Israel's devastating military campaign in Gaza, however,
complicated the American strategy. For MBS, moving toward normalization with
Israel became politically difficult while Palestinians continued to suffer.
Riyadh instead maintained that recognition must be linked to Palestinian
statehood and a credible two-state solution.
China's mediation of the Saudi-Iran rapprochement delivered
another strategic message to Washington. If two traditional regional rivals
could overcome decades of hostility through Chinese diplomacy, America's
traditional dominance in the Middle East could gradually weaken. The development
also demonstrated that Saudi Arabia had alternatives to exclusive dependence on
Washington.
When the US-Israeli war against Iran began on February 28,
2026, the regional equation changed dramatically. As Trump decided to escalate
the conflict, Iranian retaliation against American military installations and
interests across the Gulf became increasingly predictable. Saudi Arabia, with
its enormous energy infrastructure and strategic importance, was inevitably
exposed.
The US blockade of the Strait of Hormuz also threatened oil
and gas exports from Gulf Arab states. Attempts to reroute Saudi oil through
the Red Sea created additional vulnerabilities, particularly as attacks
attributed to the Houthis increased. Drone attacks and threats to oil
infrastructure have further complicated Saudi Arabia's security environment.
The conventional explanation is that Iran and its allies are
responsible for these attacks. But another question deserves serious
examination, who ultimately benefits from keeping Saudi Arabia under sustained
security pressure?
Could regional proxy groups be operating in ways that serve
a broader strategic objective? The purpose would not necessarily be to
destabilize Saudi Arabia, but to increase its dependence on American security
guarantees and make closer alignment with Washington appear unavoidable.
The United States has long sought normalization between
Saudi Arabia and Israel. If Riyadh is repeatedly confronted with threats to its
oil infrastructure, maritime routes and national security, pressure for a
strategic accommodation with Israel could become stronger.
The crucial question, therefore, is not simply who is
attacking Saudi Arabia. It is whether insecurity itself is being exploited to
influence Riyadh's strategic choices.
Is Saudi Arabia being attacked because of its rivalry with
Iran—or is the pressure ultimately intended to push the Kingdom toward
recognizing Israel?
