Showing posts with label Bagam Air Base. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Bagam Air Base. Show all posts

Sunday, 19 October 2025

United States Still Eyes Afghanistan

Washington’s withdrawal ended its military presence, not its strategic ambitions in the heart of Asia

When the United States hurriedly withdrew from Afghanistan in August 2021, it claimed to have ended its “forever war.” Yet, Afghanistan has not slipped off Washington’s strategic radar. The methods have changed, but the motives remain. The US still views Afghanistan as a vital piece on the Eurasian chessboard — prized for its geography, intelligence value, and economic undercurrents.

First, Afghanistan’s narcotics economy remains an unspoken factor. Despite Taliban claims of banning poppy cultivation, UN data confirms continued opium production, which fuels regional criminal networks. For decades, allegations have persisted that Western intelligence agencies — especially the CIA — have tolerated or even exploited the drug trade to fund covert operations. Renewed US engagement, framed as “counter-narcotics cooperation,” could restore informal oversight of these financial flows.

Second, the chaotic exit left behind billions of dollars’ worth of military hardware — aircraft, vehicles, ammunition, and advanced surveillance systems. Much of it reportedly fell into Taliban hands or black-market networks. Washington would prefer to track, retrieve, or neutralize sensitive technologies before they reach Iran, China, or Russia. A covert re-entry, through intelligence operations or private contractors, serves this purpose well.

Third, Afghanistan’s location remains uniquely strategic. It borders Iran, China’s Xinjiang region, and several Central Asian states under Russian influence. For US planners, it is an ideal observation post to monitor three rivals simultaneously. Hence the growing emphasis on “over-the-horizon” intelligence operations launched from Gulf or Central Asian bases.

Fourth, China’s expanding Belt and Road Initiative through Pakistan and Central Asia heightens Washington’s unease. Beijing’s efforts to stabilize Afghanistan and integrate it into regional connectivity projects threaten to edge the US out of Eurasia. Re-engagement under humanitarian, counterterrorism, or anti-drug programs provides Washington a convenient pretext to retain influence.

Finally, a chronically unstable Afghanistan serves certain geopolitical interests. It prevents regional integration and complicates projects like Iran’s Chabahar port or China’s CPEC. Controlled instability ensures continued leverage without the burdens of occupation.

In essence, the US may not reoccupy Afghanistan with troops, but it seeks reassertion through intelligence, proxies, and influence networks. The 2021 withdrawal ended one phase of occupation but opened another — quieter, subtler, and more strategic. Afghanistan remains too valuable for Washington to abandon — not for peace, but for power.

Saturday, 11 October 2025

Is Pakistan Being Pushed into a ‘US Proxy War’ in Afghanistan?

Behind the new wave of border clashes may lie an old script — one written in Washington and played out in Islamabad and Kabul. Has Pakistan once again been cast in the role of America’s proxy?

The recent spike in Pak-Afghan border tensions has once again pushed the region to the edge of confrontation. Reports suggest that armed militants crossing from Afghanistan have attacked Pakistani security posts, prompting Islamabad’s “severe retaliation.” Yet, beneath the visible smoke of gunfire lies a far more intricate and disturbing reality — one that hints at the shadow of global power politics.

Following the US withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2021, Washington appeared to have lost its strategic foothold in the region. The Taliban’s refusal to hand over the Bagam Air Base — once a vital hub of American military operations — was not merely a symbolic rejection; it was a strategic rebuff. The superpower lost a vantage point near China, Iran, and Central Asia.

It is no coincidence that within months of that refusal, Afghanistan began facing renewed instability, and Pakistan started encountering an inexplicable surge in cross-border attacks.

My hypothesis is simple: when Washington cannot re-enter Afghanistan directly, it may seek to create circumstances that justify intervention. The most effective way to do that is to provoke conflict. The pattern fits. Anonymous “operators” — possibly non-state actors with advanced intelligence capabilities — carry out attacks inside Pakistan, inviting a retaliatory strike. The resulting escalation allows the US to portray the region as unstable and Taliban-controlled Afghanistan as a “global threat.” A familiar pretext for yet another intervention is thus created.

Ironically, Pakistan — which has already paid an enormous price in blood and economy during the first “War on Terror” — now risks being drawn into another one, this time as an unwilling participant in someone else’s geopolitical chessboard. The tragedy is that Islamabad still struggles to draw a clear line between its national interests and Washington’s regional ambitions. History, it seems, is repeating itself — and not for the better.

What complicates matters further is the deep mistrust between Islamabad and Kabul. The Taliban government, already under economic sanctions and political isolation, accuses Pakistan of toeing the American line. Pakistan, on the other hand, blames Afghanistan for harboring militants of the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). Yet neither side seems willing to see how external forces might be manipulating both.

The strategic question Pakistan must ask is: Whose war are we fighting this time? If recent cross-border provocations are indeed part of a larger plan to destabilize the region, Islamabad must avoid taking the bait. A measured, intelligence-based response — not blind retaliation — is the need of the hour. Pakistan’s security cannot depend on reaction; it must rest on foresight.

The lesson from the past two decades is painfully clear. Every time Pakistan has fought on behalf of someone else, it has lost — in lives, in reputation, and in internal cohesion. If history is repeating itself, the least we can do is refuse to play the same role again.