Saudi Security Vulnerabilities or Lapses

Saudi Arabia’s decision to stop issuing public warnings of imminent missile and drone attacks shortly before deadly strikes hit Riyadh airport raises serious questions about the kingdom’s security preparedness and crisis management. According to Reuters, the attacks killed at least 18 people and wounded more than 300, exposing the challenges Riyadh faces in protecting its population and maintaining an image of stability amid an escalating regional conflict.

The central question is whether the attacks exposed inherent vulnerabilities in Saudi Arabia’s security arrangements or lapses in managing an emerging threat. The distinction matters because the remedies are different - structural weaknesses require stronger defensive capabilities, while operational failures demand better coordination, timely communication and accountability.

Riyadh appears to have faced competing priorities: acknowledging the growing threat while avoiding public anxiety and disruption to economic activity. However, withholding warnings cannot eliminate danger; it can leave residents and visitors less prepared to respond.

Reuters reported that Saudi Arabia’s early-warning system had remained silent despite mounting Houthi attacks. Officials reportedly told a Western ally that alerts were disruptive and that some citizens had complained about being awakened at night. If accurate, this explanation raises concerns about how public safety was weighed against convenience. An early warning cannot prevent every casualty, but it can give people precious time to seek shelter.

The contrast with Qatar, Bahrain and Kuwait is instructive. Their use of mobile alerts and sirens demonstrates the importance of communicating potential threats, even when warnings disrupt daily routines. Public information should be treated as an essential component of national defence rather than an obstacle to normal economic activity.

Saudi Arabia also faces a formidable structural challenge. Its vast territory contains airports, oil installations, pipelines and other strategic assets that cannot all be protected simultaneously. Limited interceptor supplies and air-defence capacity complicate the task. Strengthening early-warning systems, improving defensive coordination and prioritizing critical infrastructure must therefore go hand in hand.

The economic stakes are substantial. Saudi Arabia’s investment and diversification ambitions depend partly on investor confidence and perceptions of stability. The reported withdrawal of senior oil executives from a major energy conference in Riyadh illustrates how security concerns can disrupt international engagements despite official assurances that economic plans remain on track.

Ultimately, Saudi Arabia must demonstrate that its pursuit of normalcy does not come at the expense of public safety. Whether the problem lies in structural vulnerabilities, operational lapses or both, restoring confidence requires credible warnings, stronger defensive capabilities and effective crisis management. In an era of expanding missile and drone warfare, projecting stability is no substitute for delivering security.

The Iran War: Is the Real Target Saudi Arabia?

The US-Israel war on Iran has exposed a harsh reality: American military dominance does not necessarily translate into political acceptance in the Middle East. More importantly, the conflict has raised a fundamental question about whose security Washington is really protecting.

For decades, the United States has justified its military bases across Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries as essential to protecting Arab monarchies against external threats, particularly Iran. Yet the use of these bases during the war has reinforced a perception that American military power serves Israeli security interests, potentially at the expense of the host countries. Instead of providing an unquestionable security umbrella, these arrangements risk exposing Arab states to retaliation.

China’s mediation of the 2023 Saudi-Iran rapprochement had already challenged Washington’s longstanding narrative that Iran posed a greater threat to Arab interests than Israel. Riyadh’s decision to restore diplomatic relations with Tehran demonstrated that regional security could be pursued through engagement rather than permanent confrontation.

The prolonged disruption of shipping through the Strait of Hormuz, attacks on oil tankers and energy infrastructure, and mounting pressure on Gulf economies have further exposed the vulnerabilities of Arab oil producers. These developments raise a critical question, are GCC states merely collateral victims of the war, or are they also facing strategic pressure to reconsider their regional alignments?

President Donald Trump’s reported request for Russia to supply 300,000 tons of diesel highlights the conflict’s wider energy repercussions. Although this does not establish a hidden agenda, it illustrates how the consequences extend far beyond Iran.

The larger strategic question is whether the conflict is also being used to advance Israel’s regional integration through the Abraham Accords. Saudi Arabia’s recognition of Israel and establishment of diplomatic relations would represent a major diplomatic victory for Benjamin Netanyahu and strengthen Israel’s regional position.

My interpretation is that the war may be evolving into a pressure campaign against GCC monarchies, particularly Saudi Arabia, compelling them to succumb to American pressure: recognize Israel, establish diplomatic relations and accept its regional supremacy.

This remains a strategic hypothesis, not a proven war objective. Nevertheless, it deserves serious scrutiny. The ultimate irony would be that a war ostensibly directed against Iran ends up pressuring Arab monarchies to accept a regional order shaped around Israeli supremacy—while simultaneously weakening confidence in American protection.

Pakistan and Saudi Arabia: From Brotherhood to a Strategic Partnership

Saudi Arabia’s National Day is an appropriate occasion to reflect on a relationship that has evolved from traditional bonds of faith and friendship into a broader strategic partnership. Pakistan and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia have maintained close relations for decades, supported by deep people-to-people contacts, economic cooperation and shared security interests. Today, energy, investment and regional diplomacy are adding new dimensions to this enduring relationship.

Saudi Arabia has consistently stood by Pakistan during periods of economic difficulty. In April 2026, Riyadh agreed to provide an additional US$3 billion deposit to Pakistan while extending its existing US$5 billion deposit for a longer period rather than continuing the earlier annual rollover arrangement. The support is important for Pakistan’s foreign-exchange reserves and external financing requirements.

Oil financing has also remained an important element of bilateral economic cooperation. In February 2025, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia signed a US$1.2 billion oil-import financing facility under which payment for petroleum imports could be deferred for one year. The arrangement helped Pakistan secure energy supplies while easing immediate pressure on its foreign-exchange position.

Such support is valuable, but the relationship is increasingly moving towards investment and productive cooperation. This transition is particularly visible in the energy sector.

Pakistan is working with Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Qatar on a bonded oil-storage scheme under which the Gulf countries would store crude oil and petroleum products in secure facilities in Pakistan at their own cost, with the stocks also potentially serving international markets. The initiative could strengthen Pakistan’s energy security while creating a new commercial and logistical role for the country.

For Pakistan, this opportunity is strategically important. The country remains heavily dependent on imported energy and has historically lacked adequate strategic petroleum reserves. Developing storage capacity for crude and finished products can provide greater protection against international supply disruptions while improving the efficiency of the domestic energy supply chain.

The proposed greenfield refinery represents an even more ambitious opportunity. The project envisages an integrated refinery and petrochemical complex with a minimum crude-processing capacity of 300,000 barrels per day, supported by marine infrastructure, storage, pipelines and related facilities. Saudi Aramco has been associated with the project alongside Pakistani state-owned energy companies.

If implemented successfully, such projects could change the character of Pakistan-Saudi economic relations. Instead of relying primarily on deposits, concessional financing and deferred payments, the two countries can increasingly build a partnership around investment, energy security, industrial production, logistics and trade.

There is another area where Pakistan can make a meaningful contribution - relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran. Pakistan has a unique diplomatic position. It has strategic relations with Saudi Arabia while sharing a border, history and longstanding diplomatic relations with Iran. Islamabad therefore has a natural interest in encouraging communication between Riyadh and Tehran rather than allowing regional rivalries to deepen.

Saudi Arabia and Iran themselves demonstrated in 2023 that dialogue is possible. With China’s facilitation, the two countries agreed to restore diplomatic relations and emphasized respect for sovereignty, non-interference and the peaceful resolution of differences.

Pakistan’s role has become more relevant amid the regional turbulence of 2026. Saudi Arabia publicly welcomed Pakistani mediation efforts in June, while Pakistan has continued to emphasize dialogue and diplomacy. In September, Pakistan’s Foreign Office stated that Islamabad maintains good relations with both Saudi Arabia and Iran and would continue its mediatory role.

Pakistan should build on this position carefully. Its objective should not be to replace established mediators or take responsibility for resolving every regional dispute. Rather, Islamabad can provide a trusted channel for communication, encourage confidence-building measures and facilitate dialogue whenever both sides consider such assistance useful.

Improved Saudi-Iran relations would also serve Pakistan’s interests. Greater stability in the Gulf would reduce risks to energy supplies, maritime trade and regional investment while creating a more favourable environment for economic cooperation.

On Saudi Arabia’s National Day, Pakistan can therefore celebrate more than a historic friendship. The relationship is entering a phase in which financial support remains important, but investment, energy security, industrial cooperation and regional diplomacy can provide its stronger foundations.

For Pakistan, the strategic objective should be to preserve the warmth and trust of its relationship with Saudi Arabia while converting that goodwill into long-term economic cooperation and using its unique position to promote greater regional stability.

Oil producers ‌likely to keep their production targets steady

According to a Reuters report, OPEC+ oil producing countries are ‌likely to keep their oil production targets steady for November when they meet on Sunday.

The online meeting of seven core OPEC+ members, namely: ​Saudi Arabia, Russia, Iraq, Kuwait, Algeria, Kazakhstan and Oman — comes as ⁠Gulf members have been boosting exports that have been disrupted for months by the blockade of Strait of Hurmuz, although most are still pumping well below their output targets.

OPEC+ comprises the Organization ​of the Petroleum Exporting Countries and allies including Russia. OPEC and authorities in Russia did not immediately respond to requests for comment.

The group has been raising its output targets for most of the ​year but kept them steady for October.

In September it completed the phased rollback of a ​1.65 million-barrel-per-day supply cut first agreed in 2023.

Reuters reported in July that OPEC+ was likely to make ‌no changes ⁠to its targets during the fourth quarter as it turns its focus to 2027 quota negotiations. Disruption caused by the Iran war has meant Gulf producers are falling below their quotas.

OPEC data showed the seven core OPEC+ producers produced 25.0 million barrels per ​day in August, ​up 630,000 bpd from ⁠July yet still roughly 5 million bpd below pre-war levels in February.

OPEC+ still has one more layer of production cuts of ​about 2 million bpd covering most members through the end ​of 2026.

The ⁠group needs to finalize a review of members' production capacity before setting 2027 baselines that will determine future quotas and shape plans to unwind those cuts, sources have said.

A separate OPEC+ ministerial group called the Joint Ministerial Monitoring Committee (JMMC), which does not decide policy, ​also meets on Sunday to review the market.

Other GCC Members Must Listen to Qatar

Qatar’s call for a regional security framework bringing the Gulf states and Iran together deserves serious attention from all GCC members. Speaking at the Qatar Economic Forum on the sidelines of the 81st UN General Assembly in New York, Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Sheikh Mohammed bin Abdulrahman Al Thani described the recent regional war as a “wake-up call” for the region.

His argument is straightforward; Iran is a geographical reality and a permanent neighbour of the Gulf states. Sustainable security, therefore, cannot depend exclusively on military alliances or arrangements that leave one or more regional states permanently exposed to insecurity. Doha is advocating a framework based on sovereignty, non-aggression, confidence-building and dialogue.

This does not require the GCC to overlook Iran’s actions or security concerns. Rather, it recognizes that deterrence and diplomacy have different but complementary roles. Military preparedness may deter aggression, but it cannot by itself eliminate the sources of recurring confrontation.

Recent developments have demonstrated how quickly a regional conflict can affect energy supplies, shipping routes, investment, trade and global markets.

Sheikh Mohammed described the economic consequences of the US-Israel war on Iran as an “earthquake” whose shock waves extended far beyond the Middle East.

The Gulf states have strong reasons to coordinate their security policies. But coordination among GCC members alone cannot address every source of regional tension. Geography makes coexistence with Iran unavoidable, while economic interdependence makes prolonged instability increasingly costly.

Qatar has also emphasized mediation, maintaining communication channels and working with regional and international partners to reduce tensions. Such efforts may not resolve fundamental differences, but they can create mechanisms for managing them.

The real question is therefore not whether the GCC should abandon deterrence or its external security partnerships. It is whether these arrangements should be complemented by a regional security architecture in which Gulf states and Iran can address threats, build confidence and prevent crises from escalating into wider conflicts.

Other GCC members may indeed have much to consider in Qatar’s proposal. A durable Gulf security system will ultimately require regional ownership, mutual confidence and sustained communication—including with Iran.

Are Houthis Attacking Saudi Oil Tankers - or Is There a Bigger Story?

The reports that Yemen’s Houthis are attacking Saudi oil tankers deserve closer examination. Not because such attacks are impossible, but because the emerging narrative may be more complicated than it appears.

During the height of Israel’s assault on Gaza, the Houthis declared that their maritime campaign was directed primarily against Israeli-owned or Israel-linked vessels and ships carrying goods to and from Israel. Their stated objective was to pressure Israel over Gaza. Against this background, the reported targeting of Saudi tankers represents a significant development.

There is little doubt that Houthi military operations have disrupted commercial shipping in the Red Sea and surrounding waters. But disruption of Saudi shipping does not necessarily mean that every incident represents a deliberate Houthi campaign against Saudi Arabia. The Red Sea, Bab el-Mandeb and Suez Canal form one interconnected maritime corridor. Once security deteriorates, vessels of different nationalities become exposed.

This distinction matters because the dominant Western narrative - “Iran-backed Houthis are attacking Saudi oil tankers and installations” - can simplify a complex regional conflict. Attribution should be based on evidence, while the political context surrounding each incident deserves equal attention.

There is another question that cannot simply be dismissed as conspiracy theory, who benefits from heightened insecurity around Saudi Arabia?

A prolonged Houthi threat could encourage Riyadh to deepen its security relationship with Washington, strengthen arguments for a US security umbrella, increase American arms sales to Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states, and potentially create greater pressure for Saudi Arabia to move closer to the Abraham Accords.

None of these possibilities proves that another actor is secretly attacking Saudi ships. Claims about covert operations or CIA-linked groups require evidence and should not be presented as established fact.

Yet history demonstrates that major geopolitical confrontations rarely involve only the actors appearing on the battlefield. Different powers can exploit the same crisis to advance their own strategic interests.

Therefore, the real issue may not simply be whether Houthis are attacking Saudi oil tankers. The more important question is whether Houthi attacks—and the narrative surrounding them—are becoming instruments in a much larger struggle over Saudi Arabia’s security choices, regional alignments and America’s continuing influence in the Gulf.

Iran attacks damage US diplomatic facilities

US diplomatic facilities in four Gulf countries suffered around US$184 million in estimated damages from Iranian military strikes, reports The Hill.

These facilities are located in Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), says a Pentagon 44-page report, the first one since the US and Israel launched the war in late February. 

The heaviest damage was sustained in Iraq with over US$157 million in costs, followed by Kuwait with more than US$14 million in damages and US$11.5 million in Saudi Arabia.

In the UAE, the US diplomatic post suffered US$125,000 in damages.

The US mission in Iraq experienced over 600 Iranian attacks. 

The Iranian military has targeted various US military bases in the Gulf since Operation Epic Fury kicked off on February 28 this year.

Tehran has also inflicted heavy damages on diplomatic and intelligence outposts in those countries. 

From February 28 to June 29, the Pentagon has estimated the cost of war to be US$33.4 billion, but that does not include costs for infrastructure repairs.

In July, Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth told Senate lawmakers that the Iran war’s estimated cost was US$37.5 billion, a sum that some experts argued was a low estimate. 

The State Department, meanwhile, reported that as of June 2, it had incurred US$113 million in costs related to the war and “as it continues to assess damage, costs are likely to rise.”

In addition, 18 US service members have been killed and some 800 wounded in the more than six-month war.

About 50,000 American troops are still deployed to the region, with the Trump administration yet to provide a clear exit strategy from the deeply unpopular conflict. 

Top administration officials have at times downplayed the damages Iranian one-way attack drones and missiles have inflicted on US military bases, aircraft and other assets in the US Central Command (Centcom) theater. 

Last week, President Trump denied news reports that several US military jets were damaged in Iran’s attack on Muwaffaq Salti Air Base in Jordan. 

“None whatsoever. No damage. No nothing,” the president said in an interview with The Hill’s sister network NewsNation when asked about one A-10 Thunderbolt losing a wing and eight F-15s sustained light damage. 

More than 50 US aircraft have been damaged or destroyed since the Iran war began, according to the watchdog’s report, including 4 F-15Es, seven KC-135 refueling aircraft, four AH-6 helicopters and at least 30 MQ-9 Reaper drones. 

But some top officials were more candid. 

“They blew the hell out of Bahrain,” the acting US Navy Secretary Hung Cao said in an interview last week with The Epoch Times when asked about the level of damage Naval Support Activity Bahrain (NASB), which serves as the headquarters for US Naval Forces Central Command and the US Fifth Fleet, had sustained since the conflict began. 

The Navy has used the NASB as its main logistics hub in the Middle East. The service branch is weighing what to do with the base, including if it should be repaired. 

“I have a task force that’s looking at that,” Cao said.

 

OPEC Plus keeps oil output policy unchanged

OPEC Plus kept its oil output policy unchanged for ‌October at a meeting on Sunday, as the producer group needs to agree new quotas before deciding its next output steps.

The meeting of seven core OPEC+ members — Saudi Arabia, ​Russia, Iraq, Kuwait, Algeria, Kazakhstan and Oman — comes as the US-Israel war on Iran continues to ​disrupt oil exports through the Strait of Hormuz, limiting OPEC+'s influence over prices ⁠and market share.

In August, OPEC+ agreed its production boost for September, completing a phased rollback ​of a 1.65 million barrel per day supply cut first agreed in 2023.

Despite the agreed production increases, ​the group made up of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries and its allies, including Russia, still produces far below its targets because of the war.

"OPEC+ currently has ​very limited power over the physical oil market," said Jorge Leon of Rystad Energy. "The group ​can change production targets on paper, but it cannot guarantee that those barrels will be produced or ‌actually ⁠reach the market."

"The focus now shifts away from monthly production adjustments and towards the much more consequential debate over 2027."

OPEC+ still has another layer of production cuts in place, covering most members of the 21-country group until the end of 2026. Before the group decides ​how to unwind the ​cuts and return production ⁠to the market, it needs to review members' oil production capacity to set 2027 output baselines, which form the basis for quotas.

This ​debate will likely happen later in 2026 and hence OPEC+ is ​likely to pause ⁠its output increases for the fourth quarter, sources earlier told Reuters. The statement on Sunday made no mention of policy beyond October.

Only the seven OPEC+ members who met on Sunday, plus ⁠the United ​Arab Emirates until it left OPEC in May, have ​been involved in monthly output decisions in recent years.

Formation of Multinational Maritime Defense Alliance

The founding members of the Multinational Maritime Defense Alliance on Thursday approvedthe establishment of the coalition as a framework for maritime defense cooperation, with Saudi Arabia designated as its founding nation, leader and permanent headquarters.

In a joint statement, the founding states said growing threats to global maritime security require stronger collective cooperation to protect freedom of navigation, international trade routes and global energy supply lines through the Bab al-Mandab Strait, the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden.

The alliance said it will operate in accordance with international law, United Nations conventions and internationally recognized norms to enhance maritime security, safeguard international shipping and protect shared maritime interests.

The participating countries agreed to establish the alliance's Joint Command, command-and-control centers, Joint Maritime Operations Center and General Secretariat in Saudi Arabia as its principal executive bodies.

The statement reaffirmed the founding members' commitment to the purposes and principles of the UN Charter, international law and globally recognized treaties and norms, describing maritime security as a shared responsibility that requires close coordination to address common and transnational threats.

The participating countries said they will continue completing their domestic legal and constitutional procedures to formally accede to the alliance's charter.

Under the agreement, members will expand cooperation in maritime security, intelligence and information sharing, operational planning, joint exercises, training, capacity building, lessons learned and joint maritime operations in accordance with the alliance's charter.

The statement stressed that the alliance is purely defensive in nature and is not directed against any country, alliance or international organization. It said all activities will be conducted in full compliance with international law, respect for state sovereignty and the protection of freedom of navigation, while participation in alliance activities and operations will remain a sovereign decision for each member state.

The founding members also invited other countries that share the alliance's objectives and principles to join the charter, saying broader participation would strengthen collective maritime security in the Bab al-Mandab Strait, the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden.

The statement described the alliance as a strategic step toward enhancing maritime security, deepening defense cooperation among its members and supporting regional and global stability, while complementing international efforts to preserve international peace and security.

Earlier on Thursday, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, Pakistan, Türkiye, Egypt, Jordan, Yemen, Bangladesh, Nigeria, Sudan, Djibouti and Somalia endorsed the alliance and welcomed agreement on its founding arrangements, while additional countries expressed support and are completing their national procedures before joining the initiative.

Strait of Hormuz: A Case for Regional Stewardship

The Strait of Hormuz is the world's most critical energy corridor, carrying nearly one-fifth of global oil and liquefied natural gas supplies. Any disruption in this narrow waterway sends shockwaves through energy markets, raises shipping and insurance costs, and threatens global economic stability. A disappointing fact is that due to decades of external military involvement, the Strait has remained vulnerable to recurring crises.

Recent diplomatic developments offer an opportunity to rethink its security architecture. Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi has called for closer regional cooperation, while Oman has proposed establishing a joint maritime mechanism involving Iran and the Gulf states. Inspired by the Strait of Malacca, the proposal envisages voluntary contributions from users of the waterway to finance navigation safety, environmental protection, search-and-rescue operations, and maritime coordination.

The Malacca model demonstrates that strategic waterways can be managed effectively through cooperation among the littoral states. A similar arrangement in the Gulf could bring together Iran, Oman, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Bahrain, Kuwait, and Iraq in a permanent institutional framework dedicated to ensuring safe and uninterrupted navigation.

Such a mechanism would coordinate vessel traffic, strengthen maritime safety, improve emergency response, protect the marine environment, and establish communication channels to prevent misunderstandings from escalating into conflict. More importantly, it would place responsibility in the hands of those with the greatest stake in preserving regional stability.

The economic case is equally compelling. Every Gulf state depends on secure sea lanes for energy exports, trade, and investment. A stable Strait would reduce insurance premiums, lower transportation costs, strengthen investor confidence, and enhance global energy security.

Regional stewardship should not be viewed as excluding the international community. Freedom of navigation is a shared global interest, and countries benefiting from the Strait can continue supporting its operations through voluntary financial contributions, as they do in the Strait of Malacca. Operational responsibility should rest with the littoral states.

The Strait of Hormuz should become a symbol of cooperation rather than confrontation. By establishing a credible regional maritime framework, Gulf nations can safeguard one of the world's most vital trade routes while demonstrating that regional challenges are best addressed through regional leadership, shared responsibility, and sustained diplomatic engagement.

The Shifting Battle: From Oil to Shipping Corridors

For much of the twentieth century, oil was regarded as the world's most powerful geopolitical weapon. In the twenty-first century, however, control over global shipping corridors may prove equally—if not more—consequential. Whoever can influence the world's maritime chokepoints can shape not only energy supplies but also international trade, supply chains, and economic stability. Against this backdrop, the Red Sea appears to be emerging as the next major strategic battleground.

Following months of disruption around the Strait of Hormuz, growing concerns are now centered on the security of commercial shipping through the Red Sea. Together, the Strait of Hormuz, the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, and the Suez Canal constitute one of the world's most vital maritime corridors, carrying a substantial share of global trade, including oil, liquefied natural gas, manufactured goods, agricultural commodities, and containerized cargo. Any prolonged disruption would ripple across continents through higher freight costs, supply-chain bottlenecks, inflationary pressures, and increased energy prices.

The immediate question is not simply who is attacking commercial vessels, but who stands to gain from sustained instability in these strategic waterways.

Western governments and much of the international media have attributed recent attacks to Yemen's Houthi movement, arguing that the group continues to target maritime traffic as part of its confrontation with Israel and its Western allies. Given the Houthis' own public statements and previous operations, this explanation cannot be dismissed.

Yet geopolitics is rarely straightforward.

Military confrontations are increasingly accompanied by information warfare, where competing narratives emerge almost as rapidly as military events themselves. Some analysts caution against assigning responsibility before credible, independent investigations establish the facts. Premature conclusions can become powerful geopolitical tools, shaping public opinion and diplomatic responses long before evidence is fully examined.

Another line of analysis raises a different possibility. It suggests that if vessels linked to Saudi Arabia increasingly become targets, the objective may extend beyond disrupting commercial shipping. Such incidents could undermine the fragile rapprochement between Riyadh and Tehran, reviving regional rivalries that had begun to ease after years of confrontation. Those who favour a polarized Middle East would clearly benefit from renewed distrust between the region's two most influential powers.

There is also the Israeli dimension. Since the outbreak of the Gaza conflict, the Houthis have repeatedly declared that their maritime campaign is intended to pressure Israel by disrupting shipping linked to Israeli interests. If commercial traffic through the Red Sea becomes increasingly constrained, Israel's trade routes could face significant economic and logistical challenges. However, if the pattern of attacks shifts from Israeli-linked shipping toward Saudi-linked vessels, analysts will inevitably ask whether the conflict is being redirected by actors pursuing broader geopolitical objectives.

History suggests that great powers compete not only for natural resources but also for the routes that transport them. The struggle is no longer confined to controlling oil fields. Increasingly, the ability to influence strategic maritime corridors has become a source of geopolitical leverage. Disrupting a major shipping route can impose economic costs on multiple countries simultaneously without direct military confrontation.

Whether the current tensions represent an extension of the Israel-Houthi conflict, an attempt to derail Saudi-Iranian reconciliation, or a broader contest for influence over global shipping corridors remains an open question. What appears increasingly clear is that in today's interconnected world, strategic power lies not only beneath the ground in oil reserves but also on the sea lanes that connect continents.

The nation—or coalition—that can influence these maritime arteries possesses a powerful instrument of geopolitical leverage. In the twenty-first century, control of shipping corridors may prove even more valuable than control of the cargo itself.

Beyond Hormuz: Is Yemen the New Diversion?

The attempt by an Iranian aircraft to land in Houthi-controlled Yemen, and the swift response by Saudi-backed Yemeni forces to prevent it, should not be viewed as an isolated aviation incident. It may represent another chapter in the wider geopolitical contest unfolding across the Middle East. More importantly, it raises a strategic question: Is the focus on Yemen intended to shift international attention away from the Strait of Hormuz?

For decades, the Strait of Hormuz has remained the world's most critical maritime energy corridor. Roughly one-fifth of global oil and a significant share of liquefied natural gas exports pass through this narrow waterway. Any instability there has immediate consequences for energy prices, inflation, global trade and financial markets. It is also the one strategic chokepoint where Iran possesses considerable geographic leverage.

Against this backdrop, renewed attention to Yemen is unlikely to be accidental. By reigniting tensions around Sanaa, the Red Sea and Bab el-Mandeb, Washington and its regional partners can compel Iran to divide its strategic focus. Instead of concentrating on Hormuz, Tehran must also devote diplomatic, military and logistical resources to protecting its interests in Yemen.

For Saudi Arabia, preventing Iranian flights from landing in Houthi-held territory serves immediate security objectives. For the United States, the broader strategic benefit lies in expanding the theatre of competition. A conflict confined to Hormuz leaves Iran operating in its strongest geographic position. A conflict stretching from the Persian Gulf to the Red Sea forces Tehran to manage multiple fronts simultaneously, thereby diluting its leverage.

Whether this reflects a carefully coordinated strategy or the convergence of regional interests remains open to debate. Yet the cumulative effect is unmistakable: international attention shifts from Hormuz to Yemen, from energy security to aviation disputes, and from the Persian Gulf to the Red Sea.

The Middle East has long demonstrated that perception is as important as military capability. In modern geopolitics, shaping the narrative often shapes policy. The latest confrontation in Yemen may therefore be less about one aircraft than about redirecting the world's strategic gaze. While headlines focus on Sanaa, the Strait of Hormuz—the true center of the region's geopolitical gravity—risks fading into the background. That, in itself, may be the most significant development.

Who Governs Yemen?

The emergency meeting of Yemen's Presidential Leadership Council in Riyadh over Iran's direct flight to Sanaa raises a fundamental question, who actually governs Yemen today?

The Council described the flight as a violation of Yemen's sovereignty and international law. Yet the very fact that the country's internationally recognized leadership convened outside Yemen inevitably invites scrutiny.

Governments derive legitimacy not only from international recognition but also from their ability to exercise effective authority over their own territory. In practical terms, the Houthis control Sanaa and much of northern Yemen, while the Presidential Leadership Council continues to rely heavily on external political and security support.

This reality reflects the uncomfortable truth that Yemen has evolved into a battleground where competing regional and global powers pursue strategic interests through local actors. Iran openly backs the Houthis, while the internationally recognized government enjoys diplomatic and military support from a coalition led by Saudi Arabia and backed by the United States.

The strategic significance of Yemen extends far beyond its internal politics. Sitting at the entrance to the Red Sea through the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, Yemen occupies one of the world's most critical maritime chokepoints. Whoever influences this corridor can affect international trade, energy supplies, and naval movements linking Europe and Asia.

It is therefore unsurprising that many analysts believe the broader contest in Yemen is less about restoring democratic governance and more about securing geopolitical influence over one of the world's busiest shipping routes. In this interpretation, Washington's overriding objective is to maintain strategic leverage over the Red Sea, while regional allies inevitably become participants in a much larger geopolitical competition.

Saudi Arabia is frequently portrayed as the principal architect of Yemen's prolonged conflict. Such a characterization, however, overlooks the wider strategic calculations of global powers. Riyadh has undoubtedly made decisions that attract criticism, but reducing the conflict to a Saudi-Iran rivalry ignores the interests of larger actors whose strategic priorities extend well beyond Yemen itself.

The tragedy is that while external powers compete for influence over a vital maritime corridor, the Yemeni people continue to pay the highest price. The real battle may not simply be for Yemen, but for control of one of the world's most strategically important waterways.

Pak-Iran energy cooperation: Geopolitics Limits Economic Choices

For decades, Pakistan has relied on imported energy to meet its growing requirements. Crude oil, refined petroleum products and LNG have largely come from Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Qatar, creating deep economic and strategic linkages with the Gulf region.

However, Pakistan’s energy map has also been shaped by geopolitical realities. Energy cooperation with Iran has remained limited, largely due to international sanctions on Tehran, particularly those imposed by the United States. The Iran-Pakistan gas pipeline remains one of the clearest examples of how strategic considerations can override economic logic.

At a time when Pakistan faces persistent energy shortages, high import costs and pressure on foreign exchange reserves, the question of affordable and diversified energy supplies has become increasingly important. Yet, despite recent improvement in Pakistan-US relations and public expressions of cooperation from both sides, the sensitive issue of Iranian energy imports remains largely absent from the discussion.

Pakistan also faces potential financial consequences linked to delays in implementing the Iran-Pakistan gas pipeline agreement. This highlights a broader dilemma: whether Pakistan’s energy decisions are being driven primarily by economic necessity or constrained by a larger geopolitical environment.

Iran, as a neighbouring country with significant energy resources, could theoretically provide Pakistan with another supply option. Any such engagement, however, would require Islamabad to carefully balance relations with Washington and its longstanding partnerships with key Gulf energy suppliers.

The issue is not simply about choosing one partner over another. Pakistan’s challenge is that energy security, diplomacy and global power politics are now deeply interconnected. In an ideal economic environment, the cheapest and most reliable energy source would naturally attract demand. In reality, international relations often influence commercial decisions.

This has led some analysts to question whether Pakistan has sufficient strategic space to pursue every economically attractive opportunity, including potential energy cooperation with Iran.

For Pakistan, the long-term objective must be an energy policy that maximizes national interest while managing external sensitivities. A country with growing economic ambitions cannot afford energy insecurity, but it must also navigate the complex realities of global alliances.

The emerging debate is therefore not only about Iran, sanctions or pipelines. It is about whether Pakistan can build an energy strategy where economic priorities and geopolitical realities find a workable balance.

OPEC+ to raise oil output by 188,000 bpd

Seven OPEC+ countries have agreed to increase their combined crude oil output targets by 188,000 barrels per day (bpd) in July. This is the same as the June hike, which was adjusted down from monthly increases of 206,000 bpd in May and April to ⁠take into account the UAE exit.

The decision was taken by the countries—Saudi Arabia, Russia, Iraq, Kuwait, Kazakhstan, Algeria, and Oman—during their virtual meeting held on Sunday to review global market conditions and outlook.

This increase marks the fourth monthly quota hike under the group's phased unwinding of voluntary supply cuts, though the physical realization of these barrels currently remains limited due to the blockade of the Strait of Hormuz.

Seven OPEC+ countries have increased their output quotas from April to June this year by almost 600,000 barrels per day. In their collective commitment to support oil market stability, the seven countries decided to implement a production adjustment of 188,000 bpd from the additional voluntary adjustments announced in April 2023. This adjustment will be implemented from next month.

The additional voluntary adjustments announced in April 2023 may be returned in part or in full subject to evolving market conditions and in a gradual manner. The countries will continue to closely monitor and assess market conditions, and in their continuous efforts to support market stability, they reaffirmed the importance of adopting a cautious approach and retaining full flexibility to increase, pause or reverse the phase out of the voluntary production adjustments, including reversing the previously implemented voluntary adjustments announced in November 2023.

The seven OPEC+ countries noted that this measure will provide an opportunity for the participating countries to accelerate their compensation. These countries reiterated their collective commitment to achieve full conformity with the Declaration of Cooperation, including the additional voluntary production adjustments that will be monitored by the Joint Ministerial Monitoring Committee (JMMC).
They also confirmed their intention to fully compensate for any overproduced volume since January 2024. The compensation period will be extended until the end of December 2026.

Game Spoilers in the Gulf Conflict

As the confrontation between the United States and Iran drags on without a decisive outcome, the risk of “game spoilers” entering the conflict appears to be increasing. In every prolonged geopolitical crisis, there are actors that benefit not from peace, but from deeper mistrust, wider confrontation, and permanent instability.

Recent attacks on the UAE and Saudi Arabia have once again intensified regional tensions. Predictably, fingers were pointed towards Iran. Yet the opaque nature of modern hybrid warfare makes definitive attribution increasingly difficult. Drone strikes, sabotage operations, and covert attacks are often designed to create confusion before facts fully emerge.

This raises an uncomfortable but important question: does Iran genuinely benefit from escalating hostilities with Gulf Arab states at this particular moment?

The answer is far from straightforward.

The UAE, particularly Dubai, depends heavily on regional stability to sustain its position as a financial, logistics, and commercial hub. Saudi Arabia’s Vision 2030 also requires calm energy markets and investor confidence. Iran, meanwhile, urgently needs uninterrupted oil exports — especially shipments destined for China — to stabilize its sanction-hit economy. A prolonged disruption in the Strait of Hormuz would damage Tehran as much as its Arab neighbors.

If all major regional players need stable oil flows, then who benefits from widening the Arab-Iranian divide?

This is where the possibility of “game spoilers” deserves attention. Any gradual rapprochement between Gulf capitals and Tehran could reduce regional polarization, weaken dependence on external security arrangements, and create new economic alignments across the Middle East. Such an outcome may not suit every strategic actor involved in the region.

History shows that Middle Eastern conflicts are rarely shaped solely by declared combatants. Proxy warfare, covert operations, intelligence manipulation, and narrative management have long remained part of the geopolitical landscape.

None of this proves the existence of a hidden hand behind recent attacks. However, dismissing the possibility entirely may also be naive. In today’s Middle East, perception itself has become a weapon.

The real danger may not only be missiles and drones, but the invisible forces attempting to ensure that Arabs and Iranians remain locked in perpetual suspicion and confrontation.

MBS Silence and Strategic Pressure

The unusually restrained posture of Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MBS) during the ongoing US-Israel war on Iran reflects a deeper geopolitical shift unfolding across the Middle East. For decades, Washington’s regional strategy relied heavily on portraying Iran as the principal threat to Arab security. However, the China-brokered rapprochement between Saudi Arabia and Iran weakened that narrative and signaled growing strategic independence within the Gulf.

Equally significant is Riyadh’s continued reluctance to join the Abraham Accords despite persistent pressure from the United States. Several Gulf states now appear increasingly cautious about unconditional alignment with Washington’s regional priorities.

Against this backdrop, the renewed legal attention to the Jamal Khashoggi case in France carries significance beyond the human rights dimension alone. A French anti-terrorism judge has been tasked with investigating allegations linked to Khashoggi’s killing inside the Saudi consulate in Istanbul in 2018 — years after Turkey transferred proceedings to Saudi authorities and the United States effectively closed related civil litigation by granting immunity protections to MBS.

There is no evidence of direct political coordination behind the French inquiry. Yet, in geopolitics, timing often shapes perception as much as facts themselves. The reopening of a dormant controversy at a moment of visible divergence between Washington and Riyadh inevitably invites broader strategic interpretation.

Whether the renewed focus on Khashoggi is purely judicial or partly geopolitical may become clearer in the months ahead, particularly if tensions between the United States and Saudi Arabia continue to widen.

UAE and Fractured Middle East

Since endorsing the Abraham Accords, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) has recast itself as a forward-looking state prioritizing economic opportunity over ideological rigidity. Normalization with Israel opened avenues in trade, technology, and finance, but it also stirred unease across sections of the Muslim world, where the move is still viewed as a departure from collective positioning on Palestine.

The discomfort is not merely rhetorical. Within parts of the Arab region, policy circles continue to debate whether such outreach weakens negotiating leverage on longstanding geopolitical disputes. Even in the United States—a principal architect of the accords—analysts have quietly flagged the risks of accelerated realignments that outpace regional stability.

Dubai’s rise as a global financial hub adds complexity to this equation. Increased capital flows, including those linked to Israeli networks, have energized its economy, but they also expose it to heightened scrutiny in an era of sanctions enforcement and financial transparency. Longstanding discussions in compliance circles about the emirate’s role in facilitating trade with Iran further underscore the delicate balance it must maintain.

Recent regional tensions have brought these vulnerabilities into sharper focus. Reports of attacks targeting strategic assets in Dubai—amid conflicting narratives about their origin—highlight a critical reality, economic hubs cannot remain insulated from geopolitical rivalries.

The UAE’s strategy reflects ambition and pragmatism, but also risk. In a region where alliances shift rapidly, economic integration without parallel security insulation may prove a fragile proposition.

Emerging UAE Role in the US–Iran Equation

The proposition that the United States may be quietly positioning the United Arab Emirates (UAE), particularly Dubai—as a forward proxy against Iran is gaining traction, but it demands a measured and fact-driven reading rather than a dramatic conclusion.

The strategic backdrop has undeniably shifted since the Abraham Accords. These agreements did more than normalize UAE-Israel relations; these created a wider geopolitical architecture that strengthened US influence and recalibrated regional alignments vis-à-vis Iran. Analysts increasingly view this framework as part of a broader containment strategy, linking security, trade corridors, and intelligence cooperation.

At the same time, Iran’s perception of the UAE has hardened. The ongoing conflict in 2026 has seen direct strikes, diplomatic downgrades, and rising mistrust, effectively pushing bilateral relations into open hostility. This escalation reinforces the idea that the UAE is no longer a neutral economic intermediary, but an exposed frontline state—whether by choice or circumstance.

Geography amplifies this vulnerability. The narrow Persian Gulf places the UAE within immediate operational range of Iran. While this proximity could, in theory, offer logistical advantages for surveillance or rapid deployment, it simultaneously makes Emirati infrastructure an easy target. Recent attacks on shipping and critical assets in the region underline how quickly economic zones can turn into strategic pressure points.

However, the leap from “strategic partner” to “proxy battlefield” remains analytically weak. Dubai’s role as a global financial and logistics hub imposes hard constraints. Its economic model is built on stability, openness, and investor confidence—factors fundamentally incompatible with sustained military confrontation. Turning such a hub into a Launchpad for ground operations would impose costs far exceeding any tactical gain.

Equally important is the UAE’s own signaling. Despite deepening security ties with Washington, it has publicly resisted the use of its territory for offensive operations and has consistently called for de-escalation. This suggests a calibrated approach: align strategically, but avoid becoming the battlefield.

The more credible interpretation, therefore, lies in the evolving nature of modern conflict. The UAE is emerging not as a warfront, but as a strategic node—facilitating intelligence sharing, surveillance capabilities, and logistical depth within a US-led framework. In contemporary geopolitics, influence is often projected through networks rather than invasions.

In essence, the UAE’s role in the US–Iran equation is expanding, but within limits. It is a partner, a pressure point, and at times a target—but not, at least for now, a chosen battlefield.

Riyadh Returns to Iran Threat Narrative

In the aftermath of Iran’s 1979 Islamic Revolution, the United States recalibrated its regional strategy, increasingly presenting Tehran as the principal source of instability in the Middle East. Over time, this framing found resonance in several Arab capitals, particularly in Saudi Arabia, shaping a security outlook that continues to influence regional policy choices.

This perception was reinforced through tangible measures. The expansion of US military infrastructure across the Gulf—most prominently in Qatar—was justified largely on the premise of countering Iranian influence. Simultaneously, Washington sustained economic pressure on Tehran over its nuclear program, despite Iran’s status as a signatory to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, in contrast to Israel’s longstanding ambiguity.

Historical episodes added further complexity. The Iran-Iraq war entrenched regional rivalries, while later diplomatic efforts—including the nuclear agreement under President Barack Obama and the China-brokered rapprochement between Riyadh and Tehran—offered brief openings for recalibration. Yet such initiatives have struggled to overcome deeply embedded mistrust, particularly amid shifting US policies and competing geopolitical interests.

Recent remarks by Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Faisal bin Farhan reflect a return to a more cautious, if not hardened, posture. His assertion that trust in Iran has been “completely shattered,” alongside allegations of destabilizing activities across the region, underscores Riyadh’s growing concerns about security and sovereignty. These claims are rooted in reported attacks on energy infrastructure and maritime navigation, which Saudi Arabia and its partners attribute to Iran.

Tehran, however, has consistently rejected such accusations, framing its actions as defensive and, at times, suggesting that regional escalations are shaped by broader geopolitical contestation. Independent verification of specific incidents remains contested, contributing to a narrative environment marked as much by perception as by provable fact.

What emerges is not merely a dispute over actions, but over interpretation. Saudi Arabia’s current stance appears closely aligned with a long-standing US strategic framing that positions Iran as the central regional threat. While this perspective reflects genuine security concerns, it also risks narrowing the analytical lens through which complex regional dynamics are understood.

The persistence of this narrative suggests that, despite episodic diplomacy and shifting alliances, foundational perceptions remain largely intact. In effect, Riyadh’s position today echoes a familiar refrain—one shaped over decades—where Iran continues to be viewed as the primary challenge to regional stability.