The Whole World Is Losing, Except the US

My point is clear, the United States must acknowledge defeat, ensure the full reopening of the Strait of Hormuz, lift economic sanctions on Iran, and compensate for the losses incurred during this war. Enough time has passed, and there is no justification for portraying defeat as victory.

The ongoing negotiations between the United States and Iran are increasingly becoming a rhetorical exercise rather than a strategic achievement. The ambitious campaign launched in coordination with Israel to curb Iran’s regional influence and nuclear development has failed to accomplish its stated objectives.

It would not be incorrect to say that Iran’s regional significance has increased, its negotiating posture has become more assertive, and its capacity to withstand economic pressure has proven far stronger than anticipated. After weeks of diplomacy, fundamental differences remain unresolved due to US intransigence, leaving the talks far from any meaningful breakthrough.

The situation in and around the Strait of Hormuz underscores US miscalculations and Iran’s leverage, while exposing the vulnerability of oil-exporting countries that rely heavily on American security guarantees. The US blockade of the Strait has reduced the daily movement of approximately 140 vessels to only a handful of oil and LNG carriers.

The consequences have been staggering. Oil-exporting Arab states are facing uncertain revenues, while energy-importing economies are grappling with inflationary pressures and severe supply disruptions.

Despite these grim realities, Washington’s rhetoric continues to speak of progress and opportunity. Such claims stand in stark contrast to the facts and appear to be an attempt to reframe strategic underperformance as diplomatic success. This only reinforces the perception of a policy being pursued without clear goals, direction, or achievable objectives.

The central point is now unmistakable - the longer the truth is denied, the greater the price the rest of the world will be forced to pay.

 

Lebanon: Israel’s Last Strategic Frontier?

Lebanon continues to occupy a central place in Israel’s strategic calculus, not merely as a neighboring state but as the remaining unresolved frontier in its northern security doctrine. From this perspective, Israel’s sustained pressure on Lebanon is shaped by a mix of historical experience, security anxieties, and regional power competition.

At the core lies the belief in parts of Israeli strategic thinking that Lebanon represents the last major obstacle to achieving uncontested dominance along its northern arc. Unlike other Arab theatres where state structures have either been weakened or neutralized through normalization or conflict, Lebanon remains structurally resistant.

Secondly, Israel views Hezbollah as the most capable and disciplined non-state military actor on its borders. With its missile arsenal and battlefield experience, Hezbollah is seen not just as a border threat but as a strategic deterrent that constrains Israeli freedom of action.

Thirdly, the northern border security buffer remains a persistent concern. Israel’s strategic doctrine has long emphasized preventing hostile entrenchment along its immediate frontier, and southern Lebanon is viewed as an area where such entrenchment has already occurred.

Fourthly, the eastern Mediterranean energy equation adds another layer. Maritime boundaries, offshore gas fields, and economic corridors have turned Lebanon from a peripheral concern into a contested strategic space where economic and security interests increasingly overlap.

Finally, Lebanon is viewed through the wider prism of Iran’s regional influence. Israel’s strategic planners often interpret Hezbollah’s presence as part of a broader deterrence network linked to Tehran, making Lebanon not just a bilateral issue but a node in a wider regional rivalry.

Taken together, these factors explain why Lebanon remains a focal point in Israeli strategic thinking — not necessarily as a target for territorial expansion, but as an unresolved security frontier that continues to shape regional dynamics.

War, Fear and Israeli Ballot

As Israelis prepare to vote while military operations continue against Iran and tensions remain high on multiple fronts, the election is being viewed through a simple question: will voters reward or punish Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu for choosing confrontation over restraint? Several outcomes are conceivable.

One possibility is that Netanyahu's coalition suffers setbacks because many Israelis have grown weary of living under a constant state of emergency. Years of conflict have imposed economic, social and psychological costs. Critics argue that military victories, however significant, have not produced lasting peace. Voters seeking stability may therefore conclude that a different political course is needed.

A second scenario is that Netanyahu emerges stronger. His supporters will contend that Israel has seized a historic opportunity to weaken what it regards as its most formidable adversary. If military operations are widely perceived as successful, many voters may see little reason to replace the leadership that authorized them. In times of conflict, electorates often prioritize continuity over change.

A third possibility is that Netanyahu benefits from his image as the guardian of Israeli security. Elections held during periods of heightened tensions are rarely fought on economic performance alone. Security concerns tend to dominate public discourse, and leaders who project determination frequently gain political advantage. For many voters, the question may not be whether they approve of every government decision, but whether they trust any alternative leadership to manage the threats facing the country.

A fourth scenario is that the electorate embraces candidates advocating de-escalation and diplomacy. Such an outcome would signal a growing belief that military power, while necessary for defense, cannot by itself resolve Israel's long-term security challenges.

Yet the balance of probabilities appears to favor Netanyahu. The election is taking place in an environment where security concerns overshadow almost every other issue. Moreover, significant political, security and ideological constituencies remain committed to a strategy of confronting and weakening Israel's adversaries before pursuing broader regional accommodation.

The decisive factor may not be Netanyahu himself. Rather, it is whether Israeli society continues to believe that greater security can be achieved through military dominance. If that belief remains intact, Netanyahu's path to victory becomes considerably easier. The election, therefore, may be less a verdict on one leader than a reflection of a broader national mood shaped by fear, conflict and the enduring quest for security.

Invisible Hand Behind Iran War

The latest round of hostilities involving Iran, Israel, and the United States raises a question that mainstream discourse appears reluctant to confront: if elected leaders are truly in control, why do military actions so often proceed in defiance of political declarations?

President Donald Trump publicly urged restraint and claimed that he "calls all the shots." Yet Israeli strikes followed almost immediately. The episode exposed a contradiction that has become increasingly common in international politics. Governments speak the language of diplomacy while military escalation continues unabated.

Perhaps the real issue is not whether Washington controls Tel Aviv or vice versa. The more important question is whether both are operating within a framework dictated by interests far larger than individual politicians.

For decades, every major crisis in the Middle East has produced the same winners. Defense industries secure larger contracts. Security establishments gain expanded powers. Energy markets remain vulnerable to disruption. Strategic planners find justification for maintaining military footprints across the region. Meanwhile, ordinary citizens pay the price through economic hardship, displacement, and insecurity.

Iran has become the latest target of this entrenched system. Officially, the objective is to halt Tehran's nuclear ambitions and neutralize its missile capabilities. Yet the scope of military pressure suggests broader ambitions. The weakening of the Iranian state, the containment of its regional influence, and perhaps even the eventual collapse of the current political order appears to be equally important goals.

The implications extend beyond the Middle East. Any disruption involving the Strait of Hormuz threatens global energy flows and places additional pressure on emerging economies. China, one of the largest consumers of Iranian energy, stands to lose from prolonged instability. In this context, the conflict increasingly resembles a chapter in a wider geopolitical contest rather than a narrowly defined security operation.

What makes the situation particularly troubling is the growing irrelevance of public accountability. Leaders change, governments come and go, yet the direction of policy remains remarkably consistent. Escalation follows escalation, regardless of electoral promises or diplomatic rhetoric.

One does not need to believe in secret conspiracies to recognize this pattern. A powerful nexus of military, economic, and geopolitical interests has repeatedly demonstrated its ability to shape outcomes. Whether it is called an establishment, a strategic network, or an informal cartel of influence, its fingerprints are visible across the region.

The tragedy is that while nations debate who fired the latest missile, few ask who benefits from a conflict that never seems to end.

OPEC+ to raise oil output by 188,000 bpd

Seven OPEC+ countries have agreed to increase their combined crude oil output targets by 188,000 barrels per day (bpd) in July. This is the same as the June hike, which was adjusted down from monthly increases of 206,000 bpd in May and April to ⁠take into account the UAE exit.

The decision was taken by the countries—Saudi Arabia, Russia, Iraq, Kuwait, Kazakhstan, Algeria, and Oman—during their virtual meeting held on Sunday to review global market conditions and outlook.

This increase marks the fourth monthly quota hike under the group's phased unwinding of voluntary supply cuts, though the physical realization of these barrels currently remains limited due to the blockade of the Strait of Hormuz.

Seven OPEC+ countries have increased their output quotas from April to June this year by almost 600,000 barrels per day. In their collective commitment to support oil market stability, the seven countries decided to implement a production adjustment of 188,000 bpd from the additional voluntary adjustments announced in April 2023. This adjustment will be implemented from next month.

The additional voluntary adjustments announced in April 2023 may be returned in part or in full subject to evolving market conditions and in a gradual manner. The countries will continue to closely monitor and assess market conditions, and in their continuous efforts to support market stability, they reaffirmed the importance of adopting a cautious approach and retaining full flexibility to increase, pause or reverse the phase out of the voluntary production adjustments, including reversing the previously implemented voluntary adjustments announced in November 2023.

The seven OPEC+ countries noted that this measure will provide an opportunity for the participating countries to accelerate their compensation. These countries reiterated their collective commitment to achieve full conformity with the Declaration of Cooperation, including the additional voluntary production adjustments that will be monitored by the Joint Ministerial Monitoring Committee (JMMC).
They also confirmed their intention to fully compensate for any overproduced volume since January 2024. The compensation period will be extended until the end of December 2026.

Sovereignty, Security and Selective Silence

Saudi Arabia's condemnation of Iranian attacks on Kuwait and Bahrain is understandable. Any attack against a neighboring Gulf state threatens regional stability and raises legitimate concerns about security. Riyadh's warning that such actions could push the region toward greater instability reflects the anxieties of governments and citizens alike.

Yet the latest crisis exposes a deeper question that deserves serious debate across the Gulf.

The Kingdom and its GCC partners have been swift in condemning Iranian military actions. However, they have been far more restrained when it comes to criticizing US attacks on Iran, many of which originate from military facilities located within GCC countries. This raises an uncomfortable but important question. Is sovereignty being defended as a universal principle, or is it being interpreted through the lens of strategic alliances?

The issue is not whether Iran should be held accountable for actions that threaten regional peace. It should. The real issue is whether the same standards are applied consistently to all actors.

For decades, Gulf states have justified hosting US military bases as a necessary component of their security architecture. The arrangement has undoubtedly provided strategic protection. However, it has also created a paradox. Facilities intended to enhance security may simultaneously transform host nations into potential targets whenever confrontation erupts between Washington and its adversaries.

This dilemma goes beyond the Gulf. It touches the very meaning of sovereignty in the modern world. Sovereignty is not merely the defense of territorial borders; it is also the ability to exercise independent control over how national territory is used. If military operations against a third country are launched from bases located within a sovereign state, can that state genuinely claim neutrality in the resulting conflict?

Supporters of the current security framework argue that these operations occur with the consent of host governments and therefore do not violate sovereignty. Critics counter that consent alone does not eliminate responsibility for the consequences that follow.

The Gulf's leaders frequently call for dialogue, restraint and de-escalation. These are worthy objectives. Yet lasting credibility requires a consistent approach. Condemning attacks from adversaries while remaining silent about military actions conducted by allies inevitably invites questions about selective outrage.

The debate, therefore, is not about choosing between Washington and Tehran. It is about determining whether sovereignty is a principle to be upheld universally or a concept applied selectively when political convenience demands it.

Trading at PSX driven by US-Iran conflict

The benchmark Index of Pakistan Stock Exchange (PSX) continued its positive momentum in May 2026 for the second consecutive month as the US and Iran moved closer to clinching a deal. The absence of additional revenue measures in the upcoming budget, amid the uncertainty created by the recent US-Iran conflict boosted investors’ confidence. Technology, Cement, and OMC sectors delivered the strongest positive returns while refineries remained negative during the month under review.

The Index continued its positive momentum for the second consecutive month as the US and Iran moved closer to clinching a deal that could pave the way for the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz. Consequently, the Index gained 6.7% (6.8% in US$ terms) during May. However, market liquidity contracted by 20.6% on sequential basis as average daily traded volume declined to 929 million shares from 1,170 million shares in April 2026 due to Eid effect. Average daily traded value also dropped by 22.2% to PKR41.8 billion (US$150 million) from PKR53.7 billion (US$192.7 million) in April 2026.

The absence of additional revenue measures in the upcoming budget, amid the uncertainty created by the recent US-Iran conflict boosted investor confidence. Analysts expect the government's focus to remain on increasing revenue through enforcement measures while curtailing expenditures, which would continue to be the mainstay of its fiscal strategy.

Pakistan’s role as a mediator in the ongoing US-Iran conflict supports the view that the country’s increasing importance in the GCC is likely to improve its global standing and help attract foreign investment. However, any adverse development in the US-Iran conflict could become a source of concern for investors.

Technology, Cement, and OMC sectors delivered the strongest positive returns, driven by improving IT exports, continued robust domestic demand, and higher inventory gains. The Technology sector posted a return of 15.6% in May, followed by OMCs and Cement, which generated returns of 10.7% and 10.0% respectively. The Fertilizer sector also reported a strong return of 8.8%, supported by healthy offtakes and attractive dividend yields. As against this, Refineries sector posted a negative return of 1.2% during the month following the government's decision to fix margins on certain petroleum products to provide relief to consumers.

Insurance and Brokers remained net buyers in May, accumulating equities worth US$12.8 million and US$5.5 million, respectively, amid expectations of a US-Iran deal. Conversely, Companies, Banks, and Mutual funds remained net sellers as funds shifted toward fixed-income securities following policy rate increase by the central bank in April 2026. Foreign investors also remained net sellers due to geopolitical tensions and rising concerns over currency depreciation across emerging and frontier markets amid inflationary pressures in developed economies resulting from the Middle East conflict. Net foreign selling was recorded at US$17.2 million, primarily in the banking sector (US$14.1 million), followed by the cement sector (US$5.4 million).