Sanctions as Theatre: Washington’s War on Iran Funds Itself

 This is hypocrisy and outright strategic farce

A report by The Hill reveals that the administration of Donald Trump has authorized the release of roughly 140 million barrels of Iranian oil stranded at sea. While Washington claims to be tightening the noose around Iran, which is it—economic warfare or economic relief?

For decades, US sanctions have been designed to suffocate Iran’s revenues. Yet at a moment of heightened confrontation, Washington has chosen to unlock one of Tehran’s largest oil stockpiles and push it into global markets. This is not tactical flexibility; it is policy contradiction at its most blatant.

Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent claims Iran will struggle to access the proceeds. That argument is deeply misleading. Oil, once sold, creates economic space—whether through direct revenue, indirect trade channels, or geopolitical leverage. Sanctions diluted at convenience cease to be sanctions at all.

More telling is Washington’s own admission Iranian oil is being used to suppress global prices. In effect, the US is leveraging Iranian crude to cushion its own economy from a crisis it is helping sustain.

This is not pressure—it is dependence.

Criticism from Richard Blumenthal and analyst Victoria Taylor exposes the deeper flaw. You cannot claim to isolate an adversary while facilitating its core export. Such a policy erodes credibility, weakens deterrence, and signals that pressure is negotiable.

The message to Tehran is unmistakable - hold firm, and the system bends.

If sanctions can be lifted when oil prices rise, then they are not instruments of strategy—they are tools of convenience. And a policy built on convenience cannot sustain a war of pressure.

Washington may call this a temporary measure. In reality, it is a revealing one.

Because in trying to weaken Iran, the United States has once again proven how indispensable it remains.

Trump faces fate worse than Bush faced in Iraq

On March 17, 2026, I posted a blog titled “Washington’s Miscalculation: War It Can't Win”. Its opening paragraph was, I quote “Since the Iranian Revolution, the United States has pursued not coexistence with Iran, but its submission. Nearly five decades of sanctions, covert operations, and proxy confrontations have produced results Washington resists admitting - Iran has not weakened — it has adapted, and in many respects, hardened”. Today, March 21, 2026 Reuters ran a story with a caption “How Trump's stated reasons, goals and timeline for Iran war have shifted”.

 According to the report, President Donald Trump and his top officials have offered shifting objectives and reasons for the US-Israeli war on Iran, which critics say shows a lack of planning for the conflict and its aftermath.

Stated objectives and expected timeline have varied, including toppling Iran's government, weakening Iran's military, security and nuclear capabilities and its regional influence, as well as supporting Israeli interests.

Here is how Trump described his ​war goals and timeline:

FEBRUARY 28: CALLS FOR IRANIANS TO TOPPLE THEIR GOVERNMENT

The Iranian people should "take over" governance of their country, Trump said in a video on ‌social media as the US and Israel launched their attacks. "It will be yours to take," he added. "This will be probably your only chance for generations."

Trump described the attacks as "major combat operations."

FEBRUARY 28: WEAKEN IRAN'S MILITARY, INFLUENCE

Trump said Washington would deny Iran the ability to have a nuclear weapon, although Tehran has insisted its nuclear program is for peaceful purposes. Iran does not have nuclear weapons while the United States does. Israel is also widely believed to ​be the only Middle Eastern country with nuclear weapons.

Trump insisted he would end what he described as Tehran's ballistic missile threat. "We're going to destroy their missiles and raze their missile ​industry to the ground," he said. "We're going to annihilate their navy."

Trump claimed Iran's long range missiles "can now threaten our very good friends and allies ⁠in Europe, our troops stationed overseas, and could soon reach the American homeland."

His remarks echoed the case of President George W. Bush for the Iraq war, which had false claims. Neither experts nor ​US intelligence support Trump's assertions and both assess that Iran's ballistic missile program was years from threatening the US homeland.

MARCH 2: SHIFTING TIMELINE

Trump said the war was projected to last four to five ​weeks but could go on longer.

"We're already substantially ahead of our time projections. But whatever the time is, it's okay. Whatever it takes," Trump said at the White House. In a social media post, Trump said there was a "virtually unlimited supply" of US munitions and that "wars can be fought 'forever,' and very successfully, using just these supplies."

In a notification to Congress, Trump provided no timeline. Trump earlier told the Daily Mail the war could take "four weeks, ​or less," then told The New York Times four to five weeks and subsequently said it could take longer.

MARCH 2: RUBIO SAYS US ATTACKED IRAN BECAUSE ISRAEL DID

Secretary of State Marco Rubio told ​reporters Israel's determination to attack Iran forced Washington to strike.

"We knew that there was going to be an Israeli action, we knew that that would precipitate an attack against American forces, and we knew that if ‌we didn't preemptively ⁠go after them before they launched those attacks, we would suffer higher casualties," Rubio said.

MARCH 3: TRUMP CONTRADICTS RUBIO

Trump said he ordered US forces to join Israel's attack on Iran because he believed Iran was about to strike first.

"I might have forced their (Israel's) hand," Trump said. "If we didn't do it, they (Iran) were going to attack first."

MARCH 04: CALL TO 'DESTROY' SECURITY INFRASTRUCTURE

Pentagon chief Pete Hegseth said the goal was to "destroy Iranian offensive missiles, destroy Iranian missile production, destroy their navy and other security infrastructure."

MARCH 06: 'UNCONDITIONAL SURRENDER' CALL

"There will be no deal with Iran except UNCONDITIONAL SURRENDER," Trump wrote on social ​media.

MARCH 8-11: JUST THE START BUT ALSO 'PRETTY MUCH ​COMPLETE'

Hegseth told CBS News in an interview aired ⁠March 08 strikes on Iran were "only just the beginning."

A day later, Trump told the same network "I think the war is very complete, pretty much."

"We've already won in many ways, but we haven't won enough," Trump told reporters later on the same day. When asked if the war was beginning ​or complete, he said: "Well, I think you could say both."

On March 11, Trump again said he thought the US had won but: "We've got ​to finish the job."

MARCH 13: ⁠SOFTENS CALL FOR INTERNAL UPRISING

In a March 13 interview, Trump told Fox News the war will end "when I feel it in my bones."

Trump softened his call for Iranians to topple their government. "So I really think that's a big hurdle to climb for people that don't have weapons," Trump said.

MARCH 19: HEGSETH SAYS NO TIME FRAME

Hegseth said Washington was not setting a time frame for the war and Trump would ⁠decide when to ​stop.

"We wouldn't want to set a definitive time frame," the Pentagon chief said. "It will be at the president's choosing, ​ultimately, where we say, 'Hey, we've achieved what we need to.'"

MARCH 20: TRUMP CONSIDERS WINDING DOWN BUT NO CEASEFIRE

Trump posted on Truth Social, "we are getting very close to meeting our objectives as we consider winding down our great Military efforts" in ​the Iran war. Earlier in the day, Trump told reporters "I don't want to do a ceasefire" when asked about the war.

 

Riyadh Returns to Iran Threat Narrative

In the aftermath of Iran’s 1979 Islamic Revolution, the United States recalibrated its regional strategy, increasingly presenting Tehran as the principal source of instability in the Middle East. Over time, this framing found resonance in several Arab capitals, particularly in Saudi Arabia, shaping a security outlook that continues to influence regional policy choices.

This perception was reinforced through tangible measures. The expansion of US military infrastructure across the Gulf—most prominently in Qatar—was justified largely on the premise of countering Iranian influence. Simultaneously, Washington sustained economic pressure on Tehran over its nuclear program, despite Iran’s status as a signatory to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, in contrast to Israel’s longstanding ambiguity.

Historical episodes added further complexity. The Iran-Iraq war entrenched regional rivalries, while later diplomatic efforts—including the nuclear agreement under President Barack Obama and the China-brokered rapprochement between Riyadh and Tehran—offered brief openings for recalibration. Yet such initiatives have struggled to overcome deeply embedded mistrust, particularly amid shifting US policies and competing geopolitical interests.

Recent remarks by Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Faisal bin Farhan reflect a return to a more cautious, if not hardened, posture. His assertion that trust in Iran has been “completely shattered,” alongside allegations of destabilizing activities across the region, underscores Riyadh’s growing concerns about security and sovereignty. These claims are rooted in reported attacks on energy infrastructure and maritime navigation, which Saudi Arabia and its partners attribute to Iran.

Tehran, however, has consistently rejected such accusations, framing its actions as defensive and, at times, suggesting that regional escalations are shaped by broader geopolitical contestation. Independent verification of specific incidents remains contested, contributing to a narrative environment marked as much by perception as by provable fact.

What emerges is not merely a dispute over actions, but over interpretation. Saudi Arabia’s current stance appears closely aligned with a long-standing US strategic framing that positions Iran as the central regional threat. While this perspective reflects genuine security concerns, it also risks narrowing the analytical lens through which complex regional dynamics are understood.

The persistence of this narrative suggests that, despite episodic diplomacy and shifting alliances, foundational perceptions remain largely intact. In effect, Riyadh’s position today echoes a familiar refrain—one shaped over decades—where Iran continues to be viewed as the primary challenge to regional stability.

Motives Behind Strait of Hormuz Escalation

The closure of the Strait of Hormuz by Iran is being widely blamed for the emerging shortages and surge in global oil and gas prices. However, this represents only one side of a far more complex narrative—one that is being actively shaped by the United States and amplified by sections of the Western media.

At a time when President Donald Trump is reportedly seeking an allocation of US$200 billion, the intent appears less about de-escalation and more about intensifying and prolonging the conflict. This raises a fundamental question, what is the real motive behind what is being portrayed as a response, but increasingly resembles a calculated escalation?

In my assessment, the United States has aligned itself closely with Israel, whose strategic objective remains the neutralization—if not outright elimination—of Iran as a regional rival. The broader vision often discussed in this context is the restructuring of the Middle East’s geopolitical order to suit their long-term strategic interests.

Both Washington and Tel Aviv were fully aware that any Iranian retaliation—particularly against Arab states hosting US military bases—would reinforce a long-standing narrative: portraying Iran as the principal threat to regional stability, thereby diverting scrutiny away from Israel’s own role.

There is also a significant economic dimension. A wider conflict risks damaging oil and gas infrastructure across key producing Muslim countries. Such a disruption could potentially reposition the United States and its allies to exert greater influence over global energy markets, enabling them to dictate supply dynamics and pricing.

A particularly telling signal is the reported statement attributed to Donald Trump regarding Kharg Island—not to destroy it, but to capture it. This underscores a strategic interest that extends beyond military objectives to direct control over critical energy assets.

The demand by the United States and Israel for Iran’s unconditional surrender must also be viewed through this broader lens. Both countries seek to consolidate their dominance in the Middle East. Israel benefits from geographical proximity, while leveraging the United States as a force multiplier in advancing shared strategic goals.

At the same time, influence over key global sectors—including defense industries, energy corporations, financial markets, and media platforms—plays a crucial role in shaping both policy and perception. The ongoing deliberations in Washington over massive military funding further reinforce the scale and seriousness of these ambitions.

It is also important to note how the justification for targeting Iran has evolved over time. What began as concerns over its nuclear program gradually expanded to include its missile capabilities, and eventually shifted toward calls for regime change under the banner of restoring democracy. Yet, beneath these shifting narratives, a more enduring objective appears to persist: gaining control over Iran’s vast oil and gas reserves.

PSX benchmark index down 0.70%WoW

Pakistan Stock Exchange (PSX) remained volatile throughout the week, amid persistent Middle East military conflict driving volatility in international oil prices. The benchmark index lost 1,126 points or 0.7% during the week to close at 152,740 on Thursday, March 19, 2026, the last trading day before Eid Holidays.

Market participation remained lackluster during the week, with average daily traded volume declining to 418 million shares, from 548 million shares in the prior week. Developments on the economic front remained encouraging, as the country posted Current Account surplus of US$427 million in February 2026, against a deficit of US$85 million during the same period last year, primarily driven by higher workers’ remittances.

Industrial activity (LSMI) expanded by 10.5%YoY in January 2026, led by growth in the automobile and textile sectors.

Power generation increased by 11%YoY in February 2026, supported by lower tariffs and a shift of industrial consumers towards national grid.

Urea offtakes declined by 28%YoY during February 2026 due to elevated channel inventory following advance procurement in December 2025. offtakes rose 2.5x YoY over the same period.

T-Bill yields rose by 51 to 100bps in the first auction following SBP decision to leave policy rate unchanged.

Other major news flow during the week included: 1) Pakistan secures alternative fuel supply from Gulf amid regional tensions, 2) ADB unveils US$10 billion financing strategy for Pakistan, 3) IT exports rise 20%YoY to US$365 million, 4) REER drops to 102.5 in February 2026, and 5) GoP considering to hold fuel price till 31st March, 2026.

Woollen, Synthetic & Rayon and Close-End Mutual Fund were amongst the top performing sectors, while Leather & Tanneries, Commercial Banks and Miscellaneous were amongst the laggards.

Major selling was recorded by Foreigners and Mutual Funds with a net sell of US$9.3 million and US$4.5 million, respectively.

Banks and Individuals absorbed most of the selling with a net buy of US$10.3million and US$7.4 million, respectively.

Top performing scrips of the week were: PKGP, ABOT, IBFL, BNWM, and KOHC, while laggards included: NBP, AICL, PABC, UNITY, and SRVI.

Going forward, AKD Believes market sentiment will hinge on the developments in the Middle East conflict. At the same time, investor focus will remain on the government’s energy conservation measures, diversification of fuel imports, and progress on the IMF review.

Over the medium term, any de -escalation in the conflict could spark a strong market rebound, as recent corrections have made valuations attractive.

Top picks of the brokerage house include: OGDC, PPL, UBL, MEBL, HBL, FFC, ENGROH, PSO, LUCK, FCCL, INDU, ILP and SYS.

Targets by Choice: They Can’t Have It Both Ways

The escalating confrontation between the United States fully supported Israel against Iran has exposed a fundamental contradiction in the posture of Arab Gulf states. Governments hosting US military bases have condemned Iranian strikes on these installations as violations of sovereignty. Yet this claim collapses under the weight of their own strategic choices.

US bases in the Gulf are not passive or symbolic presences. They are active components of a broader military architecture directed against Iran. These facilities support operations ranging from intelligence gathering to force projection. In any conflict, such installations are not neutral—they are legitimate military targets.

Iran’s response must be understood within this context. Lacking the capacity to strike the US mainland, Tehran has chosen to target the physical infrastructure through which US power is exercised in the region. This includes bases located in Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, and Qatar. These locations are not incidental; they are central to the operational reach of the United States in the Gulf.

The assertion that such strikes amount to attacks on Arab states themselves is misleading. These bases, while geographically situated within sovereign territory, function as extensions of US military capability. Targeting them is not an assault on the host nation in the conventional sense, but a calculated effort to degrade an adversary’s war-making capacity.

More importantly, the argument of violated sovereignty overlooks a prior reality: sovereignty was effectively diluted when these states permitted foreign military infrastructure on their soil. Hosting bases that are actively engaged in conflict is not a neutral act—it is a strategic alignment. That alignment carries consequences.

The current situation is therefore not an unexpected escalation, but a predictable outcome. By embedding themselves within the operational framework of US military strategy, these states have assumed the risks associated with it. Their territories have, in effect, become extensions of a conflict in which they claim no direct role.

Protesting Iranian retaliation while continuing to host these bases reflects a fundamental inconsistency. It suggests an attempt to benefit from security arrangements without accepting the vulnerabilities they create. In geopolitical terms, this is not a sustainable position.

If these states seek genuine insulation from regional conflict, the solution is neither diplomatic protest nor rhetorical positioning. It is structural. Removing foreign military bases would reduce their exposure and reassert control over their own security environment. Anything less leaves them entangled in a conflict they cannot fully control, yet cannot credibly distance themselves from.

The reality is stark. By hosting US military infrastructure, these states have made themselves part of the battlefield. What they face today is not an unjust imposition, but the direct consequence of deliberate policy choices.

Why Is Washington Pursuing a War It Cannot Win?

Plans to seize Iran’s strategic assets risk triggering a wider conflict that could spiral beyond American control

Washington is no longer debating whether to escalate its conflict with Iran—it is moving steadily toward a war it cannot win. The real question is not capability, but judgment: why pursue a course whose consequences are both predictable and uncontrollable?

Deliberations within the administration of Donald Trump over deploying ground forces—whether to secure Kharg Island or to take control of Iran’s enriched uranium stockpiles—reflect a dangerous misreading of both history and reality.

Such objectives may appear decisive in military briefings, but they are strategically unsound. Airstrikes and targeted operations create an illusion of dominance; they do not translate into sustainable control. The moment U.S. troops set foot on Iranian soil, the conflict will cease to be limited. It will become a full-scale national resistance.

Iran is not comparable to past theaters like Libya or Afghanistan, where fragmented internal dynamics shaped outcomes. It is a cohesive state with deep-rooted national identity and an established capacity for asymmetric warfare. There will be no local cooperation—only organized, ideological resistance.

History has already delivered a clear warning. The failure of Operation Eagle Claw was not merely operational; it exposed the limits of American power in unfamiliar terrain. It is telling that successive U.S. administrations, despite sustained hostility, avoided direct military engagement inside Iran.

Equally flawed is the belief that eliminating leadership structures weakens Tehran. It does the opposite. Each strike reinforces a narrative of resistance, radicalizes the population, and strengthens long-term resolve against U.S. presence in the region.

Even the objective of securing the Strait of Hormuz cannot justify such escalation. A ground presence in Iran would invite retaliation across multiple fronts—military, economic, and geopolitical—far beyond Washington’s ability to contain.

The United States must confront a fundamental reality: overwhelming power does not guarantee strategic success. Entering Iran militarily would not demonstrate strength—it would expose vulnerability. The wiser course is not escalation, but restraint—because once this line is crossed, there may be no way back.