Why Pak-Afghan Conflict Remains Unresolved?

The conflict between Pakistan and Afghanistan remains unresolved because it is rooted in a mix of historical disputes, mutual mistrust, and competing security interests that have persisted for decades. Despite cultural, religious, and economic linkages, both nations continue to view each other with suspicion rather than cooperation.

At the heart of the problem lies the Durand Line, drawn by the British in 1893 and inherited by Pakistan after independence. Afghanistan has never formally recognized it as an international border, claiming it divides the Pashtun population. Pakistan, however, considers the frontier legally settled. This disagreement has become a symbol of deeper political and ethnic tensions.

The Pashtun question adds another layer of complexity. The tribes on both sides share linguistic and familial ties, but political narratives have often turned these affinities into instruments of rivalry. Pakistan fears Afghan nationalism could spill over its borders, while Kabul perceives Pakistan’s involvement as interference in its internal affairs.

Security concerns have long overshadowed diplomacy. Since the Soviet invasion of 1979, Pakistan has played a key role in Afghan affairs, hosting millions of refugees and supporting various political factions. Yet, both sides accuse each other of harboring hostile groups — Pakistan blames Afghanistan for sheltering the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), while Kabul accuses Islamabad of backing insurgents. This cycle of allegations has eroded trust.

The Taliban’s return to power in 2021 initially raised hopes for stability, but their refusal to recognize the Durand Line and restrain TTP activities has renewed friction. Meanwhile, regional players — including India, Iran, China, and the United States — continue to shape dynamics that complicate bilateral understanding.

For lasting peace, both countries must shift from blame to dialogue, strengthen border management, and build economic interdependence through trade and connectivity. The Pak-Afghan relationship should not remain hostage to history; instead, it should evolve into a partnership anchored in mutual respect and regional stability.

Only through sustained diplomacy, trust-building, and shared development goals can Pakistan and Afghanistan transform a troubled past into a cooperative future.

 

 

SAARC: Awakening a Sleeping Might

Reviving the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) is not a romantic ideal; it is a strategic necessity. The global order is shifting toward regional blocs that consolidate economic and political influence — from ASEAN and the EU to the African Continental Free Trade Area. South Asia cannot afford to remain fragmented when its combined GDP already exceeds US$4 trillion and its population represents a quarter of the world. A dormant SAARC limits each member’s bargaining power, constrains trade diversification, and weakens collective resilience against climate and security threats.

The process of revival begins with institutional restructuring. SAARC’s Secretariat in Kathmandu must be transformed from a symbolic coordination office into an empowered regional policy hub. This requires financial autonomy, a merit-based staffing system, and authority to monitor and evaluate implementation.

Member states should establish a SAARC Development Fund, enabling cross-border infrastructure, health, and education projects independent of political disruptions. Regular ministerial meetings, even at sub-regional levels, can sustain policy momentum when summits stall.

Economic integration remains the most practical catalyst for reactivation. South Asia’s intra-regional trade potential is estimated at over US$100 billion, yet remains trapped below 6 percent of total commerce.

The complete operationalization of the South Asian Free Trade Area (SAFTA) must be prioritized, coupled with the removal of non-tariff barriers and the adoption of digital customs and payment systems.

A regional e-commerce and logistics framework could integrate small and medium enterprises across borders, reducing trade costs and increasing competitiveness.

Energy cooperation offers another powerful unifying platform. Hydropower trade among Nepal, Bhutan, and India, and gas pipeline connectivity involving Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Afghanistan could underpin mutual interdependence.

A “SAARC Energy Corridor,” integrating electricity grids and renewable-energy investment, would not only enhance supply security but also establish climate-friendly growth foundations.

People-to-people diplomacy is equally critical. Academic partnerships, student mobility programs, media collaboration, and cultural exchanges can foster regional consciousness that transcends political disputes.

Civil-society engagement and private-sector participation should complement intergovernmental dialogue.

The long-term sustainability of SAARC lies not in bureaucratic communiqués but in public ownership of the regional project.

Pakistan’s role in this reawakening is pivotal. Geographically positioned at the crossroads of South, Central, and West Asia, Islamabad can act as a natural bridge for trade and energy corridors.

Reframing its regional engagement from security-centric to economic-centric diplomacy could reposition Pakistan as a constructive stakeholder in regional stability.

Advocating connectivity rather than confrontation would strengthen its diplomatic leverage and economic prospects simultaneously.

Ultimately, SAARC’s revival depends on political will — not from external actors but from within South Asia itself. The logic is simple: collective prosperity is indivisible.

Competing regional architectures cannot substitute for the historical, cultural, and economic interdependence that binds SAARC members.

By re-energizing this sleeping might, South Asia can finally transition from a region of unrealized potential to one of shared progress.

The moment calls for leadership that recognizes cooperation as power, not concession. SAARC’s awakening will not occur overnight, but without the first deliberate steps, South Asia risks remaining a fragmented geography rather than a united economic community.

Why SAARC Lost Its Way?

When the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) was established in 1985, it represented a rare regional consensus in a politically fragmented subcontinent. The founding declaration emphasized collective self-reliance, mutual assistance, and the pursuit of shared prosperity. For a region holding nearly one-fourth of humanity, the potential was extraordinary. Yet, after four decades, SAARC stands largely dormant — a victim of geopolitical rivalry and institutional inertia rather than structural failure.

SAARC’s vision was ambitious but achievable: foster economic, social, and cultural cooperation to enhance the quality of life in member states. However, the trajectory of the organization was quickly derailed by the deep-rooted political mistrust between India and Pakistan. The unresolved Kashmir dispute, periodic border tensions, and competing security narratives transformed the platform into a casualty of bilateral hostility. Since the 2014 Kathmandu Summit, SAARC’s high-level meetings have been suspended indefinitely, leaving the secretariat in Kathmandu underutilized and politically irrelevant.

The cost of this dormancy has been immense. Intra-regional trade among SAARC members remains below 6 percent of total trade — the lowest for any comparable regional bloc. Transport corridors, energy-sharing projects, and digital connectivity initiatives have been stalled. The absence of a collective policy voice has left South Asia peripheral in major global economic and climate negotiations.

Comparatively, ASEAN and the European Union began with modest frameworks centered on trade facilitation and economic complementarity, eventually evolving into influential regional institutions. Their success was not rooted in political harmony but in the understanding that economic interdependence can temper political rivalry. SAARC, unfortunately, allowed politics to precede economics, forfeiting the very logic that drives successful regionalism.

The failure to institutionalize decision-making has also weakened SAARC’s resilience. The Secretariat operates with limited resources and minimal authority. Summits and ministerial meetings, which should function as policy engines, have instead become arenas for diplomatic signaling. Moreover, the proliferation of alternative regional frameworks — notably BIMSTEC and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization — reflects the shifting preferences of member states toward arrangements perceived as more functional or geopolitically advantageous.

Yet, it would be incorrect to describe SAARC as obsolete. The organization retains a symbolic and functional foundation that can be reactivated. Its network of specialized bodies in agriculture, environment, health, and disaster management continues to operate, albeit at suboptimal capacity. More importantly, the shared challenges of climate vulnerability, energy security, and regional inequality demand precisely the kind of coordinated response that only a platform like SAARC can provide.

The need is not to abandon SAARC but to reimagine it — as a mechanism of pragmatic regionalism rather than political posturing. The first step toward revival is to acknowledge why it failed: not because its goals were unrealistic, but because national egos overshadowed collective rationality. South Asia’s sleeping might remain potent; it only awaits political maturity to awaken.

Bridging the Divide: Pakistan and Taliban Need Dialogue, Not Confrontation

The relationship between Pakistan’s ruling regime and the Taliban stands at a delicate crossroads. Bound by geography, faith, and shared history, the two sides also carry layers of mistrust accumulated over decades of shifting alliances and conflicting expectations. In recent years, political statements, security operations, and media narratives have widened this gap further. Yet, beneath the surface lies an undeniable truth — their destinies remain intertwined. To stabilize the region, both must replace suspicion with structured dialogue, and confrontation with cooperation. Military responses may suppress symptoms, but only intellectual engagement can address the root causes of misunderstanding.

The first major misunderstanding arises from security concerns. Pakistan’s authorities often believe that the Taliban have not taken adequate measures against elements of Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), who continue to operate from Afghan territory. On the other hand, the Taliban view Pakistan’s cross-border operations and frequent border closures as violations of Afghan sovereignty. Both sides see each other’s actions through a defensive lens. A structured security dialogue — focusing on intelligence coordination, cross-border communication, and non-interference — can help bridge these perceptions and restore mutual confidence.

The second area of friction involves economic and trade relations. The Taliban leadership frequently accuses Pakistan of using trade controls as leverage, while Pakistan expresses concern over smuggling, informal trade routes, and foreign currency outflows. These differences have converted economic engagement into a tool of pressure rather than cooperation. A transparent, rules-based mechanism for transit trade and financial transactions could turn the economic relationship into a stabilizing force. When trade and transport flow smoothly, political tensions tend to ease naturally.

The third and perhaps most sensitive dimension is ideological understanding. Many in Pakistan interpret the Taliban’s policies solely through a security framework, while the Taliban often perceive Pakistan’s government as too close to Western interests. These views overlook the nuanced realities on both sides. Constructive academic and religious exchanges, involving scholars and opinion leaders, could help generate trust and empathy. Mutual respect for each side’s national priorities is essential for regional harmony.

Peace cannot be dictated by military power or external persuasion; it must evolve from within the region itself. Pakistan and the Taliban must recognize that lasting stability demands open communication, patience, and political maturity. Excluding foreign influences and engaging in honest dialogue will help transform mutual suspicion into cooperation. The region has paid too high a price for conflict — it is time to invest in understanding. Dialogue, not deterrence, is the true foundation of peace between Pakistan and the Taliban.

 

Stock Market Investors: Sad One Day, Jubilant the Next

The Pakistan Stock Exchange (PSX) continues to mirror the country’s volatility — euphoric one day, anxious the next. Despite its recent upward trajectory, warnings of a potential correction were largely ignored. When the inevitable dips arrived, they rattled investors, particularly amid heavy selling by mutual funds.

The start of the week was a rollercoaster. On Monday, the benchmark index plunged by 4,600 points as rising border tensions with Afghanistan, political instability in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, and violent protests in Punjab weighed heavily on sentiment. Yet, within 24 hours, the market staged an extraordinary rebound — gaining nearly 7,000 points on Tuesday and recovering most of its earlier losses.

According to Yousuf M. Farooq, Director of Research at Chase Securities, the rebound was driven by an overnight easing of domestic unrest and improving signals on the Afghanistan front. His observation underscores how sentiment-driven and headline-sensitive the market remains, reacting more to news flow than to fundamentals.

Analysts agree that valuations still look attractive, with several sectors trading below their intrinsic worth. However, they also caution that risks persist. Any slippage on the current account or fiscal front could quickly reverse the recent gains. The macroeconomic environment remains fragile, and the market’s wild swings are a reminder that stability in the PSX cannot be achieved without stability in policy and politics alike.

In short, the stock market’s mood swings are less about numbers and more about nerves. Until investors see a consistent policy direction and improved economic fundamentals, the PSX will continue to oscillate — keeping investors, as always, sad one day and jubilant the next.

Pakistan-IMF: Partnership Built on Dependence

In my recent reflections on Pakistan’s economic dilemmas, one truth stands out — our relationship with the IMF has never been economic, it has always been political. What began as assistance for growth soon turned into a calculated trap of dependency. The IMF didn’t reform Pakistan’s economy; it reprogrammed its sovereignty.

Pakistan’s long association with the IMF has never truly been about stability; it has been about control. What started in the name of “support” evolved into a vicious cycle of borrowing, serving both foreign powers and the ruling elite at home.

During the Cold War, IMF lending was less about economics and more about strategy. Pakistan’s geography made it a convenient pawn in Washington’s global game of containment. Loans came with neatly crafted “conditionalities,” but the real aim was to keep Pakistan’s economy tethered to Western influence.

The much-advertised structural reforms were cosmetic. Land reforms never touched the feudal elite, tax reforms spared the powerful, and privatization transferred wealth to cronies. Instead of fostering industrial growth, policies promoted consumer industries — assembling fast-moving consumer goods rather than producing capital or export goods. The result: an illusion of progress built on imports and consumption.

With every bailout, the dependency mindset grew stronger. The IMF was always available, and policymakers were always willing. A belief took root — that salvation lies in foreign help, not self-reliance.

After the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in the late 1970s, Pakistan was declared a “frontline ally.” The US poured in funds and influence, effectively turning Pakistan’s economy into a Cold War instrument. IMF support neatly aligned with Washington’s geopolitical interests, ensuring compliance rather than reform.

Over the decades, this external control merged with internal manipulation. Regime changes — military or civilian — often bore foreign fingerprints. Today, the IMF stands not as a partner in reform but as a symbol of economic subservience — proof that Pakistan’s journey from aid to autonomy remains unfinished.

Pakistani Policies Turning Taliban Foe

The unraveling Pakistan–Taliban relationship highlights the limits of old security doctrines in a changing regional order.

When the Taliban returned to power in Kabul in 2021, Pakistan hoped for a friendly neighbor and a stable frontier. Four years later, that optimism has faded. Relations have soured, trust has eroded, and the Taliban’s growing warmth toward India signals how far Islamabad’s Afghan policy has drifted from reality.

Pakistan’s once-comfortable relationship with the Taliban is deteriorating — not because of ideology, but because of Islamabad’s own policy. What was once hailed as “strategic depth” is now fast becoming a strategic setback.

For decades, Pakistan believed that supporting the Taliban would ensure border security and limit Indian influence. But since the group’s return to power, those assumptions have collapsed.

Instead of cooperation, Pakistan now faces increasing hostility - frequent border clashes, defiant statements from Kabul, and a resurgent Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) operating from Afghan soil.

The Taliban’s visible tilt toward India is a symptom of Islamabad’s stance. Pakistan has chosen pressure over diplomacy — closing key crossings, threatening to expel Afghan refugees, and publicly accusing Kabul of harboring militants.

These measures have not subdued the Taliban; they have driven them closer to New Delhi, which offers humanitarian aid and political legitimacy without direct interference.

The irony is stark. Pakistan, once the Taliban’s strongest backer, now finds itself isolated, while India — long regarded as an adversary in Afghan affairs — is quietly re-establishing presence in Kabul. The Taliban, in turn, are using this outreach to project independence and resist external dictates.

Islamabad’s Afghan policy remains trapped in outdated security thinking, viewing Kabul solely through the prism of control.

Unless Pakistan recalibrates its approach — replacing coercion with constructive engagement — it risks losing whatever influence it still retains. The “strategic depth” doctrine that once shaped policy has now turned dangerously shallow.

 

Is Pakistan Being Pushed into a ‘US Proxy War’ in Afghanistan?

Behind the new wave of border clashes may lie an old script — one written in Washington and played out in Islamabad and Kabul. Has Pakistan once again been cast in the role of America’s proxy?

The recent spike in Pak-Afghan border tensions has once again pushed the region to the edge of confrontation. Reports suggest that armed militants crossing from Afghanistan have attacked Pakistani security posts, prompting Islamabad’s “severe retaliation.” Yet, beneath the visible smoke of gunfire lies a far more intricate and disturbing reality — one that hints at the shadow of global power politics.

Following the US withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2021, Washington appeared to have lost its strategic foothold in the region. The Taliban’s refusal to hand over the Bagam Air Base — once a vital hub of American military operations — was not merely a symbolic rejection; it was a strategic rebuff. The superpower lost a vantage point near China, Iran, and Central Asia.

It is no coincidence that within months of that refusal, Afghanistan began facing renewed instability, and Pakistan started encountering an inexplicable surge in cross-border attacks.

My hypothesis is simple: when Washington cannot re-enter Afghanistan directly, it may seek to create circumstances that justify intervention. The most effective way to do that is to provoke conflict. The pattern fits. Anonymous “operators” — possibly non-state actors with advanced intelligence capabilities — carry out attacks inside Pakistan, inviting a retaliatory strike. The resulting escalation allows the US to portray the region as unstable and Taliban-controlled Afghanistan as a “global threat.” A familiar pretext for yet another intervention is thus created.

Ironically, Pakistan — which has already paid an enormous price in blood and economy during the first “War on Terror” — now risks being drawn into another one, this time as an unwilling participant in someone else’s geopolitical chessboard. The tragedy is that Islamabad still struggles to draw a clear line between its national interests and Washington’s regional ambitions. History, it seems, is repeating itself — and not for the better.

What complicates matters further is the deep mistrust between Islamabad and Kabul. The Taliban government, already under economic sanctions and political isolation, accuses Pakistan of toeing the American line. Pakistan, on the other hand, blames Afghanistan for harboring militants of the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). Yet neither side seems willing to see how external forces might be manipulating both.

The strategic question Pakistan must ask is: Whose war are we fighting this time? If recent cross-border provocations are indeed part of a larger plan to destabilize the region, Islamabad must avoid taking the bait. A measured, intelligence-based response — not blind retaliation — is the need of the hour. Pakistan’s security cannot depend on reaction; it must rest on foresight.

The lesson from the past two decades is painfully clear. Every time Pakistan has fought on behalf of someone else, it has lost — in lives, in reputation, and in internal cohesion. If history is repeating itself, the least we can do is refuse to play the same role again.

Saudi Support to Pakistan Beyond Diplomacy

Saudi Arabia and Pakistan share a relationship that is often described as “brotherly” rather than merely diplomatic. Rooted in faith, history, and mutual respect, the Kingdom’s support to Pakistan over the decades has been nothing short of exceptional. At every critical juncture—from wars and economic crises to natural disasters—Riyadh has stepped forward with generosity, affirming its role as Islamabad’s most trusted partner.

Historical Foundations of Brotherhood

Saudi Arabia was among the very first nations to recognize Pakistan after its independence in 1947. Since then, ties have been nurtured on shared Islamic values and common aspirations. The relationship quickly matured into a strategic alliance, with both nations backing each other in times of need. During Pakistan’s wars in 1965 and 1971, Riyadh extended strong political and moral support. Similarly, Pakistan stood firmly with the Kingdom during regional crises, cementing trust that has endured for generations.

Financial Lifelines in Times of Need

Perhaps the most visible manifestation of Saudi support has been on the economic front. Pakistan, a developing country often facing fiscal and balance-of-payment challenges, has repeatedly found in Riyadh a source of immediate relief.

In recent years alone, the Kingdom deposited billions of dollars in Pakistan’s State Bank reserves, providing crucial breathing space at a time when international institutions were either hesitant or demanded painful reforms. Oil supplies on deferred payment have cushioned Pakistan’s import bill, helping stabilize inflation and energy costs. Unlike Western lenders, Saudi assistance has rarely been tied to political or structural conditions, making it uniquely generous and timely.

This pattern is not new. Since the 1970s, Riyadh has offered concessional oil facilities, long-term loans, and grants to help Pakistan weather external shocks. Time and again, Saudi Arabia has proven to be Pakistan’s financial first responder.

Energy Security and Investment Potential

Saudi Arabia has also played a key role in Pakistan’s energy security. Its oil facilities have ensured that Pakistan’s economy continues to function even during periods of global energy volatility. Looking ahead, Riyadh has expressed strong interest in investing in Pakistan’s energy infrastructure, particularly in the proposed multibillion-dollar Gwadar Oil Refinery. Such projects not only promise to reduce Pakistan’s dependence on imported petroleum products but also strengthen its role as a regional energy hub.

Humanitarian Generosity and People to People Impact

The Kingdom’s generosity extends far beyond state to state transactions. During Pakistan’s worst humanitarian crises, including the devastating 2005 earthquake and the catastrophic floods of 2010 and 2022, Saudi Arabia was among the largest donors of aid. Relief goods, medical teams, and financial contributions directly helped millions of displaced and vulnerable citizens.

Saudi-funded development projects—ranging from schools and hospitals to water supply schemes—have left a lasting impact on communities across Pakistan. These initiatives reflect Riyadh’s recognition that real support lies not just in financial transfers but in uplifting the quality of life of ordinary people.

Strategic and Defense Cooperation

Defense and security cooperation remain another cornerstone of the relationship. Pakistani military personnel have long been involved in training Saudi armed forces, a partnership that has enhanced Riyadh’s defense capacity while deepening trust between the two establishments.

At the diplomatic level, Saudi Arabia has consistently stood by Pakistan on sensitive issues, particularly Kashmir. By lending its political weight to Islamabad’s positions at the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) and other global platforms, Riyadh has amplified Pakistan’s voice in the international arena.

Mutuality of Interests

Although Saudi Arabia’s exceptional support to Pakistan often takes the spotlight, the relationship is not one-sided. Pakistan has consistently extended manpower, expertise, and solidarity to the Kingdom. Millions of Pakistani workers in Saudi Arabia are a vital part of the Kingdom’s development, especially under Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s Vision 2030. Their contributions not only drive Saudi progress but also sustain Pakistan’s economy through remittances that exceed billions of dollars annually.

In times of regional tension, Pakistan has also stood firmly with Riyadh, whether by providing military expertise or diplomatic support. This reciprocity underscores the fact that the partnership is built on mutual respect and shared strategic interests.

Looking Toward the Future

As the global order undergoes transformation, the Saudi-Pakistan relationship is poised to enter a new phase. Vision 2030, which seeks to diversify the Saudi economy beyond oil, opens new avenues for Pakistani professionals, investors, and skilled workers. Pakistan, with its youthful population and strategic location at the crossroads of South Asia, Central Asia, and the Middle East, remains a natural partner for Riyadh’s long-term ambitions.

Furthermore, investment in renewable energy, technology, agriculture, and infrastructure can redefine the contours of this relationship. What has historically been dominated by financial and defense cooperation is now broadening into sectors that will drive growth in the 21st century.

Exceptional Saudi support to Pakistan is not merely about financial bailouts or humanitarian aid. It is the reflection of a bond rooted in shared faith, tested by history, and strengthened by mutual benefit. For Pakistan, Saudi Arabia has been a dependable partner in times of uncertainty. For Riyadh, Islamabad remains a steadfast ally with strategic depth and human capital.

As both nations look ahead, their challenge is to transform this exceptional support into sustainable, future-oriented cooperation. By building on decades of trust, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan can not only uplift their own people but also set an example of solidarity and resilience for the wider Muslim world.

 

President Trump Gaza Belongs to Palestinians

US President Donald Trump is scheduled to meet leaders and officials from multiple Muslim-majority countries on Tuesday and discuss the situation in Gaza, which has been under a mounting assault from Washington's ally Israel.

White House Press Secretary Karoline Leavitt told reporters on Monday that Trump will hold a multilateral meeting with Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Qatar, Egypt, Jordan, Turkey, Indonesia and Pakistan.

Axios reported Trump will present the group with a proposal for peace and post-war governance in Gaza.

In addition to freeing hostages and ending the war, Trump is expected to discuss US plans around an Israeli withdrawal and post-war governance in Gaza, without Hamas involvement, according to Axios.

Washington wants Arab and Muslim countries to agree to send military forces to Gaza to enable Israel's withdrawal and to secure funding for transition and rebuilding programs, Axios reported.

Trump will address the UN General Assembly on Tuesday, a day after dozens of world leaders gathered at the United Nations to embrace a Palestinian state, a landmark diplomatic shift nearly two years into the Gaza war that faces fierce resistance from Israel and the United States.

The nations said a two-state solution was the only way to achieve peace, but Israel said the recognition of a Palestinian state was a reward to extremism.

Israel's assault on Gaza since October 2023 has killed tens of thousands, internally displaced Gaza's entire population, and set off a starvation crisis. Multiple rights experts, scholars and a UN inquiry assessed it amounts to genocide.

Israel calls its actions self-defense and has also bombed Iran, Lebanon, Yemen, Syria and Qatar during the course of its war in Gaza.

Trump had promised a quick end to the war in Gaza, but a resolution remains elusive eight months into his term.

In February, Trump proposed a US takeover of Gaza and a permanent displacement of Palestinians from there. It was labeled as an "ethnic cleansing" proposal by rights experts and the United Nations. Forcible displacement is illegal under international law. Trump cast the plan as a re-development idea.

What options US can exercise if Afghans refuse to handover Bagram Air Base?

If Afghans refuse to handover Bagram Air Base back to the United States, Washington is likely to face a serious strategic dilemma. The response will likely depend on how far the super power is willing to push its military and political leverage in the region. Some of the likely options are:

1. Diplomatic Pressure

The first option would be to apply diplomatic pressure on the Taliban government, possibly through Qatar or Pakistan as intermediaries. The US may frame Bagram’s access as essential for counterterrorism monitoring, and push for a limited presence under international arrangements rather than outright US control.

2. Economic and Sanctions Leverage

If diplomacy fails, Washington could use financial levers that include:

Tightening sanctions on Taliban leaders.

Blocking international recognition of the Taliban government.

Cutting off humanitarian exemptions or aid that Afghanistan relies on.

This would make Kabul’s refusal costlier.

3. Regional Partnerships

The US might deepen military partnerships with neighbors instead. For instance:

Expanding use of bases in Central Asia (though Russia and China will resist this).

Strengthening presence in the Persian Gulf (Qatar, UAE).

Increasing over-the-horizon operations using drones and satellites.

This would reduce dependency on Bagram, though at a higher logistical cost.

4. Covert Operations

If Washington views Bagram as critical for counterterrorism, it could resort to covert methods—arming rival Afghan groups, intelligence penetration, or even destabilization strategies to pressure the Taliban into concessions.

5. Accept and Adapt

Though difficult, the US may accept that Afghanistan is now firmly outside its reach and adapt by monitoring from afar. This would reflect Washington’s reluctance to re-engage militarily in Afghanistan after two decades of war.

From RCD to ECO to Complete Dormancy

Regionalism has often been hailed as a path toward prosperity, but the trajectory of the Regional Cooperation for Development (RCD) and its successor, the Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO), tells a sobering story of missed opportunities. What began with promise in the 1960s has today slipped into near-complete irrelevance.

The RCD was founded in 1964 by Iran, Pakistan, and Turkey to strengthen economic, cultural, and technical cooperation. It emerged in a Cold War environment, where smaller powers sought to shield themselves from great-power dependency by building regional linkages.

On paper, the project had logic, three strategically located Muslim countries, with shared aspirations of modernization, pooling resources to advance trade, industry, and connectivity. In practice, RCD never went beyond symbolism.

The organization lacked institutional strength, faced political frictions, and struggled to overcome the dominance of external economic ties over intra-regional trade.

By the late 1970s, the Iranian Revolution and shifting geopolitical alignments sealed RCD’s fate. In 1979, it faded into history without leaving a substantial legacy.

A revival attempt came in 1985, when the same three countries launched the Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO). ECO promised a fresh start and greater ambition. Its major breakthrough came in 1992 with the admission of seven new members — Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan.

ECO spanned a vast geography bridging South, Central, and West Asia, with a market of nearly half a billion people and immense natural resources.

Observers predicted that ECO could become a Eurasian economic powerhouse, knitting together landlocked Central Asia with energy-rich Iran and Turkey, and consumer-rich Pakistan.

As decades passed, the promise remained unfulfilled. Member states pursued conflicting foreign policies, were more deeply tied to external trade partners than to each other, and often lacked political trust. Infrastructure gaps meant goods could not move freely.

Overlapping memberships — in the OIC, SCO, CIS, and other blocs — diluted ECO’s relevance.

High-sounding declarations at summits were rarely followed by implementation. Even flagship projects, such as the Islamabad-Tehran-Istanbul railway, never became viable trade corridors.

Today, ECO exists largely as a ceremonial body. Meetings are infrequent, agreements unenforced, and the organization invisible in global or even regional affairs.

Intra-ECO trade remains stuck around 7–8% of members’ total trade, a telling indicator of stagnation.

Compared to other regional blocs such as ASEAN or the EU, ECO demonstrates how political will, not geography, determines success.

The journey from RCD to ECO to dormancy offers a lesson ‑ regional cooperation cannot survive on rhetoric alone. Without trust, shared vision, and consistent follow-through, even the most promising initiatives collapse into irrelevance.

ECO still retains potential — its geography places it at the crossroads of major trade routes, including China’s Belt and Road Initiative. But unless member states move beyond statements and invest in genuine integration, ECO’s story will remain one of unrealized potential and organizational decay.

 

 

President Trump you cannot order Taliban to handover Bagram Air Base to the United States

It may be a wish of US President Donald Trump to get control of Bagram Air Base. However, he does not have any authority to demand the Afghan government to handover the base. Threatening bad things would happen to Afghanistan if it does not give back control of the base to the United States, is outright terrorism.

Here are several possible motives behind the Trump demand:

·        Restoring US influence in Afghanistan and the wider region, especially after the pull-out which many view as a strategic loss.

·        Countering rivals, particularly China and others by having a base close by.

·        Strengthening counterterrorism posture, ensuring that militant groups can't easily use Afghan territory to plan or launch attacks.

·        Leveraging domestic political pressure as the opponents say the withdrawal decision was a mistake.

·        Using it as a bargaining chip to secure concessions i.e. economic aid, diplomatic recognition, etc.

Being a sovereign county and also because the US does recognize the Taliban government of Afghanistan it is the inherent right of Taliban to outright rejected the US demand.

·        They rightly say Afghanistan’s territorial integrity cannot be compromised.

·        No foreign military presence will be allowed.

·        Taliban insists that political and economic relations with the US are possible without giving up land or allowing foreign bases.

Regaining control of Bagram will not an easy task for the US. It would likely require a major military deployment, security provisions, defense spending, etc. Experts say holding the base would be challenging militarily and politically.

Some analysts view the US demand as an attempt to restore hegemony over Afghanistan and adjoining countries.

They warn that pushing too hard might destabilize relations, reduce cooperation, or provoke negative responses from locals or other countries.

Under the Doha Agreement (2020) and other engagements, the US made certain commitments about respecting Afghanistan’s sovereignty, no foreign bases, etc. Returning to or demanding possession of Bagram is violation of these agreements.

Significance of Saudi Arabia-Pakistan defence pact

The Saudi Arabia-Pakistan defence pact is not just a military arrangement—it is a strategic partnership that underpins Pakistan’s economic security and Saudi Arabia’s military security. For Pakistan, it guarantees vital financial and diplomatic backing; for Saudi Arabia, it provides trusted military support and, indirectly, a nuclear-armed ally. Together, it represents one of the strongest security relationships in the Muslim world.

The Saudi Arabia- Pakistan defence pact carries deep strategic, political, and economic significance for both countries and the wider region. Its importance can be seen from multiple angles:

Strategic and Security Dimension

Mutual Security Guarantee:

Pakistan has historically provided military training, expertise, and manpower to Saudi Arabia, reinforcing the Kingdom’s defence at times of regional tension. In return, Saudi Arabia has been a security partner for Pakistan in times of external pressure.

Balancing Iran’s Influence:

For Saudi Arabia, Pakistan’s military cooperation is part of a broader strategy to counterbalance Iran in the Gulf and beyond. For Pakistan, it ensures strong backing from the Kingdom while maintaining a delicate balance in its own relations with Iran.

Nuclear Umbrella:

Although not formalized, Pakistan’s nuclear capability is sometimes seen as a potential backstop for Saudi security in case of existential threats, making the defence relationship symbolically powerful.

Military Cooperation

Training and Deployment:

Thousands of Pakistani military personnel have served in Saudi Arabia over the decades, providing training to Saudi forces. Even today, a contingent of Pakistani troops is stationed there for defence cooperation.

Arms and Defence Technology:

Pakistan has supplied small arms, ammunition, and defence equipment to Saudi Arabia. Joint ventures in defence production are under discussion.

Counterterrorism and Intelligence Sharing:

Both states have collaborated closely in intelligence sharing, counterterrorism operations, and combating extremist networks that threaten regional stability.

Economic and Political Significance

Financial Lifeline for Pakistan:

Saudi Arabia has been one of Pakistan’s most consistent financial supporters—providing oil on deferred payments, direct loans, and balance-of-payments support. The defence pact strengthens this bond by ensuring Pakistan’s military commitment in return.

Diplomatic Support:

Saudi Arabia often champions Pakistan’s stance on international platforms, including on Kashmir and economic cooperation within the OIC. Pakistan reciprocates by supporting Saudi positions on regional security and Islamic solidarity.

Regional and Global Context

Gulf Security:

Saudi Arabia views Pakistan as a reliable partner in securing the Gulf, especially in moments of instability.

Islamic Military Alliance:

Pakistan plays a central role in the Saudi-led Islamic Military Counter Terrorism Coalition (IMCTC), with former Pakistani Army Chief Gen. Raheel Sharif appointed as its first commander.

US–China Factor:

The pact also gives Saudi Arabia an alternative to over-reliance on Western defence support, while Pakistan uses it to diversify its security partnerships alongside China.

Symbolic and Religious Aspect

Custodianship of Holy Places:

Pakistan attaches special reverence to Saudi Arabia as the custodian of Islam’s holiest sites, and defence cooperation is also framed as protecting the sanctity of the Two Holy Mosques.

Soft Power and Legitimacy:

The pact signals unity of two major Muslim powers—Saudi Arabia with its economic and religious clout, and Pakistan with its military strength and nuclear capability.

Saudi Arabia and Pakistan sign defence pact

According to Reuters, Saudi Arabia and nuclear-armed Pakistan have signed a formal mutual defense pact on Wednesday, in a move that significantly strengthens a decades-long security partnership amid heightened regional tensions.

The enhanced defense ties come as Gulf Arab states grow increasingly wary about the reliability of the United States as their longstanding security guarantor. Israel's attack on Qatar last week heightened those concerns.

"This agreement is a culmination of years of discussions. This is not a response to specific countries or specific events but an institutionalization of longstanding and deep cooperation between our two countries," a senior Saudi official told Reuters when asked about its timing.

Israel's attempt to kill the political leaders of Hamas with airstrikes on Doha, while they were discussing a ceasefire proposal that Qatar is helping to mediate, infuriated Arab countries.

The pact could shift the strategic calculus in a complex region. Allies of Washington, Gulf monarchies have sought to stabilize ties with both Iran and Israel to resolve longstanding security concerns.

But the Gaza war has upended the region and Gulf state Qatar has been subjected to direct hits twice in a year, once by Iran and once by Israel.

The senior Saudi official, who spoke on condition of anonymity, acknowledged the need to balance relations with Pakistan's rival, India, also a nuclear power.

"Our relationship with India is more robust than it has ever been. We will continue to grow this relationship and seek to contribute to regional peace whichever way we can."

Asked whether Pakistan would be obliged to provide Saudi Arabia with a nuclear umbrella under the pact, the official said, "This is a comprehensive defensive agreement that encompasses all military means."

Pakistani state television showed Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif and Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, the kingdom's de facto ruler, embracing after signing the agreement. In attendance was Pakistan's army chief, Field Marshal Asim Munir, regarded as the country's most powerful person.

"This agreement, which reflects the shared commitment of both nations to enhance their security and to achieving security and peace in the region and the world, aims to develop aspects of defense cooperation between the two countries and strengthen joint deterrence against any aggression. The agreement states that any aggression against either country shall be considered an aggression against both," a statement from the Pakistani prime minister's office said.

Significance of Pezeshkian’s visit to China

Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian wrapped up a four-day visit to China on Wednesday, heading back to Tehran after attending a military parade in Beijing that marked 80 years since the end of World War II.

Pezeshkian's first stop in China was the northern port city of Tianjin, where he attended the 25th Meeting of the SCO Council of Heads of State, the largest gathering of the bloc to date. The Iranian president delivered a speech there, addressing the "unfair" global order led by the West and highlighting the need to create a new one through collaboration among the Global South.

A much-anticipated meeting between the presidents of Iran and China took place the next day. Pezeshkian told Xi Jinping that Iran was ready to work with China "under any circumstances" to elevate relations to their highest level, stressing that Beijing could count on Tehran as a "strong and determined friend and ally." Xi reciprocated, stating he sees Tehran as a "strategic partner" with a "forward-looking approach." Both sides agreed that more needed to be done to implement the 25-year cooperation plan signed in 2020.

Analysts in Iran hope that the president’s visit, during which he was accompanied by his foreign minister, economy minister, and defense minister, would lead to new military and financial deals.

This appears to be the case, as upon arriving in Tehran, Pezeshkian stated that "important," "strategic," and "vital" decisions had been made following his discussions with Xi.

"Additionally, discussions on security and defense equipment were held with the support of the defense minister, who was present during this trip, and necessary follow-ups will be carried out in this regard," Pezeshkian declared. It is believed that Iran is looking to buy air defense systems and fighter jets from China, although there is no official confirmation on what it seeks to purchase.

While Iranians have mostly focused on what the trip could bring about for Iran, the rest of the world has mainly been discussing how the SCO summit and the close interaction between India's Modi and Xi demonstrate that the split President Trump opened up between Washington and New Delhi is much larger than expected.

Trump’s former security advisor told American media that Trump has “shredded decades of effort” to pull India away from the Russian and Chinese orbit with his tariff policies. 

Furthermore, Modi's presence at the recent SCO meeting, along with other developments, is viewed as a sign that the new global order Pezeshkian has called for is approaching, or may already be in place.

"The new international order everyone has been talking about for years has almost arrived," said economic and trade analyst Majid Shakeri.

The expert said several factors point to this consolidation include: 1) the exclusion of Arab states from the Wednesday parade after their embrace of Trump during his West Asia tour earlier this year, 2) the Siberian Power Pipeline agreement signed between Russia and China this week, 3) and Beijing's announcement of its intention to establish an artificial intelligence cooperation center with the rest of the SCO.

"A crucial piece of the puzzle that is still incomplete and unclear is India's balancing act between China and America," Shakeri explained.

Pezeshkian's visit to China also included significant interactions with other world leaders. While there appeared to be no interaction with the Indian Prime Minister, Pezeshkian spent four hours in discussion with Russia's Vladimir Putin and a shorter amount of time speaking with Pakistan's Shehbaz Sharif, whose country's relationship with Iran is growing closer by the day.

Recep Tayyip Erdogan of Turkey was filmed holding onto Pezeshkian's hand while walking alongside him in a hall. The Iranian president expressed anticipation for Erdogan's visit to Tehran.

Despite recent tensions between Iran and Turkey regarding South Caucasus transportation plans and the situation in Syria, both nations appear in favor of maintaining their friendly relations.

Tajikistan’s Emomali Rahmon was also affectionate with Pezeshkian. The two countries share a significant part of their history and culture and view each other fondly.

 

India alerts Pakistan about possible flood

Despite strained relations following the May 2025 standoff, India has formally alerted Pakistan about a potential flood in the River Tawi at Jammu that could affect the Pakistani territory.

According to a senior official, the Indian High Commission in Islamabad contacted the Foreign Office at 10am on Sunday, cautioning about a “significant flood situation.”

This marks the first major communication between the two countries since the May conflict, when bilateral ties deteriorated sharply.

Officials emphasized that the exchange was in line with the Indus Waters Treaty, which obliges both sides to share data on river flows and flood forecasts during the monsoon season.

Following the alert, the Government of Pakistan issued warnings to all relevant federal and provincial departments, including the National Disaster Management Authority (NDMA), irrigation departments and military engineering units.

The 1960 Indus Waters Treaty requires India and Pakistan to share flood-related data to help protect downstream communities and minimize damage from natural disasters.

While tensions remain high, officials described India’s latest move as a “positive gesture” under the treaty framework. The spokesperson for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was unavailable for comment.

 

Iran-Pakistan set ambitious agri trade target

Iran and Pakistan signed a joint statement pledging to expand cooperation in agriculture, trade, and food security, with a goal to raise bilateral agricultural trade to US$3 billion within two years.

Iran’s Agriculture Minister Gholamreza Nouri Ghezeljeh said current trade is around US$1.4 billion, noting both countries’ complementary strengths.

Iran will expand exports of dairy, nuts, fruits, and vegetables, while Pakistan will supply rice, corn, and 60% of Iran’s meat imports.

Both sides also agreed to collaborate on climate change research, food security, and establish a joint agricultural committee to meet biannually.

Pakistan’s Minister Rana Tanveer Hussain called the Tehran meeting “fruitful,” stressing that regional trade is cheaper than sourcing from distant markets like Brazil.

Both public and private sectors will participate, with barter and tailored facilities under consideration.

The Iran–Pakistan Business Conference opened in Islamabad on August 03, attended by President Masoud Pezeshkian and hosted by Senator Ishaq Dar.

Pakistan’s Commerce Minister Jam Kamal Khan highlighted the draft Free Trade Agreement, tariff issue resolution, and improved border infrastructure, including activation of the Pishin–Mand market and plans for a new Chadgi–Kouhak crossing.

Iran’s Trade Minister Mohammad Atabak emphasized the need to expand land terminals, rail connectivity, and port cooperation.

Dar underlined close ties under the Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO) and invited Iranian investors to Pakistan, citing reforms and a new investment facilitation council.

Reza Masrour, head of Iran’s Free Trade and Special Economic Zones, proposed joint paddy farming in Pakistan with rice processing in Iran’s Chabahar Free Zone to address water shortages.

He also suggested multi-entry visas, a joint free zone, and linking CPEC to Iran and the North–South Corridor. Pakistan welcomed these ideas.

According to Iran’s Trade Promotion Organization, trade reached US$3.129 billion in 2024–25, with Iran exporting US$2.423 billion (mainly petroleum products, milk powder, and dates) and importing US$706 million (primarily rice, oilseeds, and meat). However, trade in early 2025 dipped due to regional instability.

Officials stressed that better logistics, customs cooperation, and transport infrastructure are vital for sustaining growth and realizing the long-delayed promise of free trade.

US-Pakistan strategic cooperation

Secretary of State Marco Rubio said Washington looked forward to exploring cooperation with Pakistan on critical minerals and hydrocarbons, with his comments coming in a statement issued by the State Department on Pakistan's Independence Day.

Washington and Islamabad hailed a trade deal last month, which Pakistan said would result in lower tariffs and increased investment.

Pakistan's Commerce Minister Jam Kamal has said Islamabad will offer US businesses opportunities to invest in mining projects primarily in the southwestern Baluchistan province through joint ventures with local companies, providing concessions such as lease grants.

The province is home to key mining projects, including Reko Diq, run by mining firm Barrick Gold and believed to be one of the world's largest gold and copper mines.

"We look forward to exploring new areas of economic cooperation, including critical minerals and hydrocarbons, and fostering dynamic business partnerships," Rubio said late on Wednesday.

"The United States deeply appreciates Pakistan's engagement on counterterrorism and trade."

Before President Donald Trump's administration, Islamabad's relationship with Washington had cooled in recent years, as the US drew closer to Pakistan's traditional adversary India to counter China's rise, among other factors.

Washington also resented Islamabad over Afghanistan, especially under former President Joe Biden's administration, which oversaw a chaotic withdrawal from Afghanistan and the takeover of the country by the Taliban insurgency that Washington accused Islamabad of backing. Pakistan denied the charge.

In recent months, Washington's ties with Islamabad have improved. Trump took credit for a ceasefire between India and Pakistan after the Asian neighbors engaged in hostilities in May following an April attack in India-administered Kashmir.

Pakistan praised Trump while India maintained that New Delhi and Islamabad should resolve their issues directly without outside involvement.

The US and Pakistan held the latest round of counterterrorism talks in Islamabad on Tuesday. Washington has designated separatist militant group Baluchistan Liberation Army as a "foreign terrorist organization."

"The US-Pakistan counterterrorism dialogue joint statement is one of the most positive and effusive I've seen from these two countries on CT for quite a few years," Michael Kugelman, a Washington-based South Asia analyst and writer for Foreign Policy magazine, said.

 

PSX benchmark index up 3.08%WoW

Pakistan Stock Exchange (PSX) sustained its bullish momentum throughout the week on anticipation of strong earnings during the ongoing results season. The benchmark index touched its all-time high closing at 145,647 points on Thursday, but closed the week at 145,383 points, up 4,348 points, up 3.08%WoW, with meager decline in the last trading session.

Market participation improved with average daily traded volume increasing by 16.3%WoW to 653 million shares, up from 561 million shares a week ago.

Trade deficit for the month of July 2025 rose to US$2.8 billion, up 44%YoY.

Workers’ remittances for July 2025 also rose to US$3.2 billion, up 7%YoY.

Foreign exchange reserves held by State Bank of Pakistan (SBP) decreased by US$72 million to US$14.2 billion as of August 01, 2025.

Key sectoral developments included robust 30%YoY growth in cement dispatches for July 2025, while OMC offtakes reached 1.2 million tons, up 2% YoY.

On the international front, the Trump administration imposed an additional 25% tariff on India, raising reciprocal tariffs to 50%.

Other major news flow during the week included: 1) Pakistan gets 19% tariff after US drives a hard bargain, 2) SBP enhances housing finance limit for microfinance borrowers to PKR5 million, 3) ExxonMobil likely to come back for offshore venture, 4) Pakistan set to initiate dialogue with Qatar on LNG supplies, and 5) Budget deficit drops to 5.4% in FY25 from 6.8% for the same period last year.

Woollen, Jute, insurance, Tobacco, and Food & Personal Care were amongst the top performing sectors, while Synthetic & Rayon, Close-end Mutual Funds, Chemical, Sugar & Allied Industries, and Textile Weaving were amongst the laggards.

Major selling was recorded by Banks/ DFI with a net sell of US$18.8 million. On the other hand, Mutual Funds absorbed most of the selling with a net buy of US$22.9 million.

Top performing scrips the week were: AGL, NESTLE, UNITY, HBL, and BNWM, while the laggards included: GADT, PKGP, FABL, LCI, and IBFL.

According to AKD Securities, the market is expected to remain positive in the coming weeks, with further developments over circular debt expected to drive the market along with upcoming corporate results remaining in the limelight.

The benchmark index is anticipated to sustain its upward trajectory, with a target of 165,215 points by end December 2025, primarily driven by strong earnings in Fertilizers, sustained ROEs in Banks, and improving cash flows of E&Ps and OMCs, benefiting from falling interest rates and economic stability.

The top picks of the brokerage house include OGDC, PPL, PSO, FFC, ENGROH, MCB, FCCL, KOHC, INDU, and SYS.