Showing posts with label United States. Show all posts
Showing posts with label United States. Show all posts

Saturday, 13 September 2025

Who is the true representative of Palestinians?

For more than 700 days Israel has been undertaking land and air attacks on Gaza enclave and killed more than 65,000 people, mostly women and children. The strip has been reduced to rubbles, with the destruction of infrastructure. In the latest UN resolution the two state formula has been endorsed, with minus Hamas involvement.

There is no denying to the fact that Hamas has been in virtual control of Gaza for nearly two decades. There is a suggestion to resolve Palestine issue without any role of Hamas, what so ever. It may be a wish of Israel, but do the ground realities support this?

Ironically Palestinians are represented by different bodies in different contexts:

Internationally (Diplomatic Representation)

Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO):

Recognized by the United Nations and over 130 countries as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. The PLO holds Palestine’s seat at the UN as a “non-member observer state.”

Within Occupied Palestinian Territories

Palestinian Authority (PA):
Established under the 1993 Oslo Accords, the PA governs parts of the West Bank. Its leadership is dominated by Fatah, a major faction of the PLO. President Mahmoud Abbas is both head of the PA and chairman of the PLO.

Hamas:
An Islamist movement that controls the Gaza strip since 2007, after winning the 2006 Palestinian legislative elections and subsequent conflict with Fatah. Hamas is not part of the PLO, and it does not support Oslo-style negotiations with Israel.

In Exile

Millions of Palestinians live outside the West Bank and Gaza, especially in Jordan, Lebanon, and elsewhere. They are formally represented by the PLO, but many feel underrepresented due to internal divisions.

United States

The US recognizes the PLO as the representative of Palestinians, but relations are tense. It does not recognize Hamas and designates it as a terrorist organization. Washington supports the PA (West Bank-based) but pressures it to cooperate on security with Israel.

European Union (EU)

The EU deals mainly with the PA/ PLO. Like the US, the EU also labels Hamas a terrorist group. Provides large amounts of financial aid to the PA for governance and humanitarian work.

Arab League and Arab States

Mostly Arabs recognize the PLO as the representative of the Palestinians. Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and UAE work with the PA and sometimes mediate between Fatah and Hamas. Qatar and Turkey maintain ties with Hamas, provide financial aid to Gaza, and give political space to its leadership.

Iran and Allies

This group strongly back Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) militarily and financially. Iran does not consider the PA effective against Israel and instead supports “resistance” factions. Hezbollah of Lebanon also aligns with Hamas and PIJ.

Russia and China

Both the leading super powers recognize the PLO/ PA officially, but also engage with Hamas as part of broader Middle East diplomacy, positioning themselves as mediators.

Let us explore how Hamas has attained popularity?

Hamas’s rise in popularity among Palestinians is rooted in a mix of social, religious, political, and resistance factors. Here’s a breakdown of how it became a powerful force:

Origins and Religious Roots

Founded in 1987, during the First Intifada (uprising against Israeli occupation), Hamas emerged from the Muslim Brotherhood network in Gaza, which already had credibility through mosques, schools, and charities. It gained early support by combining Islamic identity with nationalist resistance, offering an alternative to the more secular PLO/ Fatah.

Resistance against Israel

Hamas distinguished itself by armed resistance (rockets, suicide bombings, tunnels), presenting itself as uncompromising in the face of Israeli occupation. Many Palestinians saw Hamas as more effective in confronting Israel than the PA, which was engaged in negotiations that delivered little tangible progress. After the Second Intifada (2000–2005), Hamas gained credibility as the symbol of defiance, while the PA lost legitimacy due to corruption and security coordination with Israel.

Social Services & Grassroots Work

Hamas built extensive charitable networks that include schools, clinics, food distribution, orphan support and relief for families of prisoners and martyrs. These welfare programs won the loyalty of poorer Palestinians, especially in refugee camps and Gaza, where the PA and international aid were seen as insufficient.

Political Legitimacy through Elections

In 2006 Palestinian Legislative Elections, Hamas (running under the banner Change and Reform) won a majority of seats, defeating Fatah. Its victory was attributed to: 1) frustration with Fatah’s corruption and inefficiency, 2) Hamas’s reputation for integrity and discipline and above all 3) its hardline stance against Israel.

Regional and International Support

Iran, Qatar, and Turkey provided financial, political, and military backing that allowed Hamas to sustain governance in Gaza despite Israeli blockades. Egypt, while wary of Hamas, also engaged with it as a key player in Gaza.

Gaza Takeover (2007)

After a violent split with Fatah, Hamas seized control of Gaza Strip in 2007. Despite isolation and blockade, Hamas positioned itself as the de facto authority, further cementing its influence among Palestinians in Gaza.

Symbol of Resistance rather Compromise

Many Palestinians perceive the PA/ Fatah as compromised, weak, or too close to Israel and the United states. Hamas, despite the hardships in Gaza, is seen as authentic, incorruptible, and willing to sacrifice. Each confrontation with Israel (wars in 2008–09, 2012, 2014, 2021, and 2023–25) often boosts Hamas’s popularity, as it frames survival itself as victory. Hamas attained popularity by blending religion, resistance, social welfare, and political credibility at a time when the PA and Fatah were seen as corrupt and ineffective.

Let us also examine how its popularity differs between Gaza, the West Bank, and the Palestinian diaspora?

Gaza Strip

Hamas has emerged the strongest since beginning of its rule in Gaza in 2007.

The reasons for support include governance, security, and basic services despite blockade. The group has emerged as defender against Israel during repeated wars. Many people view Hamas as less corrupt as compared to Fatah.

The factors marring it popularity are said to be hardships from blockade, unemployment, and war destruction, at times fueling resentment. Some Gazans criticize Hamas’s authoritarian style and restrictions on freedoms. Despite suffering, many still rally behind Hamas in times of conflict with Israel.

West Bank

Hamas support is significant, but less than in Gaza. The reasons for support include: 1) frustration with the Palestinian Authority (PA) and its security coordination with Israel and 2) younger generation sees Hamas as more authentic and uncompromising. The challenges it faces include: 1) West Bank being under tight Israeli control and PA crackdowns, limits Hamas’s political space, and 2) fear of violence or arrest reduces open activism.

During escalations in Gaza, Hamas’s popularity spikes in the West Bank as people see them standing up against Israel.

Palestinian Diaspora

Support for Hamas is found mainly in Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, and the Gulf states as many refugees feel abandoned by the PA/ PLO, but Hamas keeps the “right of return” alive in its rhetoric. Hamas runs charities and schools in refugee camps (especially in Lebanon).

In Jordan, support is cautious, since the government fears Islamist influence.

In Lebanon, Hamas has networks in Palestinian refugee camps but competes with other factions.

In Gulf/ Turkey elite diaspora often back Hamas politically and financially.

Palestinian Citizens of Israel

Hamas has limited direct influence, since it is outlawed by Israel. Some Palestinians in Israel admire its stance against occupation, but most are engaged in civil rights struggles through legal political parties.

Keeping all these narratives in mind, it may be said that eliminating Hamas or bringing peace in the occupied territories or even creation of an independent Palestine will not be sustainable.  

Thursday, 11 September 2025

Is Israel attacking countries under the US supervision?

With each passing day and the precision with which Israel attacked Qatar, Iran, Syria, Iraq and other countries, a question is getting louder, is Israel attacking countries under the US supervision?

It is a very important and sensitive question. Based on the strategic relationships between United States and Israel the probability just can’t be ruled out.

Here are the reasons that support the perception:

Military Support:

Israel is the largest cumulative recipient of the US foreign military aid, running into billions of dollars annually. Much of Israel’s military technology, intelligence systems, and weapons are supplied by the US.

Operational Coordination:

While not every Israeli attack is directly supervised by the US, Washington is usually informed in advance of major military operations—especially those with regional consequences like strikes in Gaza, Lebanon, Syria, or beyond.

Political Cover:

The US provides Israel with diplomatic protection, especially at the UN Security Council, often vetoing resolutions that condemn Israeli actions. This gives Israel confidence that it can continue operations without facing strong international consequences.

Shared Intelligence:

The CIA, Pentagon, and Israeli intelligence frequently share intelligence. In many cases, Israeli attacks—particularly on Iran linked targets—are planned with at least some level of US awareness, if not outright coordination.

Recent Pattern:

Analysts often describe Israeli military actions as being carried out with a “green light” from Washington, even if the US doesn’t control the tactical execution.

The US may not be giving step-by-step battlefield orders, Israel’s ongoing military actions—especially in Gaza—are effectively carried out under US strategic supervision and protection, both militarily and diplomatically.

Let us explore the incidents where US involvement was direct (like supplying bombs during Gaza wars, or joint planning against Iran), to show how this collaboration works.

Let us identify the situations where the US involvement was direct or so close that it’s hard to separate support from supervision:

1. Gaza Wars (2008–09, 2014, 2021, 2023–25)

Weapons Supply:

During heavy Israeli bombardments of Gaza, the US quickly replenished Israel’s stock of precision-guided bombs, artillery shells, and Iron Dome interceptors. For example, in 2014 and again in 2021, Washington quietly authorized emergency transfers of munitions while battles were still ongoing.

Political Cover:

At the UN, the US vetoed multiple ceasefire resolutions, allowing Israel to continue operations.

Supervision Aspect:

Without US weapons and diplomatic shields, Israel could not have sustained these long campaigns.

2. Lebanon and Hezbollah (2006 and beyond)

2006 War:

Israel’s month-long war with Hezbollah relied on US-supplied bunker-buster bombs and real-time intelligence from American surveillance assets.

Joint Planning:

US and Israeli militaries regularly war-game scenarios of a “multi-front” war with Hezbollah, meaning Israel’s current strategy is partly drawn up with Pentagon input.

3. Operations against Iran

Nuclear Program Attacks:

The famous Stuxnet cyberattack (2009–10) on Iran’s Natanz facility was a joint CIA-Mossad operation.

Targeted Killings:

Israel’s assassinations of Iranian nuclear scientists were carried out with US intelligence support, according to multiple reports.

Air Strikes in Syria:

Israeli strikes on Iranian convoys and depots in Syria often used US intelligence and were coordinated to avoid clashing with US troops stationed nearby.

Present Gaza War

Direct Weapons Pipeline:

US cargo planes flew precision bombs, tank shells, and artillery rounds directly to Israel while civilian casualties mounted in Gaza.

White House Green Light:

Leaks from Pentagon officials revealed Israel was asked to pause or minimize strikes, but not ordered to stop.

Embedded Coordination:

US military officers reportedly worked inside Israeli command centers to coordinate targeting and logistics — an unusually deep level of involvement.

Ongoing Strategic Framework

US and Israel have joint operations rooms for real-time intelligence sharing.

Israel’s most advanced fighter jets (F-35s) are co-produced with US technology, and software updates pass through Pentagon systems — meaning the US can monitor their use.

Israel does not fight wars in isolation; every major military campaign has US fingerprints, whether in weapons, intelligence, or diplomatic protection.

Bottom line:

While Israel pulls the trigger, the US is the one who supplies the gun, reloads it, and shields Israel from the world’s outrage. That is why many analysts argue Israeli attacks are effectively conducted under US supervision.

Significance of US base in Qatar

There are contrary responses to the Israeli attack on Hamas leaders in Qatar. These could be broadly clubbed in two categories: 1) Israel will have to pay a huge price and 2) Arabs have no spine to teach Israel a lesson. We invite the readers to first understand the significance of the US military base in Qatar. We should also keep in mind what some cynics say “Qatar is in total control of United States and the Arabs just can’t dare to think about causing even the smallest damage to the base”.

According to the details available about the US military base in Qatar (Al Udeid Air Base, near Doha) it holds very high strategic and geopolitical significance for both Washington and its regional allies.  Here’s why it matters:

1. Largest US Military Presence in the Middle East

Al Udeid hosts around 10,000–13,000 US and coalition troops. It is home to the US Air Force Central Command (AFCENT) forward headquarters. The base has one of the longest runways in the Gulf, capable of handling heavy bombers, cargo planes, and refueling aircraft.

2. Command and Control Hub

It houses the Combined Air Operations Center (CAOC), which directs US and allied air missions across the Middle East, including Iraq, Syria, Afghanistan, and the Persian Gulf. It provides real-time surveillance, intelligence, and command capabilities for regional operations.

3. Geostrategic Location

Qatar sits between Iran and Saudi Arabia, giving the US a vantage point to monitor both. Its Gulf location allows rapid deployment to hotspots in the Middle East, North Africa, and South Asia. It acts as a deterrent against Iran’s influence and provides a security guarantee to Gulf states.

4. Operations and Wars

It has played a central role in the 2001 invasion of Afghanistan and the 2003 Iraq War. It remains critical for ongoing counterterrorism, anti-ISIS missions, and monitoring the Strait of Hormuz.

5. Political Significance

The base signals a deep US-Qatar partnership, despite Qatar’s sometimes independent stance in Gulf politics (relations with Iran, hosting Hamas leaders, supporting Muslim Brotherhood).

It provides Qatar with security insurance against regional rivals (Saudi Arabia, UAE, Bahrain), especially after the 2017 Gulf blockade.

On top of all it helps the US project power without being fully dependent on bases in Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, or Turkey.

6. Energy Security

Qatar is the world’s leading LNG exporter. US presence protects not only Qatar’s infrastructure but also the global energy supply routes in the Gulf.

In short, the US base in Qatar is the backbone of American military power projection in the Middle East. It protects Gulf allies, counters Iran, secures energy flows, and anchors US influence in a volatile region.

The United States faces certain risks and vulnerabilities by relying so heavily on this base. Let us look at the risks and vulnerabilities:

1. Overdependence on a Single Hub

Al Udeid is the largest US forward operating base in the Middle East, so any disruption (attack, political fallout, or natural disaster) could cripple US operations in the region. To be precise, it acts as a “single point of failure” for command and control.

2. Exposure to Iran

Iran sees Al Udeid as a primary military threat on its doorstep. The base is well within range of Iranian ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and drones. In a war scenario, it would likely be one of the first targets.

3. Qatar’s Independent Foreign Policy

Unlike Saudi Arabia or UAE, Qatar often balances relations with both the U.S. and rivals like Iran, Turkey, and Islamist movements. Hosting Hamas leaders and maintaining ties with Tehran means Qatar could, in theory, restrict US operations if its own diplomacy is at risk. The 2017 Gulf blockade showed how fragile intra-GCC politics are, leaving Washington in an awkward position between allies.

4. Local Political Sensitivities

Presence of US troops in Muslim-majority countries can be a political flashpoint, supporting the narratives of foreign occupation. While Qatar welcomes the base for protection, its presence could become domestically unpopular in times of crisis.

5. Energy Infrastructure as Collateral

Qatar’s LNG facilities and shipping routes are near the base. Any attack on US forces risks spilling into global energy markets, creating vulnerabilities for both Qatar and the rest of world.

6. Shifting US Strategy

The US is trying to pivot to Asia and reduce military exposure in the Middle East. Heavy reliance on Al Udeid ties Washington to regional conflicts it may want to step back from. Over time, this dependency could look like a strategic liability rather than an asset.

Other US bases in the Middle East

While Al Udeid is a strategic jewel, it’s also a big, exposed target that ties US interests tightly to Gulf politics and risks. Let us compare it with other US military footholds in the Middle East (Bahrain, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Djibouti) — to show how it fits into the bigger US military puzzle?

1. Qatar – Al Udeid Air Base

Regional command-and-control hub that houses 10,000 to 13,000 troops. It houses Combined Air Operations Center (CAOC). Long runways for heavy bombers, refueling aircraft, and transports. Central location for quick reach to Gulf, Levant, Afghanistan. Its biggest Weaknesses are: 1) within easy range of Iranian missiles and 2) Qatar’s independent diplomacy (ties with Iran, Turkey and Hamas) can complicate US use in a crisis.

2. Bahrain – Naval Support Activity (NSA) Bahrain, Manama

It is home of the US Fifth Fleet with 7,000 troops. Its strengths include: 1) provides control to US naval operations in the Persian Gulf, Red Sea, Arabian Sea., it plays vital role in keeping the Strait of Hormuz and Gulf shipping lanes open.

Its weaknesses include: Bahrain is politically unstable; Shi’a majority often protests US presence, and 2) it is vulnerable to Iran-backed militias and unrest.

3. Kuwait – Camp Arifjan, Ali Al Salem Air Base

It is the army logistics hub that houses more than 13,000 troops and can be termed the largest US ground presence in Gulf).

Its strengths are: 1) key supply and logistics backbone for all Gulf operations and 2) it hosts pre-positioned equipment for rapid deployment. Its weaknesses are: 1) less glamorous than Qatar/ Bahrain but essential — if disrupted, US supply lines suffer.

4. Saudi Arabia – Prince Sultan Air Base (PSAB)

It is basically a backup air operations center where around 2,500 troops are kept.

Its strengths: 1) gives US redundancy in case Qatar base is hit or denied and 2) hosts missile defense systems, fighter jets, and ISR (intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance).

Its major weaknesses include: 1) US presence has been historically controversial in Saudi Arabia (linked to Bin Laden’s anti-US narrative) and Saudis prefer limited, rotational deployments, not permanent bases.

5. Djibouti – Camp Lemonnier (Horn of Africa)

It is primarily Africa and Red Sea operations hub with 4,000 troops.

Its strengths are: 1) key to anti-terror missions in Somalia and Yemen, and 2) strategic position on the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, choke point for global shipping.

It biggest weakness is proximity to China’s naval base (first overseas Chinese base).

6. Iraq & Syria – Smaller Outposts

This is primarily to counter-ISIS missions, with 2,500 troops in Iraq and 900 Syria. It is considered highly vulnerable to political backlash and militia attacks; not long-term sustainable.

In short, Qatar’s Al Udeid is the nerve center, but the US builds redundancy through Bahrain (navy), Kuwait (logistics), and Saudi (backup). If Al Udeid went offline, US operations could still continue — but far less smoothly.

Wednesday, 10 September 2025

Time for Muslims to take collective actions against Israel

For more than 700 days killing of Gazans has continued unabated, but the Muslim rulers have not gone beyond condemnation of Israeli attacks. Now, Israel has killed the political leaders of Hamas in the Qatari capital Doha on Tuesday and only condemnation in very soft words has come. Let us find why can't Muslim rulers go beyond condemnation of Israeli terrorism?

In our opinion, it is a pertinent and important question. The repeated condemnations without meaningful action by most Muslim-majority states in response to Israeli aggression—especially in Gaza—stem from a complex mix of geopolitical, economic, and internal factors. Some of the main reasons are:

Dependence on the West

Many Muslim countries, particularly in the Middle East, rely heavily on the United States and Europe for security, trade, investment, and military technology. They fear, taking decisive action against Israel risks sanctions, aid cuts, or political isolation.

Deep Split

The Muslim world is deeply fragmented—Sunni vs Shia, Arab vs non-Arab, monarchies vs republics. This has resulted in rivalries (Saudi Arabia vs Iran, Turkey vs Gulf monarchies) those prevent a unified front.

Normalization and Hidden Ties with Israel

Several Arab states (UAE, Bahrain, Morocco, and Sudan) have normalized relations through the Abraham Accords, and many others maintain covert cooperation.

Economic Vulnerabilities

Oil-rich states depend on stable exports, foreign investment, and dollar-based trade. Poorer Muslim countries (Pakistan, Bangladesh, Egypt, etc.) face IMF pressure and debt traps, limiting foreign policy freedom.

Fear of Internal Unrest

Leaders worry that pushing too hard against Israel, in other words the United States could invite political or regime change attempts. Authoritarian governments fear that pro-Palestine activism could spill over into broader dissent.

Lack of Unanimity

The Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) has been reduced to a symbolic forum, issuing statements but lacking enforcement mechanisms or collective security structures.

Strategic Silence

Some leaders prefer Israel as a silent partner in intelligence, cyber, and defense, especially against Iran, Hezbollah, or Islamist movements that threaten their regimes.

Therefore, Muslim countries remain stuck between public outrage and private interests. Condemnation is the safest path—it appeases their populations without risking ties with Washington or destabilizing their regimes.

Enough is enough, now the time has come to take concrete steps. Here are some realistic and concrete steps Muslim countries could take—short of direct war—if they truly wanted to go beyond mere condemnation of Israeli aggression:

Economic Measures

Oil & Gas Leverage:

Gulf states could coordinate an oil embargo or selective supply restrictions targeting Israel’s allies, similar to the 1973 Arab oil embargo.

Boycott and Divestment:

Governments could ban trade with Israeli firms and pressure companies operating in Israel to disengage.

Sanctions on Israeli Goods: Restrict imports of Israeli agricultural, tech, or defense products.

Diplomatic Pressure

Expel Ambassadors:

Muslim countries with relations (UAE, Bahrain, Morocco, Turkey, Egypt, Jordan) could downgrade or cut diplomatic ties.

Global Legal Action:

Refer Israel to the International Criminal Court (ICC) collectively, instead of leaving it to NGOs.

Block Normalization:

States like Saudi Arabia could halt normalization talks, signaling that Palestine remains a red line.

Political Unity

Revitalize the OIC:

Transform it from a talk shop into an action body: joint resolutions, emergency summits with binding decisions.

Joint Palestine Fund:

Pool resources into a sovereign fund for Gaza reconstruction and Palestinian self-sufficiency.

Collective Lobbying at UN:

Use numbers (57 Muslim countries) to push binding UN resolutions, even if the U.S. vetoes in the Security Council.

Strategic Non-Military Support

Humanitarian Corridors:

Use leverage with Egypt and Jordan to ensure permanent aid corridors into Gaza.

Technology and Cyber Support:

Provide Palestinians with communication tools, cybersecurity, and medical technology to resist siege conditions.

Intelligence Sharing:

Quietly pass on information that can protect Palestinian civilians from strikes.

Symbolic but High-Impact Moves

Suspend Flights to Tel Aviv:

Muslim-majority airlines could suspend services, disrupting Israel’s connectivity.

Cultural and Sports Boycotts:

Ban Israeli teams from participating in sporting events in Muslim countries.

Public Accountability:

Name and shame Muslim leaders who maintain cozy ties with Israel while condemning it publicly.

Tuesday, 9 September 2025

Spy agencies determining fate of Middle East

We are of the view that the geopolitics in the Middle East are basically driven by the top ace spy agencies CIA and MI6 due to their long presence and lust to attain dominance. Both the agencies often play complementary as well as opposing role. In the Middle East, both the CIA of United States and MI6 of Britain active, but their influence and power are not equal. Here’s a breakdown:

CIA (Central Intelligence Agency)

Stronger presence:

The US has far greater military, economic, and political involvement in the Middle East as compared to Britain, which gives the CIA wider reach.

Resources and scale:

Vast funding, technology, and manpower allow the CIA to operate with more depth — from drone surveillance to covert paramilitary operations.

Regional influence:

CIA has elaborate intelligence sharing agreements with Israel, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Egypt, and Gulf states. The CIA often leads in counterterrorism, cyber intelligence, and monitoring Iran.

Direct action capability:

CIA has carried out assassinations of Qasem Soleimani in 2020 with Pentagon support, regime-change operations in Iraq in 2003, and drone warfare across Yemen, Syria, and elsewhere.

MI6 (Secret Intelligence Service of Britain)

Smaller but skilled:

MI6 operates with fewer resources but has deep historical networks dating back to the colonial and post-colonial era.

Special niche:

It is strong in human intelligence (HUMINT), diplomatic channels, and discreet operations. Often complements CIA efforts rather than competing.

Influence through alliances:

MI6 maintains ties in former British-influenced states (Jordan, Oman, Gulf monarchies). Often acts as a bridge between US and regional players, sometimes preferred for backchannel talks where US involvement is too visible.

It may be concluded that CIA is stronger in raw power, funding, and reach. MI6 is smarter in specialized, discreet, and historic networks. In practice, they often work together, with CIA leading and MI6 supplementing in sensitive or diplomatic areas.

Still it may be of some interest to readers to compare their weaknesses in the Middle East (CIA’s visibility vs. MI6’s limited resources).

CIA Weaknesses in the Middle East

Visibility and Reputation:

The CIA is often seen as the symbol of American interventionism. Its role in the 1953 Iran coup, the 2003 Iraq invasion, and drone strikes has created deep mistrust among populations.

Over-reliance on technology:

Heavy dependence on satellite imagery, drones, and cyber tools sometimes weakens on the ground human intelligence (HUMINT). Local actors may feed misleading information (faulty Iraqi WMD intelligence in 2003).

Political Constraints:

The CIA operates mostly within US foreign policy ambit, which can change with administrations (Trump pulling out of Syria, Biden recalibrating Iran policy). This limits long-term consistency in operations.

MI6 Weaknesses in the Middle East

Limited Resources:

Britain’s budget and global presence are much smaller than that of the United States. MI6 often has to “ride on the back” of CIA logistics and surveillance infrastructure.

Reduced Global Clout:

Post-colonial decline means Britain no longer has the political weight it once held in the region. Many Middle Eastern powers see London as secondary to Washington.

Reliance on Alliances:

MI6 depends heavily on Five Eyes (United States, Canada, Australia, New Zealand) for intelligence sharing. Alone, it struggles to project force or influence in hostile zones (Iran, Syria).

Therefore it may be said that in the Middle East CIA is the heavyweight, but MI6 survives by being subtle and clever, often achieving results disproportionate to its size.

Adding Mossad of Israel to the picture really changes the balance of spy power in the Middle East.

Mossad (Israel)

Strengths:

Regional focus and expertise:

Unlike CIA and MI6, Mossad is laser-focused on the Middle East. It enjoys deep cultural, linguistic, and ethnic infiltration skills (especially in Arab states and Iran).

Human Intelligence (HUMINT):

Mossad is known for its daring covert operations that include kidnapping Eichmann (Argentina, 1960), assassinations of Iranian nuclear scientists, and cyberattacks like Stuxnet with CIA help. It uses diaspora networks, business fronts, and deep-cover operatives.

Operational daring:

Conducts high-risk missions the CIA or MI6 would hesitate to attempt due to political exposure.

Political backing:

Israel’s survival depends on intelligence; Mossad has a direct line to top leadership and can act fast.

Weaknesses

Limited global reach:

It operates best in Middle East, North Africa, and Europe; weaker footprint in Asia or Latin America as compared to CIA.

Overexposure:

Mossad’s assassinations and covert operations generate huge backlash; Arab states and Iran actively hunt Mossad operatives.

Dependency:

It relies heavily on CIA for satellite surveillance, funding, and advanced cyber tools.

The Strongest

CIA is the strongest in resources, global reach, and tech. It can topple governments, conduct drone wars, and pressurize allies.

MI6 is the best at diplomacy, subtle influence, and backchannel talks. It is trusted more in Gulf monarchies than the CIA sometimes, due to less heavy-handed reputation.

Mossad is the sharpest blade in the region itself. When it comes to Iran, Hezbollah, Hamas, or Syria — Mossad usually has the deepest, most actionable intelligence.

Sunday, 7 September 2025

The New World Disorder

French historian Fernand Braudel identified three cycles of history. The shortest is the day-to-day flow of events; Braudel called them “fireflies” on the stage. Next up are paradigm shifts — like the end of the Cold War — that can play out over decades or longer. Finally, there’s the longue durée: the bedrock of climate and geography that shapes everything else and changes only over centuries or millennia.

Six months into US President Donald Trump’s second term, it’s clear that the course of events has changed. What’s the collective noun for a group of fireflies? Probably not “paradigm shift,” but in this case that’s what it adds up to. 

The US pivot from free trade and global security to a sharper focus on the national interest has the makings of a decades-defining transformation, reversing the global integration supercharged by the end of the Cold War.

In the decades after World War II, the US was the champion of free trade, the anchor for global security and the gold standard on governance. Now, it has raised tariffs to the highest level since the 1930s, told allies they need to pay for protection and crossed red lines on independence for the Fed and statistical agencies.

That’s a major break, and an important moment for the global economy, shifting patterns of growth and inflation, borrowing and debt.

The geopolitical landscape has shifted just as decisively. Jolting though it is, Trump’s focus on America First is a reflection of a new reality where the US is no longer the world’s sole superpower. Regardless of who occupies the White House next, the US allies and adversaries will continue to reorient around that new state of affairs.

How about Braudel’s longue durée — the slowest moving cycle of history on which everything else rests? Could even that be at an inflection point? Maybe.

Trump has pulled the US out of the Paris climate agreement, again. The global fight against climate change will continue, but without the world’s second-largest emitter, it gets harder. The arrival of artificial general intelligence could also prove an epochal shift.

“History,” Braudel wrote, “may be divided into three movements: what moves rapidly, what moves slowly and what appears not to move at all.” Right now, events are moving almost too fast to track and the slow-moving Pax Americana is heading rapidly toward the dustbin of history. If global temperatures rise much further or machines start thinking for themselves, there will be movement even in the cycle that appears not to move at all.


Thursday, 4 September 2025

The Fading Edge of Western Sanctions

Western sanctions were once the sharpest weapon in Washington and Brussels’ arsenal — a way to cripple adversaries without firing a shot. But today, their overuse and poor calibration are blunting their impact, most visibly in the case of Russia’s energy industry.

Take the recent arrival of the Arctic Mulan in southern China. On August 28, the sanctioned tanker unloaded liquefied natural gas from Russia’s Arctic LNG-2 plant — a facility buried under Western restrictions. That shipment, China’s first from the Siberian project, came just days before Vladimir Putin’s state visit to Beijing. The symbolism is unmistakable: Beijing is choosing energy security and strategic ties with Moscow over Washington’s disapproval.

Washington’s own missteps reinforce the sense that sanctions are losing their sting. In late August, President Donald Trump slapped a 25% “secondary tariff” on Indian imports of Russian crude, doubling existing duties. The gamble backfired. India not only kept buying Russian oil but also found common cause with China — a troubling development for US strategists who once counted on Delhi as a counterweight to Beijing.

The core problem is not intent but longevity. Sanctions work best when they are broad, swift, and temporary — delivering a shock that compels change before targets can adapt. But when restrictions drag on, industries build workarounds.

Russia has done so with astonishing speed, channeling crude through China and India, which now absorb 80% of its exports, and relying on “dark fleets” of tankers to bypass Western oversight. Iran and Venezuela, veterans of economic siege, have perfected similar tactics.

Meanwhile, the sheer scale of sanctions is undermining their effectiveness. Since 2017, the number of international sanctions has surged by 450%, according to LSEG Risk Intelligence. After Moscow’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, EU sanctions on Russia jumped from zero in 2013 to more than 2,500 by 2025. Washington blacklisted over 3,100 new entities last year alone, most of them Russian. The result, enforcement has become a bureaucratic quagmire, draining multinational firms with compliance costs while Russia and its partners adapt.

In short, the West is flooding the world with sanctions — but the more it leans on this tool, the less powerful it becomes. Economic warfare cannot be waged indefinitely without diminishing returns. If sanctions are to remain credible, they must be recalibrated: fewer, smarter, and more time-bound, backed by genuine multilateral coordination.

Otherwise, the very weapon once seen as a substitute for war may become just another dull instrument in an increasingly multipolar world.

China-Russia pipeline diplomacy a threat to Trump’s energy grip

The high stakes energy diplomacy in Beijing this week signals China’s willingness to defy US President Donald Trump’s efforts to isolate Russia and assert US energy dominance.

Chinese President Xi Jinpin, sitting alongside Russian President Vladimir Putin, used a military parade this week marking 80 years since Japan's defeat in World War Two to project Beijing's military and diplomatic clout amid heightened trade tensions with Washington.

China backed the pageantry with action on Tuesday, when Russia’s gas giant Gazprom announced the sides had signed a legally binding memorandum with Moscow for the construction of Power of Siberia 2, a 2,600-km (1,615 mile) gas pipeline that will run between the two countries. The project has struggled to take off after more than a decade of fruitless talks.

China will also boost the already large gas volumes it imports through the existing ‘Power of Siberia’ pipeline. Gazprom CEO Alexei Miller said on Tuesday that the two countries had agreed to increase supplies via the pipeline to 44 billion cubic metres a year from 38 bcm.

Additionally, both sides agreed to raise the volume of Russian gas deliveries to China via a pipeline from Sakhalin Island in Russia's Far East by 20% to 12 bcm annually.

Taken together, this is yet another indication of the growing ties between Beijing and Moscow, but more importantly, it is a signal that China is not planning to back down in the face of US pressure.

Of course, several major hurdles remain for the new Siberian project.

First and foremost, the sides have yet to agree on the price of the gas that will be transported through the pipeline. The Gazprom CEO indicated that the price would be lower than what European buyers paid in the past.

It also remains unclear whether China will require the additional volume. Chinese companies in recent years have signed many long-term liquefied natural gas supply deals, including with US producers, amounting to around 50 bcm per year of additional supplies through 2030, according to the Institute for Energy Economics and Financial Analysis.

On top of that, China ramped up its domestic gas production by 28% between 2020 and 2024 to 246.4 bcm, according to IEEFA.

The bigger problem could be strategic. Completing the new project would cement Russia's position as the biggest natural gas supplier to China – and that could be a concern for Beijing.

Russia supplied around 22% of China's gas imports in 2024, or about 38 bcm, when including pipeline gas and deliveries of LNG, according to data from the Energy Institute's Statistical Review of World Energy.

The new volumes from the existing pipeline would raise Russia's share in China’s imports to over a quarter next year, assuming an increase in the country’s gas demand.

Adding another 50 bcm capacity from the new pipeline, which likely would not come on stream before 2030, would therefore double Russia's share of China’s gas imports.

But in today’s new global environment, what might matter more is that Putin and Xi appear politically invested in making the project work.

For Russia, the agreement offers a long-term market for its vast natural gas reserves – something that has become particularly important since Europe, Russia's biggest gas market for decades, began to wean itself off Russian gas following Moscow's invasion of Ukraine in 2022.

For China, this appears to be another shot across the bow in the economic stand-off with Washington.

On a practical level, importing larger volumes of gas from Russia would reduce Beijing's need to increase U.S. LNG imports, one of the major promises many other countries have made in trade talks with the Trump administration.

And then there is the desire to signal defiance – a negotiating tactic in itself.

It is notable that last week China imported its first LNG cargo from Russia’s Arctic LNG 2 plant, despite heavy US sanctions, undermining Trump’s attempts to isolate Moscow and pressure Putin over Ukraine. Other cargoes from the plant could be heading to China.

The Trump administration has yet to respond to the cargo’s arrival in Beihai, but the timing just days before Putin’s visit is unlikely to be a coincidence.

 

 

Wednesday, 3 September 2025

The Beginning of the End of US Hegemony

The leaders of China, North Korea and Russia stood shoulder to shoulder Wednesday as high-tech military hardware and thousands of marching soldiers filled the streets of Beijing. Two days earlier, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, Russian President Vladimir Putin and Chinese President Xi Jinping huddled together, smiling broadly and clasping hands at a meeting of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization.

The gatherings in China this week could be read as a striking, maybe even defiant, message to the United States and its allies. At the very least, they offered yet more evidence of a burgeoning shift away from a US-dominated, Western-led world order, as President Donald Trump withdraws America from many of its historic roles and roils economic relationships with tariffs.

Will it be right to say that it is the beginning of the end of US hegemony? It is a transition from uni-polarity to multi-polarity. The US is losing its ability to act unchallenged. The world is moving towards competitive coexistence, where Washington remains powerful but will have to share space with Beijing, Moscow, and other rising centers of influence. It looks less like a sudden collapse, and more like a slow erosion of dominance.

For nearly eight decades, the United States has been the undisputed leader of the world, setting the rules of politics, trade, and security. But today, cracks in this dominance are becoming visible.

The rise of China as a technological and economic powerhouse, Russia’s defiance of Western sanctions, and the growing assertiveness of regional blocs such as BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization are eroding Washington’s monopoly over global influence. Even long-time allies in the Middle East and Asia are quietly hedging their bets, diversifying partnerships beyond the US.

At home, the super power faces mounting challenges, a polarized political system, unsustainable debt levels, and an exhausted military stretched across multiple conflict zones. Meanwhile, the US dollar, once an untouchable pillar of global finance, is slowly facing competition from alternative payment systems. Yet, it is premature to declare the end of US power.

History suggests that hegemonies rarely fall overnight. The American era may not be over, but its golden age of unquestioned dominance is clearly behind us.

US strikes vessel operated by Venezuelan drug gang

According to media reports, President Donald Trump said Tuesday the US has carried out a strike in the southern Caribbean against a drug-carrying vessel that departed from Venezuela and was operated by the Tren de Aragua gang.

The president said in a social media posting that 11 people were killed in the rare US military operation in the Americas, a dramatic escalation in the Republican administration’s effort to stem the flow of narcotics from Latin America. Trump also posted a short video clip of a small vessel appearing to explode in flames.

“The strike occurred while the terrorists were at sea in International waters transporting illegal narcotics, heading to the United States,” Trump said on Truth Social.

“No U.S. Forces were harmed in this strike. Please let this serve as notice to anybody even thinking about bringing drugs into the United States of America.”

The video appears to show a long, multi-engine speedboat traveling at sea when a bright flash of light bursts over the craft. The boat is then briefly seen covered in flames.

The video, which is largely in black and white, is not clear enough to see if the craft is carrying as many as 11 people. The video also did not show any large or clear stashes of drugs inside the boat.

Tren de Aragua originated more than a decade ago at an infamously lawless prison with hardened criminals in Venezuela’s central state of Aragua. The gang has expanded in recent years as more than 7.7 million Venezuelans fled economic turmoil and migrated to other Latin American countries or the US.

Trump and administration officials have repeatedly blamed the gang for being at the root of the violence and illicit drug dealing that plague some cities. And the president on Tuesday repeated his claim — contradicted by a declassified US intelligence assessment — that Tren de Aragua is operating under Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro’s control.

The White House did not immediately explain how the military determined that those aboard the vessel were Tren de Aragua members. The size of the gang is unclear, as is the extent to which its actions are coordinated across state lines and national borders.

 

Tuesday, 2 September 2025

Macron and MBS to co-chair two-state solution conference in New York

French President Emmanuel Macron said on Tuesday that he had spoken with Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman and that the two leaders will co-chair the Conference on the Two-State Solution in New York on September 22, reports Saudi Gazette.

Macron criticized Washington’s move to deny visas to Palestinian officials, calling it “unacceptable” and urging that the decision be reversed in line with the UN Host Country Agreement to ensure Palestinian participation.

“Our objective is clear, to rally the broadest possible international support for the Two-State Solution—the only way to meet the legitimate aspirations of both Israelis and Palestinians,” Macron said.

He added that achieving this would require a permanent ceasefire, the release of all hostages, large-scale humanitarian aid deliveries to Gaza, and the deployment of a stabilization mission.

Macron also said efforts were underway to ensure that “the day after” Hamas would be disarmed and excluded from governance, while the Palestinian Authority would be reformed and strengthened, and Gaza fully reconstructed.

“No offensive, annexation attempt, or forced displacement of populations will derail the momentum we have created with the Crown Prince momentum that many partners have already joined,” he stressed.

He concluded, “See you in New York on September 22. Together, let us make this Conference on the Two-State Solution a decisive turning point for peace and security for all in the region.”

Time Is Ripe for Dumping Trump

Every political career reaches a tipping point. For Donald Trump, that moment has arrived. His return to the political stage was meant to showcase strength and inevitability. Instead, most of his high-profile decisions and strategies in what amounts to his “second term of influence” have backfired, leaving the Republican Party fractured and America’s standing diminished.

On foreign policy, Trump’s swagger delivered little substance. His tariff wars bruised US farmers more than Beijing, his embrace of autocrats yielded no concessions, and his abandonment of long-standing allies left Washington isolated. The Middle East “breakthroughs” unraveled into fresh instability, while his tough talk on Iran and North Korea ended with neither deterrence nor diplomacy.

At home, his tax cuts fed corporations but starved the federal budget, inflating deficits without lifting wages for most Americans. His promised transformations on infrastructure and healthcare never materialized. Instead, voters were left with widening inequality, broken promises, and a chaotic pandemic response that remains a stain on his record.

Politically, the costs are even starker. Trumpism has become an anchor for Republicans, costing the party moderates and suburban voters while entrenching bitter divisions within. Legal troubles multiply, crowding out policy debate and reminding Americans of the scandals that defined his presidency. What once looked like disruptive energy now looks like exhaustion.

The United States faces serious challenges — from economic restructuring to climate resilience and global leadership. Clinging to a leader defined by backfires, chaos, and personal vendettas is not just unwise; it is reckless. The time is not just ripe but urgent for Republicans, and for the country, to move beyond Donald Trump.

Monday, 1 September 2025

China and Russia reject European move to restore sanctions on Iran

UN Security Council permanent members China and Russia backed Iran on Monday in rejecting a move by European countries to reimpose UN sanctions on Tehran loosened a decade ago under a nuclear agreement, reports Reuters.

A letter signed by the Chinese, Russian and Iranian foreign ministers said a move by Britain, France and Germany to automatically restore the sanctions under a so-called "snapback mechanism" was "legally and procedurally flawed".

China and Russia were signatories to Iran's 2015 nuclear deal with world powers, along with the three European countries, known as the E3. President Donald Trump pulled the United States out of the agreement in his first term in 2018.

The Europeans launched the "snapback mechanism" last week, accusing Iran of violating the deal, which had provided relief from international financial sanctions in return for curbs to Iran's nuclear program.

The letter published by Iran's Foreign Minister Abbas Araqchi in a post on X on Monday said that the course taken by Britain, France, and Germany "abuses the authority and functions of the UN Security Council".

Iran has long since broken through the limits on uranium production set under the 2015 deal, arguing that it is justified in doing so as a consequence of Washington having pulled out of the agreement. The deal expires in October this year, and the snapback mechanism would allow sanctions that were lifted under it to take effect again.

Iran and the E3 held talks aimed at a new nuclear agreement after Israel and the US bombed Iran's nuclear installations in mid-June. But the E3 deemed that talks in Geneva last week did not yield sufficient signals of readiness for a new deal from Iran.

"Our joint letter with my colleagues, the foreign ministers of China and Russia, signed in Tianjin, reflects the firm position that the European attempt to invoke snapback is legally baseless and politically destructive", Iran's foreign minister said in his post on X.

 

 

Sunday, 31 August 2025

Gaza likely to become another state of the US

With the passage of time it is becoming that initially United States, with the help of Israel, will take physical and administrative control of Gaza. Officially, it is being said that the US is not taking control of Gaza, most rich in fossil oil and gas. 

It is also being propagated that people are talking about a proposal circulating among Trump-aligned officials, not an actual policy in effect.

A Controversial Proposal Circulating

A plan called the Gaza Reconstitution, Economic Acceleration, and Transformation (GREAT) Trust is being floated. It envisions the US administering Gaza under a 10-year trusteeship, temporarily relocating Gazans with financial incentives, and rebuilding the region into high-tech smart cities and resorts.

This proposal is not officially approved or implemented, it remains under discussion and highly controversial, especially regarding legality and humanitarian implications.

Trump’s Remarks on “Taking Over” Gaza

In February 2025, Donald Trump made headlines by stating that the US would “take over” Gaza and possibly deploy troops, framing it as redevelopment.

His comments triggered widespread international condemnation, with UN experts calling the proposal a violation of international law and likening it to ethnic cleansing.

Some analysts stress it is unlikely ever to be executed—constituting extreme rhetoric or a negotiating ploy rather than a concrete, actionable policy.

Current Ground Reality

At present, Gaza is under Israeli military control, not US administration. Israel controls Gaza’s borders, airspace, and sea access, and the international community recognizes Gaza as part of the occupied Palestinian territories.

US involvement is limited to supporting Israel diplomatically and militarily—not on-the-ground governance or administration of Gaza.

 

 

While provocative plans and statements have surfaced suggesting US control over Gaza, no such control has been put into action. The status quo remains unchanged - Gaza is not under US administration, and these proposals are speculative and deeply contested.

Houthis threat to kill Netanyahu

The Houthis (Ansar Allah) are primarily a Yemeni movement with their base of power in northern part of the country. More recently, its main conflict has been with the United States and its allies, particularly because of Red Sea shipping disruptions.

After the killing of the prime minister of Yemen's Houthi-run government and several other ministers, Houthis have expressed their intentions to kill Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. Can this be taken as a real threat to the life of Netanyahu?

In all the probability, the Houthis do not have the capability to directly target Netanyahu inside Israel. Their missile and drone reach has extended toward Israel during the Gaza war (some were intercepted by Israel, US, and allied forces), but striking the Israeli Prime Minister personally is far beyond their operational reach.

However, they can increase pressure on Israel by: 1) targeting Israeli linked ships and shipping lanes in the Red Sea, 2) launching long-range missiles or drones toward Israeli territory, and 3) deepening Israel’s regional isolation by linking the Gaza conflict with Yemen.

In reality, Netanyahu faces greater personal risk from inside Israel (domestic unrest, Palestinian militant groups) or from major regional actors (Hezbollah or Iran) rather than from the Houthis themselves.

While, it may be concluded that the Houthis are not a direct threat to Netanyahu, but they contribute to the overall regional security pressure on Israel that indirectly undermines his political standing and safety.

External threats to Netanyahu

Let us examine the structured hierarchy of external threats to Netanyahu’s life and political survival, ranked from most serious to least:

Hezbollah – Highest Direct Threat

The group has the capability, being the largest, most experienced armed group on Israel’s borders. It has tens of thousands of rockets, advanced drones, precision missiles. Its biggest advantage is proximity, right on Israel’s northern border. It may be said that the threat level to Netanyahu is very high – Hezbollah could, in theory, target Israeli leadership.

Iran – Indirect Threat

Iran enjoys capability, being the regional power with ballistic missiles, drones, cyber operations. While Iran may not directly target Netanyahu, it can facilitate proxies (Hezbollah, militias in Iraq/ Syria, and Houthis).

Palestinian Militants

Hamas, PIJ, and West Bank groups have the capability, having short-to-medium range rockets, cross-border raids, suicide missions. On top of all they enjoy proximity. Most of the resistance group consider Netanyahu directly responsible for Gaza destruction. Analysts believe it is difficult for them to reach him personally due to Israel’s heavy security.

Houthis (Yemen)

Houthis enjoy certain advantages like long-range drones and ballistic missiles, some have reached Israel’s southern airspace, others intercepted. Houthis position themselves as part of “Axis of Resistance” with Iran, Hezbollah, and Hamas. Target Israel-linked shipping and occasionally Israel itself. Their threat level is low, as they cannot realistically strike Netanyahu personally, but can harass Israel economically and militarily.

Other Regional Militias

Groups based in Iraq and Syria enjoy certain capabilities, rockets and drones, but usually confined to US or Israeli targets in Syria/ Iraq. Therefore, the real threat level to Netanyahu’s life may be low to moderate, but nuisance attacks are possible, though unlikely to reach Israeli leadership.

Saturday, 30 August 2025

Mahmoud Abbas Becomes Redundant

The Trump administration announced Friday it would deny and revoke visas for about 80 senior Palestinian officials, including President Mahmoud Abbas, ahead of the UN General Assembly in New York in September. The move, unprecedented in scope, would bar most of the Palestinian delegation from one of their few global platforms.

The State Department justified the measure by citing the Palestinian Authority’s appeals to international courts, its alleged refusal to condemn the October 07 attacks, and its pursuit of unilateral recognition. Yet the decision violates the 1947 UN Headquarters Agreement, which obliges Washington, as host state, to admit all delegations. International law, like diplomacy, is treated in Washington as a tool bent to Israel’s interests.

Contrary to US assertions that Abbas has not condemned the Hamas October 07 operation, in a letter sent in early June 2025 to French President Emmanuel Macron — and also to Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman — Abbas wrote that what Hamas did, “in killing and taking civilians hostage, is unacceptable and condemnable.” He further called for the immediate release of all hostages, the dismantling of Hamas’s military capabilities, and its removal from power in Gaza.

The ban is striking because the Palestinian Authority has long served as a subcontractor for Israel’s occupation. Rather than a liberation movement, Mahmoud Abbas and Fatah became administrators of an imposed status quo.

The so-called PA “security forces” have worked closely with Israel to suppress resistance—arresting fighters, dispersing protests, and keeping order while settlements expanded. The Authority collected taxes, ran services, and projected a façade of sovereignty as Israel tightened control.

Again and again, Abbas bent to US and Israeli demands: endless “peace talks” without peace, restraining international campaigns against Israel, and managing a bureaucracy designed more to pacify than to resist.

His rhetoric echoed Washington’s ostensible preference for negotiations over confrontation. Yet the moment he pursued even mild accountability—seeking prosecutions in The Hague, he and his entourage were punished like enemies.

The lesson is clear. Compliance has not protected Abbas. Obedience has not earned favor. By banning the delegation, Washington has shown that subservience guarantees nothing. The PA’s decades of compromise have delivered only humiliation, proving that trading resistance for hollow promises is a bargain with no reward.

Washington claims its decision safeguards peace, but hypocrisy is obvious. In 1988, it denied Yasser Arafat a visa, forcing the UN to relocate to Geneva so he could speak.

In 2013, it barred Sudan’s Omar al-Bashir over his ICC indictment. Yet Benjamin Netanyahu—himself wanted by the ICC for Gaza crimes—will address the Assembly without issue. Law is wielded selectively; principle turned into a cudgel.

Timing also reveals intent. France, the UK, and Canada are preparing to recognize Palestine, joining nearly 150 countries that already do. Washington fears Abbas might use the UN podium to press for independence, and so silences him preemptively. This is not diplomacy but sabotage—an effort to erase Palestinians from the global conversation just as momentum builds for recognition.

Even so, Europe’s recognition drive is riddled with contradictions. Recognition without sovereignty is little more than a flag on paper. A Palestinian “state” lacking borders, airspace, water, and an economy would be a phantom. The Western vision is one of management, not liberation: Abbas — or a hand-picked successor in his mold — presiding over fractured enclaves while Israel sets the terms.

Yet even this empty gesture alarms Washington and Tel Aviv, who move to crush it before it gathers force. The visa ban is more than bureaucracy—it is an assault on Palestinian representation itself. Once again, the US proves not a mediator but Israel’s enforcer, binding its credibility to permanent occupation.

For those who believed collaboration would yield liberation, the lesson could not be sharper. Decades of compliance, of abandoning armed struggle for negotiations and coordinating security with an occupier, have yielded nothing but betrayal.

The moment Abbas sought accountability, he was discarded like a tool no longer useful. You cannot compromise your way to freedom; bargaining with those determined to erase you leads only to erasure.

In silencing Abbas, Washington has not just humiliated a pliant Authority. It has broadcast contempt for international law, the UN system, and Palestinian voices.

The US poses as the champion of democracy and human rights, but this is the behavior of an authoritarian bully afraid of losing control. And though the Palestinian delegation may be barred from September’s Assembly, their absence will speak louder than any speech—reminding the world that a people erased from the chamber are not erased from history.

 

Iran arrests suspects having links with Mossad

Iran's Revolutionary Guards said on Saturday they had arrested eight people suspected of trying to transmit the coordinates of sensitive sites and details about senior military figures to Israel's Mossad, reports Iranian state media.

They are accused of having provided the information to the Mossad spy agency during Israel's air war on Iran in June, when it attacked Iranian nuclear facilities and killed top military commanders as well as civilians in the worst blow to the Islamic Republic since the 1980s war with Iraq.

Iran retaliated with barrages of missiles on Israeli military sites, infrastructure and cities. The United States entered the war on June 22 with strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities.

A Guard’s statement alleged that the suspects had received specialized training from Mossad via online platforms. It said they were apprehended in northeastern Iran before carrying out their plans, and that materials for making launchers, bombs, explosives and booby traps had been seized.

State media reported earlier this month that Iranian police had arrested as many as 21,000 "suspects" during the 12-day war with Israel, though they did not say what these people had been suspected of doing.

Security forces conducted a campaign of widespread arrests and also stepped up their street presence during the brief war that ended in a US-brokered ceasefire.

Iran has executed at least eight people in recent months, including nuclear scientist Rouzbeh Vadi, hanged on August 9 for passing information to Israel about another scientist killed in Israeli airstrikes.

Human rights groups say Iran uses espionage charges and fast tracked executions as tools for broader political repression.

 

Friday, 29 August 2025

Duality of standards for Iran and Israel

Many readers like me are unable to understand why the United States, Britain, France and Germany are adamant at imposing sanction on Iran, but are not asking Israel to stop bombarding Gaza?

The apparent contradiction reflects how strategic interests, alliances, and global optics intersect in United States and Britain, France and Germany foreign policy. Let me break it down:

Iran Nuclear Program

The United States, Britain France and Germany have long opposed Iran’s uranium enrichment, seeing it as a path to nuclear weapons. Sanctions are their primary leverage tool.

Regional Rivalries

Iran’s support for Hezbollah, Houthis, and other groups hostile to Israel and the West makes it a “destabilizer” in their eyes.

Alliance Pressures

Many Gulf Arab states are partners of Israel, US, Britain, France and Germany and they view Iran as a strategic threat, pushing Western powers to maintain maximum pressure.

Domestic Politics

In Washington and Europe, appearing “soft on Iran” is politically costly. Sanctions serve as a signal of toughness.

Israeli attacks on Gaza

Israel’s strikes in Gaza have caused massive civilian deaths. Western governments face pressure from international institutions (UN, ICC), NGOs, and their own publics.

The US, Britain France and Germany consider themselves defenders of international law. Unchecked Israeli bombing undermines their stance on Ukraine, human rights, and global order.

Escalation in Gaza risks dragging in Lebanon, Syria, and potentially Iran—threatening oil supplies and broader Middle East stability, which Europe especially fears.

In the US and Europe, large pro-Palestinian movements, especially among younger voters and immigrant communities are creating political pressure to rein in Israel.

Core Contradiction

On Iran, the West uses sanctions as a pressure tool because Iran is seen as an adversary.

On Israel, despite being an ally, the West uses diplomatic urging rather than sanctions—because Israel is a strategic partner, but its Gaza actions are politically damaging to the West’s global image.

In essence, Iran is a strategic opponent and super powers use sanctions as pressure

They consider Israel a strategic ally and want to save it from any external pressure, the statements are rhetoric only.

This double standard is being viewed in non-Western capitals (Beijing, Moscow, Global and South) as dual standard and Western stance weakens their credibility globally.

The non-Western world views this double standard of sanctions on Iran but “restraint pleas” for Israel.

China points out that the US, Britain, France and Germany are punishing Iran harshly for alleged destabilizing actions, but shield Israel diplomatically despite Gaza bombings.

By calling for ceasefires and humanitarian aid, China portrays itself as a “responsible global mediator,” contrasting with the West’s selective morality.

Iran is a vital energy partner for China under its Belt and Road Initiative. Sanctions make Tehran more dependent on Beijing, strengthening Chinese influence.

Russia

Russia terms the West’s “rules-based order” biased. They argue: “If bombing cities in Ukraine is a war crime, why not Gaza?”

Iran is often accused of supplying drones and partnering with Russia under sanctions, so Moscow benefits from Tehran’s isolation.

Russia frames itself as standing with the oppressed (Palestinians) against Western-backed aggression, resonating in Arab and African states.

Colonial Echoes

Many see the West’s defense of Israel and punishment of Iran as a continuation of imperial “divide and rule.”

Western claims about human rights and international law are viewed as selective—undermining their authority when they criticize others (African leaders, Asian governments).

Countries like Turkey, Brazil, and South Africa amplify calls for accountability against Israel, while trading more with Iran outside the dollar system.

Strategic Impact

The West’s inconsistency weakens its moral standing globally.

Non-Western powers gain diplomatic and economic space by filling the “justice gap.”

Iran, despite sanctions, finds sympathy in many Global South societies as a victim of Western double standards—while Israel risks becoming diplomatically isolated outside the Western bloc.

Moral of the story

The contradictory stances of US, Britain France and Germany may preserve short-term alliances, but they’re eroding their credibility in the long run, especially in the Global South.