Iran's economic relations with its neighbors

In recent years, the economic relationships between Iran and its neighboring countries have grown in both complexity and significance. This economic integration is crucial for the development of Iran’s non-oil sector and its broader economic strategy, especially considering the geopolitical challenges that the country faces.

In this article, an effort has been made to explore the current state and future prospects of Iran’s trade with its neighbors, examine key sectors, trade volumes, and strategic partnerships.

As of late 2024, Iran’s non-oil trade with its neighbors has seen a notable increase. Non-oil trade volumes reached US$55.3 billion in the first 11 months of the year, with exports constituting 67 million tons of goods valued at US$25.8 billion and imports amounting to 21.4 million tons valued at US$29.4 billion.

This represents a significant increase in trade flows, driven by an increase in exports of petrochemical products, minerals, and agricultural goods.

Iran’s primary trading partners in the region include Iraq, the UAE, Turkey, Pakistan, and Afghanistan. The UAE and Iraq are Iran’s two largest trade partners, especially in terms of exports.

For example, in the first seven months of 2024, Iran’s trade with Iraq was valued at US$7.6 billion, making it one of the most crucial destinations for Iranian goods. The major exports to Iraq include petrochemicals, cement, and agricultural products, while imports primarily consist of machinery and food items.

Turkey has also maintained its position as a key trading partner, with trade between the two countries amounting to US$9.9 billion in the same period. Iranian exports to Turkey largely consist of natural gas and petroleum products, while imports from Turkey are diverse, including electrical machinery and textiles.

Iran’s geopolitical location, bordered by 15 countries, gives it a strategic advantage in the trade of goods and services. This advantageous position allows Iran to serve as a key transit hub for goods moving between Central Asia, the Caucasus, and West Asia.

In particular, the development of international transport corridors, such as the North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC), which links Iran with Russia, India, and Central Asia, is expected to enhance Iran’s role in regional trade.

Furthermore, the expansion of special economic zones, such as the Lamerd Free Trade Zone, has created new opportunities for businesses to engage in regional trade. This diversification of trade routes and infrastructure investment is expected to foster deeper economic ties with countries in the Persian Gulf and beyond.

Despite challenges, such as global sanctions and regional instability, Iran’s government has focused on expanding its non-oil exports, particularly to its neighbors. This strategy is part of a broader effort to reduce Iran’s dependency on oil revenues and diversify its economy.

The Iranian government’s push for stronger trade relations with Central Asia, Russia, and even countries like Oman and Turkmenistan, is driven by the need for economic diversification and the potential to access new markets. Iran’s trade with Russia, for example, has grown steadily, with recent figures showing a trade volume of US$1.5 billion in 2024.

The economic outlook for Iran’s trade with neighboring countries is promising. The country’s strategic location, combined with increased infrastructure investment and a strong focus on non-oil exports, positions Iran as a key player in the regional economy.

However, the ongoing challenges of sanctions and geopolitical tensions remain factors to consider as Iran continues to navigate its path toward economic diversification.

If these trade relationships continue to strengthen, Iran could significantly enhance its role as a regional economic hub, ensuring long-term stability and growth for its economy.

 

Iran: Transit trade through Chabahar Port

Officials from Iran, India, Afghanistan, and Uzbekistan met in Mumbai to explore strategies for enhancing commercial transactions and facilitating the transportation and transit of goods through Iran’s Chabahar Port.

Hossein Shahdadi, Deputy Director of Port and Economic Affairs of Chabahar, represented Iran at the meeting, which also included senior officials from India’s Ministry of Ports, Shipping, and Waterways, as well as ambassadors and diplomats from Uzbekistan, Afghanistan, and Iran.

Chabahar potential

The discussions centered on leveraging Chabahar’s strategic position as a vital trade and transit hub connecting Central Asia, South Asia, and the Middle East. Participants reviewed the port’s current infrastructure and operational capacity while addressing key obstacles to trade, including bureaucratic challenges, logistical inefficiencies, and infrastructure gaps.

As part of the agenda, the officials also proposed measures to streamline customs processes, enhance multimodal transport connectivity, and expand investment in Chabahar’s development to unlock its full potential as a regional trade gateway.

Chabahar regional role

Chabahar Port, located on Iran’s southeastern coast in the Gulf of Oman, is Iran’s only oceanic port and holds immense strategic significance. It provides a shorter and more secure trade route for landlocked countries such as Afghanistan and Uzbekistan, offering a viable alternative to traditional trade routes through Pakistan.

India, in particular, has invested heavily in Chabahar as part of its broader strategy to bypass Pakistan and enhance trade with Central Asia, Afghanistan, and beyond. The port is seen as a linchpin of India’s International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC), a multimodal trade route linking India to Russia via Iran and Central Asia.

Chabahar Port and India

India has played a significant role in the development of Chabahar Port, committing substantial financial and technical resources to its construction and expansion. Under a trilateral agreement signed in 2016 between Iran, India, and Afghanistan, India has been granted operational control of a portion of the port. Since then, the country has contributed to improving the port’s infrastructure, including the construction of new terminals, installation of modern equipment, and dredging activities to enhance its cargo-handling capacity.

In recent years, India has shipped essential commodities such as wheat to Afghanistan through Chabahar and has positioned the port as a key enabler of humanitarian assistance and economic collaboration. The development of Chabahar aligns with India’s vision of regional connectivity and underscores its commitment to promoting economic stability in Afghanistan and Central Asia.

Future goals and challenges

The third joint working group meeting also highlighted the challenges faced in realizing Chabahar’s full potential. These include the need for sustained investment in rail and road connectivity, enhancing port efficiency, and addressing geopolitical issues, including US sanctions on Iran, which have hindered the pace of collaboration in some areas.

Despite these hurdles, all four nations reiterated their commitment to furthering cooperation on Chabahar and exploring innovative solutions to promote regional trade and economic integration. The port’s strategic location and growing role in fostering connectivity ensure it will remain central to the economic ambitions of the participating nations.

 

Bangladesh: Performance of interim government

Nearly three months have passed that the interim government (IG) has been in charge of a country devastated beyond comprehension. We the mere mortals, struggling to forget the nightmarish 15 years, can be forgiven for nurturing very high expectations from the new dispensation.

It will do us well to remember that the IG is not the caretaker government (CTG) of the past. It is very unique, given the circumstances in which it came to power—a popular youth-led uprising has validated not only the IG’s assumption of power but has also, ipso facto, granted approval for any and all legal actions it undertakes to rectify the damage to the nation’s institutions and agencies. The mutilation done to the nation would require more than run of the mill actions or traditional approach.

In passing it should be stressed that raising the issue of Hasina’s resignation at this point in time is out of place, some may see this as being ulteriorly motivated, and reeking of conspiracy.

It is of no consequence whether a person who assumed power in a dubious manner, was deposed through a popular uprising—there can be no greater mandate than this—and sought exile of their own volition, has tendered an official letter of resignation. We must admit that the president’s recent remarks regarding this have mystified us.

The various reform committee gives us a good idea of the sectoral reforms the IG wants to undertake. Unique situation requires unique response that may not necessarily conform to the normal methods and means of administering a country.

But while the IG goes about fixing things, it should keep the people informed about its policies and plan of action for rectification. The IG should keep in mind that although it is not bound by any timeframe and its framework of reference is very wide, its time limit is also not open-ended. And a “reasonable” timeframe is open to various interpretations. What the IG is doing should also be visible.

The first thing that still needs to be fully addressed is the administration, which seems to be influenced by the lingering presence of the Awami League. Reportedly, many beneficiaries of the past regime continue in important appointments. The longer they stay in the administration the more are the risks they pose to the successful implementation of the IG’s reform plans. The significance of the manufactured unrest in the RMG sector, sabotage of oil tankers, and various demands from different professional groups are well-orchestrated actions to nip the plans of the IG in the bud.

Apparently, it would seem that the administration is not moving fast enough for some quarter’s liking, and a feature post-revolution is the regime of intimidation and coercion imposed on certain quarters. While that is understandable under the circumstances, making haste while sorting out the muck of the last 15 years may be counterproductive.

The public has certain expectations as well as grievances, and some of these are manifested in the student outburst, demonstrated in their siege of the High Court for removal of judges appointed during the Hasina regime where personal fealty triumphed over qualification and merit. The latest outburst is against the person in Bangabhaban for reasons mentioned.

One of the gripes the students have, and justifiably so, is the continuation of some senior bureaucrats who thrived under the Hasina regime, and who were complicit in the destruction of the state institutions and misuse of the state agencies for partisan gains. This goes for all sectors.

The education sector was a target of the students too. But witch-hunting is not the answer. Admittedly, the public universities were caderised from the vice chancellor down to the junior most lecturer. Most of them did not meet the minimum requirements of the post. One might say that it was a long-term plan to destroy the backbone of the nation by destroying the education sector.

It would also seem that the process of accountability is not moving fast enough. One hears the question “Where have all the crooks gone, and how?” Indeed, one may ask, once again, where have all the crooks gone? And by crooks, I mean all those that sought sanctuary inside the safety of the cantonments across the country after the student-led revolution that has been anointed with the very appropriate appellation of Monsoon Revolution, and many others who made good their escape quite a few days after the assumption of office of the IG. In fact, there is a general suspicion that the beneficiaries of the previous government may still be calling the shots.

A passing reference was made to this subject in one of my previous columns, but time has come to accord the issue more than a cursory glance. It is my distinct impression that the matter has been deliberately swept under the carpet hoping that, Bangalee memory being short, the matter would be forgotten. Well, not so soon.

A few questions need to be answered by the relevant individuals in positions of responsibility. Feigning ignorance will not sit well with the common man, who feels that allowing those responsible for bringing so much misery to the people—through wanton loot and plunder, siphoning billions out of the country, and particularly those directly responsible for the deaths of a thousand and the maiming of several times more—soils the blood of the martyrs. They must be held accountable.

Of the 170 million Bangladeshis, only 600 or so sought refuge inside the military establishments. Among them were politicians and senior members of the law enforcing agencies. The question is why. They must have done something wrong that they feared would incur public wrath. In fact, these were the people who would have left the country sooner but somehow couldn’t. Some of their cleverer and smarter colleagues had abandoned the Awami League boat no sooner than they realized that it had started taking in water.

In fact, abandoning the followers and leaving the country furtively for safer places during hard times has been the hallmark of the party leadership. History will bear out my comments. Therefore, to see the leader living up to the party tradition after August 05 was not a surprise.

My question is, in the future, will highly secured places within the country be used as sanctuaries for those responsible for killing democracy, looting public wealth, and committing the kinds of misdeeds that those seeking protection in the cantonments are alleged to have committed? Additionally, we are still at a loss to explain how many of these individuals managed to leave the country and who guaranteed them a safe exit.

The ultimate goal is to hold a participatory all-inclusive and acceptable election. Having said that, holding elections without fixing the systemic aberrations would take us back to square one. That would denigrate the sacrifice of the martyrs of the Monsoon Revolution. And it shall not be allowed to happen.

 Courtesy: Daily Star

Omar New Chief Minister of Jammu & Kashmir

Omar Abdullah was sworn in as the chief minister of Jammu and Kashmir on Wednesday. Abdullah, the chairman of the Jammu and Kashmir National Conference (JKNC) party, is now the leader of Kashmir's first elected government since Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi of the ruling Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) revoked the region's special semi-autonomous status in 2019.

Now Jammu and Kashmir is directly administered by the Indian federal government in New Delhi. 

The swearing-in ceremony took place in the city of Srinigar, the largest city in Jammu and Kashmir. 

Abdullah's JKNC won the most seats in a three-phase election prior to his swearing-in.

The JKNC is staunchly opposed to Modi's move to abrogate Kashmir's Article 370 of semi autonomy, with the JKNC's victory seen as backlash against Modi's decision. 

Manoj Sinha, a member of the ruling BJP, administered the oath of office to Abdullah. Sinha serves as the Lieutenant Governor of Jammu and Kashmir, a position that was created by the 2019 Jammu and Kashmir Reorganization Act in the wake of Article 270's abrogation. 

Modi, in a post on X, congratulated Abdullah on becoming chief minister: "Wishing him the very best in his efforts to serve the people." 

The JKNC is allied with the Indian National Developmental Inclusive Alliance (INDIA), which is led by India's largest opposition party, the Indian National Congress.

Rahul Gandhi, a member of the Congress Party who serves as leader of opposition in the Indian parliament's lower house, or Lok Sabha, was present at Abdullah's swearing in.   

Gandhi extended his congratulations to Abdullah in a post on X. At the same time, he said "government formation without statehood felt incomplete today."

"Democracy was snatched from the people of Jammu and Kashmir, and today we renew our pledge to continue our fight until statehood is fully restored," Gandhi said. 

 

Sri Lankan go to crucial poll today

Sri Lankans are going to the polls to elect a president today (Saturday), at a time when the country is struggling to emerge from the worst economic crisis it has faced since gaining independence in 1948.

Sri Lankans have suffered a turbulent few years. Fed up with severe shortages of essentials such as food and medicines, and lengthy power cuts, they took to the streets for months in 2022. Those protests culminated in the storming of the presidential palace in July that year, forcing former President Gotabaya Rajapaksa to flee the country.

United National Party's Ranil Wickremesinghe assumed the presidency then and is standing as an independent now. He faces three other main competitors -- National People's Power (NPP) candidate Anura Kumara Dissanayake, Samagi Jana Balawegaya's (SJB) Sajith Premadasa and Sri Lanka Podujana Peramuna's Namal Rajapaksa, scion of the powerful family that had dominated the nation's politics for over two decades.

Here are four things to know about the election:

What is the key issue on voters' minds?

Top of voters' concerns is economic stability and growth. The 17.1 million registered voters want to know how to improve their financial health and the plans the next government has to target the corruption they blame for their misery. Although shortages have eased, Sri Lankans still face high costs of living and a squeeze on public spending as the Wickremesinghe administration restructures the country's debt to meet conditions laid out by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) for a bailout. Sri Lankans largely blame the Rajapaksas for the state of the economy. The Supreme Court ruled late last year that Gotabaya and Mahinda Rajapaksa were among 13 former leaders guilty of economic mismanagement that led to the crisis.

Who are the main candidates?

A total of 38 candidates have entered the race, although there are only four main contenders. Antiestablishment opposition parliamentarian Dissanayake, leader of NPP, an alliance of left-leaning groups, has captured the imagination of many voters.

Competing with him is another parliamentary opposition leader, Premadasa, leader of SJB, a center-left alliance.

The main candidates have assured voters they will not tear up the IMF's economic recovery blueprint, but voters are wary of the austerity measures required for Sri Lanka's US$3 billion bailout. As such, many are leaning toward positions offered by Dissanayake and Premadasa to tweak the IMF's benchmarks to provide economic relief to impoverished millions.

Premadasa told The Associated Press that his party was already in discussions with the IMF to ease the tax burden on the poor.

Trailing them are two candidates who are considered pillars of the status quo and seemingly out of step with the public: the incumbent Wickremesinghe and Namal Rajapaksa, nephew of Gotabaya and son of another former president, Mahinda.

Some, however, credit Wickremesinghe for stabilizing and even growing the economy. Sri Lanka reported on September 13 that its economy expanded 4.7% year-on-year in the April quarter.

Saturday's election will also bring Sri Lanka's strategic location into sharp focus, as Asian rivals India and China have stakes in the outcome.

A victory for Dissanayake, whose main constituent party has Marxist and revolutionary roots, is expected to pave the way for Beijing to regain some of the foothold it has lost to New Delhi during the Wickremesinghe presidency.

India, according to Colombo-based diplomatic sources, prefers a Premadasa presidency.

How will the winner be decided?

Voter turnout for presidential elections typically hovers in the healthy 70% range, sometimes higher. Traditionally, voters choose one of two main candidates. The candidate with the majority of votes -- 50% plus one vote -- will be named president. This time, though, there are four main competitors, meaning a scenario could arise in which no one candidate reaches the majority threshold. As such, voters are asked in this election to mark the numbers 1, 2 and 3 against their top three choices. In the event no one wins a majority, the election will go to a second round, which only involves an additional count. The two candidates with the most votes in the first round will be pitted against each other. Ballots that had either one of them as their second or/and third choices will be added to their tallies. The one with the highest total will win the election. There is no time limit for the second round.

Why is there anxiety about the transition of power?

Concerns about a smooth transition of power have once again emerged, as they did after previous polls. Sri Lankans are worried that any period of political uncertainty after a potential second round could leave room for exploitation by political opportunists within the incumbent government.

Courtesy: Nikkei Asia

 

 

 

Kashmiris to vote in historic elections

On a bright September afternoon, a caravan of colorful cars, festooned with flags, arrives at a village in Indian-administered Kashmir for an election rally. Iltija Mufti, a politician from the Peoples Democratic Party (PDP), slowly rises from the sunroof of one of the cars, reports Saudi Gazette.

“Yeli ye Mufti (When Mufti will be in power)," she shouts at a crowd that has gathered to hear the third-generation leader of one of the most influential political dynasties of the region.

“Teli Tch’le Sakhti (Then the repression will end)," they respond in unison.

From a distance, army personnel in bulletproof jackets, armed with automatic rifles, stand watch, tracking every movement.

For the first time in a decade, elections are being held in 47 assembly seats of Kashmir, long marked by violence and unrest. The region, claimed by both India and Pakistan, has been the cause of three wars between the nuclear-armed neighbors. Since the 1990s, an armed insurgency against Indian rule has claimed thousands of lives, including civilians and security forces.

The three-phase polls will also extend to the 43 seats in the neighboring Hindu-majority Jammu region.

The election is the first since 2019, when Prime Minister Narendra Modi's government revoked Jammu and Kashmir's autonomy, stripped its statehood, and split it into two federally administered territories. Since then, the region has been governed by a federal administrator.

In the fray are 13 main parties vying for a majority in the 90-seat assembly.

The major players are the two main regional parties — the PDP led by Mehbooba Mufti and the National Conference (NC) which is headed by Omar Abdullah. Both Mufti and Abdullah are former chief ministers of the region.

The NC has formed an alliance with India's main opposition party Congress.

Modi's Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) is also contesting but not many are betting on the party, which has a stronghold in Jammu but a weak political base in the valley.

In the last elections in 2014, the BJP had formed a government in alliance with PDP after sweeping Jammu. The alliance fell apart in 2018 after years of disagreements.

Also in the picture, this time, is Engineer Rashid — a politician who has spent five years in jail accused of a terror case and was released on bail this week. Rashid came to the limelight earlier this year when he pulled off a stunning victory in the general election over Abdullah. He fought the election from jail, with his sons leading an emotional campaign on the ground.

Elections in Kashmir have long been contentious, with residents and separatist leaders often boycotting them, viewing the process as Delhi's attempt to legitimize its control.

Since 1947, Kashmir has held 12 assembly elections, but voter turnout has often been low and marked by violence. Militants have attacked polling stations, and security forces have been accused of forcing voters to come out and vote. Since the 1990s, hundreds of political workers have been kidnapped or killed by militant groups.

But for the first time in decades, even separatist leaders are contesting in several seats.

The most keenly watched of these is the outlawed Jamaat-e-Islami (JEI) party, which has joined hands with Rashid's Awami Ittehad Party (AIP).

Residents will vote to elect a local assembly, led by a chief minister and council of ministers. Though the assembly will have limited powers under Delhi's rule, it has sparked hopes for a political change in the valley.

Almost all opposition parties have pledged to restore statehood and the region's special status. The BJP has ruled out restoring autonomy but has promised to reinstate statehood to Jammu and Kashmir "at an appropriate time after the elections".

Most residents appeared to be reconciled to the loss of their region's autonomy.

“I don’t think Article 370 will come back unless any miracle happens,” said Suheel Mir, a research scholar, adding that parties were making promises about restoring autonomy in a “politically charged” atmosphere to get votes.

Several young men and women said they were more concerned about issues like political instability, corruption and most of all, unemployment - also a major concern in Jammu.

“We want to cast our vote to resolve our day-to-day issues. It has nothing to do with the Kashmir dispute,” said a man who did not wish to be named.

But others said they didn't want to give the impression that they had accepted the events of 2019 and would participate in the election solely to vote against the BJP.

"We want to send a message to the government that the revocation is unacceptable to us no matter what," said 38-year-old Zameer Ahmad.

Five years ago when Modi's government abrogated Article 370, the 70-year-old constitutional provision that gave the region its autonomy, the government said it was necessary to restore normalcy in India’s only Muslim-majority region.

The move triggered a severe security clampdown, mass detentions, curfews and a months-long internet blackout, stripping residents of rights to jobs and land.

Since then, Modi and his ministers have extensively talked about a new era of peace and development in Kashmir, announcing projects worth hundreds of millions of dollars that they say are part of a plan to integrate the region's economy with the rest of India. (Until Jammu and Kashmir's special status was removed, outsiders could not buy land to do business there).

But locals say they have yet to see the benefits of such projects and continue to struggle with violence and high levels of unemployment.

Thousands of Indian army troops continue to be perpetually deployed there, with powers that have led to decades of allegations of human rights violations.

"There is an absence of democracy and freedoms in Kashmir and many political activists remain in jail," said political scientist Noor Ahmad Baba.

"The election allows people to give their verdict for or against these changes."

The change in mood is visible everywhere.

Across Jammu and Kashmir, streets are adorned with posters, party flags, and billboards and men at local bakeries freely discuss election outcomes over chai.

"There has been a complete overhaul of traditional political narratives," said Tooba Punjabi, a researcher.

"Earlier, public boycotts defined elections. But now, it's a means of putting the right party in place to undo the damage."

The shift in political attitudes was also evident earlier this year, when Kashmir registered a historic 58.46% voter turnout in the parliamentary election.

Many residents are now pinning their hopes on regional parties to raise their demands.

"These parties have acted as a shield between Delhi and Kashmir," said businessman Tahir Hussain," adding that "it didn't matter who will form the government as long as it's a local one".

Analysts say the BJP's performance could also receive a significant blow in Jammu this time, where internal discord and infighting has derailed its ambitions.

There's also growing anger among the residents who are unhappy with the party's policies.

Until now, the BJP's push for development has resonated with people in Jammu who hope it would bring in more economic opportunities for them.

But many say they are yet to see any signs of change. “In fact, now that Article 370 has been scrapped, people from other states are coming to Jammu. Our rights on jobs and land are being taken away from us," said Gulchain Singh Charak, a local politician.

Sunil Sethi, BJP's chief spokesperson in the region, rejected the allegations.

“We have done massive infrastructure developments, built roads and brought foreign investors here,” he said.

India to extend sugar export ban

According to a Reuter report, India plans to extend a ban on sugar exports for the second straight year as the world's biggest consumer of the sweetener grapples with the prospects of lower cane output.

New Delhi also plans to raise the price at which oil companies buy ethanol from sugar mills as part of efforts to boost supplies of the biofuel. They did not wish to be identified as deliberations were not public.

India's absence from the world market would further squeeze global supplies, propping up benchmark prices in New York and London.

New Delhi plans to prohibit mills from exporting sugar when supplies from Brazil, the world's top producer and supplier of the sweetener, are expected to drop because of a drought in the South American nation.

"In the current crop scenario, there is no space for sugar exports," said one of the government sources.

"After fulfilling the local sugar demand, our next priority is ethanol blending, and we need much more cane to meet the ethanol blending targets."

Seeking to curb carbon emissions, India aims to increase the share of ethanol in gasoline to 20% by 2025-26, from around 14% now.

Some of the Indian sugar mills have increased their ethanol production capacity in the last few years.

The government is also considering an increase in ethanol procurement price by more than 5% for the new marketing season beginning November, sources said.

Late last month, a government order said India would allow sugar mills to use cane juice or syrup to produce ethanol starting in November.

India, also the world's biggest sugar producer after Brazil, banned mills from exporting the sweetener during the current season that began on October 01, 2023. That was the first sugar export curb time in seven years.

New Delhi allowed mills to export only 6.1 million metric tons of sugar during the last season, nearly half of the country's total shipment in 2021-22.

Sugar output during the next 2024-25 season is likely to fall to 32 million metric tons from this year's 34 million tons due to the adverse impact of last year's patchy rains in Maharashtra and Karnataka states, the sources said.

"The world will need shipments from India in 2025, as Brazil's production is expected to be lower. Without Indian exports, global prices will rise further," said a Mumbai-based dealer with a global trade house.

 

Elections in Indian Occupied Kashmir

This article explores the complexities and consequences of holding elections in a region where the very foundation of democratic principles is under siege.

As India prepares to hold assembly elections in the disputed territory of Jammu and Kashmir (J&K), a cloud of skepticism and dissent hovers over the region. For many Kashmiris and their leaders, these elections represent not a democratic exercise but a cynical attempt to legitimize India’s occupation and control over the region.

The announcement of the elections has been met with sharp criticism from prominent Kashmiri leaders such as Altaf Hussain Wani and Abdul Hameed Lone, who have denounced the move as a desperate ploy to deceive both the international community and the local population.

Since the abrogation of Articles 370 and 35A in August 2019, Jammu and Kashmir has undergone a dramatic and controversial transformation. Once a state with special autonomous status, it was downgraded to a union territory under direct control of the central government in New Delhi.

This move was widely condemned by Kashmiris and has been perceived as an assault on the region’s unique cultural, political, and religious identity. The central government’s subsequent actions, including changes to domicile laws and the intensification of military presence, have only deepened the sense of alienation and resentment among the local population.

In this context, the upcoming elections are viewed by many as an attempt to present a veneer of normalcy in a region that remains deeply troubled.

The Indian government’s narrative is one of democratic engagement and development, but this is a narrative that rings hollow for those who live under the constant shadow of militarization and political repression.

The skepticism surrounding the elections is not without reason. Historically, elections in Jammu and Kashmir have been marred by low voter turnout, allegations of rigging, and widespread disenchantment with the political process.

For many Kashmiris, the electoral process is seen as a tool used by the Indian state to project an image of legitimacy while the underlying issues of self-determination and human rights remain unaddressed.

Leaders like Altaf Hussain Wani have been vocal in their criticism, labeling the upcoming elections as a “drama” designed to create a false impression of normalcy.

Wani’s assertion that these elections are nothing but a sham reflects the broader sentiment among Kashmiris who feel that their voices are being silenced and their aspirations ignored.

The elections, in their view, do not represent a genuine opportunity for democratic expression but rather a strategic maneuver by the Indian government to consolidate its control over the region.

The Indian government’s portrayal of the elections as a step towards restoring normalcy and democracy in Jammu and Kashmir is met with widespread skepticism.

While the central government insists that the elections are a democratic exercise, the reality on the ground tells a different story.

The ongoing militarization, the curtailment of civil liberties, and the lack of meaningful political engagement with local leaders have created an environment where true democratic expression is impossible.

For many Kashmiris, the elections are a façade—an attempt by the Indian state to project an image of stability and legitimacy to the outside world while continuing to suppress the region’s demand for self-determination.

The electoral process, rather than addressing the root causes of the conflict, serves to entrench the status quo and perpetuate the cycle of violence and repression.

The upcoming elections in Jammu and Kashmir may proceed as planned, but their legitimacy and effectiveness are in serious doubt. For the elections to be meaningful, they must be more than just a box-ticking exercise.

These must be accompanied by a genuine commitment to addressing the aspirations of the Kashmiri people, including their right to self-determination as enshrined in United Nations Security Council resolutions.

A comprehensive approach to resolving the Kashmir issue is needed—one that goes beyond electoral politics and addresses the fundamental grievances of the people.

This includes the demilitarization of the region, the restoration of civil liberties, and meaningful dialogue with all stakeholders, including those who have been marginalized or excluded from the political process.

Ultimately, the future of Jammu and Kashmir cannot be decided through elections alone. It requires a concerted effort to heal the wounds of the past, respect the rights and aspirations of the Kashmiri people, and work towards a peaceful and just resolution of the conflict. Only then can the promise of democracy be truly realized in this troubled region

Courtesy: South Asia Journal

Bangladesh: One month of hope and despair

A month ago, as Bangladesh teetered on the brink of chaos after the downfall of Sheikh Hasina, Nobel Laureate Muhammad Yunus returned home to steer the nation through political turbulence.

It was a dramatic turnaround for Yunus, who faced relentless legal peril at home but ultimately emerged as the savior of a scarred nation. Many feared that Yunus, the nemesis of Hasina, would land in jail during her tenure, but on August 08, 2024 he came back from Paris to a hero’s welcome and headed to the presidential palace to take over the helm of Bangladesh, a country in flux. His long-time tormentor, Hasina, had fled three days earlier.

The students, who had spearheaded the protests and catalyzed the people’s uprising, championed Yunus as their choice for the head of an interim government. People were relieved that he had indeed agreed to take charge. And as such, the economics professor came to personify the hopes and aspirations of Bangladesh.

His arrival ended a four-day power vacuum. He spoke to the media as if he was already in charge, celebrating what he said was a “second liberation”, imploring the countrymen to keep faith in him and sending a message of unity to the nation in times of an unprecedented crisis.

At Dhaka airport, he shared words of empathy with anti-government protesters. At times, he struggled to fight back tears, a rare display of grief, when he remembered Abu Sayed, who died in a hail of bullets fired by the police.

The first few days, as expected, were steeped in symbolism. His carefully chosen words – the rebirth of Bangladesh and renewal after a period of turmoil – resonated deeply with the audience.

Then came the hardest part. The interim government nervously began the heavy task of restoring law and order after weeks of deadly protests. A month went by, but the morale of the police force was still low. The police administration underwent major reshuffles in the past month. Officers largely stayed away from work and appeared to be reluctant to respond to disturbances.

Reprisal attacks spiked in the immediate aftermath of Hasina’s downfall, although it has now come down. But extortion and murder cases against journalists continue to be a big concern.

All of this means that maintaining law and order remains a formidable challenge for the interim government, as various groups try to exploit the social disorder to their advantage.

Yunus has initiated a major clean-up of key institutions, appointing a former IMF economist as the central bank governor to bring discipline to the banking sector.

Additionally, he has tasked another prominent economist with drafting a white paper on the entrenched corruption during Hasina’s 15-year tenure.

While the economy is still facing challenges, businesses are gradually recovering. The advisory council now faces the crucial task of implementing effective economic policies and reforms to rebuild public trust and attract foreign direct investment, ensuring long-term stability.

In the decades since the end of HM Ershad’s military rule in 1990, Bangladesh experienced an “economic miracle” that lifted tens of millions out of poverty, driven largely by a booming garment sector.

However, since emerging from the COVID-19 pandemic, the country has suffered from high inflation, particularly in food prices, and shortages of foreign currency.

These issues are largely attributed to corruption and government mismanagement.

For political reasons, Hasina’s administration was reluctant to pursue serious economic reforms. The recent unrest has only exacerbated the country’s economic problems, with garment buyers cancelling orders, which require serious and urgent attention.

One priority for Yunus should be re-establishing the independence of the Election Commission to build confidence in the forthcoming polls with the top bosses gone. Under the former prime minister, parliament became a rubber stamp, the civil service and judiciary were highly politicized, and the media and civil society were closely controlled.

“While some of these institutions will quickly flourish in a more open environment, others will bear the scars of subordination for years to come,” the Crisis Group said in a report.

It’s a race against time for Yunus who took over on August 08 with a fledgling team. He brought swift changes to the civil administration, police, the Rapid Action Battalion, the Detective Branch and the Directorate General of Forces Intelligence that Hasina exploited to create a culture of fear and intimidation. They enjoyed almost total impunity under Hasina’s administration.

It’s a monumental task for Yunus to make sure people have confidence they will not be arrested, abducted or even killed extrajudicially for political reasons.

Yunus also faces significant challenges in navigating the evolving geopolitical landscape, especially considering the aspirations of the Bangladeshi people. The relationship with India, traditionally seen as Hasina’s strongest supporter, has been strained due to Dhaka’s push for her extradition.

Although the interim government has stated that Hasina’s stay in New Delhi won’t affect bilateral relations, the changing public sentiment in Bangladesh requires careful management to maintain strategic cooperation with India and adopt a more balanced approach in foreign relations.

“In supporting her administration so staunchly despite its clear unpopularity, India has badly damaged itself in Bangladeshis’ eyes. If it now seems to be standing in the way of reform, it will only amplify anti-India sentiment, which could linger to the detriment of neighbourly relations,” the Crisis Group said.

India should instead support the interim government, and revive links with other parties too as part of a political renewal in Bangladesh.

The interim government faces numerous challenges as citizens demand justice on multiple fronts. It must priorities addressing the grievances of those affected by Hasina’s 15-year rule, implement necessary reforms and manage a smooth political transition. The new administration, at least for now, seems focused on “managing expectations from all sides.”

The domestic political landscape is fraught with challenges, as the uprising reflects deep dissatisfaction with the current system. The interim government, recognizing the urgency of the situation, has initiated dialogues with established political parties, civil society members, development partners and journalists to pursue reforms to create a more stable political environment.

One key option could be the revival of the caretaker government system, which was abolished by Hasina’s administration in 2011. This system could help ensure fair and transparent elections, reducing the risk of another autocratic leader emerging.

Hasina’s departure offers a unique opportunity to move beyond the hyper-partisan, winner-take-all electoral dynamics that have harmed Bangladeshi politics for the past three decades. It’s an opportunity to undo the past wrongdoings.

Courtesy: Daily Star

 

 

Will Modi come to Pakistan to attend the SCO meeting?

The PML-N love for India has invited Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi to the upcoming Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) meeting in Islamabad, despite India-Israel relationship, particularly in munitions supply and ongoing genocide in Gaza.

One of the narratives is that Pakistan being the host has to extend the invitation to India, but the other narrative is that Modi should decline the invitation and send foreign minister instead.

The two countries downgraded their diplomatic ties in August 2019 and recalled their high commissioners. This is now the longest period in peacetime that the two countries have been without their top diplomats in each other’s capital.

SCO is a multilateral platform, but Modi’s presence in Islamabad would nevertheless would be seen significant. If nothing else, the sidelines of the SCO summit offer the two sides a chance to start talking about talks.

It is a harsh reality that the hawks on both sides are not interested in normalization of relationships. India considers itself a regional super power, it has joined various economic cooperation groups, but seems least interested in relations with SAARC members.

There is no denying that there are major differences between the two countries, as well as the thorny disputes that they have fought many wars on. There seems no hope of easing the tension, yet for a like SCO offers opportunity to establish working relationships.

Pakistan made the first move in May last year when then-foreign minister Bilawal Bhutto-Zardari went to Goa to attend the SCO’s Council of Foreign Ministers. Though the reception in India was far from warm despite the significance of his visit, Bilawal’s presence sent a positive signal that Pakistan remains open to engaging with New Delhi diplomatically.

The SCO is a multilateral platform and, therefore, of limited import as far as India-Pakistan ties are concerned. Still presence of Indian delegates in Islamabad should bring some positivity. If nothing else, the sidelines of the SCO summit offer the two sides a chance to start talking about talks.

 

Indian dockworkers’ strike averted

The latest showdown between dockworkers in India and their employers appears to be ending without any significant disruptions.

Port employees’ unions in India agreed to a new five-year wage deal with government officials, averting a planned nationwide strike scheduled to start Wednesday, Bloomberg’s Rajesh Kumar Singh and Weilun Soon report.

The new deal halts a walkout that could have involved nearly 20,000 workers and brought widespread disruption to cargo operations at some of the nation’s busiest ports.

Unions at India’s 12 major state-run ports have been negotiating with the government since 2021 to try to increase pay.

Under the newly agreed terms, unions accepted an 8.5% wage increase over five years, backdated to January 01, 2022, said Narendra Rao, a working committee member of the Centre of Indian Trade Unions.

P.M. Mohammed Haneef, president at All India Port and Dock Workers’ Federation, said management has agreed to conclude the proceedings of the wage negotiations panel within 15 days.

Earlier this year, labor disruptions at Germany’s biggest ports threatened to worsen shipping delays, and a French union called a series of strikes to protest government pension reforms, potentially slowing grain export terminals.

In March, Finland’s ports and rail networks faced strikes over labor market reforms.

The following month, port workers in Chile staged protests that disrupted the loading and unloading of ships in one of the biggest exporters of raw materials from copper and lithium to pulp and fruit.

Perhaps the biggest potential problem with maritime labor is unfolding in the United States, where talks between East and Gulf Coast dockworkers and their employers are at a stalemate, a little over a month before the current contract expires September 30, 2024.

 

Bangladesh: Yunus faces a rough terrain

Nobel Peace Prize-winning economist Muhammad Yunus has become the leader of Bangladesh's caretaker government on August 08, 2024 following weeks of turmoil that began when student-led protests rose up against the government and climaxed with the dramatic resignation of Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina.

As Yunus and the interim government have tough work ahead to quell social unrest, they also have to deal with mounting expectations for structural reforms and prepare for free and fair elections to be held sometime soon.

Who is this Nobel Prize winner, what sparked the rage that chased away Hasina and how are neighboring countries reacting?

Yunus is best known for his work with Grameen Bank, which traces its origins to small unsecured loans he began making to poor families in 1974. Hasina saw this champion of the underclass as a political threat, indicting him on what many saw as a long history of trumped-up charges.

Bangladesh was under the firm grip of Hasina until a few weeks ago. With her now out of the country, many citizens are waking up to a hopeful future for "a new Bangladesh" under the nonpartisan interim government headed by an 84-year-old economist, despite a series of economic challenges and the lingering effects of unrest.

Hasina enjoyed a good relationship with Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi. But in the wake of her resignation and fleeing the country, uncertainty hangs over the two nations. As India's biggest South Asian trading partner, Bangladesh has received much investment from its neighbor, politically and financially

Hasina had recently signed a slew of economic, trade and public health agreements with China. With the countries also having elevated their relationship to a "comprehensive strategic cooperative partnership," how will Beijing find working with the next government?

For Yunus, who will lead the caretaker administration, the first and most urgent task will be to reestablish the rule of law.

However, the bigger and more difficult tasks will be to prevent interference of United States and continue to receive aid/ financial support from China and Russia.

Yunus has to quickly come up with a “home grown plan” to break the IMF shekels. The largest source of foreign exchange for Bangladesh is “textiles and clothing” and the major buyers are United States and members of European Union, who may opt for pressure tactics to keep Bangladesh away from China and Russia.

Bangladesh: Hasina Breaks Silence

Former Bangladesh Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina, currently taking refuge in India, has broken her silence by accusing foreign powers like the US of playing a hand in her ouster. This comes days after the Indian government said it was analyzing the possibility of a “foreign hand” behind the political crisis in Bangladesh.

“I could have remained in power if I had left St. Martin and the Bay of Bengal to America,” she said in a message conveyed to her Awami League supporters Saturday.

 The Hasina government saw strained relations with the US for many years. Ahead of January’s elections this year, she said “a white man” had offered her a smooth return to power in exchange for an airbase.

 In her latest statement, Hasina, the longest-serving prime minister in Bangladesh’s history, warned the new interim government not be “used” by such foreign powers.

The 17-member advisory council, which includes four members who lean towards the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) and three affiliated with the Jamaat-e-Islami, took oath Thursday night.

The Bangladesh Parliament was dissolved earlier this week, after army chief General Waker-Uz-Zaman announced Hasina’s resignation shortly after she fled the country.

“I resigned so that I did not have to see the procession of dead bodies. They wanted to come to power over your (students’) bodies, I did not allow it. I came with power,” read Hasina’s statement.

“Maybe if I was in the country today, more lives would have been lost, more wealth would have been destroyed,” she added.

She is also expected to address the media while in India next week.

Over 300 people died in weeks-long student protests against Hasina. The United States, Britai, Canada and other countries have called for investigations into the deaths of students.

With the new interim government in Dhaka, Washington said it hopes it will “chart a democratic future” in Bangladesh.

Nobel Laureate Mohammed Yunus, leading the new interim government, is believed to have strong ties with the US. In the past, he has held frequent meetings with American diplomats to “bemoan” the state of Bangladeshi politics, according to WikiLeaks cables.

The US is also Bangladesh’s largest foreign direct investor.

 ‘I will return soon’

In her message to supporters and party cadres, she vowed to return to the country, though accepting her defeat.

“I will return soon inshallah.  The defeat is mine but the victory is [that of] the people of Bangladesh,” she stated.

“I removed myself, I came with your victory, you were my strength, you did not want me, I myself then left, resigned. My workers who are there, no one will lose morale. Awami League has stood up again and again,” she added.

The former prime minister also accused people of distorting her words.

“I want to repeat to my young students, I never called you Razakars…My words have been distorted. A group has taken advantage of your danger. ,” she said in the message.

The term ‘Razakar’ is considered to be derogatory in Bangladesh as it refers to ‘volunteers’ who collaborated with the Pakistan Army during Bangladesh’s 1971 war for independence.

 

Is there any similarity between toppling of Hasina and Imran regimes?

According to my friend Muda Guppa, on Monday Sheikh Hasina prime minister of Bangladesh relinquished power that reminded a planned non-confidence move against ex-prime minister of Pakistan, Imran Khan. 

The only difference was that a member National Assembly, Shehbaz Sharif, became prime minister for the remaining term, whereas in Bangladesh chief of army became head of the government for the interim period till new elections are held.

Muda insisted that in change of regime in Bangladesh and Pakistan, United States played a key role, and the architect of change in regimes in both the countries was Donald Lu, US assistant secretary of state.

In the recent past I have been taking about three types of countries which United States hates.  During her three regimes Hasina made Bangladesh from strong to stronger, evident from GDP growth rate and foreign exchange reserves held by the country.

However, Bangladesh was lured to approach IMF for a bailout package.

Muda insisted that United States was not happy with Hasina due to her tilt towards China, which has been mediating between countries having long history of animosity. United States believed the restoration of diplomatic relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran would weaken its influence in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA).

It is on record that Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates (UAE) refused to join a naval task forces led by United States and some of the European countries to take action against Houthis of Yemen.

In the saga, India played the role of most trusted friend of Hasina, it took her out of Bangladesh and provided a safe haven.

Muda believes that the whole controversy started when students demanded to end the quota system for the children of those who had fought against Pakistan Army.

Therefore, India has to arrange for a safe exit of Hasina. She and her father Sheikh Mujibur Rahman played a key role in turning East Pakistan into Bangladesh.

 

Russian crude drives dark fleet demand

Dark fleet tankers and risky Suez transits are having little impact on India’s soaring imports of Russian crude, now running at 20 times the volume shipped prior to the invasion of Ukraine.

Analysis by New York broker, Poten & Partners, has revealed that Indian imports of heavily sanctioned Russian crude have increased to almost 1.8 million barrels a day (bpd), up from just 88,000 bpd prior to the invasion in February 2022.

At that time, Russia ranked ninth on India’s list of oil suppliers, with Iraq, Saudi Arabia and the UAE supplying about 60% of the country’s crude. The three Middle East nations were followed by the US and Nigeria.

Prior to the invasion, Russian crude had not been attractive to Indian refiners because of logistical constraints. None of Russia’s main export ports in the Baltic, the Black Sea or the Far East can load VLCCs, Poten pointed out, so Russian cargoes were shipped aboard Aframax and Suezmax tankers.  

However, the picture changed dramatically following the 2022 invasion when western nations imposed sanctions on Russian crude. This was largely driven by price. Until the invasion, ‘Dated Brent’ and Urals crude had traded broadly in parity but, following sanctions, ‘official’ Urals prices were an average of US$10-20 lower. Since deals involving Russian crude are shrouded in secrecy, Poten’s analysis has revealed that actual discounts could be much higher, possibly as much as US$40 a barrel.  

Much of the new Soviet crude was bought based on spot prices and arranged by Russian oil traders, many of them in Dubai, who charge ‘significant commissions’ for their services. But over recent months, the discount of Urals to Brent crude has narrowed, making the crude less attractive.

Meanwhile, the tanker trade from Russia to India has become more challenging, Poten said. Sanctions now restrict the use of Western shipping services including owners, brokers, and insurers when the Soviet crude price exceeds the ‘price cap’ of US$60 per barrel. This has forced Indian importers to rely on tankers in the so-called dark fleet – ships that may be old, poorly maintained, with dodgy crews and questionable insurance cover.

The dangers of the dark fleet have been highlighted by the recent collision between the Sao Tome and Principe VLCC Ceres I and the Singapore-registered product tanker Hafnia Nile, where the VLCC later attempted to flee the scene of the accident.

The US and EU are trying to ‘tighten the noose’ around these sanctions-busting shipowners. The availability of suitable ships could soon become a problem, possibly even limiting Russia’s export possibilities. At the same time, conflict in the Middle East is making this worse.

The dark fleet tankers on the route from Russia to India often take the shortcut through Suez, Poten said, even though the Houthis are increasing their strikes against ships in the Red Sea and Bab Al-Mandeb Straits. But the voyage round the Cape takes far longer and is much more expensive.

Despite these setbacks, Poten reports that Indian refiners are now in dialogue with Soviet suppliers on term deals, rather than spot contracts. This could reduce transaction costs by cutting out the middlemen.

“It would also suggest that the boost in ton-mile demand that has helped trigger the sustained increase in tanker rates may be here to stay,” Poten concluded.  

Courtesy: Seatrade Maritime News

 

Outlook for BRICS Common Currency

The prime objective of formation of BRICS, in my opinion, is to “end the US hegemony by getting rid of involvement of US currency in trade and above all US dominated settlement system”. It is not an easy task because creation of an alternative currency and dependable settlement system is a mammoth job, especially because United States would not like to see end to its hegemony.

De-dollarization of the global financial system is the long-term goal of the bloc amid Western economic sanctions on several members. For example, Saudi Arabia and the UAE might face rising pressures to sell oil to China and India in a currency acceptable and dependable. Trade in general is set to be increasingly carried out in the bloc’s currencies. Nonetheless, a common BRICS currency is not an easy task given the Gulf countries’ heavy links with the West and the Petrodollar, large economic disparities among members, and the strength of the Western financial system. 

BRICS economies will remain heterogeneous, with marked differences in their stage and pace of development, and in economic size and structure. For example India, Egypt and Ethiopia will grow at the fastest rates, boosted by great catch-up potential. China will benefit from its high-tech manufacturing sector. Non-oil diversification strategies will buttress activity in Saudi Arabia and the UAE. In contrast, Brazil, Iran, Russia and South Africa are set to grow at underwhelming clips due to lackluster progress on structural reforms. 

The western analysts believe, “Expansion will bolster the BRICS geopolitical significance—provided the group can reconcile its internal tensions—and its combined economic muscle, but the direct economic impact will be small. The BRICS group is unlikely to become a solid geopolitical and economic construction, regardless of how many bricks are added to the wall.” 

 The biggest agreement is, “Despite some pressure, the Petrodollar will remain the preferential currency for trade. A greater role of BRICS and other emerging markets in global trade may create more natural demand for alternatives to Petrodollars, but this has not happened so far. The higher share of CNY in trade invoicing doesn’t seem to be dethroning Petrodollar, but rather pushing out second tier developed market FX, such as GBP. One direction in which Petrodollar could be challenged given the geopolitical confrontation is the higher focus of BRICS trade on other emerging market economies.” 

Changing Indian foreign policy under Modi

The United States has recently issued a bold call for India to realign its foreign policy, urging it to move away from its current stance of peacemaker and instead align more closely with American interests, particularly in countering China.

This shift was prompted by Prime Minister Narendra Modi's recent visits to Austria and Russia, where his embrace of President Vladimir Putin drew criticism from US Ambassador Eric Garcetti.

Garcetti emphasized the need for concrete actions, suggesting India should stand with the US and NATO, possibly even supporting Ukraine against Russia.

Under Modi, India has engaged in military exercises in the South China Sea as part of the QUAD alliance, signaling a departure from its traditionally non-aligned stance.

However, Modi's approach to the Ukraine-Russia conflict, characterized by neutrality, has drawn scrutiny and criticism in Western circles, which view India's stance as opportunistic rather than principled.

Historically, India under leaders like Nehru and later Indira Gandhi maintained a policy of non-alignment and emphasized principles like sovereignty, non-aggression, and peaceful coexistence. Despite occasional conflicts with Pakistan and defiance of Western pressures on nuclear issues, India generally upheld a neutral stance in global affairs.

Modi's tenure has seen a significant increase in foreign engagements, including numerous trips abroad and strategic dialogues with major powers like China and the US.

However, his handling of relations, particularly with China, has been marked by fluctuating dynamics, highlighted by border disputes and military confrontations like the Galwan Valley clash.

Critics, including opposition leader Rahul Gandhi, accuse Modi of erratic diplomacy lacking a coherent strategy, particularly concerning China, Russia, and the United States.

Despite political divisions, past Indian governments maintained a relatively consistent foreign policy, which Modi's administration has diverged from, potentially complicating India's regional and global relationships.

Looking ahead, Modi faces challenges in reconciling India's foreign policy shifts with regional and global expectations, particularly in responding to calls from allies like the US to take a more definitive stance in global conflicts.

The balancing act between asserting India's sovereignty and navigating international partnerships remains a delicate task for his administration.

While Modi has reshaped India's global engagements, criticisms over inconsistency and strategic clarity persist, posing ongoing challenges for India's foreign policy direction under his leadership.

Malaysia and Thailand keen in joining BRICS

According to NIKKEI Asia, two Southeast Asian nations, Malaysia and Thailand, have recently revealed their plans to join the BRICS grouping of emerging nations as middle power countries seek to maneuver amid growing geopolitical uncertainties, including the US-China tensions.

What kind of organization is BRICS?

BRICS, an acronym for Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa, was launched in 2009 as BRIC and later renamed BRICS in 2010 when South Africa joined the group. It was formed to foster economic, political and cultural cooperation among its members.

Compared to the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the group operates without a formal charter or secretariat -- akin to an informal group that meets annually to allow for flexibility and prompt responses to global challenges.

Alicia Garcia-Herrero, a senior research fellow at the Brussels-based think tank Bruegel, argued in her article on the East Asia Forum that at the start of the group's formation, China dominated the bloc, and most of the growth in trade has been China-centric. However, the recent increase, mostly driven by India, has "experienced an acceleration in economic growth" of the group.

The five countries combined accounted for gross domestic product of US$25.8 trillion last year, or about a quarter of the global total, whereas Group of Seven (G7) developed nations had a combined US$46.8 trillion.

Why do Malaysia and Thailand want to join?

Participation in BRICS would foster economic cooperation with peer emerging economies, such as trade and investment.

In addition, Malaysia views this as an opportunity to engage in rising multilateralism, according to Hoo Chiew Ping, a senior fellow at the East Asian International Relations Caucus. She said joining BRICS would support a multipolar world order rather than being drawn into a new Cold War centered on the US-China rivalry.

Thailand has said a BRICS membership would enhance Thailand's role as a leader among emerging countries.

A foreign ministry spokesperson told reporters last week that the country wants to play more roles, promoting Thai potentials to co-play the roles with developed nations and underdeveloped nations to provide guidelines for global community development to promote justice and equality, adding that being a BRICS member does not mean Thailand is taking sides.

Will other countries in Southeast Asia follow?

Indonesian Foreign Minister Retno Marsudi said earlier this year that Jakarta was still assessing the benefits of joining BRICS. This follows President Jokowi Widodo's attendance at the BRICS summit in South Africa in August last year, during which he called for stronger cooperation among developing nations to fight trade discrimination.

Jokowi told reporters afterward that despite Indonesia's good economic relationships with the group's members, we don't want to rush joining the bloc.

Observers describe Indonesia's reluctance to join BRICS as a desire to avoid being seen as too close to China, already its biggest source of foreign direct investment and trading partner in recent years. China has also been the biggest trading partner to most ASEAN countries in the past decade.

This is amid Indonesia's ambition to join the OECD instead. The rich-country club opened accession discussions with Indonesia in February that, if realized, will make it the first OECD member from Southeast Asia.

Rahul Mishra, an associate professor at the Center for Indo-Pacific Studies of Jawaharlal Nehru University, said that Malaysia's and Thailand's moves will motivate Indonesia to revive its BRICS plans. Vietnam could be the next member, and a bigger BRICS would mean a collective of more voices from the Global South, he added.

Vietnam sent a delegation to attend the BRICS Dialogue with Developing Countries in Russia's Nizhny Novgorod this month. The country is watching the BRICS expansion but has not made any comments on joining the bloc. Thailand and Laos took part in the forum as well.

What would Thailand's and Malaysia's BRICS memberships mean for Southeast Asia?

The shift could put a strain on the unity and centrality of Southeast Asia's own multilateral framework, ASEAN, and the Southeast Asian bloc needs to adapt to remain relevant as its members explore other alignments, experts say.

"It is high time for ASEAN to prepare the necessary, to complement the appetite of its member states in bolstering action and crafting solutions, in which ASEAN seems to be counterproductive," said Fikry A Rahman, the head of foreign affairs at Malaysia's research institute Bait Al-Amanah.

Fikry said that ASEAN will continue to take center stage for Southeast Asia, and its members will not undermine the values, although he also pointed out that the nature of the Southeast Asian bloc limits its role in serving regional goals.

What does a bigger BRICS mean for the world?

The expansion of BRICS would amplify the voice of the Global South and point to a further disparity of a more polarized world.

In January 2024, BRICS expanded its membership to include more prominent Global South countries: Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), with more countries potentially joining the group.

"The expanded BRICS membership is a direct response to heightened bipolar rivalry, which has significantly increased global geopolitical uncertainties," Hoo said, highlighting how middle powers maneuver amid the tension between superpowers.

However, Hoo cautioned that the inclusion of more countries, especially with Russia's involvement in the grouping, could send a problematic signal to the US and its allies, as membership can be viewed as adversarial to Western interests and values.