Reportedly, Indian foreign exchange reserves have reached a record US$785.7 billion. However, the more important lesson for Pakistan is not the size of India’s reserves, but the policy approach used to attract foreign currency. India has demonstrated that a country can actively mobilize foreign exchange through appropriate financial instruments instead of simply waiting for exports, remittances or external borrowing to increase reserves.
In June, the
Reserve Bank of India (RBI) introduced measures to encourage dollar inflows,
including discounted hedging facilities for overseas borrowings by state-run
companies and banks, as well as free-of-cost hedging facilities for banks
raising foreign-currency deposits from abroad.
The response
was significant. Between June 5 and August 31, India received US$136.3 billion
through these schemes, including US$127 billion in non-resident Indian
deposits—far above initial expectations. Foreign exchange reserves subsequently
increased by almost US$120 billion over ten consecutive weeks. The latest
weekly increase alone was nearly US$45 billion.
The Indian
experience raises an important question for Pakistan: can we develop a similar
policy framework to mobilize foreign exchange rather than repeatedly seeking
emergency financing?
Pakistan
already has an important foundation through Roshan Digital Accounts and its
large overseas Pakistani community. Millions of Pakistanis living abroad have
strong economic and emotional links with the country. Yet the potential of this
community as a stable source of foreign exchange remains considerably
underutilized.
What is
required is a more ambitious and coordinated foreign-exchange mobilization
strategy.
First,
overseas Pakistanis should be offered more attractive foreign-currency deposit
and investment products, supported by competitive returns, predictable taxation
and greater confidence in the financial system. The objective should be to
encourage longer-term savings rather than merely short-term remittances.
Second, the
banking sector could be provided carefully designed hedging facilities to
attract longer-term foreign-currency deposits while managing exchange-rate
risks. Such facilities should be transparent and market-oriented rather than
creating an open-ended burden for the central bank.
Third,
exporters should be encouraged to repatriate and retain a greater proportion of
their foreign-exchange earnings within Pakistan. Export competitiveness should
remain the priority, but the financial system can provide incentives for
exporters to keep and invest their foreign-currency earnings domestically.
Fourth,
financially sound Pakistani companies, banks and state-owned enterprises could
be facilitated in raising foreign currency through international markets. A
credible regulatory framework, stronger corporate governance and transparent
disclosure would be essential to attract investors.
Pakistan could
also explore mechanisms to channel part of its substantial diaspora wealth into
infrastructure, energy, agriculture, technology and export-oriented industries.
This would transform foreign exchange from a short-term financing source into
productive capital.
Pakistan must avoid creating the appearance of
stronger reserves through excessive short-term borrowing. The composition,
maturity and sustainability of foreign-exchange inflows matter as much as the
headline reserve figure. Borrowed dollars can provide temporary relief but
cannot substitute for sustainable external earnings.
India’s
experience demonstrates that foreign exchange does not always have to be
passively accumulated. Appropriate incentives, financial instruments and
institutional confidence can actively mobilize it.
The real
question is no longer whether Pakistan needs more dollars. It is whether
Pakistan is prepared to design a policy that makes those dollars come to
Pakistan—and stay productively invested in the country.
