Iran-China-Russia naval drill in Indian Ocean

The navies of Iran, China, and Russia have initiated joint drills in the northern tip of the Indian Ocean, marking their fifth collaborative military exercise in recent years. Naval delegations from Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Oman, Pakistan, and South Africa are present as the observers of the exercises.

Chinese and Russian naval forces have entered Iranian territorial waters to participate in the primary stage of the naval war game, named Maritime Security Belt 2024, near the Gulf of Oman. This international exercise, involving Iran, China, and Russia, underscores a commitment to peace and security in the region.

During a joint press conference with Russian and Chinese commanders, Second Flotilla Admiral Mustafa Taj al-Dini emphasized the strategic significance of this being the fifth joint exercise among the involved countries. He highlighted the objectives of this joint naval drill, including bolstering maritime trade security, combating piracy and terrorism, and fostering cooperation among the participating nations.

According to Taj al-Dini, this security-focused exercise, covering an expansive area of 17,000 square kilometers, aims to address multifaceted challenges. Despite the approaching festivities for the Persian New Year, the spokesperson underscored that security efforts remain steadfast.

Notably, naval units from Iran, China, and Russia, comprising destroyers and missile cruisers, actively contribute to this collaborative initiative.

Iranian naval forces, along with their Chinese and Russian counterparts, have conducted several military drills in recent years to enhance the security and stability of international maritime trade. They have also collaborated in countering piracy and maritime terrorism, exchanging information in naval rescue and relief operations, as well as sharing operational and tactical experiences.

Russia's defense ministry stated that the exercises, running through Friday and involving warships and aviation, would focus on the protection of maritime economic activity.

The Russian defence ministry said its Pacific fleet, led by the Varyag guided missile cruiser and the Marshal Shaposhnikov frigate, had arrived at Iran’s Chabahar port on Monday to take part in the joint drill.

China’s defense ministry mentioned that the drills aimed at jointly maintaining regional maritime security. China sent its 45th escort task force, consisting of the guided-missile destroyer Urumqi, guided-missile frigate Linyi, and the comprehensive supply ship Dongpinghu, to the exercise.

Last month, Rear Admiral Shahram Irani, commander of the Iranian Navy, announced Tehran's plan to hold joint drills with Beijing and Moscow before the end of March, aimed at ensuring regional security.

Providing insights into the strategic maritime efforts, the rear admiral revealed that the mission to safeguard Iran's shipping lines in international waters commenced in 2009 under the direct command of the Leader of the Islamic Revolution, Ayatollah Seyyed Ali Khamenei.

Emphasizing the unwavering commitment of the Army's strategic naval force, he highlighted their continuous role in ensuring the security of the nation's economic hub in both the Gulf of Aden and the northern Indian Ocean.

The admiral further highlighted the expansion of the security mission beyond securing shipping lines in the Red Sea over the past four years. Currently, the comprehensive management of protection for Iran's shipping lines extends from the Gulf of Aden to the Suez Canal.

The Iranian Navy conducts routine exercises throughout the year. In recent years, Iranian military experts and technicians have made significant progress in developing and manufacturing a diverse range of military equipment, achieving self-sufficiency for the armed forces in the military industry.

In March 2023, Iranian, Chinese, and Russian naval forces staged the 2023 Marine Security Belt war game in the northern parts of the Indian Ocean, marking the fourth joint exercise in recent years. Alongside Chinese and Russian fleets, more than 10 Iranian Navy vessels and three helicopters reportedly took part.

 Courtesy Tehran Times

Persian Gulf needs homegrown security

Major General Mohammad Hossein Baqeri, Chief of Staff of the Iranian Armed troops, has criticized the deployment of foreign military troops in the region and emphasized the necessity for the Persian Gulf governments to work together to secure the region.

In a meeting with Commander of Royal Army of Oman Major General Matar bin Salim bin Rashid al Balushi, General Baqeri said, “We believe that the security of the Persian Gulf region must be provided through interaction and cooperation among the regional countries.”

The Iranian commander emphasized the nations of the Persian Gulf are capable of ensuring regional security without the presence or involvement of foreigners.

He also underscored the armed forces of Iran and Oman’s operational, intelligence and training competence, saying that the two nations’ mutual experience-sharing will help improve regional security.

Inviting the Omani navy forces to participate in the Marine Security Belt naval exercises, General Baqeri also praised Oman’s regional initiatives.

Omani commander called for strengthening military ties between Tehran and Muscat.

General Salim bin Rashid al Balushi cited Oman’s initiative to strengthen connections with neighbors and noted that communications have become even more important due to Oman and Iran’s connectivity in the Strait of Hormuz.

High-level military officials from Iran and Oman signed a memorandum of understanding in April 2019 to expand military cooperation.

In recent years, the two friendly neighbors have conducted a number of joint naval exercises.

In May, the Iranian Armed Forces chief of staff paid a visit to Oman to have discussions about fostering regional security, cooperation, and peace.

Major General Baqeri slammed the presence of foreign troops in the region and asserted that collaboration between Tehran and Muscat would enhance regional security.

The general also said, “The joint actions by Iran and Oman can improve security and demonstrate that outsiders are not required in the region.”

Baqeri noted that the multipolar world order and the transfer of power from the West to Asia have an impact on West Asia and emphasized the need for closer military cooperation to maintain security in the Strait of Hormuz, the Sea of Oman, and the northwestern regions of the Indian Ocean.

The commander then praised Oman for its sensible foreign policy toward the Yemen issue, emphasizing that more work must be done to establish a fair peace and safeguard Yemen’s territorial integrity.

Iran to eliminate US dollar in trade with Oman

In a meeting between the governor of the Central Bank of Iran (CBI) and a senior trade delegation from Oman on Monday, the Iranian side expressed complete readiness for eliminating the United States dollar from the two countries’ trade transactions.

Speaking at the meeting, CBI Governor Mohammadreza Farzin, who is also the head of the Iran-Oman Joint Economic Committee, said the strategic policy of the Central Bank of Iran is to cut ties with the US dollar in foreign exchange and trade, the CBI portal reported.

“We have sound economic and political reasons for this strategy, because, on one hand, the US uses the dollar as a political tool, and on the other hand, other currencies, especially in Asia are getting stronger against the dollar,” Farzin explained.

Referring to the complete readiness of the CBI to reduce and eliminate dollar exchanges from the cycle of commercial and economic transactions between Iran and Oman the official said, “The grounds for conducting economic and commercial transactions based on the national currencies of the two countries are fully prepared.”

Referring to the positive negotiations between Iran and Oman last year regarding the development of monetary and banking relations along with trade relations between the two countries Frazin stated, “Iran is ready for international methods like clearinghouses, multilateral monetary agreements and bilateral monetary agreements in trade transactions with Oman.”

The CBI governor further mentioned the expansion of trade relations between Iran and Oman in the previous Iranian calendar year (ended on March 20) and said, “The trade between the two countries grew by 40% in the past year and reached US$1.8 billion.”

He further emphasized the necessity of using joint credit cards between the monetary and banking networks of Iran and Oman in order to facilitate the commercial relations and economic activities of the two countries’ businessmen and stated: “The negotiations in this regard have also been carried out with the Central Bank of Oman and Iran is ready to put the use of joint credit cards on the agenda as soon as possible.”

OPEC Plus gaining control of oil market

According to M.K. Bhadrakumar, a former Indian diplomat, the recent shocking oil production cuts from May outlined by the OPEC Plus essentially means that eight key OPEC countries decided to join hands with Russia to reduce oil production, signaling that OPEC and OPEC Plus are now back in control of the oil market.

No single oil producing country is acting as the Pied Piper here. The great beauty about it is that Saudi Arabia and seven other major OPEC countries have unexpectedly decided to support Russia’s efforts and unilaterally reduce production.

While the eight OPEC countries are talking about a reduction of one million barrels per day (bpd) from May to the end of 2023, Russia will extend for the same period its voluntary adjustment that already started in March, by 500,000 barrels.

Now, add to this the production adjustments already decided by the OPEC Plus previously, and the total additional voluntary production adjustments touch a whopping 1.6 million bpd.

Fundamentally, many analysts had forewarned, the Western sanctions against Russian oil creating distortions and anomalies in the oil market and upsetting the delicate ecosystem of supply and demand, which were compounded by the incredibly risky decision by the G7, at the behest of the US Treasury, to impose a price cap on Russia’s oil sales abroad.

On top of it, the Biden administration’s provocative moves to release oil regularly from the US Strategic Petroleum Reserve in attempts to micromanage the oil prices and keep them abnormally low in the interests of the American consumer as well as to keep the inflationary pressures under check turned out to be an affront to the oil-producing countries whose economies critically depend on income from oil exports.

The OPEC Plus calls the production cuts a precautionary measure aimed at supporting the stability of the oil market. In the downstream of the OPEC Plus decision, analysts expect the oil prices to rise in the short term and pressure on Western central banks to increase due to the possible spike in inflation.

What stands out in the OPEC Plus decision is that Russia’s decision to reduce oil production by the end of the year has been unanimously supported by the main Arab producers.

Independent but time-coordinated statements were made by Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Kuwait, Iraq, Algeria, Oman and Kazakhstan, while Russia confirmed its intention to extend until the end of the year its own production reduction by 500,000 barrels per day, which began in March.

Significantly, these statements have been made precisely by those largest oil producers in OPEC, who have a record of fully utilizing their existing quota. Put differently, the reduction in production is going to be real, not just on paper.

Partly at least, the banking crisis in the US and Europe prompted the OPEC Plus to intervene. Although Washington will downplay it, in March, Brent oil prices fell to US$70 per barrel for the first time since 2021 amid the bankruptcy of several banks in the US and the near-death experience of Credit Suisse, one of the largest banks in Switzerland. The events sparked concern about the stability of the Western banking system and fear of a recession that would affect oil demand.

There is every likelihood that tensions may increase between the US and Saudi Arabia as higher oil prices will push inflation and make it even more difficult for the US Federal Reserve to find a balance between raising the key rate and maintaining financial and economic stability.

Equally, the Biden administration must be furious that practical cooperation is still continuing between Russia and the OPEC countries, especially Saudi Arabia, notwithstanding the West’s price cap on Russian oil and Moscow’s decision to unilaterally cut production in March.

However, the Biden administration has only a limited range of options to respond to the OPEC Plus surprise move, one, go for another release of oil from the Strategic Petroleum Reserve; two, pressure US producers to increase domestic oil output; three, back legislation that would allow the United States to take the dramatic step of suing OPEC nations; and, four, curb the US export of gasoline and diesel.

To be sure, the OPEC Plus production cut goes against the Western demand to increase oil output even as sanctions were imposed against Russian oil and gas exports. On the other hand, the disruption in oil supplies from Russia contributed to the rising inflation in the EU countries.

The US wanted the Gulf Arab states to step in and step-up oil production. But the latter did not oblige because they felt that there wasn’t enough economic activity in the West and there were clear signs of recession contrary to expectation.

Thus, as a result of the sanctions against Russia, Europe is facing the complex situation of inflation and near-recession known as stagflation.  In reality, the adaptive and agile OPEC Plus read the situation correctly and has shown that it is willing to act ahead of the curve.

At a time when the world economy is struggling to grow at a healthy rate, the demand for oil would be relatively less, and it makes sense to cut oil production to maintain the price balance.

All that the Western leaders can complain about is that the OPEC Plus cut in oil output has come at an inappropriate time. But the woes of Western economies cannot be laid at the door of OPEC Plus as there are inherent problems which are now coming to the surface.

For instance, the large-scale protests in France against pension reform or the widespread strikes in Britain for higher wages show that there are deep structural problems in these economies, and the governments seem helpless in tackling them.

In geopolitical terms, the OPEC Plus move came after a meeting between Russian Deputy Prime Minister Alexander Novak and Saudi Energy Minister Prince Abdulaziz bin Salman in Riyadh on March 16 that focused on oil market cooperation. Therefore, it is widely seen as the tightening of the bond between Russia and Saudi Arabia.

In fact, in May, as the largest members of OPEC join Russia in its unilateral reduction, the balance of quotas and the ratio of market shares between and amongst the participants in the OPEC Plus deal will return to the level set when it was concluded in April 2020.

The rise in crude oil prices particularly benefits Russia. Simply put, the production cuts will tighten up the oil market and thus help Russia to secure better prices for the crude oil it sells. Second, the new cuts also confirm that Russia is still an integral and important part of the group of oil producing countries, despite the Western attempts to isolate it. Third, the consequences of the decision are all the greater because, unlike the previous cuts by the OPEC+ group at the height of the pandemic or last October, today, the momentum for global oil demand is up, not down—what with a strong recovery by China expected.

That is to say, the surprise OPEC Plus reduction further consolidates the Saudi-Russian energy alliance, by aligning their production levels, thus placing them on equal footing. It is a slap in the face for Washington.

Make no mistake, this is another signal regarding a new era where the Saudis are not afraid of the US anymore, as the OPEC leverage is on Riyadh’s side.

The Saudis are only doing what they need to do, and the White House has no say in the matter. Clearly, a recasting of the regional and global dynamics that has been set in motion lately is gathering momentum. The future of the petrodollar seems increasingly uncertain.

 

Saudi Arabia, Russia announce oil output cuts

Saudi Arabia and other OPEC Plus oil producers on Sunday announced voluntary cuts to their production, with Riyadh saying it would cut output by 500,000 barrels per day (bpd) from May until the end of 2023.

Russia's Deputy Prime Minister also said Moscow would extend a voluntary cut of 500,000 bpd until the end of 2023.

The United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Iraq, Oman and Algeria said they would voluntarily cut output over the same time period.

The UAE said it would cut production by 144,000 bpd, Kuwait announced a cut of 128,000 bpd while Iraq said it would cut output by 211,000 bpd and Oman announced a cut of 40,000 bpd. Algeria said it would cut its output by 48,000 bpd.

The Saudi Energy Ministry said in a statement that the kingdom's voluntary cut was a precautionary measure aimed at supporting the stability of the oil market.

Russia will extend 500,000 barrels per day (bpd) oil production cut until the end of the year, Deputy Prime Minister Alexander Novak said on Sunday.

Russia announced the move within minutes of statements by Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Oman, Iraq and the United Arab Emirates that they were also reducing output until the end of the year. Russia is part of OPEC Plus, which groups the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries and allies.

"Acting as a responsible market participant and as a precautionary measure against further market volatility, the Russian Federation will implement a voluntary cut of 500 thousand barrels per day till the end of 2023, from the average production level as assessed by the secondary sources for the month of February," Novak said in a statement.

The announcement means Russia has now twice extended the output cut that Novak first announced in February this year.

Novak said on Feb. 10 that Russia would reduce production by 500,000 bpd in March. On March 21, he said the cut would continue until the end of June.

On March 24, Novak said Russia was very close to reaching the targeted level of output, which he said would be 9.5 million bpd.

 

Iranian presence in neighboring countries in oil and gas exploration

Director of Exploration of National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC) stated that currently Iran has oil and gas exploration relations with four neighboring countries. Transferring exploration technologies to neighboring countries is creating value and generating income for Iran.

Making the remarks in a press conference, Mehdi Fakour said that exploration has a special status in the oil industry, stressing that exploration maps the country's energy future.

The transfer of exploration technologies to neighboring countries can create value and generate income, the official further reiterated.

Pointing out that there is no local exploration management in the countries around Iran, the director of the exploration of the National Iranian Oil Company said this is a prominent position for the Iranian Ministry of Oil to present itself to the neighboring countries and Eurasian countries, and they are also willing to cooperate with Iran.

Emphasizing that this important issue has not been possible in the past years, Fakour clarified, “We now have exploratory relations with four neighboring countries.”

He pointed to the holding of meetings with Oman and said, “We had meetings with the minister of Oman and they accepted all the proposals for exploration cooperation to form a joint team and advance the agreements.”

The official also named Tajikistan, Russia, and Iraq as the three other neighboring countries cooperating with Iran in the field of exploration.

 

Arab reluctance to react to Iranian protests

Wilson Center has tried to find an explanation for the lack of Arab support in highlighting the actions of Iranian ruling regime. Its efforts could be termed ‘Killing two birds with one stone’. Not only has it maligned Iran, but also Arab States for not opposing Iran because they also don’t like opposition.   

When protests in Iran broke out in September 2022 following the killing of 22-year-old Mahsa Amini by the morality police, the world showed immediate support for the outraged Iranian women who took to the streets. Unlike before, these protests gained momentum as popular demands shifted from greater freedoms and economic reforms to the overthrow of the oppressive regime. The Iranian government’s harsh repression sparked international condemnation and sanctions against officials and entities, including the morality police itself.

As compared to strong responses from Western nations, Arab governments have stayed noticeably silent. This pattern of silence from Arab governments on internal Iranian issues, in contrast to Iranian involvement in Arab protests and revolutions, has been evident since the 2009 ‘green scarf movement’ in Iran and raises questions about the relationship between Arab states and Iran during times of popular upheaval.

While certain Arab nations, including Saudi Arabia, harbor a desire for the downfall of the Iranian regime, their reluctance to engage with Iran’s protests and internal politics is due to a multitude of challenges and constraints.

Many Arab governments, particularly those in the Gulf region, have a complex relationship with Iran. They may disapprove of the suppression of protests, but they also see Iran as a regional rival and may not want to give the impression of supporting domestic dissent, in effect allowing Iran to justify its interventionist policies elsewhere in the region.

The GCC nations, particularly Saudi Arabia, are grappling with the uncertainty surrounding the potential consequences of taking a unilateral adversarial approach towards Iran amid concerns about US security commitments and a decline in bilateral relations. Nevertheless, since the early days of the protests, Iranian authorities have repeatedly blamed foreign nations, including Saudi Arabia, for instigating the demonstrations.

IRGC Commander-in-Chief Hossein Salami warned the Saudi leadership, saying, “You are involved in this matter and know that you are vulnerable; it is better to be careful.” This warning was in reference to media supported by Saudi Arabia, such as funding for Iran International TV, which broadcasts in both Persian and English from London. It also refers to other Saudi-funded media outlets like Al-Arabiya and newspapers like Al-Sharq Al-Awsat, Okaz, Al-Riyadh, and Al-Madina, as well as Qatari and Jordanian newspapers. Arab News, a Saudi English-language newspaper, even dedicated special coverage to the protests.

To such accusations, Prince Faisal bin Farhan, the Saudi Foreign Minister stated, “A country that strengthens itself with good governance and a clear vision does not need to turn to the outside, and the Kingdom firmly adheres to the principle of non-interference in other countries’ internal affairs.”

Meanwhile, the Wall Street Journal reported that Iran was planning to attack Saudi Arabia, either directly or through its allies, such as the Houthis in Yemen, allegedly to distract from the protests.

Indeed, there is a state of uncertainty regarding the trajectory of events within Iran that raises four concerns:

First, it is unclear whether the current wave of protests will be more impactful than previous ones in affecting the regime. Given the past failures of protest movements to achieve their demands, it is understandable for Arabs to expect the current protests to fail or remain focused solely on reforms without aiming for regime change.

Second is the possibility of a desperate retaliation from the regime on neighboring states and interests should the protests escalate to the point of overthrowing the government—the ‘Samson option.’

Third is whether the support for the demonstrations will pressure the regime to respond positively to the JCPOA negotiations or vice versa.

Fourth is what the new regime will look like if the mullahs’ regime falls (to avoid repeating the deception of the 1979 revolution) and the role of opposition groups already plagued by sharp internal division.

Comparably, the silence and reticence of Arab capitals towards the Iranian protests are rooted in their varying relationships with Iran and their perceptions of the threat posed by the Islamic Republic.

Countries like Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Bahrain hold a hostile attitude toward Iran, while Iraq, Syria, and Algeria maintain close ties and similar ideologies. Oman tries to maintain a balancing act between Iran and Saudi Arabia, while Qatar has strong economic connections with Iran that have only grown stronger in recent years after the GCC blockade in 2017.

 In some ways, this explains Al Jazeera’s limited media coverage of the protests in Iran compared to that of the Arab Spring uprisings. But at least the Qatari Foreign Minister, in his interview with Bloomberg, indicated that “We are opposing using violence by security forces against civilians whether a woman or a man. This is a domestic issue, and we don’t normally interfere in domestic issues with countries.”

Arab governments may be hesitant to speak out against the Iranian government’s repression of protests due to their fear of a domino effect. This fear stems from the potential for revolutionary contagion, as seen in the Iran Islamic Revolution and Arab Spring Uprisings, and the potential undermining of ideological ties with Iran.

It is clear that since the Arab Spring uprisings, the change in the power dynamic in the region has worked in Iran’s favor, allowing it to expand the axis of resistance it leads, particularly to the detriment of Saudi Arabia.

On the other hand, these Arab governments may avoid taking a stance on the issue to avoid drawing attention to their own history of suppressing protests and to prove their goodwill and non-interference in Iran’s internal politics on the principle of good neighborliness—moral grandstanding. They believe this would strengthen their negotiating positions with Iran on outstanding and complex issues and strengthen their legitimacy in the international community.

Arabs and Iranians share the same region and religion. However, they have proud and distinct heritage, speak different languages and follow different branches of Islam, with Arabs predominantly Sunni while Iranians are Shiite. These cultural and linguistic differences create communication barriers and binary stereotypes, making it difficult to understand each other’s current common interests and demands.

Arab and Gulf media focus primarily on Iran’s regional influence and power struggles but pay little attention to local issues such as popular protests and human rights violations against minorities.

The lack of meaningful Arab media dedicated to in-depth coverage of Iranian society has heightened the divide between the Arab and Iranian peoples. The deliberate media stereotyping that portrays Iran merely through its regime and regional behavior, viewed from a narrow religious perspective, obscures the overall picture of Iranian society and erodes the trust and sympathy of the Arab public.

As against this, Iran has a vast media apparatus aimed at both the Arab and Iranian publics that reflects the views of the Iranian regime and presents political events through ideological and sectarian lenses.

Arab elites, especially after the Arab Spring, continue to face restrictions on freedom of demonstration and expression. Indeed, this impedes their ability to back advocacy campaigns for the protests in Iran organized by civil society.

Authorities are balancing a political equation that prevents them from officially supporting the protests in Iran. Nevertheless, some interaction with the protests, such as solidarity statements, condemnations, and vigils, can be observed in a few Arab capitals and elsewhere in the diaspora.

In Arab countries such as Lebanon and Iraq, which have close ties to Iran, any upheaval in Iranian politics could be viewed as a window of hope for those who grapple with their own internal struggles to challenge Iranian political influence.

In Lebanon, for example, Fe-male, a feminist organization, held a vigil to show support for the Iranian women protesting against mandatory veiling under the title “From us to you, [sending] all our love and support.” The vigil featured slogans in Arabic and Persian, including mantra of the protesters, “Woman, Life, Freedom.”

Other activist groups also sought to organize a protest in front of the Iranian embassy in Beirut, calling it “From Tehran to Beirut, the killer regime is one,” but failed amid threats from Hezbollah’s militias.

In Iraq, some women on social media launched the “No to Compulsory Hijab” campaign to support Iranian women facing regime repression and the mandatory dress code.

Also, in Tunisia, human rights and feminist organizations held a rally outside the Iranian Cultural Center to express their support for women in Iran. The demonstrators denounced the discrimination and mistreatment of women in Iran and chanted slogans such as “Tunisian women support Iranian women,” “Here to voice our solidarity with Iranian women,” and “Revolution and freedom.”

The International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH), including a coalition of Arab feminist and human rights groups, issued a statement on October 7, 2022, to express solidarity. The statement, ‘We stand in solidarity with women and demonstrators in Iran,’ condemned the suppression of peaceful protests.

We likely won’t see decisive Arab reactions to the protests in Iran any time soon. Despite Arab grievances to Iran’s regional behavior, states will maintain political neutrality given the uncertain trajectory of the protests.

Furthermore, they may fear exposing themselves ideologically if they endorse foreign protests. Lastly, in a cultural dimension, there is already a wide gulf between how Arabs and Iranians perceive each other. Despite what limited civic action we have seen, these factors inhibit any broad social expression of solidarity as seen in the west.

With the challenging and fading prospects of altering Iran’s behavior or the entire regime from within, Arabs still have other choices. These include waiting for a full-fledged revolution in Iran, capitalizing on international stances and sanctions, and luring its allies to abandon it, as were tried recently with China, Russia, and Iraq.

 

Significance of simultaneous visits of Biden and Putin to West Asia

Simultaneous visits of the presidents of the United States and Russia to the West Asia region signifies East-West confrontation.

Mohammad Hossein Soltanifard, Head of the office representing Iran’s interests in Cairo, said his country is the central part of any equation in the region.

Biden started a 4-day visit to Israel and Saudi Arabia from July 13, 2022. Putin is scheduled to visit Iran on July 19. 2022. Putin will attend a trilateral meeting with the leaders of Iran and Turkey, the so-called Astana format of meetings for Syria-related talks.

Putin's visit to Iran immediately after Biden’s trip to Israel and Saudi Arabia “evokes, once again, the East-West confrontation,” Soltanifard said on Twitter.

Soltanifard added, “Iran will still be the bridge of victory, with the difference that the Islamic Republic of Iran is considered the main part of any equation in the region at this point.”

Soltanifard has been appointed as the representative of Iran’s interests in Egypt recently. He replaced Nasser Kanaani, who is now the spokesman for the Iranian foreign ministry. Soltanifard reached Cairo on July 11.

Earlier, he also praised Cairo's position in opposing the American project to establish an alliance against the Islamic Republic of Iran. “Egypt's opposition to the illusory dream of the United States to create an alliance against the Islamic Republic of Iran in light of the silence of other countries participating in the Jeddah Summit is commendable and understandable.,” he said on Twitter.

He added, “And this project, like the project to create the Greater Middle East and the deal of the century, will be born dead, God willing.”

Iran and Egypt have held a high-level meeting in recent weeks and have agreed to boost their relations, according to a Qatari-owned newspaper.

Citing Egyptian diplomatic sources, Al Araby Al Jadeed said new developments have taken place in the relations between Tehran and Cairo ahead of a mid-July visit by US President Joe Biden to the region.

“A high-level meeting, which took place during the recent visit of Egyptian President Abdel Fattah Al-Sisi to the Sultanate of Oman, brought together Egyptian and Iranian officials,” the sources told Al Araby Al Jadeed in early July.

They added that the meeting was attended by a high-ranking figure from the delegation accompanying the Egyptian president with Omani coordination.

The sources indicated that the meeting “was of a security nature in general, and touched upon the situation in the Gaza Strip and Syria,” adding “there were many points of agreement between the two parties, and that the coming period may witness direct coordination between Cairo and Tehran on issues and matters related to the Strip.”

According to the sources, “during the meeting, an agreement was reached on joint coordination in international forums, as long as that was possible, in light of the desire of Cairo and Tehran to reach a good level of relations, provided that they would gradually improve, according to the developments of events in the region.”

In his visit to Oman, the Egyptian President was accompanied by Foreign Minister Sameh Shoukry, Chief of General Intelligence Abbas Kamel, Minister of Planning Hala Saeed, and a number of other officials.
 

 

Iranian non-oil trade with neighbors up 18% during March-June 2022 quarter

The value of Iran’s non-oil trade with its neighboring countries increased 18% during the first three months of the current Iranian calendar year (March-June), as compared to the same period last year, the spokesman of Islamic Republic of Iran Customs Administration (IRICA) announced.

Ruhollah Latifi put Iran’s non-oil trade with its neighbors at 20.973 million tons worth US$12.363 billion in the three-month period.

He said trade with the neighbors accounted for 49% of the value and 59% of the weight of Iran’s non-oil trade during the period under review.

The country exported 16.05 million tons of non-oil goods worth US$6.736 billion to the neighboring countries in the three-month period of this year, indicating 20% rise in value, while 10% drop in weight, as compared to the same period last year, the official stated.

He named Iraq, Turkey, United Arab Emirates (UAE), Afghanistan, and Oman as the five top export destinations.

Latifi further announced that Iran imported 4.433 million tons of goods worth US$5.627 billion from its neighbors during this period, with 15% growth in value and one percent rise in weight YoY.

He named UAE, Turkey, Russia, Pakistan, and Oman as the five top sources of imports.

As previously announced by the IRICA head, the value of Iran’s non-oil trade with its neighbors during the previous Iranian calendar year 1400 was reported at US$51.875 billion, an increase of 43% YoY.

Alireza Moghadasi put the weight of non-oil trade with the neighboring countries at 100.131 million tons in the said year, stating that trade with the neighbors also increased by 23% in terms of weight.

The official put the annual non-oil exports to the mentioned countries at 75.445 million tons valued at US$26.29 billion, with a 29% rise in value and a 12% growth in weight.

Major export destinations of the Iranian non-oil goods were Iraq with US$8.9 billion, followed by Turkey (US$6.1 billion), United Arab Emirates (US$4.9 billion), Afghanistan US$1.8 billion) and Pakistan with (US$1.3 billion) in imports from the Islamic Republic, others countries included Oman, Russia, Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain, and Saudi Arabia, according to the official.

Moghadasi further stated that Iran imported 24.686 million tons of non-oil commodities worth over US$25.846 billion in the previous year, with a 60% growth in value and a 68%YoY increase in weight.

The United Arab Emirates was the top exporter to Iran during the period exporting US$16.5 billion worth of goods to the country, followed by Turkey, Russia, Iraq, and Oman, he stated.

Pakistan, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, Afghanistan, Armenia, Kuwait, Qatar, and Bahrain were other top neighboring countries that supplied goods to Iran in 1400, respectively.

Increasing non-oil exports to the neighboring countries is one of the major plans that the Iranian government has been pursuing in recent years.

Iran shares land or water borders with 15 countries namely UAE, Afghanistan, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Iraq, Kuwait, Kazakhstan, Oman, Pakistan, Qatar, Russia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, and Saudi Arabia.

bp and Oman enter strategic partnership

bp and the Ministry of Energy and Minerals in Oman have signed a Strategic Framework Agreement (SFA) and a Renewables Data Collection Agreement which will support the potential development of a multiple gigawatt, world-class renewable energy and green hydrogen development in Oman, by 2030. 

As part of the agreement, bp will capture and evaluate solar and wind data from 8,000km2 of land – an area more than five times the size of Greater London. The evaluation will then support the Government of Oman in approving the future developments of renewable energy hubs at suitable locations within this area to take advantage of these resources. The renewable energy resources could also supply renewable power for the development of green hydrogen, targeting both domestic and global export markets.

This partnership represents a significant evolution of bp’s business in Oman and is aligned with bp’s strategy, which includes rapidly growing our developed renewable generating capacity and to take early positions in hydrogen. 

bp Chief Executive Bernard Looney said, “Today’s agreement represents what bp is able to offer as an integrated energy company. These projects will build on our gas business, and bring wind, solar and green hydrogen together in a distinctive and integrated way supporting Oman’s low carbon energy goals. 

“And we’re not just investing in energy. We are investing in Oman to create and develop infrastructure, support local supply chains and cultivate the skills and talent needed to usher in this next generation of energy leaders.  We look forward to working closely with the Omani government to take this forward.”

His Excellency Dr Mohammed Al Rumhy, Minister of Energy & Minerals of the Sultanate of Oman, said, “This is a proud moment for Oman and a significant step towards delivering our 2040 Vision. In partnership with bp, we will progress the development of new, world-class solar and wind resources – generating renewable power for the grid and powering the manufacture of green hydrogen to supply domestic demand and to export to global customers. Over the past 50 years, we’ve advanced our hydrocarbon production. Today’s agreement signals the next step in our energy journey – unlocking the potential for Oman as a low-carbon energy hub”.

The UK’s Minister for Investment Lord Gerry Grimstone added, “Following the signing last week of the UK-Oman Sovereign Investment Partnership, this investment by bp into Oman’s renewable energy sector is a shining example of our countries’ joint ambition to facilitate strategic and commercial bilateral investment. The project demonstrates our shared vision for future prosperity through clean growth, further strengthening the partnership between the United Kingdom and the Sultanate of Oman”.

Under the SFA, bp and Oman will also consider ways to collaborate in a number of areas, including a renewables strategy, regulation, the establishment of a renewable energy hub and the development and reskilling of the local workforce.

Oman has a strong track record in the oil and gas industry, which it has grown over recent years. Today’s announcement, which is subject to final agreement of commercial terms, is an important step towards the country’s 2040 Vision and an opportunity to become a leading low-carbon energy hub. And it would further support the Oman government’s goals of diversifying the economy and bolstering investment. 

bp is committed to growing its business and building on its 15-year history in Oman, where it operates Block 61, which produces a third of the country’s gas demand. In 2020, bp’s Oman business spent US$610 million with Omani-registered companies – 90% of its total spending. And in 2021, bp joined Oman’s national hydrogen alliance, Hy-Fly, to promote the hydrogen industry in Oman, and established a net zero taskforce to help develop a ‘roadmap’ for bp in Oman.

Oman urges Israel to create Palestinian State

Omani Foreign Minister told his Israeli counterpart he hopes Israel's new government will take concrete steps towards creating an independent Palestinian state, with east Jerusalem as its capital, reported Omani state media said on Thursday.

Oman's Badr al-Busaidi spoke by phone to Israel's Foreign Minister Yair Lapid, according to ONA, the state news agency of Oman, which has a longstanding policy of neutrality in the turbulent region and often acts as a mediator.

In February this year, Busaidi said Oman was satisfied with its current relationship with Israel, even after fellow Gulf States the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain normalized ties with Israel last year under US-brokered accords.

Lapid will travel to the United Arab Emirates (UAE) next week in the first official visit by an Israeli minister to the Gulf state since they established diplomatic relations. He will inaugurate the Israeli Embassy in Abu Dhabi and the Consulate General of Israel in Dubai.

Israel and Oman enjoy bilateral relations. In line with the Arab League position in relation to Israel, Oman does not officially recognize the state of Israel and took part in the boycott of Israel during much of the 20th century.

It may be recalled that in 1994, the two countries established unofficial trade relations, which were discontinued in 2000. In 1994, then-Prime Minister of Israel Yitzhak Rabin visited Oman, where he was greeted by Sultan of Oman; Qaboos bin Said al Said in Muscat.

Among other things, the two sides discussed issues such as sharing water and how to improve water supplies.

In 1995, a few days after Rabin was assassinated, then-acting Prime Minister Shimon Peres hosted Omani foreign minister Yusuf bin Alawi bin Abdullah in Jerusalem.

In January 1996, Israel and Oman signed an agreement on the reciprocal opening of trade representative offices.

In 2018, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu led a delegation to Oman and met with Sultan Qaboos and other senior Omani officials.

In February 2019, Omani foreign minister, Yusuf bin Alawi, said that Oman will not normalize its relations with Israel until a sovereign Palestinian state has been established.

Tehran-Muscat stress expansion of economic and banking ties

During a meeting between the Governor of the Central Bank of Iran (CBI) and Oman’s Foreign Affairs Minister Sayyid Badr bin Hamad, in Muscat, the two sides emphasized the necessity of expanding bilateral economic and banking relations.

Addressing the meeting, the Omani minister pointed to the importance of Iran's role and position in the region, and considered the expansion of trade and economic relations between the two countries important.

It should be noted that before this and in the meeting of the CBI governor with the commerce and industry minister of Oman in Tehran last year, strategies for continuous development and facilitation of banking and trade relations between Iran and Oman were discussed.

Hemmati arrived in Muscat on Tuesday for a two-day visit aimed at strengthening trade and banking relations between the two countries, given the new international condition.

Despite the US reimposition of sanctions against Iran, Oman is getting closer to the Islamic Republic both politically and economically. There is also the same approach adopted by Iran, as Iranian companies now prefer to conduct trade with Oman rather than the United Arab Emirates (UAE), given that the UAE is highly complying with the sanctions.

Iran is somehow replacing some of its previous strategic trade partners such as UAE with Oman, considering the Sultanate as an economic-trade hub.

Over the past two years, there have been many meetings and negotiations between trade and economic officials from the state-run and private sectors of the two sides with the aim of strengthening and expanding bilateral trade ties.

During the 18th meeting of the Iran-Oman Joint Economic Committee in Tehran, Omani minister of commerce and industry had said that his country was trying to boost its trade and economic ties with Iran, stressing that this goal could be achieved through more cooperation between the two sides’ private sectors.

Ali bin Masoud al Sunaidy also said, “We will make the most efforts to provide incentives for joint investment and also promote bilateral trade cooperation between the two countries.”

Stressing that a very proper condition is available for invigorating the bilateral trade, the Omani official said the two sides can also take the advantage of bartering to expand their trade ties.

Addressing the same meeting, Iran’s Former Industry, Mining and Trade Minister Reza Rahmani said while there are potential and capabilities for boosting the trade turnover between Iran and Oman to $5 billion, the figure is currently $1 billion.

The International North South Transit Corridor (INSTC) can help the two countries elevate their bilateral trade to this level, the minister noted.

Meanwhile, Iran-Oman Joint Chamber of Commerce and Iran Mine House (IMH) signed a memorandum of understanding on cooperation for the expansion of the Iranian private sector’s presence in Oman in early August, 2020.