The 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war between Azerbaijan and
Armenia had profound repercussions for Iran’s influence and policies
in the South Caucasus. Tehran neither impacted the trajectory of the conflict
nor exerted significant diplomatic influence in ceasefire negotiations and the
ensuing peace agreement.
Though Iran was the most relevant regional power in the
conflict, bordering both Armenia and Azerbaijan, it was sidelined by Turkey and Russia.
Tehran was obliged to align with Ankara and Moscow in supporting
Baku’s territorial conquests, revealing a significant departure from its
traditional pro-Armenia stance.
From
Iran's point of view, it is Tel Aviv that provokes Baku to take a belligerent
policy against Tehran and to challenge the geopolitical status quo.
Azerbaijan did not reciprocate Iran’s good faith. Baku knowingly
isolated Tehran in Nagorno-Karabakh’s reconstruction, while prioritizing Israel
and Arab and European countries.
Backed by mighty military powers such as Turkey, Israel
and Pakistan, Azerbaijan felt it could flex its muscles against Iran’s
regional power projection. Recently, Baku hosted a joint military drill with
Ankara and Islamabad, aiming to further strengthen ties among the
three countries and to bolster counterterrorism efforts.
The
joint drill contradicts the provisions of the Convention on the Legal
Status of the Caspian Sea, which bans the presence in the Caspian Sea of armed
forces not belonging to the Parties" (Azerbaijan, Iran, Kazakhstan, the
Russian Federation and Turkmenistan).
On the margins of the drill, Baku tacitly challenged Iran’s
connectivity with Armenia by disrupting Iranian trucks transiting a road that
passes through Azerbaijan’s newly captured territories. Azerbaijan set up check
points, began charging fees to Iranian trucks, and even detained two
Iranian truckers.
Unlike Azerbaijan’s
attempt to depict recent incidents as routine procedure, Tehran sees this
new, assertive Azerbaijan in a bigger picture, where Baku plays the anti-Iran
puppet role for other regional powers hostile to Iran, such as Israel.
Tehran initially tasked the Revolutionary Guard Corps with
deploying equipment and troops across the country’s northwestern border.
But this was just a small part of Iran’s grand plan to intimidate Baku. Days
later, Tehran launched its own military drill near the Azerbaijani
border, saying "We will never tolerate the presence of the fake
Zionist regime near the Iranian border, nor any changes in the regional borders
and geopolitics”.
This rare move, alongside hawkish comments by Iranian
officials, suggests that Tehran is indeed concerned about the potential
for grave geopolitical changes near its borders.
Iran’s
Kayhan newspaper, a publication close to hardliners, claimed that
based on a Turkish-American plan, Armenia’s western-oriented president, in
collusion with Baku, intends to concede Armenia’s Syunik province to Azerbaijan. This
is the only conceivable reason for Iran’s outrage at Azerbaijan.
Syunik province separates the rest of Azerbaijan from the
Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic exclave, and constitutes the Armenian border
with Iran.
The 2020
peace deal between Azerbaijan and Armenia guaranteed Azerbaijan a corridor
to connect Nakhchivan to the rest of Azerbaijan via Syunik province.
Previously, all connections were made through Iran in the south or
Turkey in the west.
Baku is apparently not satisfied with this plan, and
maintains an ambitious goal to take all of Syunik province, which could put
Iran in a disadvantageous geopolitical position.
Tehran
would lose its connection to Armenia and convenient access to the region, while
being compelled to deal with a newly emboldened regional power that is heavily backed
by Iran’s arch-enemy, Israel.
From Iran’s point of view, it is Tel Aviv that provokes Baku
to take a belligerent policy against Tehran and to challenge the geopolitical
status quo.
The
title Tehran has chosen for its ongoing drills in the country’s northwest
drives this point home ‑ Fatehan-e Khaybar is a call back to
the Battle of Khaybar in the year 628, in which the Prophet Mohammed
confronted the Jews of the Khaybar region, who were inciting Arabian tribes
against the Muslims of Medina.
Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei recently warned
Azerbaijan against aligning with Israel noting, “Those who think that
their security will be ensured by relying on foreigners should know that they
will pay a hefty price.”
The type and scale of military equipment stationed at the
border suggests that Iran intends to deter Baku from territorial adventurism,
but Tehran ultimately wants to avoid an armed clash. If the situation
deteriorates and Azerbaijan opts not to address Tehran’s concerns and warnings,
Iran may cross the border to push preemptive deterrence from Armenian soil. A
key factor at that point would be the extent to which Azerbaijan’s allies,
primarily Turkey, would be prepared to support Baku and participate in a direct
confrontation with Iran.
Meanwhile, Iran seems determined not to step back without
affirming its national security red lines, establishing a credible level of
deterrence, and asserting its undeniable regional role, which has been somewhat
tarnished amid the recent security developments in the South Caucasus.
