Indian Search for an Afghanistan Corridor—Bypassing Pakistan

For decades, India’s access to Afghanistan has been shaped—more accurately, restricted—by geography and politics. A quick look at the regional map explains the dilemma, India shares no border with Afghanistan, and the only direct land pathway runs through Pakistan. But with Islamabad refusing transit to Indian goods, New Delhi has to explore alternative corridors. Over time, these alternatives have evolved from theoretical proposals into functioning routes that reduce Pakistan’s leverage and expand India’s strategic reach. To read details click https://shkazmipk.com/india-afghanistan-trade/

Hawks Threatening Fragile Regional Peace

The recent explosion at a police station in Indian-held Kashmir — coming just days after deadly blasts in New Delhi and Pakistan — has once again raised concerns of malign actors working deliberately to destabilize an already volatile region. Whether the Kashmir incident was truly an accidental detonation, as Indian authorities insist, or part of a wider pattern, the cumulative effect is unmistakable: someone is adamant at keeping tensions high and diplomacy frozen.

According to officials, the Nowgam police-station blast occurred while forensic teams were examining confiscated explosives. The explanation may be technically sound, yet the timing is troubling. Three significant blasts across two countries within a single week cannot be brushed aside as mere coincidence. In the past, similar strings of incidents have conveniently emerged whenever even a hint of diplomatic calm seemed possible between India and Pakistan.

Beyond the security lens lies a broader geopolitical undercurrent. With Pakistan-Afghanistan transit trade suspended amid deteriorating ties between Islamabad and Kabul, India is making well-calculated moves to expand its footprint in the region. New Delhi’s push to position itself as a reliable trade partner for Afghanistan and Central Asia — backed notably by its renewed emphasis on the Chabahar corridor — is not accidental. It aligns neatly with Pakistan’s current vulnerabilities - fractured politics, troubled borders, and waning influence in a region it once dominated economically.

This is precisely the landscape in which hawks thrive. Their objective is not simply to trigger panic but to shape narratives that erode trust, fuel suspicion, and undermine any chance of sustained engagement. Each blast, each rumour, each accusation feeds into a cycle designed to keep India and Pakistan locked in strategic paralysis.

For Pakistan, the stakes are particularly high. Its economic revival hinges on rebuilding regional connectivity and reasserting itself as a natural trade and transit hub. But that requires stability — not only at home but across its borders. Repeated shocks, even when labelled “accidental,” play directly into the hands of those who want to see Pakistan isolated and reactionary.

If the region is to move forward, both New Delhi and Islamabad must resist being dragged by hawks into predictable confrontations. Joint investigations, fact-based assessments, and a willingness to insulate diplomacy from security incidents are essential. Otherwise, every spark — whether accidental or engineered — will continue to push South Asia closer to the brink.

At a moment when the region desperately needs calm, hawks are doing what they do best - threatening the fragile peace that holds it together.

Pak–Afghan trade standoff: Self-Inflicted Losses for Both Sides

The Pakistan–Afghanistan trade standoff is fast turning from a political dispute into an economic disaster. Both sides claim victory, yet both are bleeding revenue, jobs, and regional influence — while Iran and Central Asia quietly collect the gains.

The disruption in Pak–Afghan transit trade has become a contest of blame and bravado, but beneath the rhetoric lies a shared economic loss. Both countries are paying the price for political posturing.

Pakistan’s Defence Minister Khawaja Asif has termed the situation a “blessing in disguise,” arguing that reduced cross-border movement will curb smuggling, terrorism, and market distortion. Yet, the security argument offers little comfort to exporters whose businesses now stand still.

Since mid-October, border crossings have remained closed, leaving thousands of trucks stranded and trade worth over US$45 million in limbo. Exporters of cement, textiles, footwear, fruits, and food items in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Punjab, and Sindh are bearing the brunt. With more than 60 percent of Afghan imports already diverted to Iran, Central Asia, and Turkey, Pakistan risks losing both the Afghan and Central Asian markets.

For Afghanistan, Deputy Prime Minister Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar’s call to find alternate routes may project defiance and independence, but the costs are real. Afghan traders rely on Pakistan’s ports and goods, especially for food and medicines. Turning to Iran or Central Asia will lengthen routes and raise costs, pushing prices higher for Afghan consumers.

Meanwhile, Iran, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan quietly emerge as the real beneficiaries. Their ports and overland routes are gaining traction as Afghanistan diversifies its trade options.

In the end, neither Islamabad nor Kabul wins. The prolonged standoff damages trade, jobs, and investor confidence on both sides. What could have been a bridge of mutual economic gain has turned into another front of economic self-destruction.

The message is clear: political posturing may please leaders, but it impoverishes nations.

Twin Blasts, One Message: Terror Strikes India and Pakistan on Same Day

The recent terrorist attacks in both India and Pakistan on the same day have once again exposed how terrorism in South Asia is not just a domestic issue but a geopolitical tool. The eerie similarity in timing, targets, and messaging hints at a coordinated design — possibly the work of a single network or external orchestrator seeking to inflame regional tensions.

In Pakistan, militants struck security personnel and civilians alike, highlighting the persistent threat of regrouped extremist factions that exploit porous borders and instability in Afghanistan. For ordinary citizens already burdened by inflation and political disarray, such attacks deepen despair and erode confidence in the state’s security apparatus.

Across the border, India too was hit by near-simultaneous blasts, swiftly followed by political rhetoric blaming Pakistan. Yet the mirrored nature of both attacks raises unsettling questions. Are regional spoilers deliberately staging violence to keep Islamabad and New Delhi locked in hostility? Are unseen actors manipulating both nations for broader strategic gains?

Both countries have long traded accusations, but the uncomfortable truth is that terrorism has become an instrument in regional power games — sustained by ideological indoctrination, foreign funding, and political opportunism. Whenever prospects for dialogue or trade improvement appear, a major terror incident resets the equation, serving those who profit from perpetual enmity.

The victims are the same — ordinary citizens on both sides. Each attack reinforces division and fear, allowing extremists and opportunists to thrive. South Asia cannot afford to remain hostage to these cycles of violence and suspicion.

It is time for India and Pakistan to approach such tragedies with restraint and wisdom. A cooperative, fact-based investigation into the coordinated nature of these attacks could help expose the true perpetrators and prevent further bloodshed. Only through calm dialogue and shared resolve can both nations hope to deny terrorism the political space it continues to exploit.

Why Pak-Afghan Conflict Remains Unresolved?

The conflict between Pakistan and Afghanistan remains unresolved because it is rooted in a mix of historical disputes, mutual mistrust, and competing security interests that have persisted for decades. Despite cultural, religious, and economic linkages, both nations continue to view each other with suspicion rather than cooperation.

At the heart of the problem lies the Durand Line, drawn by the British in 1893 and inherited by Pakistan after independence. Afghanistan has never formally recognized it as an international border, claiming it divides the Pashtun population. Pakistan, however, considers the frontier legally settled. This disagreement has become a symbol of deeper political and ethnic tensions.

The Pashtun question adds another layer of complexity. The tribes on both sides share linguistic and familial ties, but political narratives have often turned these affinities into instruments of rivalry. Pakistan fears Afghan nationalism could spill over its borders, while Kabul perceives Pakistan’s involvement as interference in its internal affairs.

Security concerns have long overshadowed diplomacy. Since the Soviet invasion of 1979, Pakistan has played a key role in Afghan affairs, hosting millions of refugees and supporting various political factions. Yet, both sides accuse each other of harboring hostile groups — Pakistan blames Afghanistan for sheltering the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), while Kabul accuses Islamabad of backing insurgents. This cycle of allegations has eroded trust.

The Taliban’s return to power in 2021 initially raised hopes for stability, but their refusal to recognize the Durand Line and restrain TTP activities has renewed friction. Meanwhile, regional players — including India, Iran, China, and the United States — continue to shape dynamics that complicate bilateral understanding.

For lasting peace, both countries must shift from blame to dialogue, strengthen border management, and build economic interdependence through trade and connectivity. The Pak-Afghan relationship should not remain hostage to history; instead, it should evolve into a partnership anchored in mutual respect and regional stability.

Only through sustained diplomacy, trust-building, and shared development goals can Pakistan and Afghanistan transform a troubled past into a cooperative future.

 

 

Bridging the Divide: Pakistan and Taliban Need Dialogue, Not Confrontation

The relationship between Pakistan’s ruling regime and the Taliban stands at a delicate crossroads. Bound by geography, faith, and shared history, the two sides also carry layers of mistrust accumulated over decades of shifting alliances and conflicting expectations. In recent years, political statements, security operations, and media narratives have widened this gap further. Yet, beneath the surface lies an undeniable truth — their destinies remain intertwined. To stabilize the region, both must replace suspicion with structured dialogue, and confrontation with cooperation. Military responses may suppress symptoms, but only intellectual engagement can address the root causes of misunderstanding.

The first major misunderstanding arises from security concerns. Pakistan’s authorities often believe that the Taliban have not taken adequate measures against elements of Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), who continue to operate from Afghan territory. On the other hand, the Taliban view Pakistan’s cross-border operations and frequent border closures as violations of Afghan sovereignty. Both sides see each other’s actions through a defensive lens. A structured security dialogue — focusing on intelligence coordination, cross-border communication, and non-interference — can help bridge these perceptions and restore mutual confidence.

The second area of friction involves economic and trade relations. The Taliban leadership frequently accuses Pakistan of using trade controls as leverage, while Pakistan expresses concern over smuggling, informal trade routes, and foreign currency outflows. These differences have converted economic engagement into a tool of pressure rather than cooperation. A transparent, rules-based mechanism for transit trade and financial transactions could turn the economic relationship into a stabilizing force. When trade and transport flow smoothly, political tensions tend to ease naturally.

The third and perhaps most sensitive dimension is ideological understanding. Many in Pakistan interpret the Taliban’s policies solely through a security framework, while the Taliban often perceive Pakistan’s government as too close to Western interests. These views overlook the nuanced realities on both sides. Constructive academic and religious exchanges, involving scholars and opinion leaders, could help generate trust and empathy. Mutual respect for each side’s national priorities is essential for regional harmony.

Peace cannot be dictated by military power or external persuasion; it must evolve from within the region itself. Pakistan and the Taliban must recognize that lasting stability demands open communication, patience, and political maturity. Excluding foreign influences and engaging in honest dialogue will help transform mutual suspicion into cooperation. The region has paid too high a price for conflict — it is time to invest in understanding. Dialogue, not deterrence, is the true foundation of peace between Pakistan and the Taliban.

 

United States Still Eyes Afghanistan

Washington’s withdrawal ended its military presence, not its strategic ambitions in the heart of Asia

When the United States hurriedly withdrew from Afghanistan in August 2021, it claimed to have ended its “forever war.” Yet, Afghanistan has not slipped off Washington’s strategic radar. The methods have changed, but the motives remain. The US still views Afghanistan as a vital piece on the Eurasian chessboard — prized for its geography, intelligence value, and economic undercurrents.

First, Afghanistan’s narcotics economy remains an unspoken factor. Despite Taliban claims of banning poppy cultivation, UN data confirms continued opium production, which fuels regional criminal networks. For decades, allegations have persisted that Western intelligence agencies — especially the CIA — have tolerated or even exploited the drug trade to fund covert operations. Renewed US engagement, framed as “counter-narcotics cooperation,” could restore informal oversight of these financial flows.

Second, the chaotic exit left behind billions of dollars’ worth of military hardware — aircraft, vehicles, ammunition, and advanced surveillance systems. Much of it reportedly fell into Taliban hands or black-market networks. Washington would prefer to track, retrieve, or neutralize sensitive technologies before they reach Iran, China, or Russia. A covert re-entry, through intelligence operations or private contractors, serves this purpose well.

Third, Afghanistan’s location remains uniquely strategic. It borders Iran, China’s Xinjiang region, and several Central Asian states under Russian influence. For US planners, it is an ideal observation post to monitor three rivals simultaneously. Hence the growing emphasis on “over-the-horizon” intelligence operations launched from Gulf or Central Asian bases.

Fourth, China’s expanding Belt and Road Initiative through Pakistan and Central Asia heightens Washington’s unease. Beijing’s efforts to stabilize Afghanistan and integrate it into regional connectivity projects threaten to edge the US out of Eurasia. Re-engagement under humanitarian, counterterrorism, or anti-drug programs provides Washington a convenient pretext to retain influence.

Finally, a chronically unstable Afghanistan serves certain geopolitical interests. It prevents regional integration and complicates projects like Iran’s Chabahar port or China’s CPEC. Controlled instability ensures continued leverage without the burdens of occupation.

In essence, the US may not reoccupy Afghanistan with troops, but it seeks reassertion through intelligence, proxies, and influence networks. The 2021 withdrawal ended one phase of occupation but opened another — quieter, subtler, and more strategic. Afghanistan remains too valuable for Washington to abandon — not for peace, but for power.

Pakistani Policies Turning Taliban Foe

The unraveling Pakistan–Taliban relationship highlights the limits of old security doctrines in a changing regional order.

When the Taliban returned to power in Kabul in 2021, Pakistan hoped for a friendly neighbor and a stable frontier. Four years later, that optimism has faded. Relations have soured, trust has eroded, and the Taliban’s growing warmth toward India signals how far Islamabad’s Afghan policy has drifted from reality.

Pakistan’s once-comfortable relationship with the Taliban is deteriorating — not because of ideology, but because of Islamabad’s own policy. What was once hailed as “strategic depth” is now fast becoming a strategic setback.

For decades, Pakistan believed that supporting the Taliban would ensure border security and limit Indian influence. But since the group’s return to power, those assumptions have collapsed.

Instead of cooperation, Pakistan now faces increasing hostility - frequent border clashes, defiant statements from Kabul, and a resurgent Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) operating from Afghan soil.

The Taliban’s visible tilt toward India is a symptom of Islamabad’s stance. Pakistan has chosen pressure over diplomacy — closing key crossings, threatening to expel Afghan refugees, and publicly accusing Kabul of harboring militants.

These measures have not subdued the Taliban; they have driven them closer to New Delhi, which offers humanitarian aid and political legitimacy without direct interference.

The irony is stark. Pakistan, once the Taliban’s strongest backer, now finds itself isolated, while India — long regarded as an adversary in Afghan affairs — is quietly re-establishing presence in Kabul. The Taliban, in turn, are using this outreach to project independence and resist external dictates.

Islamabad’s Afghan policy remains trapped in outdated security thinking, viewing Kabul solely through the prism of control.

Unless Pakistan recalibrates its approach — replacing coercion with constructive engagement — it risks losing whatever influence it still retains. The “strategic depth” doctrine that once shaped policy has now turned dangerously shallow.

 

Is Pakistan Being Pushed into a ‘US Proxy War’ in Afghanistan?

Behind the new wave of border clashes may lie an old script — one written in Washington and played out in Islamabad and Kabul. Has Pakistan once again been cast in the role of America’s proxy?

The recent spike in Pak-Afghan border tensions has once again pushed the region to the edge of confrontation. Reports suggest that armed militants crossing from Afghanistan have attacked Pakistani security posts, prompting Islamabad’s “severe retaliation.” Yet, beneath the visible smoke of gunfire lies a far more intricate and disturbing reality — one that hints at the shadow of global power politics.

Following the US withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2021, Washington appeared to have lost its strategic foothold in the region. The Taliban’s refusal to hand over the Bagam Air Base — once a vital hub of American military operations — was not merely a symbolic rejection; it was a strategic rebuff. The superpower lost a vantage point near China, Iran, and Central Asia.

It is no coincidence that within months of that refusal, Afghanistan began facing renewed instability, and Pakistan started encountering an inexplicable surge in cross-border attacks.

My hypothesis is simple: when Washington cannot re-enter Afghanistan directly, it may seek to create circumstances that justify intervention. The most effective way to do that is to provoke conflict. The pattern fits. Anonymous “operators” — possibly non-state actors with advanced intelligence capabilities — carry out attacks inside Pakistan, inviting a retaliatory strike. The resulting escalation allows the US to portray the region as unstable and Taliban-controlled Afghanistan as a “global threat.” A familiar pretext for yet another intervention is thus created.

Ironically, Pakistan — which has already paid an enormous price in blood and economy during the first “War on Terror” — now risks being drawn into another one, this time as an unwilling participant in someone else’s geopolitical chessboard. The tragedy is that Islamabad still struggles to draw a clear line between its national interests and Washington’s regional ambitions. History, it seems, is repeating itself — and not for the better.

What complicates matters further is the deep mistrust between Islamabad and Kabul. The Taliban government, already under economic sanctions and political isolation, accuses Pakistan of toeing the American line. Pakistan, on the other hand, blames Afghanistan for harboring militants of the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). Yet neither side seems willing to see how external forces might be manipulating both.

The strategic question Pakistan must ask is: Whose war are we fighting this time? If recent cross-border provocations are indeed part of a larger plan to destabilize the region, Islamabad must avoid taking the bait. A measured, intelligence-based response — not blind retaliation — is the need of the hour. Pakistan’s security cannot depend on reaction; it must rest on foresight.

The lesson from the past two decades is painfully clear. Every time Pakistan has fought on behalf of someone else, it has lost — in lives, in reputation, and in internal cohesion. If history is repeating itself, the least we can do is refuse to play the same role again.

What options US can exercise if Afghans refuse to handover Bagram Air Base?

If Afghans refuse to handover Bagram Air Base back to the United States, Washington is likely to face a serious strategic dilemma. The response will likely depend on how far the super power is willing to push its military and political leverage in the region. Some of the likely options are:

1. Diplomatic Pressure

The first option would be to apply diplomatic pressure on the Taliban government, possibly through Qatar or Pakistan as intermediaries. The US may frame Bagram’s access as essential for counterterrorism monitoring, and push for a limited presence under international arrangements rather than outright US control.

2. Economic and Sanctions Leverage

If diplomacy fails, Washington could use financial levers that include:

Tightening sanctions on Taliban leaders.

Blocking international recognition of the Taliban government.

Cutting off humanitarian exemptions or aid that Afghanistan relies on.

This would make Kabul’s refusal costlier.

3. Regional Partnerships

The US might deepen military partnerships with neighbors instead. For instance:

Expanding use of bases in Central Asia (though Russia and China will resist this).

Strengthening presence in the Persian Gulf (Qatar, UAE).

Increasing over-the-horizon operations using drones and satellites.

This would reduce dependency on Bagram, though at a higher logistical cost.

4. Covert Operations

If Washington views Bagram as critical for counterterrorism, it could resort to covert methods—arming rival Afghan groups, intelligence penetration, or even destabilization strategies to pressure the Taliban into concessions.

5. Accept and Adapt

Though difficult, the US may accept that Afghanistan is now firmly outside its reach and adapt by monitoring from afar. This would reflect Washington’s reluctance to re-engage militarily in Afghanistan after two decades of war.

From RCD to ECO to Complete Dormancy

Regionalism has often been hailed as a path toward prosperity, but the trajectory of the Regional Cooperation for Development (RCD) and its successor, the Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO), tells a sobering story of missed opportunities. What began with promise in the 1960s has today slipped into near-complete irrelevance.

The RCD was founded in 1964 by Iran, Pakistan, and Turkey to strengthen economic, cultural, and technical cooperation. It emerged in a Cold War environment, where smaller powers sought to shield themselves from great-power dependency by building regional linkages.

On paper, the project had logic, three strategically located Muslim countries, with shared aspirations of modernization, pooling resources to advance trade, industry, and connectivity. In practice, RCD never went beyond symbolism.

The organization lacked institutional strength, faced political frictions, and struggled to overcome the dominance of external economic ties over intra-regional trade.

By the late 1970s, the Iranian Revolution and shifting geopolitical alignments sealed RCD’s fate. In 1979, it faded into history without leaving a substantial legacy.

A revival attempt came in 1985, when the same three countries launched the Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO). ECO promised a fresh start and greater ambition. Its major breakthrough came in 1992 with the admission of seven new members — Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan.

ECO spanned a vast geography bridging South, Central, and West Asia, with a market of nearly half a billion people and immense natural resources.

Observers predicted that ECO could become a Eurasian economic powerhouse, knitting together landlocked Central Asia with energy-rich Iran and Turkey, and consumer-rich Pakistan.

As decades passed, the promise remained unfulfilled. Member states pursued conflicting foreign policies, were more deeply tied to external trade partners than to each other, and often lacked political trust. Infrastructure gaps meant goods could not move freely.

Overlapping memberships — in the OIC, SCO, CIS, and other blocs — diluted ECO’s relevance.

High-sounding declarations at summits were rarely followed by implementation. Even flagship projects, such as the Islamabad-Tehran-Istanbul railway, never became viable trade corridors.

Today, ECO exists largely as a ceremonial body. Meetings are infrequent, agreements unenforced, and the organization invisible in global or even regional affairs.

Intra-ECO trade remains stuck around 7–8% of members’ total trade, a telling indicator of stagnation.

Compared to other regional blocs such as ASEAN or the EU, ECO demonstrates how political will, not geography, determines success.

The journey from RCD to ECO to dormancy offers a lesson ‑ regional cooperation cannot survive on rhetoric alone. Without trust, shared vision, and consistent follow-through, even the most promising initiatives collapse into irrelevance.

ECO still retains potential — its geography places it at the crossroads of major trade routes, including China’s Belt and Road Initiative. But unless member states move beyond statements and invest in genuine integration, ECO’s story will remain one of unrealized potential and organizational decay.

 

 

President Trump you cannot order Taliban to handover Bagram Air Base to the United States

It may be a wish of US President Donald Trump to get control of Bagram Air Base. However, he does not have any authority to demand the Afghan government to handover the base. Threatening bad things would happen to Afghanistan if it does not give back control of the base to the United States, is outright terrorism.

Here are several possible motives behind the Trump demand:

·        Restoring US influence in Afghanistan and the wider region, especially after the pull-out which many view as a strategic loss.

·        Countering rivals, particularly China and others by having a base close by.

·        Strengthening counterterrorism posture, ensuring that militant groups can't easily use Afghan territory to plan or launch attacks.

·        Leveraging domestic political pressure as the opponents say the withdrawal decision was a mistake.

·        Using it as a bargaining chip to secure concessions i.e. economic aid, diplomatic recognition, etc.

Being a sovereign county and also because the US does recognize the Taliban government of Afghanistan it is the inherent right of Taliban to outright rejected the US demand.

·        They rightly say Afghanistan’s territorial integrity cannot be compromised.

·        No foreign military presence will be allowed.

·        Taliban insists that political and economic relations with the US are possible without giving up land or allowing foreign bases.

Regaining control of Bagram will not an easy task for the US. It would likely require a major military deployment, security provisions, defense spending, etc. Experts say holding the base would be challenging militarily and politically.

Some analysts view the US demand as an attempt to restore hegemony over Afghanistan and adjoining countries.

They warn that pushing too hard might destabilize relations, reduce cooperation, or provoke negative responses from locals or other countries.

Under the Doha Agreement (2020) and other engagements, the US made certain commitments about respecting Afghanistan’s sovereignty, no foreign bases, etc. Returning to or demanding possession of Bagram is violation of these agreements.

Understanding US and Russian policies towards Taliban

Russia has become the first country to recognize Taliban government in Afghanistan. It is on record that the United States and Russia have had different policies toward Taliban due to their distinct strategic interests, historical experiences, and regional alliances. Here’s a breakdown of some of the key reasons behind this divergence:

The United States has fought Taliban directly for over two decades after 9/11, viewing them as terrorist allies of al-Qaeda. This includes the US led NATO invasion of Afghanistan in 2001 to topple the Taliban regime.

Interestingly, Russia has not fought Taliban directly but has a history of conflicts in Afghanistan during the Soviet invasion (1979–1989), where the US and others supported the Mujahideen, some of these are now termed Taliban).

Russia sees Taliban as part of the post-Soviet regional security dynamic, not necessarily as a direct enemy.

Most interesting is the US perspective because it considers Taliban a threats to US homeland and allies. The history shows that Afghans/ Taliban never attacked the United States. It is also said that Osama bin Laden was a Saudi, which supported Mujahideen in averting the USSR attack on Afghanistan to get access to the warm waters.

The US, which never wanted to leave Afghanistan believes that Taliban rule could once again turn the country into a safe haven for global jihadis like al-Qaeda or ISIS-K. Some analysts openly say that be it al-Qaeda or ISIS-K, these are ‘B’ teams of CIA.

The prime focus of Russia is more on Central Asian stability and drug trafficking from Afghanistan. Russia fears spillover of extremism into its southern borders but engages pragmatically with Taliban to keep its influence in the region.

Both the US and Russia are keen in engaging with Taliban. The US was initially hostile, but later engaged diplomatically, courtesy Doha talks, culminating in the 2020 US-Taliban agreement. After the 2021 withdrawal, the US maintains non-recognition and economic sanctions, demanding women rights, inclusivity, and action against terrorism.

As against, Russia has hosted Taliban delegations for talks in Moscow and calls for inclusive governance but does not condition engagement as strictly as the US. Russia did not officially recognize the Taliban either, but it was more flexible in diplomacy.

Strategic Interests

The US claims, to that many do not agree, that the super power is busy in global fight against terrorism and avoids getting entangled again in the Afghan conflict. Since withdrawal of troops the US has kept Taliban under pressure through sanctions and diplomatic isolation, including freezing foreign exchange reserves of Afghanistan.

The prime Russian interest is, ending US hegemony in the region. It also wants to protect its interests in Central Asia (Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan). On top of all Russia seems to be keen in developing regional alliances that include Taliban as a reality, not a pariah.

Over the decades, the United States has maintained its hegemony through regional alliances, working closely under the NATO umbrella. The US policy towards Taliban is part of a broader Western approach tied to liberal values and counterterrorism.

Realizing its limitations Russia works closely with China, Iran, Central Asian republics. It often coordinates with anti-Western powers and is less constrained by democratic or human rights norms.

To get control over countries two of the world’s largest super powers, the United States as well as Russia have often used arsenal power. As against this China has used diplomacy and economic assistance to establish its influence.

During the election campaign Donald Trump had promised to pull the United States out of wars, but his unconditional support to Israeli genocide in Gaza and direct attacks on Iran prove he is also the tout of military complexes and would never like to end wars where the United States is involved directly or indirectly.

 

Russia becomes first country to recognize Taliban government of Afghanistan

Russia said on Thursday it had accepted the credentials of a new ambassador of Afghanistan, making it the first nation to recognize the Taliban government of the country, reports Reuters.

In a statement, the Russian Foreign Ministry said Moscow saw good prospects to develop ties and would continue to support Kabul in security, counter-terrorism and combating drug crime.

It also saw significant trade and economic opportunities, especially in energy, transport, agriculture and infrastructure

"We believe that the act of official recognition of the government of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan will give impetus to the development of productive bilateral cooperation between our countries in various fields," the ministry said.

Afghan Foreign Minister Amir Khan Muttaqi said in a statement, "We value this courageous step taken by Russia, and, God willing, it will serve as an example for others as well."

No other country has formally recognized the Taliban government that seized power in August 2021 as US-led forces staged a chaotic withdrawal from Afghanistan after 20 years of war.

China, the United Arab Emirates, Uzbekistan and Pakistan have all designated ambassadors to Kabul, in a step towards recognition.

The Russian move represents a major milestone for the Taliban administration as it seeks to ease its international isolation.

It is likely to be closely watched by Washington, which has frozen billions in Afghanistan's central bank assets and enforced sanctions on some senior leaders in the Taliban that contributed to Afghanistan's banking sector being largely cut off from the international financial system.

Russia has been gradually building relations with the Taliban, which President Vladimir Putin said last year was now an ally in fighting terrorism. Since 2022, Afghanistan has imported gas, oil and wheat from Russia.

The Taliban was outlawed by Russia as a terrorist movement in 2003, but the ban was lifted in April this year. Russia sees a need to work with Kabul as it faces a major security threat from Islamist militant groups based in a string of countries from Afghanistan to the Middle East.

In March 2024, gunmen killed 149 people at a concert hall outside Moscow in an attack claimed by Islamic State. US officials said they had intelligence indicating it was the Afghan branch of the group, Islamic State Khorasan (ISIS-K), that was responsible.

The Taliban says it is working to wipe out the presence of Islamic State in Afghanistan.

Soviet troops invaded the country in December 1979 to prop up a Communist government, but became bogged down in a long war against mujahideen fighters armed by the United States.

US presidents have history of attacking countries without Congress approval

According to The Hill, Democrats bashing President Trump for striking Iran without congressional consent are bumping into an inconvenient history, Democratic presidents have done the same thing for decades.

From Bill Clinton, to Barack Obama, to Joe Biden, every Democratic president of the modern era has employed US military forces to attack targets overseas, including strikes in Bosnia, Syria, Libya and Yemen. While they sought approval from Capitol Hill in some of those cases, Congress never provided it.

That history has muddled the Democrats’ current argument that Trump, in striking three Iranian nuclear facilities last weekend, violated the Constitution by acting on his own, without the formal approval of Congress.

The dynamic has not been overlooked by Republican leaders, who have hailed the strikes on Iran as a national security necessity and defended Trump’s powers to launch them unilaterally.

Those voices are pointing specifically to the actions of Clinton, Obama and Biden to bolster their arguments.

“Since World War II we have had more than 125 military operations from Korea and Vietnam to Iraq and Afghanistan. They have occurred without a Declaration of War by Congress,” House Speaker Mike Johnson told reporters after the strikes. “Presidents of both parties have exercised that authority frequently.”

Johnson ticked off a few examples under the most recent Democratic administrations. Biden, he noted, ordered strikes against Yemen, Syria and Iraq. Obama sustained a months-long bombing campaign in Libya. And Clinton had bombed parts of the former Yugoslavia during the Bosnian war of the mid-1990s. 

“Every one of those actions were taken unilaterally and without prior authorization from Congress,” Johnson said. 

That background is forcing Democrats to reckon with that past just as many of them are now demanding that Trump cease all military operations in Iran without explicit congressional approval. Some of them are quick to acknowledge the incongruity, voicing something like regret that Congress didn’t stand more firm in the face of those unilateral Democratic missions.

“Just because it was wrong then doesn’t mean it’s not wrong now,” said Rep. Ted Lieu, a former Air Force attorney who’s now the vice chairman of the House Democratic Caucus. “The Constitution is the Constitution. And it says only Congress has the power to declare war. And it’s been a bipartisan problem, with Congress ceding way too much power to the executive branch.”

Rep. Pete Aguilar, the chairman of the Democratic Caucus, seemed to agree. He lamented that the politics of Washington have sometimes curtailed Congress’s appetite for asserting its war powers as a check on the president, especially when Congress and the White House are controlled by opposing parties. 

“That part is unfortunate. Maybe we’ve missed a few opportunities,” Aguilar said. 

“But that doesn’t mean that we turn a blind eye right now,” he quickly added. “It doesn’t mean that we just let Donald Trump walk all over us. It means that we stand up for our authority and speak up on behalf of our constituents at every opportunity.”

The Constitution makes clear that Congress and the White House both play crucial roles in conducting military operations. Article I lends Congress the power to declare war, and Article II stipulates that the president is “Commander and Chief” of the Armed Forces, responsible for executing wars that Congress sanctions. 

Yet that conceptual balance has tilted heavily toward the executive branch over most of the last century. The last time Congress formally declared war was in 1941, after Pearl Harbor. And since then, the president has assumed virtually all power, not only to steer the Armed Forces, but also to launch them into battle.

In 1973, in the wake of Vietnam, Congress sought to reassert its authority by passing the War Powers Act. (President Nixon vetoed the bill, but Congress overrode him).

The law requires presidents to “consult with Congress before introducing United States Armed Forces into hostilities,” but it does not demand the formal authorization of the legislative branch.

As tensions in the Middle East exploded earlier in the month, lawmakers in both parties sought to limit US involvement with war powers resolutions requiring Trump to get explicit congressional consent before using military force in Iran.

One was sponsored by three leading Democrats: Reps. Gregory Meeks, Jim Himes and Adam Smith. Another was bipartisan, championed by Reps. Thomas Massie (R-Ky.) and Ro Khanna (D-Calif.).

Supporters of the resolutions are quick to acknowledge that the president has the power to act unilaterally in extraordinary circumstances, like if the nation is attacked. But there’s no evidence, they say, to indicate that Iran posed an immediate threat to Americans ahead of Trump’s strikes. 

“Any president has self-defense authority under Article II of the Constitution. But to meet that threshold, you have to show that there was an imminent risk of attack against Americans or US facilities. That’s the standard,” said Rep.

Jason Crow (D-Colo.), a former Army Ranger who served in both Iraq and Afghanistan. “As a member of the Armed Services Committee and the House Intelligence Committee, I have not seen any evidence leading up to the attack that there was an imminent risk to Americans or to US facilities to meet that threshold.”

Former Speaker Nancy Pelosi (D-Calif.) delivered a similar assessment. “If our country is attacked, all and any powers go to the president to act,” she said. “That didn’t exist here, so the president should have come to Congress.”

Complicating their argument are the actions of Democratic presidents who also activated the Armed Services without congressional consent.

In 1998, for instance, in response to the terrorist bombings of US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, Clinton ordered the launch of cruise missiles targeting al Qaeda strongholds in Sudan and Afghanistan. He also joined NATO forces in bombing Serbian targets in the former Yugoslavia. 

Obama infuriated liberals in Congress in launching strikes against numerous countries during his eight-year reign, including an extensive campaign in Libya in 2011, which helped in the toppling of President Muammar Gaddafi, as well as subsequent incursions in Syria, Yemen and Somalia. 

Obama had asked Congress for specific authorization in some cases, but lawmakers on Capitol Hill couldn’t agree on a resolution to provide it. Instead, those operations leaned heavily on a 2001 resolution — known as an authorization of military force, or AUMF — passed by Congress to sanction the Afghanistan War after the attacks of 9/11. 

In the same vein, Biden used US forces to target Syria, Yemen and Iraq. 

Lieu, for one, emphasized that he was opposed to Obama’s use of force without Congress giving the OK. 

“I publicly stated at the time that Obama needed congressional authorization to strike Syria. I believe Trump needs congressional authorization to strike Iran,” he said.

“My view of the Constitution does not change based on what party the president happens to belong to.” 

Other Democrats sought to keep the debate focused more squarely on current events.

“We can write books and fill your column inches with regrets under this dome. We’ll save that for other days,” Aguilar said. “But what is in front of us today, are we going to stand up for our constitutional authority?”

A week after the strikes, the debate over war powers may already be academic. 

On Tuesday, Trump announced a ceasefire between Iran and Israel that, if it holds, may make the constitutional disagreement moot. Massie has said he won’t force a vote on his war powers measure if the ceasefire continues.

Johnson has refused to consider such a resolution in any event, calling the War Powers Act unconstitutional. And Trump officials are expected to meet with Iranian officials later this week, when the US will seek a commitment from Tehran to abandon any plans to produce nuclear weapons.

Still, there are plenty of questions swirling about the ultimate success of the strikes in dismantling Iran’s nuclear capabilities. And Trump, asked whether he would attack again if necessary, didn’t hesitate. 

“Without question,” he said. “Absolutely.”

 

 

Western laws not needed in Afghanistan

According to media reports, the Taliban’s supreme leader, Hibatullah Akhundzada, has reiterated that Afghanistan has no need for Western legal systems, asserting that Islamic sharia law is fully in effect.

“There is no need for laws that originate from the West. We will create our own laws,” Akhundzada said during an Eid Al-Fitr sermon at the Eidgah Mosque in Kandahar.

The 50-minute message was shared publicly by Taliban spokesman Zabihullah Mujahid on X.

Akhundzada’s remarks reaffirm the stance of the Taliban government. The West alleges that Taliban has significantly rolled back civil liberties — especially for Afghan women and girls — since regaining control of the country in 2021.

Under the group’s interpretation of Islamic law, women have been barred from education, most public sector jobs, and public life.

Despite global condemnation, Akhundzada dismissed any role for democratic governance, stating, “Democracy has come to an end in Afghanistan.”

He accused supporters of democracy of attempting to drive a wedge between the Afghan people and the Taliban.

He also criticized the West, saying non-Muslim countries were aligned in opposition to Islam, referencing the ongoing Israel-Hamas war in Gaza as evidence.

While the Taliban face no formal opposition in the country, internal rifts have emerged. Some Taliban officials have pushed for easing restrictive policies and improving relations with the international community to gain economic and political support. However, Akhundzada and his close inner circle have maintained a firm grip on power and policy direction.

In recent months, there has been limited engagement between the Taliban and the administration of US President Donald Trump, largely centered on prisoner releases and humanitarian coordination.

US lifts bounties on senior Taliban figures

According to various media reports, the United States has lifted bounties on three senior Taliban officials, including Interior Minister Sirajuddin Haqqani, who also leads the Haqqani network, a group long blamed for deadly attacks against Afghanistan’s former Western-backed government.

Haqqani, who previously admitted to orchestrating the 2008 attack on Kabul’s Serena Hotel that killed six people, including American citizen Thor David Hesla, no longer appears on the US State Department’s Rewards for Justice Website.

According to Interior Ministry spokesman Abdul Mateen Qani, the US government revoked the bounties on Sirajuddin Haqqani, Abdul Aziz Haqqani, and Yahya Haqqani. “These three individuals are two brothers and one paternal cousin,” he told The Associated Press.

The Haqqani network, originally founded by Jalaluddin Haqqani, rose to prominence as one of the most lethal arms of the Taliban following the US-led invasion of Afghanistan in 2001.

The group has been linked to a series of high-profile attacks on the Indian and US embassies, the Afghan presidency, and other targets, and has also been accused of engaging in extortion, kidnappings, and other criminal activities.

Zakir Jalaly, a Foreign Ministry official in Kabul, said the US decision to lift the bounties — coming just days after the release of American prisoner George Glezmann — signaled a thaw in bilateral relations.

“Both sides are moving beyond the effects of the wartime phase and taking constructive steps to pave the way for progress,” Jalaly said. “The recent developments in Afghanistan-US relations are a good example of pragmatic and realistic engagement.”

Shafi Azam, another official, welcomed the move as the beginning of normalization, noting the Taliban’s recent assertion of control over Afghanistan’s embassy in Norway as further evidence of diplomatic progress.

Since taking power in August 2021, the Taliban have struggled with global isolation, worsened by their sweeping restrictions on women and girls.

Only a few countries, including China and Qatar, have formally or informally engaged with the Taliban diplomatically. The US has also maintained indirect channels of communication.

Despite being under United Nations sanctions since 2007, Sirajuddin Haqqani has traveled internationally in the past year. These trips, made with UN clearance, were his first abroad since the Taliban’s return to power.

Haqqani has also voiced rare public criticism of the Taliban’s decision-making process, highlighting internal divisions within the group’s leadership.

 

Pakistan: Torkham crossing remains closed

According to Saudi Gazette, Pakistani and Afghani border forces remained on high alert on Sunday as the Torkham crossing, a key trade and transit route between the two countries, remained shut for a second consecutive day following a dispute over the construction of a new checkpoint.

The border closure has halted all trade and passenger movement between Pakistan’s Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province and Afghanistan’s Nangarhar province.

“Torkham border remains closed for all types of passenger and trade vehicles movement, and security forces on both sides are on alert,” a Pakistani security official stationed at the crossing told Anadolu.

No border flag meeting or communication committee talks have been scheduled to resolve the standoff, though efforts are reportedly underway to arrange discussions between officials.

The Torkham border is one of 18 crossings between Pakistan and Afghanistan, where decades of territorial disputes have led to frequent closures, disrupting trade and travel.

Tensions between the two countries have escalated since November 2023, when Pakistan launched a crackdown on illegal foreigners, mostly targeting Afghan refugees, and initiated their forced deportation.

Islamabad has also accused Afghanistan-based militants linked to the outlawed Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) of carrying out cross-border attacks, claiming that the Taliban government in Kabul has failed to act against them—an allegation the Taliban denies.

In December 2024, the Pakistani military launched airstrikes in Afghanistan’s Paktika province, marking the second such cross-border military operation since March 2024.

The Afghan Taliban claimed that Pakistani jets killed 46 civilians, including women and children, while Islamabad denied that civilians were targeted. 

 

Pakistan on a path of implosion

It was what one may safely describe as a ‘memorable’ occasion. Exactly a year ago today, adult-aged Pakistanis from all faiths, cultures, ethnicities, and socioeconomic classes had headed to their assigned polling stations to cast their ballots in a much-delayed general election.

 was remarkable how many expectations they ended up defying that day. One recalls the unannounced blackout of all mobile communication services, enforced by the authorities shortly before polls opened, which had left people without access to vital election-related information and unable to contact their friends and families.

It was not enough to deter the over 59 million citizens’ intent on having their voices heard that day. One also recalls the smug predictions of television pundits and the surveys fed to the media in the run-up to Election Day. None of them prepared the nation for the coup ordinary Pakistanis pulled off merely with the help of a stamp and a ballot paper.

No observer can honestly deny that the last election’s results were highly unexpected.

Considerable effort was made to keep one party out of the race. The party’s leadership was jailed, its workers picked up, its electoral symbol withdrawn, and its candidates, even after being forced to declare themselves independents, not allowed to campaign.

If the previous elections were manipulated — perhaps by the same elements — to bring the PTI to power, they went out of their way to ensure that it did not have any chance this time around.

Despite all their machinations, however, the PTI ended up winning an unexpectedly large chunk of the popular vote.

The results announced two things: one, that Pakistan’s youth had finally arrived on the political scene, and two, that ordinary voters had overwhelmingly rejected the narratives set by the powers of the day. In this sense, the 2024 election was indeed a historic one.

Much went wrong after February 08, 2024, mainly because responsible individuals within the Pakistani state refused to come to terms with the country’s changed realities.

However, though the injustices that followed the last general election cannot be forgotten, it is equally important to start thinking about what must now be done to mitigate their effects.

The country has continued to march on a path of implosion, unable to contain the dissonance created by a conflict between what those controlling the state want and what the people want for themselves. Unless this fundamental conflict is resolved, the country will not be at peace with itself.

A war of egos has been fought between a handfuls of individuals at the cost of the well-being of millions of ordinary Pakistanis. This unnecessary war must be called to an end. The people of Pakistan have been wronged for too long. They need a change.

Dawn Editorial, February 08, 2025

Iran objects dam construction by Afghanistan

The spokesman of Iran’s water industry considered the unilateral exploitation of the Harirud River to be a violation of customary rights and said the effects of this unilateral action by the Afghan side will not only affect the supply of drinking water and health of several million people, but also lead to widespread damage to the downstream environment.

Issa Bozorgzadeh, said that the construction and impoundment of Pashdan dam in the Harirud border basin causes the reduction of the natural flow of the Harirud border river and the occurrence of social and environmental damages in the downstream areas, especially the problem of serious damage to the drinking water supply of the holy city of Mashhad.

Referring to the multi-dimensional economic, social and cultural ties of Mashhad and Herat, Bozorgzadeh said, “We believe that all the people who live in a watershed have the same destiny, and applying any strictness and pressure to a part of the people of the watershed will inevitably affect all the residents.”

The spokesman of the water industry further stated, “Iran has repeatedly expressed its official protest through diplomatic channels against the negative cross-border effects caused by the unilateral dam construction measures of the Afghan side in the Harirud basin and calls for joint cooperation to evaluate and reduce these effects and choose sustainable development instead of destructive development.”

He added, “We still believe that the one-sided and non-participatory exploitation of the water resources of the Harirud basin is not beneficial to any of the countries in the upstream and downstream.”