Lebanon Remains Israel’s Perpetual Battlefield

At first glance, Israel’s continued military engagement in Lebanon appears excessive, even perplexing. If Hezbollah is widely seen as a proxy of Iran, why does the conflict endure despite constraints on Iranian support? The answer lies not in territorial ambition, but in a doctrine shaped by insecurity and hard-learned lessons.

The origins of this confrontation trace back to the 1982 Lebanon War—a campaign aimed at neutralizing threats, not annexing territory. Yet it produced an unintended outcome: the rise of Hezbollah, a force far more adaptive and deeply embedded within Lebanon’s socio-political fabric than any of its predecessors. Its resilience stems not merely from external backing, but from local legitimacy, making it difficult to dismantle through conventional warfare.

Israel, mindful of the costs of past entanglements, no longer seeks occupation. Its strategy is narrower, yet relentless: degrade Hezbollah’s military infrastructure, disrupt its operational capacity, and maintain distance between the group and its northern frontier. This is not victory in the traditional sense—it is the management of a persistent threat.

Geography reinforces this reality. Southern Lebanon offers terrain ideally suited for asymmetric warfare, enabling even a weakened Hezbollah to project force into Israeli territory. For Israeli planners, restraint carries risk; periodic military action becomes a calculated necessity rather than a choice.

At a broader level, Lebanon serves as a proxy arena in the rivalry between Israel and Iran. Each strike on Hezbollah is also a signal to Tehran—asserting limits without crossing into direct war. This calibrated tension sustains a fragile but enduring equilibrium.

The conclusion is uncomfortable but clear. Lebanon is unlikely to witness lasting peace in the near term—not because Israel seeks to occupy it, but because it remains central to a conflict that thrives on continuity. In this unresolved contest between deterrence and resistance, stability is not the objective—only its temporary illusion.

Pakistan Needs Another Resolution

Every year on March 23, Pakistan celebrates the adoption of the Lahore Resolution—the historic declaration that ultimately paved the way for the creation of Pakistan on August 14, 1947. For the Muslims of the subcontinent, the resolution represented far more than a political demand; it embodied the aspiration for sovereignty, dignity, and the right to determine their own future. More than eight decades later, Pakistan commemorates this milestone with pride and patriotic fervor. Yet the realities of the present compel a deeper reflection: does Pakistan today require another national resolve to safeguard its independence and strengthen its future? To read details click https://shkazmipk.com/pakistan-day-resolution/

US-Israel war on Iran: Killing many birds with one stone

The third week of the US-Israel war on Iran has ended, while the spotlight remains fixed on Tehran, the real story lies elsewhere. Iran has undeniably suffered heavy damage, but the silent devastation across the Gulf—particularly in Dubai and Qatar—is far more consequential and enduring.

This is not a war with a single objective. It is a multi-layered strategic strike—killing many birds with one stone.

Publicly, Iran is the target. The stated ambition is to weaken it, isolate it, and, if possible, reduce it to the kind of humanitarian catastrophe witnessed in Gaza. But beneath this declared objective lies a far more calculated design: the weakening of emerging Gulf economic powerhouses that have, in recent years, begun to rival traditional Western dominance.

Dubai stands out as a prime casualty.

 Over the past two decades, it has transformed itself into a global financial and trading hub, attracting billions of US dollars in international capital—including from Israel itself. Its strategic ports, Jebel Ali and Fujairah, have turned it into a critical artery of global commerce. Such autonomy and influence were never going to fit in comfortably within a US-led order.

The Abraham Accords, celebrated as a diplomatic breakthrough, also served another purpose—drawing Dubai deeper into a geopolitical framework that left it exposed. Once tensions escalated, the emirate found itself in the crosshairs of a conflict it neither initiated nor could control.

Qatar’s trajectory is equally revealing. 

Its earlier isolation within the Gulf Cooperation Council, combined with the establishment of one of the largest US military bases in the region, was not an act of strategic generosity. It was a calculated positioning. Qatar’s vast natural gas reserves and its geographic proximity to Iran made it indispensable—not as a partner, but as a platform.

What followed was predictable. Iran was provoked into retaliation, and the Gulf became the unintended—or perhaps intended—battleground. Whether the destruction in Dubai and Qatar came directly from Iranian strikes or through more complex channels is almost secondary. The outcome remains the same - both have been dragged into a war that serves larger strategic ends.

History reinforces this pattern. Since the Iranian Revolution, the United States has viewed Iran as the principal challenge to its Middle Eastern dominance. Yet, rather than engaging directly, Washington has preferred to entangle Tehran in prolonged proxy conflicts across Yemen, Lebanon, Syria, and Iraq. Decades of sanctions and indirect warfare have failed to break Iran. If anything, they have hardened it—economically, militarily, and politically.

The current war reflects a shift born out of frustration. Israel initiated the confrontation, convinced of its ability to decisively weaken Iran. The United States, wary yet compelled, has stepped in—not out of readiness, but out of strategic necessity.

This is not merely a war against Iran. It is a broader attempt to redraw the region’s economic and geopolitical map—where even allies are expendable, and collateral damage is quietly folded into grand strategy.

Russia emerges true winner of US war on Iran

The world's attention is fixed on the Persian Gulf, where the blockade of the Strait of Hormuz has become the epicenter of a brewing energy shock. With roughly 80% of crude oil moving through the waterway normally heading to Asia, the region is uniquely exposed.

At first glance, the fallout looks familiar: Rising tensions between the duo US-Israel and Iran are threatening supply chains and stoking fears of another oil spike. But the story quickly takes a less obvious turn. As Ritesh Kumar Singh argues, "Amid the focus on the most obvious losers, the energy-dependent economies of Asia and the exporters of the Persian Gulf, another country stands to gain from the turmoil, Russia."

When Hormuz becomes unstable, "global oil logistics shift rapidly," and Russia's export routes -- spanning the Baltic and Pacific gain fresh strategic weight. In this environment, Russia's export geography suddenly becomes one of the most valuable assets in global energy markets, offering buyers the increasingly scarce asset of reliability.

"For Russia ... higher global oil prices translate directly into stronger export revenues and greater fiscal resilience. In a prolonged geopolitical contest where economic stability matters as much as battlefield outcomes, that dynamic strengthens Moscow's hand," Singh writes. "The result is a paradox. A conflict intended to weaken Iran may ultimately redraw the global energy map in ways that favor Russia."

Even Washington's closest allies are hedging. Japan and South Korea have "refrained from openly endorsing US military action," favoring quiet coordination over public backing. For two treaty allies at the core of US strategy in Asia, the instinct now is careful calibration, not automatic alignment.

Across the region, positions diverge further. China has condemned the strikes while casting itself as a stabilizer, Taiwan has voiced support framed around "freedom and democracy," and much of Southeast and South Asia has leaned into neutrality, emphasizing restraint and flexibility amid energy risks and domestic pressures.

Indo-Pacific responses reflect "layered calculations about alliance management, energy security, domestic politics, ideological orientation and economic vulnerability," Grossman writes.

"That diversity may frustrate policymakers in Washington seeking unified backing if the conflict intensifies and requires additional support. Yet it also reflects a deeper strategic reality: Alignment in the Indo-Pacific varies widely, and even America's closest partners carefully weigh their own interests when distant conflicts threaten to expand."

Courtesy: Nikkei Asia

Sanctions as Theatre: Washington’s War on Iran Funds Itself

 This is hypocrisy and outright strategic farce

A report by The Hill reveals that the administration of Donald Trump has authorized the release of roughly 140 million barrels of Iranian oil stranded at sea. While Washington claims to be tightening the noose around Iran, which is it—economic warfare or economic relief?

For decades, US sanctions have been designed to suffocate Iran’s revenues. Yet at a moment of heightened confrontation, Washington has chosen to unlock one of Tehran’s largest oil stockpiles and push it into global markets. This is not tactical flexibility; it is policy contradiction at its most blatant.

Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent claims Iran will struggle to access the proceeds. That argument is deeply misleading. Oil, once sold, creates economic space—whether through direct revenue, indirect trade channels, or geopolitical leverage. Sanctions diluted at convenience cease to be sanctions at all.

More telling is Washington’s own admission Iranian oil is being used to suppress global prices. In effect, the US is leveraging Iranian crude to cushion its own economy from a crisis it is helping sustain.

This is not pressure—it is dependence.

Criticism from Richard Blumenthal and analyst Victoria Taylor exposes the deeper flaw. You cannot claim to isolate an adversary while facilitating its core export. Such a policy erodes credibility, weakens deterrence, and signals that pressure is negotiable.

The message to Tehran is unmistakable - hold firm, and the system bends.

If sanctions can be lifted when oil prices rise, then they are not instruments of strategy—they are tools of convenience. And a policy built on convenience cannot sustain a war of pressure.

Washington may call this a temporary measure. In reality, it is a revealing one.

Because in trying to weaken Iran, the United States has once again proven how indispensable it remains.

Trump faces fate worse than Bush faced in Iraq

On March 17, 2026, I posted a blog titled “Washington’s Miscalculation: War It Can't Win”. Its opening paragraph was, I quote “Since the Iranian Revolution, the United States has pursued not coexistence with Iran, but its submission. Nearly five decades of sanctions, covert operations, and proxy confrontations have produced results Washington resists admitting - Iran has not weakened — it has adapted, and in many respects, hardened”. Today, March 21, 2026 Reuters ran a story with a caption “How Trump's stated reasons, goals and timeline for Iran war have shifted”.

 According to the report, President Donald Trump and his top officials have offered shifting objectives and reasons for the US-Israeli war on Iran, which critics say shows a lack of planning for the conflict and its aftermath.

Stated objectives and expected timeline have varied, including toppling Iran's government, weakening Iran's military, security and nuclear capabilities and its regional influence, as well as supporting Israeli interests.

Here is how Trump described his ​war goals and timeline:

FEBRUARY 28: CALLS FOR IRANIANS TO TOPPLE THEIR GOVERNMENT

The Iranian people should "take over" governance of their country, Trump said in a video on ‌social media as the US and Israel launched their attacks. "It will be yours to take," he added. "This will be probably your only chance for generations."

Trump described the attacks as "major combat operations."

FEBRUARY 28: WEAKEN IRAN'S MILITARY, INFLUENCE

Trump said Washington would deny Iran the ability to have a nuclear weapon, although Tehran has insisted its nuclear program is for peaceful purposes. Iran does not have nuclear weapons while the United States does. Israel is also widely believed to ​be the only Middle Eastern country with nuclear weapons.

Trump insisted he would end what he described as Tehran's ballistic missile threat. "We're going to destroy their missiles and raze their missile ​industry to the ground," he said. "We're going to annihilate their navy."

Trump claimed Iran's long range missiles "can now threaten our very good friends and allies ⁠in Europe, our troops stationed overseas, and could soon reach the American homeland."

His remarks echoed the case of President George W. Bush for the Iraq war, which had false claims. Neither experts nor ​US intelligence support Trump's assertions and both assess that Iran's ballistic missile program was years from threatening the US homeland.

MARCH 2: SHIFTING TIMELINE

Trump said the war was projected to last four to five ​weeks but could go on longer.

"We're already substantially ahead of our time projections. But whatever the time is, it's okay. Whatever it takes," Trump said at the White House. In a social media post, Trump said there was a "virtually unlimited supply" of US munitions and that "wars can be fought 'forever,' and very successfully, using just these supplies."

In a notification to Congress, Trump provided no timeline. Trump earlier told the Daily Mail the war could take "four weeks, ​or less," then told The New York Times four to five weeks and subsequently said it could take longer.

MARCH 2: RUBIO SAYS US ATTACKED IRAN BECAUSE ISRAEL DID

Secretary of State Marco Rubio told ​reporters Israel's determination to attack Iran forced Washington to strike.

"We knew that there was going to be an Israeli action, we knew that that would precipitate an attack against American forces, and we knew that if ‌we didn't preemptively ⁠go after them before they launched those attacks, we would suffer higher casualties," Rubio said.

MARCH 3: TRUMP CONTRADICTS RUBIO

Trump said he ordered US forces to join Israel's attack on Iran because he believed Iran was about to strike first.

"I might have forced their (Israel's) hand," Trump said. "If we didn't do it, they (Iran) were going to attack first."

MARCH 04: CALL TO 'DESTROY' SECURITY INFRASTRUCTURE

Pentagon chief Pete Hegseth said the goal was to "destroy Iranian offensive missiles, destroy Iranian missile production, destroy their navy and other security infrastructure."

MARCH 06: 'UNCONDITIONAL SURRENDER' CALL

"There will be no deal with Iran except UNCONDITIONAL SURRENDER," Trump wrote on social ​media.

MARCH 8-11: JUST THE START BUT ALSO 'PRETTY MUCH ​COMPLETE'

Hegseth told CBS News in an interview aired ⁠March 08 strikes on Iran were "only just the beginning."

A day later, Trump told the same network "I think the war is very complete, pretty much."

"We've already won in many ways, but we haven't won enough," Trump told reporters later on the same day. When asked if the war was beginning ​or complete, he said: "Well, I think you could say both."

On March 11, Trump again said he thought the US had won but: "We've got ​to finish the job."

MARCH 13: ⁠SOFTENS CALL FOR INTERNAL UPRISING

In a March 13 interview, Trump told Fox News the war will end "when I feel it in my bones."

Trump softened his call for Iranians to topple their government. "So I really think that's a big hurdle to climb for people that don't have weapons," Trump said.

MARCH 19: HEGSETH SAYS NO TIME FRAME

Hegseth said Washington was not setting a time frame for the war and Trump would ⁠decide when to ​stop.

"We wouldn't want to set a definitive time frame," the Pentagon chief said. "It will be at the president's choosing, ​ultimately, where we say, 'Hey, we've achieved what we need to.'"

MARCH 20: TRUMP CONSIDERS WINDING DOWN BUT NO CEASEFIRE

Trump posted on Truth Social, "we are getting very close to meeting our objectives as we consider winding down our great Military efforts" in ​the Iran war. Earlier in the day, Trump told reporters "I don't want to do a ceasefire" when asked about the war.

 

Riyadh Returns to Iran Threat Narrative

In the aftermath of Iran’s 1979 Islamic Revolution, the United States recalibrated its regional strategy, increasingly presenting Tehran as the principal source of instability in the Middle East. Over time, this framing found resonance in several Arab capitals, particularly in Saudi Arabia, shaping a security outlook that continues to influence regional policy choices.

This perception was reinforced through tangible measures. The expansion of US military infrastructure across the Gulf—most prominently in Qatar—was justified largely on the premise of countering Iranian influence. Simultaneously, Washington sustained economic pressure on Tehran over its nuclear program, despite Iran’s status as a signatory to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, in contrast to Israel’s longstanding ambiguity.

Historical episodes added further complexity. The Iran-Iraq war entrenched regional rivalries, while later diplomatic efforts—including the nuclear agreement under President Barack Obama and the China-brokered rapprochement between Riyadh and Tehran—offered brief openings for recalibration. Yet such initiatives have struggled to overcome deeply embedded mistrust, particularly amid shifting US policies and competing geopolitical interests.

Recent remarks by Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Faisal bin Farhan reflect a return to a more cautious, if not hardened, posture. His assertion that trust in Iran has been “completely shattered,” alongside allegations of destabilizing activities across the region, underscores Riyadh’s growing concerns about security and sovereignty. These claims are rooted in reported attacks on energy infrastructure and maritime navigation, which Saudi Arabia and its partners attribute to Iran.

Tehran, however, has consistently rejected such accusations, framing its actions as defensive and, at times, suggesting that regional escalations are shaped by broader geopolitical contestation. Independent verification of specific incidents remains contested, contributing to a narrative environment marked as much by perception as by provable fact.

What emerges is not merely a dispute over actions, but over interpretation. Saudi Arabia’s current stance appears closely aligned with a long-standing US strategic framing that positions Iran as the central regional threat. While this perspective reflects genuine security concerns, it also risks narrowing the analytical lens through which complex regional dynamics are understood.

The persistence of this narrative suggests that, despite episodic diplomacy and shifting alliances, foundational perceptions remain largely intact. In effect, Riyadh’s position today echoes a familiar refrain—one shaped over decades—where Iran continues to be viewed as the primary challenge to regional stability.