Iran’s economy has certainly suffered. Years of sanctions
have produced weak growth and high inflation, while the war has damaged
critical industrial facilities and disrupted trade through the Strait of
Hormuz. The IMF has estimated a sharp contraction in Iranian GDP, while
inflation and currency depreciation have reached alarming levels. Yet economic
pain has not translated into political surrender. Iranian businesses have spent
years adapting to sanctions, maintaining substantial inventories and developing
alternative trade channels. These practices have provided a degree of
resilience even as supply chains and maritime trade have come under severe
pressure.
Trump’s repeated appeals to Iranians to rise against their
government may also be producing the opposite effect. External pressure can
deepen public grievances, but it can simultaneously strengthen nationalist
sentiment and resistance to perceived foreign interference. Iran’s leadership
has demonstrated an ability to transfer much of the economic burden onto
ordinary citizens while preserving the state’s capacity to resist.
There is another, potentially more consequential, dimension.
Iranian attacks on US military facilities in Gulf countries have forced Arab
states to reconsider the assumptions underlying their security arrangements. If
the American military presence cannot prevent attacks on regional assets,
questions naturally arise over whether Washington’s security architecture
primarily serves Arab interests or Israel.
The Strait of Hormuz presents an equally serious dilemma.
Disruptions may constrain Iranian oil exports, but Arab economies are also
exposed through attacks on energy infrastructure, US-linked assets and reduced
energy exports. A wider disruption extending toward the Red Sea, particularly
through Houthi action, could impose an even heavier cost on regional economies.
The paradox is becoming increasingly clear - Washington may
be capable of inflicting enormous pain on Iran, but pain alone has not
delivered submission. Donald Trump’s imprudent policies may therefore be making
Iran a “Bigger Phantom”—not necessarily more powerful, but more resilient, more
unpredictable and increasingly costly to contain.


















