OPEC Plus extend production cuts

Saudi Arabia and seven other OPEC Plus countries have decided on Thursday to extend their oil production cuts for another three months, until the end of March 2025.

Saudi Arabia, Russia, Iraq, United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Kazakhstan, Algeria, and Oman, which previously announced additional voluntary adjustments in April 2023 and November 2023, held a virtual meeting on Thursday on the sideline of the 38th OPEC and non-OPEC Ministerial Meeting (ONOMM).

These countries will extend their additional voluntary adjustments of 2.2 million barrels per day, that were announced in November 2023, until the end of March 2025 and then the 2.2 million barrels per day adjustments will be gradually phased out on a monthly basis until the end of September 2026 to support market stability. This monthly increase can be paused or reversed subject to market conditions," OPEC Plus said in a statement carried by Saudi Press Agency.

The virtual meeting was held to reinforce the precautionary efforts of OPEC Plus countries, aiming to support the stability and balance of oil markets. These countries decided, in addition to the latest decisions from the 38th ONOMM, to extend the additional voluntary adjustments of 1.65 million barrels per day that were announced in April 2023, until the end of December 2026.

"In the spirit of transparency and collaboration, the meeting welcomed the pledges made by the overproducing countries to achieve full conformity and resubmit their updated compensation schedule to the OPEC Secretariat for the overproduced volumes since Jan 2024 before the end of December 2024 as agreed in the 52nd Meeting of the Joint Ministerial Monitoring Committee. The compensation period will be extended until the end of June 2026," the statement said.

  

Pro Israeli remarks trigger walkout at IPU meeting

The inaugural speech at the 147th Inter-Parliamentary Union Assembly in Luanda, Angola, drew an angry reaction from several Muslim delegations that deemed President Duarte Pacheco’s remarks in favor of the Israeli regime unjust and misleading.

On Monday the president, who is wrapping up his three-year term, kicked off his speech by commenting on “Israel’s right to defend itself”, referring to the regime’s heavy and relentless bombardment of Gaza in recent days.

The attacks have so far resulted in the death of more than 5,000 people, with children making up half of the casualties. Israel has also begun a full siege of the territory not allowing any food, water, fuel, and medicine inside Gaza. 

Delegations from South Africa, Iran, Kuwait, Palestine, Algeria, and some other Muslim countries reportedly walked out of the opening ceremony after a member of the Iranian delegation shouted “Israel is a terrorist entity” to protest the president’s remarks. 

The Parliamentary delegations returned to the ceremony once the speech was over and once again voiced their strong opposition to the rhetoric against the Palestinian Resistance. 

After the incident, Pacheco’s past interactions with the regime were brought to the limelight. The IPU president, who is supposed to represent 179 parliaments from around the world, visited the occupied territories in 2021 a year after being elected. 

During an interview with Israeli media, the official expressed regret that the IPU has chosen to condemn the regime at some instances. “I regret that there are such condemnations against Israel, because I don’t believe that they contribute to a spirit of dialogue,” he said while talking to the Jewish News Syndicate. 

Pacheco was also called a true friend of Israel during a meeting with the Knesset speaker Mickey Levy. 

 

OPEC Plus gaining control of oil market

According to M.K. Bhadrakumar, a former Indian diplomat, the recent shocking oil production cuts from May outlined by the OPEC Plus essentially means that eight key OPEC countries decided to join hands with Russia to reduce oil production, signaling that OPEC and OPEC Plus are now back in control of the oil market.

No single oil producing country is acting as the Pied Piper here. The great beauty about it is that Saudi Arabia and seven other major OPEC countries have unexpectedly decided to support Russia’s efforts and unilaterally reduce production.

While the eight OPEC countries are talking about a reduction of one million barrels per day (bpd) from May to the end of 2023, Russia will extend for the same period its voluntary adjustment that already started in March, by 500,000 barrels.

Now, add to this the production adjustments already decided by the OPEC Plus previously, and the total additional voluntary production adjustments touch a whopping 1.6 million bpd.

Fundamentally, many analysts had forewarned, the Western sanctions against Russian oil creating distortions and anomalies in the oil market and upsetting the delicate ecosystem of supply and demand, which were compounded by the incredibly risky decision by the G7, at the behest of the US Treasury, to impose a price cap on Russia’s oil sales abroad.

On top of it, the Biden administration’s provocative moves to release oil regularly from the US Strategic Petroleum Reserve in attempts to micromanage the oil prices and keep them abnormally low in the interests of the American consumer as well as to keep the inflationary pressures under check turned out to be an affront to the oil-producing countries whose economies critically depend on income from oil exports.

The OPEC Plus calls the production cuts a precautionary measure aimed at supporting the stability of the oil market. In the downstream of the OPEC Plus decision, analysts expect the oil prices to rise in the short term and pressure on Western central banks to increase due to the possible spike in inflation.

What stands out in the OPEC Plus decision is that Russia’s decision to reduce oil production by the end of the year has been unanimously supported by the main Arab producers.

Independent but time-coordinated statements were made by Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Kuwait, Iraq, Algeria, Oman and Kazakhstan, while Russia confirmed its intention to extend until the end of the year its own production reduction by 500,000 barrels per day, which began in March.

Significantly, these statements have been made precisely by those largest oil producers in OPEC, who have a record of fully utilizing their existing quota. Put differently, the reduction in production is going to be real, not just on paper.

Partly at least, the banking crisis in the US and Europe prompted the OPEC Plus to intervene. Although Washington will downplay it, in March, Brent oil prices fell to US$70 per barrel for the first time since 2021 amid the bankruptcy of several banks in the US and the near-death experience of Credit Suisse, one of the largest banks in Switzerland. The events sparked concern about the stability of the Western banking system and fear of a recession that would affect oil demand.

There is every likelihood that tensions may increase between the US and Saudi Arabia as higher oil prices will push inflation and make it even more difficult for the US Federal Reserve to find a balance between raising the key rate and maintaining financial and economic stability.

Equally, the Biden administration must be furious that practical cooperation is still continuing between Russia and the OPEC countries, especially Saudi Arabia, notwithstanding the West’s price cap on Russian oil and Moscow’s decision to unilaterally cut production in March.

However, the Biden administration has only a limited range of options to respond to the OPEC Plus surprise move, one, go for another release of oil from the Strategic Petroleum Reserve; two, pressure US producers to increase domestic oil output; three, back legislation that would allow the United States to take the dramatic step of suing OPEC nations; and, four, curb the US export of gasoline and diesel.

To be sure, the OPEC Plus production cut goes against the Western demand to increase oil output even as sanctions were imposed against Russian oil and gas exports. On the other hand, the disruption in oil supplies from Russia contributed to the rising inflation in the EU countries.

The US wanted the Gulf Arab states to step in and step-up oil production. But the latter did not oblige because they felt that there wasn’t enough economic activity in the West and there were clear signs of recession contrary to expectation.

Thus, as a result of the sanctions against Russia, Europe is facing the complex situation of inflation and near-recession known as stagflation.  In reality, the adaptive and agile OPEC Plus read the situation correctly and has shown that it is willing to act ahead of the curve.

At a time when the world economy is struggling to grow at a healthy rate, the demand for oil would be relatively less, and it makes sense to cut oil production to maintain the price balance.

All that the Western leaders can complain about is that the OPEC Plus cut in oil output has come at an inappropriate time. But the woes of Western economies cannot be laid at the door of OPEC Plus as there are inherent problems which are now coming to the surface.

For instance, the large-scale protests in France against pension reform or the widespread strikes in Britain for higher wages show that there are deep structural problems in these economies, and the governments seem helpless in tackling them.

In geopolitical terms, the OPEC Plus move came after a meeting between Russian Deputy Prime Minister Alexander Novak and Saudi Energy Minister Prince Abdulaziz bin Salman in Riyadh on March 16 that focused on oil market cooperation. Therefore, it is widely seen as the tightening of the bond between Russia and Saudi Arabia.

In fact, in May, as the largest members of OPEC join Russia in its unilateral reduction, the balance of quotas and the ratio of market shares between and amongst the participants in the OPEC Plus deal will return to the level set when it was concluded in April 2020.

The rise in crude oil prices particularly benefits Russia. Simply put, the production cuts will tighten up the oil market and thus help Russia to secure better prices for the crude oil it sells. Second, the new cuts also confirm that Russia is still an integral and important part of the group of oil producing countries, despite the Western attempts to isolate it. Third, the consequences of the decision are all the greater because, unlike the previous cuts by the OPEC+ group at the height of the pandemic or last October, today, the momentum for global oil demand is up, not down—what with a strong recovery by China expected.

That is to say, the surprise OPEC Plus reduction further consolidates the Saudi-Russian energy alliance, by aligning their production levels, thus placing them on equal footing. It is a slap in the face for Washington.

Make no mistake, this is another signal regarding a new era where the Saudis are not afraid of the US anymore, as the OPEC leverage is on Riyadh’s side.

The Saudis are only doing what they need to do, and the White House has no say in the matter. Clearly, a recasting of the regional and global dynamics that has been set in motion lately is gathering momentum. The future of the petrodollar seems increasingly uncertain.

 

Israeli envoy expelled from African Union summit

As African leaders gathered on Saturday in the Ethiopian capital for the two-day African Union (AU) summit, aiming to jumpstart a faltering trade deal and focusing on challenges of armed conflict and food crisis, an Israeli diplomat was expelled out of the AU assembly.

An AU official told AFP that the diplomat who was asked to leave had not been invited to attend the meeting, with a non-transferable invitation only issued to Israel’s ambassador to the African Union, Aleli Admasu.

“It is regrettable that the individual in question would abuse such a courtesy,” the official said.

While condemning the severe expulsion of a senior diplomat from the AU summit, Israel accused arch-foe Iran of orchestrating the move with help from Algeria and South Africa.

A video circulating on social media shows guards escorting the Israeli foreign ministry’s deputy director general for Africa, Sharon Bar-li, out of the AU assembly taking place in Addis Ababa.

A spokesman for the Israeli foreign ministry described the incident as severe, noting Bar-li was an accredited observer with an entry tag, a claim denied by an AU official.

The ministry spokesman said it was saddening to see the African Union taken hostage by a small number of extremist states like Algeria and South Africa, which are driven by hatred and controlled by Iran.

African states should oppose these actions, which harm the African Union movement and the entire continent, the spokesman insisted.

When asked about Israel’s accusations that South Africa and Algeria were behind the move, Vincent Magwenya, spokesman for South African President Cyril Ramaphosa, told AFP at the summit, “They must substantiate their claim.”

Israel attained observer status at the AU in 2021 after decades of diplomatic efforts, drawing protest from powerful members including South Africa and Algeria, which argued that it flew in the face of AU statements supporting the Palestinians.

Last year, unease flared over the accreditation of Israel as an observer at the AU, with the Pales­tinians, who also have an observer status at the body, urging it to be withdrawn. The 2022 summit suspended a debate on whether to withdraw the accreditation and a committee was formed to address the issue.

The row erupted when Moussa Faki Mahamat, head of the African Union Commission, accepted Israel’s accreditation, triggering a rare dispute within a body that values consensus. The AU has not said whether Israel’s status would be up for discussion at this year’s summit.

Israel previously held observer status at the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), but was long thwarted in its attempts to get it back after the OAU was disbanded in 2002 and replaced by the AU.

Most of the summit’s sessions will be held behind closed doors at AU headquarters. But eyes will be on the bloc to see if it can achieve ceasefires in the Sahel and the eastern DRC where the M23 militia has seized swathes of territory and sparked a diplomatic row between Kinshasa and Rwanda’s government, which is accused of backing the rebels.

At a mini-summit on Friday, leaders of the seven-nation East African Community called for all armed groups to withdraw from occupied areas in the eastern DRC by the end of next month.

“We cannot walk away from the people of DRC; history will be very harsh on us. We must do what we have to do,” Kenya’s President William Ruto told the meeting.

Created in 2002 following the disbanding of the Organization of African Unity, the AU comprises all 55 African countries, with a population of 1.3 billion people.

While the bloc has been credited with taking a stand against coups, it has long been criticized as ineffectual.

UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres, who is visiting Ethiopia, addressed the assembly while Rwandan President Paul Kagame presented a report on the reform of AU institutions. Palestinian leader Mahmud Abbas was also expected to deliver a statement, according to a draft agenda.

Escalating tension between Algeria and Morocco

On 24th August 2021, Algeria broke off its already minimal bilateral relations with Morocco, declaring this was due to the kingdom’s “hostile actions” and accusing it of involvement in the wildfires that struck the Kabylia region earlier that month. 

The heightened tension between the two countries brings into focus regional uncertainty and may spell the end of their limited collaboration in the energy sector.

The two countries have a long history of tense relations, behind which lie issues of political ideology, border demarcation, and competition for regional influence. Morocco and Algeria fought a short border war after the latter’s independence from France in the fall of 1963, and Algeria has long supported the Polisario Front in its struggle against Morocco for control of the Western Sahara.

The land border between the two countries has officially been closed since 1994; a decision Algeria made unilaterally following Moroccan accusations that the Algerian military was behind a terrorist attack in Marrakesh in 1994. The Moroccan leadership, including King Mohammed VI, has repeatedly called for re-opening the border, something Algerian leaders have consistently rejected. Still, the two countries have managed to find limited avenues for cooperation around a gas pipeline that transports Algerian gas through Morocco and on to Spain and other European markets, although the future of this arrangement is now in doubt.

Lately, tensions between Algeria and Morocco reached a level unseen in past, though an all-out military confrontation remains unlikely. Both governments have increased their military presence along the border, and while the prospects of armed conflict remain low, the growing tension provides each enough fodder to distract from more serious domestic issues. Indeed, the biggest challenge for Algeria’s military leadership has remained how to convince an inwardly focused population that Morocco is a greater threat to their well-being than internal economic, political, and security challenges.

The Algerian military and ruling elite’s dislike and suspicion of Morocco runs deep and goes back to the border conflict of the 1960s and Cold War-era ideological tensions. Old Algerian fears of Rabat’s designs for a “Greater Morocco” are no longer realistic — if they ever were — but nonetheless hawkish views of Morocco and concerns over its expansionist plans persist among Algeria’s military top brass. Morocco’s growing ambitions to increase its regional political and economic influence therefore remain alarming to some in Algeria’s military.

Recent domestic, regional, and global events have added to this ongoing suspicion and tension between the two neighbors. The US recognition of Moroccan sovereignty over the Western Sahara dealt a blow to Algerian efforts to keep Morocco isolated on the issue. Although the conflict is by no means resolved, US recognition is a major win for Morocco — and therefore, in this zero-sum game, a loss for the Polisario.

Algeria is also extremely wary of growing Moroccan-Israeli cooperation. The two countries normalized relations as part of the deal struck with the Trump administration that granted Morocco US recognition over its Western Sahara claims. Algeria remains a staunch ideological supporter of the Palestinian cause, and was extremely critical of Morocco’s decision to normalize relations.

Adding to Algeria’s outrage, Morocco’s alleged involvement in the Pegasus spyware scandal prompted condemnations and accusations of spying on Algerian officials and top military brass. Algerian Foreign Minister Ramtane Lamamra’s fiery back and forth with Morocco’s ambassador to the UN, Omar Hilal, in July regarding the Western Sahara further amplified tensions. In response to Lamamra’s reaffirmation of Algeria’s support for self-determination, Hilal, as he has provocatively done before, called on Algeria to adopt the same support for self-determination for its own long-restive Kabylia region.

Despite their sharp jabs against Algeria, the Moroccan leadership blames Algeria for the escalation and interprets it as a way for the Algerian leadership to save face while shunning King Mohammed VI’s recent calls for the reopening of the border and improved relations.

In August, as wildfires swept through the Kabylia region, Morocco offered Algeria two of its firefighting Canadair aircraft. Algeria, despite having no firefighting fleet of its own, rejected the offer.

As tensions escalate, one of the key uncertainties with broader implications is the future of the Maghreb-Europe Gas (MEG) pipeline that began operations in November 1996 to export gas to the Spanish and Portuguese markets. The pipeline crosses through Morocco and in return Morocco receives 7% of the gas transported, which it uses for domestic consumption. The agreement has weathered previous diplomatic crises. However, this time, its future is more uncertain.

In addition to the MEG pipeline, Algeria also currently exports through Medgaz, an underwater pipeline that bypasses Morocco and is under expansion to handle higher flows. MEG pushes through 13.5 billion cubic meters (bcm) of Algerian gas yearly, while Medgaz has capacity for 8 bcm a year. Medgaz has announced plans to boost its export capacity to 10 bcm a year, but the expansion will not be operational until the end of the year at the earliest. The MEG transit agreement between the two states is up for renewal in October.

For Morocco, if the deal falls through, this would deprive it of a key source of energy. Gas accounts for 10% of its domestic energy consumption, and the loss of access to Algerian gas would particularly impact two power plants located in northern Morocco — south of Tangier and south of Jerrada respectively — both of which rely on imported gas.

Over the past couple of years, with the pipeline agreement coming up for renewal, Morocco has signaled its intention to strike a more advantageous deal with Algeria, bolstered by the fact that the full ownership of the pipeline will pass from the Spanish company Naturgy to the Moroccan government as of 1st November 2021. Morocco wants to boost its own access to gas as an important energy source, despite ongoing domestic efforts to diversify its energy mix and increase the share of renewables.

If the two countries fail to reach an agreement, Morocco could face energy shortages that it might struggle to make up in the short to medium term, while Algeria would deprive itself of an important income source. For their part, Spain and Portugal would likewise have to make up energy shortages from a different supplier. If Morocco and Algeria take a hard-nosed approach, Algeria could deprive Morocco of a key bargaining chip, but it would be at the expense of its own domestic economic considerations.

Algeria cannot afford to lose this access, particularly considering the crippling economic losses the country has faced in recent years. Although Morocco has promised to keep the pipeline open, it could risk being seen as blocking access to gas for European markets. Coming on top of its recent woes with European partners over migration, spying allegations, the Western Sahara, and the upcoming European ruling on the fisheries agreement, this could seriously damage Morocco’s ties with the EU.

As the three partners — Algeria, Morocco, and Spain — continue negotiations on this agreement that they all need, geopolitical considerations are not to be overlooked. Algeria is growing more anxious to reassert itself as a regional power following two years of turmoil at home and a longer-standing retrenchment from regional affairs.

Cutting ties with Morocco, even at the risk of potentially jeopardizing its critical energy exports, is about drawing a line in the sand, a total unwillingness to allow Morocco any leverage, as well as an effort to draw the attention of domestic audiences away from problems at home and rally against an external enemy.

For Morocco, these old conflicts and tensions that it wishes to leave behind create a challenge to its domestic and foreign ambitions. They stand as a reminder that the country is vulnerable, and that its regional and local stability are not to be taken for granted — something Algeria is keen to emphasize as it seeks to restore its wider regional role.