Wilson Center has tried to find an explanation for the lack
of Arab support in highlighting the actions of Iranian ruling regime. Its
efforts could be termed ‘Killing two birds with one stone’. Not only has it maligned Iran, but also Arab States for not opposing Iran because they also don’t
like opposition.
When protests in Iran broke out in September 2022 following
the killing of 22-year-old Mahsa Amini by the morality police, the world showed
immediate support for the outraged Iranian women who took to the streets.
Unlike before, these protests gained momentum as popular demands shifted from
greater freedoms and economic reforms to the overthrow of the oppressive
regime. The Iranian government’s harsh repression sparked international
condemnation and sanctions against officials and entities, including the
morality police itself.
As compared
to strong responses from Western nations, Arab governments have stayed
noticeably silent. This pattern of silence from Arab governments on internal
Iranian issues, in contrast to Iranian involvement in Arab protests and
revolutions, has been evident since the 2009 ‘green scarf movement’ in Iran and
raises questions about the relationship between Arab states and Iran during
times of popular upheaval.
While
certain Arab nations, including Saudi Arabia, harbor a desire for the
downfall of the Iranian regime, their reluctance to engage with Iran’s protests
and internal politics is due to a multitude of challenges and constraints.
Many
Arab governments, particularly those in the Gulf region, have a complex
relationship with Iran. They may disapprove of the suppression of protests, but
they also see Iran as a regional rival and may not want to give the impression
of supporting domestic dissent, in effect allowing Iran to justify its
interventionist policies elsewhere in the region.
The GCC nations, particularly Saudi Arabia, are grappling
with the uncertainty surrounding the potential consequences of taking
a unilateral adversarial approach towards Iran amid concerns about US security
commitments and a decline in bilateral relations. Nevertheless, since the early
days of the protests, Iranian authorities have repeatedly blamed foreign
nations, including Saudi Arabia, for instigating the demonstrations.
IRGC
Commander-in-Chief Hossein Salami warned the Saudi leadership,
saying, “You are involved in this matter and know that you are vulnerable; it
is better to be careful.” This warning was in reference to media supported by
Saudi Arabia, such as funding for Iran International TV, which broadcasts in
both Persian and English from London. It also refers to other Saudi-funded
media outlets like Al-Arabiya and newspapers like Al-Sharq Al-Awsat, Okaz,
Al-Riyadh, and Al-Madina, as well as Qatari and Jordanian newspapers. Arab
News, a Saudi English-language newspaper, even dedicated special coverage to
the protests.
To such accusations, Prince Faisal bin Farhan, the Saudi
Foreign Minister stated, “A country that strengthens itself with good
governance and a clear vision does not need to turn to the outside, and the
Kingdom firmly adheres to the principle of non-interference in other countries’
internal affairs.”
Meanwhile,
the Wall Street Journal reported that Iran was planning to attack Saudi
Arabia, either directly or through its allies, such as the Houthis in Yemen,
allegedly to distract from the protests.
Indeed, there is a state of uncertainty regarding the
trajectory of events within Iran that raises four concerns:
First,
it is unclear whether the current wave of protests will be more impactful than
previous ones in affecting the regime. Given the past failures of
protest movements to achieve their demands, it is understandable for Arabs to
expect the current protests to fail or remain focused solely on reforms without
aiming for regime change.
Second
is the possibility of a desperate retaliation from the regime on neighboring
states and interests should the protests escalate to the point of overthrowing
the government—the ‘Samson option.’
Third
is whether the support for the demonstrations will pressure the regime to
respond positively to the JCPOA negotiations or vice versa.
Fourth
is what the new regime will look like if the mullahs’ regime falls (to
avoid repeating the deception of the 1979 revolution) and the role of
opposition groups already plagued by sharp internal division.
Comparably, the silence and reticence of Arab capitals
towards the Iranian protests are rooted in their varying relationships with
Iran and their perceptions of the threat posed by the Islamic Republic.
Countries
like Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Bahrain hold a hostile
attitude toward Iran, while Iraq, Syria, and Algeria maintain close ties and
similar ideologies. Oman tries to maintain a balancing act between Iran and
Saudi Arabia, while Qatar has strong economic connections with Iran that have
only grown stronger in recent years after the GCC blockade in 2017.
In some ways, this
explains Al Jazeera’s limited media coverage of the protests in Iran compared
to that of the Arab Spring uprisings. But at least the Qatari Foreign Minister,
in his interview with Bloomberg, indicated that “We are opposing using
violence by security forces against civilians whether a woman or a man. This is
a domestic issue, and we don’t normally interfere in domestic issues with
countries.”
Arab governments may be hesitant to speak out against the
Iranian government’s repression of protests due to their fear of a domino
effect. This fear stems from the potential for revolutionary contagion, as seen
in the Iran Islamic Revolution and Arab Spring Uprisings, and the potential
undermining of ideological ties with Iran.
It is
clear that since the Arab Spring uprisings, the change in the power dynamic in
the region has worked in Iran’s favor, allowing it to expand the axis of
resistance it leads, particularly to the detriment of Saudi Arabia.
On the other hand, these Arab governments may avoid taking a
stance on the issue to avoid drawing attention to their own history of
suppressing protests and to prove their goodwill and non-interference in
Iran’s internal politics on the principle of good neighborliness—moral
grandstanding. They believe this would strengthen their negotiating positions
with Iran on outstanding and complex issues and strengthen their legitimacy in
the international community.
Arabs
and Iranians share the same region and religion. However, they have proud and
distinct heritage, speak different languages and follow different branches of
Islam, with Arabs predominantly Sunni while Iranians are Shiite. These cultural
and linguistic differences create communication barriers and binary
stereotypes, making it difficult to understand each other’s current common
interests and demands.
Arab and Gulf media focus primarily on Iran’s regional
influence and power struggles but pay little attention to local issues such as
popular protests and human rights violations against minorities.
The lack of meaningful Arab media dedicated to in-depth
coverage of Iranian society has heightened the divide between the Arab and
Iranian peoples. The deliberate media stereotyping that portrays Iran merely
through its regime and regional behavior, viewed from a narrow religious
perspective, obscures the overall picture of Iranian society and erodes the
trust and sympathy of the Arab public.
As
against this, Iran has a vast media apparatus aimed at both the Arab
and Iranian publics that reflects the views of the Iranian regime and presents
political events through ideological and sectarian lenses.
Arab elites, especially after the Arab Spring, continue to
face restrictions on freedom of demonstration and expression. Indeed, this
impedes their ability to back advocacy campaigns for the protests in Iran
organized by civil society.
Authorities are balancing a political equation that prevents
them from officially supporting the protests in Iran. Nevertheless, some
interaction with the protests, such as solidarity statements, condemnations,
and vigils, can be observed in a few Arab capitals and elsewhere in the
diaspora.
In Arab
countries such as Lebanon and Iraq, which have close ties to Iran, any upheaval
in Iranian politics could be viewed as a window of hope for those who grapple
with their own internal struggles to challenge Iranian political influence.
In Lebanon, for example, Fe-male, a feminist organization,
held a vigil to show support for the Iranian women protesting against
mandatory veiling under the title “From us to you, [sending] all our love and
support.” The vigil featured slogans in Arabic and Persian, including mantra of
the protesters, “Woman, Life, Freedom.”
Other activist groups also sought to
organize a protest in front of the Iranian embassy in Beirut, calling it “From
Tehran to Beirut, the killer regime is one,” but failed amid threats from
Hezbollah’s militias.
In Iraq, some women on social media launched the “No to
Compulsory Hijab” campaign to support Iranian women facing regime
repression and the mandatory dress code.
Also, in Tunisia, human rights and feminist organizations
held a rally outside the Iranian Cultural Center to express their
support for women in Iran. The demonstrators denounced the discrimination and
mistreatment of women in Iran and chanted slogans such as “Tunisian women
support Iranian women,” “Here to voice our solidarity with Iranian women,” and
“Revolution and freedom.”
The International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH),
including a coalition of Arab feminist and human rights groups, issued a statement on
October 7, 2022, to express solidarity. The statement, ‘We stand in solidarity
with women and demonstrators in Iran,’ condemned the suppression of peaceful
protests.
We likely won’t see decisive Arab reactions to the protests
in Iran any time soon. Despite Arab grievances to Iran’s regional behavior,
states will maintain political neutrality given the uncertain trajectory of the
protests.
Furthermore,
they may fear exposing themselves ideologically if they endorse foreign
protests. Lastly, in a cultural dimension, there is already a wide gulf between
how Arabs and Iranians perceive each other. Despite what limited civic action
we have seen, these factors inhibit any broad social expression of solidarity
as seen in the west.
With the challenging and fading prospects of altering Iran’s
behavior or the entire regime from within, Arabs still have other choices.
These include waiting for a full-fledged revolution in Iran, capitalizing on
international stances and sanctions, and luring its allies to abandon it, as
were tried recently with China, Russia, and Iraq.
