War with Iran Can Be a Strategic Mistake

In his recent address, US president Donald Trump again signaled that military action against Iran remains an option — citing Tehran’s nuclear ambitions, missile program, regional conduct, and human rights record. The message was firm - Iran must never acquire a nuclear weapon. On that objective, there is rare bipartisan consensus in Washington, but consensus on a goal is not consensus on a method.

Public opinion in the United States is far more cautious than political rhetoric. After the costly wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, American voters are wary of another open-ended Middle Eastern conflict. Polling indicates limited appetite for military escalation. That hesitation reflects hard-earned lessons - wars launched with limited objectives often expand beyond initial calculations.

For Pakistan and the broader region, the consequences would be immediate and severe. Iran sits at the crossroads of global energy routes. Any disruption in the Strait of Hormuz would send oil prices sharply higher, straining fragile economies across South Asia. For energy-importing states already battling inflation and external account pressures, this would be destabilizing.

Equally important is the question of strategic clarity. Is the objective deterrence? Degradation of nuclear capability? Or regime change? Absent a clearly articulated end-state, military action risks triggering retaliation without securing lasting stability. Even limited strikes could invite asymmetric responses across the region.

Iran insists its nuclear program is peaceful, though its stockpile of highly enriched uranium alarms Western powers. Yet past diplomatic frameworks proved that monitoring and verification are possible when political will exists. Diplomacy is slow and frustrating, but war is irreversible.

The 21st century offers enough evidence that military adventurism in the Middle East produces unintended and often uncontrollable consequences. From prolonged insurgencies to regional fragmentation, the record is sobering. An attack on Iran could become another costly chapter in that history — one that reshapes the region in ways no strategist can fully predict and no economy can easily absorb. Strategic restraint is not idealism; it is realism grounded in experience.

Trump Must Accept Strategic Reality

For nearly half a century, Washington has relied on sanctions, isolation, and coercion to reshape Iran’s behavior. The results are sobering. Rather than capitulate, Tehran adapted. Its political system endured, its regional footprint expanded, and its negotiating posture hardened. Yet Donald Trump has revived the vocabulary of “maximum pressure,” again pairing economic strangulation with threats of military escalation and even rhetoric about targeting Iran’s top leadership.

This moment is being framed as a last chance for diplomacy. Ali Khamenei, now in his late eighties, faces a consequential decision: accept severe limits on Iran’s nuclear program or risk confrontation with the United States and Israel. Reports suggest U.S. envoys favor transactional breakthroughs, while military planners warn that a campaign against Iran could spiral into a prolonged conflict. Such caution is not academic. The Middle East’s history is littered with wars that began as “limited strikes” and evolved into grinding, unpredictable entanglements.

Even recent use of force underscores the limits of coercion. Joint strikes did not erase Iran’s nuclear capabilities outright. Meanwhile, Tehran signals it will not negotiate away what it views as core deterrence — uranium enrichment rights and missile capacity. Offers like diluting enriched uranium or joining a regional enrichment consortium hint at possible off-ramps, but maximalist demands risk closing those exits before they are fully explored.

There is another underappreciated dimension: regional complicity. Past operational successes by Washington and Tel Aviv were facilitated by access, logistics, and airspace in neighboring Muslim-majority states. If those governments now hesitate or refuse, the military calculus changes dramatically. Geography, not just firepower, shapes outcomes.

Regime-change fantasies should also be retired. Decapitation strategies rarely produce stable, pro-Western transitions; more often they unleash fragmentation, nationalism, and cycles of retaliation. Iran’s leadership has reportedly prepared for succession contingencies, signaling that the state’s continuity does not hinge on one individual.

Strategic reality demands sobriety. Escalation may satisfy domestic political narratives, but it heightens risks for regional stability, global energy markets, and civilian lives. Durable security will not emerge from threats alone. It requires credible diplomacy, respect for redlines, and a recognition that adversaries under pressure do not always break — they often dig in.

The wiser course is clear: de-escalate rhetoric, widen diplomatic space, and prioritize negotiated constraints over another open-ended conflict. History has already delivered its verdict on wars of choice. 

Who Decides War: Trump, or the Constitution?

A credible democracy does not drift into war on the strength of rhetoric, speculation, or executive impulse. Yet that is precisely the anxiety surrounding President Donald Trump and the intensifying discussion of possible US military action against Iran. Reports suggest that lawmakers may soon vote on whether to restrain the president’s authority to initiate hostilities without explicit approval. That vote, if it happens, will not be procedural theater — it will be a constitutional test.

The power to declare war resides with the US Congress, not the White House. This division of authority is not a technicality; it is a safeguard designed to prevent unilateral decisions carrying irreversible human, economic, and geopolitical consequences. Limited defensive strikes may fall within executive discretion, but sustained, weeks-long military operations clearly cross into territory requiring legislative consent.

According to Reuters, the US military has been preparing for the possibility of extended operations should diplomacy fail. Preparation, however, must not be confused with authorization. A democracy’s legitimacy rests not merely on capability, but on adherence to process.

The bipartisan initiatives led by Senators Tim Kaine and Rand Paul, alongside Representatives Thomas Massie and Ro Khanna, reaffirm a fundamental principle - if war is justified, elected officials must debate it openly and vote on it transparently. Evading that responsibility corrodes accountability and weakens democratic credibility at home and abroad.

Supporters of expansive presidential authority argue that Congress should not restrict national security powers. But oversight is not obstruction. Requiring approval is not weakness. It is the constitutional mechanism ensuring that war reflects national consensus rather than political expediency.

An attack on Iran would reverberate far beyond the battlefield — unsettling global markets, inflaming regional tensions, and risking dangerous escalation across an already volatile Middle East. Such a decision demands scrutiny measured not in cable news cycles, but in constitutional gravity.

If conflict is unavoidable, Congress must own the decision. If peace remains possible, diplomacy must be exhausted. What cannot be justified is silence — or worse, the surrender of legislative authority when it matters most.

Trump’s Iran Gambit: A Region on the Brink

The United States appears to be preparing military action against Iran. Reports of rapid troop movements and mobilization of advanced hardware suggest that a strike could be imminent. Yet, in this moment of peril, the world—and notably Muslim leaders—remains largely silent. Their silence, whether intentional or out of fear, risks turning a dangerous plan into an uncontrollable catastrophe.

My deepest concern is that some regional powers may inadvertently facilitate these strikes. Nations like Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the UAE could become staging grounds or provide logistical support, directly exposing themselves to Iranian retaliation. Tehran’s drone and missile capabilities are not hypothetical: even a “surgical” US strike could provoke swift counterattacks, endangering civilian populations and critical infrastructure across the Gulf.

The most alarming possibility is the elimination of Iran’s top leadership. While some may view this as a tactical objective, it would almost certainly trigger a full-scale regional war. We have seen in past conflicts how targeted killings escalate rather than contain violence, unleashing cycles of retaliation that spiral beyond anyone’s control. The economic consequences would be immediate and global: energy markets would surge, trade routes could be disrupted, and refugee flows would strain neighboring countries. Extremist groups could exploit chaos, further destabilizing the region.

The silence of Muslim-majority nations is deafening. By failing to speak against this looming confrontation, they risk becoming complicit in a war with no winners. The international community—Washington included—must recognize that diplomacy and restraint are far more powerful than pre-emptive strikes. Averted conflict today is exponentially less costly than a conflagration tomorrow.

We stand at a dangerous crossroads. Leadership demands foresight, courage, and moral clarity; recklessness promises death, destruction, and chaos. The world must act now to prevent a spark that could ignite a fire engulfing an entire region. If we do not, history will judge us for failing to speak while war loomed on the horizon.

Congress Must Draw the Line on Iran

As Washington again drifts toward confrontation with Iran, Congress faces a constitutional test it has postponed for far too long. Reports of rapid US military mobilization in the Middle East, coupled with warnings from seasoned observers, suggest that the momentum toward conflict may already be outrunning diplomacy. If so, lawmakers cannot remain spectators.

The bipartisan War Powers Resolution introduced by Ro Khanna and Thomas Massie is not a procedural nuisance; it is a reaffirmation of the separation of powers. The Constitution vests the authority to declare war in Congress precisely to prevent unilateral military adventures driven by miscalculation, political impulse, or external pressure. Requiring explicit authorization before striking Iran is the minimum safeguard, not an obstacle to national security.

Recent commentary paints a troubling picture: ultimatums that touch Iran’s declared red lines, paired with skepticism that genuine negotiations are underway. Whether one accepts that assessment or not, prudence demands congressional oversight. Wars have begun on thinner evidence and with greater confidence than hindsight could justify. Iraq remains the cautionary tale of intelligence failures, inflated expectations, and consequences that lasted decades.

The risks today are neither abstract nor distant. Iranian officials have hinted that a broader US strike would trigger severe retaliation. Even limited exchanges could endanger American troops, destabilize energy markets, and ignite a regional escalation that engulfs allies and civilians alike. Military action is easy to start, notoriously hard to contain.

Civil society groups—from Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR) to the Friends Committee on National Legislation (FCNL) and CodePink—are urging Congress to act. Their arguments vary, but converge on a central point: another Middle East war would be devastating and avoidable. Lawmakers should heed that warning without surrendering to alarmism. The question is not whether Iran poses challenges; it is whether bypassing Congress improves outcomes.

This is a moment for institutional responsibility. Debate the intelligence. Scrutinize the objectives. Weigh the costs. Then vote. If military action is truly necessary, the administration should be able to make its case to the people’s representatives. If it cannot, that itself is an answer.

Congress must draw the line—clearly, constitutionally, and now.

Trump War Mania Crossing All Red Lines

The drumbeat of war rhetoric from Donald Trump toward Iran is no longer just political posturing — it is a test of America’s constitutional integrity. Wars are not reality shows. These are irreversible acts that consume lives, destabilize regions, and stain legacies.

Reporting by Axios, citing journalist Barak Ravid, warns that the United States may be closer to a “massive,” weeks-long conflict than most Americans understand. That phrase should trigger national debate. Instead, Congress is on recess and public discourse remains oddly subdued. Silence, in moments like this, is not neutrality — it is complicity.

America’s strength has never rested solely on military power but on process: consultation with allies, engagement with the United Nations, coordination within NATO, and authorization by the United States Congress. The War Powers Act exists to prevent unilateral escalations driven by impulse or political calculus.

Yet critics observe a troubling vacuum. Democratic leaders such as Chuck Schumer and Hakeem Jeffries have raised procedural objections, but where is the forceful challenge to the logic, risks, and consequences of war itself? Procedural caution without substantive resistance is an inadequate defense against catastrophe.

Columnist David French captured the absurdity: the nation edges toward possible conflict while Congress appears disengaged and the public largely unaware. Meanwhile, Trita Parsi of the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft warns of familiar patterns — media narratives that amplify hawkish voices while sidelining restraint.

Public opinion tells a clearer story. A YouGov survey shows significantly more Americans opposing military action against Iran than supporting it. After Iraq and Afghanistan, skepticism is not isolationism — it is wisdom earned at staggering cost.

President Trump, a war with Iran would not be surgical, swift, or contained. It would ignite regional volatility, shock global markets, and risk drawing America into another open-ended quagmire. History rarely forgives leaders who confuse bravado with strategy.

Congress must act — not later, not symbolically, but now. Debate openly. Assert authority. Because once the first strike is ordered, red lines stop being diplomatic language, but become graves.

A Dangerous Drift Toward Another Unnecessary War

Signals emerging from Washington point toward a trajectory the world has seen before: military escalation presented as strategic necessity. Reports that the United States is preparing for the possibility of sustained operations against Iran should prompt serious reflection, not only in the region but among policymakers who understand how quickly “limited actions” evolve into prolonged conflicts.

Military preparedness is routine; political judgment is decisive. Confusing the two is where danger begins.

At the heart of the debate lies an uncomfortable legal tension. Iran, as a signatory to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), retains the right to pursue nuclear technology for civilian purposes under international safeguards. Disputes over compliance are meant to be resolved through verification regimes and diplomacy. When the language of air strikes overshadows the mechanisms of inspection, the credibility of multilateral agreements erodes.

History offers sobering reminders. The 2003 invasion of Iraq, justified by intelligence later discredited, destabilized a fragile state and reshaped regional security in ways few architects anticipated. The 2011 intervention in Libya, backed by NATO, removed an entrenched regime yet failed to deliver sustainable governance. These episodes illustrate a persistent reality: regime change may be swift in execution but chaotic in consequence.

Renewed rhetoric about altering Tehran’s political order risks repeating this pattern. Externally driven transitions rarely produce the institutional stability advocates promise. More often, they generate power vacuums, factional conflict, economic collapse, and long-term regional spillovers.

Moral arguments, too, demand consistency. Criticism of Iran’s domestic policies carries greater weight when human rights principles are applied universally rather than selectively. Standards invoked abroad cannot appear negotiable at home without weakening their persuasive force.

Equally problematic is the inflation of threat narratives. Iran’s regional posture is assertive and frequently destabilizing, particularly through its network of non-state partners. Yet portraying it as an imminent global menace compresses complex geopolitical realities into a binary framework that leaves little room for diplomacy. For Israel, whose security concerns are genuine, long-term stability ultimately rests on deterrence, engagement, and regional balance — not perpetual confrontation.

The risks of a sustained conflict are neither theoretical nor remote. Iran’s missile capabilities, asymmetric tools, and retaliatory doctrine make escalation highly probable. States hosting American military installations could become unintended theatres of reprisal. Energy corridors, shipping routes, and civilian infrastructure across the Gulf would face heightened vulnerability. Even a carefully calibrated campaign could trigger consequences far beyond initial objectives.

Diplomacy is slow, imperfect, and politically inconvenient. War is swift, destructive, and rarely confined to its opening script. Strategic calculations must reflect that asymmetry.

One need not be a head of state to recognize the stakes. Even an ordinary citizen can observe that conflicts launched with confidence often conclude with outcomes no one predicted — except the families, economies, and regions left to absorb the costs.

After decades marked by intervention fatigue and strategic overreach, Washington faces a defining choice: reinforce diplomacy and international law, or drift toward another confrontation whose consequences may exceed its rationale.

Strategic patience is not weakness. In a volatile geopolitical landscape, it is the most credible expression of strength.

Election or Selection? Bangladesh at the Crossroads

The latest election in Bangladesh has delivered a result that few found surprising. The continuity of leadership has reinforced a long-standing perception: politics in the country remains shaped by dynastic gravity rather than competitive churn. This predictability has revived an uncomfortable question — was it an election defined by open contest, or a selection shaped by structural advantage?

Since independence, power has largely oscillated between two dominant political forces. Such concentration can project stability, yet it also risks creating democratic fatigue. When outcomes appear preordained and opposition participation limited, public trust in the electoral process inevitably comes under strain. Legitimacy in modern democracies is measured not only by victory margins but by the credibility of the contest itself.

However, Bangladesh’s political story cannot be separated from its geopolitical significance. The country sits at a strategic junction in South Asia, attracting the sustained attention of major powers.

For the United States, Bangladesh represents both an economic partner and a node in the Indo-Pacific calculus. Democratic standards, labour rights, and regional security form key pillars of engagement.

India views Bangladesh through the lens of neighbourhood stability, connectivity, and security cooperation. Political continuity in Dhaka often translates into policy predictability for New Delhi, particularly on trade routes and border management.

China’s expanding footprint reflects its broader Belt and Road ambitions. Infrastructure financing and investment ties have deepened, making Bangladesh an increasingly important partner in Beijing’s regional architecture.

Russia, while less visible, maintains interests in energy cooperation and strategic diversification, seeking relevance in a region marked by intensifying power competition.

This convergence of external interests complicates internal democratic debates. Stability is prized by international partners, yet excessive political closure can breed long-term fragility. A system perceived as exclusionary may preserve short-term order while quietly eroding institutional confidence.

The true test for Bangladesh is not merely electoral endurance but democratic resilience. Elections must be seen as credible mechanisms of choice rather than procedural formalities. Without broader participation and trust, even economic progress may struggle to anchor political legitimacy.

In the end, the question lingers: if elections secure continuity but weaken confidence, what exactly has been strengthened — governance, or doubt?

US Trade Deal Raises Questions Over Bangladesh Autonomy

Bangladesh’s newly signed trade agreement with the United States is being hailed as a step forward in bilateral economic relations. Yet beneath the surface of tariff reductions and textile concessions, the deal raises uncomfortable questions about Dhaka’s strategic flexibility.

The agreement highlights an enduring reality of global economics: trade deals are rarely just about trade. For emerging economies like Bangladesh, the challenge is not merely securing market access but preserving policy autonomy. Economic gains can be meaningful, yet the long-term cost of constrained strategic choices may prove far more significant. In a world shaped by intensifying great-power competition, smaller states must navigate carefully — ensuring that commercial cooperation does not quietly evolve into strategic dependency.

Signed on February 09, the agreement reduces Bangladesh’s reciprocal tariff rate with the US to 19%. In return, Bangladesh secures zero reciprocal tariffs on readymade garments exported to the American market — provided those products are manufactured using US-origin cotton and man-made fibre.

While the trade benefits appear attractive, the language embedded in the agreement suggests broader expectations. The version released by the Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR) includes a notable provision:

“Bangladesh shall endeavor to increase purchases of US military equipment and limit military equipment purchases from certain countries.”

The final text avoids naming specific nations, but earlier drafts reportedly included references to reducing defence imports from China. Even without explicit mention, the geopolitical undertone is difficult to ignore.

Beyond defence procurement, the agreement outlines substantial long-term commercial commitments. Bangladesh is expected to import more than US$15 billion worth of American liquefied natural gas (LNG) over the next 15 years. The deal also encourages increased imports of US automobiles and auto parts.

In aviation, Dhaka has agreed to purchase 14 Boeing civil aircraft along with associated components, with the possibility of additional acquisitions in the future.

Another clause requires Bangladesh to submit a “full and complete” notification to the World Trade Organization (WTO) detailing all subsidies within six months — a move that could expose domestic industrial policies to heightened scrutiny.

Individually, each component of the agreement can be defended as commercially rational. Collectively, however, they reflect a familiar pattern in US trade diplomacy: economic incentives intertwined with strategic alignment.

For Bangladesh, the agreement may indeed open new economic opportunities. But it also underscores a broader dilemma faced by smaller economies — when trade arrangements begin influencing defence sourcing, energy dependence, and policy transparency, the boundary between partnership and pressure becomes blurred.

The deal may strengthen US-Bangladesh ties. Whether it narrows Bangladesh’s room for independent strategic maneuvering remains the more consequential question.

Should Iran Stop Entry of Ships with US Flag in the Strait of Hormuz?

The Strait of Hormuz is not just another sea lane — it is arguably the most consequential chokepoint in global energy geography. At its narrowest, the strait squeezes to just over 21 nautical miles, with segments falling within what Iran views — and much of the world recognizes — as its territorial waters. Yet, Washington, despite a policy of “maximum pressure” against Tehran, insists its vessels must transit unimpeded through these waters. This contradiction lies at the heart of the current impasse.

Under international law, coastal states exercise sovereignty over territorial waters, typically extending twelve nautical miles from their shorelines. While the regime of “transit passage” over straits used for international navigation exists, it is not absolute — especially when strategic maritime access is leveraged amid acute political tensions. Iran asserts that a combination of sanctions, military threats, and economic strangulation amounts to coercion, undermining the spirit of norms meant to protect freedom of navigation.

The US “maximum pressure” policy — a blend of sweeping sanctions, tariffs on Iran’s trading partners, asset freezes, and diplomatic isolation — aims to squeeze Tehran’s economy and force it back to the negotiating table on Washington’s terms. It has undoubtedly inflicted economic pain: deep currency depreciation, elevated inflation, and a contraction in trade with global partners. Yet, the policy has not delivered the strategic outcomes Washington seeks.

Iran has not fully capitulated on its nuclear ambitions, nor has it ceased support for networks that counter US influence in the region. Indeed, analysts argue that the policy’s unrelenting coercion without a clear diplomatic exit has hardened Tehran’s posture rather than moderated it.

Critically, this pressure campaign has complicated the very objective it claims to uphold — ensuring stable maritime traffic. Rather than diminishing Iran’s leverage, sustained economic and military posturing risks escalating incidents around the strait. Maritime advisories urging US-flagged vessels to stay as far as safely possible from Iranian waters reflect this unease.

If the United States wants unrestricted passage for its vessels, it must reckon with the paradox of demanding rights while applying relentless pressure that invites resistance. A sustainable solution demands not just naval escorts and sanctions, but a calibrated diplomatic engagement that acknowledges Iran’s legitimate security concerns without compromising global trade imperatives.

In a narrow channel where diplomacy and deterrence meet, rigidity will only make a bottleneck worse.

Does Iran Have the Right to Enrich Uranium?

Iran’s right to enrich uranium for peaceful purposes is grounded in international law, not ideological sympathy. As a signatory to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), Iran is legally entitled to develop nuclear technology for civilian uses such as medical isotopes, electricity generation, and scientific research, provided it remains under international safeguards. Tehran has consistently maintained that it does not seek nuclear weapons. Distrust alone cannot nullify a treaty-based right.

For nearly five decades, Iran has been subjected to economic sanctions, covert operations, cyber sabotage, and targeted killings of nuclear scientists. These measures, justified in the name of non-proliferation, have failed to eliminate Iran’s nuclear capability. Instead, they have entrenched confrontation, weakened moderates, and institutionalized hostility as a policy tool.

Israel has played the most aggressive role in this strategy. Operating with implicit Western backing, it has repeatedly attacked Iranian assets and openly threatened pre-emptive strikes. Prime Minister Netanyahu’s recurring warnings of unilateral military action reflect a dangerous mindset: one that treats force as a substitute for diplomacy and assumes escalation can be controlled. History suggests otherwise.

Any military adventurism against Iran would not remain a limited strike. It would provoke retaliation across the region, destabilize already fragile states, disrupt global energy supplies, and risk drawing major powers into a wider confrontation. The Middle East is already burdened by overlapping crises; igniting a new war over speculative threat perceptions would be an act of strategic recklessness.

If the objective is to prevent nuclear weapons proliferation, coercion has proven ineffective. Verification, inspections, and negotiated limits offer far greater security than sanctions and bombs. The West must accept that peaceful enrichment under monitoring is safer than perpetual confrontation.

Equally important, Muslim countries must move beyond silence and ambiguity. Enabling or facilitating attacks on Iran, directly or indirectly, only accelerates regional self-destruction. Strategic autonomy demands collective restraint.

Enough is enough. Denying legal rights, normalizing aggression, and tolerating unilateral strikes will not bring stability. They will only push the Middle East closer to a conflict whose consequences no one—not even its architects—can control.

Cuba another victim of US imperialism

As blackouts stretch through the night and food prices rocket by the week, Cubans are once again being tested to the limits of endurance. The streets of Havana—still lined with vintage cars and colonial façades—have rarely looked more fragile. Power outages now last up to twelve hours, fuel lines snake around blocks, and the peso continues to plummet. For many, survival has become the nation’s only industry.

The US government’s latest squeeze—threatening tariffs on countries supplying Cuba with oil—tightens an economic chokehold that stretches back decades. The collapse of Venezuela’s oil support and Mexico’s recent withdrawal have left the island gasping. Washington’s strategy may aim to force change, but the immediate result is predictable: ordinary Cubans bearing the cost of geopolitical rivalry.

Yet this is not a story of sudden collapse; it is one of cumulative exhaustion. Cuba’s aging power grid has long teetered on failure, and its post-revolution economy—built on rationing and resilience—has been stretched to breaking point. Housewives like Yaite Verdecia say, “There’s no salary that can cope with this.” Taxi drivers who once saw electric vehicles as their future can no longer find power to charge them. Lines for food and fuel have become an inescapable part of daily life.

Despite everything, the streets remain largely silent. A mix of repression, fear, and fatigue has subdued public protest since the brief outburst of 2021. Millions have left the island since the pandemic, draining its energy and voice. Those who remain, like 71-year-old Mirta Trujillo, cling to faith rather than politics: “I’m not against my country... but I don’t want to die of hunger.”

Cuba’s crisis today is not only about oil, inflation, or blackouts—it is about hope running on empty. While US sanctions may claim to pressure the regime, these are instead breaking the backs of its people. After six decades of survival against the odds, Cuba’s lights may dim again, but its will to endure—worn thin and weary—still flickers in the dark.

Which is stronger lobby in the United States? munition makers or oil producers

In Washington, power rarely announces itself openly. It works through campaign donations, revolving doors, think tanks, and carefully shaped narratives. Among the most influential forces shaping US foreign and economic policy, two lobbies stand out: 1) defence-industrial complex and 2) fossil fuel industry. Both command enormous resources. Both influence war, peace, and prosperity. Yet when measured in reach, consistency, and policy outcomes, America’s arms manufacturers increasingly overshadow even Big Oil.

The oil lobby was once unrivalled. For decades, US foreign policy in the Middle East revolved around energy security. Oil giants funded campaigns, shaped environmental regulations, and enjoyed privileged access to policymakers. While they remain powerful—especially in blocking aggressive climate legislation—their dominance has gradually eroded. The rise of renewable energy, ESG pressures, and growing public awareness of climate change have constrained their room for manoeuvre. Oil companies now often find themselves playing defence.

The munition lobby, by contrast, is in expansion mode.

America’s major arms manufacturers—Lockheed Martin, Raytheon, Northrop Grumman, Boeing Defence, and General Dynamics—operate at the intersection of geopolitics and profit. Their influence is amplified by a permanent state of conflict or perceived threat. From Ukraine to Gaza, from Taiwan to the Persian Gulf, every escalation translates into fresh contracts, replenishment orders, and higher stock prices.

Unlike oil producers, defence firms benefit directly from instability. War is not a side effect of their business; it is their business model.

Their leverage rests on three pillars: 1) Defence contractors consistently rank among the largest donors to congressional campaigns, particularly to members of key committees overseeing defence spending. 2) Retired generals become board members, former Pentagon officials turn lobbyists, and corporate executives cycle into government roles. 3) Arms factories are spread across dozens of states, allowing lawmakers to justify military budgets as job protection rather than militarism.

This creates a self-reinforcing ecosystem. Threats are magnified. Military budgets grow almost automatically. Diplomatic options are sidelined, while weapon shipments become default policy tools.

Oil companies still shape energy policy, but they no longer dictate America’s strategic posture, defence firms do. Today, it is the arms industry that frames adversaries, defines security priorities, and normalizes trillion-dollar defence budgets with minimal scrutiny.

The implications are profound. A system driven by munition profits naturally gravitates toward confrontation. Peace becomes economically inconvenient.

If the oil lobby once pulled America into wars to secure energy routes, the munition lobby now sustains conflicts to secure revenue streams. That is a far more dangerous evolution—because it embeds war into the structure of governance itself.

The uncomfortable conclusion is this: in today’s United States, bullets carry more political weight than barrels.

Election or Selection in the United States?

The United States projects itself as the world’s leading democracy, promoting its political model while judging others against it. Yet a closer look at how power operates in Washington raises an uncomfortable question: does America still practice genuine elections, or has it quietly shifted toward managed selection?

Americans vote, campaigns are televised, and results are certified. But democracy is not merely about procedure—it is about meaningful choice. And that choice is shaped long before Election Day.

Today, candidates pass through an ecosystem dominated by money, lobbying, and media influence. Corporate donors, defence contractors, energy giants, and financial institutions determine who receives funding, visibility, and institutional backing. Those who challenge entrenched interests rarely survive primaries, while outsiders are systematically marginalized. By the time voters reach polling booths, the menu has already been curated.

This is where selection replaces election.

Campaigns now cost billions. Such sums cannot be raised without compromising political independence. Elected officials emerge indebted to donors rather than constituents. The revolving door between Congress, corporate boardrooms, and federal agencies further blurs the line between public service and private profit. Policy continuity across administrations—regardless of party—reveals where real power lies.

Foreign policy offers the clearest evidence. Presidents change, but wars persist. Military budgets expand almost automatically. Arms shipments grow. Sanctions multiply. Whether Democrat or Republican, Washington remains committed to confrontation-first strategies. This consistency reflects the priorities of powerful lobbies, particularly the defence industry, which profits directly from instability.

Domestic policy tells a similar story. Despite strong public support for healthcare reform, student debt relief, and financial regulation, progress remains limited. Meanwhile, defence spending and corporate advantages pass with remarkable ease. Popular will is routinely overridden by institutional inertia and corporate pressure.

Media consolidation deepens the problem. A handful of corporations shape national discourse, narrowing debate and manufacturing consent. Candidates who question militarism or corporate dominance receive limited coverage, while establishment figures dominate airtime.

To be clear, the United States is not a dictatorship. Elections occur, courts function, and civil liberties exist. But democracy has become conditional—operating within boundaries set by moneyed interests. Citizens vote, yet rarely determine strategic direction. That privilege belongs to donors, lobbyists, and unelected power centers.

The result is a managed democracy - ballots provide legitimacy, while selection ensures continuity. Until money is removed from politics and lobbying is meaningfully restrained, “government of the people” will remain more slogan than reality.

Muslim World at a Crossroads: OIC Must Act Before Iran Becomes the Next Battlefield

President Donald Trump’s increasingly belligerent rhetoric toward Iran should ring alarm bells across the Muslim world. Since Washington tightened its grip on Venezuela—effectively neutralizing its oil exports and political sovereignty—the White House’s tone on Tehran has grown markedly harsher. Today, threats of regime change, military strikes, and even targeted assassinations of Iran’s top clergy are being voiced with unsettling openness.

This trajectory is neither accidental nor unprecedented.

Recent Israeli and US operations against Iran succeeded largely because of access to regional airspace and ground facilities provided by neighboring Muslim countries. That cooperation—whether voluntary or extracted under pressure—proved decisive. There is little reason to believe the next phase, should it materialize, would be any different. On the contrary, Washington is almost certainly weighing which regional capitals might again be persuaded, coerced, or compelled to facilitate action against Tehran.

Herein lies the collective failure of Muslim leadership.

Individually, many states lack the political or economic resilience to withstand sustained US pressure. Collectively they possess enormous diplomatic weight, energy leverage, and strategic relevance. Yet this collective strength remains largely untapped, diluted by divisions and bilateral calculations.

This is precisely why the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) must immediately convene an emergency summit.

Such a meeting should not be symbolic. It must produce a clear, unified resolution rejecting any military action against Iran and warning against the use of Muslim territories, airspace, or infrastructure for attacks on a fellow Muslim nation. Silence or ambiguity will be interpreted as consent.

Muslim rulers must also confront a sobering reality: Iran is not the endgame. Washington’s broader strategy has long revolved around reshaping political landscapes in energy-rich Muslim countries, often replacing sovereign governments with compliant “puppet” regimes. Iraq, Libya, and Afghanistan offer painful reminders of how external intervention leaves behind fractured societies and enduring instability.

The argument here is not about endorsing Iran’s policies. It is about safeguarding regional sovereignty and preventing yet another war that would devastate Muslim populations while serving external geopolitical interests.

History will judge today’s leaders by whether they chose unity over expediency.

If the Muslim world fails to draw a firm collective line now, it risks becoming a revolving battlefield—one country at a time. An emergency OIC meeting is not merely desirable; it is an urgent strategic necessity.

China-India rapprochement not a good omen for United States

President Xi Jinping’s description of China and India as “good neighbours, friends and partners” may sound ceremonial, but the timing and context carry far greater geopolitical weight. His Republic Day message to Indian President Droupadi Murmu signals more than diplomatic courtesy. It reflects a calculated recalibration in Asia—one that should deeply concern Washington.

After years of tension following the deadly 2020 Himalayan clash, Beijing and New Delhi are quietly rebuilding bridges. The resumption of direct flights in 2025, expanding trade ties, and a series of high-level visits suggest both sides are determined to move beyond confrontation. Xi’s evocative metaphor of the “dragon and the elephant dancing together” underscores a strategic reality: Asia’s two largest powers are rediscovering the value of coexistence.

For the United States, this rapprochement is not a welcome development.

Washington has invested heavily in positioning India as a counterweight to China through frameworks such as the Quad and broader Indo-Pacific strategy. A warming China–India relationship weakens this pillar. If New Delhi chooses pragmatism over alignment, America’s carefully constructed containment architecture in Asia begins to fray.

More importantly, the implications extend far beyond South Asia.

A coordinated or even cooperative China–India posture diminishes US leverage across the wider Global South. Both countries are major energy consumers, influential voices in BRICS, and key stakeholders in Middle Eastern stability. As their economic and diplomatic coordination deepens, Washington risks losing its ability to shape outcomes from Tehran to Riyadh.

Weakening US hegemony in South Asia will also loosen America’s grip on the Middle East.

This is not theoretical. China already brokers regional diplomacy, from Saudi–Iran reconciliation to infrastructure investments under the Belt and Road Initiative. India maintains historic ties with Gulf states while steadily expanding its economic footprint. Together, they offer regional actors alternatives to Western security and financial systems—precisely at a time when US foreign policy under President Donald Trump appears increasingly transactional and unpredictable.

To be sure, structural mistrust remains between Beijing and New Delhi. Their 3,800-kilometre disputed border is still heavily militarized, and strategic competition has not vanished. Yet both sides now seem willing to manage disputes rather than weaponize them.

That pragmatism carries consequences.

A stable China–India equation accelerates the shift toward a multipolar order, reducing Washington’s ability to divide and influence Asian powers. For the United States, the message is clear: when the dragon and the elephant learn to dance, America no longer leads the orchestra.

The emerging alignment may be fragile—but even a cautious rapprochement marks another step away from US-centric global dominance.

PSX benchmark index closed at an all-time high of 189,167

Pakistan Stock Exchange continued upward movement during the week, with benchmark index gaining 4,068 points or 2.2% WoW to close at an all-time high of 189,167 on Friday, January 24, 2026. Market participation also improved by 8.7%WoW, with average daily trading volume rising to 1.3 billion shares, as compared to 1.2 billion shares in the prior week.

Momentum was supported by easing geopolitical tensions and a decline in T-Bill yields to single-digit levels for the first time in four years.

Moreover, positive economic partnerships with China, US, Britain and Saudi Arabia are expected to further boost Pakistan’s economy.

On the macroeconomic front, current account deficit was recorded at US$244 million for December 2025, while FDI outflows were recorded at US$135 million.

Power generation rose 8.8%YoY at December end, while IT sector recorded highest ever monthly exports of US$437 million, up 26%YoY.

Foreign exchange reserves held by State Bank of Pakistan (SBP) increased by US$16 million to US$16.1 billion as of January 16, 3026, as a result PKR appreciated against the greenback during the week, closing the week at 279.86 PKR/ US$.

Other major news flow during the week included: 1) Pakistan, China sign US$4.5 billion farm deals, boosting jobs and food supply, 2) Pakistan signs Trump-led Board of Peace charter, 3) GoP working on proposals to reduce industrial power tariff, 4) Pakistan-Philippines can boost pharma trade to US$1 billion, and 5) Foreign firms repatriate US$1.6 billion during 1HFY26.

Refinery, Fertilizer, Leather & Tanneries, Insurance, Property were amongst the top performing sectors, while Transport, Jute, Woollen, Technology & Communication, and Engineering were amongst the laggards.

Major buying was recorded by Mutual Funds and Individuals with a net buy of US$22.1 million and US$11.5 million, respectively. Foreigners and Companies were major sellers with net sell of US$21.1 million and US$10.4 million.

Top performing scrips of the week were: AICL, ATRL, FATIMA, SAZEW, and ENGROH, while laggards included: PIOC, KTML, TGL, SYS, and PAEL.

AKD Securities foresees the positive momentum at PSX to continue due to further monetary easing driven by improving external account position and continuous focus on reforms amid political stability.

The brokerage house anticipates the benchmark index to rise to 263,800 by end December 2026.

Investors’ sentiments are expected to improve on the likelihood of foreign portfolio and direct investment flows, driven by improved relations with the United States and Saudi Arabia.

Top picks of the brokerage house are:  OGDC, PPL, UBL, MEBL, HBL, FFC, ENGROH, PSO, LUCK, FCCL, INDU, ILP and SYS.

US “armada” heading towards Middle East

US President Donald Trump said on Thursday a naval “armada” was heading toward the Middle East, as he renewed warnings to Tehran against killing protesters or restarting its nuclear program.

“We’re watching Iran,” Trump told reporters on Air Force One on Thursday as he flew back from the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland.

“We have a big force going towards Iran,” Trump said.

“I’d rather not see anything happen, but we’re watching them very closely,” he said.

Trump’s announcement on the US naval buildup comes after he appeared to back-pedal last week on his threats of military action against Iran.

US officials said the aircraft carrier USS Abraham Lincoln and other assets would arrive in the Middle East in the coming days.

One official said additional air-defense systems were also being eyed for the Middle East, which could be critical to guard against any Iranian strike on US bases in the region.

The warships started moving from the Asia-Pacific last week as tensions between Iran and the United States soared following a severe crackdown on protests across Iran in recent months.

Trump had repeatedly threatened to intervene against Iran over the recent killings of protesters there but protests dwindled last week. The president backed away from his toughest rhetoric last week, claiming he had stopped executions of prisoners.

He repeated that claim on Thursday, saying Iran canceled nearly 840 hangings after his warnings.

"I said: 'If you hang those people, you're going to be hit harder than you've ever been hit. It'll make what we did to your Iran nuclear (program) look like peanuts,'" Trump said.

"At an hour before this horrible thing was going to take place, they canceled it," he said, calling it "a good sign."

The US military has in the past periodically surged forces to the Middle East at times of heightened tensions, moves that were often defensive.

However, the US military staged a major buildup last year ahead of its June strikes against Iran's nuclear program.

China’s muted response to US threats to attack Iran

China’s restrained reaction to fresh US threats against Iran is not a sign of indifference, weakness, or quiet acquiescence. Rather, it reflects a deliberate strategic calculation shaped by energy security, diplomatic doctrine, and Beijing’s evolving view of its role in the Middle East.

Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi’s recent phone call with his Iranian counterpart captured this posture succinctly. By opposing the “use or threat of force” and reaffirming dialogue over coercion, Beijing restated principles it has upheld for decades. What stood out was what China chose not to do: no sharp condemnation of Washington, no announcement of countermeasures, and no promise of tangible intervention.

This muted response is consistent with China’s long-standing policy of non-interference. Beijing has historically avoided entanglement in the internal politics of partner states, whether governed by hardliners or reformists. For China, regime type is secondary to sovereignty, stability, and continuity of cooperation. Iran is no exception.

Economic realities reinforce this caution. China buys over 80 percent of Iran’s oil exports and remains the world’s largest crude importer. Yet Beijing is acutely aware that overt political or security involvement could invite harsher Western sanctions at a time when it is already under pressure from Washington. Restraint, therefore, is not passivity but risk management.

Crucially, China has spent decades diversifying its energy sources precisely to reduce overdependence on politically volatile suppliers. As long as Iranian instability does not escalate into a blockade of the Strait of Hormuz or a collapse of Iran’s oil infrastructure, Beijing can absorb the shock. Iran’s reliance on shadow fleets and grey-zone trade has so far kept energy flows intact.

Beijing also appears relaxed about Iran’s internal political trajectory. A more pragmatic or even West-leaning leadership in Tehran would not necessarily undermine Chinese interests. Iran’s economic needs and China’s market size ensure a continued relationship, even if discounted oil disappears.

At a broader level, China is recalibrating its Middle East strategy. While its economic footprint is expanding amid a relative decline in US influence, Beijing remains unwilling to assume security responsibilities or confront Washington head-on. Verbal opposition, strategic ambiguity, and economic engagement remain its preferred tools.

In short, China is playing the long game. Its silence is not absence, but a calculated choice to protect interests without escalation — a reminder that in geopolitics, restraint can be as strategic as confrontation.

Japan a victim of US military industrial game

It is an uncomfortable but undeniable reality that a major driver of the US economy is the global sale of military hardware. Packaged as “security cooperation,” this system increasingly functions as a mechanism of dependency that serves America’s military industrial complex more than the security needs of its allies. A recent Nikkei Asia investigation into Japan’s undelivered US weapons orders exposes this imbalance with unusual clarity.

According to the report, Japan has placed 118 orders for US military equipment worth over US$7 billion that remain undelivered more than five years after contracts were signed. In several cases, the delays have forced Japan’s Self-Defense Forces to rely on aging platforms—the very problem these purchases were meant to address. This is not a bureaucratic mishap but a structural flaw in the US Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program.

Under FMS rules, buyers must pay in advance, while prices and delivery schedules remain estimates. Washington retains the right to prioritize its own military needs, a reality that has become more pronounced since the war in Ukraine. Weapons already paid for by allies can be diverted elsewhere, while client states are expected to wait patiently. The refund of surplus funds, often cited as evidence of fairness, does little to compensate for years of strategic uncertainty.

This arrangement increasingly resembles economic coercion. Countries are encouraged to replace “obsolete” systems even when existing hardware remains functional. The logic of modernization often aligns more closely with US defense contractors’ production cycles than with genuine threat assessments. The buyer’s ability—or even need—to deploy advanced systems becomes secondary.

Japan’s experience is particularly instructive. As a technologically advanced nation and a key US ally, Tokyo should, in theory, enjoy priority treatment. Its difficulties raise serious questions about the position of smaller or less influential buyers, for whom arms purchases can become sunk costs with limited security returns.

The Nikkei Asia findings should serve as a warning. Dependence on a single supplier whose economy is deeply tied to militarization carries inherent risks. Paying upfront for weapons that arrive late—or not at all—undermines both security and sovereignty. Japan’s US$7 billion backlog is not merely a logistical failure; it is a lesson in the real economics of buying American security.