Showing posts with label Armenia. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Armenia. Show all posts

Saturday, 20 January 2024

Iran: Peace in its neighborhood

On the sidelines of the World Economic Forum’s Annual Meeting, Iranian Foreign Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian held talks with several high-ranking officials from around the world, to discuss various regional and international issues.

During a meeting with Armenian President Vahagn Khachaturyan, Amir Abdollahian stated that Tehran is an advocate of peace in the Caucasus region. 

Referring to his recent trip to Yerevan and his meetings and discussions with the Armenian foreign minister and the secretary of the country’s National Security Council, the Iranian foreign minister said, “Armenia has a significant place in Iran’s neighborhood policy.”

Amir Abdollahian pointed out that the ties between the two countries are strong, saying the bilateral ties are advancing. He said boosting the ties would serve the interests of both nations.

The Iranian foreign minister highlighted the importance of preserving the security and stability in the Caucasus region and said Iran has always supported the peace talks between the Republic of Azerbaijan and Armenia.

Amir Abdollahian held an extensive meeting with his Georgian counterpart Ilia Darchiashvili.

Expressing his satisfaction with the meeting, the Iranian foreign minister hailed the old and strong relations between the officials and people of both countries.

Amir Abdollahian said the promotion of ties with Georgia is one of Iran’s priorities and further stated that Tehran cares about the security in the Caucasus and Georgia.

He sounded upbeat that the relations between the two countries would be developed without any restrictions.

The Iranian foreign minister underlined the necessity to rely on regional solutions for the problems in the region, explaining that the security issues of the region are tied and related to each other.

Another person the Iranian diplomat convened with was Saudi Arabia’s foreign minister Faisal bin Farhan.

In the meeting, Amir Abdollahian and bin Farhan exchanged views over bilateral issues such as economic and trade cooperation.

The two top diplomats also discussed other issues of mutual interest such as Palestine’s developments and the latest state of the war in Gaza.

The Iranian foreign minister outlined the developments in Gaza and the crimes of the Zionist regime with US support, stressing Iran's support for efforts to prevent the expansion of the war and for the restoration of stability and peace in the region.

Amir Abdollahian also referred to Iran's efforts to dispel some concerns in the region and the world, including Iran's efforts to put in place mechanisms to ensure energy security.

 

Saturday, 22 April 2023

Is Iran-Azerbaijan tension being fueled by Israel?

The 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war between Azerbaijan and Armenia had profound repercussions for Iran’s influence and policies in the South Caucasus. Tehran neither impacted the trajectory of the conflict nor exerted significant diplomatic influence in ceasefire negotiations and the ensuing peace agreement. 

Though Iran was the most relevant regional power in the conflict, bordering both Armenia and Azerbaijan, it was sidelined by Turkey and Russia. Tehran was obliged to align with Ankara and Moscow in supporting Baku’s territorial conquests, revealing a significant departure from its traditional pro-Armenia stance. 

From Iran's point of view, it is Tel Aviv that provokes Baku to take a belligerent policy against Tehran and to challenge the geopolitical status quo.

Azerbaijan did not reciprocate Iran’s good faith. Baku knowingly isolated Tehran in Nagorno-Karabakh’s reconstruction, while prioritizing Israel and Arab and European countries.

Backed by mighty military powers such as Turkey, Israel and Pakistan, Azerbaijan felt it could flex its muscles against Iran’s regional power projection. Recently, Baku hosted a joint military drill with Ankara and Islamabad, aiming to further strengthen ties among the three countries and to bolster counterterrorism efforts. 

The joint drill contradicts the provisions of the Convention on the Legal Status of the Caspian Sea, which bans the presence in the Caspian Sea of armed forces not belonging to the Parties" (Azerbaijan, Iran, Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation and Turkmenistan). 

On the margins of the drill, Baku tacitly challenged Iran’s connectivity with Armenia by disrupting Iranian trucks transiting a road that passes through Azerbaijan’s newly captured territories. Azerbaijan set up check points, began charging fees to Iranian trucks, and even detained two Iranian truckers.

Unlike Azerbaijan’s attempt to depict recent incidents as routine procedure, Tehran sees this new, assertive Azerbaijan in a bigger picture, where Baku plays the anti-Iran puppet role for other regional powers hostile to Iran, such as Israel. 

Tehran initially tasked the Revolutionary Guard Corps with deploying equipment and troops across the country’s northwestern border. But this was just a small part of Iran’s grand plan to intimidate Baku. Days later, Tehran launched its own military drill near the Azerbaijani border, saying "We will never tolerate the presence of the fake Zionist regime near the Iranian border, nor any changes in the regional borders and geopolitics”.

This rare move, alongside hawkish comments by Iranian officials, suggests that Tehran is indeed concerned about the potential for grave geopolitical changes near its borders. 

Iran’s Kayhan newspaper, a publication close to hardliners, claimed that based on a Turkish-American plan, Armenia’s western-oriented president, in collusion with Baku, intends to concede Armenia’s Syunik province to Azerbaijan. This is the only conceivable reason for Iran’s outrage at Azerbaijan. 

Syunik province separates the rest of Azerbaijan from the Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic exclave, and constitutes the Armenian border with Iran.

The 2020 peace deal between Azerbaijan and Armenia guaranteed Azerbaijan a corridor to connect Nakhchivan to the rest of Azerbaijan via Syunik province. Previously, all connections were made through Iran in the south or Turkey in the west. 

Baku is apparently not satisfied with this plan, and maintains an ambitious goal to take all of Syunik province, which could put Iran in a disadvantageous geopolitical position.

Tehran would lose its connection to Armenia and convenient access to the region, while being compelled to deal with a newly emboldened regional power that is heavily backed by Iran’s arch-enemy, Israel.

From Iran’s point of view, it is Tel Aviv that provokes Baku to take a belligerent policy against Tehran and to challenge the geopolitical status quo.

The title Tehran has chosen for its ongoing drills in the country’s northwest drives this point home ‑ Fatehan-e Khaybar is a call back to the Battle of Khaybar in the year 628, in which the Prophet Mohammed confronted the Jews of the Khaybar region, who were inciting Arabian tribes against the Muslims of Medina. 

Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei recently warned Azerbaijan against aligning with Israel noting, “Those who think that their security will be ensured by relying on foreigners should know that they will pay a hefty price.”

The type and scale of military equipment stationed at the border suggests that Iran intends to deter Baku from territorial adventurism, but Tehran ultimately wants to avoid an armed clash. If the situation deteriorates and Azerbaijan opts not to address Tehran’s concerns and warnings, Iran may cross the border to push preemptive deterrence from Armenian soil. A key factor at that point would be the extent to which Azerbaijan’s allies, primarily Turkey, would be prepared to support Baku and participate in a direct confrontation with Iran. 

Meanwhile, Iran seems determined not to step back without affirming its national security red lines, establishing a credible level of deterrence, and asserting its undeniable regional role, which has been somewhat tarnished amid the recent security developments in the South Caucasus. 

Saturday, 9 July 2022

Iranian non-oil trade with neighbors up 18% during March-June 2022 quarter

The value of Iran’s non-oil trade with its neighboring countries increased 18% during the first three months of the current Iranian calendar year (March-June), as compared to the same period last year, the spokesman of Islamic Republic of Iran Customs Administration (IRICA) announced.

Ruhollah Latifi put Iran’s non-oil trade with its neighbors at 20.973 million tons worth US$12.363 billion in the three-month period.

He said trade with the neighbors accounted for 49% of the value and 59% of the weight of Iran’s non-oil trade during the period under review.

The country exported 16.05 million tons of non-oil goods worth US$6.736 billion to the neighboring countries in the three-month period of this year, indicating 20% rise in value, while 10% drop in weight, as compared to the same period last year, the official stated.

He named Iraq, Turkey, United Arab Emirates (UAE), Afghanistan, and Oman as the five top export destinations.

Latifi further announced that Iran imported 4.433 million tons of goods worth US$5.627 billion from its neighbors during this period, with 15% growth in value and one percent rise in weight YoY.

He named UAE, Turkey, Russia, Pakistan, and Oman as the five top sources of imports.

As previously announced by the IRICA head, the value of Iran’s non-oil trade with its neighbors during the previous Iranian calendar year 1400 was reported at US$51.875 billion, an increase of 43% YoY.

Alireza Moghadasi put the weight of non-oil trade with the neighboring countries at 100.131 million tons in the said year, stating that trade with the neighbors also increased by 23% in terms of weight.

The official put the annual non-oil exports to the mentioned countries at 75.445 million tons valued at US$26.29 billion, with a 29% rise in value and a 12% growth in weight.

Major export destinations of the Iranian non-oil goods were Iraq with US$8.9 billion, followed by Turkey (US$6.1 billion), United Arab Emirates (US$4.9 billion), Afghanistan US$1.8 billion) and Pakistan with (US$1.3 billion) in imports from the Islamic Republic, others countries included Oman, Russia, Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain, and Saudi Arabia, according to the official.

Moghadasi further stated that Iran imported 24.686 million tons of non-oil commodities worth over US$25.846 billion in the previous year, with a 60% growth in value and a 68%YoY increase in weight.

The United Arab Emirates was the top exporter to Iran during the period exporting US$16.5 billion worth of goods to the country, followed by Turkey, Russia, Iraq, and Oman, he stated.

Pakistan, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, Afghanistan, Armenia, Kuwait, Qatar, and Bahrain were other top neighboring countries that supplied goods to Iran in 1400, respectively.

Increasing non-oil exports to the neighboring countries is one of the major plans that the Iranian government has been pursuing in recent years.

Iran shares land or water borders with 15 countries namely UAE, Afghanistan, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Iraq, Kuwait, Kazakhstan, Oman, Pakistan, Qatar, Russia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, and Saudi Arabia.


Tuesday, 14 June 2022

China EAEU relations at stake

Western sanctions on Russia over its Ukraine invasion are forcing China to recalibrate ties with the Eurasian Economic Framework (EAEU), an economic union of post-Soviet states, with collaborations under the Belt and Road Initiative now at risk of secondary sanctions.

Beijing and Moscow signed a joint statement on cooperation between the EAEU and belt and road projects in 2015, a year after the union between Russia, Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan was established.

China and the EAEU agreed on greater economic coordination in 13 areas, including customs, trade, intellectual property rights, e-commerce and government procurement.

The enhanced coordination meant countries would not have to choose between Russia and China, said a commentary by the China Institute of International studies.

But with Russia now subject to sweeping Western sanctions after invading Ukraine, China’s economic relations with its northern neighbour and other EAEU countries is increasingly tricky.

“Collaboration between EAEU and Belt and Road Initiative is affected because sanctions from America and Europe increased the risk of secondary sanctions for Chinese companies,” said Zhao Long, a researcher at the Shanghai Institute for International studies.

Contractors and investors involved in EAEU and belt and road joint projects could run afoul of restrictions if they seek financing or conduct other business with companies that have been targeted by Western sanctions, he said.

The risk of these secondary sanctions has prompted hundreds of businesses and multilateral institutions to suspend ties with Russia.

The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and Bank of China have curtailed Russian access to capital markets, according to a database compiled by Yale University’s School of Management.

Chinese tech giant Huawei has also halted new orders and furloughed some staff in Russia, the database showed.

Oil and gas behemoth Sinopec has suspended talks with Russia for a gas chemical plant worth up to US$500 million, and at least five Chinese companies stopped work on Russia’s Arctic LNG 2 project in northern Siberia at the end of May this year.

“The war in Ukraine is impacting bilateral developments between Russia and China, and the coordination within the Eurasian union,” said Paul Stronski, senior fellow at Carnegie’s Russia and Eurasia Program.

China says ‘no limits’ in cooperation with Russia

“On sanctions, we are seeing Beijing being quite supportive of Moscow in this war, which is surprising given China’s normal approach to condemn separatism and interference in the internal affairs of another country. That is essentially what Russia is doing.”

But beyond diplomatic support and motivation to buy cheap energy, many Chinese companies have been wary of running afoul of US or EU sanctions because both economies are far more important export and trade markets for companies in China, Stronski said.

The impact of sanctions imposed on Russia will be felt across the EAEU because the design of the union ties them to Russia’s own fate, according to Kataryna Wolczuk, an associate fellow at Chatham House’s Russia and Eurasia programme, and Rilka Dragneva, professor at the University of Birmingham’s school of law.

Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, for example, are likely to see negative impacts on their currencies and remittances, while restrictions will affect the trade of key commodities, they wrote on the think-tank’s website last month.

Katarzyna Czerewacz-Filipowicz, an Associate Professor at Bialystok University of Technology’s faculty of engineering management in Poland, said firms like Cargotor, Maersk and Mediterranean Shipping Company have suspended rail freight services through Russia as a sign of solidarity with Ukraine.

“Sanctions have also been applied to Russian railways, and this is probably why the uncertainty about the Belt and Road Initiative arises,” she said. “However, it is worth emphasizing that the sanctions include access to financial markets and transactions in securities. Thus, they do not cover cargo transit contracts via Russia.”

A rail line from the Chinese border through Kazakhstan, Russia, Belarus and into the European Union, which was heavily subsidized by the Chinese side and seen as vital to get goods from China to Europe through the EAEU, is now dead, said Stronski.

“European suppliers now are wary about putting their goods on a train via Russia given the reputational risks, or fears that Russia will hold up these goods,” he said. “Chinese producers have grown wary of using the route, given all the same reasons.”

Increasingly alert to external uncertainty, China is prioritizing risk control and prevention for its belt and road push this year, according to a report released in early March by the National Development and Reform Commission.

And Chinese companies have already begun scaling back international investment under the initiative.

Some 194 belt and road projects valued at US$13.66 billion were announced last year, down from 399 projects valued at US$80.51 billion in 2020, according to a report by financial data provider Refinitiv released in December last year.

As for Russia, international isolation will hasten its pivot to the East by building the friend-shoring alliances, said Zhao at the Shanghai Institute for International studies.

“Members of the EAEU will hasten the free flow of trade, services, capital, labour and the progress of local settlements in the region before 2025,” he said. “They’ll also strengthen security initiatives with their allies in order to broaden the post-Soviet space of influence.”

 

Friday, 1 January 2021

Iran-Eurasian Economic Union trade reported at US$1.4 billion in 8 months

The value of non-oil trade between Iran and members of the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) were US$1.4 billion during the first eight months of the current Iranian calendar year (March-November 2020) as per data released by Tehran Chamber of Commerce, Industries, Mines and Agriculture (TCCIMA). Trade with Eurasia accounted for 2.8% of the country’s total non-oil trade in the mentioned period.

According to details, Iran exported 1.8 million tons of commodities worth US$639 million to the EAEU members in the period under review, registering a 20% fall in terms of weight and a 6% decline in terms of value. The country’s trade with its Eurasian partners declined 11% as compared to the previous year’s same eight-month period.

During this time span, Iran's exports to Russia and Belarus increased significantly in terms of weight and value, while exports to three other countries, namely Armenia, Kyrgyzstan, and Kazakhstan, decreased.

Eurasian destinations accounted for only 2.4 percent of Iran’s total exports in the first eight months of the current year, according to the said data.

Among Eurasian trade partners, Russia was Iran's top export destination with US$285 million, followed by Armenia with US$233 million worth of imports from the Islamic Republic, while most of Iran's imports also came from Russia (US$727 million).

Iran and Eurasian Economic Union reached a free trade agreement in October 2018 based on which about 862 commodity items were subjected to preferential tariffs. The interim agreement enabling the formation of a free trade area between Iran and the EAEU was signed on May 17, 2018, and officially came into force on October 27, 2019.

Iran is a very important market in the region and the development of ties with this country is of high significance for the EAEU members (Russia, Belarus, Armenia, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan).

The free trade agreement between Iran and the Union has laid the ground for the expansion of trade ties between the two sides.

The agreement with the bloc has increased Iran’s exports to the EAEU member states significantly, which is a turning point for the Islamic Republic's plans for boosting non-oil exports during the US sanctions.