Sunday, 4 October 2026

Is Gold Losing Its Glitter?

For centuries, gold has been regarded as a store of value, a hedge against inflation and a refuge in times of uncertainty. Yet 2026 has challenged this conventional wisdom. Gold crossed US$5,000 per ounce in January 2026 before retreating sharply. The decline raises an intriguing question, is gold losing some of its traditional glitter?

Several factors may explain this reversal.

First, central banks were major buyers of gold during the global drive to diversify reserves and reduce dependence on the US dollar. Any slowdown in this accumulation could weaken an important source of demand. However, it would be premature to conclude that central banks have stopped accumulating gold.

Second, higher oil prices increase the dollar requirements of oil-importing countries. Governments also need foreign exchange to build strategic reserves and meet external obligations. In such circumstances, liquid dollar reserves may take precedence over additional gold purchases.

Third, geopolitical uncertainty can have an unexpected impact. Gold is traditionally considered a safe haven, but crises also create an urgent need for immediately deployable liquidity. The US dollar, backed by deep and liquid financial markets, can therefore compete directly with gold for safe-haven demand.

Fourth, persistent inflation creates a paradox. Although inflation can support gold as a hedge, rising food, energy and housing costs erode household purchasing power. Families facing higher living expenses may simply have less surplus cash to invest in gold.

Fifth, the increasing availability of bank financing against jewellery may change household behaviour. Instead of selling gold to meet urgent cash requirements, owners can pledge jewellery as collateral while retaining the underlying asset.

Finally, buoyant equity markets can divert investment flows. When stocks and other risk assets promise attractive returns, investors may prefer them to non-yielding gold and gold-backed funds.

None of these factors alone explains the decline. Together, however, they suggest that the investment environment surrounding gold may be changing.

Perhaps gold has not lost its glitter. Perhaps, for the moment, liquidity has become as valuable as a safe haven. The real question is whether this is merely a correction after an extraordinary rally—or the beginning of a structural change in the way investors value gold.

Saturday, 3 October 2026

Pakistan and Saudi Arabia: From Brotherhood to a Strategic Partnership

Saudi Arabia’s National Day is an appropriate occasion to reflect on a relationship that has evolved from traditional bonds of faith and friendship into a broader strategic partnership. Pakistan and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia have maintained close relations for decades, supported by deep people-to-people contacts, economic cooperation and shared security interests. Today, energy, investment and regional diplomacy are adding new dimensions to this enduring relationship.

Saudi Arabia has consistently stood by Pakistan during periods of economic difficulty. In April 2026, Riyadh agreed to provide an additional US$3 billion deposit to Pakistan while extending its existing US$5 billion deposit for a longer period rather than continuing the earlier annual rollover arrangement. The support is important for Pakistan’s foreign-exchange reserves and external financing requirements.

Oil financing has also remained an important element of bilateral economic cooperation. In February 2025, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia signed a US$1.2 billion oil-import financing facility under which payment for petroleum imports could be deferred for one year. The arrangement helped Pakistan secure energy supplies while easing immediate pressure on its foreign-exchange position.

Such support is valuable, but the relationship is increasingly moving towards investment and productive cooperation. This transition is particularly visible in the energy sector.

Pakistan is working with Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Qatar on a bonded oil-storage scheme under which the Gulf countries would store crude oil and petroleum products in secure facilities in Pakistan at their own cost, with the stocks also potentially serving international markets. The initiative could strengthen Pakistan’s energy security while creating a new commercial and logistical role for the country.

For Pakistan, this opportunity is strategically important. The country remains heavily dependent on imported energy and has historically lacked adequate strategic petroleum reserves. Developing storage capacity for crude and finished products can provide greater protection against international supply disruptions while improving the efficiency of the domestic energy supply chain.

The proposed greenfield refinery represents an even more ambitious opportunity. The project envisages an integrated refinery and petrochemical complex with a minimum crude-processing capacity of 300,000 barrels per day, supported by marine infrastructure, storage, pipelines and related facilities. Saudi Aramco has been associated with the project alongside Pakistani state-owned energy companies.

If implemented successfully, such projects could change the character of Pakistan-Saudi economic relations. Instead of relying primarily on deposits, concessional financing and deferred payments, the two countries can increasingly build a partnership around investment, energy security, industrial production, logistics and trade.

There is another area where Pakistan can make a meaningful contribution - relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran. Pakistan has a unique diplomatic position. It has strategic relations with Saudi Arabia while sharing a border, history and longstanding diplomatic relations with Iran. Islamabad therefore has a natural interest in encouraging communication between Riyadh and Tehran rather than allowing regional rivalries to deepen.

Saudi Arabia and Iran themselves demonstrated in 2023 that dialogue is possible. With China’s facilitation, the two countries agreed to restore diplomatic relations and emphasized respect for sovereignty, non-interference and the peaceful resolution of differences.

Pakistan’s role has become more relevant amid the regional turbulence of 2026. Saudi Arabia publicly welcomed Pakistani mediation efforts in June, while Pakistan has continued to emphasize dialogue and diplomacy. In September, Pakistan’s Foreign Office stated that Islamabad maintains good relations with both Saudi Arabia and Iran and would continue its mediatory role.

Pakistan should build on this position carefully. Its objective should not be to replace established mediators or take responsibility for resolving every regional dispute. Rather, Islamabad can provide a trusted channel for communication, encourage confidence-building measures and facilitate dialogue whenever both sides consider such assistance useful.

Improved Saudi-Iran relations would also serve Pakistan’s interests. Greater stability in the Gulf would reduce risks to energy supplies, maritime trade and regional investment while creating a more favourable environment for economic cooperation.

On Saudi Arabia’s National Day, Pakistan can therefore celebrate more than a historic friendship. The relationship is entering a phase in which financial support remains important, but investment, energy security, industrial cooperation and regional diplomacy can provide its stronger foundations.

For Pakistan, the strategic objective should be to preserve the warmth and trust of its relationship with Saudi Arabia while converting that goodwill into long-term economic cooperation and using its unique position to promote greater regional stability.

Flydubai FZ1073: What Are We Not Being Told?

The more details emerging about flydubai Flight FZ1073, the more questions arise. The UAE prosecutor general has now described the incident as an attempted terrorist attack, saying the co-pilot attacked the captain with a crash axe and attempted to take control of the aircraft. Yet the motive and the full circumstances remain under investigation. I believe investigators must look beyond the immediately available narrative.

Was FZ1073 really an ordinary commercial flight, or was there something unusual about its passengers, identities or cargo?

The first question concerns identities. Were all passengers and crew travelling under their genuine identities? Were passports, immigration records, airline databases and security clearances independently cross-checked? Did any passenger or crew member have a travel history or identity requiring closer scrutiny?

The second question concerns cargo. Was every item loaded on the aircraft properly declared and recorded? Did the physical cargo correspond exactly with the manifest? Were any packages loaded, transferred or handled outside normal procedures?

Then comes the cockpit mystery. Was the co-pilot genuinely the aggressor, as now officially stated, or could the sequence of events have been more complicated? Investigators should reconstruct the confrontation through cockpit voice recordings, flight-data records, access logs, communications, forensic evidence and eyewitness accounts.

The presence of additional pilots aboard the aircraft also deserves careful examination. Their role in bringing the aircraft safely to Tabuk is established, but investigators should establish precisely when and how they became involved.

Most importantly, why have so many conflicting details appeared in the media? Fake videos and contradictory claims have already circulated, prompting fact-checkers to warn about misinformation surrounding the incident.

This is not an attempt to convict anyone through speculation. It is a demand for evidence.

If FZ1073 was simply the victim of a lone insider attack, a transparent investigation should establish that beyond doubt.

But if identities were concealed, cargo was undeclared, or the cockpit incident was merely one part of a larger plan, investigators must uncover it.

The real story will emerge only when every passenger, every piece of cargo and every minute of the flight is accounted for.

Why Should G7 Bail Out Donald Trump?

Why should the Group of Seven bail out Donald Trump from an energy crisis aggravated by the war with Iran and disruption of energy flows through the Strait of Hormuz?

The question becomes even more relevant after G7 countries agreed to release up to 100 million barrels of diesel, crude oil and other petroleum products from emergency reserves over four months, with a substantial volume of diesel to be released within the first 20 days.

The decision followed intense pressure from Washington, including the threat of a US diesel-export ban that could have further disrupted supplies to Europe.

The irony is difficult to ignore. Trump had repeatedly indicated that a diesel-export ban was under consideration. After European countries agreed to release their strategic stocks, he declared that the United States would not impose such a ban—and claimed that it had never really been on the table.

If that is the case, why were America's allies required to open their emergency reserves?

Strategic petroleum reserves are maintained for genuine emergencies. They should not become an instrument for managing the consequences of another country's policies. Releasing 100 million barrels may provide temporary relief, but it cannot substitute for restoring normal energy flows.

The larger question is therefore unavoidable, why is Washington concentrating on extracting more fuel from its allies instead of addressing the causes of the disruption?

The Strait of Hormuz is vital to the global energy system. Prolonged disruption affects far more than Iran. Higher crude and refined-product prices feed directly into transportation, agriculture, manufacturing, inflation and household costs across the world.

Trump may describe the G7 release as a “major world contribution.” But the world needs more than emergency barrels. It needs secure shipping routes, uninterrupted energy supplies and a diplomatic framework capable of ending the confrontation.

Punishing Iran through sanctions and military pressure while asking the rest of the world to absorb the resulting energy shock is hardly a sustainable strategy.

If Washington wants its allies to share the burden of the crisis, it should also be prepared to share responsibility for ending it. Otherwise, the G7 may simply be helping Trump postpone a problem that requires a political solution.

Friday, 2 October 2026

PSX benchmark index down 1.5%WoW

Pakistan Stock Exchange (PSX) remained under pressure during the week ended on Friday, October 02, 2026, as renewed uncertainty over the US-Iran conflict and elevated global energy prices continued to weigh on investor sentiment. The benchmark index witnessed erosion of 2,610 points or 1.5%WoW to close at 168,155.

Oil prices remained elevated for most of the week, touching US$105.3/ bbl, as supply chain concerns and China's suspension of oil product exports outweighed recovering Gulf crude flows.

Brent crude declined to US$99.5/ bbl in the concluding phase of the week amid growing pressure of the US on Europe to release diesel stocks.

September 2026 inflation was recorded at 10.3% as against 11.2% in August 2026 due to disinflationary pressure from food prices.

Trade deficit for September 2026 widened by 6%YoY to US$3.6 billion.

IMF mission formally began policy talks in Islamabad on the fourth EFF review and third RSF review, likely to result in the release of US$1.2 billion in combined disbursements.

FBR collected PKR3.1 trillion in 1QFY27, exceeding the IMF-agreed target by PKR13 billion.

State Bank of Pakistan (SBP) raised PKR853 billion via the T-Bills auction. The cutoff yields increased for all the tenors.

Other major news flow during the week included: 1) Finance Minister discussed potential US Export-Import Bank financing for Boeing aircraft, refinery upgrades and Reko Diq, 2) foreign exchange reserves held by SBP were reported at US$21.4 billion as of September 25, 2026, 3) SBP's net FX interventions were reported at US$841 million in June 2026, 4) GoP raised PKR46 billion and PKR72 billion in fixed/ variable Hybrid Sukuk auction, and 5) Gop plans to procure at least 25-26 LNG cargoes to meet winter gas demand.

Leading contributors were Vanaspati and Allied Industries, Synthetic and Rayon, and Modarabas, while sectors that lagged the most were Power, Inv. Cos., and Paper and Board.

Major buyers were Companies (US$5.2 million) and Individuals (US$4.5 million). On the contrary, major net selling was recorded by Mutual funds (US$6.1 million) and Brokers worthUS$2.3 million, respectively.

Top performing scrips were: SSOM, ii) BML, and ATRL, while laggards included: PSEL, FHAM, and NPL.

AKD Securities expects the market to improve on the back of strengthening economic indicators, with the upcoming IMF review to remain a key near-term catalyst.

A potential US-Iran deal could moderate international oil prices from current elevated levels. The market continues to trade at attractive valuations.

According to AKD Securities, the Index is anticipated to reach 263,800 by end December 2026.

Top picks of the brokerage house include: OGDC, PPL, UBL, MEBL, HBL, FFC, ENGROH, PSO, LUCK, FCCL, INDU, ILP and SYS.

 

 

Thursday, 1 October 2026

Four vessels struck in Hormuz in 24 hours

According to Seatrade Maritime News, UKMTO has published four warnings of attacks in the Strait of Hormuz which took place on September 28 and 29.

The first of the late reports states that a vessel was struck by an unknown projectile late on September 28, leading to a fire onboard, which was later extinguished. The crew were reported as safe. The IMO’s list of confirmed attacks in the region now carries a September 28 incident involving VLCC Al Funtas in the Strait of Hormuz, reporting damage to the ship and no pollution. The ship is owned and operated by Kuwait Oil Tanker Company.

The UKMTO report was filed as suspicious activity, rather than an attack, even though it confirms an attack on the ship.

On September 30, three more late reports were published regarding incidents that took place on September 29. The first report is of a crude oil tanker struck on the port side, identified by Vanguard Tech as 2008-built VLCC Mersin Prosperity. According to Equasis data, the ship is managed by ADNOC.

The second report is of a tanker transiting inbound being struck by an unknown projectile, identified by Vanguard as Sinbad, a Liberian-flagged tanker managed by Anglo-Eastern.

The third report of a tanker struck by an unknown projectile regards Al Ruwais, according to Vanguard, which it identified as an LNG tanker, although the vessel appears to be a Liberia-flagged LR2 owned and operated by ADNOC.

All of the attacks were within the Strait of Hormuz.

Of the three ships identified by Vanguard, only Sinbad appears on Iran’s list of non-compliant vessels it claims have breached Tehran’s rules for transiting the Strait of Hormuz. Vessels on the list, administered by the Persian Gulf Strait Authority (PGSA), are subject to fines, detention, or confiscation during future passages of the Strait of Hormuz, PGSA has warned.

“The extent of damage to the three vessels remains unclear at current,” said Vanguard.

The series of late reports from UKMTO is unusual, and follows Iranian claims to have attacked 19 vessels on September 25 and 26. UKMTO relies on a voluntary reporting scheme and acts as a point of contact for emergency response in the region, and so its reporting capability would be limited should vessels and organizations choose not to report incidents.

 

Oil producers ‌likely to keep their production targets steady

According to a Reuters report, OPEC+ oil producing countries are ‌likely to keep their oil production targets steady for November when they meet on Sunday.

The online meeting of seven core OPEC+ members, namely: ​Saudi Arabia, Russia, Iraq, Kuwait, Algeria, Kazakhstan and Oman — comes as ⁠Gulf members have been boosting exports that have been disrupted for months by the blockade of Strait of Hurmuz, although most are still pumping well below their output targets.

OPEC+ comprises the Organization ​of the Petroleum Exporting Countries and allies including Russia. OPEC and authorities in Russia did not immediately respond to requests for comment.

The group has been raising its output targets for most of the ​year but kept them steady for October.

In September it completed the phased rollback of a ​1.65 million-barrel-per-day supply cut first agreed in 2023.

Reuters reported in July that OPEC+ was likely to make ‌no changes ⁠to its targets during the fourth quarter as it turns its focus to 2027 quota negotiations. Disruption caused by the Iran war has meant Gulf producers are falling below their quotas.

OPEC data showed the seven core OPEC+ producers produced 25.0 million barrels per ​day in August, ​up 630,000 bpd from ⁠July yet still roughly 5 million bpd below pre-war levels in February.

OPEC+ still has one more layer of production cuts of ​about 2 million bpd covering most members through the end ​of 2026.

The ⁠group needs to finalize a review of members' production capacity before setting 2027 baselines that will determine future quotas and shape plans to unwind those cuts, sources have said.

A separate OPEC+ ministerial group called the Joint Ministerial Monitoring Committee (JMMC), which does not decide policy, ​also meets on Sunday to review the market.