Have All Abandoned Hamas?

The question of whether Hamas has been completely abandoned by its allies deserves a nuanced answer. While the militant-political organization is under unprecedented isolation and financial strain, it has not been left entirely friendless. What has changed is not the existence of support, but the depth and nature of it. The few remaining backers are more pragmatic and cautious than ideological.

Iran remains the most steadfast supporter of Hamas, but even Tehran’s approach has shifted from enthusiasm to calculation. The Islamic Republic continues to provide limited training, intelligence, and weapons through its network that includes Hezbollah and the IRGC. Yet, Hamas no longer occupies the central role it once did in Iran’s “Axis of Resistance.” Tehran’s strategic priority today is containing Israel through Hezbollah in Lebanon and maintaining deterrence in Syria and Iraq. In that equation, Hamas has become an auxiliary, not a frontline force.

Qatar, long seen as Hamas’s financial lifeline, has also recalibrated its policy. The unmonitored cash deliveries to Gaza that sustained Hamas’s governance structure are now being rerouted through the United Nations and humanitarian agencies. Doha seeks to retain its role as a mediator rather than an outright patron. That shift leaves Hamas with a smaller and more conditional stream of funds — insufficient to maintain administrative control in a war-torn enclave.

Turkey’s support, meanwhile, has settled into the realm of rhetoric. President Erdoğan continues to speak forcefully for Palestinian rights, but Ankara avoids concrete steps that could jeopardize its economic and diplomatic relations with the West. Turkey’s relationship with Hamas has become largely symbolic — a political shield rather than a material one.

Across the Arab world, the mood has changed dramatically. Egypt views Hamas as a destabilizing factor on its Sinai frontier; Jordan and the Gulf monarchies see it as a residue of the Muslim Brotherhood; and Saudi Arabia, pursuing strategic normalization with Israel, has little appetite for association. The UAE, a key Arab power, treats Hamas as a security threat rather than a liberation movement. This new regional consensus marks a profound isolation for the group.

Yet, Hamas is not entirely defeated. It continues to command thousands of fighters, retains limited weapons stockpiles, and still projects control over parts of Gaza. More importantly, popular sympathy for the Palestinian cause across the Muslim world remains deeply rooted. But sympathy does not translate into resources. Without substantial state sponsorship, Hamas is now sustained mainly by resilience, underground networks, and a sense of defiance rather than structured external support.

In essence, Hamas stands at a crossroads. Its godfathers have not fully abandoned it, but their backing has turned conditional and cautious. The movement survives, but in a diminished, more isolated form — powerful enough to persist, yet too constrained to dominate. The age of ideological patronage is ending; what remains is a movement fighting for relevance amid the ruins it once ruled.