Flydubai FZ1073: What Are We Not Being Told?

The more details emerging about flydubai Flight FZ1073, the more questions arise. The UAE prosecutor general has now described the incident as an attempted terrorist attack, saying the co-pilot attacked the captain with a crash axe and attempted to take control of the aircraft. Yet the motive and the full circumstances remain under investigation. I believe investigators must look beyond the immediately available narrative.

Was FZ1073 really an ordinary commercial flight, or was there something unusual about its passengers, identities or cargo?

The first question concerns identities. Were all passengers and crew travelling under their genuine identities? Were passports, immigration records, airline databases and security clearances independently cross-checked? Did any passenger or crew member have a travel history or identity requiring closer scrutiny?

The second question concerns cargo. Was every item loaded on the aircraft properly declared and recorded? Did the physical cargo correspond exactly with the manifest? Were any packages loaded, transferred or handled outside normal procedures?

Then comes the cockpit mystery. Was the co-pilot genuinely the aggressor, as now officially stated, or could the sequence of events have been more complicated? Investigators should reconstruct the confrontation through cockpit voice recordings, flight-data records, access logs, communications, forensic evidence and eyewitness accounts.

The presence of additional pilots aboard the aircraft also deserves careful examination. Their role in bringing the aircraft safely to Tabuk is established, but investigators should establish precisely when and how they became involved.

Most importantly, why have so many conflicting details appeared in the media? Fake videos and contradictory claims have already circulated, prompting fact-checkers to warn about misinformation surrounding the incident.

This is not an attempt to convict anyone through speculation. It is a demand for evidence.

If FZ1073 was simply the victim of a lone insider attack, a transparent investigation should establish that beyond doubt.

But if identities were concealed, cargo was undeclared, or the cockpit incident was merely one part of a larger plan, investigators must uncover it.

The real story will emerge only when every passenger, every piece of cargo and every minute of the flight is accounted for.

Why Should G7 Bail Out Donald Trump?

Why should the Group of Seven bail out Donald Trump from an energy crisis aggravated by the war with Iran and disruption of energy flows through the Strait of Hormuz?

The question becomes even more relevant after G7 countries agreed to release up to 100 million barrels of diesel, crude oil and other petroleum products from emergency reserves over four months, with a substantial volume of diesel to be released within the first 20 days.

The decision followed intense pressure from Washington, including the threat of a US diesel-export ban that could have further disrupted supplies to Europe.

The irony is difficult to ignore. Trump had repeatedly indicated that a diesel-export ban was under consideration. After European countries agreed to release their strategic stocks, he declared that the United States would not impose such a ban—and claimed that it had never really been on the table.

If that is the case, why were America's allies required to open their emergency reserves?

Strategic petroleum reserves are maintained for genuine emergencies. They should not become an instrument for managing the consequences of another country's policies. Releasing 100 million barrels may provide temporary relief, but it cannot substitute for restoring normal energy flows.

The larger question is therefore unavoidable, why is Washington concentrating on extracting more fuel from its allies instead of addressing the causes of the disruption?

The Strait of Hormuz is vital to the global energy system. Prolonged disruption affects far more than Iran. Higher crude and refined-product prices feed directly into transportation, agriculture, manufacturing, inflation and household costs across the world.

Trump may describe the G7 release as a “major world contribution.” But the world needs more than emergency barrels. It needs secure shipping routes, uninterrupted energy supplies and a diplomatic framework capable of ending the confrontation.

Punishing Iran through sanctions and military pressure while asking the rest of the world to absorb the resulting energy shock is hardly a sustainable strategy.

If Washington wants its allies to share the burden of the crisis, it should also be prepared to share responsibility for ending it. Otherwise, the G7 may simply be helping Trump postpone a problem that requires a political solution.

PSX benchmark index down 1.5%WoW

Pakistan Stock Exchange (PSX) remained under pressure during the week ended on Friday, October 02, 2026, as renewed uncertainty over the US-Iran conflict and elevated global energy prices continued to weigh on investor sentiment. The benchmark index witnessed erosion of 2,610 points or 1.5%WoW to close at 168,155.

Oil prices remained elevated for most of the week, touching US$105.3/ bbl, as supply chain concerns and China's suspension of oil product exports outweighed recovering Gulf crude flows.

Brent crude declined to US$99.5/ bbl in the concluding phase of the week amid growing pressure of the US on Europe to release diesel stocks.

September 2026 inflation was recorded at 10.3% as against 11.2% in August 2026 due to disinflationary pressure from food prices.

Trade deficit for September 2026 widened by 6%YoY to US$3.6 billion.

IMF mission formally began policy talks in Islamabad on the fourth EFF review and third RSF review, likely to result in the release of US$1.2 billion in combined disbursements.

FBR collected PKR3.1 trillion in 1QFY27, exceeding the IMF-agreed target by PKR13 billion.

State Bank of Pakistan (SBP) raised PKR853 billion via the T-Bills auction. The cutoff yields increased for all the tenors.

Other major news flow during the week included: 1) Finance Minister discussed potential US Export-Import Bank financing for Boeing aircraft, refinery upgrades and Reko Diq, 2) foreign exchange reserves held by SBP were reported at US$21.4 billion as of September 25, 2026, 3) SBP's net FX interventions were reported at US$841 million in June 2026, 4) GoP raised PKR46 billion and PKR72 billion in fixed/ variable Hybrid Sukuk auction, and 5) Gop plans to procure at least 25-26 LNG cargoes to meet winter gas demand.

Leading contributors were Vanaspati and Allied Industries, Synthetic and Rayon, and Modarabas, while sectors that lagged the most were Power, Inv. Cos., and Paper and Board.

Major buyers were Companies (US$5.2 million) and Individuals (US$4.5 million). On the contrary, major net selling was recorded by Mutual funds (US$6.1 million) and Brokers worthUS$2.3 million, respectively.

Top performing scrips were: SSOM, ii) BML, and ATRL, while laggards included: PSEL, FHAM, and NPL.

AKD Securities expects the market to improve on the back of strengthening economic indicators, with the upcoming IMF review to remain a key near-term catalyst.

A potential US-Iran deal could moderate international oil prices from current elevated levels. The market continues to trade at attractive valuations.

According to AKD Securities, the Index is anticipated to reach 263,800 by end December 2026.

Top picks of the brokerage house include: OGDC, PPL, UBL, MEBL, HBL, FFC, ENGROH, PSO, LUCK, FCCL, INDU, ILP and SYS.

 

 

Four vessels struck in Hormuz in 24 hours

According to Seatrade Maritime News, UKMTO has published four warnings of attacks in the Strait of Hormuz which took place on September 28 and 29.

The first of the late reports states that a vessel was struck by an unknown projectile late on September 28, leading to a fire onboard, which was later extinguished. The crew were reported as safe. The IMO’s list of confirmed attacks in the region now carries a September 28 incident involving VLCC Al Funtas in the Strait of Hormuz, reporting damage to the ship and no pollution. The ship is owned and operated by Kuwait Oil Tanker Company.

The UKMTO report was filed as suspicious activity, rather than an attack, even though it confirms an attack on the ship.

On September 30, three more late reports were published regarding incidents that took place on September 29. The first report is of a crude oil tanker struck on the port side, identified by Vanguard Tech as 2008-built VLCC Mersin Prosperity. According to Equasis data, the ship is managed by ADNOC.

The second report is of a tanker transiting inbound being struck by an unknown projectile, identified by Vanguard as Sinbad, a Liberian-flagged tanker managed by Anglo-Eastern.

The third report of a tanker struck by an unknown projectile regards Al Ruwais, according to Vanguard, which it identified as an LNG tanker, although the vessel appears to be a Liberia-flagged LR2 owned and operated by ADNOC.

All of the attacks were within the Strait of Hormuz.

Of the three ships identified by Vanguard, only Sinbad appears on Iran’s list of non-compliant vessels it claims have breached Tehran’s rules for transiting the Strait of Hormuz. Vessels on the list, administered by the Persian Gulf Strait Authority (PGSA), are subject to fines, detention, or confiscation during future passages of the Strait of Hormuz, PGSA has warned.

“The extent of damage to the three vessels remains unclear at current,” said Vanguard.

The series of late reports from UKMTO is unusual, and follows Iranian claims to have attacked 19 vessels on September 25 and 26. UKMTO relies on a voluntary reporting scheme and acts as a point of contact for emergency response in the region, and so its reporting capability would be limited should vessels and organizations choose not to report incidents.

 

Oil producers ‌likely to keep their production targets steady

According to a Reuters report, OPEC+ oil producing countries are ‌likely to keep their oil production targets steady for November when they meet on Sunday.

The online meeting of seven core OPEC+ members, namely: ​Saudi Arabia, Russia, Iraq, Kuwait, Algeria, Kazakhstan and Oman — comes as ⁠Gulf members have been boosting exports that have been disrupted for months by the blockade of Strait of Hurmuz, although most are still pumping well below their output targets.

OPEC+ comprises the Organization ​of the Petroleum Exporting Countries and allies including Russia. OPEC and authorities in Russia did not immediately respond to requests for comment.

The group has been raising its output targets for most of the ​year but kept them steady for October.

In September it completed the phased rollback of a ​1.65 million-barrel-per-day supply cut first agreed in 2023.

Reuters reported in July that OPEC+ was likely to make ‌no changes ⁠to its targets during the fourth quarter as it turns its focus to 2027 quota negotiations. Disruption caused by the Iran war has meant Gulf producers are falling below their quotas.

OPEC data showed the seven core OPEC+ producers produced 25.0 million barrels per ​day in August, ​up 630,000 bpd from ⁠July yet still roughly 5 million bpd below pre-war levels in February.

OPEC+ still has one more layer of production cuts of ​about 2 million bpd covering most members through the end ​of 2026.

The ⁠group needs to finalize a review of members' production capacity before setting 2027 baselines that will determine future quotas and shape plans to unwind those cuts, sources have said.

A separate OPEC+ ministerial group called the Joint Ministerial Monitoring Committee (JMMC), which does not decide policy, ​also meets on Sunday to review the market.

US Forces Exit Iraq After Two Decades

Is the US exiting Iraq by choice—or under pressure?

I am not surprised by the announcement that US forces are leaving Iraq. The withdrawal was agreed in 2024 under President Joe Biden and is now being implemented by Donald Trump’s administration. Yet the timing is intriguing - America is leaving Iraq while simultaneously confronting Iran in a widening regional conflict.

The obvious interpretation is that Washington has concluded that its military mission in Iraq has run its course. But geopolitics rarely ends with the departure of troops. America may be leaving Iraq militarily without necessarily leaving the Iraqi theatre strategically.

The withdrawal removes a long-standing American military presence that acted as a counterweight to Iran's influence. Iran and its allies are already celebrating the departure as a victory, while some Iraqi officials fear that the resulting security gap could strengthen Iran-backed militias. At the same time, Islamic State sleeper cells remain active, creating another potential source of instability.

This raises a more provocative question; could the withdrawal ultimately facilitate another phase of the US-Iran confrontation rather than bring it to an end?

There is no evidence that Washington intends to use Islamic State as a proxy. Yet the possibility deserves consideration. Iraqi commanders have reported increased movement by sleeper cells following news of the withdrawal, while the loss of American intelligence, drones and logistical support could give the group greater operating space.

A security vacuum, if it develops, could provide militants with an opportunity to revive—and governments with a pretext for renewed intervention.

Iraq's oil resources add another strategic dimension. Any prolonged instability affecting exploration, production or export infrastructure would have consequences far beyond Iraq. Whether such an outcome is intended or simply emerges from a deteriorating security environment remains an open question.

Therefore, America's departure should not automatically be interpreted as the end of its Iraqi engagement. Troops may be leaving, but American strategic interests are unlikely to disappear with them.

The real question begins after September 30, will Iraq finally exercise greater sovereignty, or will the vacuum created by the withdrawal become the opening chapter of another US-Iran proxy confrontation?

The Syndicate That Brought Trump Is Losing Patience

Donald Trump returned to the White House with the support of a broad coalition of political, business, media, energy, technology and investment interests. Many expected his second presidency to deliver decisive results. Nearly two years later, some members of this coalition may be confronting a widening gap between expectations and reality.

Iran is perhaps the clearest example. The US-Israeli war on Iran, which began on February 28, has entered its seventh month, yet Tehran has not surrendered. Iran has endured sustained military pressure while retaining significant leverage, particularly through the Strait of Hormuz. Diplomatic efforts are continuing, but Washington and Tehran remain far apart.

The economic consequences are becoming increasingly difficult to ignore. US diesel prices have climbed above US$6 per gallon, while concerns over shortages are intensifying. Trump has considered restricting diesel exports, but the oil industry has resisted, warning that such a move could disrupt refinery operations and ultimately worsen supplies.

The oil market presents another uncomfortable reality. Brent crude has moved above US$100 per barrel, but the much-discussed US$200 target remains elusive. More significantly, the spread between Brent and West Texas Intermediate has widened, reflecting a market increasingly distorted by geopolitical risk rather than controlled by policy.

The media was among the first constituencies to become increasingly critical. Energy companies are now showing greater resistance, while investors are becoming more selective about technology and AI valuations. The military-industrial complex, meanwhile, continues to receive substantial attention, but the prolonged conflict raises questions about the sustainability and strategic payoff of escalating military expenditure.

This growing friction also has a political dimension. A fresh impeachment resolution was tabled in the House on September 15 by 232–147, with 47 members voting present. It therefore did not proceed to a Senate trial. Yet another attempt cannot be ruled out, particularly if political control of Congress changes.

The larger question is whether the diverse interests that helped bring Trump back to power can remain united when geopolitical ambitions collide with energy prices, corporate interests, financial markets and domestic political pressures.

“The Syndicate” may never have been a formal organization. It was a convergence of interests. The real test now is whether that convergence can survive the widening gap between expectations and results.