US may use mother of all bombs on Iran

According to a CNN report, the US military has developed strike plans ​that could include using ‌the so-called "mother of ​all bombs" to target Iranian energy ⁠infrastructure and nuclear sites ​should President Donald Trump ​order renewed combat operations.

The potential deployment of the GBU-43/B Massive Ordnance Air Blast Bomb, the largest ‌non-nuclear ⁠bomb in the US arsenal, would mark a significant escalation in the ​conflict, ​although ⁠officials familiar with military planning discussions ​told CNN questions remain ​over ⁠its effectiveness in achieving Washington's strategic objectives.

Trump is facing pressure to bring an end to the deeply unpopular war, as Republicans brace for potential political backlash from voters in the upcoming midterm elections and there is little indication the two countries are close to a negotiated resolution after more than six months of US bombing.

While the US military continues to provide Trump with options for potential strikes against outstanding Iranian targets, some officials continue to privately question whether the White House has a strategy that incorporates those plans in a way that could actually end the war.

For months, Trump and his advisers have discussed options that could act as a “definitive” end to the war, aware of how unpopular the conflict has become among Americans.

While some administration figures have characterized the war as essentially won, Trump has been more guarded in recent remarks, stopping short of declaring victory and saying the US still has unfinished business in the country.

Behind the scenes, Trump has also cast doubt on some outside allies who have encouraged him to simply bring US troops home and move on. Doing so, Trump has argued, would look like defeat.

Over the course of the last several weeks, White House advisers have held meetings to discuss various options for Iran. While Trump announced publicly that he would not take new actions before the midterms, several advisers said privately they didn’t know whether that statement was definitive or could change before election day.

Trump has ordered the military to develop additional strike packages against Iranian targets that include “a lot of energy infrastructure” and the potential use of a MOAB, one of the sources told CNN.

The phrasing used was that this attack would come “prior to US retrograde in CENTCOM AOR (area of responsibility),” indicating the administration could launch the additional strikes, attempt to declare victory and quickly pull everyone out.

A second source said military plans for striking Iranian nuclear sites, including Pickaxe Mountain, also explicitly call for using the MOAB. In recent months, Trump has repeatedly threatened to strike Pickaxe, where the US and Israel believe Tehran has stored components of its nuclear program, even after pausing full combat operations earlier this year, and Trump continues to emphasize that his goal is to ensure Iran never obtains a nuclear weapon.

Another US official noted that when the military plans, it develops a menu of options for policymakers that range from the high-end to low-end. Higher-end targets, including those that are located deep underground, require bigger bombs, and the MOAB is the biggest.

But there are questions around whether the MOAB would be an effective munition to use against Iran’s nuclear facilities and other sites that are located deep underground. While the GPS-guided bomb is capable of destroying an area equivalent to nine city blocks, it likely lacks the capability to penetrate deep enough under the surface to destroy the suspected nuclear facilities at Pickaxe, which is believed to be fortified by layers of granite, and other remaining Iranian nuclear sites.

Many within the administration as well as outside analysts agree that the only way to decisively defeat Iran would be through a major operation involving ground troops, a commitment that could potentially cost thousands of American lives. The Pentagon considers all scenarios, so those plans exist, but as of now no one in the administration is arguing for such drastic action.

Trump has indicated he has little interest in putting US boots on the ground in Iran but his desire to end the conflict as soon as possible presents a political dilemma for a president who is keenly aware of how unpopular the war has become yet has been unable to secure a diplomatic agreement that would bring it to a close.

Top Trump administration officials and military planners have been focused, for weeks, on finding an off-ramp that gives Trump a “symbolic” win — at minimum — he can try to sell to the American people without preventing a potential diplomatic breakthrough, starting with an agreement to reopen the Strait of Hormuz, CNN has reported.

A fourth source familiar with the Pentagon’s recent planning discussions on Iran told CNN that military officials had developed some options that would amount to a “fireworks show,” with the goal of providing Trump an off-ramp from the conflict even if those strikes fail to accomplish his stated goals for starting the war in the first place.

And despite Trump’s recent pledge to hold off on launching additional strikes before the midterms, the US military already appears to be preparing for potential Iranian retaliation should the president give the go-ahead.

The next turnover of US troops deployed to CENTCOM is also expected to take place within the next few weeks, a US official who acknowledged it is possible some of the personnel who rotate out of the region, may not be replaced by fresh service members.

 

American Superpower Image Is Being Tarnished

The image of the United States as the world's undisputed superpower is facing an unprecedented test. A succession of strategic setbacks, policy reversals and strained alliances is raising a fundamental question, can Washington still translate its overwhelming military and economic strength into lasting geopolitical gains?

The latest agreement allowing Russian diesel supplies to global markets, accompanied by temporary sanctions relief, offers a telling example. After years of seeking to constrain Moscow over its war in Ukraine, Washington has turned to Russia to ease fuel-market pressures exacerbated by the Middle East conflict. The move highlights the limits of economic sanctions when geopolitical ambitions collide with domestic necessities.

The US-Israel war on Iran presents an even greater strategic challenge. Despite months of intensive bombing and the reported killing of Iran's supreme leader, Washington has not secured a decisive outcome. Iran's continued resistance and its ability to disrupt regional energy infrastructure demonstrate that superior firepower does not automatically translate into political submission.

The withdrawal of US forces from Iraq after more than two decades further complicates Washington's regional legacy. Although, the departure follows an earlier agreement and can be presented as a change in military strategy, Iran and its allies have celebrated it as a victory. Concerns about Tehran's expanding influence underline the difficulty Washington has faced in shaping Iraq's political and security landscape.

Saudi Arabia's experience raises equally uncomfortable questions. Despite its longstanding security partnership with Washington, the kingdom has suffered attacks on critical infrastructure, including Riyadh's airport and major energy facilities. Washington's reluctance to provide the direct military intervention Riyadh sought has fuelled doubts about the practical limits of American security guarantees.

Meanwhile, China and Russia are exploiting the shifting strategic environment to expand their influence. Their growing engagement with regional governments does not mean that either can replace America's entire security role, but it gives Middle Eastern states greater room to diversify their partnerships.

The central issue is no longer whether America possesses formidable power; it clearly does. The question is whether that power can deliver the political outcomes Washington seeks. A superpower's standing depends not only on its capacity to wage war, but also on its ability to achieve objectives, protect partners and sustain international confidence. If these shortcomings persist, America's global leadership will face an increasingly difficult test.

Who Really Seeks Control of the Red Sea Gateway?

The United States has repeatedly intervened in conflicts across the Middle East, often justifying its military presence as essential to regional stability and the protection of international trade. Yet an important question remains, do these interventions resolve security crises, or can they also create opportunities to expand American strategic influence? The confrontation involving Saudi Arabia, Yemen’s Houthis and the United States deserves scrutiny from this perspective.

The Houthis intensified attacks on shipping in the Red Sea after the Gaza war erupted in October 2023, declaring their campaign a means of pressuring Israel. Vessels linked to Israel became particular targets, although the attacks and their consequences extended beyond Israeli shipping. International trade was disrupted, seafarers were endangered and the security of the Bab el-Mandeb Strait became a global concern.

However, threatening shipping bound for Israel is not the same as deliberately targeting Saudi Arabia. Each reported attack must be examined on its own evidence, including the identity of the attacker, the intended target and the strategic purpose. Iranian support for the Houthis does not, by itself, establish Iranian direction of every operation.

Washington has presented its military campaign against the Houthis as a response to threats against navigation and regional security. But military intervention can produce consequences beyond its declared objectives. By expanding its operational presence, surveillance and influence over maritime security, the United States can strengthen its position around a gateway connecting the Red Sea with the Gulf of Aden and the wider Indian Ocean.

This raises a question that deserves serious investigation, could the escalation of hostilities be creating the strategic conditions for greater American influence over access to one of the world's most important shipping corridors?

The possibility should not be confused with proof that Washington engineered the confrontation or that a US proxy is responsible for attacks attributed to the Houthis. Such allegations require independently verifiable evidence. Nevertheless, the strategic consequences of military operations merit examination regardless of their stated intentions.

I prefer to frame the broader issue as “US-Controlled Entry and Exit” rather than simply a blockade. Control over a maritime gateway need not involve formally closing it. It can also emerge through military deployments, intelligence capabilities, security partnerships and the ability to influence the conditions under which commercial vessels pass.

The central issue, therefore, is not merely whether the Houthis threaten Saudi Arabia or whether American forces can suppress them. It is whether the resulting security arrangements protect freedom of navigation for all nations or gradually concentrate strategic leverage in the hands of an outside power.

The world must distinguish between securing an international waterway and acquiring the power to determine who can use it, on what terms and under whose protection. That distinction may ultimately prove more consequential than the military confrontation itself.

Oil Supply and Price: What Is the Reality?

For decades, we have been taught a simple economic principle: prices are determined by demand and supply. But crude oil tells a different story. Demand and supply matter, yet they do not, by themselves, determine the price consumers ultimately pay.

I was confronted with this question in 2005 when an anchor of a leading business channel asked me live, what drives crude oil prices? My instant response was, “Crude oil prices are not driven by demand and supply alone; there are other factors which analysts either do not discuss or do not know.” After the program, the anchor remarked, “Kazmi Sahib, your white hairs do not mean people will accept your absurdity.”

Two decades later, the question deserves to be revisited.

Today, Middle Eastern crude exports have recovered to, and on some days exceeded, pre-war levels despite continuing disruption around the Strait of Hormuz. Yet Brent remains above US$100 a barrel. At the same time, Saudi Aramco has cut November crude prices for Asian buyers to a six-year low, while G7 countries have agreed to release 100 million barrels of crude and diesel from emergency reserves.

If supply alone determines price, such developments should have produced a much sharper decline.

The missing piece is the financial market. Crude is priced through highly sophisticated benchmark and futures markets in which fund managers, commodity traders, banks, physical traders and financial institutions constantly buy and sell expectations about future supply, demand and geopolitical risk. Brent futures are cash-settled, meaning positions can be closed financially without physical delivery. Yet those financial markets remain closely connected to physical benchmark pricing.

This creates a powerful feedback loop. Financial-market movements are reported almost hourly by major media houses. Headlines influence expectations; expectations influence trading; trading influences benchmarks; and benchmarks influence the prices paid for physical crude.

The result is that oil producers do not necessarily determine the price of their own product. Saudi Arabia, Russia, the United States and other producers can influence supply, but the marginal price is increasingly shaped by a financial ecosystem of traders, fund managers, benchmark mechanisms and information flows.

That is why the real beneficiaries of oil-price volatility may not always be producers. They can be the financial intermediaries and speculators positioned to profit from every rise and fall.

Perhaps it is time to ask a more fundamental question, who really sets the price of crude oil—the producers who pump it, or the financial markets that trade expectations about it?

Is Gold Losing Its Glitter?

For centuries, gold has been regarded as a store of value, a hedge against inflation and a refuge in times of uncertainty. Yet 2026 has challenged this conventional wisdom. Gold crossed US$5,000 per ounce in January 2026 before retreating sharply. The decline raises an intriguing question, is gold losing some of its traditional glitter?

Several factors may explain this reversal.

First, central banks were major buyers of gold during the global drive to diversify reserves and reduce dependence on the US dollar. Any slowdown in this accumulation could weaken an important source of demand. However, it would be premature to conclude that central banks have stopped accumulating gold.

Second, higher oil prices increase the dollar requirements of oil-importing countries. Governments also need foreign exchange to build strategic reserves and meet external obligations. In such circumstances, liquid dollar reserves may take precedence over additional gold purchases.

Third, geopolitical uncertainty can have an unexpected impact. Gold is traditionally considered a safe haven, but crises also create an urgent need for immediately deployable liquidity. The US dollar, backed by deep and liquid financial markets, can therefore compete directly with gold for safe-haven demand.

Fourth, persistent inflation creates a paradox. Although inflation can support gold as a hedge, rising food, energy and housing costs erode household purchasing power. Families facing higher living expenses may simply have less surplus cash to invest in gold.

Fifth, the increasing availability of bank financing against jewellery may change household behaviour. Instead of selling gold to meet urgent cash requirements, owners can pledge jewellery as collateral while retaining the underlying asset.

Finally, buoyant equity markets can divert investment flows. When stocks and other risk assets promise attractive returns, investors may prefer them to non-yielding gold and gold-backed funds.

None of these factors alone explains the decline. Together, however, they suggest that the investment environment surrounding gold may be changing.

Perhaps gold has not lost its glitter. Perhaps, for the moment, liquidity has become as valuable as a safe haven. The real question is whether this is merely a correction after an extraordinary rally—or the beginning of a structural change in the way investors value gold.

Four vessels struck in Hormuz in 24 hours

According to Seatrade Maritime News, UKMTO has published four warnings of attacks in the Strait of Hormuz which took place on September 28 and 29.

The first of the late reports states that a vessel was struck by an unknown projectile late on September 28, leading to a fire onboard, which was later extinguished. The crew were reported as safe. The IMO’s list of confirmed attacks in the region now carries a September 28 incident involving VLCC Al Funtas in the Strait of Hormuz, reporting damage to the ship and no pollution. The ship is owned and operated by Kuwait Oil Tanker Company.

The UKMTO report was filed as suspicious activity, rather than an attack, even though it confirms an attack on the ship.

On September 30, three more late reports were published regarding incidents that took place on September 29. The first report is of a crude oil tanker struck on the port side, identified by Vanguard Tech as 2008-built VLCC Mersin Prosperity. According to Equasis data, the ship is managed by ADNOC.

The second report is of a tanker transiting inbound being struck by an unknown projectile, identified by Vanguard as Sinbad, a Liberian-flagged tanker managed by Anglo-Eastern.

The third report of a tanker struck by an unknown projectile regards Al Ruwais, according to Vanguard, which it identified as an LNG tanker, although the vessel appears to be a Liberia-flagged LR2 owned and operated by ADNOC.

All of the attacks were within the Strait of Hormuz.

Of the three ships identified by Vanguard, only Sinbad appears on Iran’s list of non-compliant vessels it claims have breached Tehran’s rules for transiting the Strait of Hormuz. Vessels on the list, administered by the Persian Gulf Strait Authority (PGSA), are subject to fines, detention, or confiscation during future passages of the Strait of Hormuz, PGSA has warned.

“The extent of damage to the three vessels remains unclear at current,” said Vanguard.

The series of late reports from UKMTO is unusual, and follows Iranian claims to have attacked 19 vessels on September 25 and 26. UKMTO relies on a voluntary reporting scheme and acts as a point of contact for emergency response in the region, and so its reporting capability would be limited should vessels and organizations choose not to report incidents.

 

Multinational Maritime Coalition: But Where Is the Real Problem?

The latest meeting of the Multinational Maritime Defense Coalition raises a basic question: what exactly is this coalition being created to achieve? The question becomes even more pertinent when representatives of 41 countries, including 154 naval commanders, planners, ambassadors and European Union officials, gather in Jeddah to prepare for operational deployment. The coalition now has 28 liaison officers and has reached Initial Operational Capability.

Its declared objective is straightforward - protect freedom of navigation, maritime routes and strategic straits through a coordinated multinational defensive framework.

But here lies the paradox. If freedom of navigation is the objective, why is the Strait of Hormuz not at the center of the discussion?

I do not subscribe to the narrative that Iran alone is responsible for the disruption of navigation through Hormuz. The present crisis followed the US-Israeli attack on Iran on February 28, while negotiations were reportedly underway. Since then, a cycle of military action and retaliation has continued, with attacks on strategic assets and shipping followed by Iranian responses.

The consequences extend well beyond Iran. The disruption is also hurting the oil-producing Arab economies of the Gulf, whose exports depend heavily on secure maritime routes. Hundreds of ships and thousands of seafarers have reportedly remained unable to sail safely through the strait for months.

This creates an uncomfortable contradiction. A coalition established in the name of maritime freedom cannot effectively address the problem by treating only one side of the conflict as responsible.

The immediate requirement is therefore not another layer of military coordination. It is de-escalation and restoration of freedom of navigation.

The United States should remove restrictions affecting Iranian shipping and work with all relevant parties to restore safe and unhindered passage through the Strait of Hormuz, including for Iranian-owned and Iranian-operated vessels.

Freedom of navigation cannot be selective. If it is genuinely a shared international interest, it must apply to everyone—or the principle itself is undermined.

Hormuz Shuttle Tankers: An Evolving Trend Amid the US-Israel war on Iran

According to a report by Seatrade Maritime News, the disruption of shipping through the Strait of Hormuz is creating a new pattern in the regional oil trade - shuttle tankers are increasingly moving crude from the Persian Gulf to the Gulf of Oman, where cargoes are transferred ship-to-ship (STS) for onward delivery.

The trend is illustrated by the Hong Kong-flagged VLCC Cospearl Lake, which recently reached Dalian, China, carrying about two million barrels of crude loaded through an STS transfer in the Gulf of Oman rather than directly from a Persian Gulf terminal. Such operations allow exporters and buyers to keep oil moving while reducing exposure to the increasingly risky and costly Hormuz transit.

The United Arab Emirates (UAE) has emerged as a key player in this shuttle trade. Regional exporters are using tankers to transport crude through the Strait and transfer it to waiting vessels outside the Gulf. This complements conventional voyages by tankers that continue directly to their destinations.

The Mombasa B provides an important example. The VLCC, chartered by UAE's ADNOC from Sinokor Maritime, entered the Persian Gulf in April and subsequently began shuttling between Gulf loading terminals and the Gulf of Oman. Since June, many of its voyages through Hormuz have been conducted as “dark transits,” with AIS signals switched off.

The risks, however, remain substantial. On July 13, Iranian forces targeted the Mombasa B with cruise missiles while it was transiting the waterway. One Indian crew member was killed and eight others injured. Although the tanker suffered material damage, it remained operational and subsequently resumed Hormuz crossings. The vessel has since been placed on Iran's list of “non-compliant” ships.

The UAE is nevertheless expanding its capacity. In August, ADNOC Logistics & Services announced the acquisition of six additional VLCCs. Other regional exporters, including Kuwait, are also using tankers in shuttle operations. Some ADNOC vessels have reportedly carried Iraqi Basrah crude, indicating that the system is evolving into a wider regional network rather than serving only UAE exports.

Kpler data shows that Persian Gulf crude and condensate loadings reached about 5.8 million barrels per day in August, including Gulf of Oman STS transfers, and have risen toward 8 million bpd in September. Iraq has also reportedly offered buyers the option of collecting crude through STS transfers outside Hormuz.

Yet shuttle tankers remain a wartime workaround rather than a replacement for normal trade routes. They require additional vessels, increase costs and operational complexity, and remain vulnerable to attack. With Iranian oil exports reportedly falling sharply and tensions continuing around the Omani corridor, Tehran may have greater incentive to disrupt these alternative supply chains.

The emerging shuttle trade therefore demonstrates the adaptability of the global oil market—but also highlights how deeply the Iran war has altered the economics, logistics and security of energy transportation through the Gulf.

Why Is the President Outside the Stock-Trading Net?

A Bloomberg analysis has raised an intriguing question about the relationship between political power and financial markets in Washington. President Donald Trump and his financial managers reportedly executed nearly 28,700 securities transactions during the 17 months following his second inauguration through June 2026—more than the roughly 22,200 transactions reported collectively by members of Congress over the same period.

The scale is remarkable. Trump’s transactions reportedly involved accounts worth more than US$858 million and covered individual stocks, bonds and cryptocurrencies. This represents a notable shift from his first term, when his assets were primarily associated with real estate.

The volume of trading, does not by itself establish wrongdoing. Trump’s representatives and the Trump Organization have maintained that the accounts are managed by independent third parties and computer-driven models, and that neither Trump nor his family receives advance notice of or exercises control over individual transactions.

Yet the issue raises a broader question of public policy. The United States already has rules against government officials using non-public information obtained through their positions for financial gain. The 2012 Stock Act clarified that insider-trading prohibitions apply to Members of Congress and other government officials. Congressional records also show that lawmakers have repeatedly proposed going further by restricting or banning securities trading by elected officials.

Here the question becomes particularly relevant, if Members of Congress are considered sufficiently exposed to potential conflicts of interest to justify restrictions on their personal investments, why should comparable safeguards not apply to the President?

Not all proposed legislation treats the President differently. Indeed, the proposed Ethics Act would cover Members of Congress, the President and Vice President, while other measures have focused specifically on lawmakers.

That variation itself deserves scrutiny. The President exercises enormous influence over policies involving taxation, tariffs, regulation, energy, defence, trade and international relations—areas capable of affecting the value of financial assets. Even when investments are managed independently, the question of public confidence remains.

The debate, should not be reduced to whether any particular Trump transaction was lawful or unlawful. The more fundamental issue is whether America's conflict-of-interest framework should apply consistently to all elected officials.

If Congress believes that stock trading can create either an actual conflict or the appearance of one, the same principle merits consideration at the highest level of government.

After all, public trust should not depend on whether an elected official occupies a seat on Capitol Hill—or sits in the Oval Office.

Iran advises crew to abandon tankers in Bahrain and Kuwait

According to Seatrade Maritime news, following strikes on five Iranian tankers by US forces, Iran has announced to strike commercial tankers in Bahrain and Kuwait. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corp (IRGC) Navy issued what Iranian media described as an “urgent warning” in response to the US attacks.

The warning told all tanker crews in Bahraini and Kuwaiti to immediately abandon their vessels, whether at anchor or at berth in ports, as they would be targeted by the IRGC Navy.

Kuwait and Bahrain, hosting US military bases have come under consistent attack by Iran since the war with the US started at the end of February.

Maritime security firm Vanguard Tech said it assessed the warning as credible enough to require "immediate operational consideration", although an attack was not inevitable.

It noted the warning was unusually specific in terms of vessel type and location, it was consistent with past Iranian behaviour in terms of targeting Bahrain and Kuwait, and a widening of the rationale for attacks to cover vessels in particular port associated with the US military regardless of flag or ownership.

The threat to commercial tankers in Bahraini and Kuwaiti ports follows the US strikes on five Iranian owned or linked tankers which US Central Command described as having “destroyed the vessels” after crews were directed to abandon ship.

The Iranian-flagged NITC VLCC Derya was targeted near Kharg Island. US forces also fired on four vessels in the Gulf of Oman – the Aframaxes Kaviz and Riesco, the oil/ product tanker Charminar, and the LPG carrier Horizon 1. 

Video from US Central Command showed four of the vessels being struck towards the stern while the Riesco was shown with fires raging on its deck and around the accommodation block.

The strikes on the Iranian linked tankers were in response to two IRGC attacks on a US warship, which US Centcom said had failed.

The threat to commercial shipping in the region has ratcheted up significantly in recent weeks with the US striking eight Iranian owned or linked tankers and Iran attacking at least four commercial tankers in the Strait of Hormuz including the Bahri VLCC Sidr which resulted in the deaths of two Filipino seafarers and the Sinokor VLCC Senegal Prosperity which was abandoned and listing following an attack on August 30, 2026.

 

Trump’s Imprudent Policies Are Making Iran a Bigger Phantom

The latest US-Israel war on Iran, which began on February 28, 2026, appears to have produced an outcome very different from what Washington may have anticipated. Despite intense military and economic pressure, Iran has not capitulated. Instead, the conflict seems to have reinforced national cohesion and strengthened Tehran’s determination to resist external coercion.

Iran’s economy has certainly suffered. Years of sanctions have produced weak growth and high inflation, while the war has damaged critical industrial facilities and disrupted trade through the Strait of Hormuz. The IMF has estimated a sharp contraction in Iranian GDP, while inflation and currency depreciation have reached alarming levels. Yet economic pain has not translated into political surrender. Iranian businesses have spent years adapting to sanctions, maintaining substantial inventories and developing alternative trade channels. These practices have provided a degree of resilience even as supply chains and maritime trade have come under severe pressure.

Trump’s repeated appeals to Iranians to rise against their government may also be producing the opposite effect. External pressure can deepen public grievances, but it can simultaneously strengthen nationalist sentiment and resistance to perceived foreign interference. Iran’s leadership has demonstrated an ability to transfer much of the economic burden onto ordinary citizens while preserving the state’s capacity to resist.

There is another, potentially more consequential, dimension. Iranian attacks on US military facilities in Gulf countries have forced Arab states to reconsider the assumptions underlying their security arrangements. If the American military presence cannot prevent attacks on regional assets, questions naturally arise over whether Washington’s security architecture primarily serves Arab interests or Israel.

The Strait of Hormuz presents an equally serious dilemma. Disruptions may constrain Iranian oil exports, but Arab economies are also exposed through attacks on energy infrastructure, US-linked assets and reduced energy exports. A wider disruption extending toward the Red Sea, particularly through Houthi action, could impose an even heavier cost on regional economies.

The paradox is becoming increasingly clear - Washington may be capable of inflicting enormous pain on Iran, but pain alone has not delivered submission. Donald Trump’s imprudent policies may therefore be making Iran a “Bigger Phantom”—not necessarily more powerful, but more resilient, more unpredictable and increasingly costly to contain.

 

Strait of Hormuz: Release the Seafarers Held Hostage

For months, entry and exit of merchant ships into/ from the Strait of Hormuz has remained at the lowest level due to the US blockade, though President Trump holds Iran responsible for this blockade.

The biggest losers are shipping companies because these ships are stuck and cannot be deployed on any other voyage. But even worse hit are the seafarers, who are stranded at sea for months, separated from their families and uncertain about when they will be able to return home.

The scale of this humanitarian crisis is staggering. According to the International Maritime Organization (IMO), around 6,000 seafarers remain stranded aboard vessels unable to leave the Persian Gulf safely. The UN human-rights office has reported that at least 6,000 seafarers aboard some 400 vessels remain stranded in and around the Strait of Hormuz.

These 6,000 people are not soldiers. They are not combatants. They are ordinary men and women doing their jobs to keep global trade moving. Yet they have become innocent victims of a geopolitical confrontation in which they have no stake.

These seafarers, stranded at sea, face disruption in food supplies, drinking water, medicines and other essential items. Prolonged confinement, uncertainty and separation from their families are placing an enormous psychological and physical burden on them.

A conclusion can be drawn that these ships and seafarers have been held “hostage” by the United States.

Iran, suffering from economic sanctions, has offered safe exit to these ships if they pay a toll. It is believed that shipping companies were willing to pay the toll for safe exit, but the US Navy denies exit even after payment of the toll.

Many analysts term US attacks on Iran illegal and the detention of ships and seafarers tantamount to “Maritime Terrorism.”

Whatever the legal or political arguments, one fact should concern the entire world - approximately 6,000 human beings are trapped at sea. They have families waiting for them. They have homes to return to. They have done nothing to become victims of this conflict.

The international community cannot remain silent while thousands of seafarers spend months trapped aboard ships.

May be the time has come for shipping companies to stop delivering cargo to, or taking cargo from, US ports unless the ships stranded at the Strait of Hormuz are allowed safe exit.

This is no longer merely a dispute between the United States and Iran. It is a humanitarian crisis.

All stakeholders - the US administration, Iran, shipping companies, maritime organizations, seafarers' unions and the international community—are requested to join hands for the immediate release and safe passage of these seafarers.

Political differences can wait. Economic disputes can wait. But human beings cannot wait indefinitely. The world must raise its voice for those who have no voice.

Release the ships. Release the seafarers.

OPEC Plus keeps oil output policy unchanged

OPEC Plus kept its oil output policy unchanged for ‌October at a meeting on Sunday, as the producer group needs to agree new quotas before deciding its next output steps.

The meeting of seven core OPEC+ members — Saudi Arabia, ​Russia, Iraq, Kuwait, Algeria, Kazakhstan and Oman — comes as the US-Israel war on Iran continues to ​disrupt oil exports through the Strait of Hormuz, limiting OPEC+'s influence over prices ⁠and market share.

In August, OPEC+ agreed its production boost for September, completing a phased rollback ​of a 1.65 million barrel per day supply cut first agreed in 2023.

Despite the agreed production increases, ​the group made up of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries and its allies, including Russia, still produces far below its targets because of the war.

"OPEC+ currently has ​very limited power over the physical oil market," said Jorge Leon of Rystad Energy. "The group ​can change production targets on paper, but it cannot guarantee that those barrels will be produced or ‌actually ⁠reach the market."

"The focus now shifts away from monthly production adjustments and towards the much more consequential debate over 2027."

OPEC+ still has another layer of production cuts in place, covering most members of the 21-country group until the end of 2026. Before the group decides ​how to unwind the ​cuts and return production ⁠to the market, it needs to review members' oil production capacity to set 2027 output baselines, which form the basis for quotas.

This ​debate will likely happen later in 2026 and hence OPEC+ is ​likely to pause ⁠its output increases for the fourth quarter, sources earlier told Reuters. The statement on Sunday made no mention of policy beyond October.

Only the seven OPEC+ members who met on Sunday, plus ⁠the United ​Arab Emirates until it left OPEC in May, have ​been involved in monthly output decisions in recent years.

Trump Sinking Deeper into the Marsh

Donald Trump may have entered the war against Iran believing that overwhelming American and Israeli military power would deliver a quick and decisive victory. Instead, he appears to be sinking deeper into a strategic marsh. The more he struggles to secure the outcome he expected, the more complicated the consequences seem to become.

The first problem is that Trump joined Israel in a war against Iran without a sufficiently broad coalition of trusted American allies. What may have been conceived as an assertion of American power has increasingly exposed the limitations of unilateral action. Iran has suffered enormous damage, but it has also demonstrated a resilience that appears to have exceeded Washington’s expectations.

The second—and perhaps more serious—problem is Trump’s mindset. He appears reluctant to consider that his original assumptions may have been wrong. If Iran cannot be forced into submission, continuing the war carries mounting costs; yet accepting this reality could require Trump to acknowledge a strategic miscalculation.

The regional consequences are equally troubling. Arab governments may increasingly perceive that, when American and Arab interests diverge, Israel remains Washington’s first choice for protection. The confrontation around the Strait of Hormuz adds another layer of resentment. Gulf economies depend heavily on uninterrupted crude exports, and restrictions on shipping threaten their interests even when they are not parties to the conflict.

Meanwhile, Iran is not isolated. Israel’s claim that China is providing technical expertise to Tehran points to an increasingly important dimension of the conflict - America may be pushing Iran closer to a powerful strategic partner.

The consequences are spreading beyond the Middle East. The withdrawal of American aircraft carriers from the South China Sea has weakened Washington’s immediate naval posture in an area where China is the principal challenger.

At the same time, depleted US arsenals, after years of support for Ukraine and the demands of the Iran conflict, could constrain Washington’s ability to respond elsewhere.

Then comes oil. Despite the disruption surrounding the Strait of Hormuz, crude prices have not reached the dramatic US$200-per-barrel level that would have transformed the economic equation in America’s favor.

Trump therefore faces an increasingly difficult choice: continue the war and risk sinking deeper, or seek an exit that could be portrayed as retreat.

The marsh may no longer be Iran. It may be Trump’s own conviction that admitting a mistake is more dangerous than continuing to struggle.

USS Abraham Lincoln: A Metaphor for a Depleted America

The arrival of the USS Abraham Lincoln in Thailand should prompt more than curiosity about the rusty appearance of an American supercarrier. It offers a striking metaphor for the condition of the United States itself.

The almost 1,100-foot-long carrier arrived at Laem Chabang after an extraordinary 286 days without a full rest-and-relaxation port call. Much of that period was reportedly spent conducting grueling combat operations against Iran. Its heavily rusted hull tells the story of prolonged deployment, while reports of supply shortages and morale problems raise questions about the condition of its crew.

To be fair, rust on a warship after prolonged deployment is not unusual. Naval experts say removing it requires substantial maintenance that cannot easily be undertaken during combat operations. The issue, therefore, is not simply the rust. It is the prolonged deployment that produced it.

That distinction carries a much larger message.

The United States appears to be confronting a similar problem - too many commitments, enormous financial burdens and insufficient time to replenish the resources consumed by sustained military operations.

Federal debt has climbed to around US$40 trillion, while prolonged conflicts and military commitments have placed extraordinary demands on defense resources. Concerns about ammunition stocks and replenishment have further exposed the limits of maintaining high-intensity operations indefinitely.

But the deeper problem is strategic rather than physical or financial. The real test of a superpower is not how much it can spend or how many weapons it possesses, but whether it can translate overwhelming capabilities into clearly defined and achievable political objectives.

This is where the contrast with Donald Trump's promise of “Make America Great Again” (MAGA) becomes uncomfortable.

Greatness cannot be measured merely by bigger ships, larger defense budgets or louder rhetoric. It requires a resilient economy, sustainable military power, sound strategy and the ability to achieve stated objectives without exhausting the resources needed for tomorrow.

The USS Abraham Lincoln may simply need maintenance after an unusually long deployment. But as a metaphor, it raises a more consequential question, is America replenishing its power—or exhausting it?

MAGA promised to make America great again. The rust on the Lincoln suggests that, before greatness can be restored, America may first need to repair, replenish and rethink the way it exercises its power.

 

Trump Has Weakened the United States

Make America Great Again (MAGA) was sold to Americans as a promise to restore the United States to a golden age—greater economic vitality, stronger sovereignty and renewed global influence. But as Donald Trump's second term approaches its midpoint, the record increasingly suggests the opposite - America may be becoming more powerful in rhetoric, but weaker in substance.

Trump is undoubtedly one of the most consequential presidents in modern American history. The problem is that many of the consequences of his policies have been damaging not only to American society but also to the country's relative power and standing in the world.

America's greatest strength has never rested solely on its military or economic might. It has also depended on the credibility of its commitments. Allies cooperate with Washington because they believe its promises will endure beyond the next political cycle. Trump's repeated threats against NATO, public attacks on allies and abrupt shifts in foreign policy have weakened that confidence while creating opportunities for adversaries.

His transactional approach to diplomacy has produced another cost, unpredictability. Tariff threats, sudden policy reversals and pressure on partners have made it increasingly difficult for governments to know where Washington will stand tomorrow. Trade wars have also imposed costs on American consumers, farmers and manufacturers while inviting retaliation.

At home, the damage is equally consequential. Persistent attacks on the judiciary, media, intelligence agencies and electoral institutions have deepened political polarization and eroded public trust. A democracy that increasingly doubts its own institutions cannot project the same confidence abroad.

The consequences extend to America's fiscal position and long-term resilience. Large deficits, rising debt, weakened climate preparedness and politicization of national-security decisions constrain the country's ability to respond effectively to future crises.

MAGA promised to make America great again. Yet greatness is not measured by how loudly a nation asserts its power, but by how effectively it converts economic strength, democratic institutions, alliances and international trust into lasting influence.

Trump may have strengthened the politics of grievance, but he has weakened the foundations of American power. In seeking to put America first, he risks leaving the United States more divided at home, less trusted abroad and, ultimately, weaker.

Sinokor VLCC abandoned

The crew of the VLCC Senegal Prosperity have been evacuated leaving the tanker abandoned and listing in the Strait of Hormuz. The Liberian-registered 320,780 dwt Senegal Prosperity was struck three times by what were described in security reports as “rockets” while transiting the Strait of Hormuz. The tanker was struck on its port side, engine room, and ballast tank.

According to an update from the Joint Maritime Information Center (JMIC) the Senegal Prosperity was southbound exiting the Strait to the Gulf of Oman and was 4 nm from the Oman coast at the time of the incident on 22:00hrs UTC on 30 August.

JMIC said the Company Security Officer (CSO) reported that all communications were lost with the vessel following the attack and it was dead in the water and listing to port.

The VLCC dropped anchor at position 2619N 05633E. The crew of the vessels were evacuated by the local authorities leaving it abandoned in the Strait of Hormuz off the Omani coast. There no casualties among the crew.

The tanker's last broadcast AIS position was two days ago offshore from Ju Aymah Oil Terminal in Saudi Arabia, in a laden condition on 28 August, according to data from Pole Star Global.

Meanwhile US forces undertook further strikes on 1 September on Iranian military targets bordering the Strait.

“US forces struck Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) targets including air defense sites, radar systems, maritime assets and facilities, mine laying capabilities, and communications sites,” US Central Command said.

“The strikes follow recent attempted attacks by the IRGC against commercial shipping in the Strait of Hormuz and against American service members.”

Courtesy: Seatrade Maritime News

 

US-Israel war on Iran: No End in Sight

The US-Israel war on Iran, launched on February 28, 2026, has completed six months—far longer than President Donald Trump’s initial claim that the conflict would be over within weeks. More troublingly, there is still no credible indication that the war is nearing an end.

A Washington Post report marking the six-month anniversary noted that Trump’s ability to achieve a decisive victory has declined sharply. Iran has demonstrated that it can withstand sustained bombardment while imposing significant costs on the world’s most powerful military through relatively inexpensive mines and drones.

Iran’s most potent weapon, however, has been its ability to disrupt the Strait of Hormuz, a critical global energy artery. Since the war began, oil and gas prices have surged, reportedly costing US consumers an estimated US$71.5 billion more at the pump than they otherwise would have paid.

Trump has repeatedly claimed that the Strait has been reopened. Yet the Post, citing Kpler, a commodities and shipping tracker, reported that more than 100 ships crossed the Strait daily before the war, compared with just five on one day this week. The stark difference between presidential claims and reality underscores the difficulty Washington faces in restoring normal shipping.

The Associated Press has highlighted another significant shift: Washington is increasingly relying on sanctions rather than military force to pressure Tehran. The move reportedly reflects concerns over dwindling US munitions and the potential impact of a prolonged conflict on American military readiness elsewhere.

Trump’s rhetoric has also changed. The president who once promised a quick victory now says he is “not in a hurry” to end the campaign.

Former US Defense Intelligence Agency officer Harrison Mann has argued that Trump has “lost the Iran War in every way possible,” citing failures to force regime change, ignite a Kurdish uprising and restore normal traffic through the Strait of Hormuz.

Six months of war have produced an outcome dramatically different from Washington’s expectations. Iran has survived the assault and strengthened its strategic leverage, while the US faces mounting economic, military and diplomatic costs.

With neither side appearing ready to concede and no clear political settlement in sight, the most sobering conclusion is simple, “The Iran war has entered its seventh month with no end in sight.”

Hormuz Security: Responsibility and Compensation Must Go Together

The decision by Britain and France to lead a multinational military mission to secure navigation through the Strait of Hormuz deserves careful scrutiny. While the initiative is being presented as an effort to protect freedom of navigation, it raises a more fundamental question, why should extra-regional powers assume responsibility for a waterway that lies between Iran and Oman?

The Strait of Hormuz is one of the world's most strategically important maritime passages. A substantial portion of global energy supplies and commercial cargo passes through it every day. Ensuring its safety is therefore essential, but geography cannot be ignored. Iran and Oman are the two littoral states that share the Strait. They have the greatest stake in maintaining peace, stability and uninterrupted maritime traffic.

Iran has consistently maintained that the security of the Strait should remain the responsibility of the countries bordering it. That position deserves serious consideration. History has shown that the involvement of outside military powers often complicates regional disputes instead of resolving them. The deployment of multinational naval forces may appear reassuring to some, but it can also intensify strategic competition and increase the risk of confrontation.

It is also difficult to believe that Britain and France are acting entirely on their own. Their initiative appears to reflect a broader Western security strategy in which the United States prefers to remain in the background while its closest allies take the lead. Whether this perception is accurate or not, it is one that many countries in the region are likely to share.

If Iran and Oman are expected to shoulder the responsibility of safeguarding one of the world's busiest maritime corridors, then responsibility and compensation should go hand in hand. Maintaining maritime surveillance, search-and-rescue services, navigation support and security infrastructure requires significant financial resources.

It is therefore reasonable to argue that Iran and Oman should be entitled to levy a regulated transit toll on commercial vessels using the Strait to recover the cost of providing this essential international service.

The Strait of Hormuz belongs to its geography before it belongs to global geopolitics. Lasting maritime security will be achieved not through the presence of foreign warships, but by recognizing the primary responsibility—and the corresponding rights—of Iran and Oman.

PSX benchmark index up 4%WoW

Pakistan Stock Exchange (PSX) witnessed positive momentum during the week ended on June 18, 2026, driven by a promising US-Iran deal causing oil prices to fall below US$80/ bbl, a 3-month low, alongside a favorable budget for most sectors including Cement, Steel, Refineries, Textile, Pharma and Tech, coupled with reduction/ elimination of super tax for individuals and corporates. The sentiments were further supported by a status quo by the central bank in its Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) meeting on Tuesday. However, the postponement of commencement of technical talks between US and Iran during Friday’s early hours slightly tempered the momentum on the final day, despite an overall positive week. The benchmark Index gained 6,523 points or 4%WoW, to close the week at 178,923 points. Market participation improved considerably, with average daily trading volume increasing by 53%WoW to 1.4 billion shares, as against 900 million shares in the prior week.

On the macroeconomic front, Current Account showed a surplus of US$459 million in May 2026, as against a deficit of US$44 million in same period last year.

IT exports rose 13%YoY to US$373 million during the same month.

Yields in the first PIB auction following the recent MPC declined by to 12.14%, 12.09%, 12.19%, and 12.61% for 2, 3, 5 and 10 year tenors, respectively.

LSM index rose 6.4%YoY in 10MFY26.

Urea offtakes remained flat YoY at 419,000 tons in May 2026 and DAP sales fell 36%YoY due to higher prices.

Other major news flow during the week included: 1) oil and gas shipments through Strait of Hurmuz commenced after signing of MOU between United States and Iran, 2) foreign exchange reserves held by SBP rose to US$17.2 billion as of June 12, 2026, 3) Power generation declined 1% in May, 4) Power sector circular debt rose to PKR1.9 trillion in 10MFY26, and 5) Textile exports rose 2%YoY to US$16.7 billion in 11MFY26.

Top performing sectors were: Vanaspati & Allied Industries, Transport, and Jute, while laggards included: Property, Woolen, and Sugar & Allied Industries

Major buying was recorded by Mutual Funds of US$63.4 million. Major selling was recorded by Insurance amounting to US$59.7 million.

Top performing scrips were: SSOM, PSX, SNGP, SSGC, and FATIMA, while laggards included: JVDC, HCAR, TRG, BNWM, and ATLH.

According to AKD Securities, compliance of peace deal along with positive outcomes of technical talks between US and Iran, followed by favorable financial results for the period ended June 30, 2026, will support market sentiment in the near term.

Market continues to trade at attractive valuations.

The brokerage forecast the benchmark Index to reach 263,800 by end December 2026.

Top picks of the brokerage house include: OGDC, PPL, UBL, MEBL, HBL, FFC, ENGROH, PSO, LUCK, FCCL, INDU, ILP and SYS.