President Trump you cannot order Taliban to handover Bagram Air Base to the United States

It may be a wish of US President Donald Trump to get control of Bagram Air Base. However, he does not have any authority to demand the Afghan government to handover the base. Threatening bad things would happen to Afghanistan if it does not give back control of the base to the United States, is outright terrorism.

Here are several possible motives behind the Trump demand:

·        Restoring US influence in Afghanistan and the wider region, especially after the pull-out which many view as a strategic loss.

·        Countering rivals, particularly China and others by having a base close by.

·        Strengthening counterterrorism posture, ensuring that militant groups can't easily use Afghan territory to plan or launch attacks.

·        Leveraging domestic political pressure as the opponents say the withdrawal decision was a mistake.

·        Using it as a bargaining chip to secure concessions i.e. economic aid, diplomatic recognition, etc.

Being a sovereign county and also because the US does recognize the Taliban government of Afghanistan it is the inherent right of Taliban to outright rejected the US demand.

·        They rightly say Afghanistan’s territorial integrity cannot be compromised.

·        No foreign military presence will be allowed.

·        Taliban insists that political and economic relations with the US are possible without giving up land or allowing foreign bases.

Regaining control of Bagram will not an easy task for the US. It would likely require a major military deployment, security provisions, defense spending, etc. Experts say holding the base would be challenging militarily and politically.

Some analysts view the US demand as an attempt to restore hegemony over Afghanistan and adjoining countries.

They warn that pushing too hard might destabilize relations, reduce cooperation, or provoke negative responses from locals or other countries.

Under the Doha Agreement (2020) and other engagements, the US made certain commitments about respecting Afghanistan’s sovereignty, no foreign bases, etc. Returning to or demanding possession of Bagram is violation of these agreements.

The New World Disorder

French historian Fernand Braudel identified three cycles of history. The shortest is the day-to-day flow of events; Braudel called them “fireflies” on the stage. Next up are paradigm shifts — like the end of the Cold War — that can play out over decades or longer. Finally, there’s the longue durée: the bedrock of climate and geography that shapes everything else and changes only over centuries or millennia.

Six months into US President Donald Trump’s second term, it’s clear that the course of events has changed. What’s the collective noun for a group of fireflies? Probably not “paradigm shift,” but in this case that’s what it adds up to. 

The US pivot from free trade and global security to a sharper focus on the national interest has the makings of a decades-defining transformation, reversing the global integration supercharged by the end of the Cold War.

In the decades after World War II, the US was the champion of free trade, the anchor for global security and the gold standard on governance. Now, it has raised tariffs to the highest level since the 1930s, told allies they need to pay for protection and crossed red lines on independence for the Fed and statistical agencies.

That’s a major break, and an important moment for the global economy, shifting patterns of growth and inflation, borrowing and debt.

The geopolitical landscape has shifted just as decisively. Jolting though it is, Trump’s focus on America First is a reflection of a new reality where the US is no longer the world’s sole superpower. Regardless of who occupies the White House next, the US allies and adversaries will continue to reorient around that new state of affairs.

How about Braudel’s longue durée — the slowest moving cycle of history on which everything else rests? Could even that be at an inflection point? Maybe.

Trump has pulled the US out of the Paris climate agreement, again. The global fight against climate change will continue, but without the world’s second-largest emitter, it gets harder. The arrival of artificial general intelligence could also prove an epochal shift.

“History,” Braudel wrote, “may be divided into three movements: what moves rapidly, what moves slowly and what appears not to move at all.” Right now, events are moving almost too fast to track and the slow-moving Pax Americana is heading rapidly toward the dustbin of history. If global temperatures rise much further or machines start thinking for themselves, there will be movement even in the cycle that appears not to move at all.

Significance of Pezeshkian’s visit to China

Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian wrapped up a four-day visit to China on Wednesday, heading back to Tehran after attending a military parade in Beijing that marked 80 years since the end of World War II.

Pezeshkian's first stop in China was the northern port city of Tianjin, where he attended the 25th Meeting of the SCO Council of Heads of State, the largest gathering of the bloc to date. The Iranian president delivered a speech there, addressing the "unfair" global order led by the West and highlighting the need to create a new one through collaboration among the Global South.

A much-anticipated meeting between the presidents of Iran and China took place the next day. Pezeshkian told Xi Jinping that Iran was ready to work with China "under any circumstances" to elevate relations to their highest level, stressing that Beijing could count on Tehran as a "strong and determined friend and ally." Xi reciprocated, stating he sees Tehran as a "strategic partner" with a "forward-looking approach." Both sides agreed that more needed to be done to implement the 25-year cooperation plan signed in 2020.

Analysts in Iran hope that the president’s visit, during which he was accompanied by his foreign minister, economy minister, and defense minister, would lead to new military and financial deals.

This appears to be the case, as upon arriving in Tehran, Pezeshkian stated that "important," "strategic," and "vital" decisions had been made following his discussions with Xi.

"Additionally, discussions on security and defense equipment were held with the support of the defense minister, who was present during this trip, and necessary follow-ups will be carried out in this regard," Pezeshkian declared. It is believed that Iran is looking to buy air defense systems and fighter jets from China, although there is no official confirmation on what it seeks to purchase.

While Iranians have mostly focused on what the trip could bring about for Iran, the rest of the world has mainly been discussing how the SCO summit and the close interaction between India's Modi and Xi demonstrate that the split President Trump opened up between Washington and New Delhi is much larger than expected.

Trump’s former security advisor told American media that Trump has “shredded decades of effort” to pull India away from the Russian and Chinese orbit with his tariff policies. 

Furthermore, Modi's presence at the recent SCO meeting, along with other developments, is viewed as a sign that the new global order Pezeshkian has called for is approaching, or may already be in place.

"The new international order everyone has been talking about for years has almost arrived," said economic and trade analyst Majid Shakeri.

The expert said several factors point to this consolidation include: 1) the exclusion of Arab states from the Wednesday parade after their embrace of Trump during his West Asia tour earlier this year, 2) the Siberian Power Pipeline agreement signed between Russia and China this week, 3) and Beijing's announcement of its intention to establish an artificial intelligence cooperation center with the rest of the SCO.

"A crucial piece of the puzzle that is still incomplete and unclear is India's balancing act between China and America," Shakeri explained.

Pezeshkian's visit to China also included significant interactions with other world leaders. While there appeared to be no interaction with the Indian Prime Minister, Pezeshkian spent four hours in discussion with Russia's Vladimir Putin and a shorter amount of time speaking with Pakistan's Shehbaz Sharif, whose country's relationship with Iran is growing closer by the day.

Recep Tayyip Erdogan of Turkey was filmed holding onto Pezeshkian's hand while walking alongside him in a hall. The Iranian president expressed anticipation for Erdogan's visit to Tehran.

Despite recent tensions between Iran and Turkey regarding South Caucasus transportation plans and the situation in Syria, both nations appear in favor of maintaining their friendly relations.

Tajikistan’s Emomali Rahmon was also affectionate with Pezeshkian. The two countries share a significant part of their history and culture and view each other fondly.

 

The Fading Edge of Western Sanctions

Western sanctions were once the sharpest weapon in Washington and Brussels’ arsenal — a way to cripple adversaries without firing a shot. But today, their overuse and poor calibration are blunting their impact, most visibly in the case of Russia’s energy industry.

Take the recent arrival of the Arctic Mulan in southern China. On August 28, the sanctioned tanker unloaded liquefied natural gas from Russia’s Arctic LNG-2 plant — a facility buried under Western restrictions. That shipment, China’s first from the Siberian project, came just days before Vladimir Putin’s state visit to Beijing. The symbolism is unmistakable: Beijing is choosing energy security and strategic ties with Moscow over Washington’s disapproval.

Washington’s own missteps reinforce the sense that sanctions are losing their sting. In late August, President Donald Trump slapped a 25% “secondary tariff” on Indian imports of Russian crude, doubling existing duties. The gamble backfired. India not only kept buying Russian oil but also found common cause with China — a troubling development for US strategists who once counted on Delhi as a counterweight to Beijing.

The core problem is not intent but longevity. Sanctions work best when they are broad, swift, and temporary — delivering a shock that compels change before targets can adapt. But when restrictions drag on, industries build workarounds.

Russia has done so with astonishing speed, channeling crude through China and India, which now absorb 80% of its exports, and relying on “dark fleets” of tankers to bypass Western oversight. Iran and Venezuela, veterans of economic siege, have perfected similar tactics.

Meanwhile, the sheer scale of sanctions is undermining their effectiveness. Since 2017, the number of international sanctions has surged by 450%, according to LSEG Risk Intelligence. After Moscow’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, EU sanctions on Russia jumped from zero in 2013 to more than 2,500 by 2025. Washington blacklisted over 3,100 new entities last year alone, most of them Russian. The result, enforcement has become a bureaucratic quagmire, draining multinational firms with compliance costs while Russia and its partners adapt.

In short, the West is flooding the world with sanctions — but the more it leans on this tool, the less powerful it becomes. Economic warfare cannot be waged indefinitely without diminishing returns. If sanctions are to remain credible, they must be recalibrated: fewer, smarter, and more time-bound, backed by genuine multilateral coordination.

Otherwise, the very weapon once seen as a substitute for war may become just another dull instrument in an increasingly multipolar world.

China-Russia pipeline diplomacy a threat to Trump’s energy grip

The high stakes energy diplomacy in Beijing this week signals China’s willingness to defy US President Donald Trump’s efforts to isolate Russia and assert US energy dominance.

Chinese President Xi Jinpin, sitting alongside Russian President Vladimir Putin, used a military parade this week marking 80 years since Japan's defeat in World War Two to project Beijing's military and diplomatic clout amid heightened trade tensions with Washington.

China backed the pageantry with action on Tuesday, when Russia’s gas giant Gazprom announced the sides had signed a legally binding memorandum with Moscow for the construction of Power of Siberia 2, a 2,600-km (1,615 mile) gas pipeline that will run between the two countries. The project has struggled to take off after more than a decade of fruitless talks.

China will also boost the already large gas volumes it imports through the existing ‘Power of Siberia’ pipeline. Gazprom CEO Alexei Miller said on Tuesday that the two countries had agreed to increase supplies via the pipeline to 44 billion cubic metres a year from 38 bcm.

Additionally, both sides agreed to raise the volume of Russian gas deliveries to China via a pipeline from Sakhalin Island in Russia's Far East by 20% to 12 bcm annually.

Taken together, this is yet another indication of the growing ties between Beijing and Moscow, but more importantly, it is a signal that China is not planning to back down in the face of US pressure.

Of course, several major hurdles remain for the new Siberian project.

First and foremost, the sides have yet to agree on the price of the gas that will be transported through the pipeline. The Gazprom CEO indicated that the price would be lower than what European buyers paid in the past.

It also remains unclear whether China will require the additional volume. Chinese companies in recent years have signed many long-term liquefied natural gas supply deals, including with US producers, amounting to around 50 bcm per year of additional supplies through 2030, according to the Institute for Energy Economics and Financial Analysis.

On top of that, China ramped up its domestic gas production by 28% between 2020 and 2024 to 246.4 bcm, according to IEEFA.

The bigger problem could be strategic. Completing the new project would cement Russia's position as the biggest natural gas supplier to China – and that could be a concern for Beijing.

Russia supplied around 22% of China's gas imports in 2024, or about 38 bcm, when including pipeline gas and deliveries of LNG, according to data from the Energy Institute's Statistical Review of World Energy.

The new volumes from the existing pipeline would raise Russia's share in China’s imports to over a quarter next year, assuming an increase in the country’s gas demand.

Adding another 50 bcm capacity from the new pipeline, which likely would not come on stream before 2030, would therefore double Russia's share of China’s gas imports.

But in today’s new global environment, what might matter more is that Putin and Xi appear politically invested in making the project work.

For Russia, the agreement offers a long-term market for its vast natural gas reserves – something that has become particularly important since Europe, Russia's biggest gas market for decades, began to wean itself off Russian gas following Moscow's invasion of Ukraine in 2022.

For China, this appears to be another shot across the bow in the economic stand-off with Washington.

On a practical level, importing larger volumes of gas from Russia would reduce Beijing's need to increase U.S. LNG imports, one of the major promises many other countries have made in trade talks with the Trump administration.

And then there is the desire to signal defiance – a negotiating tactic in itself.

It is notable that last week China imported its first LNG cargo from Russia’s Arctic LNG 2 plant, despite heavy US sanctions, undermining Trump’s attempts to isolate Moscow and pressure Putin over Ukraine. Other cargoes from the plant could be heading to China.

The Trump administration has yet to respond to the cargo’s arrival in Beihai, but the timing just days before Putin’s visit is unlikely to be a coincidence.

 

 

The Beginning of the End of US Hegemony

The leaders of China, North Korea and Russia stood shoulder to shoulder Wednesday as high-tech military hardware and thousands of marching soldiers filled the streets of Beijing. Two days earlier, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, Russian President Vladimir Putin and Chinese President Xi Jinping huddled together, smiling broadly and clasping hands at a meeting of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization.

The gatherings in China this week could be read as a striking, maybe even defiant, message to the United States and its allies. At the very least, they offered yet more evidence of a burgeoning shift away from a US-dominated, Western-led world order, as President Donald Trump withdraws America from many of its historic roles and roils economic relationships with tariffs.

Will it be right to say that it is the beginning of the end of US hegemony? It is a transition from uni-polarity to multi-polarity. The US is losing its ability to act unchallenged. The world is moving towards competitive coexistence, where Washington remains powerful but will have to share space with Beijing, Moscow, and other rising centers of influence. It looks less like a sudden collapse, and more like a slow erosion of dominance.

For nearly eight decades, the United States has been the undisputed leader of the world, setting the rules of politics, trade, and security. But today, cracks in this dominance are becoming visible.

The rise of China as a technological and economic powerhouse, Russia’s defiance of Western sanctions, and the growing assertiveness of regional blocs such as BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization are eroding Washington’s monopoly over global influence. Even long-time allies in the Middle East and Asia are quietly hedging their bets, diversifying partnerships beyond the US.

At home, the super power faces mounting challenges, a polarized political system, unsustainable debt levels, and an exhausted military stretched across multiple conflict zones. Meanwhile, the US dollar, once an untouchable pillar of global finance, is slowly facing competition from alternative payment systems. Yet, it is premature to declare the end of US power.

History suggests that hegemonies rarely fall overnight. The American era may not be over, but its golden age of unquestioned dominance is clearly behind us.

China shows power at military parade

Chinese President Xi Jinping warned the world was facing a choice between peace or war at a massive military parade in Beijing on Wednesday, flanked by Russia's Vladimir Putin and North Korea's Kim Jong Un in an unprecedented show of force.

The event to mark 80 years since Japan's defeat at the end of World War Two was largely shunned by Western leaders, with Putin and Kim - pariahs in the West due to the Ukraine war and Kim's nuclear ambitions - the guests of honour.

Designed to project China's military might and diplomatic clout, it also comes as US President Donald Trump's tariffs and volatile policymaking strain its relations with allies and rivals alike.

"Today, mankind is faced with the choice of peace or war, dialogue or confrontation, win-win or zero-sum," Xi told a crowd of more than 50,000 spectators at Tiananmen Square, adding that the Chinese people "firmly stand on the right side of history".

Riding in an open-top limousine, Xi then inspected the troops and cutting-edge military equipment such as hypersonic missiles, underwater drones and a weaponized 'robot wolf'.

Helicopters trailing large banners and fighter jets flew in formation during a 70-minute showcase that culminated in the release of 80,000 'peace' birds.

Donning a tunic suit in the style worn by former leader Mao Zedong, Xi earlier greeted more than 25 leaders on the red carpet, including Indonesia's Prabowo Subianto who made a surprise appearance despite widespread protests at home.

Seated between Putin and Kim in the viewing gallery, Xi repeatedly engaged in conversations with both leaders as thousands of troops and materiel paraded before them. It marked the first time the trio have appeared together in public.

Putin later thanked his North Korean counterpart for his soldiers' courageous fighting in the war in Ukraine during a bilateral meeting at China's State Guesthouse. Kim said he was willing to do everything he can to help Russia.

"Please give my warmest regards to Vladimir Putin, and Kim Jong Un, as you conspire against the United States of America," Trump said in a post directed at Xi on Truth Social, as the event kicked off. He also highlighted the US role in helping China secure its freedom from Japan during World War Two.

Trump had earlier told reporters he did not see the parade as a challenge to the United States. Japan's top government spokesperson declined to comment on the parade, adding Asia's top two economies were building "constructive relations".

Democratically governed Taiwan, which China considers its own, has urged its people not to attend the parade, warning that attendance could reinforce Beijing's territorial claims. Taiwan does not commemorate peace with a barrel of a gun, its President Lai Ching-te said on Wednesday in pointed criticism of the event.

Xi has cast World War Two as a major turning point in the "great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation", in which it overcame the humiliation of Japan's invasion to become a global powerhouse.

Earlier this week, Xi unveiled his vision of a new world order at a regional security summit, calling for unity against "hegemonism and power politics", a thinly veiled swipe at his rival across the Pacific Ocean.

"Xi feels confident that the table has turned. It's China that is back in the driver's seat now," said Wen-Ti Sung, fellow at the Atlantic Council's Global China Hub, based in Taiwan.

"It's been Trumpian unilateralism rather than China’s wolf warrior diplomacy when people talk about the leading source of uncertainty in the international system."

At a lavish reception after the parade at the Great Hall of the People, Xi told his guests that humanity must not return to the "law of the jungle".

Beyond the pomp and propaganda, analysts are watching whether Xi, Putin and Kim may signal closer defence relations following a pact signed by Russia and North Korea in June 2024, and a similar alliance between Beijing and Pyongyang, an outcome that may alter the military calculus in the Asia-Pacific region.

Putin has already sealed deeper energy deals with Beijing during his China visit, while the gathering has given the reclusive Kim an opportunity to gain implicit support for his banned nuclear weapons.

It has been 66 years since a North Korean leader last attended a Chinese military parade.

Kim travelled to Beijing with his daughter Ju Ae, whom South Korean intelligence consider his most likely successor, although she was not seen alongside him at the parade.

 

Time Is Ripe for Dumping Trump

Every political career reaches a tipping point. For Donald Trump, that moment has arrived. His return to the political stage was meant to showcase strength and inevitability. Instead, most of his high-profile decisions and strategies in what amounts to his “second term of influence” have backfired, leaving the Republican Party fractured and America’s standing diminished.

On foreign policy, Trump’s swagger delivered little substance. His tariff wars bruised US farmers more than Beijing, his embrace of autocrats yielded no concessions, and his abandonment of long-standing allies left Washington isolated. The Middle East “breakthroughs” unraveled into fresh instability, while his tough talk on Iran and North Korea ended with neither deterrence nor diplomacy.

At home, his tax cuts fed corporations but starved the federal budget, inflating deficits without lifting wages for most Americans. His promised transformations on infrastructure and healthcare never materialized. Instead, voters were left with widening inequality, broken promises, and a chaotic pandemic response that remains a stain on his record.

Politically, the costs are even starker. Trumpism has become an anchor for Republicans, costing the party moderates and suburban voters while entrenching bitter divisions within. Legal troubles multiply, crowding out policy debate and reminding Americans of the scandals that defined his presidency. What once looked like disruptive energy now looks like exhaustion.

The United States faces serious challenges — from economic restructuring to climate resilience and global leadership. Clinging to a leader defined by backfires, chaos, and personal vendettas is not just unwise; it is reckless. The time is not just ripe but urgent for Republicans, and for the country, to move beyond Donald Trump.

Xi rolls out carpet for Ukraine war aggressors, sidelining Trump

I am disgusted by reading the headline and the wordings of opening paragraph of a news report by Reuters on the meeting of presidents of China and Russia. I also invite the readers to register their like or dislike to the way of reporting by western media, which I term, “dishonest”.  

Reuters reports, “In a show of solidarity with the aggressors in Europe's worst war in 80 years, China's Xi Jinping will convene with his Russian and North Korean counterparts for the first time as Donald Trump and other Western leaders watch from afar”.

It continues, “Vladimir Putin and Kim Jong Un's visit to Beijing for a massive military parade this week underscore the Chinese president's influence over authoritarian regimes intent on redefining the Western-led global order, while Trump's isolationist stance strains long-standing US alliances”.

It says, “The gathering of what Western analysts have dubbed the 'Axis of Upheaval' could build on a mutual defence pact signed by Russia and North Korea in June 2024, and a similar alliance between Beijing and Pyongyang, an outcome that may alter the military calculus in the Asia-Pacific region”.

Kim crossed into China early on Tuesday aboard his special train, en route to the capital Beijing. Xi and Putin, meanwhile, gathered at the Great Hall of the People for a meeting with Mongolia's leader expected to touch on a vast gas pipeline project and bilateral talks.

Putin thanked his "dear friend" Xi for the warm welcome and said the close communication showed Russia's relations with China were at an "unprecedentedly high level", according to a video of the talks posted on the Kremlin's official Telegram messaging app.

"We must continue to take a clear stand against hegemonism and power politics," Xi told a gathering of more than 20 leaders of non-Western countries at a summit on Monday, a thinly veiled swipe at his geopolitical rival across the Pacific Ocean.

Xi also held talks with Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi on Monday, resetting strained bilateral ties, as Trump ratcheted up trade pressure on New Delhi over its purchases of Russian oil.

Trump's Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent on Monday called the summit "performative" and accused China and India of being "bad actors" by fueling Russia's three-and-a-half-year war with Ukraine.

At a time when Trump is touting his peacemaking credentials, any new concentration of military power in the East that includes Russia will ring alarm bells for the West.

"Trilateral military exercises between Russia, China and North Korea seem nearly inevitable," wrote Youngjun Kim, an analyst at the US-based National Bureau of Asian Research, in March, citing how the conflict in Ukraine has pushed Moscow and Pyongyang closer together.

"Until a few years ago, China and Russia were important partners in imposing international sanctions on North Korea for its nuclear and missile tests... (they) are now potential military partners of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea during a crisis on the Korean peninsula," he added, using the diplomatically isolated country's official name.

Kim is an important stakeholder in the conflict in Ukraine: the North Korean leader has supplied over 15,000 troops to support Putin's war.

In 2024, he also hosted the Russian leader in Pyongyang - the first summit of its kind in 24 years - in a move widely interpreted as a snub to Xi and an attempt to ease his pariah status by reducing North Korea's dependence on China.

About 600 North Korean soldiers have died fighting for Russia in the Kursk region, according to South Korea's intelligence agency, which believes Pyongyang is planning another deployment.

Putin also told the Shanghai Cooperation Organization summit in Tianjin that a "fair balance in the security sphere" must be restored, shorthand for Russia's criticism of the eastward expansion of NATO and European Security.

 

China and Russia reject European move to restore sanctions on Iran

UN Security Council permanent members China and Russia backed Iran on Monday in rejecting a move by European countries to reimpose UN sanctions on Tehran loosened a decade ago under a nuclear agreement, reports Reuters.

A letter signed by the Chinese, Russian and Iranian foreign ministers said a move by Britain, France and Germany to automatically restore the sanctions under a so-called "snapback mechanism" was "legally and procedurally flawed".

China and Russia were signatories to Iran's 2015 nuclear deal with world powers, along with the three European countries, known as the E3. President Donald Trump pulled the United States out of the agreement in his first term in 2018.

The Europeans launched the "snapback mechanism" last week, accusing Iran of violating the deal, which had provided relief from international financial sanctions in return for curbs to Iran's nuclear program.

The letter published by Iran's Foreign Minister Abbas Araqchi in a post on X on Monday said that the course taken by Britain, France, and Germany "abuses the authority and functions of the UN Security Council".

Iran has long since broken through the limits on uranium production set under the 2015 deal, arguing that it is justified in doing so as a consequence of Washington having pulled out of the agreement. The deal expires in October this year, and the snapback mechanism would allow sanctions that were lifted under it to take effect again.

Iran and the E3 held talks aimed at a new nuclear agreement after Israel and the US bombed Iran's nuclear installations in mid-June. But the E3 deemed that talks in Geneva last week did not yield sufficient signals of readiness for a new deal from Iran.

"Our joint letter with my colleagues, the foreign ministers of China and Russia, signed in Tianjin, reflects the firm position that the European attempt to invoke snapback is legally baseless and politically destructive", Iran's foreign minister said in his post on X.

 

 

Duality of standards for Iran and Israel

Many readers like me are unable to understand why the United States, Britain, France and Germany are adamant at imposing sanction on Iran, but are not asking Israel to stop bombarding Gaza?

The apparent contradiction reflects how strategic interests, alliances, and global optics intersect in United States and Britain, France and Germany foreign policy. Let me break it down:

Iran Nuclear Program

The United States, Britain France and Germany have long opposed Iran’s uranium enrichment, seeing it as a path to nuclear weapons. Sanctions are their primary leverage tool.

Regional Rivalries

Iran’s support for Hezbollah, Houthis, and other groups hostile to Israel and the West makes it a “destabilizer” in their eyes.

Alliance Pressures

Many Gulf Arab states are partners of Israel, US, Britain, France and Germany and they view Iran as a strategic threat, pushing Western powers to maintain maximum pressure.

Domestic Politics

In Washington and Europe, appearing “soft on Iran” is politically costly. Sanctions serve as a signal of toughness.

Israeli attacks on Gaza

Israel’s strikes in Gaza have caused massive civilian deaths. Western governments face pressure from international institutions (UN, ICC), NGOs, and their own publics.

The US, Britain France and Germany consider themselves defenders of international law. Unchecked Israeli bombing undermines their stance on Ukraine, human rights, and global order.

Escalation in Gaza risks dragging in Lebanon, Syria, and potentially Iran—threatening oil supplies and broader Middle East stability, which Europe especially fears.

In the US and Europe, large pro-Palestinian movements, especially among younger voters and immigrant communities are creating political pressure to rein in Israel.

Core Contradiction

On Iran, the West uses sanctions as a pressure tool because Iran is seen as an adversary.

On Israel, despite being an ally, the West uses diplomatic urging rather than sanctions—because Israel is a strategic partner, but its Gaza actions are politically damaging to the West’s global image.

In essence, Iran is a strategic opponent and super powers use sanctions as pressure

They consider Israel a strategic ally and want to save it from any external pressure, the statements are rhetoric only.

This double standard is being viewed in non-Western capitals (Beijing, Moscow, Global and South) as dual standard and Western stance weakens their credibility globally.

The non-Western world views this double standard of sanctions on Iran but “restraint pleas” for Israel.

China points out that the US, Britain, France and Germany are punishing Iran harshly for alleged destabilizing actions, but shield Israel diplomatically despite Gaza bombings.

By calling for ceasefires and humanitarian aid, China portrays itself as a “responsible global mediator,” contrasting with the West’s selective morality.

Iran is a vital energy partner for China under its Belt and Road Initiative. Sanctions make Tehran more dependent on Beijing, strengthening Chinese influence.

Russia

Russia terms the West’s “rules-based order” biased. They argue: “If bombing cities in Ukraine is a war crime, why not Gaza?”

Iran is often accused of supplying drones and partnering with Russia under sanctions, so Moscow benefits from Tehran’s isolation.

Russia frames itself as standing with the oppressed (Palestinians) against Western-backed aggression, resonating in Arab and African states.

Colonial Echoes

Many see the West’s defense of Israel and punishment of Iran as a continuation of imperial “divide and rule.”

Western claims about human rights and international law are viewed as selective—undermining their authority when they criticize others (African leaders, Asian governments).

Countries like Turkey, Brazil, and South Africa amplify calls for accountability against Israel, while trading more with Iran outside the dollar system.

Strategic Impact

The West’s inconsistency weakens its moral standing globally.

Non-Western powers gain diplomatic and economic space by filling the “justice gap.”

Iran, despite sanctions, finds sympathy in many Global South societies as a victim of Western double standards—while Israel risks becoming diplomatically isolated outside the Western bloc.

Moral of the story

The contradictory stances of US, Britain France and Germany may preserve short-term alliances, but they’re eroding their credibility in the long run, especially in the Global South.

 

Trump-Putin meeting and implications for East Asian allies

Nikkei Asia claims it focuses on writing about Asia from an Asian perspective. Even when writing about the current occupant of the White House, it tries to look at what his rhetoric and policies mean for this region.

Much of the world's media focused on the direct implications for Europe stemming from US President Donald Trump's summit last weekend with Vladimir Putin and his subsequent meeting with Volodymyr Zelenskyy and a group of European leaders.

James D.J. Brown looked at the implications for East Asia stemming from these diplomatic gatherings.

Brown writes that the US president's pandering to the Russian dictator and failure to support Ukraine bodes ill, not just for Europe, but for US allies in East Asia.

He makes three key points:

1- In rolling out the red carpet for Putin, a man subject to an arrest warrant for war crimes from the International Criminal Court, Trump is flaunting his disregard for a rules-based international order. This matters enormously to countries in East Asia, including Japan, whose security and prosperity is based on the principle that larger states cannot seize territory from weaker neighbors through military force.

2- The concern is that, having dealt with Putin over the heads of the Ukrainians, Trump could do the same with China, and make 'a big, beautiful' deal with Xi Jinping regarding Taiwan.

3- US allies in the region will be concerned about Trump's increasing unreliability and impressionability as shown by his flip-flopping on Russia policy.

Also on the American leader, William Pesek argues that Xi must be loving how Trump is remaking the US in China's image.

He writes, "Trump's Chinafication project can be seen in his effort to morph the Federal Reserve into the People's Bank of China, obscure economic data, defang the courts, take government stakes in major companies like Intel and demand a 15% cut of Nvidia's chip sales to China. The White House getting a 'golden share' stake free of charge in Nippon Steel's deal for US Steel pulsates with Politburo energy.”

"The circus atmosphere pervading Trump 2.0 means time is on China's side. Optimism that Xi will be the one making an offer Trump cannot refuse has Shanghai traders ready to pop the champagne corks. And, who knows, they may be right," Pesek adds.

Outside of the Trump-sphere, Vivian Toh explains why Huawei's HarmonyOS has struggled to adopt smaller apps, while Ben Cordier and Eve Yang make the case for Asian job markets being able to weather global economic uncertainty.

 

Geopolitical stunts are created to maneuver oil prices

It may not be wrong to say that geopolitical stunts (or deliberate political maneuvers) are often used to influence oil prices. The time proves that oil is one of the most geopolitically sensitive commodities, and even the perception of instability can trigger price movements. Here are some ways this happens:

Military Conflicts and Threats

Tensions in oil-producing regions (Middle East, Russia, and Ukraine) raise fears of supply disruptions. Even without actual disruption, rhetoric, military drills, or strikes can cause speculative buying, lifting prices.

Sanctions and Embargoes

Sanctions on major producers (Iran, Venezuela, and Russia) reduce their exports, tightening supply. Announcements of new sanctions, even before implementation, often drive markets up.

OPEC Plus Announcements

OPEC and allies strategically announce production cuts or increases to move prices. Sometimes the timing is politically motivated — for example, cuts ahead of US elections or global summits.

Diplomatic Stunts

Leaders may signal alliances, threats, or peace talks to calm or unsettle oil markets. For instance, US–Saudi or US–Iran engagements often coincide with volatility in oil futures.

Domestic Politics

Countries that depend heavily on oil revenues (Russia, Saudi Arabia, Iran, Nigeria, and Venezuela) may trigger or amplify tensions abroad to keep oil prices high. Conversely, big consumers (United States, China, and European Union) may release strategic oil reserves to cool prices.

Media Amplification

Headlines about “possible war,” “pipeline sabotage,” or “shipping lane blockades” often move markets more than the actual underlying event. Traders react to expectations and fear, not just physical supply-demand.

Therefore, it could be concluded that oil markets are not purely economic — they are political battlegrounds, and states often use geopolitical stunts as levers to maneuver prices in their favor.

Here are three recent real world examples (2025) where geopolitical maneuvers clearly influenced oil prices—either via threat driven surges or optimism amid shifting sanctions and diplomacy.

Threat to Close the Strait of Hormuz

In June 2025, escalating attacks between Israel and Iran triggered a spike in oil prices—Brent crude climbed to US$70 per barrel amid concerns over supply disruptions and potential threats to the vital Strait of Hormuz.

On June 14, 2025, Iran explicitly threatened to close the Strait, which handles nearly 20% of global oil traffic. Analysts warned this could push prices even higher—possibly into the US$100 to US$150 per barrel range.

While a full closure didn’t materialize, the mere threat created a sharp short-term price shock, echoing how geopolitical risk can rapidly alter market sentiment.

Russia Ukraine Peace Talks

In August 2025, oil markets closely tracked developments—or lack thereof—in high-profile diplomatic efforts involving Russia, the United States, and Ukraine.

When President Trump proposed a trilateral summit (Putin–Zelenskiy–himself), Brent crude briefly climbed—markets anticipated that a ceasefire could eventually ease sanctions and boost supply.

Conversely, when the Trump–Putin summit yielded no binding oil or policy changes, markets cooled; analysts noted the event lacked the "magic lever" to relieve supply constraints.

Ongoing sanctions and inventory draws in the US—especially amid strong demand—continued to support prices amid supply uncertainty.

OPEC Plus Production Moves

In June 2025, OPEC Plus surprised markets by announcing a modest output increase of around 411,000 barrels per day, despite prevailing worries of oversupply. This unexpected move served as a geopolitical reminder of OPEC Plus ability to tweak supply—and kept oil prices elevated.

This came at a time when global crude production was running high, yet the announcement shaped expectations that geopolitical coordination could still swing the market.

Geopolitical Stunts Still Matter

Perception matters:

Markets often react more sharply to the fear of disruption—like threats to chokepoints—than to actual events.

Short-term risk channel:

As historical analyses show, geopolitical shocks typically drive short-term price spikes via risk premiums, though long-term economic slowdown may offset these gains.

Strategic signaling:

Diplomatic posturing—summits, threats, tariffs—can sway trader sentiment and pricing, even without concrete policy shifts.

Can there be an end to India-China animosity?

Relations between China and India are on a “positive trend” towards cooperation, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi told his Indian counterpart in New Delhi.

The world’s two most populous nations are intense rivals competing for influence across South Asia, and fought a deadly border clash in 2020.

India is also part of the Quad security alliance with the United States, Australia and Japan, which is seen as a counter to China.

Caught in global trade and geopolitical turbulence triggered by US President Donald Trump’s tariff war, the countries have moved to mend ties.

During talks on Monday with Subrahmanyam Jaishankar, India’s foreign minister, Wang said the two countries should “view each other as partners and opportunities, rather than adversaries or threats”.

He pointed to the resumption of “dialogue at all levels” and “maintenance of peace and tranquility in border areas” as evidence that bilateral ties were on a “positive trend of returning to the main path of cooperation”.

Wang is also expected to meet Prime Minister Narendra Modi during his three-day visit.

According to Indian media, Modi might visit China this month, which would be his first trip since 2018.

Relations have improved since October, when Modi and Chinese President Xi Jinping met for the first time in five years in Russia.

Chinese and Indian officials have said in recent weeks that the two countries were discussing the resumption of border trade, which has been halted since 2020.

Its resumption would be symbolically significant, and follows discussions to resume direct flights and issue tourist visas.

At this juncture it is necessary to examine the factors responsible for the confrontation between China and India.

Point blank it could be said that the omnipresent confrontation is rooted in a mix of historical, geopolitical, economic, and strategic factors.

While both the countries are major Asian powers and share a long border, their relations have been tense for decades. The reasons include:

Border Disputes

The 3,488 kilometers (2,167 miles) boundary between China and India is not formally demarcated. Two main disputed Areas are: 1) Aksai Chin (controlled by China, claimed by India) and 2) Arunachal Pradesh (controlled by India, claimed by China as “South Tibet”). Repeated standoffs (Doklam 2017, Galwan 2020) occur due to patrol overlaps and differing perceptions of the Line of Actual Control (LAC).

Historical Legacy

The 1962 Sino-Indian War left a deep scar. China defeated India and occupied Aksai Chin. India still feels betrayed, as relations before 1962 were publicly friendly under “Hindi-Chini Bhai Bhai” (India-China brotherhood).

Strategic Rivalry in Asia

Both nations see themselves as dominant Asian powers. China views India’s rise and its closeness with the US, Japan, and Australia (Quad alliance) as a counterbalance to Beijing.

Similarly, India sees China’s moves in the Indian Ocean (ports in Sri Lanka, Pakistan, and Myanmar) as strategic encirclement, often called the “String of Pearls.”

China–Pakistan Nexus

China is Pakistan’s closest ally, providing military, economic, and diplomatic support. The China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) passes through Gilgit-Baltistan, a territory claimed by India. This deepens India’s suspicion that China aims to strategically contain it.

Tibet and the Dalai Lama

India hosts the Dalai Lama and the Tibetan government-in-exile in Dharamshala. China sees this as interference in its internal affairs and a threat to its sovereignty over Tibet.

Economic Competition

India sees Chinese dominance in trade and technology as a threat. After the 2020 border clashes, India banned over 200 Chinese apps and tightened FDI rules from China.

Both China and India compete for influence in South Asia, Africa, and global institutions.

Military Build-up

Both nations are rapidly modernizing and militarizing their borders. China has built extensive infrastructure (roads, rail, and airstrips) along the LAC. India is catching up with new highways, forward bases, and troop deployments.

Nationalism and Domestic Politics

In both countries, leaders use nationalist rhetoric to project strength. In India, strong responses to China are politically popular. In China, the Communist Party portrays territorial claims as non-negotiable to maintain legitimacy.

Geopolitics

China is wary of India’s growing ties with the US (Indo-Pacific strategy, defense pacts). India distrusts China’s closeness with Russia and Pakistan. Both are competing in international organizations (UN, BRICS, SCO, and G20).

Significance of Iranian President's visit to Pakistan

The world knows that Iran was the first country to recognize Pakistan’s independence in 1947 and open its embassy in Karachi, which was then the capital of Pakistan. Likewise, Pakistanis were the first to officially recognize the victory of the Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1979.

The people of both countries share cultural, linguistic, historical, and religious ties, and have supported each other in both bitter and sweet moments throughout history. The cultural commonalities between the two nations are such that citizens of either country do not feel estranged or alien when traveling to the neighboring country.

In Tehran, prominent places such as Mohammad Ali Jinnah Highway and Pakistan Street exist. Likewise, in major Pakistani cities, including Karachi, street signs bearing names like Iran Avenue and streets named after Iranian poets like Ferdowsi, Saadi, Hafez, Khayyam, and others can be found.

Islamabad, the capital of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, hosted Dr. Pezeshkian, President of Iran, and his accompanying delegation from August 02 to 03, 2025. This was, in fact, Pezeshkian’s first official visit to Pakistan since winning Iran’s 14th presidential election.

It is worth noting that in April 2024, the martyred Ayatollah Raisi also made a three-day visit to Pakistan, including the cities of Lahore, Karachi, and Islamabad, where he was warmly welcomed by the people and officials of that country. Following the helicopter crash and martyrdom of Ayatollah Raisi and his companions, Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif of Pakistan, along with other officials, traveled to Tehran to pay their respects and attend the memorial ceremony.

In May of this year, Shehbaz Sharif once again visited Tehran to express his gratitude for Iran’s stance regarding the India-Pakistan war. Therefore, Dr. Pezeshkian’s recent visit was in response to Shehbaz Sharif’s invitation and, essentially, a reciprocation of his visit to Tehran.

Dr. Pezeshkian began his official visit in Lahore, the capital of Punjab province, by paying respects at the mausoleum of Allama Iqbal, the Pakistani philosopher and poet. It is said that over 8,000 verses of Iqbal’s poetry comprising 70% of his total works are written in Persian.

During the continuation of the visit in Islamabad, the Iranian delegation met with the Prime Minister, President, Foreign Minister, Army Chief, Speakers of the Senate and National Assembly, and Pakistani business community, seeking to implement the "Neighbor First" policy in practice. 

The current volume of annual trade between the two countries is about US$3 billion, yet many economic and commercial potentials remain untapped. During this recent visit, 12 cooperation agreements were signed in areas such as transportation, science and technology, tourism, and free trade, which, if implemented, could significantly boost bilateral relations.

One indicator of strong political relations is the frequent travel of officials between countries. In less than two years, top officials from Iran and Pakistan have visited each other’s countries four times, not including the meetings held on the sidelines of key regional and international summits. These frequent meetings highlight the close bond and significance of the relationship particularly now, when there is a growing need to expand cooperation.

Over the past few decades, Iran-Pakistan relations have enjoyed relative stability, and mutual visits and exchanges between officials have been a regular occurrence. What gives special importance to the recent presidential visit to Pakistan is the unique political situation and the developments that have taken place in recent months in South and West Asia and even globally.

The four-day war between India and Pakistan in May 2025, as two nuclear powers, created a highly sensitive situation in the region. Although brief, the consequences of this conflict continue to affect both countries and the broader region and world.

Additionally, the ongoing war and genocide in Gaza have significantly influenced global politics. In this context, the stances of Islamic countries such as Iran and Pakistan are of great importance. Tehran and Islamabad have consistently adopted shared, firm positions and have emphasized full support for the Palestinian cause. The 12-day imposed war by Israel on Iran drastically altered the geopolitics of the region and the Islamic world.

Pakistan’s positions as one of the largest and most influential Muslim nations and a nuclear power have been crucial, and the Iranian public and officials have always appreciated Pakistan’s brave and brotherly stance.

Islamabad's officials have expressed their appreciation, in various ways, for Iran’s goodwill and initiative in offering to mediate between the two countries, and for the highly important visit of Iran’s Foreign Minister Dr. Araghchi to Pakistan and India to reduce the tensions.

A key factor linking Iran and Pakistan’s foreign policies is the sensitivity of public opinion in both nations toward the Palestinian issue and their mutual opposition to Zionist occupation and crimes in Gaza. This shared stance is rooted in the principled policies laid down by the founding leaders of both nations, Imam Khomeini and Muhammad Ali Jinnah and continues today. Currently, there is deep concern over the joint illegal actions of the Zionist regime and the United States against Iran’s nuclear facilities, and the potential for similar scenarios to be repeated elsewhere.

The condemnation of the Zionist regime’s aggressive attack on Iran by Pakistan’s permanent representative at the UN Security Council, as a non-permanent member and rotating president, was well-received. Pakistan’s support for dialogue and negotiation and its affirmation of Iran’s right to nuclear knowledge were also reflected in the joint press conference held by Shehbaz Sharif and Dr. Pezeshkian.

Iranian and Pakistani officials have come to a shared understanding that the 900 plus km border between the two nations should transition from being a security border to an economic one. The two sides have created joint mechanisms to improve coordination in the fight against terrorism. There exists an ocean of untapped potential in both countries, which requires serious political will to activate. The travel of hundreds of thousands of Pakistani pilgrims as part of religious tourism is one such opportunity.

Currently, two land borders at Rimdan and Mirjaveh are operational, facilitating travel for tourists and traders. Strengthening infrastructure is essential for increasing travel between the two peoples. People-to-people ties and citizen interactions can play a critical role in raising awareness of each other’s capabilities. 

Meeting mutual needs given that the two economies complement each other should be a top priority for private sectors and businesspeople in both nations. Much of what Iran imports from other countries is easily accessible in Pakistan, and Pakistan exports goods that Iranians also import from various sources.

Pakistan can meet many of its needs through Iranian producers and benefit from the proximity and low logistics costs. There is an urgent need to upgrade the joint Iran-Pakistan Chamber of Commerce to play a more significant role.

An Iranian proverb says, “A good neighbor is better than a distant relative.” Pakistan is both a good neighbor and a good relative and we Iranians are grateful for this valued neighbor.

Courtesy: Tehran Times

 

BRICS leaders gather at Rio de Janeiro

According to Reuters, leaders of the growing BRICS group of developing nations were set to gather in Rio de Janeiro on Sunday, calling for reform of traditional Western institutions while presenting the bloc as a defender of multilateralism in an increasingly fractured world.

With forums such as the G7 and G20 groups of major economies hamstrung by divisions and the disruptive "America First" approach of US President Donald Trump, expansion of the BRICS has opened new space for diplomatic coordination.

"In the face of the resurgence of protectionism, it is up to emerging nations to defend the multilateral trade regime and reform the international financial architecture," Brazilian President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva told a BRICS business forum on Saturday.

BRICS nations now represent over half the world's population and 40% of its economic output.

The BRICS group gathered leaders from Brazil, Russia, India and China at its first summit in 2009. The bloc later added South Africa and last year included Egypt, Ethiopia, Indonesia, Iran, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates as full members. This is the first leaders' summit to include Indonesia.

"The vacuum left by others ends up being filled almost instantly by the BRICS," said a Brazilian diplomat who asked not to be named. Although the G7 still concentrates vast power, the source added, "It doesn't have the predominance it once did."

However, there are questions about the shared goals of an increasingly heterogenous BRICS group, which has grown to include regional rivals along with major emerging economies.

Stealing some thunder from this year's summit, Chinese President Xi Jinping chose to send his prime minister in his place. Russian President Vladimir Putin is attending online due to an arrest warrant from the International Criminal Court.

Still, many heads of state will gather for discussions at Rio's Museum of Modern Art on Sunday and Monday, including Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and South African President Cyril Ramaphosa.

Over 30 nations have expressed interest in participating in the BRICS, either as full members or partners.

Brazil, which also hosts the United Nations climate summit in November, has seized on both gatherings to highlight how seriously developing nations are tackling climate change, while Trump has slammed the brakes on US climate initiatives.

Both China and the UAE signaled in meetings with Brazilian Finance Minister Fernando Haddad in Rio that they plan to invest in a proposed Tropical Forests Forever Facility.

Expansion of the BRICS has added diplomatic weight to the gathering, which aspires to speak for developing nations across the Global South, strengthening calls for reforming global institutions such as the United Nations Security Council and the International Monetary Fund.

The growth of the bloc has also increased the challenges to reaching consensus on contentious geopolitical issues.

Ahead of the summit, negotiators struggled to find shared language for a joint statement about the bombardment of Gaza, the Israel-Iran conflict and a proposed reform of the Security Council.

To overcome differences among African nations regarding the continent's proposed representative to a reformed Security Council, the group agreed to endorse seats for Brazil and India while leaving open which country should represent Africa's interests, a person familiar with the talks told Reuters.

The BRICS will also continue their thinly veiled criticism of Trump's US tariff policy. At an April ministerial meeting, the bloc expressed concern about "unjustified unilateral protectionist measures, including the indiscriminate increase of reciprocal tariffs."

 

OPEC Plus likely to accelerate oil output hike

OPEC Plus is likely to announce an increase in oil output for August at its meeting on Saturday, July 05, 2025. It will be larger than the 411,000 barrels per day (bpd) hikes announced in May, June and July, reports Reuters.

Oil futures slipped slightly due to US Independence Day holiday on Friday, as the market looked ahead to this weekend's OPEC Plus meeting and the likelihood that member countries will decide to raise output. Brent crude futures settled down at US$68.30 a barrel while US West Texas Intermediate declined US$66.50 at 1700 GMT.

Eight members of the group - Saudi Arabia, Russia, the UAE, Kuwait, Oman, Iraq, Kazakhstan and Algeria - are scheduled to meet online on Saturday to decide their oil output policy for August.

OPEC Plus made a radical change in policy this year when the eight members started to unwind their most recent output cut of 2.2 million bpd starting in April. They then accelerated the hikes in May, June and July to 411,000 bpd for each month, despite the extra supply weighing on crude prices.

Earlier on Friday, other sources told Reuters the group was expected to agree to an increase of 411,000 bpd for August, which remains a possible outcome of Saturday's meeting.

The total number of active drilling rigs in the US has been on the decline, reaching its lowest level since late 2021 in June 2025, driven by lower oil prices, a focus on shareholder returns over production increases, and strategic shifts within the energy sector. As of early July 2025, the total US rig count was reported at approximately 539, down from 547 the previous week and 581 a year ago, with oil rigs seeing the most significant decrease.

The acceleration of the output hikes came after some OPEC Plus members, such as Kazakhstan, produced way over their targets, angering other members that were sticking more closely to agreed cuts.

Kazakh output returned to growth last month and matched an all-time high, as the Chevron-led Tengiz field ramped up.

OPEC Plus, comprising of Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries and allies led by Russia, is looking to expand its market share against the backdrop of growing supplies from other producers like the United States.

The group pumps about half of the world's oil. As of their decision for July output, the OPEC Plus eight have made or announced production increases of 1.37 million bpd. This is 62% of the production cut of 2.2 million bpd that they are unwinding.

 

 

 

 

 

 

Understanding US and Russian policies towards Taliban

Russia has become the first country to recognize Taliban government in Afghanistan. It is on record that the United States and Russia have had different policies toward Taliban due to their distinct strategic interests, historical experiences, and regional alliances. Here’s a breakdown of some of the key reasons behind this divergence:

The United States has fought Taliban directly for over two decades after 9/11, viewing them as terrorist allies of al-Qaeda. This includes the US led NATO invasion of Afghanistan in 2001 to topple the Taliban regime.

Interestingly, Russia has not fought Taliban directly but has a history of conflicts in Afghanistan during the Soviet invasion (1979–1989), where the US and others supported the Mujahideen, some of these are now termed Taliban).

Russia sees Taliban as part of the post-Soviet regional security dynamic, not necessarily as a direct enemy.

Most interesting is the US perspective because it considers Taliban a threats to US homeland and allies. The history shows that Afghans/ Taliban never attacked the United States. It is also said that Osama bin Laden was a Saudi, which supported Mujahideen in averting the USSR attack on Afghanistan to get access to the warm waters.

The US, which never wanted to leave Afghanistan believes that Taliban rule could once again turn the country into a safe haven for global jihadis like al-Qaeda or ISIS-K. Some analysts openly say that be it al-Qaeda or ISIS-K, these are ‘B’ teams of CIA.

The prime focus of Russia is more on Central Asian stability and drug trafficking from Afghanistan. Russia fears spillover of extremism into its southern borders but engages pragmatically with Taliban to keep its influence in the region.

Both the US and Russia are keen in engaging with Taliban. The US was initially hostile, but later engaged diplomatically, courtesy Doha talks, culminating in the 2020 US-Taliban agreement. After the 2021 withdrawal, the US maintains non-recognition and economic sanctions, demanding women rights, inclusivity, and action against terrorism.

As against, Russia has hosted Taliban delegations for talks in Moscow and calls for inclusive governance but does not condition engagement as strictly as the US. Russia did not officially recognize the Taliban either, but it was more flexible in diplomacy.

Strategic Interests

The US claims, to that many do not agree, that the super power is busy in global fight against terrorism and avoids getting entangled again in the Afghan conflict. Since withdrawal of troops the US has kept Taliban under pressure through sanctions and diplomatic isolation, including freezing foreign exchange reserves of Afghanistan.

The prime Russian interest is, ending US hegemony in the region. It also wants to protect its interests in Central Asia (Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan). On top of all Russia seems to be keen in developing regional alliances that include Taliban as a reality, not a pariah.

Over the decades, the United States has maintained its hegemony through regional alliances, working closely under the NATO umbrella. The US policy towards Taliban is part of a broader Western approach tied to liberal values and counterterrorism.

Realizing its limitations Russia works closely with China, Iran, Central Asian republics. It often coordinates with anti-Western powers and is less constrained by democratic or human rights norms.

To get control over countries two of the world’s largest super powers, the United States as well as Russia have often used arsenal power. As against this China has used diplomacy and economic assistance to establish its influence.

During the election campaign Donald Trump had promised to pull the United States out of wars, but his unconditional support to Israeli genocide in Gaza and direct attacks on Iran prove he is also the tout of military complexes and would never like to end wars where the United States is involved directly or indirectly.

 

Russia becomes first country to recognize Taliban government of Afghanistan

Russia said on Thursday it had accepted the credentials of a new ambassador of Afghanistan, making it the first nation to recognize the Taliban government of the country, reports Reuters.

In a statement, the Russian Foreign Ministry said Moscow saw good prospects to develop ties and would continue to support Kabul in security, counter-terrorism and combating drug crime.

It also saw significant trade and economic opportunities, especially in energy, transport, agriculture and infrastructure

"We believe that the act of official recognition of the government of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan will give impetus to the development of productive bilateral cooperation between our countries in various fields," the ministry said.

Afghan Foreign Minister Amir Khan Muttaqi said in a statement, "We value this courageous step taken by Russia, and, God willing, it will serve as an example for others as well."

No other country has formally recognized the Taliban government that seized power in August 2021 as US-led forces staged a chaotic withdrawal from Afghanistan after 20 years of war.

China, the United Arab Emirates, Uzbekistan and Pakistan have all designated ambassadors to Kabul, in a step towards recognition.

The Russian move represents a major milestone for the Taliban administration as it seeks to ease its international isolation.

It is likely to be closely watched by Washington, which has frozen billions in Afghanistan's central bank assets and enforced sanctions on some senior leaders in the Taliban that contributed to Afghanistan's banking sector being largely cut off from the international financial system.

Russia has been gradually building relations with the Taliban, which President Vladimir Putin said last year was now an ally in fighting terrorism. Since 2022, Afghanistan has imported gas, oil and wheat from Russia.

The Taliban was outlawed by Russia as a terrorist movement in 2003, but the ban was lifted in April this year. Russia sees a need to work with Kabul as it faces a major security threat from Islamist militant groups based in a string of countries from Afghanistan to the Middle East.

In March 2024, gunmen killed 149 people at a concert hall outside Moscow in an attack claimed by Islamic State. US officials said they had intelligence indicating it was the Afghan branch of the group, Islamic State Khorasan (ISIS-K), that was responsible.

The Taliban says it is working to wipe out the presence of Islamic State in Afghanistan.

Soviet troops invaded the country in December 1979 to prop up a Communist government, but became bogged down in a long war against mujahideen fighters armed by the United States.