Fighting Without Fighting: Super Powers Wage War by Other Means

Wars are no longer fought only on battlefields. The twenty-first century has transformed the nature of conflict: the weapons are now economic sanctions, cyberattacks, and proxy alliances, while the targets are national economies and public perceptions. The art of modern warfare lies not in destroying armies but in destabilizing societies. This is the new face of power — fighting without fighting.

During the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union perfected the strategy of indirect confrontation. They waged proxy wars in Korea, Vietnam, and Afghanistan, where others fought on their behalf. That same philosophy now defines global politics once again. Today’s superpowers — primarily the United States, China, and Russia — prefer to engage through economic blockades, digital espionage, and information manipulation rather than direct military confrontation. The logic is simple, global integration makes total war too costly to win and too dangerous to survive.

Economic warfare has become the preferred tool. The United States uses financial sanctions and trade restrictions as strategic weapons. Russia, in turn, employs energy supplies as instruments of coercion. China manipulates market access and technology exports to shape global alignments. In this arena, a single executive order or export ban can inflict more damage than a missile strike. The global financial system has become a silent battlefield, where currencies, commodities, and credit replace tanks and artillery.

Cyber warfare adds another invisible dimension. State-backed hackers can paralyze banking systems, shut down power grids, or steal sensitive data — all without firing a shot.

The 2022–24 conflict in Ukraine, for instance, has shown how digital attacks and disinformation can amplify physical wars. The battlefield now includes social media platforms and data networks, where narratives are manufactured and public opinion is weaponized.

Meanwhile, proxy conflicts continue to shape regional politics — in the Middle East, Africa, and Eastern Europe. These low-intensity wars allow great powers to test new technologies, weaken rivals, and expand influence without bearing the political cost of direct involvement. The blood is local, but the strategy is global.

The danger is that “war without war” is harder to detect and even harder to end. Economic sanctions, once imposed, linger for years; cyber weapons, once unleashed, spread uncontrollably. The absence of visible warfare creates a dangerous illusion of peace while societies quietly erode from within.

In this new world order, victory is no longer measured by territory captured but by systems disrupted, economies weakened, and narratives controlled. The future of conflict will not be marked by explosions but by silence — the silence of power grids failing, economies collapsing, and truths being rewritten.

The War That Will Never Be Fought — But Never End

The United States and the Soviet Union never fought a direct war, and their modern successors — Washington and Moscow — are unlikely ever to do so. Both possess nuclear arsenals capable of ending human civilization within hours, a reality that forces restraint even in the fiercest confrontations. Yet, the absence of direct warfare does not mean peace. From Korea to Ukraine, the two powers have fought shadow wars through proxies, sanctions, and propaganda — proving that while a nuclear world discourages combat, it encourages competition without limits.

The Cold War, which dominated the second half of the twentieth century, was essentially a struggle for global dominance without direct confrontation. The US and USSR armed their allies, financed revolutions, and competed for ideological influence from Asia to Latin America. Conflicts such as Korea, Vietnam, and Afghanistan became testing grounds for superpower ambitions. Each side bled indirectly, ensuring that nuclear deterrence remained intact while smaller nations paid the human cost.

When the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, many believed the Cold War had ended for good. But three decades later, the same strategic rivalry re-emerged — this time between the US and Russia. The Ukraine war has become the modern version of a Cold War battlefield. The US supplies advanced weapons, intelligence, and economic support to Kyiv, while Russia frames the conflict as a defensive war against NATO encirclement. Both powers fight fiercely, but indirectly, ensuring no direct clash between American and Russian troops.

The logic remains the same - nuclear deterrence equals survival. Direct war would mean destruction for both, leaving only proxy wars, cyber battles, and economic coercion as tools of power. Each side tests the other’s limits without crossing the line of mutual annihilation. The contest has moved from ideology to influence — from red flags and capitalism to control over energy routes, technology, and global alliances.

Even hawkish voices in Washington calling for tougher action against Moscow know the line that cannot be crossed. Sanctions may strangle economies; drones and missiles may change the battlefield; but a direct strike remains unthinkable. Moscow, too, understands this calculus. The nuclear shadow keeps both in check — unwilling to yield, yet unable to attack.

In truth, the Cold War never died; it simply evolved. The battlegrounds have changed, but the mindset remains: weaken the rival, avoid direct war, and dominate the narrative. Proxy adventurism — from Eastern Europe to cyberspace — will persist as the preferred weapon of choice. The world’s two great powers may never face each other openly, but their shadow duel ensures the war that will never be fought will also never end.

United States Still Eyes Afghanistan

Washington’s withdrawal ended its military presence, not its strategic ambitions in the heart of Asia

When the United States hurriedly withdrew from Afghanistan in August 2021, it claimed to have ended its “forever war.” Yet, Afghanistan has not slipped off Washington’s strategic radar. The methods have changed, but the motives remain. The US still views Afghanistan as a vital piece on the Eurasian chessboard — prized for its geography, intelligence value, and economic undercurrents.

First, Afghanistan’s narcotics economy remains an unspoken factor. Despite Taliban claims of banning poppy cultivation, UN data confirms continued opium production, which fuels regional criminal networks. For decades, allegations have persisted that Western intelligence agencies — especially the CIA — have tolerated or even exploited the drug trade to fund covert operations. Renewed US engagement, framed as “counter-narcotics cooperation,” could restore informal oversight of these financial flows.

Second, the chaotic exit left behind billions of dollars’ worth of military hardware — aircraft, vehicles, ammunition, and advanced surveillance systems. Much of it reportedly fell into Taliban hands or black-market networks. Washington would prefer to track, retrieve, or neutralize sensitive technologies before they reach Iran, China, or Russia. A covert re-entry, through intelligence operations or private contractors, serves this purpose well.

Third, Afghanistan’s location remains uniquely strategic. It borders Iran, China’s Xinjiang region, and several Central Asian states under Russian influence. For US planners, it is an ideal observation post to monitor three rivals simultaneously. Hence the growing emphasis on “over-the-horizon” intelligence operations launched from Gulf or Central Asian bases.

Fourth, China’s expanding Belt and Road Initiative through Pakistan and Central Asia heightens Washington’s unease. Beijing’s efforts to stabilize Afghanistan and integrate it into regional connectivity projects threaten to edge the US out of Eurasia. Re-engagement under humanitarian, counterterrorism, or anti-drug programs provides Washington a convenient pretext to retain influence.

Finally, a chronically unstable Afghanistan serves certain geopolitical interests. It prevents regional integration and complicates projects like Iran’s Chabahar port or China’s CPEC. Controlled instability ensures continued leverage without the burdens of occupation.

In essence, the US may not reoccupy Afghanistan with troops, but it seeks reassertion through intelligence, proxies, and influence networks. The 2021 withdrawal ended one phase of occupation but opened another — quieter, subtler, and more strategic. Afghanistan remains too valuable for Washington to abandon — not for peace, but for power.

Hamas Agreeing to Ceasefire: Victory or Defeat

This ceasefire is not the end of war. It is merely the pause between two tragedies.

After months of destruction, displacement, and despair, Hamas has agreed to a ceasefire. Its supporters call it a “strategic pause,” but in truth, it reflects exhaustion — political, military, and moral. When resistance drifts from purpose to performance, it loses the essence of struggle and becomes an exercise in survival.

Hamas overestimated its resilience and underestimated the duplicity of the Arab world. The self-proclaimed defenders of Palestine turned spectators, mouthing empty slogans while doing business with Tel Aviv.

The Western champions of democracy and human rights proved, once again, that these values have geographical limits. In this moral vacuum, Hamas found itself fighting alone — a resistance without reinforcements.

The ceasefire may silence the guns, but it cannot disguise the catastrophe. Gaza stands in ruins — its governance crippled, its population scattered, its children scarred.

Israel may not have destroyed Hamas, but it has devastated everything around it. The resistance lives, but the society it claimed to protect lies in ashes.

Yet Israel’s so-called “victory” is equally hollow. Two years of relentless war have brought neither peace nor security. Instead, Israel finds itself morally isolated and diplomatically cornered. The global sympathy it once commanded has turned to disgust. Even among its traditional allies, questions are being asked: how long can “self-defense” justify collective punishment?

To conclude, is this ceasefire a victory or a defeat?

For Hamas, it is survival without success; for Israel, dominance without dignity. Both sides are trapped in a cycle of destruction that yields no justice, only rubble and resentment.

The true defeat lies with the international community — which has normalized occupation, tolerated brutality, and renamed surrender as “peace.”

 

Western Media Starts Wailing When Crude Oil Prices Fall

One of the greatest ironies of the global economy is that when oil prices rise, Western media cries about “global inflation,” but when prices fall, the same voices start lamenting “economic instability.” It seems oil prices are not an energy concern but rather the emotional thermostat of the West — every fluctuation sends their headlines into fever or frost.

Whenever OPEC decides to cut production to stabilize prices, Western analysts call it a “cartel manipulation.” Yet when American shale oil producers flood the market with excess supply, driving prices down, the same pundits celebrate it as a “victory of the free market.” The contradiction is so striking that even economists find themselves wondering — where does the real crisis lie: in the market or in the Western conscience?

If Russia sells oil to sustain its economy, it’s branded a “war economy.” But when the United States sells off its strategic reserves to reduce its fiscal deficit, it’s hailed as an act of “economic wisdom.” The truth is, every drop in oil prices hurts not the ordinary consumer — who might finally breathe easier at the pump — but the investors whose profits are tied to every dollar movement in Brent crude.

To the Western media, oil is no longer just fuel; it’s a narrative weapon — used to control markets, moods, and minds. When oil is expensive, the threat comes from Russia or OPEC; when it’s cheap, the “global economy” is suddenly in peril. The rest of the world can only watch, amused, as the same newsrooms that cheer for capitalism begin to mourn when the market actually behaves like one.

Perhaps one day, crude prices will drop — and Western media won’t start wailing. But until then, every fall in oil prices will sound like a siren in newsroom.

Gaza War: Russia and China Look Indifferent

At first glance, Russia and China seem unmoved by the relentless bloodshed in Gaza. Their silence is often mistaken for apathy. But in reality, both are pursuing a deliberate and ruthless calculation — letting the United States drown in a moral crisis of its own making.

Moscow and Beijing see Gaza not as a regional conflict but as the ultimate exposure of Western hypocrisy. For decades, Washington lectured the world on human rights while funding Israel’s occupation machinery. Now, as civilian deaths pile up, the United States finds itself stripped of credibility. Russia and China see no reason to save America from the consequences of its double standards.

At the United Nations, their diplomacy is coldly efficient. Both talk of peace but avoid taking any direct lead, knowing well that every American veto on a ceasefire resolution is another self-inflicted wound for Washington. Why intervene when your rival insists on showcasing its moral bankruptcy before the world?

For Russia, already locked in the Ukraine war, Gaza is an unexpected advantage — a distraction that diverts Western attention and resources.

For China, the war exposes America’s declining global authority, strengthening Beijing’s narrative of a fairer, multipolar world. Both understand that the longer Gaza burns, the weaker US influence becomes in the Global South.

Neither Moscow nor Beijing wants to be entangled in Middle Eastern chaos. They prefer to appear detached while quietly cultivating Arab trust and sympathy. Their silence is not a void — it is strategy, precision, and patience rolled into one.

The West calls it indifference. In truth, it is the art of letting a rival crumble under the weight of its own contradictions.

The opponents of Russia and China say these countries are not neutral; they are opportunistic. And in Gaza’s tragedy, they have found a powerful stage on which America’s self-proclaimed moral leadership is collapsing — in full view of a watching world.

Donald Trump: Loose Bull or Fearless Leader

Donald Trump is no longer just a political figure — he has emerged as a major force of disruption. To his critics, he’s a loose bull, to his loyalists, he’s a fearless fighter standing alone. Both sides may be right, that makes him dangerous.

The general impression is that Trump doesn’t follow rules; he tramples them. He doesn’t debate ideas; he dominates the stage. Every insult, every indictment, every scandal seems to fuel his sense of destiny. For millions of disillusioned Americans, he’s not the problem — he’s the rebellion.

A rebellion without restraint easily turns into wreckage. Trump’s politics are built on grievance, not governance. He thrives on outrage, feeds on division, and weaponizes mistrust. His rallies ignite passion but also paranoia; his promises stir hope but sow hostility. Underneath the red caps and roaring crowds lies a country tearing itself apart.

His defenders say he speaks truth to power. May be yes, but he also speaks poison to democracy. The media is “the enemy,” the courts are “corrupt,” and the system — unless it serves him — is “rigged.” It’s not leadership; it is demolition disguised as defiance.

The tragedy is that Trump didn’t create America’s anger — he merely harnessed it. He turned frustration into a political movement and chaos into a campaign strategy. That’s his genius, and his curse.

Trump may call himself the voice of the forgotten, but in truth, he’s the echo of a broken democracy shouting at itself.

Whether the United States can survive another round of his rampage — or finally find the courage to tame its loose bull — will decide not just an election, but the future of its republic.

 

Triple Whammy of Crude Uncertainty

Oil prices rose slightly on Friday after four straight sessions of declines but were on track for their steepest weekly decline since late June due to market expectations that the OPEC Plus could hike output further despite oversupply concerns. If prices do not further recover in this session, Brent could close at the lowest level since the week ended May 30, while WTI would finish at a level not seen since May 02. On a weekly basis, Brent has plunged 8.3%, while WTI is 7.6% lower.

Oil markets thrive on stability, yet today they stand at the crossroads of three unpredictable forces: OPEC’s internal calculations, China’s demand swings, and the broader geopolitical turmoil stretching from the Middle East to Eastern Europe. Together, these factors create a triple whammy of uncertainty that is shaking investor confidence and distorting price forecasts.

First, OPEC remains the central player, but its cohesion is under strain. Saudi Arabia’s output discipline often clashes with the fiscal needs of smaller producers desperate for higher revenues. The cartel’s recent production adjustments reflect less a unified strategy and more a fragile balancing act between market control and survival. Traders now treat OPEC announcements with skepticism, wary that compliance may fracture under pressure.

Second, China—the world’s largest crude importer—casts a long shadow. Its slowing economy, punctuated by property sector woes and uneven industrial growth, has dampened energy consumption. Yet at the same time, Beijing stockpiles aggressively when prices dip, injecting volatility into the market. A single policy shift in China, from stimulus measures to green energy acceleration, can ripple through global demand curves in weeks, leaving analysts scrambling to adjust projections.

Finally, geopolitics adds combustible uncertainty. Wars in Ukraine and the Middle East, sanctions on Russia and Iran, and maritime tensions in the South China Sea all threaten supply chains and shipping lanes. Insurance premiums on crude shipments rise, pipelines face sabotage risks, and diplomatic fractures widen the unpredictability. Energy markets are not just reacting to supply and demand—they are hostage to political brinkmanship.

What makes this triad dangerous is their intersection. OPEC’s decisions are influenced by geopolitical rivalries; China’s demand patterns intersect with U.S. foreign policy and sanctions regimes. The market is no longer shaped by economics alone—it is choreographed by power struggles, both overt and hidden.

For investors, refiners, and consumers alike, the message is clear: crude is no longer just a commodity. It is a barometer of global instability. Until OPEC, China, and geopolitics align toward predictability—a highly unlikely prospect—oil will remain the most uncertain asset of our time.

 

Crude oil prices drifting down

Crude oil—the world’s most political commodity—is drifting down again. Markets that once trembled at the whisper of war or an OPEC decree are today unimpressed. Prices are slipping not because the world is safer, but because supply is running ahead of demand, and no cartel seems willing—or able—to hold back the flood.

The immediate triggers are clear. The resumption of Kurdish crude exports has added barrels back to an already saturated market. OPEC Plus, once a disciplined enforcer of scarcity, is instead edging up production to defend market share. Add to this the steady increase in US output, and the result is an unmistakable surplus. In Washington, reports of rising crude stockpiles reinforce the perception that inventories will keep swelling into 2026.

Demand is hardly roaring either. The end of the US summer driving season has clipped consumption, while China—the world’s most important incremental buyer—remains stuck in an uneven recovery. India, though growing fast, cannot absorb the excess.

Analysts now project that inventories will rise by more than two million barrels per day through early next year. In oil economics, that is the equivalent of a slow-motion glut.

Layered on top is the dollar’s strength. Every tick upward in the greenback makes oil more expensive for non-US buyers, further cooling appetite. And unlike past cycles, geopolitical flashpoints—sanctions on Iran, Russia’s war economy, Middle East tension—have not translated into major supply disruptions. Traders, ever cynical, now discount the “risk premium” that once propped up prices.

The real story is structural. Oil is losing its tightrope balance between scarcity and abundance. Producers are pumping more aggressively, while demand faces limits from efficiency gains and a global economy weighed down by debt and weak growth.

Unless OPEC Plus suddenly reverses course or a geopolitical shock knocks supply offline, the path of least resistance for oil is downward.

For consumers, cheaper fuel may feel like relief. For producers, especially those whose budgets depend on oil, it is a creeping crisis. And for the global system, it is a reminder the age of automatic oil windfalls is over, and volatility is the new name of the game.

 

What options US can exercise if Afghans refuse to handover Bagram Air Base?

If Afghans refuse to handover Bagram Air Base back to the United States, Washington is likely to face a serious strategic dilemma. The response will likely depend on how far the super power is willing to push its military and political leverage in the region. Some of the likely options are:

1. Diplomatic Pressure

The first option would be to apply diplomatic pressure on the Taliban government, possibly through Qatar or Pakistan as intermediaries. The US may frame Bagram’s access as essential for counterterrorism monitoring, and push for a limited presence under international arrangements rather than outright US control.

2. Economic and Sanctions Leverage

If diplomacy fails, Washington could use financial levers that include:

Tightening sanctions on Taliban leaders.

Blocking international recognition of the Taliban government.

Cutting off humanitarian exemptions or aid that Afghanistan relies on.

This would make Kabul’s refusal costlier.

3. Regional Partnerships

The US might deepen military partnerships with neighbors instead. For instance:

Expanding use of bases in Central Asia (though Russia and China will resist this).

Strengthening presence in the Persian Gulf (Qatar, UAE).

Increasing over-the-horizon operations using drones and satellites.

This would reduce dependency on Bagram, though at a higher logistical cost.

4. Covert Operations

If Washington views Bagram as critical for counterterrorism, it could resort to covert methods—arming rival Afghan groups, intelligence penetration, or even destabilization strategies to pressure the Taliban into concessions.

5. Accept and Adapt

Though difficult, the US may accept that Afghanistan is now firmly outside its reach and adapt by monitoring from afar. This would reflect Washington’s reluctance to re-engage militarily in Afghanistan after two decades of war.

Syria regime change: MI6 links with HTS

The outgoing chief of Britain’s Secret Intelligence Service (MI6), Richard Moore, has confirmed that London maintained clandestine communications with the extremist group Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) before the fall of Bashar al-Assad.

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Speaking in Istanbul on Friday, Moore described establishing a “backchannel” with HTS—still officially designated a terrorist organization—as allowing Britain to “get ahead of events” during Syria’s political transition.

HTS, which many consider the rebranded version of al-Qaeda in Syria, was formally dissolved after its leader, Ahmad al-Sharaa, assumed power in December 2024, but its senior operatives continue to dominate Syria’s government.

Al-Sharaa, also known as Abu Mohammed al-Jolani, was captured as a senior al-Qaeda commander in Iraq in 2006 and released from US custody in 2011, yet remains unapologetic for his past attacks.

According to reports by independent journalist Kit Klarenberg, the British engagement with HTS was facilitated by Inter-Mediate, a shadowy “conflict resolution” NGO founded by Jonathan Powell, now National Security Advisor to Prime Minister Keir Starmer.

According to leaked documents, the firm maintains an office inside Syria’s Presidential Palace and worked closely with MI6 and the Foreign Office to groom HTS for political legitimacy. Critics warn this constitutes a flagrant violation of British counter-terrorism laws, which criminalize dealings with proscribed groups.

The partnership between HTS and Western intelligence agencies had long been suspected. Former US ambassador Robert Ford disclosed that in 2023, a UK NGO sought his help to rebrand HTS from a terrorist entity into a political actor. Inter-Mediate’s consultations reportedly ensured the extremist group’s military seizure of Damascus would align with London’s strategic interests.

This revelation raises serious questions about Britain’s role in Syria, echoing the CIA’s Timber Sycamore program, which, from 2012 onwards, funneled weapons, funding, and training to rebel groups fighting Assad—many of which later merged with extremist factions like HTS.

The program exposed how Western interventions intended to shape Syria’s political landscape often empowered the very groups classified as terrorists, underscoring the risks of covert operations that prioritize regime change over stability and civilian protection.

 

President Trump you cannot order Taliban to handover Bagram Air Base to the United States

It may be a wish of US President Donald Trump to get control of Bagram Air Base. However, he does not have any authority to demand the Afghan government to handover the base. Threatening bad things would happen to Afghanistan if it does not give back control of the base to the United States, is outright terrorism.

Here are several possible motives behind the Trump demand:

·        Restoring US influence in Afghanistan and the wider region, especially after the pull-out which many view as a strategic loss.

·        Countering rivals, particularly China and others by having a base close by.

·        Strengthening counterterrorism posture, ensuring that militant groups can't easily use Afghan territory to plan or launch attacks.

·        Leveraging domestic political pressure as the opponents say the withdrawal decision was a mistake.

·        Using it as a bargaining chip to secure concessions i.e. economic aid, diplomatic recognition, etc.

Being a sovereign county and also because the US does recognize the Taliban government of Afghanistan it is the inherent right of Taliban to outright rejected the US demand.

·        They rightly say Afghanistan’s territorial integrity cannot be compromised.

·        No foreign military presence will be allowed.

·        Taliban insists that political and economic relations with the US are possible without giving up land or allowing foreign bases.

Regaining control of Bagram will not an easy task for the US. It would likely require a major military deployment, security provisions, defense spending, etc. Experts say holding the base would be challenging militarily and politically.

Some analysts view the US demand as an attempt to restore hegemony over Afghanistan and adjoining countries.

They warn that pushing too hard might destabilize relations, reduce cooperation, or provoke negative responses from locals or other countries.

Under the Doha Agreement (2020) and other engagements, the US made certain commitments about respecting Afghanistan’s sovereignty, no foreign bases, etc. Returning to or demanding possession of Bagram is violation of these agreements.

The New World Disorder

French historian Fernand Braudel identified three cycles of history. The shortest is the day-to-day flow of events; Braudel called them “fireflies” on the stage. Next up are paradigm shifts — like the end of the Cold War — that can play out over decades or longer. Finally, there’s the longue durée: the bedrock of climate and geography that shapes everything else and changes only over centuries or millennia.

Six months into US President Donald Trump’s second term, it’s clear that the course of events has changed. What’s the collective noun for a group of fireflies? Probably not “paradigm shift,” but in this case that’s what it adds up to. 

The US pivot from free trade and global security to a sharper focus on the national interest has the makings of a decades-defining transformation, reversing the global integration supercharged by the end of the Cold War.

In the decades after World War II, the US was the champion of free trade, the anchor for global security and the gold standard on governance. Now, it has raised tariffs to the highest level since the 1930s, told allies they need to pay for protection and crossed red lines on independence for the Fed and statistical agencies.

That’s a major break, and an important moment for the global economy, shifting patterns of growth and inflation, borrowing and debt.

The geopolitical landscape has shifted just as decisively. Jolting though it is, Trump’s focus on America First is a reflection of a new reality where the US is no longer the world’s sole superpower. Regardless of who occupies the White House next, the US allies and adversaries will continue to reorient around that new state of affairs.

How about Braudel’s longue durée — the slowest moving cycle of history on which everything else rests? Could even that be at an inflection point? Maybe.

Trump has pulled the US out of the Paris climate agreement, again. The global fight against climate change will continue, but without the world’s second-largest emitter, it gets harder. The arrival of artificial general intelligence could also prove an epochal shift.

“History,” Braudel wrote, “may be divided into three movements: what moves rapidly, what moves slowly and what appears not to move at all.” Right now, events are moving almost too fast to track and the slow-moving Pax Americana is heading rapidly toward the dustbin of history. If global temperatures rise much further or machines start thinking for themselves, there will be movement even in the cycle that appears not to move at all.

Significance of Pezeshkian’s visit to China

Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian wrapped up a four-day visit to China on Wednesday, heading back to Tehran after attending a military parade in Beijing that marked 80 years since the end of World War II.

Pezeshkian's first stop in China was the northern port city of Tianjin, where he attended the 25th Meeting of the SCO Council of Heads of State, the largest gathering of the bloc to date. The Iranian president delivered a speech there, addressing the "unfair" global order led by the West and highlighting the need to create a new one through collaboration among the Global South.

A much-anticipated meeting between the presidents of Iran and China took place the next day. Pezeshkian told Xi Jinping that Iran was ready to work with China "under any circumstances" to elevate relations to their highest level, stressing that Beijing could count on Tehran as a "strong and determined friend and ally." Xi reciprocated, stating he sees Tehran as a "strategic partner" with a "forward-looking approach." Both sides agreed that more needed to be done to implement the 25-year cooperation plan signed in 2020.

Analysts in Iran hope that the president’s visit, during which he was accompanied by his foreign minister, economy minister, and defense minister, would lead to new military and financial deals.

This appears to be the case, as upon arriving in Tehran, Pezeshkian stated that "important," "strategic," and "vital" decisions had been made following his discussions with Xi.

"Additionally, discussions on security and defense equipment were held with the support of the defense minister, who was present during this trip, and necessary follow-ups will be carried out in this regard," Pezeshkian declared. It is believed that Iran is looking to buy air defense systems and fighter jets from China, although there is no official confirmation on what it seeks to purchase.

While Iranians have mostly focused on what the trip could bring about for Iran, the rest of the world has mainly been discussing how the SCO summit and the close interaction between India's Modi and Xi demonstrate that the split President Trump opened up between Washington and New Delhi is much larger than expected.

Trump’s former security advisor told American media that Trump has “shredded decades of effort” to pull India away from the Russian and Chinese orbit with his tariff policies. 

Furthermore, Modi's presence at the recent SCO meeting, along with other developments, is viewed as a sign that the new global order Pezeshkian has called for is approaching, or may already be in place.

"The new international order everyone has been talking about for years has almost arrived," said economic and trade analyst Majid Shakeri.

The expert said several factors point to this consolidation include: 1) the exclusion of Arab states from the Wednesday parade after their embrace of Trump during his West Asia tour earlier this year, 2) the Siberian Power Pipeline agreement signed between Russia and China this week, 3) and Beijing's announcement of its intention to establish an artificial intelligence cooperation center with the rest of the SCO.

"A crucial piece of the puzzle that is still incomplete and unclear is India's balancing act between China and America," Shakeri explained.

Pezeshkian's visit to China also included significant interactions with other world leaders. While there appeared to be no interaction with the Indian Prime Minister, Pezeshkian spent four hours in discussion with Russia's Vladimir Putin and a shorter amount of time speaking with Pakistan's Shehbaz Sharif, whose country's relationship with Iran is growing closer by the day.

Recep Tayyip Erdogan of Turkey was filmed holding onto Pezeshkian's hand while walking alongside him in a hall. The Iranian president expressed anticipation for Erdogan's visit to Tehran.

Despite recent tensions between Iran and Turkey regarding South Caucasus transportation plans and the situation in Syria, both nations appear in favor of maintaining their friendly relations.

Tajikistan’s Emomali Rahmon was also affectionate with Pezeshkian. The two countries share a significant part of their history and culture and view each other fondly.

 

The Fading Edge of Western Sanctions

Western sanctions were once the sharpest weapon in Washington and Brussels’ arsenal — a way to cripple adversaries without firing a shot. But today, their overuse and poor calibration are blunting their impact, most visibly in the case of Russia’s energy industry.

Take the recent arrival of the Arctic Mulan in southern China. On August 28, the sanctioned tanker unloaded liquefied natural gas from Russia’s Arctic LNG-2 plant — a facility buried under Western restrictions. That shipment, China’s first from the Siberian project, came just days before Vladimir Putin’s state visit to Beijing. The symbolism is unmistakable: Beijing is choosing energy security and strategic ties with Moscow over Washington’s disapproval.

Washington’s own missteps reinforce the sense that sanctions are losing their sting. In late August, President Donald Trump slapped a 25% “secondary tariff” on Indian imports of Russian crude, doubling existing duties. The gamble backfired. India not only kept buying Russian oil but also found common cause with China — a troubling development for US strategists who once counted on Delhi as a counterweight to Beijing.

The core problem is not intent but longevity. Sanctions work best when they are broad, swift, and temporary — delivering a shock that compels change before targets can adapt. But when restrictions drag on, industries build workarounds.

Russia has done so with astonishing speed, channeling crude through China and India, which now absorb 80% of its exports, and relying on “dark fleets” of tankers to bypass Western oversight. Iran and Venezuela, veterans of economic siege, have perfected similar tactics.

Meanwhile, the sheer scale of sanctions is undermining their effectiveness. Since 2017, the number of international sanctions has surged by 450%, according to LSEG Risk Intelligence. After Moscow’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, EU sanctions on Russia jumped from zero in 2013 to more than 2,500 by 2025. Washington blacklisted over 3,100 new entities last year alone, most of them Russian. The result, enforcement has become a bureaucratic quagmire, draining multinational firms with compliance costs while Russia and its partners adapt.

In short, the West is flooding the world with sanctions — but the more it leans on this tool, the less powerful it becomes. Economic warfare cannot be waged indefinitely without diminishing returns. If sanctions are to remain credible, they must be recalibrated: fewer, smarter, and more time-bound, backed by genuine multilateral coordination.

Otherwise, the very weapon once seen as a substitute for war may become just another dull instrument in an increasingly multipolar world.

China-Russia pipeline diplomacy a threat to Trump’s energy grip

The high stakes energy diplomacy in Beijing this week signals China’s willingness to defy US President Donald Trump’s efforts to isolate Russia and assert US energy dominance.

Chinese President Xi Jinpin, sitting alongside Russian President Vladimir Putin, used a military parade this week marking 80 years since Japan's defeat in World War Two to project Beijing's military and diplomatic clout amid heightened trade tensions with Washington.

China backed the pageantry with action on Tuesday, when Russia’s gas giant Gazprom announced the sides had signed a legally binding memorandum with Moscow for the construction of Power of Siberia 2, a 2,600-km (1,615 mile) gas pipeline that will run between the two countries. The project has struggled to take off after more than a decade of fruitless talks.

China will also boost the already large gas volumes it imports through the existing ‘Power of Siberia’ pipeline. Gazprom CEO Alexei Miller said on Tuesday that the two countries had agreed to increase supplies via the pipeline to 44 billion cubic metres a year from 38 bcm.

Additionally, both sides agreed to raise the volume of Russian gas deliveries to China via a pipeline from Sakhalin Island in Russia's Far East by 20% to 12 bcm annually.

Taken together, this is yet another indication of the growing ties between Beijing and Moscow, but more importantly, it is a signal that China is not planning to back down in the face of US pressure.

Of course, several major hurdles remain for the new Siberian project.

First and foremost, the sides have yet to agree on the price of the gas that will be transported through the pipeline. The Gazprom CEO indicated that the price would be lower than what European buyers paid in the past.

It also remains unclear whether China will require the additional volume. Chinese companies in recent years have signed many long-term liquefied natural gas supply deals, including with US producers, amounting to around 50 bcm per year of additional supplies through 2030, according to the Institute for Energy Economics and Financial Analysis.

On top of that, China ramped up its domestic gas production by 28% between 2020 and 2024 to 246.4 bcm, according to IEEFA.

The bigger problem could be strategic. Completing the new project would cement Russia's position as the biggest natural gas supplier to China – and that could be a concern for Beijing.

Russia supplied around 22% of China's gas imports in 2024, or about 38 bcm, when including pipeline gas and deliveries of LNG, according to data from the Energy Institute's Statistical Review of World Energy.

The new volumes from the existing pipeline would raise Russia's share in China’s imports to over a quarter next year, assuming an increase in the country’s gas demand.

Adding another 50 bcm capacity from the new pipeline, which likely would not come on stream before 2030, would therefore double Russia's share of China’s gas imports.

But in today’s new global environment, what might matter more is that Putin and Xi appear politically invested in making the project work.

For Russia, the agreement offers a long-term market for its vast natural gas reserves – something that has become particularly important since Europe, Russia's biggest gas market for decades, began to wean itself off Russian gas following Moscow's invasion of Ukraine in 2022.

For China, this appears to be another shot across the bow in the economic stand-off with Washington.

On a practical level, importing larger volumes of gas from Russia would reduce Beijing's need to increase U.S. LNG imports, one of the major promises many other countries have made in trade talks with the Trump administration.

And then there is the desire to signal defiance – a negotiating tactic in itself.

It is notable that last week China imported its first LNG cargo from Russia’s Arctic LNG 2 plant, despite heavy US sanctions, undermining Trump’s attempts to isolate Moscow and pressure Putin over Ukraine. Other cargoes from the plant could be heading to China.

The Trump administration has yet to respond to the cargo’s arrival in Beihai, but the timing just days before Putin’s visit is unlikely to be a coincidence.

 

 

The Beginning of the End of US Hegemony

The leaders of China, North Korea and Russia stood shoulder to shoulder Wednesday as high-tech military hardware and thousands of marching soldiers filled the streets of Beijing. Two days earlier, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, Russian President Vladimir Putin and Chinese President Xi Jinping huddled together, smiling broadly and clasping hands at a meeting of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization.

The gatherings in China this week could be read as a striking, maybe even defiant, message to the United States and its allies. At the very least, they offered yet more evidence of a burgeoning shift away from a US-dominated, Western-led world order, as President Donald Trump withdraws America from many of its historic roles and roils economic relationships with tariffs.

Will it be right to say that it is the beginning of the end of US hegemony? It is a transition from uni-polarity to multi-polarity. The US is losing its ability to act unchallenged. The world is moving towards competitive coexistence, where Washington remains powerful but will have to share space with Beijing, Moscow, and other rising centers of influence. It looks less like a sudden collapse, and more like a slow erosion of dominance.

For nearly eight decades, the United States has been the undisputed leader of the world, setting the rules of politics, trade, and security. But today, cracks in this dominance are becoming visible.

The rise of China as a technological and economic powerhouse, Russia’s defiance of Western sanctions, and the growing assertiveness of regional blocs such as BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization are eroding Washington’s monopoly over global influence. Even long-time allies in the Middle East and Asia are quietly hedging their bets, diversifying partnerships beyond the US.

At home, the super power faces mounting challenges, a polarized political system, unsustainable debt levels, and an exhausted military stretched across multiple conflict zones. Meanwhile, the US dollar, once an untouchable pillar of global finance, is slowly facing competition from alternative payment systems. Yet, it is premature to declare the end of US power.

History suggests that hegemonies rarely fall overnight. The American era may not be over, but its golden age of unquestioned dominance is clearly behind us.

China shows power at military parade

Chinese President Xi Jinping warned the world was facing a choice between peace or war at a massive military parade in Beijing on Wednesday, flanked by Russia's Vladimir Putin and North Korea's Kim Jong Un in an unprecedented show of force.

The event to mark 80 years since Japan's defeat at the end of World War Two was largely shunned by Western leaders, with Putin and Kim - pariahs in the West due to the Ukraine war and Kim's nuclear ambitions - the guests of honour.

Designed to project China's military might and diplomatic clout, it also comes as US President Donald Trump's tariffs and volatile policymaking strain its relations with allies and rivals alike.

"Today, mankind is faced with the choice of peace or war, dialogue or confrontation, win-win or zero-sum," Xi told a crowd of more than 50,000 spectators at Tiananmen Square, adding that the Chinese people "firmly stand on the right side of history".

Riding in an open-top limousine, Xi then inspected the troops and cutting-edge military equipment such as hypersonic missiles, underwater drones and a weaponized 'robot wolf'.

Helicopters trailing large banners and fighter jets flew in formation during a 70-minute showcase that culminated in the release of 80,000 'peace' birds.

Donning a tunic suit in the style worn by former leader Mao Zedong, Xi earlier greeted more than 25 leaders on the red carpet, including Indonesia's Prabowo Subianto who made a surprise appearance despite widespread protests at home.

Seated between Putin and Kim in the viewing gallery, Xi repeatedly engaged in conversations with both leaders as thousands of troops and materiel paraded before them. It marked the first time the trio have appeared together in public.

Putin later thanked his North Korean counterpart for his soldiers' courageous fighting in the war in Ukraine during a bilateral meeting at China's State Guesthouse. Kim said he was willing to do everything he can to help Russia.

"Please give my warmest regards to Vladimir Putin, and Kim Jong Un, as you conspire against the United States of America," Trump said in a post directed at Xi on Truth Social, as the event kicked off. He also highlighted the US role in helping China secure its freedom from Japan during World War Two.

Trump had earlier told reporters he did not see the parade as a challenge to the United States. Japan's top government spokesperson declined to comment on the parade, adding Asia's top two economies were building "constructive relations".

Democratically governed Taiwan, which China considers its own, has urged its people not to attend the parade, warning that attendance could reinforce Beijing's territorial claims. Taiwan does not commemorate peace with a barrel of a gun, its President Lai Ching-te said on Wednesday in pointed criticism of the event.

Xi has cast World War Two as a major turning point in the "great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation", in which it overcame the humiliation of Japan's invasion to become a global powerhouse.

Earlier this week, Xi unveiled his vision of a new world order at a regional security summit, calling for unity against "hegemonism and power politics", a thinly veiled swipe at his rival across the Pacific Ocean.

"Xi feels confident that the table has turned. It's China that is back in the driver's seat now," said Wen-Ti Sung, fellow at the Atlantic Council's Global China Hub, based in Taiwan.

"It's been Trumpian unilateralism rather than China’s wolf warrior diplomacy when people talk about the leading source of uncertainty in the international system."

At a lavish reception after the parade at the Great Hall of the People, Xi told his guests that humanity must not return to the "law of the jungle".

Beyond the pomp and propaganda, analysts are watching whether Xi, Putin and Kim may signal closer defence relations following a pact signed by Russia and North Korea in June 2024, and a similar alliance between Beijing and Pyongyang, an outcome that may alter the military calculus in the Asia-Pacific region.

Putin has already sealed deeper energy deals with Beijing during his China visit, while the gathering has given the reclusive Kim an opportunity to gain implicit support for his banned nuclear weapons.

It has been 66 years since a North Korean leader last attended a Chinese military parade.

Kim travelled to Beijing with his daughter Ju Ae, whom South Korean intelligence consider his most likely successor, although she was not seen alongside him at the parade.

 

Time Is Ripe for Dumping Trump

Every political career reaches a tipping point. For Donald Trump, that moment has arrived. His return to the political stage was meant to showcase strength and inevitability. Instead, most of his high-profile decisions and strategies in what amounts to his “second term of influence” have backfired, leaving the Republican Party fractured and America’s standing diminished.

On foreign policy, Trump’s swagger delivered little substance. His tariff wars bruised US farmers more than Beijing, his embrace of autocrats yielded no concessions, and his abandonment of long-standing allies left Washington isolated. The Middle East “breakthroughs” unraveled into fresh instability, while his tough talk on Iran and North Korea ended with neither deterrence nor diplomacy.

At home, his tax cuts fed corporations but starved the federal budget, inflating deficits without lifting wages for most Americans. His promised transformations on infrastructure and healthcare never materialized. Instead, voters were left with widening inequality, broken promises, and a chaotic pandemic response that remains a stain on his record.

Politically, the costs are even starker. Trumpism has become an anchor for Republicans, costing the party moderates and suburban voters while entrenching bitter divisions within. Legal troubles multiply, crowding out policy debate and reminding Americans of the scandals that defined his presidency. What once looked like disruptive energy now looks like exhaustion.

The United States faces serious challenges — from economic restructuring to climate resilience and global leadership. Clinging to a leader defined by backfires, chaos, and personal vendettas is not just unwise; it is reckless. The time is not just ripe but urgent for Republicans, and for the country, to move beyond Donald Trump.

Xi rolls out carpet for Ukraine war aggressors, sidelining Trump

I am disgusted by reading the headline and the wordings of opening paragraph of a news report by Reuters on the meeting of presidents of China and Russia. I also invite the readers to register their like or dislike to the way of reporting by western media, which I term, “dishonest”.  

Reuters reports, “In a show of solidarity with the aggressors in Europe's worst war in 80 years, China's Xi Jinping will convene with his Russian and North Korean counterparts for the first time as Donald Trump and other Western leaders watch from afar”.

It continues, “Vladimir Putin and Kim Jong Un's visit to Beijing for a massive military parade this week underscore the Chinese president's influence over authoritarian regimes intent on redefining the Western-led global order, while Trump's isolationist stance strains long-standing US alliances”.

It says, “The gathering of what Western analysts have dubbed the 'Axis of Upheaval' could build on a mutual defence pact signed by Russia and North Korea in June 2024, and a similar alliance between Beijing and Pyongyang, an outcome that may alter the military calculus in the Asia-Pacific region”.

Kim crossed into China early on Tuesday aboard his special train, en route to the capital Beijing. Xi and Putin, meanwhile, gathered at the Great Hall of the People for a meeting with Mongolia's leader expected to touch on a vast gas pipeline project and bilateral talks.

Putin thanked his "dear friend" Xi for the warm welcome and said the close communication showed Russia's relations with China were at an "unprecedentedly high level", according to a video of the talks posted on the Kremlin's official Telegram messaging app.

"We must continue to take a clear stand against hegemonism and power politics," Xi told a gathering of more than 20 leaders of non-Western countries at a summit on Monday, a thinly veiled swipe at his geopolitical rival across the Pacific Ocean.

Xi also held talks with Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi on Monday, resetting strained bilateral ties, as Trump ratcheted up trade pressure on New Delhi over its purchases of Russian oil.

Trump's Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent on Monday called the summit "performative" and accused China and India of being "bad actors" by fueling Russia's three-and-a-half-year war with Ukraine.

At a time when Trump is touting his peacemaking credentials, any new concentration of military power in the East that includes Russia will ring alarm bells for the West.

"Trilateral military exercises between Russia, China and North Korea seem nearly inevitable," wrote Youngjun Kim, an analyst at the US-based National Bureau of Asian Research, in March, citing how the conflict in Ukraine has pushed Moscow and Pyongyang closer together.

"Until a few years ago, China and Russia were important partners in imposing international sanctions on North Korea for its nuclear and missile tests... (they) are now potential military partners of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea during a crisis on the Korean peninsula," he added, using the diplomatically isolated country's official name.

Kim is an important stakeholder in the conflict in Ukraine: the North Korean leader has supplied over 15,000 troops to support Putin's war.

In 2024, he also hosted the Russian leader in Pyongyang - the first summit of its kind in 24 years - in a move widely interpreted as a snub to Xi and an attempt to ease his pariah status by reducing North Korea's dependence on China.

About 600 North Korean soldiers have died fighting for Russia in the Kursk region, according to South Korea's intelligence agency, which believes Pyongyang is planning another deployment.

Putin also told the Shanghai Cooperation Organization summit in Tianjin that a "fair balance in the security sphere" must be restored, shorthand for Russia's criticism of the eastward expansion of NATO and European Security.