US Foreign Policy Is Becoming Morally Bankrupt

Over the years, many analysts, including myself, have questioned whether the United States consistently adheres to the ethical principles it expects other nations to respect. Under Donald Trump, the contradiction between Washington’s rhetoric and its actions has become increasingly difficult to ignore. Democracy, sovereignty and a rules-based international order are presented as universal principles, yet their application often appears conditional on American strategic and economic interests.

The war against Iran, the killing of its Supreme Leader and Washington’s pursuit of regional objectives raise serious questions about the limits of American power. Similarly, the arrest of Venezuela’s president and the drive to control the country’s energy resources have reinforced concerns that national sovereignty becomes negotiable when a government challenges Washington’s interests.

In South Asia, allegations of American involvement in political changes in Pakistan and Bangladesh have fuelled suspicions that Washington’s commitment to democracy is selective. Such allegations require scrutiny, and domestic political dynamics cannot be ignored. Nevertheless, the perception that external powers can influence political outcomes undermines the credibility of the principles they claim to defend.

The latest Russian diesel arrangement offers another revealing example of Washington’s shifting priorities. The reported purchase of 300,000 tons of Russian diesel, despite American efforts to restrict Moscow’s energy revenues over its war against Ukraine, raises questions about the consistency of US policy. When energy security and domestic economic pressures become pressing, previously declared strategic principles appear open to adjustment.

The implications extend beyond energy markets. Ukraine, under President Volodymyr Zelensky, has depended heavily on American military and financial support to resist Russia’s invasion. Yet Trump’s reported suggestion that Ukraine needed new leadership following disagreements over policy raises a fundamental question, is American support grounded in a consistent commitment to sovereignty, or is it conditional on political compliance?

Here lies the contradiction. Washington has supported Ukraine’s resistance to Russian aggression, yet its own interests can lead it towards arrangements that potentially benefit Moscow. The immediate priorities of American consumers and voters may take precedence over the strategic concerns of an ally fighting for its territorial integrity.

The issue is not whether America has the right to pursue its national interests. Every sovereign state does. The question is whether Washington can claim moral leadership while applying one standard to its adversaries and another to itself.

Military supremacy can compel compliance, economic power can impose costs, and political pressure can influence governments. None, however, guarantees moral authority. When principles become negotiable and national interests override proclaimed values, the result is a crisis of credibility.

A superpower may impose its will through military and economic strength, but it cannot command moral authority. American foreign policy risks losing precisely what Washington claims to defend - the moral legitimacy of its leadership.

The Iran War: Is the Real Target Saudi Arabia?

The US-Israel war on Iran has exposed a harsh reality: American military dominance does not necessarily translate into political acceptance in the Middle East. More importantly, the conflict has raised a fundamental question about whose security Washington is really protecting.

For decades, the United States has justified its military bases across Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries as essential to protecting Arab monarchies against external threats, particularly Iran. Yet the use of these bases during the war has reinforced a perception that American military power serves Israeli security interests, potentially at the expense of the host countries. Instead of providing an unquestionable security umbrella, these arrangements risk exposing Arab states to retaliation.

China’s mediation of the 2023 Saudi-Iran rapprochement had already challenged Washington’s longstanding narrative that Iran posed a greater threat to Arab interests than Israel. Riyadh’s decision to restore diplomatic relations with Tehran demonstrated that regional security could be pursued through engagement rather than permanent confrontation.

The prolonged disruption of shipping through the Strait of Hormuz, attacks on oil tankers and energy infrastructure, and mounting pressure on Gulf economies have further exposed the vulnerabilities of Arab oil producers. These developments raise a critical question, are GCC states merely collateral victims of the war, or are they also facing strategic pressure to reconsider their regional alignments?

President Donald Trump’s reported request for Russia to supply 300,000 tons of diesel highlights the conflict’s wider energy repercussions. Although this does not establish a hidden agenda, it illustrates how the consequences extend far beyond Iran.

The larger strategic question is whether the conflict is also being used to advance Israel’s regional integration through the Abraham Accords. Saudi Arabia’s recognition of Israel and establishment of diplomatic relations would represent a major diplomatic victory for Benjamin Netanyahu and strengthen Israel’s regional position.

My interpretation is that the war may be evolving into a pressure campaign against GCC monarchies, particularly Saudi Arabia, compelling them to succumb to American pressure: recognize Israel, establish diplomatic relations and accept its regional supremacy.

This remains a strategic hypothesis, not a proven war objective. Nevertheless, it deserves serious scrutiny. The ultimate irony would be that a war ostensibly directed against Iran ends up pressuring Arab monarchies to accept a regional order shaped around Israeli supremacy—while simultaneously weakening confidence in American protection.

Who Really Seeks Control of the Red Sea Gateway?

The United States has repeatedly intervened in conflicts across the Middle East, often justifying its military presence as essential to regional stability and the protection of international trade. Yet an important question remains, do these interventions resolve security crises, or can they also create opportunities to expand American strategic influence? The confrontation involving Saudi Arabia, Yemen’s Houthis and the United States deserves scrutiny from this perspective.

The Houthis intensified attacks on shipping in the Red Sea after the Gaza war erupted in October 2023, declaring their campaign a means of pressuring Israel. Vessels linked to Israel became particular targets, although the attacks and their consequences extended beyond Israeli shipping. International trade was disrupted, seafarers were endangered and the security of the Bab el-Mandeb Strait became a global concern.

However, threatening shipping bound for Israel is not the same as deliberately targeting Saudi Arabia. Each reported attack must be examined on its own evidence, including the identity of the attacker, the intended target and the strategic purpose. Iranian support for the Houthis does not, by itself, establish Iranian direction of every operation.

Washington has presented its military campaign against the Houthis as a response to threats against navigation and regional security. But military intervention can produce consequences beyond its declared objectives. By expanding its operational presence, surveillance and influence over maritime security, the United States can strengthen its position around a gateway connecting the Red Sea with the Gulf of Aden and the wider Indian Ocean.

This raises a question that deserves serious investigation, could the escalation of hostilities be creating the strategic conditions for greater American influence over access to one of the world's most important shipping corridors?

The possibility should not be confused with proof that Washington engineered the confrontation or that a US proxy is responsible for attacks attributed to the Houthis. Such allegations require independently verifiable evidence. Nevertheless, the strategic consequences of military operations merit examination regardless of their stated intentions.

I prefer to frame the broader issue as “US-Controlled Entry and Exit” rather than simply a blockade. Control over a maritime gateway need not involve formally closing it. It can also emerge through military deployments, intelligence capabilities, security partnerships and the ability to influence the conditions under which commercial vessels pass.

The central issue, therefore, is not merely whether the Houthis threaten Saudi Arabia or whether American forces can suppress them. It is whether the resulting security arrangements protect freedom of navigation for all nations or gradually concentrate strategic leverage in the hands of an outside power.

The world must distinguish between securing an international waterway and acquiring the power to determine who can use it, on what terms and under whose protection. That distinction may ultimately prove more consequential than the military confrontation itself.

PSX benchmark index declines 0.6%WoW

Pakistan Stock Exchange (PSX) remained volatile during the week ended on October 09, 2026 amid continued attacks on key shipping routes. The benchmark Index declined by 1,066 points or 0.6%WoW to close at 167,089. Market activity also weakened, with average daily trading volume declining by 16.5%WoW to 541 million shares.

Meanwhile, Ukraine’s drone strikes on Russian refineries and concerns over US energy supplies amid Hurricane Isaias kept Brent oil prices above US$100/ bbl, despite improving traffic through the Strait of Hormuz and Trump’s claim that it would refrain from attacking Iran until the midterm elections scheduled for early November 2026.

The IMF reached a Staff-Level Agreement with Pakistan on the 4th review of EFF and 3rd review of RSF, acknowledging the Government’s policies in navigating the Middle East conflict.

Foreign exchange reserves held by State Bank of Pakistan (SBP) increased to US$21.5 billion as of October 02, 2026.

Pakistan raised PKR352 billion in the latest PIB auction, with yields rising across all tenors.

Banking sector deposits rose 14%YoY to PKR39.2 trillion at end August 2026.

Cement offtakes increased 6%YoY to 4.6 million tons in September 2026, reflecting improved local demand due to recovery in construction activity.

Cotton arrivals increased 5%YoY to 3.2 million bales during the same period.

Other major news flow during the week included: 1) Makkah defence alliance agrees to 'rapid force deployment' in Saudi Arabia, 2) GoP debt posts marginal decline to date, 3) GoP clears nine bidders for Gepco sale, 4) Bahrain working to 'speed up' approval of Pak-GCC free trade pact, and 5) Pakistan, Qatar agree to review LNG deal.

While the laggards were: Vanaspati & Allied Industries, Leasing companies, and Sugar, Textile spinning, Synthetic & Rayon, and Modarabas emerged top performers.

Major selling was recorded by Mutual Funds with US$17.6 million. On the contrary, net buyers were Individuals (US$11.4 million) and Companies (US$6.5 million).

Top performing scrips were: TGL, PSO, BML, AGP, and FCCL, while laggards included: SSOM, PGLC, CPHL, IMAGE, and PSX.

AKD Securities anticipates the market to improve on the back of strengthening economic indicators. Additionally, easing inflationary pressures would reduce probability of monetary tightening. Any positive development on Middle East conflict could moderate international oil prices and serve as a key trigger for market, paving the way for monetary easing.

The market continues to trade at attractive valuations. The top picks of the brokerage house include: OGDC, PPL, UBL, MEBL, HBL, FFC, ENGROH, PSO, LUCK, FCCL, INDU, ILP and SYS.

Over 80 US aircrafts destroyed or damaged

According to Saudi Gazette, the US military has had at least 81 aircraft destroyed or damaged during military operations against Iran. The figures comprise of operational incidents recorded since February 28, 2026 across Pentagon records, US Central Command (CENTCOM) statements, military inspector general findings, and press accounts.

The number includes both airplanes and helicopters as well as drones, with the MQ-9 Reaper drone – used for intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, close air support and combat search and rescue – accounting for more than half of the losses.

Also on the list are some of the Pentagon’s most-prized assets, including an F-35A fighter jet and an E-3 Sentry, the four-engine jet with a large radar dome atop the fuselage used for target tracking and airspace management.

The total cost of the aircraft lost is between US$1.9 billion and US$3.3 billion, depending on the Defense Department’s plans for replacements, the report said, citing figures from the Congressional Budget Office.

The total cost of the war is much higher – at least US$45 billion. That figure doesn’t include damage to infrastructure at US bases in the region, including those where some of the aircraft losses happened.

Some of the aircraft included in the count may have been returned to service, including eight F-15 Strike Eagle fighter jets that sustained light damage in an Iranian strike on Muwaffaq Salti Air Base, Jordan, in September.

The report is based on numbers contained in statements from the Defense Department; its inspector general; US Central Command, which has been conducting the operations against Iran; and news reports reviewed by the CRS.

The report poses several questions for congressional consideration, including whether lawmakers are getting enough information from the Pentagon on the losses to determine effects and remedies.

Defense Department reporting on Iran war losses has, to date, been vague. Even the Pentagon inspector general’s report on the losses, released in September and covering action from February 28 to June 30, cites previous CRS reports for some of its aircraft loss numbers.

Other issues Congress needs to think about are whether to provide funding for repairs or replacements; whether there is enough industrial capacity to satisfy those requirements; and the effects on US military sales to foreign partners.

It also raises questions about how the Iran war has affected US posture outside the Middle East.

“Congress may assess whether losses in certain high-demand platforms that are aging and limited in number, such as the E-3 Sentry, create capability gaps or increase risk in other theaters,” the report says.

Analysts have said actions in the Middle East, including the Iran war and earlier confrontations with the Houthi rebels in Yemen, an Iranian proxy group, have taken an especially heavy toll on the MQ-9 drones, which Air Force Chief of Staff Gen. Kenneth Wilsbach told Congress earlier this year was the military’s “most valuable player” in the war with Iran.

Forty-five have been lost in the Middle East this year, “an alarming rate,” according to a September report from the Atlantic Council.

The Air Force has lost about 35% of its MQ-9s since 2004, it says.

 

Has the World Forgotten the Gazans?

October 7 has become a date the world remembers for different reasons. Three years ago, Hamas and other Palestinian armed groups attacked Israel, killing more than 1,200 people and taking 251 hostages. The attack was horrific, and nothing can justify the deliberate killing or abduction of civilians. But October 7 also marked the beginning of a catastrophe whose human consequences in Gaza continue to unfold.

Nearly three years of Israeli bombardment and ground operations have killed more than 74,000 Gazans, according to figures reported by Gaza authorities. Much of Gaza has been reduced to rubble. Hundreds of thousands of homes have been destroyed or damaged, hospitals and schools have been devastated, and essential water, sanitation and electricity infrastructure has been severely compromised.

Yet statistics cannot capture what life means for a population that has lost homes, livelihoods, schools, hospitals and basic services. Gazans have been displaced repeatedly and continue to live in extremely difficult conditions. Even after a ceasefire agreement, violence and humanitarian challenges persist.

Then came another geopolitical shock. Since February 28, 2026, the US-Israel war with Iran has consumed international attention. Gaza, already pushed to the margins, has slipped even further down the world's agenda. This raises an uncomfortable question: Has the world become accustomed to Gazans' suffering?

The most disturbing possibility is that Gaza's destruction will eventually be viewed not as a humanitarian catastrophe requiring justice, but as a redevelopment opportunity requiring investment. With billions of dollars needed for reconstruction, the temptation to see Gaza primarily through the lens of real estate, tourism and strategic interests could become enormous.

History may therefore record these three years in one devastating sentence: The world watched Gaza being destroyed, then waited for the rubble to clear so that the real-estate bonanza could begin.

But Gaza is not an empty piece of land awaiting developers. It is home to Gazans who have survived war, displacement and unimaginable loss. Reconstruction must restore not merely buildings, but dignity, ownership, livelihoods and the right of Gazans to determine their own future.

The world still has a choice: remember Gaza as a human tragedy—or allow the suffering of Gazans to become someone else's opportunity.

Brewing Turmoil in India

The brewing turmoil should be treated as a warning—not dismissed as merely another season of protests.

India's impressive economic numbers increasingly appear to be masking a more uncomfortable reality. Beneath the narrative of rapid growth and rising global influence, public frustration is building over unemployment, stagnant real wages, inflation, women's safety and growing doubts about the integrity of democratic institutions.

The latest wave of protests reflects this widening disconnect between India's economic performance on paper and the everyday experiences of many citizens, particularly the young. Although, India remains one of the world's fastest-growing major economies, employment opportunities and real wage growth have not kept pace with expectations. Rising consumer prices have further eroded purchasing power, encouraging an increasing number of young Indians to seek opportunities abroad, including in the European Union.

Monetary policy is also reflecting these pressures. The Reserve Bank of India has raised its key interest rate by 25 basis points to 5.50% in an effort to contain inflation and bring it closer to the central bank's 4% target. Higher interest rates, however, can also constrain investment and consumption, complicating the government's challenge of creating sufficient employment for a rapidly expanding workforce.

Political tensions are adding another layer of uncertainty. Youth-led protests that initially focused on alleged examination leaks have now expanded to accusations of electoral manipulation. The Election Commission's revision of voter rolls—officially intended to eliminate duplicate, deceased and ineligible voters—has become politically contentious, with opposition groups alleging that the process could benefit the ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP).

Questions about institutional independence are particularly sensitive in the world's largest democracy. Reports that election commissioners themselves have objected to certain decisions, coupled with the Supreme Court seeking explanations from the BJP and Election Commission over voter-roll changes, have intensified public scrutiny.

Meanwhile, protests in New Delhi following the alleged rape of a young woman have highlighted another deeply troubling issue: women's safety. Public anger becomes particularly potent when citizens believe government officials are dismissive of their concerns.

India's challenge is no longer simply to sustain high economic growth. It must ensure that growth translates into jobs, purchasing power, institutional credibility and personal security. Economic statistics can impress investors, but social stability ultimately depends on whether ordinary citizens believe that the system works for them.