Ground Realities Trump Must Not Ignore

The sooner President Donald Trump understands the realities of war, the better it will be for him.

What began on February 28, 2026, as an unannounced offensive by the United States and Israel against Iran was projected as swift and decisive. Weeks later, despite a fragile truce, the strategic picture tells a different story. The Strait of Hormuz remains effectively constrained, global oil markets are unsettled, and the core objectives of the campaign appear only partially fulfilled.

The most telling gap is between rhetoric and results. Early signals from Washington hinted at regime destabilization in Tehran. Yet Iran’s leadership has adapted rather than collapsed, with continuity preserved at the top. Its nuclear capability, though impacted, is not eliminated. More significantly, Tehran retains its most potent lever—its ability to disrupt global energy flows through the Strait of Hormuz, a chokepoint for roughly one-fifth of the world’s oil supply.

The economic consequences have been immediate and far-reaching. Oil prices have surged, pushing US fuel costs sharply higher and straining global markets. Ironically, some of the worst-affected players are Washington’s own Arab allies, whose economic stability is closely tied to uninterrupted energy flows. A conflict that unsettles allies while failing to decisively weaken the adversary raises uncomfortable strategic questions.

At home, the political costs are mounting. The war has already cost American taxpayers at least US$25 billion, while public opinion has turned increasingly skeptical. A clear majority of Americans now view the conflict as a mistake. Against this backdrop, Trump’s escalating attacks on the media—labeling coverage as “seditious” or hostile—appear less like defiance and more like frustration. When expectations are set high and outcomes fall short, the narrative inevitably shifts.

There is also a historical echo worth noting. During the Vietnam War, early confidence gradually gave way to a recognition of stalemate, amplified by increasingly critical media coverage. While the current conflict is different in scale and context, the emerging pattern—bold claims, limited gains, and rising domestic unease—carries a familiar undertone.

Wars are not won through declarations but through outcomes. Assertions of victory carry little weight when strategic objectives remain elusive and costs continue to rise. The longer this gap between expectation and reality persists, the greater the political and economic toll.

The conclusion is unavoidable: the sooner Donald Trump understands the realities of war, the better it will be for him.

Power Without Leverage

The rhetoric attributed to Donald Trump—of unilateral victory, a prolonged blockade of the Strait of Hormuz, and forcing Iran into submission—reads less like strategy and more like illusion dressed as resolve.

Start with the claim of “victory.” Wars are not won by declaration. If anything, the gap between stated objectives and actual outcomes after US-Israeli strikes on Iran underscores a harsher truth: overwhelming power no longer guarantees decisive results. The superpower looks less triumphant and more constrained.

The blockade argument is equally flawed. Closing the Strait of Hormuz for months is not a show of strength—it is an invitation to escalation. Iran retains the means to retaliate asymmetrically, while Gulf states would be unwilling passengers in a conflict that directly threatens their economic lifelines. What begins as pressure quickly mutates into regional instability.

Then comes the oil calculus. Squeezing Iranian exports may sound tactically appealing, but it is strategically self-defeating. The immediate consequence would be tighter supply, higher prices, and global economic stress. Washington’s Arab partners, far from benefiting, would absorb the shock. Punishing Iran ends up punishing the system.

Most unrealistic, however, is the expectation of Iran’s unconditional surrender. Tehran’s track record suggests the opposite: pressure entrenches resistance. Escalation does not compel compliance; it erodes space for negotiation.

The underlying problem is not intent but misreading leverage. Coercion without credible endgames risks exposing limits rather than enforcing outcomes. Each additional threat weakens, rather than strengthens, the credibility of US strategy.

A sustainable path demands restraint, not bravado—consolidating ceasefire arrangements, reopening diplomatic channels, and allowing all sides a face-saving exit. Power, when detached from realism, ceases to be power at all; it becomes noise with consequences.

If Strait of Hormuz Blocked, Can Saudi Arab Overcome Oil Supply Crisis?

After 14/9 attacks on Aramco installations, some critics doubted the capacity of Saudi Arabia to guarantee adequate and uninterrupted oil flows to the market. The narrative of these analysts is not based on current situation but a temporary closure of the Strait of Hormuz, in case of a full blown war between Saudi Arab and Iran. They conclude, Saudi Arabia may be capable of doing a lot, but saving the global economy if the Gulf explodes is not one of its capabilities.

They say, Saudi Arab will not be able to keep the necessary crude oil and products volumes flowing to Asian and European markets in the case of blockade of Strait of Hormuz, even though Saudi Arab owns and operates a crude oil pipeline with a capacity of 5 million bpd, carrying crude 1,200 kilometers between the Arabian Gulf and Red Sea.

They also say, Saudi move to stabilize the current market is praiseworthy, especially just before the upcoming meeting of OPEC+ in Vienna. Saudi Arab has been saying that it is capable of supplying sufficient crude through the Red Sea, reiterating that the necessary pipeline and terminal infrastructure is there. These critics say, Saudi Arab can only assure its supply, which may be not higher this summer than around the level this pipeline can support. The real issue, if it comes to a full-blown conflict, is that not only Saudi oil is being threatened.

Reportedly, around 20 million bpd of crude and petroleum products are transported via the Strait of Hormuz, at present. Saudi exports are significant, but other countries include UAE, Iraq, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar and Iran, who will have to explore alternative routes. They warn, any military action in the region can cause a temporary disruption for all maritime traffic.

Besides the options that are the already on the table, such as the Saudi onshore pipeline and the UAE’s Fujairah pipeline, no other real alternatives are available, as overland trucking or rail transport is minimal. Transferring volumes via the Saudi and UAE’s pipelines is not an option at all, as the total capacity of the two is less than 10 million bpd, representing not even 50% of the current maritime flows through Hormuz. Another thing that should be noted is that pipelines can’t ship crude and crude products at the same time.

Another consequence of a blockade would be that most available VLCCs and other tankers will either be in the Persian Gulf and blocked or will not be able to be rerouted, before the market finds solution days and probably weeks will have gone by and a price spike for all products cannot be ruled out.

Only a few analysts are talking about oilfield security and pipeline availability. Any military advisor will put these options as part of his or her 1st phase military action plan. If Iran were to be attacked, or faces a surgical strike by an opponent, all Arab oil and gas infrastructure will become a legitimate offensive target, least in the eyes of Tehran and its proxies.

Looking at the majority of oil and gas production assets and infrastructure in the Arab world, especially in Saudi Arabia, UAE or even Iraq, everything is in reach of short-distance missiles, fighter jets, and even drones. Any move against Iran will result in a full-scale attack on Saudi’s Eastern Province, which produces 80% of all its oil and gas, Abu Dhabi’s offshore oil infrastructure and the regional pipelines. Looking at history, denying energy access and diminishing the opponent’s stability are on top of military strategy.

At present, oil market is a victim of geopolitical power projections of emotional leaders superseding rationality. The continuing references to Iran-Iraq tanker war during 1980-1988 is out of touch with reality. At this time, it is not going to be Iran denying support or trade with Iraq, but a possible Arab-Iranian confrontation, led by the US if no countermeasures are being implemented.