Other GCC Members Must Listen to Qatar

Qatar’s call for a regional security framework bringing the Gulf states and Iran together deserves serious attention from all GCC members. Speaking at the Qatar Economic Forum on the sidelines of the 81st UN General Assembly in New York, Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Sheikh Mohammed bin Abdulrahman Al Thani described the recent regional war as a “wake-up call” for the region.

His argument is straightforward; Iran is a geographical reality and a permanent neighbour of the Gulf states. Sustainable security, therefore, cannot depend exclusively on military alliances or arrangements that leave one or more regional states permanently exposed to insecurity. Doha is advocating a framework based on sovereignty, non-aggression, confidence-building and dialogue.

This does not require the GCC to overlook Iran’s actions or security concerns. Rather, it recognizes that deterrence and diplomacy have different but complementary roles. Military preparedness may deter aggression, but it cannot by itself eliminate the sources of recurring confrontation.

Recent developments have demonstrated how quickly a regional conflict can affect energy supplies, shipping routes, investment, trade and global markets.

Sheikh Mohammed described the economic consequences of the US-Israel war on Iran as an “earthquake” whose shock waves extended far beyond the Middle East.

The Gulf states have strong reasons to coordinate their security policies. But coordination among GCC members alone cannot address every source of regional tension. Geography makes coexistence with Iran unavoidable, while economic interdependence makes prolonged instability increasingly costly.

Qatar has also emphasized mediation, maintaining communication channels and working with regional and international partners to reduce tensions. Such efforts may not resolve fundamental differences, but they can create mechanisms for managing them.

The real question is therefore not whether the GCC should abandon deterrence or its external security partnerships. It is whether these arrangements should be complemented by a regional security architecture in which Gulf states and Iran can address threats, build confidence and prevent crises from escalating into wider conflicts.

Other GCC members may indeed have much to consider in Qatar’s proposal. A durable Gulf security system will ultimately require regional ownership, mutual confidence and sustained communication—including with Iran.

Is the US Gulping Middle Eastern Oil?

More than one billion barrels of crude oil have transited the Strait of Hormuz in recent months under a US military blockade, US Central Command (CENTCOM) said Saturday.

“CENTCOM forces have supported more than 1 billion barrels of crude oil leaving the Gulf,” Adm. Brad Cooper said in remarks released by the command.

US forces have also assisted more than 2,000 commercial vessel transits through the strategic waterway by providing coordinated protection. The strait’s primary transit lanes had been cleared of mines, allowing thousands of ships to pass through the waterway.

At the same time, Cooper said Iran had exported “zero barrels” of oil, attributing the halt to what he described as the US “ironclad blockade.”

The volume of crude oil, cargo and liquefied natural gas moving through the strait over the past two weeks was higher than at any point during the previous six months.

US has been working with Gulf Cooperation Council countries, insurers and shipping companies to further increasing traffic through the Strait of Hormuz, one of the world’s key energy transit routes.

 

Multinational Maritime Coalition: But Where Is the Real Problem?

The latest meeting of the Multinational Maritime Defense Coalition raises a basic question: what exactly is this coalition being created to achieve? The question becomes even more pertinent when representatives of 41 countries, including 154 naval commanders, planners, ambassadors and European Union officials, gather in Jeddah to prepare for operational deployment. The coalition now has 28 liaison officers and has reached Initial Operational Capability.

Its declared objective is straightforward - protect freedom of navigation, maritime routes and strategic straits through a coordinated multinational defensive framework.

But here lies the paradox. If freedom of navigation is the objective, why is the Strait of Hormuz not at the center of the discussion?

I do not subscribe to the narrative that Iran alone is responsible for the disruption of navigation through Hormuz. The present crisis followed the US-Israeli attack on Iran on February 28, while negotiations were reportedly underway. Since then, a cycle of military action and retaliation has continued, with attacks on strategic assets and shipping followed by Iranian responses.

The consequences extend well beyond Iran. The disruption is also hurting the oil-producing Arab economies of the Gulf, whose exports depend heavily on secure maritime routes. Hundreds of ships and thousands of seafarers have reportedly remained unable to sail safely through the strait for months.

This creates an uncomfortable contradiction. A coalition established in the name of maritime freedom cannot effectively address the problem by treating only one side of the conflict as responsible.

The immediate requirement is therefore not another layer of military coordination. It is de-escalation and restoration of freedom of navigation.

The United States should remove restrictions affecting Iranian shipping and work with all relevant parties to restore safe and unhindered passage through the Strait of Hormuz, including for Iranian-owned and Iranian-operated vessels.

Freedom of navigation cannot be selective. If it is genuinely a shared international interest, it must apply to everyone—or the principle itself is undermined.

PSX benchmark index closes almost flat

Pakistan Stock Exchange (PSX) remained volatile during the week ended on September 18, 2026. The benchmark Index gained 372 points or 0.22%WoW during the week to close at 170,885 points.

Yemeni Houthi attacks on Saudi Arabia's East-West Pipeline forced the closure of a key export route, pushing Brent crude to a 4-month high of US$109.7/ bbl.

Oil prices eased during the final two days, with the index recovering as fading concerns over immediate Saudi supply disruptions ultimately outweighed fears of a broader Middle East conflict.

The GoP reintroduced austerity measures in an effort to conserve fuel.

Pakistan’s central bank kept the policy rate unchanged at 11.50% on Monday, in line with broad market consensus.

Current account deficit narrowed sharply by 70%YoY to US$98 million in August 2026.

Foreign exchange reserves held by SBP forex hit a record high of US$21.4 billion, pushing the country's import cover past three months for the first time in 5-Years.

Yields on 3 and 6 month T-bills declined to 11.38% and 11.70%, respectively, in the latest auction.

FDI increased by 80%YoY to US$316 million during August 2026.

Auto industry sales increased by 11%YoY to 17,485 units in August 2026, while IT exports rose 17%YoY to US$394 million.

Other major news flow during the week included: 1) GoP presents IMF plan to retire PKR3.6 trillion gas-sector circular debt, 2) Pakistan eyes to seek an expansion of its 30 billions yuan swap line with China, 3) Pakistan cotton arrivals rose by 19%YoY to 2.4 million bales as of September this year, 4) Auto financing in August 2026 reached record high of PKR393 billion, and 5) GoP approves PKR75 billion subsidy for fuel relief scheme.

Leading sectors were: Synthetic and Rayon, Leasing Companies, and Real Estate Investment Trust.

while the lagged included: Textile Weaving, Paper & Board, and Leathers & Tanneries.

Major buyers were Individuals (US$11.0 million) and Banks (US$2.6 million). Major selling was recorded by Mutual Funds (US$12.7 million) and Foreigners (US$3.4 million).

Top performing scrips of the week were: PSEL, IBFL, and CPHL, while the laggards included: GHNI, GAL, and NBP.

AKD Securities expects the market to improve on the back of strengthening economic indicators, with the upcoming IMF review in the next week to remain a key near-term catalyst.

A potential US-Iran deal could moderate international oil prices from current elevated levels, the market continues to trade at attractive valuations.

The brokerage house forecasts the Index to reach 263,800 by end December 2026.

Top picks of the brokerage house include: OGDC, PPL, UBL, MEBL, HBL, FFC, ENGROH, PSO, LUCK, FCCL, INDU, ILP and SYS.

Hormuz Shuttle Tankers: An Evolving Trend Amid the US-Israel war on Iran

According to a report by Seatrade Maritime News, the disruption of shipping through the Strait of Hormuz is creating a new pattern in the regional oil trade - shuttle tankers are increasingly moving crude from the Persian Gulf to the Gulf of Oman, where cargoes are transferred ship-to-ship (STS) for onward delivery.

The trend is illustrated by the Hong Kong-flagged VLCC Cospearl Lake, which recently reached Dalian, China, carrying about two million barrels of crude loaded through an STS transfer in the Gulf of Oman rather than directly from a Persian Gulf terminal. Such operations allow exporters and buyers to keep oil moving while reducing exposure to the increasingly risky and costly Hormuz transit.

The United Arab Emirates (UAE) has emerged as a key player in this shuttle trade. Regional exporters are using tankers to transport crude through the Strait and transfer it to waiting vessels outside the Gulf. This complements conventional voyages by tankers that continue directly to their destinations.

The Mombasa B provides an important example. The VLCC, chartered by UAE's ADNOC from Sinokor Maritime, entered the Persian Gulf in April and subsequently began shuttling between Gulf loading terminals and the Gulf of Oman. Since June, many of its voyages through Hormuz have been conducted as “dark transits,” with AIS signals switched off.

The risks, however, remain substantial. On July 13, Iranian forces targeted the Mombasa B with cruise missiles while it was transiting the waterway. One Indian crew member was killed and eight others injured. Although the tanker suffered material damage, it remained operational and subsequently resumed Hormuz crossings. The vessel has since been placed on Iran's list of “non-compliant” ships.

The UAE is nevertheless expanding its capacity. In August, ADNOC Logistics & Services announced the acquisition of six additional VLCCs. Other regional exporters, including Kuwait, are also using tankers in shuttle operations. Some ADNOC vessels have reportedly carried Iraqi Basrah crude, indicating that the system is evolving into a wider regional network rather than serving only UAE exports.

Kpler data shows that Persian Gulf crude and condensate loadings reached about 5.8 million barrels per day in August, including Gulf of Oman STS transfers, and have risen toward 8 million bpd in September. Iraq has also reportedly offered buyers the option of collecting crude through STS transfers outside Hormuz.

Yet shuttle tankers remain a wartime workaround rather than a replacement for normal trade routes. They require additional vessels, increase costs and operational complexity, and remain vulnerable to attack. With Iranian oil exports reportedly falling sharply and tensions continuing around the Omani corridor, Tehran may have greater incentive to disrupt these alternative supply chains.

The emerging shuttle trade therefore demonstrates the adaptability of the global oil market—but also highlights how deeply the Iran war has altered the economics, logistics and security of energy transportation through the Gulf.

Will Another Media Narrative Push the Muslim World Towards War?

The Western media, which played a major role in building the narrative that Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction, appears to be following a familiar script in the Middle East. This time, Iran is being projected not merely as an adversary of the United States and Israel, but increasingly as a threat to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.

Since the US and Israel jointly attacked Iran on February 28, the narrative surrounding Iran has intensified. For decades, Western policymakers and media outlets have repeatedly presented Iran as a greater threat to the region than Israel. The question is whether this narrative is now being expanded to create a direct confrontation between Iran and the Arab Gulf states.

There is another important distinction that deserves attention. The United States maintains military facilities and assets in several GCC countries. When Iran retaliates against American military targets, reports can easily create the impression that Iran is attacking the territory of the Gulf state hosting those facilities. The distinction between an attack on a US military asset and an attack on the host country should not be lost.

When attempts to pressure or destabilize Iran failed to produce the expected outcome, the familiar sectarian card also appeared. Reports involving the alleged killing of a Sunni cleric were circulated with the potential to inflame Shia-Sunni tensions, although subsequent developments did not substantiate the dramatic interpretation initially suggested.

Now comes an even more sensitive issue, reports that the Houthis targeted Mecca.

Saudi authorities say a Houthi drone was intercepted south of Mecca, while the Houthis deny targeting the holy city. Such a serious allegation demands independent verification, not sensational headlines.

The danger is obvious. Mecca and Medina are not Saudi-Iranian, Shia-Sunni or Arab-Persian issues. They belong to the entire Muslim Ummah.

The Iraq WMD narrative demonstrated how devastating a questionable intelligence narrative can become when it is converted into political justification for war. The consequences were measured not merely in headlines but in human lives and regional instability.

Muslims should therefore reject attempts to exploit the sanctity of the holy cities for geopolitical or sectarian purposes. If the Houthis actually targeted Mecca or Medina, the evidence should be established transparently. If they did not, the allegation must not be allowed to become the spark for a much larger conflict.

The Muslim world cannot afford another war manufactured through narratives, rumours and sectarian emotions. The first responsibility should be to verify—not to mobilize.

The 2026 US Primaries: Politics Full of Surprises

The 2026 US primary season has delivered an unusual series of surprises, exposing growing pressures within both the Democratic and Republican parties ahead of November’s congressional elections.

On the Democratic side, progressive and democratic-socialist candidates made significant gains by defeating several established lawmakers. Their victories reflected the strength of anti-establishment sentiment among sections of the Democratic electorate and demonstrated that incumbency is no longer an assured advantage.

Republicans, meanwhile, continued to feel the influence of President Donald Trump. His decision to endorse Ken Paxton rather than Senator John Cornyn in the Texas Senate runoff underlined his continuing role in Republican politics. Trump also backed successful primary challenges against several Republican critics, including Cornyn, Representative Thomas Massie and Senator Bill Cassidy.

Trump's influence was not absolute. He suffered notable setbacks in several gubernatorial contests, while the broader primary results showed that his endorsements do not automatically determine outcomes.

The season also raised questions about political polling. Candidates expected to dominate races in Michigan and Wisconsin encountered much stronger competition than anticipated. The revelation that fake polls had circulated in two major contests further damaged confidence in an already scrutinized industry.

Another unexpected development came from Pennsylvania Senator John Fetterman, whose appearance at a Republican convention and praise for Republican Senator Dave McCormick highlighted the ideological and political tensions within the Democratic Party.

In Maine, Graham Platner's rapidly rising campaign collapsed following allegations of sexual misconduct and scrutiny of controversial past posts, forcing Democrats to select a replacement candidate.

Meanwhile, a Supreme Court ruling affecting the Voting Rights Act triggered new congressional redistricting in several Southern states, potentially altering the balance of House seats.

With Election Day only weeks away, the primaries have revealed a fluid American political landscape in which incumbents, party establishments, polling expectations and even traditional party loyalties face increasing pressure.

Modi and Xi agree to look beyond differences

All eyes were on India last weekend as Prime Minister Narendra Modi played host for the annual BRICS summit. The event marked Chinese President Xi Jinping's first visit to India since a clash in a disputed border region in 2020 left 20 Indian and four Chinese soldiers dead. The 11-member bloc makes up about 40% of the global economy, but its two heavyweights India and China have often veered between hostility and cooperation.

On the sidelines of the summit, Xi and Modi once again reaffirmed the importance of long-term cooperation, especially with world trade being reshaped by volatile US tariff policies. But you wouldn't be blamed for skepticism here, analysts told Nikkei Asia.

India's trade deficit with China has ballooned over the years, and its dependence on imports from its neighbor in sectors ranging from electronics to electric vehicles remains stark. But for Chinese companies seeking new growth markets amid mounting domestic overcapacity, India's large and growing market is unmatched.

India wants to move up global value chains, but China's interests are best served if India's import dependence remains where it is. China's restrictions on equipment exports, tech transfers and even business visas have affected Indian manufacturers as the country pushes for self-reliance in critical new-age sectors.

These thorny issues will remain the subject of debate, especially at India's Semicon event beginning on Thursday. This year's three-day conference comes only weeks after India initiated its second semiconductor mission, which places a far bigger emphasis on chip design. In the first mission, 12 projects were approved, including India's first fab, being set up by the Tata group.

India's semiconductor drive will be a crucial test of its ability to build a critical ecosystem in China's shadow its - import dependence is acute in chips and electronic components. As India vies for data center investments, higher localization of manufacturing in chips, components and power systems will be crucial for the biggest ecosystem benefits.

Why Is the President Outside the Stock-Trading Net?

A Bloomberg analysis has raised an intriguing question about the relationship between political power and financial markets in Washington. President Donald Trump and his financial managers reportedly executed nearly 28,700 securities transactions during the 17 months following his second inauguration through June 2026—more than the roughly 22,200 transactions reported collectively by members of Congress over the same period.

The scale is remarkable. Trump’s transactions reportedly involved accounts worth more than US$858 million and covered individual stocks, bonds and cryptocurrencies. This represents a notable shift from his first term, when his assets were primarily associated with real estate.

The volume of trading, does not by itself establish wrongdoing. Trump’s representatives and the Trump Organization have maintained that the accounts are managed by independent third parties and computer-driven models, and that neither Trump nor his family receives advance notice of or exercises control over individual transactions.

Yet the issue raises a broader question of public policy. The United States already has rules against government officials using non-public information obtained through their positions for financial gain. The 2012 Stock Act clarified that insider-trading prohibitions apply to Members of Congress and other government officials. Congressional records also show that lawmakers have repeatedly proposed going further by restricting or banning securities trading by elected officials.

Here the question becomes particularly relevant, if Members of Congress are considered sufficiently exposed to potential conflicts of interest to justify restrictions on their personal investments, why should comparable safeguards not apply to the President?

Not all proposed legislation treats the President differently. Indeed, the proposed Ethics Act would cover Members of Congress, the President and Vice President, while other measures have focused specifically on lawmakers.

That variation itself deserves scrutiny. The President exercises enormous influence over policies involving taxation, tariffs, regulation, energy, defence, trade and international relations—areas capable of affecting the value of financial assets. Even when investments are managed independently, the question of public confidence remains.

The debate, should not be reduced to whether any particular Trump transaction was lawful or unlawful. The more fundamental issue is whether America's conflict-of-interest framework should apply consistently to all elected officials.

If Congress believes that stock trading can create either an actual conflict or the appearance of one, the same principle merits consideration at the highest level of government.

After all, public trust should not depend on whether an elected official occupies a seat on Capitol Hill—or sits in the Oval Office.

Are Houthis Attacking Saudi Oil Tankers - or Is There a Bigger Story?

The reports that Yemen’s Houthis are attacking Saudi oil tankers deserve closer examination. Not because such attacks are impossible, but because the emerging narrative may be more complicated than it appears.

During the height of Israel’s assault on Gaza, the Houthis declared that their maritime campaign was directed primarily against Israeli-owned or Israel-linked vessels and ships carrying goods to and from Israel. Their stated objective was to pressure Israel over Gaza. Against this background, the reported targeting of Saudi tankers represents a significant development.

There is little doubt that Houthi military operations have disrupted commercial shipping in the Red Sea and surrounding waters. But disruption of Saudi shipping does not necessarily mean that every incident represents a deliberate Houthi campaign against Saudi Arabia. The Red Sea, Bab el-Mandeb and Suez Canal form one interconnected maritime corridor. Once security deteriorates, vessels of different nationalities become exposed.

This distinction matters because the dominant Western narrative - “Iran-backed Houthis are attacking Saudi oil tankers and installations” - can simplify a complex regional conflict. Attribution should be based on evidence, while the political context surrounding each incident deserves equal attention.

There is another question that cannot simply be dismissed as conspiracy theory, who benefits from heightened insecurity around Saudi Arabia?

A prolonged Houthi threat could encourage Riyadh to deepen its security relationship with Washington, strengthen arguments for a US security umbrella, increase American arms sales to Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states, and potentially create greater pressure for Saudi Arabia to move closer to the Abraham Accords.

None of these possibilities proves that another actor is secretly attacking Saudi ships. Claims about covert operations or CIA-linked groups require evidence and should not be presented as established fact.

Yet history demonstrates that major geopolitical confrontations rarely involve only the actors appearing on the battlefield. Different powers can exploit the same crisis to advance their own strategic interests.

Therefore, the real issue may not simply be whether Houthis are attacking Saudi oil tankers. The more important question is whether Houthi attacks—and the narrative surrounding them—are becoming instruments in a much larger struggle over Saudi Arabia’s security choices, regional alignments and America’s continuing influence in the Gulf.

Iran attacks damage US diplomatic facilities

US diplomatic facilities in four Gulf countries suffered around US$184 million in estimated damages from Iranian military strikes, reports The Hill.

These facilities are located in Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), says a Pentagon 44-page report, the first one since the US and Israel launched the war in late February. 

The heaviest damage was sustained in Iraq with over US$157 million in costs, followed by Kuwait with more than US$14 million in damages and US$11.5 million in Saudi Arabia.

In the UAE, the US diplomatic post suffered US$125,000 in damages.

The US mission in Iraq experienced over 600 Iranian attacks. 

The Iranian military has targeted various US military bases in the Gulf since Operation Epic Fury kicked off on February 28 this year.

Tehran has also inflicted heavy damages on diplomatic and intelligence outposts in those countries. 

From February 28 to June 29, the Pentagon has estimated the cost of war to be US$33.4 billion, but that does not include costs for infrastructure repairs.

In July, Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth told Senate lawmakers that the Iran war’s estimated cost was US$37.5 billion, a sum that some experts argued was a low estimate. 

The State Department, meanwhile, reported that as of June 2, it had incurred US$113 million in costs related to the war and “as it continues to assess damage, costs are likely to rise.”

In addition, 18 US service members have been killed and some 800 wounded in the more than six-month war.

About 50,000 American troops are still deployed to the region, with the Trump administration yet to provide a clear exit strategy from the deeply unpopular conflict. 

Top administration officials have at times downplayed the damages Iranian one-way attack drones and missiles have inflicted on US military bases, aircraft and other assets in the US Central Command (Centcom) theater. 

Last week, President Trump denied news reports that several US military jets were damaged in Iran’s attack on Muwaffaq Salti Air Base in Jordan. 

“None whatsoever. No damage. No nothing,” the president said in an interview with The Hill’s sister network NewsNation when asked about one A-10 Thunderbolt losing a wing and eight F-15s sustained light damage. 

More than 50 US aircraft have been damaged or destroyed since the Iran war began, according to the watchdog’s report, including 4 F-15Es, seven KC-135 refueling aircraft, four AH-6 helicopters and at least 30 MQ-9 Reaper drones. 

But some top officials were more candid. 

“They blew the hell out of Bahrain,” the acting US Navy Secretary Hung Cao said in an interview last week with The Epoch Times when asked about the level of damage Naval Support Activity Bahrain (NASB), which serves as the headquarters for US Naval Forces Central Command and the US Fifth Fleet, had sustained since the conflict began. 

The Navy has used the NASB as its main logistics hub in the Middle East. The service branch is weighing what to do with the base, including if it should be repaired. 

“I have a task force that’s looking at that,” Cao said.

 

Iran advises crew to abandon tankers in Bahrain and Kuwait

According to Seatrade Maritime news, following strikes on five Iranian tankers by US forces, Iran has announced to strike commercial tankers in Bahrain and Kuwait. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corp (IRGC) Navy issued what Iranian media described as an “urgent warning” in response to the US attacks.

The warning told all tanker crews in Bahraini and Kuwaiti to immediately abandon their vessels, whether at anchor or at berth in ports, as they would be targeted by the IRGC Navy.

Kuwait and Bahrain, hosting US military bases have come under consistent attack by Iran since the war with the US started at the end of February.

Maritime security firm Vanguard Tech said it assessed the warning as credible enough to require "immediate operational consideration", although an attack was not inevitable.

It noted the warning was unusually specific in terms of vessel type and location, it was consistent with past Iranian behaviour in terms of targeting Bahrain and Kuwait, and a widening of the rationale for attacks to cover vessels in particular port associated with the US military regardless of flag or ownership.

The threat to commercial tankers in Bahraini and Kuwaiti ports follows the US strikes on five Iranian owned or linked tankers which US Central Command described as having “destroyed the vessels” after crews were directed to abandon ship.

The Iranian-flagged NITC VLCC Derya was targeted near Kharg Island. US forces also fired on four vessels in the Gulf of Oman – the Aframaxes Kaviz and Riesco, the oil/ product tanker Charminar, and the LPG carrier Horizon 1. 

Video from US Central Command showed four of the vessels being struck towards the stern while the Riesco was shown with fires raging on its deck and around the accommodation block.

The strikes on the Iranian linked tankers were in response to two IRGC attacks on a US warship, which US Centcom said had failed.

The threat to commercial shipping in the region has ratcheted up significantly in recent weeks with the US striking eight Iranian owned or linked tankers and Iran attacking at least four commercial tankers in the Strait of Hormuz including the Bahri VLCC Sidr which resulted in the deaths of two Filipino seafarers and the Sinokor VLCC Senegal Prosperity which was abandoned and listing following an attack on August 30, 2026.

 

Oman postpones Hormuz talks with Iran and Gulf states

According to Eurasia Media Network, Oman has postponed a regional meeting scheduled for Monday in Salalah between Iran and several Gulf countries on the future of the Strait of Hormuz.

Omani Foreign Minister Badr Albusaidi said the gathering was delayed “in the interests of consensus” to allow conditions for constructive dialogue that could support regional stability.

Iran’s Foreign Ministry said the postponement came at the request of some regional countries and was a joint decision with Muscat. No new date has been set.

The talks were meant to discuss an Iran-Oman framework for managing shipping through the vital waterway, which carries a large share of the world’s oil and gas.

Iran has maintained restrictions on transit since the wider Middle East conflict began in late February.

Tehran has floated ideas including passage fees and revised routes. Bahrain had already said it would not attend until diplomatic ties with Iran were restored.

The delay comes amid continued disruption to energy flows, recent attacks on vessels, and high oil prices.

Oman, which borders the southern side of the strait, has been mediating for weeks. Officials in Muscat and Tehran said they remain committed to dialogue.

Pakistan Should Follow Indian FX Strategy

Reportedly, Indian foreign exchange reserves have reached a record US$785.7 billion. However, the more important lesson for Pakistan is not the size of India’s reserves, but the policy approach used to attract foreign currency. India has demonstrated that a country can actively mobilize foreign exchange through appropriate financial instruments instead of simply waiting for exports, remittances or external borrowing to increase reserves.

In June, the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) introduced measures to encourage dollar inflows, including discounted hedging facilities for overseas borrowings by state-run companies and banks, as well as free-of-cost hedging facilities for banks raising foreign-currency deposits from abroad.

The response was significant. Between June 5 and August 31, India received US$136.3 billion through these schemes, including US$127 billion in non-resident Indian deposits—far above initial expectations. Foreign exchange reserves subsequently increased by almost US$120 billion over ten consecutive weeks. The latest weekly increase alone was nearly US$45 billion.

The Indian experience raises an important question for Pakistan: can we develop a similar policy framework to mobilize foreign exchange rather than repeatedly seeking emergency financing?

Pakistan already has an important foundation through Roshan Digital Accounts and its large overseas Pakistani community. Millions of Pakistanis living abroad have strong economic and emotional links with the country. Yet the potential of this community as a stable source of foreign exchange remains considerably underutilized.

What is required is a more ambitious and coordinated foreign-exchange mobilization strategy.

First, overseas Pakistanis should be offered more attractive foreign-currency deposit and investment products, supported by competitive returns, predictable taxation and greater confidence in the financial system. The objective should be to encourage longer-term savings rather than merely short-term remittances.

Second, the banking sector could be provided carefully designed hedging facilities to attract longer-term foreign-currency deposits while managing exchange-rate risks. Such facilities should be transparent and market-oriented rather than creating an open-ended burden for the central bank.

Third, exporters should be encouraged to repatriate and retain a greater proportion of their foreign-exchange earnings within Pakistan. Export competitiveness should remain the priority, but the financial system can provide incentives for exporters to keep and invest their foreign-currency earnings domestically.

Fourth, financially sound Pakistani companies, banks and state-owned enterprises could be facilitated in raising foreign currency through international markets. A credible regulatory framework, stronger corporate governance and transparent disclosure would be essential to attract investors.

Pakistan could also explore mechanisms to channel part of its substantial diaspora wealth into infrastructure, energy, agriculture, technology and export-oriented industries. This would transform foreign exchange from a short-term financing source into productive capital.

Pakistan must avoid creating the appearance of stronger reserves through excessive short-term borrowing. The composition, maturity and sustainability of foreign-exchange inflows matter as much as the headline reserve figure. Borrowed dollars can provide temporary relief but cannot substitute for sustainable external earnings.

India’s experience demonstrates that foreign exchange does not always have to be passively accumulated. Appropriate incentives, financial instruments and institutional confidence can actively mobilize it.

The real question is no longer whether Pakistan needs more dollars. It is whether Pakistan is prepared to design a policy that makes those dollars come to Pakistan—and stay productively invested in the country.

 

BRICS Members Move to Reduce Reliance on the US Dollar

BRICS leaders have called for reforms to the global governance system, condemned unilateral tariffs and “acts of war”, and backed greater representation for developing countries at the United Nations Security Council (UNSC).

The positions were outlined in the New Delhi Declaration adopted on September 12 at the BRICS Summit in the Indian capital. Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi said the changing world could not be governed through outdated institutions and stressed the need for reforms in representation, responsiveness and rule-making.

The declaration called for a “structural update” of the UNSC, with greater representation for developing countries from Africa, Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean. China and Russia reiterated support for Brazil and India seeking a greater role at the United Nations, including on the Security Council.

A particularly significant development was the call for BRICS members to increase the use of local currencies in trade among themselves, reducing reliance on the US dollar. This reflects a broader effort to diversify international trade and financial transactions and gradually reduce dependence on the dollar-dominated global system.

BRICS also criticized unilateral tariffs and other trade restrictions, warning that they could disrupt supply chains, hamper global trade and deepen economic disparities. The bloc reaffirmed support for reforming the World Trade Organization to better address the needs of emerging and developing economies.

The declaration strongly condemned terrorism in all its forms and rejected attempts to associate terrorism with any religion, nationality, civilization or ethnic group. It also denounced “unilateral acts of war” and emphasized the protection of seafarers and commercial navigation amid continuing military tensions in the Middle East.

The expanding BRICS platform increasingly reflects the aspirations of the Global South for a more representative and multipolar international order.

Is Saudi Arabia Being Attacked to Recognize Israel

The growing friction between US President Donald Trump and Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MBS) surfaced when Washington sought to pressure Riyadh over the killing of Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi. Although the issue was eventually hushed up, US pressure on MBS continued, with Washington increasingly seeking Saudi recognition of Israel.

Israel's devastating military campaign in Gaza, however, complicated the American strategy. For MBS, moving toward normalization with Israel became politically difficult while Palestinians continued to suffer. Riyadh instead maintained that recognition must be linked to Palestinian statehood and a credible two-state solution.

China's mediation of the Saudi-Iran rapprochement delivered another strategic message to Washington. If two traditional regional rivals could overcome decades of hostility through Chinese diplomacy, America's traditional dominance in the Middle East could gradually weaken. The development also demonstrated that Saudi Arabia had alternatives to exclusive dependence on Washington.

When the US-Israeli war against Iran began on February 28, 2026, the regional equation changed dramatically. As Trump decided to escalate the conflict, Iranian retaliation against American military installations and interests across the Gulf became increasingly predictable. Saudi Arabia, with its enormous energy infrastructure and strategic importance, was inevitably exposed.

The US blockade of the Strait of Hormuz also threatened oil and gas exports from Gulf Arab states. Attempts to reroute Saudi oil through the Red Sea created additional vulnerabilities, particularly as attacks attributed to the Houthis increased. Drone attacks and threats to oil infrastructure have further complicated Saudi Arabia's security environment.

The conventional explanation is that Iran and its allies are responsible for these attacks. But another question deserves serious examination, who ultimately benefits from keeping Saudi Arabia under sustained security pressure?

Could regional proxy groups be operating in ways that serve a broader strategic objective? The purpose would not necessarily be to destabilize Saudi Arabia, but to increase its dependence on American security guarantees and make closer alignment with Washington appear unavoidable.

The United States has long sought normalization between Saudi Arabia and Israel. If Riyadh is repeatedly confronted with threats to its oil infrastructure, maritime routes and national security, pressure for a strategic accommodation with Israel could become stronger.

The crucial question, therefore, is not simply who is attacking Saudi Arabia. It is whether insecurity itself is being exploited to influence Riyadh's strategic choices.

Is Saudi Arabia being attacked because of its rivalry with Iran—or is the pressure ultimately intended to push the Kingdom toward recognizing Israel?

Linking Iran with 9/11: A Badly Woven Story

This morning, I burst into laughter when I read a report in The Hill quoting President Donald Trump and Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth linking the Iran war to the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks. What an extraordinary attempt to rewrite history!

For nearly a quarter of a century, the world has been told that Osama bin Laden, a Saudi national, and his al-Qaeda accomplices masterminded the 9/11 attacks. Yet the Trump administration now appears to be drawing Iran into that narrative by suggesting that the Islamic Republic’s hostility toward America is somehow a continuation of the war launched after 9/11.

Hegseth reportedly said that the United States has fought an Islamic theocracy that “cheered on 9/11.” Such a sweeping assertion demands evidence. Hostility toward the United States is not evidence of responsibility for an attack carried out by al-Qaeda. Nor does opposition to American foreign policy establish Iranian involvement in 9/11.

For those born after 9/11, a reminder of history is important. The United States imposed sanctions on Iran soon after the 1979 Islamic Revolution and subsequently supported Iraq during its nearly eight-year war against Iran. For decades, Washington maintained pressure on Tehran through sanctions, diplomatic isolation and military deployments, while Israel repeatedly targeted Iranian strategic installations and Iranian nuclear scientists.

Iran has therefore remained in Washington’s crosshairs for nearly half a century. But transforming this long-running confrontation into an extension of the 9/11 war is an entirely different matter.

The timing is equally revealing. Trump has indicated that the war with Iran, which began on February 28, 2026, could continue until the November midterm elections and then “end immediately.” This inevitably raises questions about the political utility of prolonged warfare.

The world should be extremely cautious about historical revisionism. The 9/11 tragedy was used to launch America’s “war on terror,” which lasted nearly two decades. Attempting now to rhetorically associate Iran with that tragedy, without presenting credible evidence of Iranian responsibility, risks turning history into a political instrument.

This is not merely an inaccurate narrative. It is a badly concocted story that deserves scrutiny rather than applause.

PSX benchmark index declines 2.7%WoW

Pakistan Stock Exchange (PSX) remained under pressure during the week ended on September 11, 2026. The benchmark Index declined 4,817 points or 2.7%WoW to close at 170,512 level. Market activity also weakened, with average daily trading volume declining by 17.5%WoW to 801 million shares.

Escalating attacks along key shipping routes by both US and Iran and Houthis targeting Saudi energy facilities, raised concerns about energy supplies and pushed global oil prices higher. Domestically, fuel prices also increased.

On a positive note, Moody’s highlighted that Pakistan absorbed the current conflict shock better than the 2022 crisis, supported by improved macroeconomic indicators.

The Workers’ Remittances in August 2026 rose by 17%YoY to US$3.7 billion.

Foreign exchange reserves held by State Bank of Pakistan (SBP) rose to US$18.3 billion as of September 4, 2026.

The Prime Minister approved the draft auto policy for FY27-31, although IMF approval remains pending.

RDA inflows rose 58%YoY to US$259 million in August 2026.

Other major news flow during the week included: 1) IMF review talks scheduled to start on September 22, 2026, 2) Qatari LNG cargo bound for Pakistan cleared Strait of Hormuz, 3) GoP cuts HSD refining margin cap to US$30/ bbl, 4) Pakistan signs cybersecurity cooperation agreement with Saudi Arabia, and 5) Pakistan- Australia likely to finalize investment agreement soon.

Major selling was recorded by Foreigners (US$7.2 million) and Mutual Funds (US$5.3 million), while the major buyers were Individuals (US$10.8 million) and Companies (US$5.5 million).

Top performing scrips were: PSEL, AICL, and LCI, while the laggards included: PGLC, SSGC, and CHCC.

AKD Securities expects the market to improve on the back of strengthening economic indicators.

Upcoming IMF review and monetary policy announcement to remain key near-term catalysts.

A potential US-Iran deal could moderate international oil prices from current elevated levels.

Market continues to trade at attractive valuations. The brokerage house forecasts the Index to reach 263,800 by end December 2026.

Top picks of the brokerage house include: OGDC, PPL, UBL, MEBL, HBL, FFC, ENGROH, PSO, LUCK, FCCL, INDU, ILP and SYS.

 

Trump’s Imprudent Policies Are Making Iran a Bigger Phantom

The latest US-Israel war on Iran, which began on February 28, 2026, appears to have produced an outcome very different from what Washington may have anticipated. Despite intense military and economic pressure, Iran has not capitulated. Instead, the conflict seems to have reinforced national cohesion and strengthened Tehran’s determination to resist external coercion.

Iran’s economy has certainly suffered. Years of sanctions have produced weak growth and high inflation, while the war has damaged critical industrial facilities and disrupted trade through the Strait of Hormuz. The IMF has estimated a sharp contraction in Iranian GDP, while inflation and currency depreciation have reached alarming levels. Yet economic pain has not translated into political surrender. Iranian businesses have spent years adapting to sanctions, maintaining substantial inventories and developing alternative trade channels. These practices have provided a degree of resilience even as supply chains and maritime trade have come under severe pressure.

Trump’s repeated appeals to Iranians to rise against their government may also be producing the opposite effect. External pressure can deepen public grievances, but it can simultaneously strengthen nationalist sentiment and resistance to perceived foreign interference. Iran’s leadership has demonstrated an ability to transfer much of the economic burden onto ordinary citizens while preserving the state’s capacity to resist.

There is another, potentially more consequential, dimension. Iranian attacks on US military facilities in Gulf countries have forced Arab states to reconsider the assumptions underlying their security arrangements. If the American military presence cannot prevent attacks on regional assets, questions naturally arise over whether Washington’s security architecture primarily serves Arab interests or Israel.

The Strait of Hormuz presents an equally serious dilemma. Disruptions may constrain Iranian oil exports, but Arab economies are also exposed through attacks on energy infrastructure, US-linked assets and reduced energy exports. A wider disruption extending toward the Red Sea, particularly through Houthi action, could impose an even heavier cost on regional economies.

The paradox is becoming increasingly clear - Washington may be capable of inflicting enormous pain on Iran, but pain alone has not delivered submission. Donald Trump’s imprudent policies may therefore be making Iran a “Bigger Phantom”—not necessarily more powerful, but more resilient, more unpredictable and increasingly costly to contain.

 

Xi’s Washington Visit: A Changing Balance of Power

Chinese President Xi Jinping’s upcoming visit to Washington for a summit with US President Donald Trump on September 24 comes at a critical juncture in global geopolitics. More than a bilateral engagement, the meeting could provide an insight into the changing balance of diplomatic influence between the world’s two largest economies.

Xi is arriving in Washington after an intensive diplomatic outreach covering the SCO, the Middle East and the wider Global South. His message is becoming increasingly clear - China’s foreign relations do not revolve around Washington. Beijing is building partnerships and expanding its diplomatic space while presenting itself as an advocate of dialogue, multilateralism and economic cooperation. The contrast with Washington is striking.

Trump has imposed punitive tariffs on a wide range of US trading partners, including traditional allies. These measures have generated retaliation, uncertainty and diplomatic friction rather than producing a corresponding surge in US exports. The broader issue is that unilateral tariff measures have also been challenged on grounds of their compatibility with the rules-based multilateral trading system.

Trump’s military confrontation with Iran has further complicated America’s international standing. The conflict has disrupted shipping through the Strait of Hormuz, one of the world’s most important energy arteries. The resulting disruption has affected oil and gas supplies, raised energy prices and created serious risks for commercial shipping and seafarers.

The crisis has also strained Washington’s relations with its traditional Middle Eastern partners. The China-brokered Saudi-Iran rapprochement had offered an opportunity to reduce regional confrontation. Renewed hostilities have undermined that spirit, leaving regional countries to reassess their dependence on Washington.

Meanwhile, Xi is using diplomacy to demonstrate that China has alternatives. His recent engagement with Egypt, alongside wider relations across Eurasia and the Global South, reinforces Beijing’s claim to a more multipolar international order.

This does not mean China has replaced the United States. America remains a formidable economic, technological and military power. But diplomatic influence cannot be sustained indefinitely through tariffs, pressure and military confrontation.

The Trump-Xi summit is being watched not merely for trade agreements, but for what it reveals about the future architecture of global power. One point is crystal clear; Donald Trump has antagonized relations with most of the countries around the world.

BRICS in Search of Purpose

When Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa expanded BRICS in the 2020s, the grouping appeared poised to become a major pillar of an emerging multipolar order. Today, with 11 full members and 10 partner countries, BRICS has considerable demographic, economic and diplomatic weight. Yet expansion has exposed a fundamental weakness - BRICS is better at expressing dissatisfaction with the existing international system than agreeing on what should replace it.

BRICS is not collapsing. It continues to attract countries seeking greater international influence, diversified partnerships and alternatives—or supplements—to Western-dominated institutions. The real question is whether its expanded membership can be converted into practical influence or whether internal rivalries and geopolitical contradictions will gradually erode its momentum.

The grouping contains democracies, monarchies and authoritarian states; energy exporters and importers; sanctioned countries and close Western partners. India and China remain strategic competitors, while Russia’s war in Ukraine and Iran’s confrontation with Israel and the United States complicate efforts to establish common security positions. BRICS has neither a collective defence commitment nor an effective mechanism for resolving disputes among its members.

This does not make BRICS irrelevant. Its greater value may lie in functioning as a consultative platform for countries that disagree on major geopolitical issues but cannot afford to ignore one another.

Under India’s 2026 presidency, security has moved higher on the agenda, including terrorism, cybersecurity, critical infrastructure, emerging technologies and other non-traditional threats. These areas offer greater scope for practical cooperation than contentious questions surrounding Ukraine, Gaza or US strategic power. Protecting ports, energy supplies, food systems and digital infrastructure can produce tangible benefits without requiring political unanimity.

Economic cooperation offers another opportunity. Despite years of talk about de-dollarization, a common BRICS currency remains unrealistic given members’ divergent monetary systems and political priorities. More achievable goals include expanding local-currency trade, improving cross-border payment systems and strengthening the New Development Bank.

BRICS should also clarify membership rules, distinguish the rights and responsibilities of full members and partners, and streamline decision-making. Consensus can remain essential for major declarations, while willing members should be allowed to pursue voluntary initiatives in infrastructure, food and energy security, climate adaptation, public health, cybersecurity and trade facilitation.

Ultimately, BRICS will not gain relevance simply by expanding or opposing Western dominance. Its longevity will depend on whether it can build institutions and deliver tangible benefits. Institutions do not last because of what they oppose; they last because of what they build.

Strait of Hormuz: Release the Seafarers Held Hostage

For months, entry and exit of merchant ships into/ from the Strait of Hormuz has remained at the lowest level due to the US blockade, though President Trump holds Iran responsible for this blockade.

The biggest losers are shipping companies because these ships are stuck and cannot be deployed on any other voyage. But even worse hit are the seafarers, who are stranded at sea for months, separated from their families and uncertain about when they will be able to return home.

The scale of this humanitarian crisis is staggering. According to the International Maritime Organization (IMO), around 6,000 seafarers remain stranded aboard vessels unable to leave the Persian Gulf safely. The UN human-rights office has reported that at least 6,000 seafarers aboard some 400 vessels remain stranded in and around the Strait of Hormuz.

These 6,000 people are not soldiers. They are not combatants. They are ordinary men and women doing their jobs to keep global trade moving. Yet they have become innocent victims of a geopolitical confrontation in which they have no stake.

These seafarers, stranded at sea, face disruption in food supplies, drinking water, medicines and other essential items. Prolonged confinement, uncertainty and separation from their families are placing an enormous psychological and physical burden on them.

A conclusion can be drawn that these ships and seafarers have been held “hostage” by the United States.

Iran, suffering from economic sanctions, has offered safe exit to these ships if they pay a toll. It is believed that shipping companies were willing to pay the toll for safe exit, but the US Navy denies exit even after payment of the toll.

Many analysts term US attacks on Iran illegal and the detention of ships and seafarers tantamount to “Maritime Terrorism.”

Whatever the legal or political arguments, one fact should concern the entire world - approximately 6,000 human beings are trapped at sea. They have families waiting for them. They have homes to return to. They have done nothing to become victims of this conflict.

The international community cannot remain silent while thousands of seafarers spend months trapped aboard ships.

May be the time has come for shipping companies to stop delivering cargo to, or taking cargo from, US ports unless the ships stranded at the Strait of Hormuz are allowed safe exit.

This is no longer merely a dispute between the United States and Iran. It is a humanitarian crisis.

All stakeholders - the US administration, Iran, shipping companies, maritime organizations, seafarers' unions and the international community—are requested to join hands for the immediate release and safe passage of these seafarers.

Political differences can wait. Economic disputes can wait. But human beings cannot wait indefinitely. The world must raise its voice for those who have no voice.

Release the ships. Release the seafarers.

OPEC Plus keeps oil output policy unchanged

OPEC Plus kept its oil output policy unchanged for ‌October at a meeting on Sunday, as the producer group needs to agree new quotas before deciding its next output steps.

The meeting of seven core OPEC+ members — Saudi Arabia, ​Russia, Iraq, Kuwait, Algeria, Kazakhstan and Oman — comes as the US-Israel war on Iran continues to ​disrupt oil exports through the Strait of Hormuz, limiting OPEC+'s influence over prices ⁠and market share.

In August, OPEC+ agreed its production boost for September, completing a phased rollback ​of a 1.65 million barrel per day supply cut first agreed in 2023.

Despite the agreed production increases, ​the group made up of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries and its allies, including Russia, still produces far below its targets because of the war.

"OPEC+ currently has ​very limited power over the physical oil market," said Jorge Leon of Rystad Energy. "The group ​can change production targets on paper, but it cannot guarantee that those barrels will be produced or ‌actually ⁠reach the market."

"The focus now shifts away from monthly production adjustments and towards the much more consequential debate over 2027."

OPEC+ still has another layer of production cuts in place, covering most members of the 21-country group until the end of 2026. Before the group decides ​how to unwind the ​cuts and return production ⁠to the market, it needs to review members' oil production capacity to set 2027 output baselines, which form the basis for quotas.

This ​debate will likely happen later in 2026 and hence OPEC+ is ​likely to pause ⁠its output increases for the fourth quarter, sources earlier told Reuters. The statement on Sunday made no mention of policy beyond October.

Only the seven OPEC+ members who met on Sunday, plus ⁠the United ​Arab Emirates until it left OPEC in May, have ​been involved in monthly output decisions in recent years.

From Seven Sisters to Magnificent Seven: Is America’s Supremacy Changing?

The emergence of United States as the world’s economic superpower was closely intertwined with oil. For much of the 20th century, the global petroleum industry was dominated by the “Seven Sisters”—five American companies and two European majors. Their influence extended far beyond their home countries. They controlled substantial portions of exploration, production, transportation, refining and marketing, particularly in the Middle East.

Oil was therefore much more than a commodity. Control over its production and supply gave the West enormous economic and geopolitical leverage—and helped underpin American supremacy, but the source of power is changing.

In 2026, the United States still possesses unparalleled military capabilities. Yet its confrontation with Iran has highlighted a new reality - military superiority does not automatically translate into absolute strategic dominance. Iran’s ability to employ relatively inexpensive missiles and drones demonstrates how cost asymmetry can challenge even the most sophisticated and expensive military systems.

Meanwhile, another group of seven American companies has emerged as symbols of a new economic era - Nvidia, Apple, Microsoft, Alphabet, Amazon, Meta and Tesla—the “Magnificent Seven.”

Their power is fundamentally different from that of the Seven Sisters. These entities dominate artificial intelligence, semiconductors, software, cloud computing, data, digital platforms and other technologies that increasingly determine economic competitiveness, yet there is an important contradiction.

While Wall Street provides these corporations with enormous access to capital and valuation, their physical production and supply chains are global. Critical components, manufacturing capacity and rare-earth processing remain heavily dependent on other countries. A country can therefore lead the technological revolution while remaining dependent on foreign ecosystems for some of its physical foundations.

This raises a serious question, is America moving from an age of controlling the world’s most important commodity to an age of controlling its most important technologies—without necessarily controlling everything those technologies require?

The United States may remain the world’s most powerful nation. But perhaps the era of absolute American supremacy is giving way to an era of shared supremacy, in which China, Japan and other major powers increasingly possess the resources, manufacturing capabilities and technologies needed to shape the global order.

The Seven Sisters built an oil-powered America. The Magnificent Seven may be building a technology-powered America, but unlike oil, technology cannot be controlled in isolation.

Trump Sinking Deeper into the Marsh

Donald Trump may have entered the war against Iran believing that overwhelming American and Israeli military power would deliver a quick and decisive victory. Instead, he appears to be sinking deeper into a strategic marsh. The more he struggles to secure the outcome he expected, the more complicated the consequences seem to become.

The first problem is that Trump joined Israel in a war against Iran without a sufficiently broad coalition of trusted American allies. What may have been conceived as an assertion of American power has increasingly exposed the limitations of unilateral action. Iran has suffered enormous damage, but it has also demonstrated a resilience that appears to have exceeded Washington’s expectations.

The second—and perhaps more serious—problem is Trump’s mindset. He appears reluctant to consider that his original assumptions may have been wrong. If Iran cannot be forced into submission, continuing the war carries mounting costs; yet accepting this reality could require Trump to acknowledge a strategic miscalculation.

The regional consequences are equally troubling. Arab governments may increasingly perceive that, when American and Arab interests diverge, Israel remains Washington’s first choice for protection. The confrontation around the Strait of Hormuz adds another layer of resentment. Gulf economies depend heavily on uninterrupted crude exports, and restrictions on shipping threaten their interests even when they are not parties to the conflict.

Meanwhile, Iran is not isolated. Israel’s claim that China is providing technical expertise to Tehran points to an increasingly important dimension of the conflict - America may be pushing Iran closer to a powerful strategic partner.

The consequences are spreading beyond the Middle East. The withdrawal of American aircraft carriers from the South China Sea has weakened Washington’s immediate naval posture in an area where China is the principal challenger.

At the same time, depleted US arsenals, after years of support for Ukraine and the demands of the Iran conflict, could constrain Washington’s ability to respond elsewhere.

Then comes oil. Despite the disruption surrounding the Strait of Hormuz, crude prices have not reached the dramatic US$200-per-barrel level that would have transformed the economic equation in America’s favor.

Trump therefore faces an increasingly difficult choice: continue the war and risk sinking deeper, or seek an exit that could be portrayed as retreat.

The marsh may no longer be Iran. It may be Trump’s own conviction that admitting a mistake is more dangerous than continuing to struggle.

PSX average daily trading volume declines by 26%WoW

Pakistan Stock Exchange (PSX) remained subdued during this past week, with the escalation of the US-Iran conflict, now in its seventh month, being the primary headwind, following US strikes on Iran and subsequent Iranian retaliatory strikes on US air bases in the region. Market activity also weakened, with average daily trading volume declining by 26%WoW to 971 million shares.

Consequently, Brent crude surged to a six-week high of US$97.6/ bbl during the week, while the benchmark Index declined 2,368 points, down 1.3%WoW to close at 175,329.

However, negative sentiments were partially offset by Pakistan’s record US$3 billion dual-tranche Eurobond issuance, which achieved the lowest spreads over US Treasuries in two decades and marked the country’s largest-ever international capital market transaction.

Trade deficit widened 10%YoY to US$3.2 billion in August 2026, although it narrowed 20%MoM despite higher international oil prices.

CPI for August 2026 accelerated to 11.1%YoY (9.2%YoY in June 2026) on higher Transport and Food prices.

FBR surpassed its 2MFY27 revenue target by PKR12 billion, while the government raised PKR657 billion through T-Bill auctions, with yields ranging between 11.39% and 11.99% across tenors.

Cement dispatches edged down 0.7%YoY to 4.0 million tons amid monsoon rains, while petroleum offtakes declined 3%YoY to 1.3 million tons due to transporters strikes.

Other major news flow during the week included: 1) Pakistan to head joint defence secretariat under Makkah Defence Alliance, 2) GoP made record PKR1.2 trillion early repayment of central bank debt, 3) IMF cites Pakistan as model for debt, growth and reform drive, 4) Cotton arrivals rose 27%YoY to 1.7 million bales in August 2026, and 5) foreign exchange reserves held by SBP rose modestly to US$17.1 billion as of August 28, 2026.

Top performing sectors were Textile Composites and Refineries, while the laggards included Banks, Pharmaceuticals, and Technology.

Major selling was recorded by Mutual Funds (US$18.1 million) and Foreigners (US$7.4 million). Net buyers were Individuals with US$16.6 million.

Top performing scrips were: PGLC, THALL, EFERT, TPLRF1, and ILP, while laggards included: PSEL, SCBPL, SRVI, KOHC, and BAHL.

AKD Securities expects the market to improve on the back of strengthening economic indicators and a strong fiscal position, while moderating inflation should increase the likelihood of interest rates returning to single digits by year-end.

Additionally, a potential US Iran deal could moderate international oil prices towards pre-conflict levels. Market continues to trade at attractive valuations.

Top picks of the brokerage house include: OGDC, PPL, UBL, MEBL, HBL, FFC, ENGROH, PSO, LUCK, FCCL, INDU, ILP and SYS.