When the United States hurriedly withdrew from Afghanistan
in August 2021, it claimed to have ended its “forever war.” Yet, Afghanistan
has not slipped off Washington’s strategic radar. The methods have changed, but
the motives remain. The US still views Afghanistan as a vital piece on the
Eurasian chessboard — prized for its geography, intelligence value, and
economic undercurrents.
First, Afghanistan’s narcotics economy remains an unspoken
factor. Despite Taliban claims of banning poppy cultivation, UN data confirms
continued opium production, which fuels regional criminal networks. For
decades, allegations have persisted that Western intelligence agencies —
especially the CIA — have tolerated or even exploited the drug trade to fund
covert operations. Renewed US engagement, framed as “counter-narcotics
cooperation,” could restore informal oversight of these financial flows.
Second, the chaotic exit left behind billions of dollars’
worth of military hardware — aircraft, vehicles, ammunition, and advanced
surveillance systems. Much of it reportedly fell into Taliban hands or
black-market networks. Washington would prefer to track, retrieve, or
neutralize sensitive technologies before they reach Iran, China, or Russia. A
covert re-entry, through intelligence operations or private contractors, serves
this purpose well.
Third, Afghanistan’s location remains uniquely strategic. It
borders Iran, China’s Xinjiang region, and several Central Asian states under
Russian influence. For US planners, it is an ideal observation post to monitor
three rivals simultaneously. Hence the growing emphasis on “over-the-horizon”
intelligence operations launched from Gulf or Central Asian bases.
Fourth, China’s expanding Belt and Road Initiative through
Pakistan and Central Asia heightens Washington’s unease. Beijing’s efforts to
stabilize Afghanistan and integrate it into regional connectivity projects
threaten to edge the US out of Eurasia. Re-engagement under humanitarian,
counterterrorism, or anti-drug programs provides Washington a convenient
pretext to retain influence.
Finally, a chronically unstable Afghanistan serves certain
geopolitical interests. It prevents regional integration and complicates
projects like Iran’s Chabahar port or China’s CPEC. Controlled instability
ensures continued leverage without the burdens of occupation.
In essence, the US may not reoccupy Afghanistan with troops,
but it seeks reassertion through intelligence, proxies, and influence networks.
The 2021 withdrawal ended one phase of occupation but opened another — quieter,
subtler, and more strategic. Afghanistan remains too valuable for Washington to
abandon — not for peace, but for power.
