Wednesday, 22 July 2026

Washington Is Not Changing Course - It Is Buying Time

US Secretary of State Marco Rubio's recent statement that Washington remains willing to negotiate with Iran and that "the possibility for diplomacy remains alive" has raised more questions than answers. After nearly two weeks of sustained military operations, the renewed emphasis on diplomacy appears less like a change of policy and more like an attempt to buy time.

Since the ceasefire memorandum signed in April, President Donald Trump's objectives have appeared to shift repeatedly. At different stages, Washington has spoken of containing Iran's nuclear program, weakening its regional influence, pressuring its leadership and demanding broader concessions. These shifting objectives have reinforced the perception that the ultimate goal is Iran's unconditional surrender—an ambition that has proved far more difficult than many in Washington may have anticipated.

Ironically, the prolonged confrontation appears to have strengthened the very adversary it sought to weaken. Rather than triggering internal divisions or regime change, sustained external pressure seems to have fostered greater national unity inside Iran. Many regional analysts now argue that the conflict has elevated Tehran's strategic importance instead of diminishing it, making Iran an even more influential regional actor.

Military history shows that major powers often pause not because they have secured victory, but because they need time to reassess. Reports suggesting heavy expenditure of advanced munitions, the failure to achieve the anticipated regime change, and growing debate among some Gulf Arab states over long-term reliance on US security guarantees all point to an increasingly complex strategic landscape. Against this backdrop, a diplomatic initiative may offer Washington an opportunity to regroup, replenish resources, reassess its options and preserve strategic flexibility without appearing to retreat.

The battle is also being fought in the information domain. Narratives portraying the Houthis as targeting Saudi oil tankers have been questioned by many regional observers, who argue that their operations have primarily focused on vessels linked to Israel. Regardless of which narrative ultimately proves more accurate, the contest to shape international opinion has become almost as important as developments on the battlefield itself.

Whether Washington's latest diplomatic outreach leads to meaningful negotiations or merely marks a tactical pause remains to be seen. What is becoming increasingly evident that military superiority alone has not delivered the political outcome the United States and Israel sought. If diplomacy has returned to center stage, it may not be because Washington has changed course—it may simply be because, in modern conflict, time itself is a strategic weapon.

The Shifting Battle: From Oil to Shipping Corridors

For much of the twentieth century, oil was regarded as the world's most powerful geopolitical weapon. In the twenty-first century, however, control over global shipping corridors may prove equally—if not more—consequential. Whoever can influence the world's maritime chokepoints can shape not only energy supplies but also international trade, supply chains, and economic stability. Against this backdrop, the Red Sea appears to be emerging as the next major strategic battleground.

Following months of disruption around the Strait of Hormuz, growing concerns are now centered on the security of commercial shipping through the Red Sea. Together, the Strait of Hormuz, the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, and the Suez Canal constitute one of the world's most vital maritime corridors, carrying a substantial share of global trade, including oil, liquefied natural gas, manufactured goods, agricultural commodities, and containerized cargo. Any prolonged disruption would ripple across continents through higher freight costs, supply-chain bottlenecks, inflationary pressures, and increased energy prices.

The immediate question is not simply who is attacking commercial vessels, but who stands to gain from sustained instability in these strategic waterways.

Western governments and much of the international media have attributed recent attacks to Yemen's Houthi movement, arguing that the group continues to target maritime traffic as part of its confrontation with Israel and its Western allies. Given the Houthis' own public statements and previous operations, this explanation cannot be dismissed.

Yet geopolitics is rarely straightforward.

Military confrontations are increasingly accompanied by information warfare, where competing narratives emerge almost as rapidly as military events themselves. Some analysts caution against assigning responsibility before credible, independent investigations establish the facts. Premature conclusions can become powerful geopolitical tools, shaping public opinion and diplomatic responses long before evidence is fully examined.

Another line of analysis raises a different possibility. It suggests that if vessels linked to Saudi Arabia increasingly become targets, the objective may extend beyond disrupting commercial shipping. Such incidents could undermine the fragile rapprochement between Riyadh and Tehran, reviving regional rivalries that had begun to ease after years of confrontation. Those who favour a polarized Middle East would clearly benefit from renewed distrust between the region's two most influential powers.

There is also the Israeli dimension. Since the outbreak of the Gaza conflict, the Houthis have repeatedly declared that their maritime campaign is intended to pressure Israel by disrupting shipping linked to Israeli interests. If commercial traffic through the Red Sea becomes increasingly constrained, Israel's trade routes could face significant economic and logistical challenges. However, if the pattern of attacks shifts from Israeli-linked shipping toward Saudi-linked vessels, analysts will inevitably ask whether the conflict is being redirected by actors pursuing broader geopolitical objectives.

History suggests that great powers compete not only for natural resources but also for the routes that transport them. The struggle is no longer confined to controlling oil fields. Increasingly, the ability to influence strategic maritime corridors has become a source of geopolitical leverage. Disrupting a major shipping route can impose economic costs on multiple countries simultaneously without direct military confrontation.

Whether the current tensions represent an extension of the Israel-Houthi conflict, an attempt to derail Saudi-Iranian reconciliation, or a broader contest for influence over global shipping corridors remains an open question. What appears increasingly clear is that in today's interconnected world, strategic power lies not only beneath the ground in oil reserves but also on the sea lanes that connect continents.

The nation—or coalition—that can influence these maritime arteries possesses a powerful instrument of geopolitical leverage. In the twenty-first century, control of shipping corridors may prove even more valuable than control of the cargo itself.

Tuesday, 21 July 2026

Oil Is No Longer a Weapon

For decades, a major military conflict involving Iran would almost certainly have sent global oil prices soaring. Conventional wisdom held that any disruption in the Persian Gulf would trigger an energy crisis, fuel inflation, and push the world economy toward recession. Yet, nearly five months into the US-Iran war, oil prices have remained relatively stable. This apparent contradiction deserves closer examination.

The foremost reason is that the conflict has not significantly disrupted physical oil supplies. Energy markets react less to military headlines than to actual interruptions in production and transportation. Despite intense hostilities, oil has continued to flow.

The Strait of Hormuz, through which nearly one-fifth of the world's seaborne oil trade passes, remains open. Although shipping costs and insurance premiums have risen, oil tankers continue to transit the waterway. A prolonged blockade would almost certainly have triggered a dramatic spike in crude prices.

Iran has also continued exporting crude oil, primarily to China and, through indirect channels, to other Asian buyers. At the same time, Saudi Arabia, the UAE and other Gulf producers have maintained production, while exports through the Red Sea have largely continued despite heightened security risks.

The global energy landscape has changed fundamentally over the past decade. The United States has emerged as one of the world's largest producers of both crude oil and natural gas, reducing dependence on Middle Eastern supplies. Meanwhile, despite Western sanctions, Russian oil continues to reach international markets through alternative buyers and trading routes, preventing a significant supply shortfall.

Demand-side factors have also played a role. Slower economic growth in China and subdued industrial activity in several major economies have moderated global oil consumption, offsetting much of the upward pressure created by geopolitical tensions.

Perhaps the most important factor is market confidence that none of the principal actors wants to ignite a full-scale energy crisis by destroying vital oil infrastructure or permanently blocking key shipping lanes. Investors have increasingly distinguished between a military conflict and an energy war.

The lesson is unmistakable. The Middle East remains indispensable to global energy security, but today's oil market is more diversified, resilient and interconnected than ever before. As long as production continues, shipping lanes remain open and alternative suppliers keep the market well supplied, oil will struggle to serve as an effective geopolitical weapon. The era when a Middle East conflict automatically plunged the world into an oil crisis may well be coming to an end.

Monday, 20 July 2026

Growing lust for controlling energy routes

The Red Sea is not merely another conflict zone in the Middle East. It has become the latest theatre in an intensifying struggle for control over the world's most critical maritime trade and energy corridors. Following prolonged disruption in the Strait of Hormuz, renewed threats to commercial shipping in the Red Sea suggest that the contest has moved beyond territorial disputes to a broader competition over strategic chokepoints that sustain the global economy.

Much of the international debate remains focused on Yemen's Houthi movement and its attacks on commercial vessels. The Houthis have publicly linked their operations to the Gaza conflict and have demonstrated the capability to target shipping with drones and missiles. Western governments also maintain that Iran provides the group with varying degrees of political, military and technical support. These developments are important, but they do not fully explain the strategic significance of what is unfolding.

The Red Sea and the Strait of Hormuz are connected by more than geography. Together, they form the principal maritime gateway through which a substantial share of Gulf oil, liquefied natural gas and international trade reaches global markets. Disruption at either chokepoint unsettles energy markets. Simultaneous instability at both has the potential to reshape global trade flows, increase transport and insurance costs, fuel inflation and slow economic growth far beyond the Middle East.

This raises an important strategic question: Is the objective simply to disrupt shipping, or to increase the strategic vulnerability of Gulf energy exporters?

Publicly available evidence does not allow a definitive answer. However, it is beyond dispute that prolonged insecurity in these sea lanes weakens the commercial position of Gulf exporters, reduces the attractiveness of the Red Sea–Suez route, and increases dependence on alternative transport corridors. Whether these outcomes are intended or incidental, they carry profound geopolitical consequences.

Modern warfare has evolved. Economic disruption has become a strategic instrument alongside military force. Countries and non-state actors increasingly seek to influence rivals by targeting supply chains, energy infrastructure, financial systems and maritime trade rather than engaging in conventional battlefield confrontations. In this environment, the ability to threaten a strategic waterway may generate political leverage disproportionate to military strength.

Yemen illustrates this reality. A country with limited conventional military power occupies territory overlooking the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, one of the world's most important maritime chokepoints. Geography has given the Houthis an influence extending far beyond Yemen's borders. Their actions demonstrate how relatively inexpensive drones and missiles can compel some of the world's most advanced naval forces to devote enormous resources to protecting commercial shipping.

The question of who benefits also deserves careful examination. The immediate economic losers are evident: Gulf Arab exporters face higher shipping costs and insurance premiums; Egypt risks losing valuable Suez Canal revenue; Europe and Asia confront longer supply routes; global shipping companies absorb higher operating costs; and consumers ultimately pay more. At the same time, prolonged instability can strengthen the strategic position of actors seeking higher energy prices, expanded defence spending, greater geopolitical leverage or a reconfiguration of regional influence. Identifying potential beneficiaries does not establish responsibility, but it is an essential element of serious geopolitical analysis.

The continued vulnerability of commercial shipping despite the deployment of powerful multinational naval forces exposes another important reality. Maritime security in the twenty-first century can no longer be guaranteed solely through conventional naval superiority. Low-cost drones, precision missiles and asymmetric tactics have fundamentally altered the economics of maritime conflict, enabling comparatively weak actors to impose substantial costs on much stronger adversaries.

For policymakers, the central lesson is clear. Viewing the Red Sea crisis solely through the lens of Yemen risks overlooking the larger strategic transformation taking place. Control of maritime chokepoints is becoming one of the defining features of contemporary geopolitics. The competition is no longer confined to territorial boundaries; it increasingly revolves around the ability to influence global commerce, energy supplies and supply chains.

History repeatedly demonstrates that control over trade routes often proves as decisive as victories on the battlefield. From the Strait of Hormuz to the Bab el-Mandeb and the Suez Canal, the struggle for maritime access is shaping the strategic landscape of the twenty-first century. The real question, therefore, is not whether the Red Sea crisis began in Yemen. It is whether the world is witnessing the emergence of a new era in which control of sea lanes becomes the principal instrument of geopolitical power.

Sunday, 19 July 2026

Technological Superiority Cannot Guarantee Victory

For months, I have been convinced that President Donald Trump has pursued a strategy aimed at securing nothing less than Iran's unconditional surrender. More than five months into the conflict, however, that objective remains unfulfilled despite the overwhelming military and technological superiority of the United States and Israel. This raises a fundamental question; can military dominance alone compel a determined nation to surrender?

The conflict has steadily moved beyond its originally stated objective of curbing Iran's nuclear and missile programs. Instead, it increasingly appears to have become an effort to weaken the Iranian state itself. The repeated attacks on Iranian infrastructure have intensified human suffering and drawn criticism from those who argue that such operations risk violating international humanitarian law. Whatever the legal verdict may ultimately be, the war has expanded far beyond its declared purpose.

Ironically, the countries paying an increasingly heavy price are America's Arab allies. By hosting US military bases, they have become vulnerable to retaliation despite having little direct stake in the conflict. Their economies, energy infrastructure, shipping routes, and national security now face growing risks as the confrontation deepens.

The greatest lesson of this conflict is that technological superiority cannot guarantee victory against a dispersed and resilient adversary. Precision-guided weapons, advanced intelligence, and air superiority have not eliminated Iran's ability to respond. Even many Western analysts acknowledge that Tehran retains the capability to launch missiles and drones against American military installations, Gulf allies, and commercial shipping transiting the Strait of Hormuz. As long as that capability exists, expectations of forcing Iran into unconditional surrender appear unrealistic.

If President Trump refuses to alter course, America's Arab partners may eventually conclude that protecting their own national interests requires a different approach. They should insist that offensive military operations against Iran are no longer conducted from bases located on their territory and seek a transparent timetable for redefining the role of foreign military forces. If those bases cease to be launch pads for attacks, Iran would have far less incentive to target Arab states.

Any durable regional security arrangement should also include China, whose growing economic and diplomatic influence makes it an indispensable stakeholder in Gulf stability.

My greatest concern is that trust has been severely damaged. The current war erupted while diplomatic engagement was still underway, making future negotiations far more difficult. Peace cannot rest on demands for unconditional surrender. It requires credible diplomacy, mutual security guarantees, and respect for commitments. The enduring lesson of this conflict is unmistakable: technological superiority may win battles, but it cannot, by itself, guarantee political victory.

Saturday, 18 July 2026

Growing Discontent Across the Arab World

As the conflict between the United States and Iran enters a more dangerous phase, another challenge is quietly emerging across the Middle East. While global attention remains focused on air strikes, missile exchanges and military strategy, America's Arab partners are confronting a growing strategic dilemma. The longer the war continues, the greater the political, economic and security costs they will have to bear. For many Arab governments, patience is not unlimited.

For decades, the United States has been the principal security partner of several Gulf states, maintaining military bases and providing strategic protection against external threats. Today, however, those same military installations have become potential targets for Iranian retaliation. Every attack on a US base in the Gulf exposes the host country to risks it neither initiated nor seeks.

As tensions escalate, Arab governments face the difficult task of preserving their security partnerships with Washington while preventing their own territories from becoming battlefields in a widening regional conflict.

The economic implications are equally serious. Gulf economies are no longer driven solely by oil exports. Through ambitious diversification programs, countries across the region are investing heavily in tourism, finance, technology, logistics and manufacturing. These reforms require political stability, investor confidence and uninterrupted trade. A prolonged war threatens all three. Rising insurance premiums, uncertainty in financial markets and disruptions to maritime commerce could undermine years of economic planning.

The Strait of Hormuz and the Red Sea remain two of the world's most important maritime corridors. Any disruption to these routes would directly affect the export-dependent economies of the Gulf and reverberate throughout the global economy. While energy prices have remained relatively stable so far, Arab leaders understand that a prolonged conflict could eventually jeopardize both regional prosperity and international energy security.

Equally significant is the political dimension. Across the Arab world, public concern over regional instability and humanitarian suffering continues to grow. Governments must balance their strategic ties with Washington against the expectations of their own citizens, who increasingly want their countries to avoid becoming participants in another prolonged regional war. This balancing act becomes more difficult with every passing day.

The conflict also threatens to reverse the diplomatic progress achieved in recent years. Several Arab states have worked to reduce regional tensions, rebuild diplomatic relationships and promote economic cooperation. A wider war could undo those gains, deepen regional polarization and weaken collective efforts to build a more stable Middle East.

History offers a sobering lesson - wars in the Middle East rarely remain confined to their original battlefield. These spill across borders, reshape alliances and leave behind long-lasting political and economic consequences. Military victories may be celebrated in the short term, but the costs of prolonged conflict are borne by entire societies.

For America's Arab partners, the overriding priority is not the military defeat of Iran or the strategic success of Washington. Their foremost interest lies in safeguarding their sovereignty, protecting their economies and preserving regional stability. As the costs of continued escalation mount, pressure for diplomacy will inevitably grow.

The longer the war continues, the greater the Arab world's discontent—and the stronger the demand for a political solution that ends the cycle of confrontation before it engulfs the entire region.

 

Friday, 17 July 2026

Seven Days of US Strikes, No Strategic Breakthrough

Seven consecutive days of United States air strikes on Iran have raised a fundamental question, has Washington moved any closer to achieving its strategic objectives? Judging by the available evidence, the answer appears far from convincing. Military campaigns are ultimately measured not by the number of missiles fired, but by the political and strategic outcomes they produce.

Despite the intensity of the operation, remarkably little official information has been released about the military targets destroyed or the extent of the damage inflicted. In modern warfare, governments are usually quick to showcase decisive battlefield successes. The absence of detailed battle damage assessments has inevitably fueled speculation that the campaign has yielded fewer tangible results than expected.

Equally concerning are reports that civilian infrastructure and public utilities have been affected. If the intention is to increase economic hardship and public suffering in the hope of provoking unrest against Tehran, such a strategy carries significant legal, moral and political risks. Under international humanitarian law, deliberate attacks on civilian objects that are not legitimate military targets could raise serious questions about compliance with the laws of armed conflict. Greater transparency is therefore essential.

The broader strategic picture also remains uncertain. One apparent objective has been to pressure Iran by disrupting regional energy security through the Strait of Hormuz. Yet global oil markets have remained relatively calm, with crude prices staying below the psychologically important threshold of US$100 per barrel. Markets appear unconvinced that energy supplies will face prolonged disruption.

Attention is now increasingly focused on the Red Sea, another critical maritime corridor for global trade and Gulf energy exports. Any escalation there would broaden the conflict, increase risks to international shipping and place additional economic and political pressure on Arab oil-exporting states.

Perhaps the campaign's most significant consequence has been political rather than military. Iranian retaliatory strikes against American military installations in Gulf countries have heightened regional tensions and risk fuelling anti-American sentiment. For governments hosting US military bases, the political cost of continued escalation could become increasingly difficult to manage.

History offers a consistent lesson - air power can destroy military assets and infrastructure, but it rarely secures lasting political victories on its own. If anything, sustained external military pressure often strengthens national resolve rather than weakens it.

After seven days of strikes, Washington appears to have achieved neither a decisive military breakthrough nor a clear political advantage. Unless diplomacy regains priority, the conflict risks expanding while the prospects for a durable peace continue to diminish.