The recent collapse of Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Syria
marks a significant and unexpected development for Iran, comparable in its
surprise to the Taliban’s swift takeover of Kabul in 2021. Iran has been a
steadfast ally of Assad, who thought the cost of resistance is less
than the cost of compromise. Tehran provided Damascus with substantial military
and financial support throughout the Syrian civil war. The sudden downfall of
Assad’s government not only disrupts Iran’s strategic foothold in the Levant
but also challenges its influence in the broader Middle East region.
The rapid fall of the Western-backed government in Kabul —
with which Tehran had sought to engage diplomatically to maintain stability
along Iran’s eastern border — similarly caught the Iranian leadership off
guard. This event as well as Assad’s toppling both underscore the volatility of
regional alliances and the complexities Iran faces in navigating its foreign
policy objectives amid rapidly changing political landscapes.
While Iran had at least prepared for a scenario of the
Taliban’s return and established some contacts and exchanges with the group
even before the latter returned to power, the collapse of the Assad
regime, described as a key link in the Axis of Resistance, came more
suddenly.
Only a few days before the fall of Damascus to the Hayat
Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), Iran started evacuating its key assets and personnel,
including high-ranking military advisors and members of the Islamic
Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), to save critical resources.
It is vital for Iran at this point to secure a role in
shaping the future of Syria’s political landscape to prevent an adversarial
government and to be able to preserve some level of strategic influence in the
region.
Although the common border with Afghanistan is perhaps the
number one security concern for Iran to the east, Syria’s strategic value
cannot be overstated when it comes to Iran’s western flank.
Syria was the heart of the resistance, which
provided a direct link to Hezbollah in Lebanon and supported Iran’s deterrence
against Israel. Thus, losing Syria not only disrupts the Axis of Resistance but
also weakens Iran’s ability to project power in the region.
In the absence of Iranian proxies on the ground, the
resulting power vacuum is likely to be filled by Turkey or Saudi Arabia, which
in turn could force Iran to redirect its focus to defending its interests in
other places.
At home, the legitimacy of the Iranian regime was severely
damaged by its violent crackdowns on the Mahsa Amini protests in late
2022-early 2023. At the same time, Iran’s broad and substantial investments in
Syria and elsewhere, which many Iranians saw as a costly miscalculation,
intensified public criticism and political dissent over neglected economic
issues.
Fears that their country could follow a path toward civil
war, similar to those in Syria and Libya, deterred some from advocating for
regime change at any cost. If Syria now descends into another civil war with
further destruction, it could validate these concerns. However, if Syria
manages to form an inclusive and stable government free of revenge, it could
inspire Iranians.
In the aftermath of Assad’s collapse, Tehran will likely
recalibrate its regional strategy, strengthening its militia networks,
particularly Hezbollah and Shi’a militias in Syria and Iraq as the primary
focus. These will need to serve as Tehran’s primary tool for projecting power
in the absence of a friendly Syrian government.
Iran may also attempt to expand its regional alliances with
Russia and China to sustain its ambitions. However, given the outcome of its
previous reliance on Moscow to protect the Assad regime, Iran may need to
recalculate the level of Russian support it can truly expect.
Rethinking its Syria policy may additionally encourage
Tehran to shift from overt to covert approaches — a potentially challenging aim
due to Iran’s over-stretched resources.
Assad’s downfall marks a significant setback for Iran’s
regional strategy, disrupting the latter’s network of alliances and diminishing
its influence in the Levant.
Courtesy: Middle East Institute