Escalation Carries Costs World Cannot Afford

The debate surrounding the Strait of Hormuz increasingly appears to be moving in a dangerous direction. Attention seems focused on how quickly the waterway can be reopened and how strongly pressure can be applied. Yet a larger question deserves equal attention, what if the cure becomes costlier than the disease itself?

The Strait of Hormuz is not merely a strategic water passage. It is one of the world’s most critical economic arteries. Any prolonged disruption affects much more than regional politics. Energy markets react instantly, shipping costs rise, insurance premiums climb, and financial markets begin pricing uncertainty into almost every sector.

The present concern is not simply the blockade itself. The greater risk lies in the assumption that military escalation automatically delivers rapid political results. History often suggests otherwise. Military pressure can create consequences that continue long after the original objective has been achieved.

Another issue relates to perception and diplomacy. The impression that US President Donald Trump often adopts forceful positions and occasionally shifts messaging rapidly could create uncertainty among allies and adversaries alike. In international crises, predictability can become a strategic asset. Markets and partners generally respond more positively to clarity than to uncertainty.

Arab states also have reasons to remain cautious. Their economies have spent decades building themselves around trade, finance, logistics, and regional stability. Few would welcome being pulled into an expanding confrontation carrying uncertain outcomes.

Meanwhile, larger powers cannot be ignored. If Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin conclude that their strategic or economic interests are being threatened, increased diplomatic or political involvement may further complicate the situation.

The real warning is becoming difficult to ignore. The issue may no longer be whether the Strait of Hormuz is reopened. The larger question is whether attempts to force a quick solution end up creating a much wider economic shock. History repeatedly shows that markets can recover from temporary disruptions. Recovering from a broader geopolitical fracture is often far more difficult.

Trump: Diplomat, Opportunist, Hypocrite or Simply a Gambler?

The latest headline in Nikkei Asia — “Trump calls Xi ‘great leader,’ vows ties will be better than ever” — once again exposes the extraordinary contradictions that define the politics of US President, Donald Trump. Only recently, Trump had declared that the United States did not require Chinese cooperation to deal with a possible blockade of the Strait of Hormuz. At the same time, Washington continued tightening sanctions targeting the movement of Iranian oil to China while portraying Beijing as America’s principal strategic adversary.

The sudden shift in tone raises a serious question, who exactly is Donald Trump — a diplomat, an opportunist, a hypocrite, or simply a political gambler?

Diplomacy normally relies on consistency, credibility, and strategic clarity. Trump’s style appears fundamentally different. His statements often seem driven less by coherent long-term policy and more by immediate political or economic convenience. One-day China is accused of exploiting global trade, weakening American industry, and threatening international security. The next day, Xi Jinping is described as a “great leader” and bilateral relations are promised a bright future.

Such contradictions may energize domestic political audiences, but these simultaneously weaken America’s diplomatic credibility abroad. Allies struggle to understand Washington’s actual strategic direction, while rivals increasingly view American policy as transactional and unpredictable.

The contradiction becomes even sharper when examined alongside Trump’s broader policies. Sanctions on Chinese-linked Iranian oil trade, aggressive tariff rhetoric, restrictions on technology exports, and repeated efforts to economically isolate Beijing all reinforce the perception that Trump views China less as a business partner and more as a geopolitical foe. Yet whenever economic pressure begins unsettling American markets or threatening global supply chains, the rhetoric suddenly softens.

When a leader repeatedly alternates between portraying China as an existential threat and praising its leadership as indispensable, critics naturally begin questioning whether such statements reflect genuine policy or merely political convenience.

This is not classical diplomacy. It resembles high-stakes bargaining where confrontation and praise are alternated to maximize leverage. Trump appears convinced that unpredictability itself is a negotiating weapon. However, unpredictability may work in real estate deals; it becomes dangerous in global geopolitics.

Great powers can survive hostile rivals, but they struggle under inconsistent leadership. The real danger for America may not be China’s rise, but Washington’s inability to decide whether Beijing is an enemy to confront or a partner it ultimately cannot live without.

Trump Lost Before the Game Started

The recent visit of Donald Trump to China was presented as a major diplomatic engagement aimed at resetting communication between the world’s two largest economies. Yet, even before substantive discussions began, the visit exposed an uncomfortable geopolitical reality for Washington - the United States appeared to need China’s cooperation more than China needed American approval.

For years, Trump built his political narrative around confronting China. Tariffs, technology restrictions, sanctions, and economic pressure were all designed to slow Beijing’s rise and reinforce American dominance. However, global developments have revealed the limitations of pressure-driven diplomacy in an increasingly interconnected world.

The contradiction became particularly visible in the context of the Iran conflict. Senior American officials openly acknowledged that China possesses considerable leverage because of its close economic relationship with Tehran and its dependence on Iranian oil supplies. Washington’s indirect appeal for Beijing’s assistance in stabilizing the Strait of Hormuz was more than a diplomatic request; it was recognition that China has become an indispensable stakeholder in global crisis management.

Trade tensions further underline this strategic reversal. After years of tariff wars that disrupted supply chains and increased costs worldwide, both sides are now seeking mechanisms to preserve economic engagement. Discussions surrounding new trade and investment coordination frameworks suggest that confrontation alone failed to produce the decisive advantage Washington once expected.

At the same time, difficult issues remain unresolved. Differences over Taiwan, semiconductor restrictions, artificial intelligence, and human rights continue to shape relations between the two powers. Yet despite these disputes, the United States still finds itself compelled to engage Beijing on virtually every major global challenge.

This is where the symbolism of Trump’s visit becomes important. A leader who once projected China as an adversary to be economically isolated has now arrived seeking cooperation on trade stability, regional security, and technological governance. Diplomatically, the visit may produce positive optics. Strategically, it reflects a deeper shift in global politics.

Great powers can impose sanctions, launch tariff wars, and escalate rhetoric, but they cannot indefinitely ignore geopolitical realities. In today’s emerging multipolar order, influence increasingly belongs not to the loudest power, but to the one others cannot afford to bypass.

The 700-Million-Barrel Oil Shock

Based on the projection from the Kepler Institute, by the final week of April 2026, the cumulative deficit in oil supply resulting from the closure of the Strait of Hormuz will hit 700 million barrels.

The closure of the Strait of Hormuz has presented the world with one of the most critical oil supply disruptions in modern history and has driven prices sharply upward. Unlike past shocks triggered by wars or embargoes, this blockage strikes at the very jugular of global energy logistics.

According to a fresh assessment by the Kepler Institute, an ongoing halt to oil tanker transit through the Strait of Hormuz until the end of April 2026 could push the global energy market into an extraordinary crisis, bringing the total oil supply deficit caused by this closure to approximately 700 million barrels. This drop in supply has triggered one of the largest oil shocks of the current era. By April 12, around 300 million barrels of oil had been removed from the supply chain due to the stoppage of traffic through this vital chokepoint — a corridor that carries roughly 20% of the world's daily oil demand.

In the wake of this disruption, Brent crude oil prices have surpassed US$100 per barrel, and the cost of refined products such as jet fuel has risen above US$200 per barrel — a scenario that has set off the phenomenon of demand destruction, leading airlines to cancel numerous flight routes, consumer countries to impose fuel rationing and mandatory remote work, and the International Energy Agency to revise downward its 2026 oil demand growth forecast.

Meanwhile, Saudi Arabia, by leveraging the full capacity of its East-West pipeline, and the United Arab Emirates, via the Fujairah export route, are attempting to offset part of the supply shortfall.

Conversely, Iraq has been largely incapacitated, with its exports collapsing from 4 million to less than 900,000 barrels per day. Without immediate diplomatic intervention, smaller Persian Gulf states may soon follow Iraq into paralysis.

Kepler cautions that even if the crisis is resolved immediately, the process of market recovery will not be swift, and the volume of lost oil could reach one billion barrels before the supply chain is fully restored. 

Two potential paths lie ahead for the market. In the favorable scenario, limited demand contraction and a gradual easing of the crisis over the next several weeks are anticipated. However, in the unfavorable scenario, continued disruption into the third quarter of the year could push oil prices toward US$190 per barrel and cause demand destruction on the order of several million barrels per day — an outcome that would be even more severe than the oil crisis of the 1970s. 

 

PSX benchmark index down 4.5%WoW

Pakistan Stock Exchange (PSX) remained in the grip of bears during the ended on April 30, 206. The benchmark index shed 7,677 points, down 4.5%WoW to close at 162,994 points, with average daily trading volume declining to 1.2 billion shares, down 30%WoW.

The most dominant factor contributing to this decline was the collapse of the Iran-US talks, where the US President cancelled a planned trip of his envoys to Pakistan. Consequently, oil prices remained elevated through the week, with the June’26 Brent contract hitting a high of US$126/ bbl.

Adding to this was decision by State Bank of Pakistan (SBP) to raise the policy rate by 100bps to 11.5% on Monday, the first rate hike in over two and half years.

The prolonged Middle East conflict was termed to be the primary driver for raising the policy rate, attributing inflation to remain above the target range in the next few quarters.

However, a positive development was the confirmation of the IMF Executive Board meeting scheduled for May 08, 2026 to consider approval of the US$1.2 billion tranche under the EFF and RSF programs.

Foreign exchange reserves held by SBP as of April 24, 2026 were reported at US$15.8 billion.

Other major news flow during the week included: 1) Pakistan clears US$3.45 billion loan to UAE, 2) Pakistan plans launch of Panda Bonds, 3) IMF okays 60% cut in gas levy, 4) No let-up in Pakistan’s efforts for US-Iran peace, and 5) Pakistan's weekly oil import bill rises to US$800 million amid US-Iran conflict.

Top performing sectors were: Textile Weaving, Tobacco, and Auto Assemblers, while laggards included: Vanaspati, Property, and Woolen.

Major selling was recorded by Mutual funds, and Brokers amounting to US$28.6 million and US$3.1 million respectively.

Major buyers were Individuals, and Companies with net buy of US$27.4 million and US$1.4 million respectively.

Top performing scrips were: HCAR, MEHT, INDU, PAKT, and MTL, while laggards included: YOUW, NBP, SSOM, GADT, and SSGC.

According to AKD Securities, a constructive resolution of US-Iran would remain the pivotal near-term catalyst for the market direction, with softening of oil prices to act as a trigger. Market continues to trade at attractive valuations.

Top picks of the brokerage house include: OGDC, PPL, UBL, MEBL, HBL, FFC, ENGROH, PSO, LUCK, FCCL, INDU, ILP and SYS.

PSX benchmark index down 1.9%WoW

Pakistan Stock Exchange (PSX) witnessed reversal of momentum during this past week, the benchmark index shed 3,267 points, down 1.9%WoW to close at 170,672, as investors tried to understand more complex geopolitical realities following last week's ceasefire driven rally.

The average daily trading volume rose to 1,665 million shares - up 31.7%WoW, with investor risk appetite witnessing pullbacks as US-Iran diplomatic talks encountered fresh hiccups. However, sentiment returned during second half of Friday’s session as Iran confirmed the arrival of its foreign minister to Pakistan over the weekend.

Furthermore, US president’s indefinite extension of the ceasefire on Tuesday, hours before its expiry kept hopes of resolution alive and prevented a material selloff as well.

Oil prices rose 3.2%WoW to US$104.8/ bbl, as Iran's seizure of two container vessels attempting to transit the Strait of Hormuz reignited supply disruption fears.

On the macroeconomic front, IMF’s executive board is expected to consider approval of the fourth tranche of the 37-month program during May’26.

Foreign exchange reserves held by State Bank of Pakistan (SBP) rose to US$15.1 billion.

Other major news flow during the week included: 1) Pakistan ups Eurobond issuance to US$750 millio, 2) IMF to vet auto policy before cabinet, 3) IMF urges removal of non-tariff curbs, 4) Pakistan seeks LNG spot cargoes after December, and 5) First Central Asian shipment reaches Pakistan via China.

Top active sectors were: Textile Weaving, Refinery, Synthetic & Rayon, while lagged included: Jute, Pharmaceuticals, and Cement.

Major selling was recorded by Insurance, and Other Organization aggregating to US$16.9 million. Individuals and Companies emerged net buyers with US$17.2 million.

Top performing scrips included: YOUW, ATRL, GADT, IBFL, and MUREB, while laggards included: PIOC, DGKC, ISL, CPHL, and MLCF.

AKD Securities believes that a constructive resolution would remain the pivotal near-term catalyst for the market direction, with any positive developments over the weekend becoming the trigger.

According to the brokerage house, despite the recent recovery, market continues to trade at attractive values.

Top picks of the brokerage house include: OGDC, PPL, UBL, MEBL, HBL, FFC, ENGROH, PSO, LUCK, FCCL, INDU, ILP and SYS.

 

What Next? Escalation not a solution

As the fragile truce nears its end, the diplomatic space between United States and Iran appears to be narrowing rather than expanding. Signals from both sides suggest that compromise remains elusive. If Tehran refuses to accept Washington’s terms—as appears likely—the question is no longer whether tensions will rise, but how far escalation might go.

Rhetoric from Donald Trump has reinforced a posture of maximum pressure, where the implicit belief is that overwhelming force can compel compliance. Yet history offers a more sobering lesson: coercion against resilient states rarely produces submission. Instead, it hardens positions and invites asymmetric responses.

Iran’s strategic doctrine is built precisely for such scenarios. Without matching conventional military strength, it retains the capacity to disrupt through missile reach, proxy networks, and its geographic proximity to critical energy corridors. Even a limited confrontation could unsettle the Gulf, placing key oil infrastructure at risk and sending shockwaves through global markets. In such a scenario, the very objective often attributed to US strategy—securing long-term influence over energy flows—would be undermined by instability and destruction.

The risks are not confined to the immediate theatre. Escalation in the Gulf increases the probability of miscalculation, where unintended actors or incidents widen the conflict. Not every escalation becomes global, but the absence of clear off-ramps makes containment far more difficult once hostilities resume.

This is the central contradiction - a strategy designed to enforce compliance may instead erode control. Military superiority does not automatically translate into political outcomes, particularly in conflicts where the adversary’s threshold for pain is structurally higher and its response options more diffuse.

For Washington, the more effective path lies not in testing the outer limits of force, but in recognizing the limits of coercion itself.

A calibrated approach—however politically inconvenient—offers a better chance of preserving stability than a conflict whose consequences would be both immediate and enduring.