Ground Realities Trump Must Not Ignore

The sooner President Donald Trump understands the realities of war, the better it will be for him.

What began on February 28, 2026, as an unannounced offensive by the United States and Israel against Iran was projected as swift and decisive. Weeks later, despite a fragile truce, the strategic picture tells a different story. The Strait of Hormuz remains effectively constrained, global oil markets are unsettled, and the core objectives of the campaign appear only partially fulfilled.

The most telling gap is between rhetoric and results. Early signals from Washington hinted at regime destabilization in Tehran. Yet Iran’s leadership has adapted rather than collapsed, with continuity preserved at the top. Its nuclear capability, though impacted, is not eliminated. More significantly, Tehran retains its most potent lever—its ability to disrupt global energy flows through the Strait of Hormuz, a chokepoint for roughly one-fifth of the world’s oil supply.

The economic consequences have been immediate and far-reaching. Oil prices have surged, pushing US fuel costs sharply higher and straining global markets. Ironically, some of the worst-affected players are Washington’s own Arab allies, whose economic stability is closely tied to uninterrupted energy flows. A conflict that unsettles allies while failing to decisively weaken the adversary raises uncomfortable strategic questions.

At home, the political costs are mounting. The war has already cost American taxpayers at least US$25 billion, while public opinion has turned increasingly skeptical. A clear majority of Americans now view the conflict as a mistake. Against this backdrop, Trump’s escalating attacks on the media—labeling coverage as “seditious” or hostile—appear less like defiance and more like frustration. When expectations are set high and outcomes fall short, the narrative inevitably shifts.

There is also a historical echo worth noting. During the Vietnam War, early confidence gradually gave way to a recognition of stalemate, amplified by increasingly critical media coverage. While the current conflict is different in scale and context, the emerging pattern—bold claims, limited gains, and rising domestic unease—carries a familiar undertone.

Wars are not won through declarations but through outcomes. Assertions of victory carry little weight when strategic objectives remain elusive and costs continue to rise. The longer this gap between expectation and reality persists, the greater the political and economic toll.

The conclusion is unavoidable: the sooner Donald Trump understands the realities of war, the better it will be for him.

Power Without Leverage

The rhetoric attributed to Donald Trump—of unilateral victory, a prolonged blockade of the Strait of Hormuz, and forcing Iran into submission—reads less like strategy and more like illusion dressed as resolve.

Start with the claim of “victory.” Wars are not won by declaration. If anything, the gap between stated objectives and actual outcomes after US-Israeli strikes on Iran underscores a harsher truth: overwhelming power no longer guarantees decisive results. The superpower looks less triumphant and more constrained.

The blockade argument is equally flawed. Closing the Strait of Hormuz for months is not a show of strength—it is an invitation to escalation. Iran retains the means to retaliate asymmetrically, while Gulf states would be unwilling passengers in a conflict that directly threatens their economic lifelines. What begins as pressure quickly mutates into regional instability.

Then comes the oil calculus. Squeezing Iranian exports may sound tactically appealing, but it is strategically self-defeating. The immediate consequence would be tighter supply, higher prices, and global economic stress. Washington’s Arab partners, far from benefiting, would absorb the shock. Punishing Iran ends up punishing the system.

Most unrealistic, however, is the expectation of Iran’s unconditional surrender. Tehran’s track record suggests the opposite: pressure entrenches resistance. Escalation does not compel compliance; it erodes space for negotiation.

The underlying problem is not intent but misreading leverage. Coercion without credible endgames risks exposing limits rather than enforcing outcomes. Each additional threat weakens, rather than strengthens, the credibility of US strategy.

A sustainable path demands restraint, not bravado—consolidating ceasefire arrangements, reopening diplomatic channels, and allowing all sides a face-saving exit. Power, when detached from realism, ceases to be power at all; it becomes noise with consequences.

War May Pause Cracks Already Visible

The announcement of a ceasefire in the US–Israel war on Iran has been welcomed across the globe with a mix of relief and restraint. For now, the guns have fallen silent, markets have steadied, and fears of a wider regional conflagration have receded. But beneath the diplomatic optimism lies a harder truth - this is less a peace agreement and more a calculated pause.

In the United States, President Donald Trump has framed the ceasefire as a strategic success—asserting that American objectives were achieved without plunging into a prolonged war. Washington’s language also betrays caution, emphasizing that the truce is merely a window for negotiations, not an endgame.

For Iran, the ceasefire is being projected not as compromise but as resistance. Tehran’s messaging suggests a tactical pause while retaining strategic leverage—an indication that it sees the confrontation as far from over. Israel has signaled that the ceasefire does not necessarily extend to all fronts, particularly in Lebanon, underscoring the fragmented nature of the truce.

China and Russia have called for restraint and dialogue, though both remain critical of the escalation that preceded the ceasefire. Their position reflects a broader concern - unilateral military actions risk institutionalizing instability in an already volatile region.

Across Europe, the response has been two-tiered. Key states such as the Britain, France, and Germany have welcomed the ceasefire as a “step back from the brink.” At the same time, the European Union has formally urged all parties to honor the truce and convert it into a durable settlement, warning that only sustained diplomacy can prevent renewed escalation.

In the Gulf, reactions from Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Qatar reflect a different urgency. For these states, the ceasefire is not just about peace but about economic survival—protecting energy flows and regional stability.

Turkey has welcomed the ceasefire while warning against violations, positioning itself once again as a potential mediator in a fractured diplomatic landscape.

Pakistan has been credited with quietly facilitating the truce, underscoring its re-emerging diplomatic relevance.

India, for its part, has maintained a cautious stance—calling for restraint while carefully safeguarding its strategic interests.

Despite the near-universal welcome, the ceasefire remains fragile. Critical fault lines persist - competing narratives between Washington and Tehran, Israel’s selective interpretation of the truce, and unresolved proxy conflicts across the region. The continuation of hostilities beyond the core framework highlights a deeper reality—this agreement has paused escalation without resolving its causes.

What the world is witnessing is not the end of a conflict but the interruption of one. The relief is real—but the skepticism runs deeper.

The coming days will determine whether this ceasefire becomes a bridge to diplomacy or merely a prelude to the next round of confrontation. For now, the world watches—cautiously, and without illusion.

PSX benchmark index closes week slightly above 150,000 mark

Pakistan Stock Exchange (PSX) remained volatile throughout the week, primarily driven by evolving geopolitical tensions in the Middle East and sharp movements in international oil prices. The benchmark index declined by 1,309 points during the week to close at 150,399 points, leading to subdued market participation, with average daily traded volumes declining by 31%WoW to 604 million shares.

Positive sentiments in the first half of the week were supported by: 1) Pakistan-led diplomatic efforts fueling optimism for a possible de-escalation, 2) lower-than-expected increase in CPI to 7.3%YoY in March 2026, and 3) Pakistan securing Staff level agreement with IMF for US$1.2 billion. However, conflicting statements from Iran and the US, along with concerns over a possible ground invasion by the latter, created negative sentiment.

On the macroeconomic front, 2QFY26 GDP growth improved to 3.9%YoY as compared to 3.6%YoY in 1QFY26), while the trade deficit for March 2026 widened 4%YoY to US$2.7 billion.

Meanwhile, the government announced an increase in fuel prices, with HSD/MS rising by PKR184.5 and PKR137.2 per litre, respectively, after providing subsidies over the past 3 weeks.

On the sectoral front, OMC sales for March 2026 increased 19%YoY to 1.4 million tons, while cement offtakes rose 1%YoY during the same period.

Furthermore, T-Bill yields showed mixed movement, declining by 29/2bps for one-month and six-month papers, while three-month and twelve-month papers rose by 29bps and 25bps, respectively.

Other major news flow during the week included: 1) GoP secures Kuwait backing for fuel imports, 2) Pakistan, China release ‘five-point initiative’ to restore peace in the Middle East, 3) Pakistan, Afghan Taliban officials meet in China for ceasefire talks, 4) Iran allows 20 more Pak-flagged to pass through Hormuz, and 5) Foreign Exchange reserves held by State Bank of Pakistan increase by US$6 million to US$16.4 billion as of March 27, 2026.

Refinery, Woollen, and Transport emerged as top performing sectors, while Vanaspati & Allied Industries, Leather & Tanneries, and Cable & Electrical Goods were laggards.

Major selling was recorded by Mutual Funds with a net outflow of US$15.7 million, while Individuals absorbed most of the selling with a net buy of US$16.7 million.

Top performing scrips of the week were: TRG, CNERGY, ATRL, BAHL, and BAFL, while laggards included: SCBPL, GADT, KTML, SSOM, and PAEL.

According to AKD Securities, going forward, market sentiment will hinge on developments of the Middle East conflict. Concurrently, upcoming corporate results would also remain in the limelight as 3QFY26 results season approaches. Over the medium term, any de-escalation in the Middle East could spark a strong market rebound. The recent corrections have made valuations more attractive, with forward P/E now at 6.4x.

The brokerage house forecasts the KSE-100 Index to reach 263,800 by end December 2026.

Top picks of the brokerage house include: OGDC, PPL, UBL, MEBL, HBL, FFC, EN GROH, PSO, LUCK, FCCL, INDU, ILP and SYS.

Strait of Hormuz: Mandating Force, Manufacturing Legitimacy

The draft resolution before the United Nations Security Council, fronted by Bahrain, is not a neutral instrument to secure maritime trade—it is an attempt to manufacture legal cover for the use of force against Iran. Cloaked in the language of “defensive necessity,” it effectively authorizes escalation while evading the question that matters most, who set this crisis in motion?

The closure of the Strait of Hormuz did not occur in isolation. It followed coordinated strikes by the United States and Israel on Iranian territory—reportedly at a time when nuclear negotiations were still underway. That decision did not just derailed diplomacy; it rendered it irrelevant. Yet, the diplomatic narrative that followed has been predictably selective - Iran’s response is branded destabilizing, while the initiating use of force is quietly normalized.

This is not inconsistency—it is doctrine. The same Council that failed to act during the devastation of Gaza, paralyzed by repeated vetoes, now finds urgency in authorizing force under elastic terminology. “All defensive means necessary” is not a stabilizing clause; it is a blank cheque. Once endorsed, it lowers the threshold for military action under the imprimatur of international legitimacy.

Crucially, the façade of consensus is already cracking. China has warned that authorizing force would legitimize indiscriminate escalation. Russia and France have disrupted procedural unanimity, exposing the geopolitical fractures beneath the resolution. This is not collective security—it is contested power politics dressed up as multilateralism.

Meanwhile, Donald Trump continues to escalate rhetorically and militarily without presenting a credible pathway to reopening the Strait or stabilizing energy flows. Oil markets have already reacted, underscoring a simple truth: escalation without strategy is not deterrence—it is risk exported to the global economy.

Iran, hardened by decades of sanctions and isolation, is not capitulating—it is recalibrating. Its threat to restrict maritime passage is not an act of adventurism; it is leverage in the face of sustained pressure. To deny that context is to strip the crisis of causality and reduce diplomacy to theatre.

What is being constructed here is not a ceasefire framework but a hierarchy of compliance. The demand is not de-escalation—it is submission. And submission, when enforced through selective legality, does not produce stability; it breeds prolonged confrontation.

If adopted, this resolution will not secure the Strait of Hormuz. It will secure a precedent—one where force is legalized after the fact, where power dictates principle, and where the language of international order is repurposed to justify its erosion.

Why should world bear brunt of Trump’s miscalculation?

After reviewing reports of Donald Trump’s recent address to the American public, a number of observations emerge:

1. The president of a global superpower appears detached from ground realities, almost operating in a state of strategic illusion. Either he is not adequately heeding intelligence assessments, or those assessments themselves are failing him.
2. There is a persistent refusal to acknowledge that Iran has demonstrated considerable resilience—both as a state and as a military actor with indigenous capabilities. The stated objectives of regime change and meaningful degradation of its nuclear and missile assets remain largely unfulfilled.
3. His European allies are visibly reluctant to associate themselves with a war widely perceived as initiated under the influence of Benjamin Netanyahu. This hesitation underscores growing transatlantic unease.
4. While Trump may have managed to secure political loyalty at home to fend off institutional challenges, the broader sentiment within the United States is increasingly uneasy. Public discontent is no longer easy to contain.
5. The notion of occupying Kharg Island borders on strategic fantasy. Iran is not Venezuela; any such misadventure could prove disastrously costly, with airborne troops facing overwhelming resistance within hours rather than days.
6. Reports suggesting the withdrawal or repositioning of US naval assets reflect an uncomfortable reality: modern asymmetric warfare—particularly drone and missile capabilities—has altered the battlefield in Iran’s favor.
7. Even if financial resources—reportedly in the range of $200 billion—are available, the sustainability of logistics and supply chains remains questionable. Wars are not won by funding alone, but by operational continuity.

Recent reporting also indicates that while Trump claimed progress and “mission success,” he offered no clear exit strategy, even as global markets reacted negatively and oil prices surged amid fears of prolonged conflict.

Therefore, the insistence on Iran’s “unconditional surrender” appears increasingly detached from strategic reality. A more pragmatic course would be to engage with some of Tehran’s terms and seek an end to what is fast becoming a protracted and costly conflict.

Why should the global economy—and indeed the wider international community—be compelled to absorb the consequences of what increasingly resembles a strategic miscalculation driven by one leader, especially when that leader faces growing skepticism at home?

Ceasefire or Strategic Overreach? Washington’s Iran Dilemma

The confrontation between the United States and Iran has entered a familiar but dangerous phase: both sides speak of ceasefire, yet their conditions make peace increasingly elusive.

At the center of this standoff lies the Strait of Hormuz—a vital artery for global energy flows. Washington’s primary demand is its immediate reopening, coupled with far-reaching conditions: rollback of Iran’s nuclear program, curbs on its missile capabilities, and disengagement from regional allies. In effect, the United States is seeking not merely de-escalation, but a strategic reordering of Iran’s regional posture.

Tehran, unsurprisingly, views these demands as excessive. Its counter-conditions—cessation of attacks, guarantees against future aggression, and compensation for war damages—reflect a sovereignty-driven approach. Most critically, Iran insists on recognition of its authority over Hormuz, transforming a geographic chokepoint into a symbol of national leverage.

This divergence reflects a deeper divide. The United States frames the ceasefire in terms of global security and stability; Iran frames it in terms of sovereignty and deterrence. Each side demands that the other act first—Washington insisting on compliance before relief, and Tehran demanding guarantees before concessions.

It is within this context that the strategy of President Donald Trump invites scrutiny. By advancing what appears to be a maximalist framework, Washington risks conflating ceasefire with capitulation. Such an approach may project strength, but it also narrows the diplomatic space necessary for de-escalation.

There is also a structural contradiction. While the United States seeks secure and uninterrupted maritime flows, its pressure-heavy strategy may incentivize Iran to tighten, rather than loosen, its grip over the Strait. The sequencing problem—each side waiting for the other to move first—has effectively locked diplomacy in place.

Ultimately, the trajectory of this conflict suggests that both Washington and Tehran may be overestimating what force alone can achieve. While US strategy risks prolonging a conflict it seeks to shape, Iran too faces economic strain and the long-term costs of sustained confrontation.

What is increasingly evident is that neither side is positioned for a clear or lasting victory. Instead, the burden is shifting outward. Energy markets remain unsettled, trade flows uncertain, and inflationary pressures persistent—leaving much of the global economy to absorb the consequences of a conflict it neither initiated nor controls.

If this impasse endures, the outcome may not be defined by who wins the war, but by who best avoids its costs. And on that count, the rest of the world may already be losing.

 

Unlocking The Strait of Hormuz Requires Diplomacy, Not Escalation

The latest confrontation in the Gulf has pushed the region into one of its most dangerous moments in recent decades. The joint military assault by the United States and Israel on Iran—reportedly carried out while negotiations on Tehran’s nuclear program were still underway—has dramatically escalated tensions. Matters deteriorated further after the killing of Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei, an event Tehran considers an unprecedented attack on its sovereignty and political system.

Iran’s retaliation was swift and calculated. It launched strikes against American military installations located in neighboring Arab states and moved to restrict shipping through the strategically vital Strait of Hormuz. This narrow waterway remains one of the most critical arteries of global energy trade, with a substantial portion of the world’s oil shipments passing through it every day. By tightening control over this chokepoint, Tehran has effectively reminded the world that instability in the Gulf carries immediate and significant global economic consequences.

The debate now dominating diplomatic circles is simple: how can the Strait of Hormuz be unlocked?

The answer lies less in military maneuvering and more in political realism. History repeatedly demonstrates that escalating force in the Middle East rarely produces lasting stability. Instead, it deepens mistrust and widens the scope of conflict. Continued military pressure on Iran will likely provoke further retaliation, potentially dragging the entire region into a broader confrontation.

A more pragmatic path is available. The United States and Israel should immediately halt further assaults on Iranian territory and create space for diplomatic engagement. Reviving negotiations on Iran’s nuclear program could provide the first step toward rebuilding communication channels that have now been severely damaged.

Equally important is a removal of the sanctions imposed on Iran. Immediate withdrawal of some of the sanctions could offer incentives for de-escalation while restoring confidence in the diplomatic process.

Ultimately, reopening the Strait of Hormuz will not be achieved through warships or airstrikes. It requires restraint, dialogue, and a recognition that enduring security in the Gulf can only emerge from diplomacy rather than confrontation.

Time Is on Iran’s Side

Despite the overwhelming military might of the United States and Israel, time may ultimately favor Iran in the ongoing conflict, as mounting political and economic pressures strain the Trump administration.

Since launching Operation Epic Fury, US forces have reportedly struck some 6,000 Iranian targets, damaging naval vessels, missile launch sites, and other military infrastructure. The US Central Command says more than 90 Iranian vessels have been neutralized. Experts argue that Iran anticipated such attacks and structured its defense around confronting conventionally superior foes.

Analysts note that Iran is deliberately prolonging the conflict, betting it can endure military pressure longer than the US can withstand domestic political fallout. Rising oil prices, disruptions in global energy markets, and attacks on US allies in the Gulf have intensified the economic and diplomatic costs of the war. The closure of the Strait of Hormuz has pushed oil prices near US$100 per barrel, adding further pressure on the global economy.

Military analysts suggest that Iran’s definition of victory is simple - survival. Removing the current leadership in Tehran would require far greater military commitment than the United States has so far deployed. Pentagon officials reported that the war cost over $11.3 billion in just the first six days. The conflict has also taken a human toll - seven American service members have died, and roughly 140 have been wounded.

In his first statement as Iran’s new supreme leader, Mojtaba Khamenei vowed to keep the Strait of Hormuz closed and continue military pressure on regional adversaries. The US is considering naval escorts for oil tankers through the waterway. Analysts warn that as the conflict drags on, rising economic costs, political divisions in Washington, and potential casualties could erode domestic support for what some critics describe as an “optional war.”

While US and Israeli forces dominate tactically, Iran’s endurance strategy could make the political and economic cost of the conflict unsustainable for the United States, leaving the regime in Tehran intact and the strategic balance in the Gulf uncertain.

Dollar Bomb Ticking Faster and Louder

When I uploaded my post “Dollar Bomb Can Burst Any Time” on August 24, 2020, only a few took it seriously. Five years later, the warning sounds louder — and far more credible — as de-dollarization gains momentum across continents. The same excesses once confined to American finance have now evolved into a global geopolitical fault line. 

The warning signs are flashing brighter than ever. The scale of money creation in the United States has reached alarming proportions. With public debt now exceeding US$35 trillion and fiscal deficits continuing to mount, the Federal Reserve faces a trap of its own making. Keeping interest rates high risks plunging the economy into recession, while lowering them could reawaken inflation. Either way, the era of cheap money that once fueled global dominance of the dollar is drawing to a close.

Now critics openly say that the so-called “resilient” US economy rests on shaky foundations. Growth is being financed not by productivity, but by unprecedented monetary expansion. More than 60 cents of every dollar the federal government spends is borrowed or printed. This illusion of prosperity masks structural decay — the same speculative excesses and fiscal irresponsibility that triggered the 2008 financial crisis, now magnified many times over.

The repercussions are no longer confined to American borders. A growing number of countries are openly challenging the dollar’s hegemony. The BRICS alliance — now expanded to include energy-rich nations like Saudi Arabia and the UAE — is laying the groundwork for a new trade settlement system that bypasses the US financial network. China is leading the charge, pushing for the yuan in energy transactions and bilateral trade, while Russia and Iran have turned to local currency arrangements to circumvent sanctions.

The Gulf states, long considered the backbone of the petrodollar system, are quietly rethinking their dependence on the greenback. Deals between Beijing and Riyadh to price oil in yuan have sent shockwaves through Washington. Once the world’s major energy producers start accepting payments in other currencies, the dollar’s status as the global reserve currency will erode faster than expected.

The US, meanwhile, continues to export inflation through its fiscal recklessness. Ordinary Americans face rising living costs, while policymakers keep resorting to debt-financed spending. Analysts warn that if confidence in the dollar falters, the US could face a sovereign debt crisis of its own — one that no amount of printing can avert. When foreign creditors and central banks begin to question Washington’s ability to repay without devaluation, the “safe haven” myth collapses.

Gold purchases by central banks have surged to multi-decade highs, underscoring a quiet but steady return to real assets. The shift is not just financial — it is geopolitical. The world’s emerging powers are building an alternative order that no longer depends on US control of money, trade, or technology.

If the dollar bomb bursts, the consequences will be global and enduring. Markets will convulse, commodities will reprice, and the old financial hierarchy will crumble. The illusion of endless American solvency will fade — replaced by a multipolar monetary world, one no longer bound by the dictates of Washington.

PSX benchmark index closes at all-time high

Pakistan Stock Exchange (PSX) sustained its bullish momentum throughout the week. The benchmark index closed the week at all-time high of 131,949 points on Friday, July 04, 2025.

Market participation increased as well, with average daily traded volumes increasing by 31.4%WoW to 967 million shares, up from 736 million shares a week ago.

Market participation improved due to increase in withholding tax (WHT) on profit/ interest from savings and fixed deposits to 20%, while it remained unchanged at 15% for equity investments in the recently approved Finance act, triggering a reallocation of funds, driving flows into the stock market.

Optimism was further supported by a strong external position amid Pakistan receiving a US$3.4 billion loan roll-over from China, in addition to finalizing another US$1.0 billion loan from a Middle Eastern commercial bank and US$500 million from multilateral financing.

These inflows spiked foreign exchange reserves held by State Bank of Pakistan (SBP) to US$14.5 billion by end-June 2025. The SBP was able to meet its goal of closing FY25 at the US$14 billion mark.

PKR remained stable against the greenback throughout the week, closing at PKR283.97/US$.

On the macroeconomic front, trade deficit for June 2025 was recorded at US$2.3 billion, taking FY25 trade deficit to US$26.3 billion, up 9%YoY.

Inflation for June 2025 was recorded at 3.2%YoY as compared to 3.5%YoY for May, taking FY25 inflation to 4.5%YoY.

Cement sales for FY25 were reported at 46.2 million tons, up 2%YoY, driven by higher exports.

OMC offtakes for FY25 grew to 16.3 million tons, up 7%YoY.

Other major news flow during the week included: 1) SBP buys US$6.8 billion from market and 2) Aurangzeb advances strategic partnerships on sidelines of Fourth International Conference for Financing Development in Spain.

Commercial Banks, Textile Spinning, Insurance, and Miscellaneous, were amongst the top performing sectors, while Woollen, Jute, Glass & Ceramics, and Leasing Companies were amongst the worst performers.

Major buying of US$22.2 million was recorded by Mutual Funds. Foreigners were net seller during the week, with a net sell of US$15.3 million.

Top performing scrips of the week were: GADT, AICL, and FABL, while laggards included:  BNWM, GHGL, and PGLC.

According to AKD Securities, the market is expected to remain positive in the coming weeks, with forward inflation for FY26 projected at 4.4%YoY, indicating substantial room for monetary easing, which would serve as a catalyst for equities.

The benchmark index is anticipated to remain on upward trajectory, primarily driven by strong earnings in Fertilizers, sustained ROEs in Banks, and improving cash flows of E&Ps and OMCs, benefiting from falling interest rates and economic stability.

The top picks of the brokerage house include: OGDC, PPL, PSO, FFC, ENGROH, MCB, HBL, LUCK, FCCL, INDU, and SYS

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Pakistan: Central Bank Reduces Policy Rate

The State Bank of Pakistan (SBP) announced its monetary policy statement today (September 12, 2024) decreasing the policy rate by 200bps to 17.5%. After the announcement, the SBP Governor made the following remarks in the analyst briefing:

The SBP's policy rate decision is influenced by a greater than expected decline in inflation and favorable trends in global oil and food prices. However, given the uncertain nature of these developments, the committee has adopted a cautious stance.

Real interest rates remain sufficiently positive to achieve the SBP's medium-term inflation target of up to 7%.

The SBP is not focused on a specific interest rate level but considers various factors, including the external account and future inflation, when making rate decisions.

Governor was hopeful that the IMF board will review Pakistan’s agenda for the approval of the 37-month Extended Fund Facility (EFF) program this month, as the government has secured all required external financing assurances.

Moving forward, the SBP will publish semi-annual data on central bank interventions in currency markets, as well as projections for foreign exchange reserves and upcoming debt obligations over the next six months.

Data on currency market interventions will be published with a three-month lag due to the sensitivity of the information.

In June 2024, the SBP purchased US$573 million from the open market.

By the end of March 2025, country’s foreign exchange reserves are projected to reach US$12.0 billion despite debt repayments.

The government is obligated to pay US$14.2 billion by March 2025, of which US$8.3 billion will be rolled over, while the remaining amount consists of debt repayments.

To date, the government has cleared US$4 billion in debt, including US$2.3 billion in rollovers. The remaining debt repayments of US$5.8 billion will be spread evenly until March 2025.

For FY24, the government has US$26 billion in debt obligations, including US$12 billion in rollovers and US$4 billion in commercial bilateral loans, which are also expected to be rolled over.

Of the US$8.3 billion repayments due this year, US$1.7 billion has already been settled.

According to audited accounts, the SBP earned a profit of PKR2.5 trillion in FY24 and is expected to disburse this amount as a dividend to the government in the coming days.

Non-oil imports are at levels seen in FY22 and early FY23, with the reduction primarily driven by a significant decline in oil imports.

 

 

Resilience of Russian Economy, beyond doubt

Bloomberg reports that Russian government has touted robust domestic demand in boosting its 2024 growth forecast on Tuesday. While some might be tempted to dismiss the move as geopolitical bravado in the face of the US stepping up Ukraine aid, Russian economic strength is real.

In fact, Moscow’s new 2.8% GDP projection weighs in under the IMF’s latest ‑ also upgraded forecast, of 3.2%, released last week.

It might be tempting to put this resilience down to a massive defense build-up. But the Washington-based IMF had much the same assessment as President Vladimir Putin’s team: a strong job market and swift wage rises are helping to power consumer spending. The fund even cautioned “there are some signs of overheating,” with unemployment at a record low.

What about all the Western sanctions, the mass emigration of Russian talent and the departure of a number of global corporate giants? Alexander Isakov at Bloomberg Economics offers some insight.

The sanctions on Russian energy aren’t as tight as they were for, say, Venezuela and Iran, thanks in large part to the West not wanting to worsen its own cost-of-living shock with a further surge in oil prices.

Some financial sanctions had already been imposed in 2014 after the Crimea invasion, and Russia had already amortized that cost.

Russian households remain confident thanks to a tight labor market, with the jobless rate at 2.8%. A largely voluntary military recruitment model, using monetary incentives, has let consumers keep calm and carry on.

Since some large multinationals have stayed in place, will Russia’s economy just keep on ticking?

Isakov notes that part of job market’s tightness is indeed a side effect of fiscal outlays tied to the war, funded in part by energy exports. Moscow needs crude prices to stay around the current US$90 a barrel levels to keep the budget balanced — a slump to, say, US$60 could make things difficult.

The IMF sees growth slowing to 1.8% next year, and cautioned that Russia’s potential growth rate has dropped to around 1.25% from 1.7% before the war.

This would mean that Russia’s income per capita may no longer converge toward Western European levels in the medium to long term, but for now, Russia’s chugging right along

 

Transition from OPEC to OPEC Plus

OPEC was founded in 1960 in Baghdad by Iraq, Iran, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Venezuela with an aim of coordinating petroleum policies and securing fair and stable prices. Now, it includes 13 countries, which are mainly from the Middle East and Africa. They produce around 30% of the world's oil.

There have been some challenges to OPEC's influence over the years, often resulting in internal divisions, and a global push towards cleaner energy sources and a move away from fossil fuels could ultimately diminish its dominance.

OPEC became OPEC Plus in 2016 after joining hands with 10 of the world's major non-OPEC members, including Russia.

OPEC+ Plus represents around 40% of world oil production and its main objective is to regulate the supply of oil to the world market. The leaders are Saudi Arabia and Russia, which produce around 10 million barrels per day (bpd) of oil each.

OPEC member states' exports make up around 60% of global petroleum trade. In 2021, OPEC estimated that its member countries accounted for more than 80% of the world's proven oil reserves.

Because of the large market share, the OPEC decisions affect oil prices. Its members meet regularly to decide how much oil to sell on global markets.

As a result, when they lower supply when demand falls, oil prices tend to rise. Prices tend to fall when the group decides to supply more oil to the market.

On April 02, 2023 OPEC Plus agreed to deepen crude oil production cuts to 3.66 million barrels per day (bpd) or 3.7% of global demand, until the end of 2023, which helped to push up oil prices by about US$9 a barrel to above US$87 per barrel over the following days, but Brent prices have since lost those gains.

During the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, Arab members of OPEC imposed an embargo against the United States in retaliation for its decision to re-supply the Israeli military, as well as other countries that supported Israel. The embargo banned petroleum exports to those nations and introduced cuts in oil production.

The oil embargo pressured an already strained US economy which had grown dependent on imported oil. Oil prices jumped, causing high fuel costs for consumers and fuel shortages in the United States. The embargo also brought the United States and other countries to the brink of a global recession.

In 2020, during COVID-19 lockdowns around the world, crude oil prices slumped. After that development, OPEC Plus slashed oil production by 10 million barrels a day, which is equivalent to around 10% of global production, to try to bolster prices.

The current members of OPEC are: Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Iraq, Iran, Algeria, Angola, Libya, Nigeria, Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon and Venezuela.

Non-OPEC countries in the global alliance of OPEC Plus are represented by Russia, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Bahrain, Brunei, Malaysia, Mexico, Oman, South Sudan and Sudan.

OPEC to welcome Iran’s return to oil market

OPEC will welcome Iran’s full return to the oil market when sanctions are lifted, the secretary general of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) told the Iranian oil ministry's website SHANA on Monday.

Iran is an OPEC member, although its oil exports are subject to US sanctions aimed at curbing Tehran's nuclear program.

Secretary General Haitham Al Ghais, who is visiting Tehran for the first time, added that Iran has the capacity to bring on significant production volumes within a short period of time.

"We believe that Iran is a responsible player amongst its family members, the countries in the OPEC group. I’m sure there will be good work together, in synchronization, to ensure that the market will remain balanced as OPEC has continued to do over the past many years," SHANA's English-language website cited him as saying.

Asked about OPEC’s voluntary production cut and its effect on oil prices, Ghais said, "In OPEC...we don’t target a certain price level. All our actions, all our decisions are made in order to have a good balance between global oil demand and global oil supply."

In a surprise move in early April, Saudi Arabia and other members of OPEC Plus, which comprises OPEC and allies including Russia, announced further oil output cuts of around 1.2 million barrels per day, bringing the total volume of cuts by OPEC Plus to 3.66 million barrels per day, according to Reuters calculations.

Saudi Arabia, the kingpin of OPEC, and Iran announced in March that they would restore diplomatic relations after years of hostility, in a deal brokered by China, the world's second largest oil consumer.

US House committee to consider bill on pressuring OPEC

The House Judiciary Committee was set to consider a bill on Wednesday to pressure the OPEC oil production group to stop making output cuts that can result in higher fuel prices for US drivers.

The committee was expected to vote on No Oil Producing and Exporting Cartels (NOPEC) bill, which would change US antitrust law to revoke the sovereign immunity that has protected OPEC Plus members and their national oil companies from lawsuits over price collusion. OPEC Plus members include Saudi Arabia and Russia.

In March, a group of bipartisan senators introduced a similar bill in the Senate.

Analysts were skeptical that the NOPEC bill would pass Congress while oil prices were relatively low as the market fears a recession.

"House Judiciary Committee passage of NOPEC is more a biennial tradition than a sign of momentum," Rapidan Energy Group said in a note to clients. The committee has passed the bill in 2018, 2019 and 2021, Rapidan said.

The bill would have to pass the committees, both chambers of Congress and be signed by President Joe Biden to become law.

 

Pakistan: OGDC profit down 22%QoQ

Pakistan’s largest exploration and production company, Oil & Gas Development Company (OGDC) has reported its 2QFY23 financial results, posting profit after tax of PKR 41.7 billion (EPS: PKR9.70), lower by 22%QoQ, higher by 18%YoY.

Net sales were PKR97.2 billion for the period, down 8.3%QoQ but up 22%YoY basis, mainly on the back of declining oil prices (down 15%QoQ) during the period. Overall, total hydrocarbon production declined by 1.7% during the quarter.

Exploration expenses were reported at PKR5.1 billion on account of two dry wells: Shahpurabad-1 (OGDCL stake: 50%) and Sundha Thal-1 (OGDCL stake: 50%).

Furthermore, operating expenses increased to PKR21.4 billion (up 15%QoQ) from PKR18.63 billion in the previous quarter.

Finance & other income for the quarter were reported at PKR9.2 billion, likely due to higher income on lease holdings and bank deposits.

Along with the result, company also announced an interim cash dividend of PKR2.25/share, taking total 1HFY23 dividend payout to PKR4.0/share.

 

Xi calls for oil trade in yuan

President Xi Jinping told Gulf Arab leaders that China would work to buy oil and gas in yuan, a move that would support Beijing's goal to establish its currency internationally and weaken the US dollar's grip on world trade.

Xi was speaking in Saudi Arabia where Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman hosted two milestone Arab summits with the Chinese leader which showcased the powerful prince's regional heft as he courts partnerships beyond close historic ties with the West.

Top oil exporter Saudi Arabia and economic giant China both sent strong messages during Xi's visit on non-interference at a time when Riyadh's relationship with Washington has been tested over human rights, energy policy and Russia.

Any move by Saudi Arabia to ditch the dollar in its oil trade would be a seismic political move, which Riyadh had previously threatened in the face of possible US legislation exposing OPEC members to antitrust lawsuits.

China's growing influence in the Gulf has unnerved the United States. Deepening economic ties were touted during Xi's visit, where he was greeted with pomp and ceremony and met with Gulf states and attended a wider summit with leaders of Arab League countries spanning the Gulf, Levant and Africa.

At the start of Friday's talks, Prince Mohammed heralded a historic new phase of relations with China, a sharp contrast with the awkward US-Saudi meetings five months ago when President Joe Biden attended a smaller Arab summit in Riyadh.

Asked about his country's relations with Washington in light of the warmth shown to Xi, Foreign Minister Prince Faisal bin Farhan Al Saud said Saudi Arabia would continue to work with all its partners. "We don't see this as a zero sum game," he said.

"We do not believe in polarization or in choosing between sides," the prince told a news conference after the talks.

Though Saudi Arabia and China signed several strategic and economic partnership deals, analysts said relations would remain anchored mostly by energy interests, though Chinese firms have made forays into technology and infrastructure sectors.

"Energy concerns will remain front and centre of relations," Robert Mogielnicki, senior resident scholar at the Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington, told Reuters.

The Chinese and Saudi governments will also be looking to support their national champions and other private sector actors to move forward with trade and investment deals. There will be more cooperation on the tech side of things too, prompting familiar concerns from Washington."

Saudi Arabia agreed a memorandum of understanding with Huawei this week on cloud computing and building high-tech complexes in Saudi cities. The Chinese tech giant has participated in building 5G networks in Gulf states despite US concerns over a possible security risk in using its technology.

Saudi Arabia and its Gulf allies have defied US pressure to limit dealings with China and break with fellow OPEC Plus oil producer Russia over its invasion of Ukraine, as they try to navigate a polarized world order with an eye on national economic and security interests.

Riyadh is a top oil supplier to China and the two countries reaffirmed in a joint statement the importance of global market stability and energy collaboration, while striving to boost non-oil trade and enhance cooperation in peaceful nuclear power

Xi said Beijing would continue to import large quantities of oil from Gulf Arab countries and expand imports of liquefied natural gas, adding that their countries were natural partners who would cooperate further in upstream oil and gas development.

China would also make full use of the Shanghai Petroleum and National Gas Exchange as a platform to carry out yuan settlement of oil and gas trade, he said.

Beijing has been lobbying for use of its yuan currency in trade instead of the U.S. dollar.

A Saudi source, speaking before Xi's visit, told Reuters that a decision to sell small amounts of oil in yuan to China could make sense in order to pay Chinese imports directly, but it is not yet the right time.

Most of Saudi Arabia's assets and reserves are in dollars including more than US$120 billion of US Treasuries that Riyadh holds, and the Saudi riyal, like other Gulf currencies, is pegged to the dollar.

Earlier, the Chinese leader said his visit heralded a new era in relations, voicing hope the Arab summits would become "milestone events in the history of China-Arab relations".

 

Interruption in Libyan oil supply: A cause of concern or bluff only

Contrary to the wishes of US fund managers price of crude oil could not be jacked up. The United States caused a war like situation in Ukraine to keep oil prices at an elevated level. When the strategy failed US supported forces in Libya caused virtual shut down of production and loading facilities.

I have preferred to term this strategy a bluff only because Libya’s share in global oil markets is paltry. Export or no export is hardly of any consequence. Dissemination of such reports by the Western media facilitates the fund managers to drive the market and make windfall profit.

 Reportedly, Libyan National Oil Company (NOC) has declared force majeure on another key Libyan oil field, the 300,000 bpd Al Sharara, amid protests that had shut down production at two ports and the El Feel oilfield on Sunday.

NOC said, “A group of individuals put pressure on workers in the Al-Sharara oil field and forced them to gradually shut down production and made it impossible for the NOC to implement its contractual obligations”. 

The NOC said it was “obliged” to declare a state of force majeure on Al Sharara “until further notice”. 

Al-Sharara is Libya’s biggest oilfield, and the move effectively suspended all Libyan oil production and exports. 

On Sunday, the NOC said that loadings of crude oil at two Libyan ports had been suspended amid anti-government protests that were interfering with oil industry operations.

Loading from the Mellita terminal was suspended following a shut down in production at the El Feel oil field, with the NOC stating that individuals were preventing the field’s workers from continuing production. 

Also on Sunday, the NOC shut down operations at the Zueitina export terminal over protests calling for the resignation of incumbent Prime Minister Abdul Hamid Dbeibah.  

The NOC has been eyeing a ramp-up in production to 1.4 million bpd for Libya, but a new political battle is setting the stage for potential return to civil war. Libya has been producing around 1million bpd since the beginning of this year. 

Two rival governments have now emerged in Libya, with incumbent Prime Minister Deibah refusing to step down for newly sworn-in eastern Prime Minister Fathi Bashaga, who last week said his forces would take over the capital Tripoli peacefully. 

The latest protests that have led to force majeure appear to be engineered by supporters of the Bashaga to gain control of the oil industry from supporters of the incumbent Dbeibah. 

Early on Monday, the initial force majeure declarations pushed oil prices higher, with Brent trading above US$111 per barrel.

With the latest force majeure declaration for Al-Sharara, oil prices are pushing higher still, with Brent at US$113 at the time of writing and WTI above US$108. 

 

Saudi Arabia chooses Putin over Biden on Ukraine to keep oil Prices high

I have selected an article by David Ottaway dated March 02, 2022 and want to share it with readers of my blogs.  This may help them understand that the United States and Saudi Arabia don’t share ‘same oil policy’. 

In my opinion only United States can be held responsible for the widening breach between the two countries. 

Saudi Arabia has decided to side with Russia and spurn cries of United States for help as the Ukraine crisis sends the price of oil sky high even though it is the only country with sufficient spare oil production to stop the spiraling to its highest level in eight years. 

Saudi Arabia, Russia, and the United States are the world’s top three oil exporters, supplying collectively 30% of world demand. But Saudi Arabia is the only one with the capacity to increase production quickly, by as much as two million barrels per day, more or less immediately.

The Saudi government has come under increasing pressure from US President Joe Biden to use its leverage to lower prices. But the Saudi de facto ruler, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MBS), has just re- committed to working with Russia to keep them high. Prices have reached over US$100/barrel; up dramatically from the onset of the coronavirus pandemic two years ago, when prices at one point in April 2020 fell below zero.

The crown prince clearly feels he owes nothing personally to President Biden, who has refused to talk to him due to their falling out over the former’s involvement in the assassination of the prominent Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi.

Saudi Arabia has shown less and less interest in cooperating with the United States on oil matters as it has become a rival oil exporter to the Saudi kingdom.   The US companies presently export around three million barrels a day as compared to Saudi Arabia’s 6.8 million barrels. But they currently produce roughly a million barrels more because the Saudis deliberately limit their output to keep upward pressure on prices.

On the other hand, oil has brought MBS and Russian President Vladimir Putin closer than ever before – at least on oil matters. Saudi Arabia and Russia each lead a group of oil producers that have figured out how to work together to keep prices high.  The former heads the 13-Member Organization of Oil Exporting Countries (OPEC) and the latter a grouping of ten non-OPEC producers.  Together, they are referred to as OPEC+ Plus.

The Saudi prince’s siding with Putin over Biden has also been reflected in Saudi silence on the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This may be partly explained by Saudi Arabia’s own invasion of neighboring Yemen. Both leaders have said their action was motivated by historic ties and national security concerns.

At an emergency meeting Wednesday, the 23 producers voted to stick to their plan to increase their collective production by only 400,000 more barrels a day each month. By this they signaled no interest in seeing prices fall or in coming to the rescue of Western European nations facing a drop in their Russian oil imports, which account for about 30% of their total consumption.    

When it comes to oil, US-Saudi relations have turned from being more or less cooperative to outright antagonistic as the US companies have developed new methods of extracting oil and gas from shale deposits known as fracking. 

This has seen US crude oil production shoot up from 5.2 million barrels a day in 2005 to more than 12 million barrels just before the pandemic cratered the world economy in early 2020. 

This happened just as Saudi Arabia and Russia were in a standoff over increasing production. In a power play, the Saudis decided in March of that year to swamp the market with more oil to force its will on Russia, increasing their production from 9.7 million barrels a day to 12.3 million.

At the same time, they decided to try to put those US companies involved in fracking out of business.  In March 2020, they hired twenty supertankers carrying 40 million barrels of oil to the United States where it was dumped on an already saturated market. Its effect was dramatic.

On April 20, 2020 the price for a barrel of oil on the New York Mercantile Exchange actually fell to negative US$37.63, a theretofore unheard of low. The oil dump plus the pandemic-induced recession achieved the Saudi objective, scores of small fracking companies went out of business and US production dropped by more than two million barrels a day.

Biden even made a rare phone call to King Salman in early February to plead his case for more Saudi oil.

Ever since, the Saudi crown prince and his oil minister, Prince Abdulaziz bin Salman, who is his half-brother, have chosen to work with Russia and OPEC+ Plus over heeding any pleas for help from the White House. Even before the Ukraine crisis, Biden was pressing Saudi Arabia to open up its oil spigot to help relieve the ever-rising price of gasoline in the United States – one of the main causes of high inflation helping to undermine his standing in the polls. Biden even made a rare phone call to King Salman in early February to plead his case for more Saudi oil. According to the White House account of their conversation, the two leaders committed to ensuring the stability of global energy supplies.

A week later, the Saudi Oil Minister made clear his country was sticking to the agreement first worked out in July 2021 among the 23 members of OPEC+ to slowly only restore their monthly collective production at the rate of 400,000 more barrels a day. This agreement has been renewed again and again ever since.

At its meeting which lasted just 15 minutes, OPEC Plus issued a statement washing its hands of any responsibility for spiraling oil prices.  It declared the oil market well-balanced and blamed the volatility in prices on current geopolitical developments. There was no mention of Ukraine.