Ceasefire or Strategic Overreach? Washington’s Iran Dilemma

The confrontation between the United States and Iran has entered a familiar but dangerous phase: both sides speak of ceasefire, yet their conditions make peace increasingly elusive.

At the center of this standoff lies the Strait of Hormuz—a vital artery for global energy flows. Washington’s primary demand is its immediate reopening, coupled with far-reaching conditions: rollback of Iran’s nuclear program, curbs on its missile capabilities, and disengagement from regional allies. In effect, the United States is seeking not merely de-escalation, but a strategic reordering of Iran’s regional posture.

Tehran, unsurprisingly, views these demands as excessive. Its counter-conditions—cessation of attacks, guarantees against future aggression, and compensation for war damages—reflect a sovereignty-driven approach. Most critically, Iran insists on recognition of its authority over Hormuz, transforming a geographic chokepoint into a symbol of national leverage.

This divergence reflects a deeper divide. The United States frames the ceasefire in terms of global security and stability; Iran frames it in terms of sovereignty and deterrence. Each side demands that the other act first—Washington insisting on compliance before relief, and Tehran demanding guarantees before concessions.

It is within this context that the strategy of President Donald Trump invites scrutiny. By advancing what appears to be a maximalist framework, Washington risks conflating ceasefire with capitulation. Such an approach may project strength, but it also narrows the diplomatic space necessary for de-escalation.

There is also a structural contradiction. While the United States seeks secure and uninterrupted maritime flows, its pressure-heavy strategy may incentivize Iran to tighten, rather than loosen, its grip over the Strait. The sequencing problem—each side waiting for the other to move first—has effectively locked diplomacy in place.

Ultimately, the trajectory of this conflict suggests that both Washington and Tehran may be overestimating what force alone can achieve. While US strategy risks prolonging a conflict it seeks to shape, Iran too faces economic strain and the long-term costs of sustained confrontation.

What is increasingly evident is that neither side is positioned for a clear or lasting victory. Instead, the burden is shifting outward. Energy markets remain unsettled, trade flows uncertain, and inflationary pressures persistent—leaving much of the global economy to absorb the consequences of a conflict it neither initiated nor controls.

If this impasse endures, the outcome may not be defined by who wins the war, but by who best avoids its costs. And on that count, the rest of the world may already be losing.

 

Trump’s Energy Ultimatum: Straining the Transatlantic Compact

The latest outburst by Donald Trump marks more than a passing diplomatic flare-up—it signals a troubling shift in the nature of Western alliances. By telling Britain to “go get your own oil,” Trump has introduced a coercive undertone into what has long been a relationship anchored in shared responsibility and strategic trust. In doing so, he risks diminishing not only the standing of King Charles III but also the perceived credibility of Britain’s security apparatus, including MI6.

The immediate trigger lies in British Prime Minister Sir Keir Starmer’s decision to avoid direct military involvement in strikes against Iran, opting instead for de-escalation. Washington’s response, however, frames restraint as reluctance.

Trump’s assertion that allies unwilling to participate in conflict should not expect US support in securing critical energy routes—particularly the Strait of Hormuz—effectively recasts alliance obligations as conditional.

This approach exposes a deeper inconsistency. While claiming that the United States has already “done the hard part,” Washington is simultaneously urging partners to assume the most immediate risks—reopening a volatile maritime chokepoint amid ongoing hostilities. If stability had indeed been restored, global oil flows would not remain disrupted, nor would energy prices continue their upward surge, now crossing the US$100 per barrel threshold.

Remarks by Pete Hegseth questioning the readiness of the Royal Navy reinforce a narrative of diminished British capability. Yet this overlooks the UK’s sustained security presence in the Gulf.

As Defence Secretary John Healey emphasized, Britain continues to contribute meaningfully to regional stability—its role defined by operational commitments rather than rhetorical alignment.

The broader concern is structural. By linking energy access with military participation, Washington risks normalizing a transactional model of alliance management. Such an approach may yield short-term leverage but carries long-term costs, including erosion of trust and reduced cohesion among Western partners.

At a time when geopolitical fault lines are widening, this recalibration could prove consequential. Strategic ambiguity within the transatlantic alliance not only complicates crisis response but may also create space for rival powers to exploit divisions. In seeking to pressure allies, Washington may ultimately be weakening the very framework that underpins its global influence.

US Seeks War Funding, Arabs Count Losses

 

Strategic divergence widens as Gulf economies weigh the cost of conflict over the logic of confrontation

The suggestion by Donald Trump that Arab countries should help finance the war against Iran reflects a familiar instinct in Washington: externalize the financial burden while retaining strategic command. Yet, this proposition is increasingly at odds with shifting regional priorities.

According to White House spokesperson Karoline Leavitt, the idea is not merely rhetorical but rooted in the President’s thinking. This comes at a time when Washington claims that negotiations with Tehran are progressing, even as it threatens to target Iran’s energy infrastructure. Such dual signaling—diplomacy on one hand and coercion on the other—highlights a policy struggling to reconcile intent with outcome.

For decades, the United States has framed Iran as the principal destabilizing force in the region, often in strategic alignment with Israel. That narrative is no longer universally compelling across Arab capitals. The issue is not the absence of concern about Iran, but the rising cost of confrontation.

Three realities now shape the regional calculus.

First, the ongoing conflict is widely perceived as emerging from a convergence of US-Israeli strategic interests, despite visible unease among several Gulf states. This perception complicates efforts to build financial or political backing for prolonged military engagement.

Second, the credibility of US security guarantees has come under scrutiny. Strategic installations in countries hosting American bases have faced vulnerabilities, raising questions about the reliability of external protection. If security assurances appear uncertain, underwriting conflict becomes a harder sell domestically.

Third, and most decisively, the economic fallout is being borne disproportionately by Arab economies. The disruption of the Strait of Hormuz—a critical artery for global oil shipments—has directly impacted revenues, trade flows, and fiscal stability across the Gulf. For these states, the war is not an abstract geopolitical contest but an immediate economic strain.

Even within Washington, strategic clarity remains elusive. While Trump speaks in terms of near-accomplished “regime change,” Marco Rubio has cautioned that outcomes remain uncertain. This internal divergence weakens the case for burden-sharing and raises concerns about long-term policy direction.

The emerging divide is therefore subtle but significant. Arab states are not dismissing security concerns, but they are increasingly prioritizing economic stability and regional de-escalation over alignment with an open-ended conflict.

In this evolving landscape, one reality stands out: while Washington may seek partners to fund its war, Arab states—already counting the losses—are far less inclined to underwrite it.

Who should be blamed for the closure of Strait of Hormuz? Iran or United States

The closure of the Strait of Hormuz has sent shockwaves across global markets, but the deeper question is unavoidable: what led to this point of no return?

The answer lies not in a single act, but in a sequence of decisions that began with the use of force at a moment when diplomacy was still in motion. Reports indicate that while negotiations were ongoing, the United States and Israel carried out strikes against Iranian targets. In geopolitical terms, such actions do not merely apply pressure—they fundamentally dismantle the diplomatic track.

When dialogue is replaced by force, retaliation becomes a predictable outcome. The response from Iran must be viewed within this context. Faced with attacks on its strategic installations and the killing of key leadership figures, Iran signaled clearly that it would respond—and that certain red lines, once crossed, would trigger consequences.

The closure of the Strait is not an impulsive decision. It is a calculated assertion of leverage. Geography is Iran’s strongest strategic asset, and in moments of existential pressure, it becomes the tool through which power is projected. By announcing conditions for maritime passage, Iran has reinforced that this is not chaos, but controlled pressure in response to external actions.

To place responsibility squarely where it belongs: this crisis did not emerge from Iran acting in isolation—it was set in motion by those who chose escalation over negotiation. The moment diplomacy was interrupted by strikes, the trajectory toward confrontation became unavoidable.

Compounding the situation is the rhetoric emanating from Washington, including calls for “unconditional surrender.” Such language is not just diplomatically unhelpful—it is strategically counterproductive. It removes space for compromise and signals an approach rooted in dominance rather than resolution.

The Strait of Hormuz, through which a significant portion of global energy flows, has now become the epicenter of a crisis that could have been avoided. The disruption we are witnessing is not the starting point—it is the consequence.

Between Exit and Escalation: A War Slipping Beyond Control

The evolving US-Israeli war on Iran has pushed Donald Trump into a strategic trap—one defined not by a lack of power, but by a lack of viable options. What was conceived as a limited campaign to reassert deterrence is steadily transforming into a conflict that resists containment, reshapes global markets, and erodes political capital at home. 

A month into the war, the contradictions are stark. Washington sought a short, decisive engagement; instead, it faces a resilient Iran that has shifted the battlefield from military confrontation to economic disruption. By tightening pressure on the Strait of Hormuz and sustaining missile and drone operations, Tehran has leveraged geography and endurance to impose costs far beyond the immediate theatre of war.

The consequences are already visible. Rising global energy prices are no longer an externality—they are a direct political liability. For an administration navigating fragile domestic support, the economic ripple effects risk becoming more damaging than the conflict itself. Approval ratings slipping into dangerous territory underscore a deeper problem - this war is losing its political legitimacy at home even as it remains strategically unresolved abroad.

This leaves Trump with choices that are stark but deeply constrained. A negotiated exit appears increasingly elusive. Diplomatic overtures, including reported backchannel proposals, demand concessions that Iran has historically rejected. Even if a deal were reached, it would likely be seen as a retreat—undermining the very premise on which the war was launched.

Escalation, meanwhile, carries even greater risks. Expanding military operations or deploying ground forces could entangle the United States in a prolonged conflict—precisely the kind Trump has repeatedly vowed to avoid. The shadow of past wars in Iraq and Afghanistan looms large, not just in strategic calculations but in public memory. Any move in that direction risks accelerating domestic backlash and fracturing political support.

Analysts such as Jonathan Panikoff have pointed to a fundamental flaw: the absence of a clearly defined and achievable endgame. Without clarity on what constitutes success, each tactical move risks deepening strategic ambiguity.

Meanwhile, as Jon Alterman notes, Iran’s strategy appears rooted in a far simpler objective—endure and outlast. In such a framework, survival itself becomes victory.

This asymmetry is critical. The United States seeks a decisive outcome; Iran seeks persistence. The longer the conflict continues, the more it reinforces the perception that time is not on Washington’s side. Every passing week tightens the strategic bind, amplifying economic disruption, unsettling allies, and testing domestic patience.

Trump’s shifting signals—alternating between threats of escalation and gestures toward diplomacy—reflect an attempt to manage this narrowing space. But such contradictions, while tactically useful, risk creating uncertainty among allies and markets alike.

As Laura Blumenfeld observed, this “fog of war” messaging may keep adversaries guessing, but it also underscores the absence of a coherent pathway forward.

What began as a war of choice is edging toward a loss of control. The longer the conflict persists, the narrower Washington’s options become—diplomacy without leverage, escalation without certainty, and a domestic landscape growing increasingly unforgiving. 

This is no longer about achieving decisive victory; it is about managing the consequences of a strategy that has outpaced its own assumptions. For Trump, the dilemma is no longer theoretical. It is immediate, structural, and tightening by the day.

US–Israel War on Iran: Dominance Under Question

The brief but intense confrontation between the United States, Israel, and Iran in June 2025—lasting barely twelve days—was projected as a calibrated show of force. Officially concluded as a ceasefire, the episode aimed to restore deterrence and reset strategic equations. Yet, nearly nine months later, the outcomes appear far less definitive than anticipated.

At the time, negotiations over Iran’s nuclear program were reportedly progressing. The sudden escalation suggested a shift from diplomacy to coercion, widely interpreted as an attempt—driven in part by Israeli pressure—to achieve multiple objectives: degrade Iran’s strategic infrastructure, weaken its regional posture, and potentially trigger internal instability. None of these goals, however, seem to have been fully realized.

There is little doubt that Iran’s strategic installations suffered damage. However, the broader political and military picture is more nuanced. The Iranian regime has remained intact, and domestic cohesion appears to have strengthened rather than fractured. External pressure, instead of splintering the state, may have reinforced national resolve—an outcome not unfamiliar in modern conflict settings.

Equally significant is the perceptual shift. The image of unquestioned military supremacy long associated with the United States and Israel appears to have been dented. Iran’s ability—both real and projected—to respond through retaliatory actions against regional targets and US-linked assets has complicated the narrative of one-sided dominance.

Reports and claims emerging from the conflict add further complexity. Iranian officials have asserted successful targeting of military assets and bases, while some unverified accounts point to disruptions in logistical and maritime supply lines, including incidents in strategically sensitive waterways and installations in the broader Indian Ocean region. While these claims remain contested, they nonetheless contribute to a narrative of reach and resilience that Tehran appears keen to project.

The latest signals from Donald Trump—indicating a pause or deferral in further strikes on Iran’s strategic assets—have deepened speculation. This could reflect tactical recalibration, but it also raises the possibility of operational limits rather than purely strategic choice. In contemporary conflict, pauses often reveal as much as offensives.

What emerges, therefore, is not a clear victory for any side, but a reminder of limits. Military power, even when overwhelming, does not automatically translate into decisive political outcomes. Short wars can disrupt, degrade, and demonstrate—but they rarely resolve deeply embedded strategic rivalries.

For Iran, the ability to absorb pressure and maintain internal stability can be framed as a form of strategic endurance. For the United States and Israel, the episode underscores the complexity of converting battlefield advantage into lasting geopolitical gains. The balance of power may not have fundamentally shifted—but its boundaries have certainly been tested.

In the end, the twelve-day war—and the weeks that followed—reinforce a familiar lesson - in geopolitics, outcomes are rarely as clear-cut as intentions.

Over One Million Americans Say Impeach and Remove Trump

The legal advocacy organization Free Speech for People on Thursday published a full-page advertisement in The New York Times highlighting the more than one million people who have endorsed the group’s petition to impeach and remove President Donald Trump from office.

Free Speech for People’s (FSFP) campaign—which also includes billboard trucks and projections in Washington, DC—comes ahead of the third wave of “No Kings” demonstrations, which are set to take place Saturday in thousands of locations across the United States.

“On March 28, 2026, the people will rise up,” said FSFP digital organizing strategist Jax Foley. “The No Kings 3 protest is projected to be the largest mass comobilization in US history, with over 3,000 actions planned worldwide. People across this country are organizing, mobilizing, defending their communities, and demanding accountability.”

No Kings 3 comes amid Trump’s attacks on the rule of law and constitutional rights at home and escalating militarism abroad as the president has bombed seven countries since returning to office—and 10 or possibly even 11 over the course of his two terms—while backing Israel’s genocidal war on Gaza.

“Donald Trump poses a direct threat to our Constitution and to the rule of law,” FSFP president and co-founder John Bonifaz said in a statement. “The constitutional remedy of impeachment exists precisely for moments like this when a president abuses power, defies the law, and attacks democracy itself. Congress must act.”

FSFP’s petition, which was launched on the day of Trump’s second inauguration, urges Congress to “take action to defend our republic and Constitution” by impeaching the president again. As of Thursday afternoon, the petition had over 1,070,000 signatures and is more than halfway to its goal of 2 million signers.

“For more than a year, FSFP’s team of lawyers, election security experts, and grassroots organizers have been tirelessly and fiercely leading the campaign to impeach and remove Trump and key administration officials,” Foley said. “We have heard from people across the United States who are with us in the call for no kings, no tyrants, and the immediate impeachment and removal of Trump and his coconspirators. Put the power back in the hands of We The People.”

Trump is the only US president to be impeached twice—once in 2019 for abuse of power and obstruction of justice and again in 2021 for incitement of insurrection. A majority of senators voted to acquit Trump in 2019; a majority—but not the requisite two-thirds—voted to convict in 2021. Both chambers of Congress are now narrowly controlled by Trump’s GOP.

“The congressional power of impeachment is designed to address this tyrannical threat to our democracy,” FSFP said in the New York Times ad. “Members of Congress must abide by their oath to protect and defend the Constitution and impeach and remove Trump from office.”

Courtesy: Common Dreams

 

Two Wars One Outcome: Failure

At first glance, Israel’s war in Gaza and the US-Israel confrontation with Iran appear fundamentally different—one a confined urban battlefield, the other a vast geopolitical contest. Yet both reveal a shared strategic failure: the inability to convert overwhelming military superiority into decisive control.

In Gaza, Israel entered with clear advantages—proximity, intelligence dominance, and unmatched firepower. The expectation was swift dismantling of resistance and consolidation of control. Instead, the conflict has proven stubbornly complex. Urban warfare, asymmetric tactics, and deeply embedded resistance networks have turned territorial gains into a costly and reversible exercise. Control, despite boots on the ground, remains contested.

The Iran theatre presents an even sharper limitation. While the United States and Israel possess unquestioned military superiority, geography alone alters the equation. Iran’s size, terrain, and strategic depth make ground invasion prohibitively costly and politically untenable. Without physical occupation, the objective of “complete control” becomes inherently unrealistic. Airstrikes and missile campaigns may degrade capabilities, but they cannot impose authority.

This contrast exposes a deeper flaw in strategic thinking. If control cannot be secured in Gaza—despite proximity and ground operations—it is even less attainable in Iran, where occupation is off the table. Military power, in both cases, reveals its limits: it can destroy assets, but not command legitimacy.

Iran, however, adds another layer to this equation—endurance. Decades of sanctions have forced adaptation. Indigenous capabilities in missiles, drones, and air defense are products of necessity, not choice. More importantly, Iranian society has internalized resilience under pressure, blunting the impact of external coercion.

Equally telling is the political outcome. Attempts to incite internal dissent against Iran’s clerical leadership have largely failed. External pressure, rather than weakening the regime, appears to have reinforced it. History suggests this is no anomaly—external threats often consolidate internal cohesion.

The parallel, therefore, is not about identical conflicts but about identical miscalculations. In both Gaza and Iran, there is a persistent overestimation of what military force alone can achieve. Territory is not merely land—it is people, perception, and political acceptance. Without these, control remains an illusion.

Iran sinks US Ship carrying 30,000 Interceptors

Please watch and save this video, because shortly it may be removed. This narrates a story of Iran sinking a US Supply Ship USNS Robert E. Peary in Red Sea, where 30,000 interceptors were lost in 20 minutes. To hear details click https://youtu.be/WqAPNl-36NU?si=f-2ngZJCnc96BVCt

Mystery about Iran’s attempted strike on Diego Garcia base

Mystery about Iran’s attempted strike on Diego Garcia base

When an attempted strike of Iran on a British base became a headline, the world was astonished. Most of the people hardly had any knowledge about this base, and on top of all the distance of Iranian missile covering 4,000 kilometers was taken as a propaganda stunt. I request the viewers to listen to this brief video clip and decide if it is a publicity stunt or the harsh reality. To watch video clip, click https://youtube.com/shorts/T8Esh-e_cCw?si=bhWrDa-FPmCSsaG1

 

US-Israel war on Iran: Killing many birds with one stone

The third week of the US-Israel war on Iran has ended, while the spotlight remains fixed on Tehran, the real story lies elsewhere. Iran has undeniably suffered heavy damage, but the silent devastation across the Gulf—particularly in Dubai and Qatar—is far more consequential and enduring.

This is not a war with a single objective. It is a multi-layered strategic strike—killing many birds with one stone.

Publicly, Iran is the target. The stated ambition is to weaken it, isolate it, and, if possible, reduce it to the kind of humanitarian catastrophe witnessed in Gaza. But beneath this declared objective lies a far more calculated design: the weakening of emerging Gulf economic powerhouses that have, in recent years, begun to rival traditional Western dominance.

Dubai stands out as a prime casualty.

 Over the past two decades, it has transformed itself into a global financial and trading hub, attracting billions of US dollars in international capital—including from Israel itself. Its strategic ports, Jebel Ali and Fujairah, have turned it into a critical artery of global commerce. Such autonomy and influence were never going to fit in comfortably within a US-led order.

The Abraham Accords, celebrated as a diplomatic breakthrough, also served another purpose—drawing Dubai deeper into a geopolitical framework that left it exposed. Once tensions escalated, the emirate found itself in the crosshairs of a conflict it neither initiated nor could control.

Qatar’s trajectory is equally revealing. 

Its earlier isolation within the Gulf Cooperation Council, combined with the establishment of one of the largest US military bases in the region, was not an act of strategic generosity. It was a calculated positioning. Qatar’s vast natural gas reserves and its geographic proximity to Iran made it indispensable—not as a partner, but as a platform.

What followed was predictable. Iran was provoked into retaliation, and the Gulf became the unintended—or perhaps intended—battleground. Whether the destruction in Dubai and Qatar came directly from Iranian strikes or through more complex channels is almost secondary. The outcome remains the same - both have been dragged into a war that serves larger strategic ends.

History reinforces this pattern. Since the Iranian Revolution, the United States has viewed Iran as the principal challenge to its Middle Eastern dominance. Yet, rather than engaging directly, Washington has preferred to entangle Tehran in prolonged proxy conflicts across Yemen, Lebanon, Syria, and Iraq. Decades of sanctions and indirect warfare have failed to break Iran. If anything, they have hardened it—economically, militarily, and politically.

The current war reflects a shift born out of frustration. Israel initiated the confrontation, convinced of its ability to decisively weaken Iran. The United States, wary yet compelled, has stepped in—not out of readiness, but out of strategic necessity.

This is not merely a war against Iran. It is a broader attempt to redraw the region’s economic and geopolitical map—where even allies are expendable, and collateral damage is quietly folded into grand strategy.

Russia emerges true winner of US war on Iran

The world's attention is fixed on the Persian Gulf, where the blockade of the Strait of Hormuz has become the epicenter of a brewing energy shock. With roughly 80% of crude oil moving through the waterway normally heading to Asia, the region is uniquely exposed.

At first glance, the fallout looks familiar: Rising tensions between the duo US-Israel and Iran are threatening supply chains and stoking fears of another oil spike. But the story quickly takes a less obvious turn. As Ritesh Kumar Singh argues, "Amid the focus on the most obvious losers, the energy-dependent economies of Asia and the exporters of the Persian Gulf, another country stands to gain from the turmoil, Russia."

When Hormuz becomes unstable, "global oil logistics shift rapidly," and Russia's export routes -- spanning the Baltic and Pacific gain fresh strategic weight. In this environment, Russia's export geography suddenly becomes one of the most valuable assets in global energy markets, offering buyers the increasingly scarce asset of reliability.

"For Russia ... higher global oil prices translate directly into stronger export revenues and greater fiscal resilience. In a prolonged geopolitical contest where economic stability matters as much as battlefield outcomes, that dynamic strengthens Moscow's hand," Singh writes. "The result is a paradox. A conflict intended to weaken Iran may ultimately redraw the global energy map in ways that favor Russia."

Even Washington's closest allies are hedging. Japan and South Korea have "refrained from openly endorsing US military action," favoring quiet coordination over public backing. For two treaty allies at the core of US strategy in Asia, the instinct now is careful calibration, not automatic alignment.

Across the region, positions diverge further. China has condemned the strikes while casting itself as a stabilizer, Taiwan has voiced support framed around "freedom and democracy," and much of Southeast and South Asia has leaned into neutrality, emphasizing restraint and flexibility amid energy risks and domestic pressures.

Indo-Pacific responses reflect "layered calculations about alliance management, energy security, domestic politics, ideological orientation and economic vulnerability," Grossman writes.

"That diversity may frustrate policymakers in Washington seeking unified backing if the conflict intensifies and requires additional support. Yet it also reflects a deeper strategic reality: Alignment in the Indo-Pacific varies widely, and even America's closest partners carefully weigh their own interests when distant conflicts threaten to expand."

Courtesy: Nikkei Asia

Riyadh Returns to Iran Threat Narrative

In the aftermath of Iran’s 1979 Islamic Revolution, the United States recalibrated its regional strategy, increasingly presenting Tehran as the principal source of instability in the Middle East. Over time, this framing found resonance in several Arab capitals, particularly in Saudi Arabia, shaping a security outlook that continues to influence regional policy choices.

This perception was reinforced through tangible measures. The expansion of US military infrastructure across the Gulf—most prominently in Qatar—was justified largely on the premise of countering Iranian influence. Simultaneously, Washington sustained economic pressure on Tehran over its nuclear program, despite Iran’s status as a signatory to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, in contrast to Israel’s longstanding ambiguity.

Historical episodes added further complexity. The Iran-Iraq war entrenched regional rivalries, while later diplomatic efforts—including the nuclear agreement under President Barack Obama and the China-brokered rapprochement between Riyadh and Tehran—offered brief openings for recalibration. Yet such initiatives have struggled to overcome deeply embedded mistrust, particularly amid shifting US policies and competing geopolitical interests.

Recent remarks by Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Faisal bin Farhan reflect a return to a more cautious, if not hardened, posture. His assertion that trust in Iran has been “completely shattered,” alongside allegations of destabilizing activities across the region, underscores Riyadh’s growing concerns about security and sovereignty. These claims are rooted in reported attacks on energy infrastructure and maritime navigation, which Saudi Arabia and its partners attribute to Iran.

Tehran, however, has consistently rejected such accusations, framing its actions as defensive and, at times, suggesting that regional escalations are shaped by broader geopolitical contestation. Independent verification of specific incidents remains contested, contributing to a narrative environment marked as much by perception as by provable fact.

What emerges is not merely a dispute over actions, but over interpretation. Saudi Arabia’s current stance appears closely aligned with a long-standing US strategic framing that positions Iran as the central regional threat. While this perspective reflects genuine security concerns, it also risks narrowing the analytical lens through which complex regional dynamics are understood.

The persistence of this narrative suggests that, despite episodic diplomacy and shifting alliances, foundational perceptions remain largely intact. In effect, Riyadh’s position today echoes a familiar refrain—one shaped over decades—where Iran continues to be viewed as the primary challenge to regional stability.

PSX benchmark index down 0.70%WoW

Pakistan Stock Exchange (PSX) remained volatile throughout the week, amid persistent Middle East military conflict driving volatility in international oil prices. The benchmark index lost 1,126 points or 0.7% during the week to close at 152,740 on Thursday, March 19, 2026, the last trading day before Eid Holidays.

Market participation remained lackluster during the week, with average daily traded volume declining to 418 million shares, from 548 million shares in the prior week. Developments on the economic front remained encouraging, as the country posted Current Account surplus of US$427 million in February 2026, against a deficit of US$85 million during the same period last year, primarily driven by higher workers’ remittances.

Industrial activity (LSMI) expanded by 10.5%YoY in January 2026, led by growth in the automobile and textile sectors.

Power generation increased by 11%YoY in February 2026, supported by lower tariffs and a shift of industrial consumers towards national grid.

Urea offtakes declined by 28%YoY during February 2026 due to elevated channel inventory following advance procurement in December 2025. offtakes rose 2.5x YoY over the same period.

T-Bill yields rose by 51 to 100bps in the first auction following SBP decision to leave policy rate unchanged.

Other major news flow during the week included: 1) Pakistan secures alternative fuel supply from Gulf amid regional tensions, 2) ADB unveils US$10 billion financing strategy for Pakistan, 3) IT exports rise 20%YoY to US$365 million, 4) REER drops to 102.5 in February 2026, and 5) GoP considering to hold fuel price till 31st March, 2026.

Woollen, Synthetic & Rayon and Close-End Mutual Fund were amongst the top performing sectors, while Leather & Tanneries, Commercial Banks and Miscellaneous were amongst the laggards.

Major selling was recorded by Foreigners and Mutual Funds with a net sell of US$9.3 million and US$4.5 million, respectively.

Banks and Individuals absorbed most of the selling with a net buy of US$10.3million and US$7.4 million, respectively.

Top performing scrips of the week were: PKGP, ABOT, IBFL, BNWM, and KOHC, while laggards included: NBP, AICL, PABC, UNITY, and SRVI.

Going forward, AKD Believes market sentiment will hinge on the developments in the Middle East conflict. At the same time, investor focus will remain on the government’s energy conservation measures, diversification of fuel imports, and progress on the IMF review.

Over the medium term, any de -escalation in the conflict could spark a strong market rebound, as recent corrections have made valuations attractive.

Top picks of the brokerage house include: OGDC, PPL, UBL, MEBL, HBL, FFC, ENGROH, PSO, LUCK, FCCL, INDU, ILP and SYS.

Targets by Choice: They Can’t Have It Both Ways

The escalating confrontation between the United States fully supported Israel against Iran has exposed a fundamental contradiction in the posture of Arab Gulf states. Governments hosting US military bases have condemned Iranian strikes on these installations as violations of sovereignty. Yet this claim collapses under the weight of their own strategic choices.

US bases in the Gulf are not passive or symbolic presences. They are active components of a broader military architecture directed against Iran. These facilities support operations ranging from intelligence gathering to force projection. In any conflict, such installations are not neutral—they are legitimate military targets.

Iran’s response must be understood within this context. Lacking the capacity to strike the US mainland, Tehran has chosen to target the physical infrastructure through which US power is exercised in the region. This includes bases located in Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, and Qatar. These locations are not incidental; they are central to the operational reach of the United States in the Gulf.

The assertion that such strikes amount to attacks on Arab states themselves is misleading. These bases, while geographically situated within sovereign territory, function as extensions of US military capability. Targeting them is not an assault on the host nation in the conventional sense, but a calculated effort to degrade an adversary’s war-making capacity.

More importantly, the argument of violated sovereignty overlooks a prior reality: sovereignty was effectively diluted when these states permitted foreign military infrastructure on their soil. Hosting bases that are actively engaged in conflict is not a neutral act—it is a strategic alignment. That alignment carries consequences.

The current situation is therefore not an unexpected escalation, but a predictable outcome. By embedding themselves within the operational framework of US military strategy, these states have assumed the risks associated with it. Their territories have, in effect, become extensions of a conflict in which they claim no direct role.

Protesting Iranian retaliation while continuing to host these bases reflects a fundamental inconsistency. It suggests an attempt to benefit from security arrangements without accepting the vulnerabilities they create. In geopolitical terms, this is not a sustainable position.

If these states seek genuine insulation from regional conflict, the solution is neither diplomatic protest nor rhetorical positioning. It is structural. Removing foreign military bases would reduce their exposure and reassert control over their own security environment. Anything less leaves them entangled in a conflict they cannot fully control, yet cannot credibly distance themselves from.

The reality is stark. By hosting US military infrastructure, these states have made themselves part of the battlefield. What they face today is not an unjust imposition, but the direct consequence of deliberate policy choices.

Washington’s Miscalculation: War It Can't Win

Since the Iranian Revolution, the United States has pursued not coexistence with Iran, but its submission. Nearly five decades of sanctions, covert operations, and proxy confrontations have produced a results Washington resists admitting - Iran has not weakened — it has adapted, and in many respects, hardened.

This is not an isolated miscalculation. From Iraq to Libya, the assumption that external force can re-engineer political systems has repeatedly collapsed. Iran is proving no exception, exposing once again the limits of military and economic coercion as instruments of political change.

The effort to portray Iran as the region’s central threat—overshadowing Israel—has long served as the foundation of US policy in the Gulf. It justified massive arms sales, entrenched military bases, and culminated in the Abraham Accords. What was presented as a pathway to stability now appears increasingly as a framework of managed dependency.

That framework is beginning to fracture. The devastation in Gaza has reshaped public opinion across the Arab world, exposing the disconnect between state policy and societal sentiment. Governments that once moved toward normalization now find themselves under growing domestic pressure to reassess those alignments.

The latest confrontation has further dismantled the illusion of quick victories. Even the assassination of Ali Khamenei — an act calculated to destabilize Iran’s leadership — has failed to produce systemic collapse. Instead, it has reinforced internal cohesion, underscoring a consistent lesson - external aggression often strengthens, rather than weakens, entrenched systems.

Meanwhile, the economic consequences are no longer theoretical. Disruptions in the Strait of Hormuz have constrained oil flows, placing Gulf economies under mounting strain. The reluctance of European allies to engage militarily signals a quiet but significant lack of confidence in both the strategy and its endgame.

What is unfolding is not a temporary crisis but a structural failure of policy. The belief that Iran can be coerced into submission—or reshaped through force—rests less on evidence and more on the persistence of outdated assumptions.

This war is not merely unwinnable; it is strategically irrational. It undermines regional stability, weakens alliances, and imposes escalating economic costs on those it claims to protect.

The question is no longer whether this approach will fail, but how much damage will be inflicted before it is finally abandoned.

Unlocking The Strait of Hormuz Requires Diplomacy, Not Escalation

The latest confrontation in the Gulf has pushed the region into one of its most dangerous moments in recent decades. The joint military assault by the United States and Israel on Iran—reportedly carried out while negotiations on Tehran’s nuclear program were still underway—has dramatically escalated tensions. Matters deteriorated further after the killing of Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei, an event Tehran considers an unprecedented attack on its sovereignty and political system.

Iran’s retaliation was swift and calculated. It launched strikes against American military installations located in neighboring Arab states and moved to restrict shipping through the strategically vital Strait of Hormuz. This narrow waterway remains one of the most critical arteries of global energy trade, with a substantial portion of the world’s oil shipments passing through it every day. By tightening control over this chokepoint, Tehran has effectively reminded the world that instability in the Gulf carries immediate and significant global economic consequences.

The debate now dominating diplomatic circles is simple: how can the Strait of Hormuz be unlocked?

The answer lies less in military maneuvering and more in political realism. History repeatedly demonstrates that escalating force in the Middle East rarely produces lasting stability. Instead, it deepens mistrust and widens the scope of conflict. Continued military pressure on Iran will likely provoke further retaliation, potentially dragging the entire region into a broader confrontation.

A more pragmatic path is available. The United States and Israel should immediately halt further assaults on Iranian territory and create space for diplomatic engagement. Reviving negotiations on Iran’s nuclear program could provide the first step toward rebuilding communication channels that have now been severely damaged.

Equally important is a removal of the sanctions imposed on Iran. Immediate withdrawal of some of the sanctions could offer incentives for de-escalation while restoring confidence in the diplomatic process.

Ultimately, reopening the Strait of Hormuz will not be achieved through warships or airstrikes. It requires restraint, dialogue, and a recognition that enduring security in the Gulf can only emerge from diplomacy rather than confrontation.

War with Iran and the Question of America’s Global Power

As the United States–Israel war against Iran enters its third week, the expanding scope of the conflict is forcing the world to reassess the role of the United States in shaping the international order. What began as a military confrontation is increasingly being interpreted as part of a broader geopolitical strategy — one that echoes patterns seen in earlier American interventions.

The latest signal came when the administration of Donald Trump announced a US$10 million bounty for information on Mojtaba Khamenei, Iran’s newly elevated supreme leader. The reward, issued through Washington’s “Rewards for Justice” program, targets individuals whom the United States accuses of involvement in militant activities.

Such a move is unusual in modern diplomacy. Publicly placing a bounty on a serving leader of a sovereign state sends a strong political message and inevitably raises questions about Washington’s long-term objectives in the conflict. Critics argue that the step suggests the war may extend beyond military confrontation and could ultimately aim at weakening or reshaping Iran’s leadership.

The controversy unfolds against the backdrop of intense global criticism of Israel’s conduct in Gaza. The war there has produced devastating humanitarian consequences, with tens of thousands reported dead, many of them civilians. For much of the world, the expansion of conflict toward Iran reinforces the perception that the United States and Israel are pursuing a broader strategic agenda across the Middle East.

Historically, American interventions have frequently been framed in the language of security, democracy, or counter-terrorism. Yet several precedents are often cited by critics as examples where these interventions eventually evolved into attempts to alter political leadership. The invasion of Iraq in 2003, the NATO intervention in Libya in 2011, and sustained political pressure on governments in Venezuela are commonly referenced in this debate.

These precedents also revive a deeper question about the effectiveness of global governance institutions. The United Nations was established after the Second World War to prevent unilateral wars and protect the sovereignty of states. However, the structure of the Security Council — where the United States holds veto power — often limits the organization’s ability to act decisively when Washington itself is directly involved in a conflict.

This structural imbalance has created a persistent credibility dilemma. While the United Nations remains the central forum for international diplomacy, critics increasingly argue that its capacity to restrain the strategic ambitions of major powers remains limited.

As the war with Iran unfolds, the debate is no longer confined to the future of the Middle East alone. It now touches the credibility of the international system itself — and whether the global order is governed by collective rules or ultimately shaped by the interests of its most powerful states.

Trump’s Iran War: Rising Costs and Political Risks

President Donald Trump is confronting growing political pressure after authorizing military strikes against Iran. While the battlefield dynamics appear to favor the combined military strength of the United States and Israel, the more immediate challenge for the White House may lie at home, where the economic consequences of the conflict are beginning to unsettle voters.

The most visible pressure point is energy prices. Tensions around the Strait of Hormuz — a narrow maritime corridor through which nearly one-fifth of the world’s oil supply normally passes — have triggered sharp volatility in global markets. The price of Brent crude oil has climbed above US$100 per barrel, swinging as traders react to shifting signals from the conflict.

American consumers are already feeling the impact. The national average price for gasoline has jumped from about US$2.90 per gallon before the hostilities to around US$3.61. Although Trump has argued that higher oil prices benefit the United States because of its status as a major energy producer, that argument may carry limited political weight at a time when voters remain deeply concerned about inflation and the overall cost of living.

Public skepticism toward the war is also evident in opinion polls. A recent survey conducted by The Economist in partnership with YouGov found that only 39 percent of Americans approve of Trump’s handling of the Iran crisis, while 52 percent disapprove. The absence of a traditional “rally around the flag” effect suggests that the administration has yet to convincingly explain why military force was necessary.

Criticism has emerged even within Republican circles. Former congressman Charlie Dent argues that although the US military has performed effectively, the political and diplomatic case for war was never clearly articulated. Without a compelling strategic narrative, the conflict risks becoming a liability for Republican candidates in the approaching midterm elections.

Supporters of the war, including Senator Lindsey Graham, insist the campaign is degrading Iran’s nuclear and missile capabilities and weakening the government’s ability to project power. Yet the political challenge facing the administration is ultimately a question of time.

As long as tensions threaten energy routes and keep oil markets volatile, inflationary pressures are likely to intensify. Higher fuel and transportation costs could ripple through the broader economy, pushing up prices from farm inputs to supermarket shelves.

Military superiority may secure tactical advantages. Politically, however, prolonged wars often test economic resilience and public patience. For Trump, the decisive arena may ultimately be the domestic economy rather than the battlefield in the Middle East.

PSX benchmark index down 2.3%WoW

Pakistan Stock Exchange (PSX) remained volatile throughout the week, driven by ongoing Middle East military conflict. Overall, the benchmark index declined by 3,630 points or 2.3%WoW to close at 153,866 on Friday, March 13, 2026. Market participation remained moderate during the week, with average daily traded volumes declining to 548 million shares, from 791 million shares in the prior week.

Market began the week on a bearish note on Monday, as oil prices surged by more than 20% in intraday trading, with Brent crossing US$119/bbl in early trading as Iran conflict deepens with traffic halted at Strait of Hormuz. However, market largely recovered in subsequent session as oil prices stabilized after the announcement of release of 400 million bbl of oil from IEA strategic reserves, along with signals of easing sanctions on Russian oil following call between Trump and Putin. Moreover, status quo in the policy rate, with largely unchanged economic projections for inflation, current account, and foreign exchange reserves held by State Bank of Pakistan (SBP), supported investors’ confidence

IMF mission concluded its Pakistan visit for the third review, with end-of-mission statement noting significant progress, while discussions will continue in the coming days, including a more fully assessment of impact of recent global developments.

Economic indicators remained largely positive, with worker remittances remaining strong in February 2026, increasing by 5%YoY to US$3.3 billion.

OMC offtakes increased by 13%YoY, while auto sales continued growth, rising by 42%YoY during the month.

Other major news flow during the week included: 1) Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif assures Mohammad Bin Salman of full solidarity during Jeddah visit, 2) Pakistan raises US$507 million through 5G spectrum auction, 3) GoP raises petrol and diesel prices, 4) RDA inflows rise 12%MoM and 19%YoY to US$242 million in the previous month, and 5) Foreign exchange reserves held SBP rose US$41 million to US$16.34 billion as of March 06, 2026.

Refinery, Leasing Companies and Jute were amongst the top performing sectors, while Woollen, Paper & Board and Transport were amongst the laggards.

Major selling was recorded by Companies and Foreigners with a net sell of US$16.5 million and US$13.4 million.

Individuals and Banks absorbed most of the selling with a net buy of US$10.8 million and US$11.7 million.

Top performing scrips of the week were: AICL, LOTCHEM, HINOON, PGLC, and YOUW, while laggards included: SAZEW, FCCL, MUREB, GHNI, and DGKC.

AKD Securities anticipates market sentiments to be dictated by developments in the ongoing Middle East conflict. GoP’s efforts to address energy conservation and the ongoing IMF review would also remain key areas of focus.

In the medium term, any de-escalation of Middle East military conflict could trigger a significant market recovery, as the recent correction has made market valuations much more appealing, with forward P/E now at 6.6x.

The brokerage house forecast the benchmark Index to reach 263,800 by end December 2026.

Top picks of AKD Securities include: OGDC, PPL, UBL, MEBL, HBL, FFC, ENGROH, PSO, LUCK, FCCL, INDU, ILP and SYS.