China and Russia reject European move to restore sanctions on Iran

UN Security Council permanent members China and Russia backed Iran on Monday in rejecting a move by European countries to reimpose UN sanctions on Tehran loosened a decade ago under a nuclear agreement, reports Reuters.

A letter signed by the Chinese, Russian and Iranian foreign ministers said a move by Britain, France and Germany to automatically restore the sanctions under a so-called "snapback mechanism" was "legally and procedurally flawed".

China and Russia were signatories to Iran's 2015 nuclear deal with world powers, along with the three European countries, known as the E3. President Donald Trump pulled the United States out of the agreement in his first term in 2018.

The Europeans launched the "snapback mechanism" last week, accusing Iran of violating the deal, which had provided relief from international financial sanctions in return for curbs to Iran's nuclear program.

The letter published by Iran's Foreign Minister Abbas Araqchi in a post on X on Monday said that the course taken by Britain, France, and Germany "abuses the authority and functions of the UN Security Council".

Iran has long since broken through the limits on uranium production set under the 2015 deal, arguing that it is justified in doing so as a consequence of Washington having pulled out of the agreement. The deal expires in October this year, and the snapback mechanism would allow sanctions that were lifted under it to take effect again.

Iran and the E3 held talks aimed at a new nuclear agreement after Israel and the US bombed Iran's nuclear installations in mid-June. But the E3 deemed that talks in Geneva last week did not yield sufficient signals of readiness for a new deal from Iran.

"Our joint letter with my colleagues, the foreign ministers of China and Russia, signed in Tianjin, reflects the firm position that the European attempt to invoke snapback is legally baseless and politically destructive", Iran's foreign minister said in his post on X.

 

 

Gaza likely to become another state of the US

With the passage of time it is becoming that initially United States, with the help of Israel, will take physical and administrative control of Gaza. Officially, it is being said that the US is not taking control of Gaza, most rich in fossil oil and gas. 

It is also being propagated that people are talking about a proposal circulating among Trump-aligned officials, not an actual policy in effect.

A Controversial Proposal Circulating

A plan called the Gaza Reconstitution, Economic Acceleration, and Transformation (GREAT) Trust is being floated. It envisions the US administering Gaza under a 10-year trusteeship, temporarily relocating Gazans with financial incentives, and rebuilding the region into high-tech smart cities and resorts.

This proposal is not officially approved or implemented, it remains under discussion and highly controversial, especially regarding legality and humanitarian implications.

Trump’s Remarks on “Taking Over” Gaza

In February 2025, Donald Trump made headlines by stating that the US would “take over” Gaza and possibly deploy troops, framing it as redevelopment.

His comments triggered widespread international condemnation, with UN experts calling the proposal a violation of international law and likening it to ethnic cleansing.

Some analysts stress it is unlikely ever to be executed—constituting extreme rhetoric or a negotiating ploy rather than a concrete, actionable policy.

Current Ground Reality

At present, Gaza is under Israeli military control, not US administration. Israel controls Gaza’s borders, airspace, and sea access, and the international community recognizes Gaza as part of the occupied Palestinian territories.

US involvement is limited to supporting Israel diplomatically and militarily—not on-the-ground governance or administration of Gaza.

 

 

While provocative plans and statements have surfaced suggesting US control over Gaza, no such control has been put into action. The status quo remains unchanged - Gaza is not under US administration, and these proposals are speculative and deeply contested.

Houthis threat to kill Netanyahu

The Houthis (Ansar Allah) are primarily a Yemeni movement with their base of power in northern part of the country. More recently, its main conflict has been with the United States and its allies, particularly because of Red Sea shipping disruptions.

After the killing of the prime minister of Yemen's Houthi-run government and several other ministers, Houthis have expressed their intentions to kill Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. Can this be taken as a real threat to the life of Netanyahu?

In all the probability, the Houthis do not have the capability to directly target Netanyahu inside Israel. Their missile and drone reach has extended toward Israel during the Gaza war (some were intercepted by Israel, US, and allied forces), but striking the Israeli Prime Minister personally is far beyond their operational reach.

However, they can increase pressure on Israel by: 1) targeting Israeli linked ships and shipping lanes in the Red Sea, 2) launching long-range missiles or drones toward Israeli territory, and 3) deepening Israel’s regional isolation by linking the Gaza conflict with Yemen.

In reality, Netanyahu faces greater personal risk from inside Israel (domestic unrest, Palestinian militant groups) or from major regional actors (Hezbollah or Iran) rather than from the Houthis themselves.

While, it may be concluded that the Houthis are not a direct threat to Netanyahu, but they contribute to the overall regional security pressure on Israel that indirectly undermines his political standing and safety.

External threats to Netanyahu

Let us examine the structured hierarchy of external threats to Netanyahu’s life and political survival, ranked from most serious to least:

Hezbollah – Highest Direct Threat

The group has the capability, being the largest, most experienced armed group on Israel’s borders. It has tens of thousands of rockets, advanced drones, precision missiles. Its biggest advantage is proximity, right on Israel’s northern border. It may be said that the threat level to Netanyahu is very high – Hezbollah could, in theory, target Israeli leadership.

Iran – Indirect Threat

Iran enjoys capability, being the regional power with ballistic missiles, drones, cyber operations. While Iran may not directly target Netanyahu, it can facilitate proxies (Hezbollah, militias in Iraq/ Syria, and Houthis).

Palestinian Militants

Hamas, PIJ, and West Bank groups have the capability, having short-to-medium range rockets, cross-border raids, suicide missions. On top of all they enjoy proximity. Most of the resistance group consider Netanyahu directly responsible for Gaza destruction. Analysts believe it is difficult for them to reach him personally due to Israel’s heavy security.

Houthis (Yemen)

Houthis enjoy certain advantages like long-range drones and ballistic missiles, some have reached Israel’s southern airspace, others intercepted. Houthis position themselves as part of “Axis of Resistance” with Iran, Hezbollah, and Hamas. Target Israel-linked shipping and occasionally Israel itself. Their threat level is low, as they cannot realistically strike Netanyahu personally, but can harass Israel economically and militarily.

Other Regional Militias

Groups based in Iraq and Syria enjoy certain capabilities, rockets and drones, but usually confined to US or Israeli targets in Syria/ Iraq. Therefore, the real threat level to Netanyahu’s life may be low to moderate, but nuisance attacks are possible, though unlikely to reach Israeli leadership.

Mahmoud Abbas Becomes Redundant

The Trump administration announced Friday it would deny and revoke visas for about 80 senior Palestinian officials, including President Mahmoud Abbas, ahead of the UN General Assembly in New York in September. The move, unprecedented in scope, would bar most of the Palestinian delegation from one of their few global platforms.

The State Department justified the measure by citing the Palestinian Authority’s appeals to international courts, its alleged refusal to condemn the October 07 attacks, and its pursuit of unilateral recognition. Yet the decision violates the 1947 UN Headquarters Agreement, which obliges Washington, as host state, to admit all delegations. International law, like diplomacy, is treated in Washington as a tool bent to Israel’s interests.

Contrary to US assertions that Abbas has not condemned the Hamas October 07 operation, in a letter sent in early June 2025 to French President Emmanuel Macron — and also to Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman — Abbas wrote that what Hamas did, “in killing and taking civilians hostage, is unacceptable and condemnable.” He further called for the immediate release of all hostages, the dismantling of Hamas’s military capabilities, and its removal from power in Gaza.

The ban is striking because the Palestinian Authority has long served as a subcontractor for Israel’s occupation. Rather than a liberation movement, Mahmoud Abbas and Fatah became administrators of an imposed status quo.

The so-called PA “security forces” have worked closely with Israel to suppress resistance—arresting fighters, dispersing protests, and keeping order while settlements expanded. The Authority collected taxes, ran services, and projected a façade of sovereignty as Israel tightened control.

Again and again, Abbas bent to US and Israeli demands: endless “peace talks” without peace, restraining international campaigns against Israel, and managing a bureaucracy designed more to pacify than to resist.

His rhetoric echoed Washington’s ostensible preference for negotiations over confrontation. Yet the moment he pursued even mild accountability—seeking prosecutions in The Hague, he and his entourage were punished like enemies.

The lesson is clear. Compliance has not protected Abbas. Obedience has not earned favor. By banning the delegation, Washington has shown that subservience guarantees nothing. The PA’s decades of compromise have delivered only humiliation, proving that trading resistance for hollow promises is a bargain with no reward.

Washington claims its decision safeguards peace, but hypocrisy is obvious. In 1988, it denied Yasser Arafat a visa, forcing the UN to relocate to Geneva so he could speak.

In 2013, it barred Sudan’s Omar al-Bashir over his ICC indictment. Yet Benjamin Netanyahu—himself wanted by the ICC for Gaza crimes—will address the Assembly without issue. Law is wielded selectively; principle turned into a cudgel.

Timing also reveals intent. France, the UK, and Canada are preparing to recognize Palestine, joining nearly 150 countries that already do. Washington fears Abbas might use the UN podium to press for independence, and so silences him preemptively. This is not diplomacy but sabotage—an effort to erase Palestinians from the global conversation just as momentum builds for recognition.

Even so, Europe’s recognition drive is riddled with contradictions. Recognition without sovereignty is little more than a flag on paper. A Palestinian “state” lacking borders, airspace, water, and an economy would be a phantom. The Western vision is one of management, not liberation: Abbas — or a hand-picked successor in his mold — presiding over fractured enclaves while Israel sets the terms.

Yet even this empty gesture alarms Washington and Tel Aviv, who move to crush it before it gathers force. The visa ban is more than bureaucracy—it is an assault on Palestinian representation itself. Once again, the US proves not a mediator but Israel’s enforcer, binding its credibility to permanent occupation.

For those who believed collaboration would yield liberation, the lesson could not be sharper. Decades of compliance, of abandoning armed struggle for negotiations and coordinating security with an occupier, have yielded nothing but betrayal.

The moment Abbas sought accountability, he was discarded like a tool no longer useful. You cannot compromise your way to freedom; bargaining with those determined to erase you leads only to erasure.

In silencing Abbas, Washington has not just humiliated a pliant Authority. It has broadcast contempt for international law, the UN system, and Palestinian voices.

The US poses as the champion of democracy and human rights, but this is the behavior of an authoritarian bully afraid of losing control. And though the Palestinian delegation may be barred from September’s Assembly, their absence will speak louder than any speech—reminding the world that a people erased from the chamber are not erased from history.

 

Iran arrests suspects having links with Mossad

Iran's Revolutionary Guards said on Saturday they had arrested eight people suspected of trying to transmit the coordinates of sensitive sites and details about senior military figures to Israel's Mossad, reports Iranian state media.

They are accused of having provided the information to the Mossad spy agency during Israel's air war on Iran in June, when it attacked Iranian nuclear facilities and killed top military commanders as well as civilians in the worst blow to the Islamic Republic since the 1980s war with Iraq.

Iran retaliated with barrages of missiles on Israeli military sites, infrastructure and cities. The United States entered the war on June 22 with strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities.

A Guard’s statement alleged that the suspects had received specialized training from Mossad via online platforms. It said they were apprehended in northeastern Iran before carrying out their plans, and that materials for making launchers, bombs, explosives and booby traps had been seized.

State media reported earlier this month that Iranian police had arrested as many as 21,000 "suspects" during the 12-day war with Israel, though they did not say what these people had been suspected of doing.

Security forces conducted a campaign of widespread arrests and also stepped up their street presence during the brief war that ended in a US-brokered ceasefire.

Iran has executed at least eight people in recent months, including nuclear scientist Rouzbeh Vadi, hanged on August 9 for passing information to Israel about another scientist killed in Israeli airstrikes.

Human rights groups say Iran uses espionage charges and fast tracked executions as tools for broader political repression.

 

Duality of standards for Iran and Israel

Many readers like me are unable to understand why the United States, Britain, France and Germany are adamant at imposing sanction on Iran, but are not asking Israel to stop bombarding Gaza?

The apparent contradiction reflects how strategic interests, alliances, and global optics intersect in United States and Britain, France and Germany foreign policy. Let me break it down:

Iran Nuclear Program

The United States, Britain France and Germany have long opposed Iran’s uranium enrichment, seeing it as a path to nuclear weapons. Sanctions are their primary leverage tool.

Regional Rivalries

Iran’s support for Hezbollah, Houthis, and other groups hostile to Israel and the West makes it a “destabilizer” in their eyes.

Alliance Pressures

Many Gulf Arab states are partners of Israel, US, Britain, France and Germany and they view Iran as a strategic threat, pushing Western powers to maintain maximum pressure.

Domestic Politics

In Washington and Europe, appearing “soft on Iran” is politically costly. Sanctions serve as a signal of toughness.

Israeli attacks on Gaza

Israel’s strikes in Gaza have caused massive civilian deaths. Western governments face pressure from international institutions (UN, ICC), NGOs, and their own publics.

The US, Britain France and Germany consider themselves defenders of international law. Unchecked Israeli bombing undermines their stance on Ukraine, human rights, and global order.

Escalation in Gaza risks dragging in Lebanon, Syria, and potentially Iran—threatening oil supplies and broader Middle East stability, which Europe especially fears.

In the US and Europe, large pro-Palestinian movements, especially among younger voters and immigrant communities are creating political pressure to rein in Israel.

Core Contradiction

On Iran, the West uses sanctions as a pressure tool because Iran is seen as an adversary.

On Israel, despite being an ally, the West uses diplomatic urging rather than sanctions—because Israel is a strategic partner, but its Gaza actions are politically damaging to the West’s global image.

In essence, Iran is a strategic opponent and super powers use sanctions as pressure

They consider Israel a strategic ally and want to save it from any external pressure, the statements are rhetoric only.

This double standard is being viewed in non-Western capitals (Beijing, Moscow, Global and South) as dual standard and Western stance weakens their credibility globally.

The non-Western world views this double standard of sanctions on Iran but “restraint pleas” for Israel.

China points out that the US, Britain, France and Germany are punishing Iran harshly for alleged destabilizing actions, but shield Israel diplomatically despite Gaza bombings.

By calling for ceasefires and humanitarian aid, China portrays itself as a “responsible global mediator,” contrasting with the West’s selective morality.

Iran is a vital energy partner for China under its Belt and Road Initiative. Sanctions make Tehran more dependent on Beijing, strengthening Chinese influence.

Russia

Russia terms the West’s “rules-based order” biased. They argue: “If bombing cities in Ukraine is a war crime, why not Gaza?”

Iran is often accused of supplying drones and partnering with Russia under sanctions, so Moscow benefits from Tehran’s isolation.

Russia frames itself as standing with the oppressed (Palestinians) against Western-backed aggression, resonating in Arab and African states.

Colonial Echoes

Many see the West’s defense of Israel and punishment of Iran as a continuation of imperial “divide and rule.”

Western claims about human rights and international law are viewed as selective—undermining their authority when they criticize others (African leaders, Asian governments).

Countries like Turkey, Brazil, and South Africa amplify calls for accountability against Israel, while trading more with Iran outside the dollar system.

Strategic Impact

The West’s inconsistency weakens its moral standing globally.

Non-Western powers gain diplomatic and economic space by filling the “justice gap.”

Iran, despite sanctions, finds sympathy in many Global South societies as a victim of Western double standards—while Israel risks becoming diplomatically isolated outside the Western bloc.

Moral of the story

The contradictory stances of US, Britain France and Germany may preserve short-term alliances, but they’re eroding their credibility in the long run, especially in the Global South.

 

Will the story of the seven sisters be repeated in Pakistan

The United States is likely to commence oil exploration in Pakistan. It may be too early to talk about the likely outcome of US entry in Pakistan’s oil and gas exploration. However, it will be very insightful to explore, will the story of the seven sisters be repeated in Pakistan?

The “Seven Sisters” refers to the seven major Western oil companies (Exxon, Mobil, Chevron, Gulf Oil, Texaco, BP, Shell) that dominated global oil production and pricing from the 1940s through the 1970s. They exercised near-monopolistic control over oil reserves in the Middle East, Latin America, and beyond—often exploiting weaker producer states, dictating terms of exploration and pricing, and sidelining local sovereignty. Their dominance was only broken after the rise of OPEC in the 1970s, when producing countries nationalized oil resources and asserted ownership.

Similarities to the Seven Sisters Era

Strategic Dependence

If Pakistan allows foreign companies (especially US majors) to explore and control its oil blocks without strong regulatory oversight, it risks repeating a dependency cycle where foreign firms repatriate profits, leaving limited benefit for the host economy.

Geopolitical Influence

Just as the Seven Sisters shaped Middle Eastern politics, US energy companies could wield geopolitical leverage over Pakistan’s foreign policy, especially given its precarious IMF dependence and ties with Saudi Arabia, China, and Iran.

Asymmetry in Bargaining Power

Pakistan’s economic weakness may force it to accept lopsided contracts (production-sharing agreements, tax holidays, profit guarantees) in favor of US firms.

Key Differences Today

Rise of National Oil Companies

Unlike in the 1950s, today Saudi Aramco, ADNOC, Petronas, CNPC and even OGDCL and PPL exist in Pakistan. They country has more leverage to create joint ventures instead of full foreign control.

OPEC Plus and Energy Nationalism

Oil producing states are much more aware of resource sovereignty. Pakistan could align itself with models used by Middle Eastern producers (service contracts, technology partnerships, revenue-sharing).

Multipolar World

Unlike the US and British dominated oil order of the Seven Sisters, today Russia, China, Gulf states, and even renewable energy competition provide alternatives. Pakistan is not locked into only US companies.

Domestic Politics & Public Awareness

Civil society, media, and political opposition in Pakistan can challenge exploitative deals, unlike in the early Seven Sisters era when secrecy prevailed.

Possible Scenarios for Pakistan

Repetition of Seven Sisters

If Pakistan grants excessive concessions, lacks regulatory oversight, and allows oil companies to dictate terms, then yes, it risks becoming a neo-colonial oil frontier.

Balanced Partnership

If Pakistan uses joint ventures, ensures technology transfer, and negotiates fair production-sharing agreements, it can benefit without ceding sovereignty.

Strategic Competition

The US entry may trigger Saudi, Chinese, and Russian counteroffers, giving Pakistan leverage but also complicating its geopolitics.

Moral of the story

The Seven Sisters story will only repeat in Pakistan if policymakers repeat the mistakes of weak bargaining and short-term concessions. If Pakistan plays smart—diversifying partners, prioritizing sovereignty, and aligning exploration with long-term energy security—it can avoid becoming a pawn like many Middle Eastern states were in the mid-20th century.

Riviera of Middle East to Trump economic zone

In a report on August 21, Axios revealed part of the US President Donald Trump’s ambition in South Lebanon according to which the region will be transformed into an investment zone. The plan, called “Trump economic zone”, would be part of a greater project extending from Gaza and the West Bank, through Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, Iraq, Egypt, and the Persian Gulf.

The “Trump economic zone” was revealed after Axios, quoting two informed sources, said in its report headlined “US asks Israel to scale down Lebanon strikes after decision to disarm Hezbollah”.

According to Axios, the Lebanese cabinet's unprecedented decision to prepare to disarm Hezbollah by the end of 2025 came at the urging of the US, but many in the region doubt the government will be able to carry it out.

Trump’s vision for South Lebanon is a practical application of his “economic realism” with which he approaches West Asian issues.

Obviously, the controversial US President believes that the conflict with the Israeli occupation entity can be simplified and resolved through investments.

However, the “Trump economic zone” is nothing but dreams and illusions.

Trump believes that the Lebanese strip adjacent to the border with the occupied Palestine will automatically put an end to the resistance. He is deluded that peace and prosperity will prevail once the project is implemented.

This delusion is similar to his dream of turning Gaza into the “Riviera of the Middle East,” which would drown the Gazans in a supposed prosperity, making them forget their resistance to the Israeli occupation!

Trump and those around him delude themselves that the popular base of the Resistance is unaware of the seriousness of what is being plotted against them.

Economic temptation may be an effective tool to confront the resistance project, but previous experiences and the occupation regime’s false peace projects no longer fool anyone.

Despite their small number and modest capabilities, resistance, for the people of Lebanon and Palestine, is not merely a tactical option but rather the foundation of their sacred ideological identity, which cannot be abandoned, no matter the sacrifices and costs.

It is clear that the American empire has never ceased to treat other peoples as cheap tools for its factories. Our people believe that any Western economic initiative is nothing more than an attempt to buy people’s loyalty and turn them into slaves and mercenaries.

Last December, Israel Hayom reported that dozens of members of Ori Tzafon, also known as the Movement for Settlement in South Lebanon, had invaded the skirts of Maroun al-Ras to lay the foundation stone for a settlement called Mei Marom.

“Maroun al-Ras was an ancient Hebrew land where priests lived. We will return to all the places where Jews lived in Lebanon,” they claimed.

The Lebanese government, of course, remained silent, just as it did when Israeli Chief of Staff Eyal Zamir toured occupied Lebanese territory two weeks ago, threatening that his occupying entity “will not go back and will not allow threats to grow again.”

The government also remained silent as an Israeli prisoner in Lebanon was released unconditionally.

Meanwhile, US deputy envoy Morgan Ortagus is expected to return to Beirut early next week along with a congressional delegation that comprises hardline Zionist Republican Senator Lindsey Graham.

The visit will take place as Iranian National Security Council Secretary Ali Larijani made a notable statement. He affirmed Iran’s continued support for Hezbollah, which he described as “Lebanon’s strategic capital.”

 

Trump-Putin meeting and implications for East Asian allies

Nikkei Asia claims it focuses on writing about Asia from an Asian perspective. Even when writing about the current occupant of the White House, it tries to look at what his rhetoric and policies mean for this region.

Much of the world's media focused on the direct implications for Europe stemming from US President Donald Trump's summit last weekend with Vladimir Putin and his subsequent meeting with Volodymyr Zelenskyy and a group of European leaders.

James D.J. Brown looked at the implications for East Asia stemming from these diplomatic gatherings.

Brown writes that the US president's pandering to the Russian dictator and failure to support Ukraine bodes ill, not just for Europe, but for US allies in East Asia.

He makes three key points:

1- In rolling out the red carpet for Putin, a man subject to an arrest warrant for war crimes from the International Criminal Court, Trump is flaunting his disregard for a rules-based international order. This matters enormously to countries in East Asia, including Japan, whose security and prosperity is based on the principle that larger states cannot seize territory from weaker neighbors through military force.

2- The concern is that, having dealt with Putin over the heads of the Ukrainians, Trump could do the same with China, and make 'a big, beautiful' deal with Xi Jinping regarding Taiwan.

3- US allies in the region will be concerned about Trump's increasing unreliability and impressionability as shown by his flip-flopping on Russia policy.

Also on the American leader, William Pesek argues that Xi must be loving how Trump is remaking the US in China's image.

He writes, "Trump's Chinafication project can be seen in his effort to morph the Federal Reserve into the People's Bank of China, obscure economic data, defang the courts, take government stakes in major companies like Intel and demand a 15% cut of Nvidia's chip sales to China. The White House getting a 'golden share' stake free of charge in Nippon Steel's deal for US Steel pulsates with Politburo energy.”

"The circus atmosphere pervading Trump 2.0 means time is on China's side. Optimism that Xi will be the one making an offer Trump cannot refuse has Shanghai traders ready to pop the champagne corks. And, who knows, they may be right," Pesek adds.

Outside of the Trump-sphere, Vivian Toh explains why Huawei's HarmonyOS has struggled to adopt smaller apps, while Ben Cordier and Eve Yang make the case for Asian job markets being able to weather global economic uncertainty.

 

Venezuela: US attempt to change regime

The White House's announcement Wednesday that it had deployed three warships to the coast of Venezuela has raised fears among antiwar and human rights advocates of the US becoming embroiled in another potential "regime change" quagmire.

In recent weeks, the Trump administration has accused Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro of being one of the world's largest traffickers of illegal narcotics and of leading the cocaine trafficking gang Cartel de los Soles.

In 2020, Maduro was charged with narco-terrorism and conspiracy to import cocaine into the US, with the first Trump administration promising a US$15 million reward for his arrest. The Biden administration increased that bounty to US$25 million before Trump, earlier this month, doubled it to US$50 million.

Trump also expanded the litany of accusations against Maduro, alleging that he is the kingpin of Mexico's Sinaloa cartel, an allegation that Mexican President Claudia Sheinbaum says there is no evidence to support.

Even before Maduro's indictment, however, Trump had long sought to oust him from power. During his first term, he repeatedly suggested that the US should invade Venezuela to take Maduro out—an idea that his top aides rebuffed.

Trump instead dramatically escalated sanctions on Venezuela, which many studies have shown contributed to the nation's historic economic crisis. His former Secretary of State Mike Pompeo explicitly acknowledged that the goal of these sanctions was to push the Venezuelan people to topple Maduro.

In 2023, following his first presidency, Trump lamented at a rally that the US had to purchase oil from Venezuela, saying that if he were in charge, "We would have taken [Venezuela] over; we would have gotten to all that oil; it would have been right next door."

The exact objective of Trump's destroyers, which are expected to arrive on the Venezuelan coast as soon as Sunday, remains unclear.

But the Venezuelan government and others in the region have perceived Trump's threats as a serious provocation.

On Monday, Maduro said he would mobilize 4.5 million militia members following what he called "the renewal of extravagant, bizarre, and outlandish threats" from Trump. After the announcement of approaching warships, those militias began to be deployed throughout the country.

Colombian President Gustavo Petro issued a harsh warning to Trump following the news. "The gringos are mad if they think invading Venezuela will solve their problem," he said. "They are dragging Venezuela into a Syria-like situation, with the problem that they are dragging Colombia too."

The American antiwar group CodePink condemned the deployment of ships as a "reckless escalation" that "dangerously militarizes the Caribbean and brings our region closer to war."

The group argues that Venezuela's role in drug trafficking is being overblown to justify an invasion. They note that the US's own internal assessments of global drug trafficking have not identified Venezuela as a primary transit country. They also cite the UN's latest World Drug Report, which did not find Venezuela to be a central node of the drug trade.

The Washington Office on Latin America, a DC-based human rights group, has warned that a regime change war would likely be a catastrophe on par with the invasion of Iraq two decades prior.

"The 'victorious' US military would likely find itself governing an impoverished country with broken institutions, trying to hand over power to an opposition weakened by repression and exile, and probably facing an insurgency made up of regime diehards, criminal groups, and even Colombian guerrillas," they said. "There is no evidence that this approach would lead to a democratic transition in Venezuela."

"These aggressive policies seek to extend US dominance in Latin America, no matter the human cost," CodePink said. "The people of Venezuela, like the people of the United States, deserve peace, dignity, and sovereignty, not threats, blockades, and warships."

Courtesy: Common Dreams 

US issues sanctions on entities from China, Hong Kong and UAE

Reuters reports that the Trump administration on Thursday issued more Iran-related sanctions, targeting 13 entities based in Hong Kong, China, the United Arab Emirates and the Marshall Islands, as well as eight vessels, the US Treasury Department said.

The measures cover Greek national Antonios Margaritis and his network of companies and vessels that Treasury said was involved in transporting Iranian oil exports in violation of sanctions.

Treasury also designated Ares Shipping in Hong Kong, Comford Management in the Marshall Islands and Hong Kong Hangshun Shipping in Hong Kong.

Designated crude oil tankers include Panama-flagged vessels Adeline G and Kongm, and Lafit under the flag of Sao Tome and Principe.

The State Department separately said it imposed sanctions on two China-based operators of oil-related terminals and storage. It said they handled imports of Iranian oil aboard tankers previously targeted by US sanctions.

The firms were identified as Qingdao Port Haiye Dongjiakou Oil Products Co. in Shandong province and Yangshan Shengang International Petroleum Storage and Transportation Co in Zhejiang province.

Geopolitical stunts are created to maneuver oil prices

It may not be wrong to say that geopolitical stunts (or deliberate political maneuvers) are often used to influence oil prices. The time proves that oil is one of the most geopolitically sensitive commodities, and even the perception of instability can trigger price movements. Here are some ways this happens:

Military Conflicts and Threats

Tensions in oil-producing regions (Middle East, Russia, and Ukraine) raise fears of supply disruptions. Even without actual disruption, rhetoric, military drills, or strikes can cause speculative buying, lifting prices.

Sanctions and Embargoes

Sanctions on major producers (Iran, Venezuela, and Russia) reduce their exports, tightening supply. Announcements of new sanctions, even before implementation, often drive markets up.

OPEC Plus Announcements

OPEC and allies strategically announce production cuts or increases to move prices. Sometimes the timing is politically motivated — for example, cuts ahead of US elections or global summits.

Diplomatic Stunts

Leaders may signal alliances, threats, or peace talks to calm or unsettle oil markets. For instance, US–Saudi or US–Iran engagements often coincide with volatility in oil futures.

Domestic Politics

Countries that depend heavily on oil revenues (Russia, Saudi Arabia, Iran, Nigeria, and Venezuela) may trigger or amplify tensions abroad to keep oil prices high. Conversely, big consumers (United States, China, and European Union) may release strategic oil reserves to cool prices.

Media Amplification

Headlines about “possible war,” “pipeline sabotage,” or “shipping lane blockades” often move markets more than the actual underlying event. Traders react to expectations and fear, not just physical supply-demand.

Therefore, it could be concluded that oil markets are not purely economic — they are political battlegrounds, and states often use geopolitical stunts as levers to maneuver prices in their favor.

Here are three recent real world examples (2025) where geopolitical maneuvers clearly influenced oil prices—either via threat driven surges or optimism amid shifting sanctions and diplomacy.

Threat to Close the Strait of Hormuz

In June 2025, escalating attacks between Israel and Iran triggered a spike in oil prices—Brent crude climbed to US$70 per barrel amid concerns over supply disruptions and potential threats to the vital Strait of Hormuz.

On June 14, 2025, Iran explicitly threatened to close the Strait, which handles nearly 20% of global oil traffic. Analysts warned this could push prices even higher—possibly into the US$100 to US$150 per barrel range.

While a full closure didn’t materialize, the mere threat created a sharp short-term price shock, echoing how geopolitical risk can rapidly alter market sentiment.

Russia Ukraine Peace Talks

In August 2025, oil markets closely tracked developments—or lack thereof—in high-profile diplomatic efforts involving Russia, the United States, and Ukraine.

When President Trump proposed a trilateral summit (Putin–Zelenskiy–himself), Brent crude briefly climbed—markets anticipated that a ceasefire could eventually ease sanctions and boost supply.

Conversely, when the Trump–Putin summit yielded no binding oil or policy changes, markets cooled; analysts noted the event lacked the "magic lever" to relieve supply constraints.

Ongoing sanctions and inventory draws in the US—especially amid strong demand—continued to support prices amid supply uncertainty.

OPEC Plus Production Moves

In June 2025, OPEC Plus surprised markets by announcing a modest output increase of around 411,000 barrels per day, despite prevailing worries of oversupply. This unexpected move served as a geopolitical reminder of OPEC Plus ability to tweak supply—and kept oil prices elevated.

This came at a time when global crude production was running high, yet the announcement shaped expectations that geopolitical coordination could still swing the market.

Geopolitical Stunts Still Matter

Perception matters:

Markets often react more sharply to the fear of disruption—like threats to chokepoints—than to actual events.

Short-term risk channel:

As historical analyses show, geopolitical shocks typically drive short-term price spikes via risk premiums, though long-term economic slowdown may offset these gains.

Strategic signaling:

Diplomatic posturing—summits, threats, tariffs—can sway trader sentiment and pricing, even without concrete policy shifts.

Can there be an end to India-China animosity?

Relations between China and India are on a “positive trend” towards cooperation, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi told his Indian counterpart in New Delhi.

The world’s two most populous nations are intense rivals competing for influence across South Asia, and fought a deadly border clash in 2020.

India is also part of the Quad security alliance with the United States, Australia and Japan, which is seen as a counter to China.

Caught in global trade and geopolitical turbulence triggered by US President Donald Trump’s tariff war, the countries have moved to mend ties.

During talks on Monday with Subrahmanyam Jaishankar, India’s foreign minister, Wang said the two countries should “view each other as partners and opportunities, rather than adversaries or threats”.

He pointed to the resumption of “dialogue at all levels” and “maintenance of peace and tranquility in border areas” as evidence that bilateral ties were on a “positive trend of returning to the main path of cooperation”.

Wang is also expected to meet Prime Minister Narendra Modi during his three-day visit.

According to Indian media, Modi might visit China this month, which would be his first trip since 2018.

Relations have improved since October, when Modi and Chinese President Xi Jinping met for the first time in five years in Russia.

Chinese and Indian officials have said in recent weeks that the two countries were discussing the resumption of border trade, which has been halted since 2020.

Its resumption would be symbolically significant, and follows discussions to resume direct flights and issue tourist visas.

At this juncture it is necessary to examine the factors responsible for the confrontation between China and India.

Point blank it could be said that the omnipresent confrontation is rooted in a mix of historical, geopolitical, economic, and strategic factors.

While both the countries are major Asian powers and share a long border, their relations have been tense for decades. The reasons include:

Border Disputes

The 3,488 kilometers (2,167 miles) boundary between China and India is not formally demarcated. Two main disputed Areas are: 1) Aksai Chin (controlled by China, claimed by India) and 2) Arunachal Pradesh (controlled by India, claimed by China as “South Tibet”). Repeated standoffs (Doklam 2017, Galwan 2020) occur due to patrol overlaps and differing perceptions of the Line of Actual Control (LAC).

Historical Legacy

The 1962 Sino-Indian War left a deep scar. China defeated India and occupied Aksai Chin. India still feels betrayed, as relations before 1962 were publicly friendly under “Hindi-Chini Bhai Bhai” (India-China brotherhood).

Strategic Rivalry in Asia

Both nations see themselves as dominant Asian powers. China views India’s rise and its closeness with the US, Japan, and Australia (Quad alliance) as a counterbalance to Beijing.

Similarly, India sees China’s moves in the Indian Ocean (ports in Sri Lanka, Pakistan, and Myanmar) as strategic encirclement, often called the “String of Pearls.”

China–Pakistan Nexus

China is Pakistan’s closest ally, providing military, economic, and diplomatic support. The China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) passes through Gilgit-Baltistan, a territory claimed by India. This deepens India’s suspicion that China aims to strategically contain it.

Tibet and the Dalai Lama

India hosts the Dalai Lama and the Tibetan government-in-exile in Dharamshala. China sees this as interference in its internal affairs and a threat to its sovereignty over Tibet.

Economic Competition

India sees Chinese dominance in trade and technology as a threat. After the 2020 border clashes, India banned over 200 Chinese apps and tightened FDI rules from China.

Both China and India compete for influence in South Asia, Africa, and global institutions.

Military Build-up

Both nations are rapidly modernizing and militarizing their borders. China has built extensive infrastructure (roads, rail, and airstrips) along the LAC. India is catching up with new highways, forward bases, and troop deployments.

Nationalism and Domestic Politics

In both countries, leaders use nationalist rhetoric to project strength. In India, strong responses to China are politically popular. In China, the Communist Party portrays territorial claims as non-negotiable to maintain legitimacy.

Geopolitics

China is wary of India’s growing ties with the US (Indo-Pacific strategy, defense pacts). India distrusts China’s closeness with Russia and Pakistan. Both are competing in international organizations (UN, BRICS, SCO, and G20).

US-Pakistan strategic cooperation

Secretary of State Marco Rubio said Washington looked forward to exploring cooperation with Pakistan on critical minerals and hydrocarbons, with his comments coming in a statement issued by the State Department on Pakistan's Independence Day.

Washington and Islamabad hailed a trade deal last month, which Pakistan said would result in lower tariffs and increased investment.

Pakistan's Commerce Minister Jam Kamal has said Islamabad will offer US businesses opportunities to invest in mining projects primarily in the southwestern Baluchistan province through joint ventures with local companies, providing concessions such as lease grants.

The province is home to key mining projects, including Reko Diq, run by mining firm Barrick Gold and believed to be one of the world's largest gold and copper mines.

"We look forward to exploring new areas of economic cooperation, including critical minerals and hydrocarbons, and fostering dynamic business partnerships," Rubio said late on Wednesday.

"The United States deeply appreciates Pakistan's engagement on counterterrorism and trade."

Before President Donald Trump's administration, Islamabad's relationship with Washington had cooled in recent years, as the US drew closer to Pakistan's traditional adversary India to counter China's rise, among other factors.

Washington also resented Islamabad over Afghanistan, especially under former President Joe Biden's administration, which oversaw a chaotic withdrawal from Afghanistan and the takeover of the country by the Taliban insurgency that Washington accused Islamabad of backing. Pakistan denied the charge.

In recent months, Washington's ties with Islamabad have improved. Trump took credit for a ceasefire between India and Pakistan after the Asian neighbors engaged in hostilities in May following an April attack in India-administered Kashmir.

Pakistan praised Trump while India maintained that New Delhi and Islamabad should resolve their issues directly without outside involvement.

The US and Pakistan held the latest round of counterterrorism talks in Islamabad on Tuesday. Washington has designated separatist militant group Baluchistan Liberation Army as a "foreign terrorist organization."

"The US-Pakistan counterterrorism dialogue joint statement is one of the most positive and effusive I've seen from these two countries on CT for quite a few years," Michael Kugelman, a Washington-based South Asia analyst and writer for Foreign Policy magazine, said.

 

Brazil to be largest source of output expansion

OPEC has downgraded its forecast for US oil supply growth next year, paving the way for Brazil to become the largest source of non OPEC output expansion in 2026, according to its latest Monthly Oil Market Report (MOMR).

US liquids output is now expected to rise by just 130,000 barrel per day — down by 80,000 bpd from last month's report and sharply lower than the 510,000 bpd projected in January. The revision reflects sustained capital discipline and weaker momentum in drilling activity, the MOMR said. It follows a series of earlier downgrades to US oil supply growth for both this year and next.

Brazilian supply is forecast to increase by 160,000 bpd in 2026, making it the top contributor to non OPEC Plus growth.

Total non OPEC Plus supply is now projected to grow by 630,000 bpd next year — 100,000 bpd less than previously expected. OPEC left its 2025 non OPEC supply growth forecast unchanged at 810,000 bpd.

OPEC Plus crude output — including Mexico — rose by 335,000 bpd to 41.94 million bpd in July, based on an average of secondary sources including Argus.

The group estimates the call on OPEC Plus crude at 42.5 million bpd in 2025 and 43.1 million bpd in 2026.

On the demand side, OPEC has raised its 2026 global oil demand growth forecast by 100,000 bpd to 1.38 million bpd, bringing total demand to 106.52 million bpd. The upgrade reflects stronger expectations for consumption in the US, Europe, the Middle East and Africa.

Demand growth for 2025 was left unchanged at 1.29 million bpd, with total consumption seen at 105.14 million bpd.

But there remains considerable uncertainty regarding global oil demand, with other outlooks such as the IEA projecting much lower consumption.

The IEA sees oil demand growing by just 700,000 bpd to 103.68 million bpd in 2025, and by another 720,000 bpd to 104.40 million bpd in 2026. This equates to a gap of about 1.5 million bpd between OPEC and the IEA 2025 demand projections, rising to more than 2 million bpd in 2026.

 

Trump Administration threatens backers of IMO net zero proposals

A joint statement by US Secretary of State Marco Rubio, Secretary of Commerce Howard Lutnick, Secretary of Energy Chris Wright, and Secretary of Transportation Sean Duffy, said the Trump Administration “unequivocally rejects” the net zero framework proposal that the IMO is aiming to reach agreement on in October, reports Seatrade Maritime News.

The joint statement said the Trump Administration, “will not tolerate any action that increases costs for our citizens, energy providers, shipping companies and their customers, or tourists”.

However, the statement did not merely reject the IMO’s net zero proposals but also said that the US would retaliate against nations backing them at the MEPC meeting in October.

“We will fight hard to protect the American people and their economic interests. Our fellow IMO members should be on notice that we will look for their support against this action and not hesitate to retaliate or explore remedies for our citizens should this endeavour fail.”

There was no mention of what shape retaliation or remedies might take, but tariffs have very much been the Trump Administration’s weapon of choice.

The strongly worded rejection of the proposals follows the US delegation walking out of a vote at extraordinary meeting of the MEPC at the IMO in April. Despite the US walkout and some member states either abstaining or voting against the proposals the necessary majority was attained to take the framework forward to the next meeting in October.

The Trump Administration’s threat of retaliation against countries backing the proposals will add further difficulties to what was already expected to be a challenging meeting in October.

In May DNV Maritime CEO Knut Ørbeck-Nilssen, told a webinar, “Considering that the US withdrew from the whole process, I think it is still uncertain what will happen in October.”

While those pushing for net zero targets were critical of the proposals for not providing enough incentives for the switch green fuels such as ammonia or methanol, the Trump Administration railed against potentially higher costs for ship owners and operators using LNG and biofuels with the imposition of what it sees as a global carbon tax.

“Whatever its stated goals, the proposed framework is effectively a global carbon tax on Americans levied by an unaccountable UN organization. These fuel standards would conveniently benefit China by requiring the use of expensive fuels unavailable at global scale,” the statement said.

China is at the forefront of developing alternative fuels. According to the Methanol Institute when it comes to developing green methanol production China represents more than half of the total announced capacity to 2030 and in the near term will provide 75 to 80% up to 2028.

Rubio, Lutnick, and Duffy stated, “These standards would also preclude the use of proven technologies that fuel global shipping fleets, including lower emissions options where US industry leads such as liquified natural gas (LNG) and biofuels. Under this framework, ships will have to pay fees for failing to meet unattainable fuel standards and emissions targets.”

 

India: Calls to boycott US goods

From McDonald's and Coca-Cola to Amazon and Apple, US-based multinationals are facing calls for a boycott in India as business executives and Prime Minister Narendra Modi's supporters stoke anti-American sentiment to protest against US tariffs, reports Reuters.

India, the world's most populous nation, is a key market for American brands that have rapidly expanded to target a growing base of affluent consumers, many of whom remain infatuated with international labels seen as symbols of moving up in life.

India, for example, is the biggest market by users for Meta's WhatsApp and Domino's has more restaurants than any other brand in the country. Beverages like Pepsi and Coca-Cola often dominate store shelves, and people still queue up when a new Apple store opens or a Starbucks cafe doles out discounts.

Although there was no immediate indication of sales being hit, there's a growing chorus both on social media and offline to buy local and ditch American products after Donald Trump imposed a 50% tariff on goods from India, rattling exporters and damaging ties between New Delhi and Washington.

Manish Chowdhary, co-founder of India's Wow Skin Science, took to LinkedIn with a video message urging support for farmers and startups to make "Made in India" a "global obsession," and to learn from South Korea whose food and beauty products are famous worldwide.

"We have lined up for products from thousands of miles away. We have proudly spent on brands that we don't own, while our own makers fight for attention in their own country," he said.

Rahm Shastry, CEO of India's DriveU, which provides a car driver on call service, wrote on LinkedIn: "India should have its own home-grown Twitter/ Google/ YouTube/ WhatsApp/ FB -- like China has."

To be fair, Indian retail companies give foreign brands like Starbucks stiff competition in the domestic market, but going global has been a challenge.

Indian IT services firms, however, have become deeply entrenched in the global economy, with the likes of TCS and Infosys providing software solutions to clients world over.

On Sunday, Modi made a "special appeal" for becoming self-reliant, telling a gathering in Bengaluru that Indian technology companies made products for the world but "now is the time for us to give more priority to India's needs."

 

 

 

 

 

Trump threats to India may prove hoax calls

The crude oil market's rather sanguine reaction to the US threats to India over its continued purchases of Russian oil is effectively a bet that very little will actually happen, reports Reuters.

President Donald Trump cited India's imports of Russian crude when imposing an additional 25% tariff on imports from India on August 06, which is due to take effect on August 28.

If the new tariff rate does come into place, it will take the rate for some Indian goods to as much as 50%, a level high enough to effectively end US imports from India, which totalled nearly US$87 billion in 2024.

As with everything related to Trump, it pays to be cautious given his track record of backflips and pivots.

It's also not exactly clear what Trump is ultimately seeking, although it does seem that in the short term he wants to increase his leverage with Russian President Vladimir Putin ahead of their planned meeting in Alaska this week, and he's using India to achieve this.

Whether Trump follows through on his additional tariffs on India remains uncertain, although the chances of a peace deal in Ukraine seem remote, which means the best path for India to avoid the tariffs would be to acquiesce and stop buying Russian oil.

But this is an outcome that simply isn't being reflected in current crude oil prices.

Global benchmark Brent futures have weakened since Trump's announcement of higher tariffs on India, dropping as low as US$65.81 a barrel in early Asian trade on Monday, the lowest level in two months.

This is a price that entirely discounts any threat to global supplies, and assumes that India will either continue buying Russian crude at current volumes, or be able to easily source suitable replacements without tightening the global market.

The track record of the crude oil market is somewhat remarkable in that it quickly adapts to new geopolitical realities and any price spikes tend to be short-lived.

The Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 sent crude prices hurtling toward US$150 a barrel as European and other Western countries pulled back from buying Russian crude.

But what Trump is proposing now is somewhat different. It appears he wants to cut Russian barrels out of the market in order to put financial pressure on Moscow to cut a deal over Ukraine.

There are effectively only two major buyers for Russian crude, India and China.

China, the world's biggest crude importer, has more leverage with Trump given US and Western reliance on its refined critical and other minerals, and therefore is less able to be coerced into ending its imports of Russian oil.

India is in a less strong position, especially private refiners like Reliance Industries which will want to keep business relationships and access to Western economies.

India imported about 1.8 million barrels per day of Russian crude in the first half of the year, or about 37% of its total, according to data compiled by commodity analysts Kpler.

About 90% of its Russian imports came from Russia's European ports and was mainly Urals grade.

This is a medium sour crude and it would raise challenges for Indian refiners if they sought to replace all their Urals imports with similar grades from other suppliers.

There are some Middle Eastern grades of similar quality, such as Saudi Arabia's Arab Light and Iraq's Basrah Light, but it would likely boost prices if India were to seek more of these crudes.

If Chinese refiners were able to take the bulk of Russian crude given up by India, it may allow for a re-shuffling of flows, but that would not appear to be what Trump wants.

Trump and his advisers may believe there is enough spare crude production capacity in the United States and elsewhere to handle the loss of up to 2 million bpd of Russian supplies.

But testing that theory may well lead to higher prices, especially for certain types of medium crudes which would be in short supply.

It's simplistic to say that higher US output can supply India's refiners, as this would mean those refiners would have to be willing to accept a different mix of refined products, including producing less diesel, as US light crudes tend to make more products such as gasoline.

For now the crude oil market is assuming that the Trump/ India/ Russia situation will end as another TACO, the acronym for Trump Always Chickens Out.

But the reality is likely to be slightly messier, as some Indian refiners pull back from importing from Russia, some Chinese refiners may buy more and once again the oil market goes on a geopolitical merry-go-round.

  

Pleasing Trump may annoy Saudi Arabia

Energy diversification is smart, but foreign policy tact is essential.

Importing US crude oil may please US President Donald Trump, but it could also annoy Saudi Arabia, especially given the special relationship between Pakistan and the Kingdom, which includes:

Long standing energy ties
Saudi Arabia is Pakistan’s largest crude oil supplier, often providing oil on deferred payment (US$3 billion oil credit facility renewed multiple times).

Financial assistance
Saudi Arabia has provided billions in loans, deposits, and grants to support Pakistan’s economy, particularly during IMF negotiations.

Strategic alignment
The Saudi-Pakistan relationship is not just economic but also political and military, including defense cooperation and labor remittances.

Though, to begin with import of crude oil from United will be small, the move could strain ties between Pakistan and Saudi Arabia.

Geopolitical optics
Importing US crude might be seen as Pakistan pivoting westward, especially if framed as part of a larger US trade deal.

Loss of market share

Even a 10% reduction in demand from a long-time buyer like Pakistan might raise commercial and symbolic concerns.

Trust and alignment issues

If the decision isn't communicated diplomatically, Riyadh may perceive it as ungrateful, especially if deferred payment oil continues.

Not necessarily a rupture

Scale is limited
Pakistan is not replacing Saudi oil. The pilot phase is just 10% of imports. It's a diversification move, not a shift in allegiance.

Economic logic
The US crude provides lighter grades and higher gasoline yield, improving domestic refining output. If positioned as a technical decision, it’s easier to justify.

Diplomatic communication
Pakistan can explain this as part of energy diversification—a common practice by many countries—and reaffirm its strategic ties with Riyadh.

Pakistan should do:

Step	Why it matters
Engage Saudi leadership in advance	Avoid surprises and reassure that US crude is a supplement, not a replacement
Reaffirm oil diplomacy	Continue or even expand the deferred payment arrangement with Saudi Arabia
Highlight refining needs	Explain that lighter crude grades improve fuel mix, not reduce strategic ties
Balance optics	Avoid appearing to pivot entirely toward US or using this purely as a bargaining chip in US trade diplomacy

 

Bottom Line

Importing US crude could cause diplomatic unease in Saudi Arabia—especially if it's perceived as Pakistan drifting from its long-standing partner. But the impact can be minimized through: 1) Transparent diplomacy, 2) Economic rationale, and 3) Strategic reassurance

 

Significance of Iranian President's visit to Pakistan

The world knows that Iran was the first country to recognize Pakistan’s independence in 1947 and open its embassy in Karachi, which was then the capital of Pakistan. Likewise, Pakistanis were the first to officially recognize the victory of the Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1979.

The people of both countries share cultural, linguistic, historical, and religious ties, and have supported each other in both bitter and sweet moments throughout history. The cultural commonalities between the two nations are such that citizens of either country do not feel estranged or alien when traveling to the neighboring country.

In Tehran, prominent places such as Mohammad Ali Jinnah Highway and Pakistan Street exist. Likewise, in major Pakistani cities, including Karachi, street signs bearing names like Iran Avenue and streets named after Iranian poets like Ferdowsi, Saadi, Hafez, Khayyam, and others can be found.

Islamabad, the capital of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, hosted Dr. Pezeshkian, President of Iran, and his accompanying delegation from August 02 to 03, 2025. This was, in fact, Pezeshkian’s first official visit to Pakistan since winning Iran’s 14th presidential election.

It is worth noting that in April 2024, the martyred Ayatollah Raisi also made a three-day visit to Pakistan, including the cities of Lahore, Karachi, and Islamabad, where he was warmly welcomed by the people and officials of that country. Following the helicopter crash and martyrdom of Ayatollah Raisi and his companions, Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif of Pakistan, along with other officials, traveled to Tehran to pay their respects and attend the memorial ceremony.

In May of this year, Shehbaz Sharif once again visited Tehran to express his gratitude for Iran’s stance regarding the India-Pakistan war. Therefore, Dr. Pezeshkian’s recent visit was in response to Shehbaz Sharif’s invitation and, essentially, a reciprocation of his visit to Tehran.

Dr. Pezeshkian began his official visit in Lahore, the capital of Punjab province, by paying respects at the mausoleum of Allama Iqbal, the Pakistani philosopher and poet. It is said that over 8,000 verses of Iqbal’s poetry comprising 70% of his total works are written in Persian.

During the continuation of the visit in Islamabad, the Iranian delegation met with the Prime Minister, President, Foreign Minister, Army Chief, Speakers of the Senate and National Assembly, and Pakistani business community, seeking to implement the "Neighbor First" policy in practice. 

The current volume of annual trade between the two countries is about US$3 billion, yet many economic and commercial potentials remain untapped. During this recent visit, 12 cooperation agreements were signed in areas such as transportation, science and technology, tourism, and free trade, which, if implemented, could significantly boost bilateral relations.

One indicator of strong political relations is the frequent travel of officials between countries. In less than two years, top officials from Iran and Pakistan have visited each other’s countries four times, not including the meetings held on the sidelines of key regional and international summits. These frequent meetings highlight the close bond and significance of the relationship particularly now, when there is a growing need to expand cooperation.

Over the past few decades, Iran-Pakistan relations have enjoyed relative stability, and mutual visits and exchanges between officials have been a regular occurrence. What gives special importance to the recent presidential visit to Pakistan is the unique political situation and the developments that have taken place in recent months in South and West Asia and even globally.

The four-day war between India and Pakistan in May 2025, as two nuclear powers, created a highly sensitive situation in the region. Although brief, the consequences of this conflict continue to affect both countries and the broader region and world.

Additionally, the ongoing war and genocide in Gaza have significantly influenced global politics. In this context, the stances of Islamic countries such as Iran and Pakistan are of great importance. Tehran and Islamabad have consistently adopted shared, firm positions and have emphasized full support for the Palestinian cause. The 12-day imposed war by Israel on Iran drastically altered the geopolitics of the region and the Islamic world.

Pakistan’s positions as one of the largest and most influential Muslim nations and a nuclear power have been crucial, and the Iranian public and officials have always appreciated Pakistan’s brave and brotherly stance.

Islamabad's officials have expressed their appreciation, in various ways, for Iran’s goodwill and initiative in offering to mediate between the two countries, and for the highly important visit of Iran’s Foreign Minister Dr. Araghchi to Pakistan and India to reduce the tensions.

A key factor linking Iran and Pakistan’s foreign policies is the sensitivity of public opinion in both nations toward the Palestinian issue and their mutual opposition to Zionist occupation and crimes in Gaza. This shared stance is rooted in the principled policies laid down by the founding leaders of both nations, Imam Khomeini and Muhammad Ali Jinnah and continues today. Currently, there is deep concern over the joint illegal actions of the Zionist regime and the United States against Iran’s nuclear facilities, and the potential for similar scenarios to be repeated elsewhere.

The condemnation of the Zionist regime’s aggressive attack on Iran by Pakistan’s permanent representative at the UN Security Council, as a non-permanent member and rotating president, was well-received. Pakistan’s support for dialogue and negotiation and its affirmation of Iran’s right to nuclear knowledge were also reflected in the joint press conference held by Shehbaz Sharif and Dr. Pezeshkian.

Iranian and Pakistani officials have come to a shared understanding that the 900 plus km border between the two nations should transition from being a security border to an economic one. The two sides have created joint mechanisms to improve coordination in the fight against terrorism. There exists an ocean of untapped potential in both countries, which requires serious political will to activate. The travel of hundreds of thousands of Pakistani pilgrims as part of religious tourism is one such opportunity.

Currently, two land borders at Rimdan and Mirjaveh are operational, facilitating travel for tourists and traders. Strengthening infrastructure is essential for increasing travel between the two peoples. People-to-people ties and citizen interactions can play a critical role in raising awareness of each other’s capabilities. 

Meeting mutual needs given that the two economies complement each other should be a top priority for private sectors and businesspeople in both nations. Much of what Iran imports from other countries is easily accessible in Pakistan, and Pakistan exports goods that Iranians also import from various sources.

Pakistan can meet many of its needs through Iranian producers and benefit from the proximity and low logistics costs. There is an urgent need to upgrade the joint Iran-Pakistan Chamber of Commerce to play a more significant role.

An Iranian proverb says, “A good neighbor is better than a distant relative.” Pakistan is both a good neighbor and a good relative and we Iranians are grateful for this valued neighbor.

Courtesy: Tehran Times