerging threat. The distinction matters because the remedies are different - structural weaknesses require stronger defensive capabilities, while operational failures demand better coordination, timely communication and accountability.

Riyadh appears to have faced competing priorities: acknowledging the growing threat while avoiding public anxiety and disruption to economic activity. However, withholding warnings cannot eliminate danger; it can leave residents and visitors less prepared to respond.

Reuters reported that Saudi Arabia’s early-warning system had remained silent despite mounting Houthi attacks. Officials reportedly told a Western ally that alerts were disruptive and that some citizens had complained about being awakened at night. If accurate, this explanation raises concerns about how public safety was weighed against convenience. An early warning cannot prevent every casualty, but it can give people precious time to seek shelter.

The contrast with Qatar, Bahrain and Kuwait is instructive. Their use of mobile alerts and sirens demonstrates the importance of communicating potential threats, even when warnings disrupt daily routines. Public information should be treated as an essential component of national defence rather than an obstacle to normal economic activity.

Saudi Arabia also faces a formidable structural challenge. Its vast territory contains airports, oil installations, pipelines and other strategic assets that cannot all be protected simultaneously. Limited interceptor supplies and air-defence capacity complicate the task. Strengthening early-warning systems, improving defensive coordination and prioritizing critical infrastructure must therefore go hand in hand.

The economic stakes are substantial. Saudi Arabia’s investment and diversification ambitions depend partly on investor confidence and perceptions of stability. The reported withdrawal of senior oil executives from a major energy conference in Riyadh illustrates how security concerns can disrupt international engagements despite official assurances that economic plans remain on track.

Ultimately, Saudi Arabia must demonstrate that its pursuit of normalcy does not come at the expense of public safety. Whether the problem lies in structural vulnerabilities, operational lapses or both, restoring confidence requires credible warnings, stronger defensive capabilities and effective crisis management. In an era of expanding missile and drone warfare, projecting stability is no substitute for delivering security.

US Foreign Policy Is Becoming Morally Bankrupt

Over the years, many analysts, including myself, have questioned whether the United States consistently adheres to the ethical principles it expects other nations to respect. Under Donald Trump, the contradiction between Washington’s rhetoric and its actions has become increasingly difficult to ignore. Democracy, sovereignty and a rules-based international order are presented as universal principles, yet their application often appears conditional on American strategic and economic interests.

The war against Iran, the killing of its Supreme Leader and Washington’s pursuit of regional objectives raise serious questions about the limits of American power. Similarly, the arrest of Venezuela’s president and the drive to control the country’s energy resources have reinforced concerns that national sovereignty becomes negotiable when a government challenges Washington’s interests.

In South Asia, allegations of American involvement in political changes in Pakistan and Bangladesh have fuelled suspicions that Washington’s commitment to democracy is selective. Such allegations require scrutiny, and domestic political dynamics cannot be ignored. Nevertheless, the perception that external powers can influence political outcomes undermines the credibility of the principles they claim to defend.

The latest Russian diesel arrangement offers another revealing example of Washington’s shifting priorities. The reported purchase of 300,000 tons of Russian diesel, despite American efforts to restrict Moscow’s energy revenues over its war against Ukraine, raises questions about the consistency of US policy. When energy security and domestic economic pressures become pressing, previously declared strategic principles appear open to adjustment.

The implications extend beyond energy markets. Ukraine, under President Volodymyr Zelensky, has depended heavily on American military and financial support to resist Russia’s invasion. Yet Trump’s reported suggestion that Ukraine needed new leadership following disagreements over policy raises a fundamental question, is American support grounded in a consistent commitment to sovereignty, or is it conditional on political compliance?

Here lies the contradiction. Washington has supported Ukraine’s resistance to Russian aggression, yet its own interests can lead it towards arrangements that potentially benefit Moscow. The immediate priorities of American consumers and voters may take precedence over the strategic concerns of an ally fighting for its territorial integrity.

The issue is not whether America has the right to pursue its national interests. Every sovereign state does. The question is whether Washington can claim moral leadership while applying one standard to its adversaries and another to itself.

Military supremacy can compel compliance, economic power can impose costs, and political pressure can influence governments. None, however, guarantees moral authority. When principles become negotiable and national interests override proclaimed values, the result is a crisis of credibility.

A superpower may impose its will through military and economic strength, but it cannot command moral authority. American foreign policy risks losing precisely what Washington claims to defend - the moral legitimacy of its leadership.

The Iran War: Is the Real Target Saudi Arabia?

The US-Israel war on Iran has exposed a harsh reality: American military dominance does not necessarily translate into political acceptance in the Middle East. More importantly, the conflict has raised a fundamental question about whose security Washington is really protecting.

For decades, the United States has justified its military bases across Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries as essential to protecting Arab monarchies against external threats, particularly Iran. Yet the use of these bases during the war has reinforced a perception that American military power serves Israeli security interests, potentially at the expense of the host countries. Instead of providing an unquestionable security umbrella, these arrangements risk exposing Arab states to retaliation.

China’s mediation of the 2023 Saudi-Iran rapprochement had already challenged Washington’s longstanding narrative that Iran posed a greater threat to Arab interests than Israel. Riyadh’s decision to restore diplomatic relations with Tehran demonstrated that regional security could be pursued through engagement rather than permanent confrontation.

The prolonged disruption of shipping through the Strait of Hormuz, attacks on oil tankers and energy infrastructure, and mounting pressure on Gulf economies have further exposed the vulnerabilities of Arab oil producers. These developments raise a critical question, are GCC states merely collateral victims of the war, or are they also facing strategic pressure to reconsider their regional alignments?

President Donald Trump’s reported request for Russia to supply 300,000 tons of diesel highlights the conflict’s wider energy repercussions. Although this does not establish a hidden agenda, it illustrates how the consequences extend far beyond Iran.

The larger strategic question is whether the conflict is also being used to advance Israel’s regional integration through the Abraham Accords. Saudi Arabia’s recognition of Israel and establishment of diplomatic relations would represent a major diplomatic victory for Benjamin Netanyahu and strengthen Israel’s regional position.

My interpretation is that the war may be evolving into a pressure campaign against GCC monarchies, particularly Saudi Arabia, compelling them to succumb to American pressure: recognize Israel, establish diplomatic relations and accept its regional supremacy.

This remains a strategic hypothesis, not a proven war objective. Nevertheless, it deserves serious scrutiny. The ultimate irony would be that a war ostensibly directed against Iran ends up pressuring Arab monarchies to accept a regional order shaped around Israeli supremacy—while simultaneously weakening confidence in American protection.

Who Really Seeks Control of the Red Sea Gateway?

The United States has repeatedly intervened in conflicts across the Middle East, often justifying its military presence as essential to regional stability and the protection of international trade. Yet an important question remains, do these interventions resolve security crises, or can they also create opportunities to expand American strategic influence? The confrontation involving Saudi Arabia, Yemen’s Houthis and the United States deserves scrutiny from this perspective.

The Houthis intensified attacks on shipping in the Red Sea after the Gaza war erupted in October 2023, declaring their campaign a means of pressuring Israel. Vessels linked to Israel became particular targets, although the attacks and their consequences extended beyond Israeli shipping. International trade was disrupted, seafarers were endangered and the security of the Bab el-Mandeb Strait became a global concern.

However, threatening shipping bound for Israel is not the same as deliberately targeting Saudi Arabia. Each reported attack must be examined on its own evidence, including the identity of the attacker, the intended target and the strategic purpose. Iranian support for the Houthis does not, by itself, establish Iranian direction of every operation.

Washington has presented its military campaign against the Houthis as a response to threats against navigation and regional security. But military intervention can produce consequences beyond its declared objectives. By expanding its operational presence, surveillance and influence over maritime security, the United States can strengthen its position around a gateway connecting the Red Sea with the Gulf of Aden and the wider Indian Ocean.

This raises a question that deserves serious investigation, could the escalation of hostilities be creating the strategic conditions for greater American influence over access to one of the world's most important shipping corridors?

The possibility should not be confused with proof that Washington engineered the confrontation or that a US proxy is responsible for attacks attributed to the Houthis. Such allegations require independently verifiable evidence. Nevertheless, the strategic consequences of military operations merit examination regardless of their stated intentions.

I prefer to frame the broader issue as “US-Controlled Entry and Exit” rather than simply a blockade. Control over a maritime gateway need not involve formally closing it. It can also emerge through military deployments, intelligence capabilities, security partnerships and the ability to influence the conditions under which commercial vessels pass.

The central issue, therefore, is not merely whether the Houthis threaten Saudi Arabia or whether American forces can suppress them. It is whether the resulting security arrangements protect freedom of navigation for all nations or gradually concentrate strategic leverage in the hands of an outside power.

The world must distinguish between securing an international waterway and acquiring the power to determine who can use it, on what terms and under whose protection. That distinction may ultimately prove more consequential than the military confrontation itself.

PSX benchmark index declines 0.6%WoW

Pakistan Stock Exchange (PSX) remained volatile during the week ended on October 09, 2026 amid continued attacks on key shipping routes. The benchmark Index declined by 1,066 points or 0.6%WoW to close at 167,089. Market activity also weakened, with average daily trading volume declining by 16.5%WoW to 541 million shares.

Meanwhile, Ukraine’s drone strikes on Russian refineries and concerns over US energy supplies amid Hurricane Isaias kept Brent oil prices above US$100/ bbl, despite improving traffic through the Strait of Hormuz and Trump’s claim that it would refrain from attacking Iran until the midterm elections scheduled for early November 2026.

The IMF reached a Staff-Level Agreement with Pakistan on the 4th review of EFF and 3rd review of RSF, acknowledging the Government’s policies in navigating the Middle East conflict.

Foreign exchange reserves held by State Bank of Pakistan (SBP) increased to US$21.5 billion as of October 02, 2026.

Pakistan raised PKR352 billion in the latest PIB auction, with yields rising across all tenors.

Banking sector deposits rose 14%YoY to PKR39.2 trillion at end August 2026.

Cement offtakes increased 6%YoY to 4.6 million tons in September 2026, reflecting improved local demand due to recovery in construction activity.

Cotton arrivals increased 5%YoY to 3.2 million bales during the same period.

Other major news flow during the week included: 1) Makkah defence alliance agrees to 'rapid force deployment' in Saudi Arabia, 2) GoP debt posts marginal decline to date, 3) GoP clears nine bidders for Gepco sale, 4) Bahrain working to 'speed up' approval of Pak-GCC free trade pact, and 5) Pakistan, Qatar agree to review LNG deal.

While the laggards were: Vanaspati & Allied Industries, Leasing companies, and Sugar, Textile spinning, Synthetic & Rayon, and Modarabas emerged top performers.

Major selling was recorded by Mutual Funds with US$17.6 million. On the contrary, net buyers were Individuals (US$11.4 million) and Companies (US$6.5 million).

Top performing scrips were: TGL, PSO, BML, AGP, and FCCL, while laggards included: SSOM, PGLC, CPHL, IMAGE, and PSX.

AKD Securities anticipates the market to improve on the back of strengthening economic indicators. Additionally, easing inflationary pressures would reduce probability of monetary tightening. Any positive development on Middle East conflict could moderate international oil prices and serve as a key trigger for market, paving the way for monetary easing.

The market continues to trade at attractive valuations. The top picks of the brokerage house include: OGDC, PPL, UBL, MEBL, HBL, FFC, ENGROH, PSO, LUCK, FCCL, INDU, ILP and SYS.

Over 80 US aircrafts destroyed or damaged

According to Saudi Gazette, the US military has had at least 81 aircraft destroyed or damaged during military operations against Iran. The figures comprise of operational incidents recorded since February 28, 2026 across Pentagon records, US Central Command (CENTCOM) statements, military inspector general findings, and press accounts.

The number includes both airplanes and helicopters as well as drones, with the MQ-9 Reaper drone – used for intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, close air support and combat search and rescue – accounting for more than half of the losses.

Also on the list are some of the Pentagon’s most-prized assets, including an F-35A fighter jet and an E-3 Sentry, the four-engine jet with a large radar dome atop the fuselage used for target tracking and airspace management.

The total cost of the aircraft lost is between US$1.9 billion and US$3.3 billion, depending on the Defense Department’s plans for replacements, the report said, citing figures from the Congressional Budget Office.

The total cost of the war is much higher – at least US$45 billion. That figure doesn’t include damage to infrastructure at US bases in the region, including those where some of the aircraft losses happened.

Some of the aircraft included in the count may have been returned to service, including eight F-15 Strike Eagle fighter jets that sustained light damage in an Iranian strike on Muwaffaq Salti Air Base, Jordan, in September.

The report is based on numbers contained in statements from the Defense Department; its inspector general; US Central Command, which has been conducting the operations against Iran; and news reports reviewed by the CRS.

The report poses several questions for congressional consideration, including whether lawmakers are getting enough information from the Pentagon on the losses to determine effects and remedies.

Defense Department reporting on Iran war losses has, to date, been vague. Even the Pentagon inspector general’s report on the losses, released in September and covering action from February 28 to June 30, cites previous CRS reports for some of its aircraft loss numbers.

Other issues Congress needs to think about are whether to provide funding for repairs or replacements; whether there is enough industrial capacity to satisfy those requirements; and the effects on US military sales to foreign partners.

It also raises questions about how the Iran war has affected US posture outside the Middle East.

“Congress may assess whether losses in certain high-demand platforms that are aging and limited in number, such as the E-3 Sentry, create capability gaps or increase risk in other theaters,” the report says.

Analysts have said actions in the Middle East, including the Iran war and earlier confrontations with the Houthi rebels in Yemen, an Iranian proxy group, have taken an especially heavy toll on the MQ-9 drones, which Air Force Chief of Staff Gen. Kenneth Wilsbach told Congress earlier this year was the military’s “most valuable player” in the war with Iran.

Forty-five have been lost in the Middle East this year, “an alarming rate,” according to a September report from the Atlantic Council.

The Air Force has lost about 35% of its MQ-9s since 2004, it says.