Xi’s Washington Visit: A Changing Balance of Power

Chinese President Xi Jinping’s upcoming visit to Washington for a summit with US President Donald Trump on September 24 comes at a critical juncture in global geopolitics. More than a bilateral engagement, the meeting could provide an insight into the changing balance of diplomatic influence between the world’s two largest economies.

Xi is arriving in Washington after an intensive diplomatic outreach covering the SCO, the Middle East and the wider Global South. His message is becoming increasingly clear - China’s foreign relations do not revolve around Washington. Beijing is building partnerships and expanding its diplomatic space while presenting itself as an advocate of dialogue, multilateralism and economic cooperation. The contrast with Washington is striking.

Trump has imposed punitive tariffs on a wide range of US trading partners, including traditional allies. These measures have generated retaliation, uncertainty and diplomatic friction rather than producing a corresponding surge in US exports. The broader issue is that unilateral tariff measures have also been challenged on grounds of their compatibility with the rules-based multilateral trading system.

Trump’s military confrontation with Iran has further complicated America’s international standing. The conflict has disrupted shipping through the Strait of Hormuz, one of the world’s most important energy arteries. The resulting disruption has affected oil and gas supplies, raised energy prices and created serious risks for commercial shipping and seafarers.

The crisis has also strained Washington’s relations with its traditional Middle Eastern partners. The China-brokered Saudi-Iran rapprochement had offered an opportunity to reduce regional confrontation. Renewed hostilities have undermined that spirit, leaving regional countries to reassess their dependence on Washington.

Meanwhile, Xi is using diplomacy to demonstrate that China has alternatives. His recent engagement with Egypt, alongside wider relations across Eurasia and the Global South, reinforces Beijing’s claim to a more multipolar international order.

This does not mean China has replaced the United States. America remains a formidable economic, technological and military power. But diplomatic influence cannot be sustained indefinitely through tariffs, pressure and military confrontation.

The Trump-Xi summit is being watched not merely for trade agreements, but for what it reveals about the future architecture of global power. One point is crystal clear; Donald Trump has antagonized relations with most of the countries around the world.

Modi turning Indian nonalignment policy into a business model

Subrahmanyam Jaishankar is the first career diplomat to serve as India's external affairs minister. Unlike many of his predecessors, he has also had experience in the private sector, serving as president of global corporate affairs for the Tata Group for about a year just before taking up his current role.

His unique background, coupled with the "Make in India" and "Atmanirbhar Bharat" driven by the administration of Prime Minister Narendra Modi to promote foreign investment and self-reliance, respectively, are reshaping Indian foreign policy.

Indian neutral position on Russian invasion of Ukraine has been the subject of considerable debate and discussions in media and policy circles. Many experts have attributed India's stance to its Cold War-era policy of nonalignment and its bonhomie with Russia, which dates back to those days.

The Indian government has justified its position as serving the country's national interests, rather than being a consequence of ideology. Its real geo-economic considerations go beyond realpolitik.

Unlike preceding administrations, the Modi government is not seeking to have one foot with the global South and one with the West in deference to the principle of nonalignment, nor is it motivated by what its developed-country partners call shared values.

Rather, behind the veneer of India's balancing act are trade and economic interests, particularly in terms of energy, defense, pharmaceuticals and high technology.

India is now poised to be the fastest-growing major economy this year, with the International Monetary Fund last week forecasting a gross-domestic product rise of 6.8%. This would be more than double the pace of China or the world as a whole at a time when developed countries look poised to enter recession.

Many economists have attributed India's strong growth to rising domestic consumption and its relative success at controlling inflation. But notably, the Indian finance ministry credits purchases of discounted Russian oil as a key factor in the country's strong macroeconomic performance.

Beyond cheap oil, India is also taking advantage of the growing geopolitical fractures to sell more arms abroad, increase space cooperation and develop markets for its pharmaceuticals.

Latin America has been a particular new area of focus, with the government setting up new consulates in Paraguay and the Dominican Republic and a state-owned fuel retailer looking to Brazil's Petrobras for supplies.

Visiting Argentina last month, Jaishankar pointedly used that country's name for the Falkland Islands, Islas Malvinas. This was not just a show of solidarity with a fellow member of the global South but part of a sales pitch for the Tejas fighter jet made by state-owned Hindustan Aeronautics.

Buenos Aires aims by year-end to finalize a decision between competing models, including offers for the US F-16, Russia's MiG-35, and the JF-17 made jointly by China and Pakistan.

The Tejas is billed as an affordable alternative to the F-16 and other Western fighters, and even to the JF-17. Priced at US$42 million a plane with an operating cost of around US$4,000 an hour, the Tejas is the cheapest lightweight combat aircraft available.

Indian Defense Minister Rajnath Singh promoted the Tejas on a visit to Egypt last month and other ministers have been traveling to the country as well. Hindustan Aeronautics is preparing to open its first overseas marketing office in Malaysia and considering adding others.

The Philippines, meanwhile, earlier this year finalized a US$375 million deal to buy supersonic BrahMos missiles from the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO), another Indian state-owned arms producer. Vietnam is also a target market for Indian defense companies.

Indian arms makers have other advantages besides price over their established American rivals in pitching to countries in the global South. US arms makers are handcuffed by Washington's alliance policies, which fracture the world into camps. Thus the DRDO is working on a deal to sell Pinaka Mark-II guided missile systems to Armenia, a longtime Russian ally.

India's participation in the new I2U2 grouping with Israel, the US and the United Arab Emirates also shows how economic interests are taking precedence over past ideological priorities, in this case, support for the Palestinian cause.

That effort now yields little economic benefit for New Delhi while the I2U2 in July set plans for a US$2 billion series of food-sector industrial parks in India and a US$330 million renewable energy project in Modi's home state of Gujarat.

Modi's vision of "Make in India, make for the world" still faces many hurdles, including the country's aversion to free trade deals and other protectionist policies, but turning top government officials into business development managers charged with cultivating foreign markets is one way to advance the effort.

Indian concept of a multipolar world can be more than geopolitical balancing between global powers but also a geoeconomic endeavor carefully crafted to take advantage of different opportunities in each country.