Iranian strategy to keep its influence intact in Middle East

According to Reuters, Iran has opened a direct line of communication with rebels in Syria's new leadership after the ouster of Bashar al-Assad It is an attempt to "prevent a hostile trajectory" between the countries.

The lightning advance of a militia alliance spearheaded by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, a former al-Qaeda affiliate, marked one of the biggest turning points for the Middle East in generations. Assad's fall removed a bastion from which Iran and Russia exercised influence across the Arab world.

Hours after Assad's fall, Iran said it expected relations with Damascus to continue based on the two countries' "far-sighted and wise approach" and called for the establishment of an inclusive government representing all segments of Syrian society.

There is little doubt about Tehran's concern about how the change of power in Damascus will affect Iran's influence in Syria, the lynchpin of its regional clout.

But there is no panic as Tehran seeks diplomatic avenues to establish contact with people whom one of the officials called "those within Syria's new ruling groups whose views are closer to Iran's".

The main concern for Iran is whether Assad's successor will push Syria away from Tehran's orbit, a scenario Iran is keen to avoid.

A hostile post-Assad Syria would deprive Lebanese armed group Hezbollah of its only land supply route and deny Iran its main access to the Mediterranean and the front line with Israel.

After losing of an important ally in Damascus and the return of Donald Trump to the white House in January 2024, this engagement is key to stabilize ties and avoiding further regional tensions.

According to Reuters, Tehran has established contacts with two groups inside the new leadership and the level of interaction will be assessed in the coming days.

Tehran was wary of Trump using Assad's removal as leverage to intensify economic and political pressure on Iran, either to force concessions or to destabilize the Islamic Republic.

After pulling the United States out of Iran's 2015 nuclear deal with six major powers in 2018, then-President Trump pursued a "maximum pressure" policy that led to extreme economic hardship and exacerbated public discontent in Iran. Trump is staffing his planned administration with hawks on Iran.

In 2020, Trump, as president, ordered a drone strike that killed Qassem Soleimani, Iran's most powerful military commander and mastermind of overseas attacks on US interests and those of its allies.

Iran is now only left with two options: fall back and draw a defensive line in Iraq or seek a deal with Trump.

The fall of Assad exposed Tehran's dwindling strategic leverage in the region, exacerbated by Israel's military offensives against Hezbollah in Lebanon and the Palestinian militant group Hamas in Gaza.

Iran's clerical rulers spent billions of dollars propping up Assad during the civil war that erupted in Syria in 2011 and deployed its Revolutionary Guards to Syria to keep its ally in power and maintain Tehran's "Axis of Resistance" to Israel and US influence in the Middle East.

Assad's fall removes a critical link in Iran's regional resistance chain that served as a crucial transit route for Tehran to supply arms and fund its proxies and particularly Hezbollah.

 

 

Syria: Opportunities and Pitfalls for Israel

The fall of Assad, an implacable foe of Israel who turned Syria into a staging ground for Iranian threats and weapons transfers to Hezbollah, is not something Israel would lament. With Syrian rebel forces rapidly advancing south toward Damascus after already taking Aleppo and Hama, the ground in Syria is shifting.

This shift is due in no small measure to the twin blows Israel dealt Hezbollah and Iran since the launch of Operation Northern Arrows in mid-September, aimed at returning displaced Israeli residents to their homes along the northern border.

In its war in Lebanon, Israel decapitated Hezbollah’s leadership, killed and wounded thousands of its fighters, and significantly degraded its missile and rocket capabilities. Hezbollah, which once fought in Syria to prop up the dictatorial regime of President Bashar al-Assad, is in no position to help Assad today as his regime has crumbled.

Iran also suffered blows at the hands of Israel – most notably the destruction of much of its air defense network and critical missile manufacturing infrastructure during Jerusalem’s retaliatory raid on October 26.

With Hezbollah severely weakened and Hamas in Gaza also no longer an effective proxy, Iran – which has made an art form of sending others to be killed to further its own interests – finds itself unable to provide Assad with the same level of assistance it once did. It also struggles to project the same regional power if wielded just a few months ago.

Assad’s other ally, Russia, whose intervention in the civil war in 2015 tipped the scales in his favor, is also unable to give Assad what it did in the past, preoccupied and overextended with its own war in Ukraine.

With Hezbollah, Iran, and Russia weakened – two of them due to Israeli action – Syrian rebels seized the opportunity to advance, launching their offensive on the same day a ceasefire was implemented in Lebanon. Hezbollah, weary and depleted, was in no position to counter the rebel advance.

The fall of Assad, an implacable foe of Israel who turned Syria into a staging ground for Iranian threats and weapons transfers to Hezbollah, is not something Israel would lament. However, the composition of the rebel forces threatening Assad’s regime is not an alliance that the Jewish state can applaud.

They are led by Sunni jihadists recently aligned with al-Qaeda and who remain on America’s list of terrorist organizations and also include Turkish-backed Islamists.

Israel has a clear interest in seeing Syria removed from Iran’s “Axis of Resistance,” ending its role as a host for Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps operatives and Iranian-sponsored militias and as a potential launch-pad for attacks against Israel.

Syria under Assad was a crucial pillar of Hezbollah’s strength in Lebanon, serving as the main conduit for smuggling missiles and advanced weaponry into the country. If Syria is taken out of the equation, Hezbollah – already reeling from Israel’s onslaught – will face even greater difficulties rebuilding.

This would be welcome news for many in Lebanon seeking freedom from Hezbollah and Iran’s stranglehold. One significant side effect of Assad’s fall could be a chance for the Lebanese to finally regain control of their own country.

While these developments are largely positive for Israel, they come with complications. Jerusalem has no interest in seeing its neighbor to the northeast taken over by Sunni jihadists of the al-Qaeda ilk or Turkish-backed Islamists. Israel’s experience with such groups – like Hamas in Gaza – has been anything but encouraging.

What happens in Syria will most definitely have an impact on Israel in the future that is why Jerusalem must keep a vigilant eye there, sending messages to all concerned that there are two developments it will not tolerate. The first is chemical weapons depots falling into the hands of jihadist or Islamist rebels, and the second is the mass deployment of Iranian troops into the country.

Those are redlines that, if crossed, would severely compromise Israel’s national security and would necessitate immediate Israeli action to prevent.

Beyond these redlines, Israel can do little to positively impact developments inside Syria, other than working behind the scenes with the US to establish channels with more moderate elements in the opposition, hoping they will emerge as a constructive force in shaping Syria’s future. 

Courtesy: The Jerusalem Post

Critical Examination of Iranian Regional Policy

Despite continuous Israeli attacks targeting Iran's military doctrine in the wake of the regime’s brutal war in Gaza, the framework of that strategy remains largely intact and continues to operate across West Asia. However, in a recent article for Chatham House Bilal Y. Saab argues that the ceasefire in Lebanon has dealt a huge blow to Iran’s regional strategy. It may be said that the article fails to fully consider the current and delayed impacts of Israel’s unprecedented use of brute force on Tel Aviv. 

The military operations in the Gaza Strip and Lebanon have currently put huge burdens on the Israeli economy with long-term impacts expected to last for years. While unconditional US aid might temporarily alleviate investor concerns regarding Israel, the potential for renewed conflict poses a significant and lasting deterrent to investment.

The issue of settlers in northern occupied Palestine has not been yet solved and seems to be a problem in the foreseeable future for Israel. Also, the impacts of Israel’s action on Western public opinion cannot be undermined; this is being seen in some countries to put pressure on policymakers to take more progressive action against Israel. 

The author argues that Israel has achieved victory in its war with Hezbollah but the facts on the ground suggest differently. Tel Aviv since October 2023 has been targeting Hezbollah facilities and fighters across Lebanon but to no avail.

Hezbollah operations in northern occupied Palestine and even deeper in Haifa and Tel Aviv continued until the last moments before a ceasefire took effect last month. Israel’s limited, targeted operations in Southern Lebanon fell short of gaining significant territory and Hezbollah was successful in repelling those attacks. 

The Lebanon ceasefire, largely mirroring UN Resolution 1701, offers no significant changes. Hezbollah retains its weaponry and maintains the capacity to resume operations against Israel at any time. 

Bilal Y. Saab views the ceasefire as a setback for the Resistance Axis, arguing that it has left Hamas isolated. But this is not the case; factions in the Resistance Front have always contained autonomy in their decisions despite Western claims about Iran controlling it all. It is largely uncontested that Hamas started Operations Al-Aqsa Storm on its own without any prior notice to other groups and actors in the region yet, the whole front with a differentiating timetable joined Hamas in its fight against Israel.

For over a year, the conflict in Lebanon remained a relatively even exchange of attacks. Only after Israel significantly escalated its assaults, pursuing new objectives, none of which were achieved, did ceasefire talks commence. The ideology of creation of Hezbollah is based on confronting Israel and the current fragile ceasefire can be considered as a temporary tactical halt for the group in its fight against Tel Aviv. 

Furthermore, Saab prescribes renewed efforts for normalization of relations between Arab countries and Israel for what he calls a lasting victory for Tel Aviv. Saudi Arabia is one of the main players in the region which is reportedly eager to normalize ties with Israel. 

The regional landscape has shifted dramatically since the early Trump administration and the Abraham Accords. The Israeli onslaughts in Gaza and Lebanon have fueled widespread regional opposition to normalization with Israel. Also, Saudi Arabia's rapprochement with Iran suggests a decreased likelihood of Arab confrontation with Tehran.

Despite the author’s claims that an expanded Abraham Accords would lead to a Palestinian state, Israel has intensified settlement expansion in the occupied West Bank, particularly since the formation of the current far-right cabinet. All these factors point to one issue and that is the impossibility of a deal being in favor of Palestinians. 

Saab says “Iran also has to think twice about how Israel might react to even the attempt to resurrect its regional strategy.” However, Tehran’s response to Israeli provocations has been clear for over a year, any attack on Iran’s interests leads to retaliation. 

Contrary to Israeli actions, Iran's measured responses are not due to military concerns but rather reflect its defensive military doctrine—a fact often overlooked in Western assessments.

 Tehran does not seek regional war. Its doctrine which is based on two main pillars (inward and outward defense) has not wobbled despite being under constant attacks. Support for the Resistance Axis can be defined in outward defense and drone, missile advancements are in line with inward defense.

Should the regional status quo significantly change, Iran may employ alternative deterrent measures to counter threats to its national interests. This potential shift includes a reassessment of its nuclear doctrine, a subject of ongoing debate among Iranian scholars and policymakers.

 

Hezbollah confirms Hashem’s martyrdom

Hezbollah announced on Wednesday that Sayyed Hashem Safieddine, the head of the Lebanese resistance movement’s Executive Council, was martyred in an Israeli airstrike on Beirut earlier this month.

“We pledge to our great martyr and his martyred brothers to continue the path of resistance and jihad (struggle) until achieving its goals of freedom and victory,” Hezbollah said in a statement.

The Israeli army said on Tuesday that Safieddine was killed during a strike on October 04, 2024.

Safieddine was widely expected to be formally elected as the next Hezbollah leader after Israel assassinated Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah last month. 

Israel killed Nasrallah, who was the movement’s chief since 1992, in an airstrike on a neighborhood in southern Beirut on September 27, 2024.

US media acknowledged that Israel used American-made 900kg (2,000-pound) bombs in the strike that killed Nasrallah and levelled residential buildings in Beirut’s suburb of Dahieh.

Israel has killed multiple Hezbollah commanders amid the exchanges of fire with the resistance group since October 8, 2023. That is a day after Israel launched its war of genocide in Gaza. Hezbollah has carried out attacks against Israel in a show of solidarity with Palestinians in Gaza.

Israel also launched a massive bombing campaign in Lebanon on September 23 this year and launched a ground incursion into southern Lebanon on October 1.

Israel has killed about 2,500 people in Lebanon since October last year, including 1,800 in the past few weeks.

In response to Israel’s attacks, Hezbollah has intensified its retaliatory operations targeting strategic military sites in Tel Aviv and Haifa.  

The resistance movement’s reprisal strikes have spread a growing sense of panic among Israelis keeping the regime on its toes. 

No supporter of Palestinians except Iran

On Monday October 07, a year of Israeli genocide in Gaza will complete. A new front has been opened in Lebanon. Israel and Iran have attacked each other.

 Following are the takeaways from conflict: 1) Israel has emerged superior due to extensive support from the United States and European countries, 2) Iran has received many dents because of lack of support from other countries, 3) Iran is virtually alone, most of its missiles have been intercepted by Arab Muslim countries and 4) oil rich Arab countries are under the hegemony of United States and avoid even condemning Israel. 

Therefore, Iran has two option 1) accept Israel’s hegemony or 2) continue to support Palestinians and accept killing of its people.

The chances of getting any support from oil rich Arab countries are the least.

Israel bans UN chief in row over Iran

The Secretary General of the United Nations, António Guterres, has been banned from entering Israel over his response to Iran's ballistic missile bombardment.

In a statement, Israel's Foreign Minister Israel Katz called Guterres an "anti-Israel secretary general who lends support to terrorists".

Writing on social media site X, formerly Twitter, after Iran fired about 180 missiles into Israel, Guterres said he condemned "the broadening of the Middle East conflict with escalation after escalation" and said these "must stop".

He said the region "absolutely" needed a ceasefire, but did not specifically mention the Iran attack.

In a statement on Wednesday, Katz declared the UN secretary general persona non grata, saying that anyone who "cannot unequivocally condemn Iran's heinous attack on Israel does not deserve to step foot on Israeli soil".

He specifically criticized Guterres for "his anti-Israel policy since the beginning of the war".

Tuesday's attack by Iran is the latest in a series of escalations, starting almost a year ago with attacks on Israel by Hamas, and recently involving increased fighting between Iran-backed Hezbollah and Israel.

Israel launched a military campaign in Gaza in response to the unprecedented attack on southern Israel on October 07, 2023 by Hamas gunmen, during which about 1,200 people were killed and 251 taken hostage

Since the attack, a military campaign in Gaza has now killed a total of 41,689 people, according to the Hamas-run health ministry.

Over the course of the conflict, there have been a number of clashes between Israel and the United Nations about the situation in Gaza and the West Bank.

There has also been friction between Israel and the UN over the role of the UN agency for Palestinian refugees, UNRWA.

In January 2024, Israel alleged that a number of the agency's staff members had been involved in the October 07 attacks.

In response to this, the agency launched an investigation - with a number of its international funders withdrawing support for it, before later reinstating it. In August, nine staff members were dismissed over potential involvement in the attacks.

During the conflict, UNRWA has criticized Israel for air strikes in Gaza which have killed its staff members.