Who Governs Yemen?

The emergency meeting of Yemen's Presidential Leadership Council in Riyadh over Iran's direct flight to Sanaa raises a fundamental question, who actually governs Yemen today?

The Council described the flight as a violation of Yemen's sovereignty and international law. Yet the very fact that the country's internationally recognized leadership convened outside Yemen inevitably invites scrutiny.

Governments derive legitimacy not only from international recognition but also from their ability to exercise effective authority over their own territory. In practical terms, the Houthis control Sanaa and much of northern Yemen, while the Presidential Leadership Council continues to rely heavily on external political and security support.

This reality reflects the uncomfortable truth that Yemen has evolved into a battleground where competing regional and global powers pursue strategic interests through local actors. Iran openly backs the Houthis, while the internationally recognized government enjoys diplomatic and military support from a coalition led by Saudi Arabia and backed by the United States.

The strategic significance of Yemen extends far beyond its internal politics. Sitting at the entrance to the Red Sea through the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, Yemen occupies one of the world's most critical maritime chokepoints. Whoever influences this corridor can affect international trade, energy supplies, and naval movements linking Europe and Asia.

It is therefore unsurprising that many analysts believe the broader contest in Yemen is less about restoring democratic governance and more about securing geopolitical influence over one of the world's busiest shipping routes. In this interpretation, Washington's overriding objective is to maintain strategic leverage over the Red Sea, while regional allies inevitably become participants in a much larger geopolitical competition.

Saudi Arabia is frequently portrayed as the principal architect of Yemen's prolonged conflict. Such a characterization, however, overlooks the wider strategic calculations of global powers. Riyadh has undoubtedly made decisions that attract criticism, but reducing the conflict to a Saudi-Iran rivalry ignores the interests of larger actors whose strategic priorities extend well beyond Yemen itself.

The tragedy is that while external powers compete for influence over a vital maritime corridor, the Yemeni people continue to pay the highest price. The real battle may not simply be for Yemen, but for control of one of the world's most strategically important waterways.

Pak-Iran energy cooperation: Geopolitics Limits Economic Choices

For decades, Pakistan has relied on imported energy to meet its growing requirements. Crude oil, refined petroleum products and LNG have largely come from Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Qatar, creating deep economic and strategic linkages with the Gulf region.

However, Pakistan’s energy map has also been shaped by geopolitical realities. Energy cooperation with Iran has remained limited, largely due to international sanctions on Tehran, particularly those imposed by the United States. The Iran-Pakistan gas pipeline remains one of the clearest examples of how strategic considerations can override economic logic.

At a time when Pakistan faces persistent energy shortages, high import costs and pressure on foreign exchange reserves, the question of affordable and diversified energy supplies has become increasingly important. Yet, despite recent improvement in Pakistan-US relations and public expressions of cooperation from both sides, the sensitive issue of Iranian energy imports remains largely absent from the discussion.

Pakistan also faces potential financial consequences linked to delays in implementing the Iran-Pakistan gas pipeline agreement. This highlights a broader dilemma: whether Pakistan’s energy decisions are being driven primarily by economic necessity or constrained by a larger geopolitical environment.

Iran, as a neighbouring country with significant energy resources, could theoretically provide Pakistan with another supply option. Any such engagement, however, would require Islamabad to carefully balance relations with Washington and its longstanding partnerships with key Gulf energy suppliers.

The issue is not simply about choosing one partner over another. Pakistan’s challenge is that energy security, diplomacy and global power politics are now deeply interconnected. In an ideal economic environment, the cheapest and most reliable energy source would naturally attract demand. In reality, international relations often influence commercial decisions.

This has led some analysts to question whether Pakistan has sufficient strategic space to pursue every economically attractive opportunity, including potential energy cooperation with Iran.

For Pakistan, the long-term objective must be an energy policy that maximizes national interest while managing external sensitivities. A country with growing economic ambitions cannot afford energy insecurity, but it must also navigate the complex realities of global alliances.

The emerging debate is therefore not only about Iran, sanctions or pipelines. It is about whether Pakistan can build an energy strategy where economic priorities and geopolitical realities find a workable balance.

OPEC+ to raise oil output by 188,000 bpd

Seven OPEC+ countries have agreed to increase their combined crude oil output targets by 188,000 barrels per day (bpd) in July. This is the same as the June hike, which was adjusted down from monthly increases of 206,000 bpd in May and April to ⁠take into account the UAE exit.

The decision was taken by the countries—Saudi Arabia, Russia, Iraq, Kuwait, Kazakhstan, Algeria, and Oman—during their virtual meeting held on Sunday to review global market conditions and outlook.

This increase marks the fourth monthly quota hike under the group's phased unwinding of voluntary supply cuts, though the physical realization of these barrels currently remains limited due to the blockade of the Strait of Hormuz.

Seven OPEC+ countries have increased their output quotas from April to June this year by almost 600,000 barrels per day. In their collective commitment to support oil market stability, the seven countries decided to implement a production adjustment of 188,000 bpd from the additional voluntary adjustments announced in April 2023. This adjustment will be implemented from next month.

The additional voluntary adjustments announced in April 2023 may be returned in part or in full subject to evolving market conditions and in a gradual manner. The countries will continue to closely monitor and assess market conditions, and in their continuous efforts to support market stability, they reaffirmed the importance of adopting a cautious approach and retaining full flexibility to increase, pause or reverse the phase out of the voluntary production adjustments, including reversing the previously implemented voluntary adjustments announced in November 2023.

The seven OPEC+ countries noted that this measure will provide an opportunity for the participating countries to accelerate their compensation. These countries reiterated their collective commitment to achieve full conformity with the Declaration of Cooperation, including the additional voluntary production adjustments that will be monitored by the Joint Ministerial Monitoring Committee (JMMC).
They also confirmed their intention to fully compensate for any overproduced volume since January 2024. The compensation period will be extended until the end of December 2026.

Game Spoilers in the Gulf Conflict

As the confrontation between the United States and Iran drags on without a decisive outcome, the risk of “game spoilers” entering the conflict appears to be increasing. In every prolonged geopolitical crisis, there are actors that benefit not from peace, but from deeper mistrust, wider confrontation, and permanent instability.

Recent attacks on the UAE and Saudi Arabia have once again intensified regional tensions. Predictably, fingers were pointed towards Iran. Yet the opaque nature of modern hybrid warfare makes definitive attribution increasingly difficult. Drone strikes, sabotage operations, and covert attacks are often designed to create confusion before facts fully emerge.

This raises an uncomfortable but important question: does Iran genuinely benefit from escalating hostilities with Gulf Arab states at this particular moment?

The answer is far from straightforward.

The UAE, particularly Dubai, depends heavily on regional stability to sustain its position as a financial, logistics, and commercial hub. Saudi Arabia’s Vision 2030 also requires calm energy markets and investor confidence. Iran, meanwhile, urgently needs uninterrupted oil exports — especially shipments destined for China — to stabilize its sanction-hit economy. A prolonged disruption in the Strait of Hormuz would damage Tehran as much as its Arab neighbors.

If all major regional players need stable oil flows, then who benefits from widening the Arab-Iranian divide?

This is where the possibility of “game spoilers” deserves attention. Any gradual rapprochement between Gulf capitals and Tehran could reduce regional polarization, weaken dependence on external security arrangements, and create new economic alignments across the Middle East. Such an outcome may not suit every strategic actor involved in the region.

History shows that Middle Eastern conflicts are rarely shaped solely by declared combatants. Proxy warfare, covert operations, intelligence manipulation, and narrative management have long remained part of the geopolitical landscape.

None of this proves the existence of a hidden hand behind recent attacks. However, dismissing the possibility entirely may also be naive. In today’s Middle East, perception itself has become a weapon.

The real danger may not only be missiles and drones, but the invisible forces attempting to ensure that Arabs and Iranians remain locked in perpetual suspicion and confrontation.

MBS Silence and Strategic Pressure

The unusually restrained posture of Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MBS) during the ongoing US-Israel war on Iran reflects a deeper geopolitical shift unfolding across the Middle East. For decades, Washington’s regional strategy relied heavily on portraying Iran as the principal threat to Arab security. However, the China-brokered rapprochement between Saudi Arabia and Iran weakened that narrative and signaled growing strategic independence within the Gulf.

Equally significant is Riyadh’s continued reluctance to join the Abraham Accords despite persistent pressure from the United States. Several Gulf states now appear increasingly cautious about unconditional alignment with Washington’s regional priorities.

Against this backdrop, the renewed legal attention to the Jamal Khashoggi case in France carries significance beyond the human rights dimension alone. A French anti-terrorism judge has been tasked with investigating allegations linked to Khashoggi’s killing inside the Saudi consulate in Istanbul in 2018 — years after Turkey transferred proceedings to Saudi authorities and the United States effectively closed related civil litigation by granting immunity protections to MBS.

There is no evidence of direct political coordination behind the French inquiry. Yet, in geopolitics, timing often shapes perception as much as facts themselves. The reopening of a dormant controversy at a moment of visible divergence between Washington and Riyadh inevitably invites broader strategic interpretation.

Whether the renewed focus on Khashoggi is purely judicial or partly geopolitical may become clearer in the months ahead, particularly if tensions between the United States and Saudi Arabia continue to widen.

UAE and Fractured Middle East

Since endorsing the Abraham Accords, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) has recast itself as a forward-looking state prioritizing economic opportunity over ideological rigidity. Normalization with Israel opened avenues in trade, technology, and finance, but it also stirred unease across sections of the Muslim world, where the move is still viewed as a departure from collective positioning on Palestine.

The discomfort is not merely rhetorical. Within parts of the Arab region, policy circles continue to debate whether such outreach weakens negotiating leverage on longstanding geopolitical disputes. Even in the United States—a principal architect of the accords—analysts have quietly flagged the risks of accelerated realignments that outpace regional stability.

Dubai’s rise as a global financial hub adds complexity to this equation. Increased capital flows, including those linked to Israeli networks, have energized its economy, but they also expose it to heightened scrutiny in an era of sanctions enforcement and financial transparency. Longstanding discussions in compliance circles about the emirate’s role in facilitating trade with Iran further underscore the delicate balance it must maintain.

Recent regional tensions have brought these vulnerabilities into sharper focus. Reports of attacks targeting strategic assets in Dubai—amid conflicting narratives about their origin—highlight a critical reality, economic hubs cannot remain insulated from geopolitical rivalries.

The UAE’s strategy reflects ambition and pragmatism, but also risk. In a region where alliances shift rapidly, economic integration without parallel security insulation may prove a fragile proposition.

Emerging UAE Role in the US–Iran Equation

The proposition that the United States may be quietly positioning the United Arab Emirates (UAE), particularly Dubai—as a forward proxy against Iran is gaining traction, but it demands a measured and fact-driven reading rather than a dramatic conclusion.

The strategic backdrop has undeniably shifted since the Abraham Accords. These agreements did more than normalize UAE-Israel relations; these created a wider geopolitical architecture that strengthened US influence and recalibrated regional alignments vis-à-vis Iran. Analysts increasingly view this framework as part of a broader containment strategy, linking security, trade corridors, and intelligence cooperation.

At the same time, Iran’s perception of the UAE has hardened. The ongoing conflict in 2026 has seen direct strikes, diplomatic downgrades, and rising mistrust, effectively pushing bilateral relations into open hostility. This escalation reinforces the idea that the UAE is no longer a neutral economic intermediary, but an exposed frontline state—whether by choice or circumstance.

Geography amplifies this vulnerability. The narrow Persian Gulf places the UAE within immediate operational range of Iran. While this proximity could, in theory, offer logistical advantages for surveillance or rapid deployment, it simultaneously makes Emirati infrastructure an easy target. Recent attacks on shipping and critical assets in the region underline how quickly economic zones can turn into strategic pressure points.

However, the leap from “strategic partner” to “proxy battlefield” remains analytically weak. Dubai’s role as a global financial and logistics hub imposes hard constraints. Its economic model is built on stability, openness, and investor confidence—factors fundamentally incompatible with sustained military confrontation. Turning such a hub into a Launchpad for ground operations would impose costs far exceeding any tactical gain.

Equally important is the UAE’s own signaling. Despite deepening security ties with Washington, it has publicly resisted the use of its territory for offensive operations and has consistently called for de-escalation. This suggests a calibrated approach: align strategically, but avoid becoming the battlefield.

The more credible interpretation, therefore, lies in the evolving nature of modern conflict. The UAE is emerging not as a warfront, but as a strategic node—facilitating intelligence sharing, surveillance capabilities, and logistical depth within a US-led framework. In contemporary geopolitics, influence is often projected through networks rather than invasions.

In essence, the UAE’s role in the US–Iran equation is expanding, but within limits. It is a partner, a pressure point, and at times a target—but not, at least for now, a chosen battlefield.

Riyadh Returns to Iran Threat Narrative

In the aftermath of Iran’s 1979 Islamic Revolution, the United States recalibrated its regional strategy, increasingly presenting Tehran as the principal source of instability in the Middle East. Over time, this framing found resonance in several Arab capitals, particularly in Saudi Arabia, shaping a security outlook that continues to influence regional policy choices.

This perception was reinforced through tangible measures. The expansion of US military infrastructure across the Gulf—most prominently in Qatar—was justified largely on the premise of countering Iranian influence. Simultaneously, Washington sustained economic pressure on Tehran over its nuclear program, despite Iran’s status as a signatory to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, in contrast to Israel’s longstanding ambiguity.

Historical episodes added further complexity. The Iran-Iraq war entrenched regional rivalries, while later diplomatic efforts—including the nuclear agreement under President Barack Obama and the China-brokered rapprochement between Riyadh and Tehran—offered brief openings for recalibration. Yet such initiatives have struggled to overcome deeply embedded mistrust, particularly amid shifting US policies and competing geopolitical interests.

Recent remarks by Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Faisal bin Farhan reflect a return to a more cautious, if not hardened, posture. His assertion that trust in Iran has been “completely shattered,” alongside allegations of destabilizing activities across the region, underscores Riyadh’s growing concerns about security and sovereignty. These claims are rooted in reported attacks on energy infrastructure and maritime navigation, which Saudi Arabia and its partners attribute to Iran.

Tehran, however, has consistently rejected such accusations, framing its actions as defensive and, at times, suggesting that regional escalations are shaped by broader geopolitical contestation. Independent verification of specific incidents remains contested, contributing to a narrative environment marked as much by perception as by provable fact.

What emerges is not merely a dispute over actions, but over interpretation. Saudi Arabia’s current stance appears closely aligned with a long-standing US strategic framing that positions Iran as the central regional threat. While this perspective reflects genuine security concerns, it also risks narrowing the analytical lens through which complex regional dynamics are understood.

The persistence of this narrative suggests that, despite episodic diplomacy and shifting alliances, foundational perceptions remain largely intact. In effect, Riyadh’s position today echoes a familiar refrain—one shaped over decades—where Iran continues to be viewed as the primary challenge to regional stability.

Who Is Benefiting From War on Iran?

As the conflict involving United States and Israel against Iran intensifies, the humanitarian cost has understandably dominated headlines. Yet wars are rarely judged only by the destruction they cause. Equally important is a harder question: who ultimately benefits from the economic and geopolitical consequences of war?

Daily Brief: PSX and Global Markets

Pakistan’s equity market ended almost flat on Wednesday, while trading in silver contracts remained suspended at the Pakistan Mercantile Exchange (PMEX). Meanwhile, Asian equities declined on Thursday as oil prices surged. Both crude benchmarks jumped about 9%, the safe-haven US dollar hovered near its strongest levels of the year, and gold prices held broadly steady. US stocks also closed lower on Wednesday. To read details click https://shkazmipk.com/capital-market-review-49/

Early estimates suggest Washington may be spending close to a billion dollars a day on military operations. While the figure appears staggering, such expenditures often circulate within the American economy itself. The vast defense ecosystem surrounding the United States Department of Defense thrives during prolonged military engagements. Demand rises for missiles, air defense systems, surveillance equipment and logistical support produced by companies such as Lockheed Martin, Raytheon Technologies, and Northrop Grumman. In that sense, war can act as a powerful economic multiplier for the military-industrial complex.

Energy markets provide another revealing dimension. The Strait of Hormuz, the world’s most critical oil chokepoint, carries nearly one-fifth of global crude supplies. Any disruption or closure immediately pushes oil prices higher. Ironically, such instability may strengthen the position of the United States, which has emerged as one of the world’s leading oil and liquefied natural gas exporters. Higher global prices make American energy exports more profitable while opening opportunities to capture market share in Europe and Asia.

For Gulf producers, the situation is more complex. Countries such as Saudi Arabia, Iraq, United Arab Emirates, and Qatar depend heavily on secure maritime routes to ship oil and gas to global markets. If traffic through the Strait of Hormuz is disrupted, export volumes could decline even while prices surge. In such a scenario, higher prices may not fully offset reduced shipments.

Geopolitical instability may also reinforce the dominance of the United States Dollar in global energy trade. Efforts by emerging economies to establish alternative settlement mechanisms often lose momentum when markets retreat toward the perceived safety of dollar-based transactions.

Meanwhile, elevated oil prices could still deliver additional fiscal space for Mohammed bin Salman, Saudi Arabia’s crown prince, helping finance ambitious transformation initiatives such as NEOM and other development plans.

None of this proves that economic gain is the sole driver of conflict. But history repeatedly shows that wars reshape markets and redistribute advantages. When the guns fall silent, the question will remain: was this merely a geopolitical confrontation, or a conflict whose economic dividends were quietly anticipated from the start?

PSX benchmark index closed at an all-time high of 189,167

Pakistan Stock Exchange continued upward movement during the week, with benchmark index gaining 4,068 points or 2.2% WoW to close at an all-time high of 189,167 on Friday, January 24, 2026. Market participation also improved by 8.7%WoW, with average daily trading volume rising to 1.3 billion shares, as compared to 1.2 billion shares in the prior week.

Momentum was supported by easing geopolitical tensions and a decline in T-Bill yields to single-digit levels for the first time in four years.

Moreover, positive economic partnerships with China, US, Britain and Saudi Arabia are expected to further boost Pakistan’s economy.

On the macroeconomic front, current account deficit was recorded at US$244 million for December 2025, while FDI outflows were recorded at US$135 million.

Power generation rose 8.8%YoY at December end, while IT sector recorded highest ever monthly exports of US$437 million, up 26%YoY.

Foreign exchange reserves held by State Bank of Pakistan (SBP) increased by US$16 million to US$16.1 billion as of January 16, 3026, as a result PKR appreciated against the greenback during the week, closing the week at 279.86 PKR/ US$.

Other major news flow during the week included: 1) Pakistan, China sign US$4.5 billion farm deals, boosting jobs and food supply, 2) Pakistan signs Trump-led Board of Peace charter, 3) GoP working on proposals to reduce industrial power tariff, 4) Pakistan-Philippines can boost pharma trade to US$1 billion, and 5) Foreign firms repatriate US$1.6 billion during 1HFY26.

Refinery, Fertilizer, Leather & Tanneries, Insurance, Property were amongst the top performing sectors, while Transport, Jute, Woollen, Technology & Communication, and Engineering were amongst the laggards.

Major buying was recorded by Mutual Funds and Individuals with a net buy of US$22.1 million and US$11.5 million, respectively. Foreigners and Companies were major sellers with net sell of US$21.1 million and US$10.4 million.

Top performing scrips of the week were: AICL, ATRL, FATIMA, SAZEW, and ENGROH, while laggards included: PIOC, KTML, TGL, SYS, and PAEL.

AKD Securities foresees the positive momentum at PSX to continue due to further monetary easing driven by improving external account position and continuous focus on reforms amid political stability.

The brokerage house anticipates the benchmark index to rise to 263,800 by end December 2026.

Investors’ sentiments are expected to improve on the likelihood of foreign portfolio and direct investment flows, driven by improved relations with the United States and Saudi Arabia.

Top picks of the brokerage house are:  OGDC, PPL, UBL, MEBL, HBL, FFC, ENGROH, PSO, LUCK, FCCL, INDU, ILP and SYS.

Yemen: Where Saudi and Emirati Paths Parts

For much of the past decade, Yemen has been framed as a proxy battleground between Saudi Arabia and Iran. Yet beneath this familiar narrative lies a quieter but increasingly significant fault line - the divergence between Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. Though, both entered the Yemen war as close allies, their strategic priorities have steadily drifted apart.

Saudi Arabia’s engagement has remained fundamentally security-centric. Yemen is Riyadh’s vulnerable southern flank, and the prospect of an Iran-aligned force entrenched in Sana’a poses a direct threat. This explains the kingdom’s consistent emphasis on Yemen’s territorial integrity and its support for a strong, central government capable of asserting authority nationwide. For Saudi Arabia, a fragmented Yemen is not a solution but a long-term liability.

The UAE, while initially aligned with these goals, adopted a markedly different approach as the conflict evolved. Abu Dhabi focused less on Yemen’s political center and more on its strategic periphery. Control over ports, islands, and coastal corridors—Aden, Mukalla, Socotra, and areas near the Bab el-Mandeb strait—became central to Emirati calculations. These assets sit astride vital global trade and energy routes, giving them value far beyond Yemen’s internal politics.

This divergence became most visible in southern Yemen. The UAE backed local militias, most notably the Southern Transitional Council (STC), which advocates autonomy or independence for the south. While these forces proved effective in securing territory and countering militant groups, they also challenged the authority of the Saudi-backed Yemeni government. Repeated clashes between allied factions exposed the incompatibility of Saudi and Emirati endgames.

For Riyadh, decentralization risks prolonged instability and leaves the north vulnerable to sustained Houthi—and by extension Iranian—influence. For Abu Dhabi, a decentralized or divided Yemen, with friendly actors controlling key maritime nodes, offers influence without the burden of governing a fractured state.

Tensions were further sharpened by differing risk calculations. Saudi Arabia remained deeply exposed militarily and diplomatically as the war dragged on. The UAE, by contrast, reduced its direct military footprint after 2019, outsourcing security to local allies while retaining strategic leverage. This asymmetry quietly altered the balance within the coalition.

The Saudi–UAE rift in Yemen is not ideological, nor is it an outright break. It is a case study in how alliances strain when national interests diverge. Yemen has revealed a fundamental truth of regional geopolitics - partners may fight together, but they rarely fight for the same future.

Netanyahu’s Washington Visit: Strategy, Sponsorship, and Shared Responsibility

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s visit to the United States is being portrayed as routine strategic coordination. In reality, it reflects a deeper convergence in which Washington is no longer a distant mediator but a principal enabler of Israel’s expanding regional agenda. The visit highlights not only Israeli ambitions, but also America’s sustained military, intelligence, and diplomatic sponsorship.

At the center of discussions lies Iran. Israel’s objective has clearly shifted from containment to systematic degradation of Iran’s strategic capabilities—nuclear latency, missile production, drones, and proxy networks. This transition would be impossible without continued US arms supplies, intelligence sharing, and political cover. While Washington publicly warns against escalation, its steady flow of advanced weaponry and repeated shielding of Israel at international forums effectively signal consent rather than restraint.

Regime change in Iran remains a sensitive phrase in Washington, but prolonged destabilization appears to be the preferred substitute. Cyber operations, economic pressure, and covert actions designed to exploit Iran’s internal vulnerabilities fit comfortably within a grey-zone strategy that allows plausible deniability. Western intelligence agencies may not openly own such operations, but coordination and silence often speak louder than formal declarations.

Saudi normalization remains another Israeli objective, though the Gaza war has made recognition politically costly for Riyadh. Netanyahu’s calculation is that the United States can again absorb the pressure—offering security guarantees and strategic incentives to Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman. In doing so, Washington risks further eroding its credibility across the Arab and Muslim world by prioritizing geopolitical bargains over public sentiment.

In Syria, Israel already enjoys near-unrestricted freedom of action, facilitated by US political backing and Russia’s strategic distraction. The goal now is to institutionalize strategic denial—preventing Iranian re-entrenchment and treating Syrian sovereignty as expendable in the pursuit of regional dominance.

Lebanon presents a similar pattern. Israel’s posture toward Hezbollah appears to be shifting from deterrence to attrition, with Washington focused on managing escalation rather than preventing it. Proposals to revise UNIFIL’s mandate or force Hezbollah north of the Litani risk dragging Lebanon into another devastating cycle.

Ultimately, Netanyahu’s visit is less about crisis management than about reaffirming a permissive American environment—one that allows Israel to act forcefully while the United States absorbs diplomatic costs. As Washington continues to arm, shield, and enable Israel, it also assumes responsibility for the instability that follows.

China backs expanding Iran-Saudi ties

Iran, China, and Saudi Arabia have wrapped up their third Trilateral Committee Meeting, with Beijing once again underscoring its commitment to strengthening relations between Tehran and Riyadh.

The meeting was held Tuesday at Iran’s Foreign Ministry in Tehran and was chaired by Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister Majid Takht-Ravanchi. Saudi Deputy Foreign Minister Walid al-Kharaji and China’s Deputy Foreign Minister Miao Deo also took part.

During the session, the three sides issued a joint statement outlining key commitments and recent progress.

They reaffirmed Iran and Saudi Arabia’s dedication to fully implementing the 2023 Beijing Agreement, the China-brokered deal that restored diplomatic ties between the two nations. Both countries stressed the importance of upholding sovereignty, territorial integrity, independence, and security in line with the UN Charter, the Charter of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), and international law.

The statement also praised China’s “continued positive role” in facilitating dialogue and overseeing the agreement’s implementation.

For its part, China reiterated its willingness to support and encourage further cooperation between Tehran and Riyadh in political, economic, cultural, and security areas.

The joint statement highlighted progress in consular coordination, noting that this cooperation helped ensure the safe travel of more than 85,000 Iranian Hajj pilgrims and over 210,000 Umrah pilgrims in 2025.

It also welcomed the expanding exchanges between Iranian and Saudi research centers, universities, media outlets, and cultural institutions.

Addressing regional issues, the three countries called for an immediate end to Israeli military operations in Palestine, Lebanon, and Syria, and condemned violations of Iranian sovereignty.

Iran’s representative expressed appreciation for the steadfast support shown by Saudi Arabia and China during Israel’s June aggression against Iran.

The parties further reaffirmed their backing of a comprehensive, UN-led political solution in Yemen.

Iran and Saudi Arabia restored diplomatic ties in March 2023 after a seven-year break, following a China-mediated agreement that led to the reopening of embassies.

Earlier rounds of the trilateral committee were held in Beijing and Riyadh, where all sides restated their commitment to respecting sovereignty and non-interference, and acknowledged China’s ongoing mediation in support of regional dialogue.

 

Two state solution requires a clear and serious path, says MBS

Saudi Crown Prince and Prime Minister Mohammed bin Salman on Tuesday reiterated the importance of establishing a clear and credible path toward a two-state solution, stressing the need for a defined plan to resolve the Palestinian issue.

Speaking at a joint press conference with US President Donald Trump at the White House, the Crown Prince said Saudi Arabia seeks peace for Palestinians, Israelis, and the wider region, noting that there is a lot of work underway with the United States.

He praised President Trump’s efforts to advance peace and underscored the vitality of the Saudi-US relationship, saying Riyadh will continue to work closely with Washington.

He added that while some had attempted to undermine ties between the two countries, Saudi Arabia remains committed to strengthening the relationship.

The Crown Prince described the partnership as deep and enduring saying. “We have worked together for many decades, and today marks a historic day for the future of our relationship.”

He also emphasized the importance of investing with the United States, calling it an important nation with a strong economy.

On economic cooperation, the Crown Prince announced that Saudi investments in the United States will rise to nearly US$1 trillion, saying the agreements signed on Tuesday represent the largest investment expansion in the history of the bilateral relationship.

He noted the strong demand to support and empower key sectors, adding that the Kingdom’s investments span multiple areas that connect Saudi Arabia with the United States.

Addressing regional issues, the Crown Prince said it would be positive for the region to reach a peace agreement with Iran.

He also highlighted the Kingdom’s long-term vision in adopting advanced technologies such as artificial intelligence.

For his part, President Trump welcomed the Crown Prince, describing him as a close friend and “an impressive man on every level” who enjoys great respect at the White House.

Trump also praised Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques King Salman, saying he had told the monarch that your son is truly exceptional.

Trump thanked Saudi Arabia for investing US$600 billion in the United States and expressed hope that the figure would reach US$1 trillion.

He said cooperation with the Kingdom would create new job opportunities and described the Saudi-US alliance as great and strategic.

Trump also announced that the United States will sell F-35 fighter jets to Saudi Arabia, calling the Kingdom a strong and important ally.

He added that the Crown Prince had played a significant role in strengthening ties with Syria and said he sees potential for a civilian nuclear agreement with Saudi Arabia.

“The relationship with Saudi Arabia is at its best,” Trump said, adding, “I love the Kingdom, and they love America. Saudi Arabia is a partner that believes in America’s success.”

 

US–Riyadh Dialogue Enters a New Phase

The meeting between Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman and US President Donald Trump signals not just a diplomatic engagement but a recalibration of one of the most consequential bilateral relationships in modern geopolitics. Both sides arrive with clear agendas, yet the regional landscape they must navigate has changed dramatically. As Washington pushes for investments, defence arrangements, and normalization with Israel, Riyadh appears more cautious, more self-assured, and far less willing to accept old formulas.

For Trump, the objectives are straightforward: 1) secure a massive US$500 billion Saudi investment, 2) persuade the Kingdom to join the Abraham Accords, and 3) lock in lucrative arms deals. His administration is presenting the visit as an opportunity to “broaden ties,” spanning commerce, technology, and even nuclear cooperation.

It is MBS’s first US trip since Jamal Khashoggi’s killing in 2018 — an event that caused global outrage but has now been diplomatically “moved past” in Washington’s narrative. Trump is expected to again sidestep human rights concerns, focusing instead on transactional gains.

Saudi investment on the scale of half a trillion dollars carries inherent risks for the Kingdom. Such deep financial exposure would place Riyadh firmly within Washington’s strategic orbit, making it vulnerable to political pressure from the US and, by extension, from Israel. The Kingdom knows that once its capital becomes entrenched in the American economy, it loses critical room for maneuver in foreign policy.

The second US priority — coaxing Riyadh into the Abraham Accords — remains far more complex. Saudi Arabia has outlined clear conditions for recognizing Israel, yet Trump’s approach relies more on pressuring Riyadh than moderating Israeli policies. MBS is acutely aware of the domestic, religious, and geopolitical sensitivities tied to formal ties with Israel. Entering the Accords without significant concessions from Tel Aviv would carry unpredictable consequences at home and across the Muslim world.

Washington’s third objective, securing large defence deals, is no longer guaranteed. The longstanding US narrative portraying Iran as the Kingdom’s chief threat justified decades of American arms sales. But with Riyadh and Tehran now engaged in détente — shifting from “foes” to “friends” — the rationale for massive weapons purchases has eroded. The Kingdom today sees no imminent adversary that requires US arsenals.

The old oil-for-security arrangement has weakened. Saudi Arabia now seeks more — a formal defence pact ratified by Congress, nuclear cooperation, and access to advanced AI technologies central to its Vision 2030 aspirations. Washington may instead offer a limited executive-order commitment, far from the ironclad guarantee Riyadh desires.

MBS arrives United States with ambition but also clarity. Trump may push hard, but the Kingdom is no longer willing to operate under outdated assumptions. The Washington–Riyadh dialogue is indeed entering a new phase — one defined not by dependence, but by negotiation, recalibration, and a shifting balance of power.

Pakistan efficient in seeking debt, pathetic in boosting exports

If Pakistan ever launches a “national skill inventory,” debt-seeking deserves pride of place—right next to cricket and political speeches. Few nations can match our talent for locating, negotiating, and securing loans at record speed. In fact, if there were global rankings for borrowing, Pakistan would be a top-tier performer. Our only handicap is that medals can’t be pledged as collateral.

Over the last few years, we have turned debt acquisition into a disciplined craft. China rolls over funds before we even finish the request. Saudi Arabia extends deposits faster than we can print press releases thanking them. And commercial banks? They happily oblige—charging interest rates so high they should come with a health warning. But we take the money anyway, proudly calling it “stabilization.”

Yet when it comes to boosting exports—the one activity that could actually reduce our dependency—we become painfully sluggish. The same state that can negotiate billions overnight cannot help exporters ship a container on time. Infrastructure collapses, policies flip, energy costs skyrocket, and bureaucratic hurdles stretch on longer than IMF conditionalities.

Our export basket still resembles a museum catalogue: textiles, some rice, a bit of leather, and heroic claims that IT exports will one day rescue us. Meanwhile, competitors raced ahead years ago. Bangladesh became a garment giant, Vietnam turned into a global manufacturing hub, and India climbed the tech value chain. Pakistan? We perfected the art of writing desperate letters requesting “emergency support.”

We do not lack vision—only execution. We produce policies like an assembly line but refuse to implement even the simplest reforms. Instead, we remain obsessed with “new inflows,” as if the nation is a smartphone constantly running on low battery and eternally plugged into someone else’s charger.

It is the grand irony of our economic life: we can sell our pleas faster than we can sell our products. Friendly countries trust us with their money more than global markets trust our goods.

Until Pakistan learns to earn instead of borrow, we will remain trapped in this cycle—experts at seeking debt, amateurs at creating value.

Triple Whammy of Crude Uncertainty

Oil prices rose slightly on Friday after four straight sessions of declines but were on track for their steepest weekly decline since late June due to market expectations that the OPEC Plus could hike output further despite oversupply concerns. If prices do not further recover in this session, Brent could close at the lowest level since the week ended May 30, while WTI would finish at a level not seen since May 02. On a weekly basis, Brent has plunged 8.3%, while WTI is 7.6% lower.

Oil markets thrive on stability, yet today they stand at the crossroads of three unpredictable forces: OPEC’s internal calculations, China’s demand swings, and the broader geopolitical turmoil stretching from the Middle East to Eastern Europe. Together, these factors create a triple whammy of uncertainty that is shaking investor confidence and distorting price forecasts.

First, OPEC remains the central player, but its cohesion is under strain. Saudi Arabia’s output discipline often clashes with the fiscal needs of smaller producers desperate for higher revenues. The cartel’s recent production adjustments reflect less a unified strategy and more a fragile balancing act between market control and survival. Traders now treat OPEC announcements with skepticism, wary that compliance may fracture under pressure.

Second, China—the world’s largest crude importer—casts a long shadow. Its slowing economy, punctuated by property sector woes and uneven industrial growth, has dampened energy consumption. Yet at the same time, Beijing stockpiles aggressively when prices dip, injecting volatility into the market. A single policy shift in China, from stimulus measures to green energy acceleration, can ripple through global demand curves in weeks, leaving analysts scrambling to adjust projections.

Finally, geopolitics adds combustible uncertainty. Wars in Ukraine and the Middle East, sanctions on Russia and Iran, and maritime tensions in the South China Sea all threaten supply chains and shipping lanes. Insurance premiums on crude shipments rise, pipelines face sabotage risks, and diplomatic fractures widen the unpredictability. Energy markets are not just reacting to supply and demand—they are hostage to political brinkmanship.

What makes this triad dangerous is their intersection. OPEC’s decisions are influenced by geopolitical rivalries; China’s demand patterns intersect with U.S. foreign policy and sanctions regimes. The market is no longer shaped by economics alone—it is choreographed by power struggles, both overt and hidden.

For investors, refiners, and consumers alike, the message is clear: crude is no longer just a commodity. It is a barometer of global instability. Until OPEC, China, and geopolitics align toward predictability—a highly unlikely prospect—oil will remain the most uncertain asset of our time.

 

Saudi Support to Pakistan Beyond Diplomacy

Saudi Arabia and Pakistan share a relationship that is often described as “brotherly” rather than merely diplomatic. Rooted in faith, history, and mutual respect, the Kingdom’s support to Pakistan over the decades has been nothing short of exceptional. At every critical juncture—from wars and economic crises to natural disasters—Riyadh has stepped forward with generosity, affirming its role as Islamabad’s most trusted partner.

Historical Foundations of Brotherhood

Saudi Arabia was among the very first nations to recognize Pakistan after its independence in 1947. Since then, ties have been nurtured on shared Islamic values and common aspirations. The relationship quickly matured into a strategic alliance, with both nations backing each other in times of need. During Pakistan’s wars in 1965 and 1971, Riyadh extended strong political and moral support. Similarly, Pakistan stood firmly with the Kingdom during regional crises, cementing trust that has endured for generations.

Financial Lifelines in Times of Need

Perhaps the most visible manifestation of Saudi support has been on the economic front. Pakistan, a developing country often facing fiscal and balance-of-payment challenges, has repeatedly found in Riyadh a source of immediate relief.

In recent years alone, the Kingdom deposited billions of dollars in Pakistan’s State Bank reserves, providing crucial breathing space at a time when international institutions were either hesitant or demanded painful reforms. Oil supplies on deferred payment have cushioned Pakistan’s import bill, helping stabilize inflation and energy costs. Unlike Western lenders, Saudi assistance has rarely been tied to political or structural conditions, making it uniquely generous and timely.

This pattern is not new. Since the 1970s, Riyadh has offered concessional oil facilities, long-term loans, and grants to help Pakistan weather external shocks. Time and again, Saudi Arabia has proven to be Pakistan’s financial first responder.

Energy Security and Investment Potential

Saudi Arabia has also played a key role in Pakistan’s energy security. Its oil facilities have ensured that Pakistan’s economy continues to function even during periods of global energy volatility. Looking ahead, Riyadh has expressed strong interest in investing in Pakistan’s energy infrastructure, particularly in the proposed multibillion-dollar Gwadar Oil Refinery. Such projects not only promise to reduce Pakistan’s dependence on imported petroleum products but also strengthen its role as a regional energy hub.

Humanitarian Generosity and People to People Impact

The Kingdom’s generosity extends far beyond state to state transactions. During Pakistan’s worst humanitarian crises, including the devastating 2005 earthquake and the catastrophic floods of 2010 and 2022, Saudi Arabia was among the largest donors of aid. Relief goods, medical teams, and financial contributions directly helped millions of displaced and vulnerable citizens.

Saudi-funded development projects—ranging from schools and hospitals to water supply schemes—have left a lasting impact on communities across Pakistan. These initiatives reflect Riyadh’s recognition that real support lies not just in financial transfers but in uplifting the quality of life of ordinary people.

Strategic and Defense Cooperation

Defense and security cooperation remain another cornerstone of the relationship. Pakistani military personnel have long been involved in training Saudi armed forces, a partnership that has enhanced Riyadh’s defense capacity while deepening trust between the two establishments.

At the diplomatic level, Saudi Arabia has consistently stood by Pakistan on sensitive issues, particularly Kashmir. By lending its political weight to Islamabad’s positions at the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) and other global platforms, Riyadh has amplified Pakistan’s voice in the international arena.

Mutuality of Interests

Although Saudi Arabia’s exceptional support to Pakistan often takes the spotlight, the relationship is not one-sided. Pakistan has consistently extended manpower, expertise, and solidarity to the Kingdom. Millions of Pakistani workers in Saudi Arabia are a vital part of the Kingdom’s development, especially under Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s Vision 2030. Their contributions not only drive Saudi progress but also sustain Pakistan’s economy through remittances that exceed billions of dollars annually.

In times of regional tension, Pakistan has also stood firmly with Riyadh, whether by providing military expertise or diplomatic support. This reciprocity underscores the fact that the partnership is built on mutual respect and shared strategic interests.

Looking Toward the Future

As the global order undergoes transformation, the Saudi-Pakistan relationship is poised to enter a new phase. Vision 2030, which seeks to diversify the Saudi economy beyond oil, opens new avenues for Pakistani professionals, investors, and skilled workers. Pakistan, with its youthful population and strategic location at the crossroads of South Asia, Central Asia, and the Middle East, remains a natural partner for Riyadh’s long-term ambitions.

Furthermore, investment in renewable energy, technology, agriculture, and infrastructure can redefine the contours of this relationship. What has historically been dominated by financial and defense cooperation is now broadening into sectors that will drive growth in the 21st century.

Exceptional Saudi support to Pakistan is not merely about financial bailouts or humanitarian aid. It is the reflection of a bond rooted in shared faith, tested by history, and strengthened by mutual benefit. For Pakistan, Saudi Arabia has been a dependable partner in times of uncertainty. For Riyadh, Islamabad remains a steadfast ally with strategic depth and human capital.

As both nations look ahead, their challenge is to transform this exceptional support into sustainable, future-oriented cooperation. By building on decades of trust, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan can not only uplift their own people but also set an example of solidarity and resilience for the wider Muslim world.

 

President Trump Gaza Belongs to Palestinians

US President Donald Trump is scheduled to meet leaders and officials from multiple Muslim-majority countries on Tuesday and discuss the situation in Gaza, which has been under a mounting assault from Washington's ally Israel.

White House Press Secretary Karoline Leavitt told reporters on Monday that Trump will hold a multilateral meeting with Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Qatar, Egypt, Jordan, Turkey, Indonesia and Pakistan.

Axios reported Trump will present the group with a proposal for peace and post-war governance in Gaza.

In addition to freeing hostages and ending the war, Trump is expected to discuss US plans around an Israeli withdrawal and post-war governance in Gaza, without Hamas involvement, according to Axios.

Washington wants Arab and Muslim countries to agree to send military forces to Gaza to enable Israel's withdrawal and to secure funding for transition and rebuilding programs, Axios reported.

Trump will address the UN General Assembly on Tuesday, a day after dozens of world leaders gathered at the United Nations to embrace a Palestinian state, a landmark diplomatic shift nearly two years into the Gaza war that faces fierce resistance from Israel and the United States.

The nations said a two-state solution was the only way to achieve peace, but Israel said the recognition of a Palestinian state was a reward to extremism.

Israel's assault on Gaza since October 2023 has killed tens of thousands, internally displaced Gaza's entire population, and set off a starvation crisis. Multiple rights experts, scholars and a UN inquiry assessed it amounts to genocide.

Israel calls its actions self-defense and has also bombed Iran, Lebanon, Yemen, Syria and Qatar during the course of its war in Gaza.

Trump had promised a quick end to the war in Gaza, but a resolution remains elusive eight months into his term.

In February, Trump proposed a US takeover of Gaza and a permanent displacement of Palestinians from there. It was labeled as an "ethnic cleansing" proposal by rights experts and the United Nations. Forcible displacement is illegal under international law. Trump cast the plan as a re-development idea.

Significance of Saudi Arabia-Pakistan defence pact

The Saudi Arabia-Pakistan defence pact is not just a military arrangement—it is a strategic partnership that underpins Pakistan’s economic security and Saudi Arabia’s military security. For Pakistan, it guarantees vital financial and diplomatic backing; for Saudi Arabia, it provides trusted military support and, indirectly, a nuclear-armed ally. Together, it represents one of the strongest security relationships in the Muslim world.

The Saudi Arabia- Pakistan defence pact carries deep strategic, political, and economic significance for both countries and the wider region. Its importance can be seen from multiple angles:

Strategic and Security Dimension

Mutual Security Guarantee:

Pakistan has historically provided military training, expertise, and manpower to Saudi Arabia, reinforcing the Kingdom’s defence at times of regional tension. In return, Saudi Arabia has been a security partner for Pakistan in times of external pressure.

Balancing Iran’s Influence:

For Saudi Arabia, Pakistan’s military cooperation is part of a broader strategy to counterbalance Iran in the Gulf and beyond. For Pakistan, it ensures strong backing from the Kingdom while maintaining a delicate balance in its own relations with Iran.

Nuclear Umbrella:

Although not formalized, Pakistan’s nuclear capability is sometimes seen as a potential backstop for Saudi security in case of existential threats, making the defence relationship symbolically powerful.

Military Cooperation

Training and Deployment:

Thousands of Pakistani military personnel have served in Saudi Arabia over the decades, providing training to Saudi forces. Even today, a contingent of Pakistani troops is stationed there for defence cooperation.

Arms and Defence Technology:

Pakistan has supplied small arms, ammunition, and defence equipment to Saudi Arabia. Joint ventures in defence production are under discussion.

Counterterrorism and Intelligence Sharing:

Both states have collaborated closely in intelligence sharing, counterterrorism operations, and combating extremist networks that threaten regional stability.

Economic and Political Significance

Financial Lifeline for Pakistan:

Saudi Arabia has been one of Pakistan’s most consistent financial supporters—providing oil on deferred payments, direct loans, and balance-of-payments support. The defence pact strengthens this bond by ensuring Pakistan’s military commitment in return.

Diplomatic Support:

Saudi Arabia often champions Pakistan’s stance on international platforms, including on Kashmir and economic cooperation within the OIC. Pakistan reciprocates by supporting Saudi positions on regional security and Islamic solidarity.

Regional and Global Context

Gulf Security:

Saudi Arabia views Pakistan as a reliable partner in securing the Gulf, especially in moments of instability.

Islamic Military Alliance:

Pakistan plays a central role in the Saudi-led Islamic Military Counter Terrorism Coalition (IMCTC), with former Pakistani Army Chief Gen. Raheel Sharif appointed as its first commander.

US–China Factor:

The pact also gives Saudi Arabia an alternative to over-reliance on Western defence support, while Pakistan uses it to diversify its security partnerships alongside China.

Symbolic and Religious Aspect

Custodianship of Holy Places:

Pakistan attaches special reverence to Saudi Arabia as the custodian of Islam’s holiest sites, and defence cooperation is also framed as protecting the sanctity of the Two Holy Mosques.

Soft Power and Legitimacy:

The pact signals unity of two major Muslim powers—Saudi Arabia with its economic and religious clout, and Pakistan with its military strength and nuclear capability.