Partnership Between Two Occupiers

The newly signed India–Israel defense treaty is not just a strategic agreement; it is a declaration of shared ideology between two occupying powers. It symbolizes the convergence of two nations that have built their modern identities through control, suppression, and justification of domination — one in Palestine, the other in Kashmir.

This alliance comes at a time when Israel stands accused of genocide in Gaza and the West Bank. Global outrage is mounting, yet India has chosen this moment to embrace Tel Aviv more openly than ever. The message is clear: New Delhi now values military advantage and strategic visibility over moral credibility.

Once, India’s foreign policy drew strength from its anti-colonial roots and its historic commitment to freedom struggles. It stood with the oppressed — from African liberation movements to the Palestinian cause. That era is gone. Under Prime Minister Narendra Modi, India’s diplomacy has shed moral caution for ideological affinity. The new partnership formalizes years of covert cooperation in defense, intelligence, and cyberwarfare — all underpinned by a common political psychology.

Zionism and Hindutva, though born in different contexts, share a majoritarian worldview: both cast national identity in religious terms, both view minorities as internal adversaries, and both justify occupation as self-defense. The defense treaty, therefore, is not just about weapons and technology; it is a public endorsement of this shared ideological DNA.

Regionally, the implications are grave. Pakistan will interpret it as an existential provocation. Bangladesh will face a diplomatic dilemma, caught between public sympathy for Palestine and dependence on India. South Asia’s post-colonial spirit of solidarity is eroding, replaced by an era of militarized rivalry and ideological segregation.

Inside India, the pact sends a chilling message to nearly 200 million Muslims. For decades, India’s symbolic support for Palestine offered reassurance of secular balance. That pretense has now vanished. The new India appears comfortable aligning with those who mirror its own majoritarian instincts.

In the end, the India–Israel alliance binds together two occupiers — one subjugating a people under siege, the other suppressing dissent at home. Power may win them weapons and allies, but it cannot cleanse the moral stain of occupation. Nations that mistake domination for destiny often discover that empires fall not from weakness, but from the weight of their own injustice

 

“Tariff Fassad” Initiated by Trump May Trigger Global Meltdown

The global economy today resembles a pressure cooker — silently building steam, waiting for the smallest policy misstep to explode. The “Tariff Fassad” initiated by US president, Donald Trump during is not an isolated episode but the beginning of a dangerous shift toward economic nationalism. Its aftershocks are now resurfacing as governments across continents flirt with protectionism, weaponized trade, and retaliatory tariffs. If not checked, this confrontation could unleash consequences far worse than “Subprime Loan Crisis of 2008”.

Unlike 2008 — which was rooted in irresponsible lending and Wall Street malpractice — this crisis is being fueled by deliberate political choices. Tariffs have distorted supply chains, raised input costs, and crippled export-oriented economies. From Chinese manufacturers to European automakers and Asian electronics exporters, uncertainty is eroding confidence. Global trade volumes are shrinking, and markets are reacting nervously.

The irony is striking, while tech giants continue to report record profits and soaring valuations, this growth stands on a very fragile foundation. Analysts are calling it a “Tech Bubble”, and not without reason. When one segment of the market inflates disproportionately banks, small businesses, and industrial shares come under pressure, it is not growth — it is imbalance. Traditional sectors are bleeding, consumer demand is weakening, and yet Big Tech is being priced as if the world economy is booming. This is speculation masquerading as optimism.

Banks, the backbone of any financial system, are showing worrying signs. Rising interest rates, tightening liquidity, and increasing defaults in trade-dependent industries have started to appear on their balance sheets. Loan growth has slowed, non-performing assets are rising, and confidence among lenders is eroding. Smaller financial institutions are especially at risk as their exposure to fragile sectors grows unchecked. This may not be a sudden collapse like Lehman Brothers — it could be a gradual suffocation, where trust quietly disappears from the system.

Emerging economies are caught in a chokehold. Currencies are under pressure, foreign exchange reserves are being depleted to manage imports, and inflation is creeping upward. For countries dependent on exports or imported raw materials, Trump-style tariff aggression has become an economic nightmare. Meanwhile, global institutions like the WTO and IMF remain spectators — issuing statements rather than solutions.

Markets do not collapse only due to bad economics; they collapse when confidence dies. Tariff wars, geopolitical brinkmanship, and speculative bubbles are collectively eroding that confidence. The threat today is not of a market crash alone — it is of a systemic disintegration of trust, credit, and cooperation.

The world must realize that economic wars have no winners. If this tariff-driven arrogance continues, the global economy will not fall off a cliff — it will slide slowly into chaos. Policymakers still have time to act, but the clock is ticking fast.

 

Why Pak-Afghan Conflict Remains Unresolved?

The conflict between Pakistan and Afghanistan remains unresolved because it is rooted in a mix of historical disputes, mutual mistrust, and competing security interests that have persisted for decades. Despite cultural, religious, and economic linkages, both nations continue to view each other with suspicion rather than cooperation.

At the heart of the problem lies the Durand Line, drawn by the British in 1893 and inherited by Pakistan after independence. Afghanistan has never formally recognized it as an international border, claiming it divides the Pashtun population. Pakistan, however, considers the frontier legally settled. This disagreement has become a symbol of deeper political and ethnic tensions.

The Pashtun question adds another layer of complexity. The tribes on both sides share linguistic and familial ties, but political narratives have often turned these affinities into instruments of rivalry. Pakistan fears Afghan nationalism could spill over its borders, while Kabul perceives Pakistan’s involvement as interference in its internal affairs.

Security concerns have long overshadowed diplomacy. Since the Soviet invasion of 1979, Pakistan has played a key role in Afghan affairs, hosting millions of refugees and supporting various political factions. Yet, both sides accuse each other of harboring hostile groups — Pakistan blames Afghanistan for sheltering the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), while Kabul accuses Islamabad of backing insurgents. This cycle of allegations has eroded trust.

The Taliban’s return to power in 2021 initially raised hopes for stability, but their refusal to recognize the Durand Line and restrain TTP activities has renewed friction. Meanwhile, regional players — including India, Iran, China, and the United States — continue to shape dynamics that complicate bilateral understanding.

For lasting peace, both countries must shift from blame to dialogue, strengthen border management, and build economic interdependence through trade and connectivity. The Pak-Afghan relationship should not remain hostage to history; instead, it should evolve into a partnership anchored in mutual respect and regional stability.

Only through sustained diplomacy, trust-building, and shared development goals can Pakistan and Afghanistan transform a troubled past into a cooperative future.

 

 

SAARC: Awakening a Sleeping Might

Reviving the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) is not a romantic ideal; it is a strategic necessity. The global order is shifting toward regional blocs that consolidate economic and political influence — from ASEAN and the EU to the African Continental Free Trade Area. South Asia cannot afford to remain fragmented when its combined GDP already exceeds US$4 trillion and its population represents a quarter of the world. A dormant SAARC limits each member’s bargaining power, constrains trade diversification, and weakens collective resilience against climate and security threats.

The process of revival begins with institutional restructuring. SAARC’s Secretariat in Kathmandu must be transformed from a symbolic coordination office into an empowered regional policy hub. This requires financial autonomy, a merit-based staffing system, and authority to monitor and evaluate implementation.

Member states should establish a SAARC Development Fund, enabling cross-border infrastructure, health, and education projects independent of political disruptions. Regular ministerial meetings, even at sub-regional levels, can sustain policy momentum when summits stall.

Economic integration remains the most practical catalyst for reactivation. South Asia’s intra-regional trade potential is estimated at over US$100 billion, yet remains trapped below 6 percent of total commerce.

The complete operationalization of the South Asian Free Trade Area (SAFTA) must be prioritized, coupled with the removal of non-tariff barriers and the adoption of digital customs and payment systems.

A regional e-commerce and logistics framework could integrate small and medium enterprises across borders, reducing trade costs and increasing competitiveness.

Energy cooperation offers another powerful unifying platform. Hydropower trade among Nepal, Bhutan, and India, and gas pipeline connectivity involving Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Afghanistan could underpin mutual interdependence.

A “SAARC Energy Corridor,” integrating electricity grids and renewable-energy investment, would not only enhance supply security but also establish climate-friendly growth foundations.

People-to-people diplomacy is equally critical. Academic partnerships, student mobility programs, media collaboration, and cultural exchanges can foster regional consciousness that transcends political disputes.

Civil-society engagement and private-sector participation should complement intergovernmental dialogue.

The long-term sustainability of SAARC lies not in bureaucratic communiqués but in public ownership of the regional project.

Pakistan’s role in this reawakening is pivotal. Geographically positioned at the crossroads of South, Central, and West Asia, Islamabad can act as a natural bridge for trade and energy corridors.

Reframing its regional engagement from security-centric to economic-centric diplomacy could reposition Pakistan as a constructive stakeholder in regional stability.

Advocating connectivity rather than confrontation would strengthen its diplomatic leverage and economic prospects simultaneously.

Ultimately, SAARC’s revival depends on political will — not from external actors but from within South Asia itself. The logic is simple: collective prosperity is indivisible.

Competing regional architectures cannot substitute for the historical, cultural, and economic interdependence that binds SAARC members.

By re-energizing this sleeping might, South Asia can finally transition from a region of unrealized potential to one of shared progress.

The moment calls for leadership that recognizes cooperation as power, not concession. SAARC’s awakening will not occur overnight, but without the first deliberate steps, South Asia risks remaining a fragmented geography rather than a united economic community.

Why SAARC Lost Its Way?

When the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) was established in 1985, it represented a rare regional consensus in a politically fragmented subcontinent. The founding declaration emphasized collective self-reliance, mutual assistance, and the pursuit of shared prosperity. For a region holding nearly one-fourth of humanity, the potential was extraordinary. Yet, after four decades, SAARC stands largely dormant — a victim of geopolitical rivalry and institutional inertia rather than structural failure.

SAARC’s vision was ambitious but achievable: foster economic, social, and cultural cooperation to enhance the quality of life in member states. However, the trajectory of the organization was quickly derailed by the deep-rooted political mistrust between India and Pakistan. The unresolved Kashmir dispute, periodic border tensions, and competing security narratives transformed the platform into a casualty of bilateral hostility. Since the 2014 Kathmandu Summit, SAARC’s high-level meetings have been suspended indefinitely, leaving the secretariat in Kathmandu underutilized and politically irrelevant.

The cost of this dormancy has been immense. Intra-regional trade among SAARC members remains below 6 percent of total trade — the lowest for any comparable regional bloc. Transport corridors, energy-sharing projects, and digital connectivity initiatives have been stalled. The absence of a collective policy voice has left South Asia peripheral in major global economic and climate negotiations.

Comparatively, ASEAN and the European Union began with modest frameworks centered on trade facilitation and economic complementarity, eventually evolving into influential regional institutions. Their success was not rooted in political harmony but in the understanding that economic interdependence can temper political rivalry. SAARC, unfortunately, allowed politics to precede economics, forfeiting the very logic that drives successful regionalism.

The failure to institutionalize decision-making has also weakened SAARC’s resilience. The Secretariat operates with limited resources and minimal authority. Summits and ministerial meetings, which should function as policy engines, have instead become arenas for diplomatic signaling. Moreover, the proliferation of alternative regional frameworks — notably BIMSTEC and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization — reflects the shifting preferences of member states toward arrangements perceived as more functional or geopolitically advantageous.

Yet, it would be incorrect to describe SAARC as obsolete. The organization retains a symbolic and functional foundation that can be reactivated. Its network of specialized bodies in agriculture, environment, health, and disaster management continues to operate, albeit at suboptimal capacity. More importantly, the shared challenges of climate vulnerability, energy security, and regional inequality demand precisely the kind of coordinated response that only a platform like SAARC can provide.

The need is not to abandon SAARC but to reimagine it — as a mechanism of pragmatic regionalism rather than political posturing. The first step toward revival is to acknowledge why it failed: not because its goals were unrealistic, but because national egos overshadowed collective rationality. South Asia’s sleeping might remain potent; it only awaits political maturity to awaken.

Pakistani Policies Turning Taliban Foe

The unraveling Pakistan–Taliban relationship highlights the limits of old security doctrines in a changing regional order.

When the Taliban returned to power in Kabul in 2021, Pakistan hoped for a friendly neighbor and a stable frontier. Four years later, that optimism has faded. Relations have soured, trust has eroded, and the Taliban’s growing warmth toward India signals how far Islamabad’s Afghan policy has drifted from reality.

Pakistan’s once-comfortable relationship with the Taliban is deteriorating — not because of ideology, but because of Islamabad’s own policy. What was once hailed as “strategic depth” is now fast becoming a strategic setback.

For decades, Pakistan believed that supporting the Taliban would ensure border security and limit Indian influence. But since the group’s return to power, those assumptions have collapsed.

Instead of cooperation, Pakistan now faces increasing hostility - frequent border clashes, defiant statements from Kabul, and a resurgent Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) operating from Afghan soil.

The Taliban’s visible tilt toward India is a symptom of Islamabad’s stance. Pakistan has chosen pressure over diplomacy — closing key crossings, threatening to expel Afghan refugees, and publicly accusing Kabul of harboring militants.

These measures have not subdued the Taliban; they have driven them closer to New Delhi, which offers humanitarian aid and political legitimacy without direct interference.

The irony is stark. Pakistan, once the Taliban’s strongest backer, now finds itself isolated, while India — long regarded as an adversary in Afghan affairs — is quietly re-establishing presence in Kabul. The Taliban, in turn, are using this outreach to project independence and resist external dictates.

Islamabad’s Afghan policy remains trapped in outdated security thinking, viewing Kabul solely through the prism of control.

Unless Pakistan recalibrates its approach — replacing coercion with constructive engagement — it risks losing whatever influence it still retains. The “strategic depth” doctrine that once shaped policy has now turned dangerously shallow.

 

Donald Trump: Loose Bull or Fearless Leader

Donald Trump is no longer just a political figure — he has emerged as a major force of disruption. To his critics, he’s a loose bull, to his loyalists, he’s a fearless fighter standing alone. Both sides may be right, that makes him dangerous.

The general impression is that Trump doesn’t follow rules; he tramples them. He doesn’t debate ideas; he dominates the stage. Every insult, every indictment, every scandal seems to fuel his sense of destiny. For millions of disillusioned Americans, he’s not the problem — he’s the rebellion.

A rebellion without restraint easily turns into wreckage. Trump’s politics are built on grievance, not governance. He thrives on outrage, feeds on division, and weaponizes mistrust. His rallies ignite passion but also paranoia; his promises stir hope but sow hostility. Underneath the red caps and roaring crowds lies a country tearing itself apart.

His defenders say he speaks truth to power. May be yes, but he also speaks poison to democracy. The media is “the enemy,” the courts are “corrupt,” and the system — unless it serves him — is “rigged.” It’s not leadership; it is demolition disguised as defiance.

The tragedy is that Trump didn’t create America’s anger — he merely harnessed it. He turned frustration into a political movement and chaos into a campaign strategy. That’s his genius, and his curse.

Trump may call himself the voice of the forgotten, but in truth, he’s the echo of a broken democracy shouting at itself.

Whether the United States can survive another round of his rampage — or finally find the courage to tame its loose bull — will decide not just an election, but the future of its republic.

 

Crude oil prices drifting down

Crude oil—the world’s most political commodity—is drifting down again. Markets that once trembled at the whisper of war or an OPEC decree are today unimpressed. Prices are slipping not because the world is safer, but because supply is running ahead of demand, and no cartel seems willing—or able—to hold back the flood.

The immediate triggers are clear. The resumption of Kurdish crude exports has added barrels back to an already saturated market. OPEC Plus, once a disciplined enforcer of scarcity, is instead edging up production to defend market share. Add to this the steady increase in US output, and the result is an unmistakable surplus. In Washington, reports of rising crude stockpiles reinforce the perception that inventories will keep swelling into 2026.

Demand is hardly roaring either. The end of the US summer driving season has clipped consumption, while China—the world’s most important incremental buyer—remains stuck in an uneven recovery. India, though growing fast, cannot absorb the excess.

Analysts now project that inventories will rise by more than two million barrels per day through early next year. In oil economics, that is the equivalent of a slow-motion glut.

Layered on top is the dollar’s strength. Every tick upward in the greenback makes oil more expensive for non-US buyers, further cooling appetite. And unlike past cycles, geopolitical flashpoints—sanctions on Iran, Russia’s war economy, Middle East tension—have not translated into major supply disruptions. Traders, ever cynical, now discount the “risk premium” that once propped up prices.

The real story is structural. Oil is losing its tightrope balance between scarcity and abundance. Producers are pumping more aggressively, while demand faces limits from efficiency gains and a global economy weighed down by debt and weak growth.

Unless OPEC Plus suddenly reverses course or a geopolitical shock knocks supply offline, the path of least resistance for oil is downward.

For consumers, cheaper fuel may feel like relief. For producers, especially those whose budgets depend on oil, it is a creeping crisis. And for the global system, it is a reminder the age of automatic oil windfalls is over, and volatility is the new name of the game.

 

What options US can exercise if Afghans refuse to handover Bagram Air Base?

If Afghans refuse to handover Bagram Air Base back to the United States, Washington is likely to face a serious strategic dilemma. The response will likely depend on how far the super power is willing to push its military and political leverage in the region. Some of the likely options are:

1. Diplomatic Pressure

The first option would be to apply diplomatic pressure on the Taliban government, possibly through Qatar or Pakistan as intermediaries. The US may frame Bagram’s access as essential for counterterrorism monitoring, and push for a limited presence under international arrangements rather than outright US control.

2. Economic and Sanctions Leverage

If diplomacy fails, Washington could use financial levers that include:

Tightening sanctions on Taliban leaders.

Blocking international recognition of the Taliban government.

Cutting off humanitarian exemptions or aid that Afghanistan relies on.

This would make Kabul’s refusal costlier.

3. Regional Partnerships

The US might deepen military partnerships with neighbors instead. For instance:

Expanding use of bases in Central Asia (though Russia and China will resist this).

Strengthening presence in the Persian Gulf (Qatar, UAE).

Increasing over-the-horizon operations using drones and satellites.

This would reduce dependency on Bagram, though at a higher logistical cost.

4. Covert Operations

If Washington views Bagram as critical for counterterrorism, it could resort to covert methods—arming rival Afghan groups, intelligence penetration, or even destabilization strategies to pressure the Taliban into concessions.

5. Accept and Adapt

Though difficult, the US may accept that Afghanistan is now firmly outside its reach and adapt by monitoring from afar. This would reflect Washington’s reluctance to re-engage militarily in Afghanistan after two decades of war.

Chinese dam being termed a global threat

According Nikkei Asia, China is building a massive dam that could alter the world's water systems as profoundly as climate change itself, Brahma Chellaney writes this week. He doesn't hold back, says "What Beijing portrays as an engineering marvel is in fact an ecological disaster in the making."

The US$168 billion Himalayan super-dam is being constructed on the Yarlung Zangbo River (also known as the Brahmaputra) in the one of the world's most seismically active zones, straddling a heavily militarized frontier where Beijing claims India's sprawling Arunachal Pradesh state as "South Tibet."

"Constructing the world's largest dam atop a geological fault line is more than reckless ‑ it is a calculated gamble with catastrophic potential," the author of "Water: Asia's New Battleground" says. "Any collapse, whether from structural weakness or reservoir-induced seismicity, would devastate India's northeast and Bangladesh, placing tens of millions at risk."

"The stakes extend beyond Asia," he adds. "Tibet is warming twice as fast as the global average, accelerating glacier melt and permafrost thaw. With its towering height rising into the troposphere, the Tibetan Plateau shapes the Asian monsoons, stabilizes climate across Eurasia and influences the Northern Hemisphere's atmospheric general circulation."

Here is a summary about the Himalayan super-dam/ hydropower project on the Yarlung Zangbo (upper Brahmaputra) river.

The project is officially known as the Yarlung Zangbo hydropower project, also referred to by names like the Medog Hydropower Station in some sources.

It is being built in the lower reaches of the Yarlung Zangbo River in the Tibet Autonomous Region (People’s Republic of China), particularly in Medog County/ Nyingchi Prefecture, near the area where the river makes the dramatic U-turn close to the border with Arunachal Pradesh, India.

The total investment is estimated to be around 1.2 trillion yuan, which translates roughly US$168 billion. It will consist of five cascade hydropower stations. Expected electricity generation is about 300 billion kilowatt-hours per year. Commercial operations are planned for some time in the 2030s.

The site takes advantage of a section of the river where there is a 2,000 meter drop over a relatively short distance, about 50 kilometers, which gives great potential for hydropower generation.

Rivers downstream of this are India’s Brahmaputra and then Bangladesh’s (Jamuna), so water flow and downstream effects are a big concern.

India and Bangladesh have expressed concerns about how the dam might affect water volume, timing of flow, sediment transport, and flooding downstream.

The region is ecologically rich, with biodiversity hotspots. Building large dams in steep gorges may disrupt habitats, wildlife, and the natural ecology.

Because Tibet is tectonically active, building in deep gorges and making large engineering modifications poses risk. Landslide, earthquake hazards are of concern.

It is not yet clear how many people would need to be relocated or how local Tibetan communities will be affected.

China says the project is important to help meet its increasing demand for clean energy and to reach net-zero emissions goals. It also maintain, in official statements, that downstream impacts will be minimal and manageable.

Significance of Saudi Arabia-Pakistan defence pact

The Saudi Arabia-Pakistan defence pact is not just a military arrangement—it is a strategic partnership that underpins Pakistan’s economic security and Saudi Arabia’s military security. For Pakistan, it guarantees vital financial and diplomatic backing; for Saudi Arabia, it provides trusted military support and, indirectly, a nuclear-armed ally. Together, it represents one of the strongest security relationships in the Muslim world.

The Saudi Arabia- Pakistan defence pact carries deep strategic, political, and economic significance for both countries and the wider region. Its importance can be seen from multiple angles:

Strategic and Security Dimension

Mutual Security Guarantee:

Pakistan has historically provided military training, expertise, and manpower to Saudi Arabia, reinforcing the Kingdom’s defence at times of regional tension. In return, Saudi Arabia has been a security partner for Pakistan in times of external pressure.

Balancing Iran’s Influence:

For Saudi Arabia, Pakistan’s military cooperation is part of a broader strategy to counterbalance Iran in the Gulf and beyond. For Pakistan, it ensures strong backing from the Kingdom while maintaining a delicate balance in its own relations with Iran.

Nuclear Umbrella:

Although not formalized, Pakistan’s nuclear capability is sometimes seen as a potential backstop for Saudi security in case of existential threats, making the defence relationship symbolically powerful.

Military Cooperation

Training and Deployment:

Thousands of Pakistani military personnel have served in Saudi Arabia over the decades, providing training to Saudi forces. Even today, a contingent of Pakistani troops is stationed there for defence cooperation.

Arms and Defence Technology:

Pakistan has supplied small arms, ammunition, and defence equipment to Saudi Arabia. Joint ventures in defence production are under discussion.

Counterterrorism and Intelligence Sharing:

Both states have collaborated closely in intelligence sharing, counterterrorism operations, and combating extremist networks that threaten regional stability.

Economic and Political Significance

Financial Lifeline for Pakistan:

Saudi Arabia has been one of Pakistan’s most consistent financial supporters—providing oil on deferred payments, direct loans, and balance-of-payments support. The defence pact strengthens this bond by ensuring Pakistan’s military commitment in return.

Diplomatic Support:

Saudi Arabia often champions Pakistan’s stance on international platforms, including on Kashmir and economic cooperation within the OIC. Pakistan reciprocates by supporting Saudi positions on regional security and Islamic solidarity.

Regional and Global Context

Gulf Security:

Saudi Arabia views Pakistan as a reliable partner in securing the Gulf, especially in moments of instability.

Islamic Military Alliance:

Pakistan plays a central role in the Saudi-led Islamic Military Counter Terrorism Coalition (IMCTC), with former Pakistani Army Chief Gen. Raheel Sharif appointed as its first commander.

US–China Factor:

The pact also gives Saudi Arabia an alternative to over-reliance on Western defence support, while Pakistan uses it to diversify its security partnerships alongside China.

Symbolic and Religious Aspect

Custodianship of Holy Places:

Pakistan attaches special reverence to Saudi Arabia as the custodian of Islam’s holiest sites, and defence cooperation is also framed as protecting the sanctity of the Two Holy Mosques.

Soft Power and Legitimacy:

The pact signals unity of two major Muslim powers—Saudi Arabia with its economic and religious clout, and Pakistan with its military strength and nuclear capability.

The New World Disorder

French historian Fernand Braudel identified three cycles of history. The shortest is the day-to-day flow of events; Braudel called them “fireflies” on the stage. Next up are paradigm shifts — like the end of the Cold War — that can play out over decades or longer. Finally, there’s the longue durée: the bedrock of climate and geography that shapes everything else and changes only over centuries or millennia.

Six months into US President Donald Trump’s second term, it’s clear that the course of events has changed. What’s the collective noun for a group of fireflies? Probably not “paradigm shift,” but in this case that’s what it adds up to. 

The US pivot from free trade and global security to a sharper focus on the national interest has the makings of a decades-defining transformation, reversing the global integration supercharged by the end of the Cold War.

In the decades after World War II, the US was the champion of free trade, the anchor for global security and the gold standard on governance. Now, it has raised tariffs to the highest level since the 1930s, told allies they need to pay for protection and crossed red lines on independence for the Fed and statistical agencies.

That’s a major break, and an important moment for the global economy, shifting patterns of growth and inflation, borrowing and debt.

The geopolitical landscape has shifted just as decisively. Jolting though it is, Trump’s focus on America First is a reflection of a new reality where the US is no longer the world’s sole superpower. Regardless of who occupies the White House next, the US allies and adversaries will continue to reorient around that new state of affairs.

How about Braudel’s longue durée — the slowest moving cycle of history on which everything else rests? Could even that be at an inflection point? Maybe.

Trump has pulled the US out of the Paris climate agreement, again. The global fight against climate change will continue, but without the world’s second-largest emitter, it gets harder. The arrival of artificial general intelligence could also prove an epochal shift.

“History,” Braudel wrote, “may be divided into three movements: what moves rapidly, what moves slowly and what appears not to move at all.” Right now, events are moving almost too fast to track and the slow-moving Pax Americana is heading rapidly toward the dustbin of history. If global temperatures rise much further or machines start thinking for themselves, there will be movement even in the cycle that appears not to move at all.

Significance of Pezeshkian’s visit to China

Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian wrapped up a four-day visit to China on Wednesday, heading back to Tehran after attending a military parade in Beijing that marked 80 years since the end of World War II.

Pezeshkian's first stop in China was the northern port city of Tianjin, where he attended the 25th Meeting of the SCO Council of Heads of State, the largest gathering of the bloc to date. The Iranian president delivered a speech there, addressing the "unfair" global order led by the West and highlighting the need to create a new one through collaboration among the Global South.

A much-anticipated meeting between the presidents of Iran and China took place the next day. Pezeshkian told Xi Jinping that Iran was ready to work with China "under any circumstances" to elevate relations to their highest level, stressing that Beijing could count on Tehran as a "strong and determined friend and ally." Xi reciprocated, stating he sees Tehran as a "strategic partner" with a "forward-looking approach." Both sides agreed that more needed to be done to implement the 25-year cooperation plan signed in 2020.

Analysts in Iran hope that the president’s visit, during which he was accompanied by his foreign minister, economy minister, and defense minister, would lead to new military and financial deals.

This appears to be the case, as upon arriving in Tehran, Pezeshkian stated that "important," "strategic," and "vital" decisions had been made following his discussions with Xi.

"Additionally, discussions on security and defense equipment were held with the support of the defense minister, who was present during this trip, and necessary follow-ups will be carried out in this regard," Pezeshkian declared. It is believed that Iran is looking to buy air defense systems and fighter jets from China, although there is no official confirmation on what it seeks to purchase.

While Iranians have mostly focused on what the trip could bring about for Iran, the rest of the world has mainly been discussing how the SCO summit and the close interaction between India's Modi and Xi demonstrate that the split President Trump opened up between Washington and New Delhi is much larger than expected.

Trump’s former security advisor told American media that Trump has “shredded decades of effort” to pull India away from the Russian and Chinese orbit with his tariff policies. 

Furthermore, Modi's presence at the recent SCO meeting, along with other developments, is viewed as a sign that the new global order Pezeshkian has called for is approaching, or may already be in place.

"The new international order everyone has been talking about for years has almost arrived," said economic and trade analyst Majid Shakeri.

The expert said several factors point to this consolidation include: 1) the exclusion of Arab states from the Wednesday parade after their embrace of Trump during his West Asia tour earlier this year, 2) the Siberian Power Pipeline agreement signed between Russia and China this week, 3) and Beijing's announcement of its intention to establish an artificial intelligence cooperation center with the rest of the SCO.

"A crucial piece of the puzzle that is still incomplete and unclear is India's balancing act between China and America," Shakeri explained.

Pezeshkian's visit to China also included significant interactions with other world leaders. While there appeared to be no interaction with the Indian Prime Minister, Pezeshkian spent four hours in discussion with Russia's Vladimir Putin and a shorter amount of time speaking with Pakistan's Shehbaz Sharif, whose country's relationship with Iran is growing closer by the day.

Recep Tayyip Erdogan of Turkey was filmed holding onto Pezeshkian's hand while walking alongside him in a hall. The Iranian president expressed anticipation for Erdogan's visit to Tehran.

Despite recent tensions between Iran and Turkey regarding South Caucasus transportation plans and the situation in Syria, both nations appear in favor of maintaining their friendly relations.

Tajikistan’s Emomali Rahmon was also affectionate with Pezeshkian. The two countries share a significant part of their history and culture and view each other fondly.

 

The Fading Edge of Western Sanctions

Western sanctions were once the sharpest weapon in Washington and Brussels’ arsenal — a way to cripple adversaries without firing a shot. But today, their overuse and poor calibration are blunting their impact, most visibly in the case of Russia’s energy industry.

Take the recent arrival of the Arctic Mulan in southern China. On August 28, the sanctioned tanker unloaded liquefied natural gas from Russia’s Arctic LNG-2 plant — a facility buried under Western restrictions. That shipment, China’s first from the Siberian project, came just days before Vladimir Putin’s state visit to Beijing. The symbolism is unmistakable: Beijing is choosing energy security and strategic ties with Moscow over Washington’s disapproval.

Washington’s own missteps reinforce the sense that sanctions are losing their sting. In late August, President Donald Trump slapped a 25% “secondary tariff” on Indian imports of Russian crude, doubling existing duties. The gamble backfired. India not only kept buying Russian oil but also found common cause with China — a troubling development for US strategists who once counted on Delhi as a counterweight to Beijing.

The core problem is not intent but longevity. Sanctions work best when they are broad, swift, and temporary — delivering a shock that compels change before targets can adapt. But when restrictions drag on, industries build workarounds.

Russia has done so with astonishing speed, channeling crude through China and India, which now absorb 80% of its exports, and relying on “dark fleets” of tankers to bypass Western oversight. Iran and Venezuela, veterans of economic siege, have perfected similar tactics.

Meanwhile, the sheer scale of sanctions is undermining their effectiveness. Since 2017, the number of international sanctions has surged by 450%, according to LSEG Risk Intelligence. After Moscow’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, EU sanctions on Russia jumped from zero in 2013 to more than 2,500 by 2025. Washington blacklisted over 3,100 new entities last year alone, most of them Russian. The result, enforcement has become a bureaucratic quagmire, draining multinational firms with compliance costs while Russia and its partners adapt.

In short, the West is flooding the world with sanctions — but the more it leans on this tool, the less powerful it becomes. Economic warfare cannot be waged indefinitely without diminishing returns. If sanctions are to remain credible, they must be recalibrated: fewer, smarter, and more time-bound, backed by genuine multilateral coordination.

Otherwise, the very weapon once seen as a substitute for war may become just another dull instrument in an increasingly multipolar world.

The Beginning of the End of US Hegemony

The leaders of China, North Korea and Russia stood shoulder to shoulder Wednesday as high-tech military hardware and thousands of marching soldiers filled the streets of Beijing. Two days earlier, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, Russian President Vladimir Putin and Chinese President Xi Jinping huddled together, smiling broadly and clasping hands at a meeting of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization.

The gatherings in China this week could be read as a striking, maybe even defiant, message to the United States and its allies. At the very least, they offered yet more evidence of a burgeoning shift away from a US-dominated, Western-led world order, as President Donald Trump withdraws America from many of its historic roles and roils economic relationships with tariffs.

Will it be right to say that it is the beginning of the end of US hegemony? It is a transition from uni-polarity to multi-polarity. The US is losing its ability to act unchallenged. The world is moving towards competitive coexistence, where Washington remains powerful but will have to share space with Beijing, Moscow, and other rising centers of influence. It looks less like a sudden collapse, and more like a slow erosion of dominance.

For nearly eight decades, the United States has been the undisputed leader of the world, setting the rules of politics, trade, and security. But today, cracks in this dominance are becoming visible.

The rise of China as a technological and economic powerhouse, Russia’s defiance of Western sanctions, and the growing assertiveness of regional blocs such as BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization are eroding Washington’s monopoly over global influence. Even long-time allies in the Middle East and Asia are quietly hedging their bets, diversifying partnerships beyond the US.

At home, the super power faces mounting challenges, a polarized political system, unsustainable debt levels, and an exhausted military stretched across multiple conflict zones. Meanwhile, the US dollar, once an untouchable pillar of global finance, is slowly facing competition from alternative payment systems. Yet, it is premature to declare the end of US power.

History suggests that hegemonies rarely fall overnight. The American era may not be over, but its golden age of unquestioned dominance is clearly behind us.

China shows power at military parade

Chinese President Xi Jinping warned the world was facing a choice between peace or war at a massive military parade in Beijing on Wednesday, flanked by Russia's Vladimir Putin and North Korea's Kim Jong Un in an unprecedented show of force.

The event to mark 80 years since Japan's defeat at the end of World War Two was largely shunned by Western leaders, with Putin and Kim - pariahs in the West due to the Ukraine war and Kim's nuclear ambitions - the guests of honour.

Designed to project China's military might and diplomatic clout, it also comes as US President Donald Trump's tariffs and volatile policymaking strain its relations with allies and rivals alike.

"Today, mankind is faced with the choice of peace or war, dialogue or confrontation, win-win or zero-sum," Xi told a crowd of more than 50,000 spectators at Tiananmen Square, adding that the Chinese people "firmly stand on the right side of history".

Riding in an open-top limousine, Xi then inspected the troops and cutting-edge military equipment such as hypersonic missiles, underwater drones and a weaponized 'robot wolf'.

Helicopters trailing large banners and fighter jets flew in formation during a 70-minute showcase that culminated in the release of 80,000 'peace' birds.

Donning a tunic suit in the style worn by former leader Mao Zedong, Xi earlier greeted more than 25 leaders on the red carpet, including Indonesia's Prabowo Subianto who made a surprise appearance despite widespread protests at home.

Seated between Putin and Kim in the viewing gallery, Xi repeatedly engaged in conversations with both leaders as thousands of troops and materiel paraded before them. It marked the first time the trio have appeared together in public.

Putin later thanked his North Korean counterpart for his soldiers' courageous fighting in the war in Ukraine during a bilateral meeting at China's State Guesthouse. Kim said he was willing to do everything he can to help Russia.

"Please give my warmest regards to Vladimir Putin, and Kim Jong Un, as you conspire against the United States of America," Trump said in a post directed at Xi on Truth Social, as the event kicked off. He also highlighted the US role in helping China secure its freedom from Japan during World War Two.

Trump had earlier told reporters he did not see the parade as a challenge to the United States. Japan's top government spokesperson declined to comment on the parade, adding Asia's top two economies were building "constructive relations".

Democratically governed Taiwan, which China considers its own, has urged its people not to attend the parade, warning that attendance could reinforce Beijing's territorial claims. Taiwan does not commemorate peace with a barrel of a gun, its President Lai Ching-te said on Wednesday in pointed criticism of the event.

Xi has cast World War Two as a major turning point in the "great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation", in which it overcame the humiliation of Japan's invasion to become a global powerhouse.

Earlier this week, Xi unveiled his vision of a new world order at a regional security summit, calling for unity against "hegemonism and power politics", a thinly veiled swipe at his rival across the Pacific Ocean.

"Xi feels confident that the table has turned. It's China that is back in the driver's seat now," said Wen-Ti Sung, fellow at the Atlantic Council's Global China Hub, based in Taiwan.

"It's been Trumpian unilateralism rather than China’s wolf warrior diplomacy when people talk about the leading source of uncertainty in the international system."

At a lavish reception after the parade at the Great Hall of the People, Xi told his guests that humanity must not return to the "law of the jungle".

Beyond the pomp and propaganda, analysts are watching whether Xi, Putin and Kim may signal closer defence relations following a pact signed by Russia and North Korea in June 2024, and a similar alliance between Beijing and Pyongyang, an outcome that may alter the military calculus in the Asia-Pacific region.

Putin has already sealed deeper energy deals with Beijing during his China visit, while the gathering has given the reclusive Kim an opportunity to gain implicit support for his banned nuclear weapons.

It has been 66 years since a North Korean leader last attended a Chinese military parade.

Kim travelled to Beijing with his daughter Ju Ae, whom South Korean intelligence consider his most likely successor, although she was not seen alongside him at the parade.

 

Time Is Ripe for Dumping Trump

Every political career reaches a tipping point. For Donald Trump, that moment has arrived. His return to the political stage was meant to showcase strength and inevitability. Instead, most of his high-profile decisions and strategies in what amounts to his “second term of influence” have backfired, leaving the Republican Party fractured and America’s standing diminished.

On foreign policy, Trump’s swagger delivered little substance. His tariff wars bruised US farmers more than Beijing, his embrace of autocrats yielded no concessions, and his abandonment of long-standing allies left Washington isolated. The Middle East “breakthroughs” unraveled into fresh instability, while his tough talk on Iran and North Korea ended with neither deterrence nor diplomacy.

At home, his tax cuts fed corporations but starved the federal budget, inflating deficits without lifting wages for most Americans. His promised transformations on infrastructure and healthcare never materialized. Instead, voters were left with widening inequality, broken promises, and a chaotic pandemic response that remains a stain on his record.

Politically, the costs are even starker. Trumpism has become an anchor for Republicans, costing the party moderates and suburban voters while entrenching bitter divisions within. Legal troubles multiply, crowding out policy debate and reminding Americans of the scandals that defined his presidency. What once looked like disruptive energy now looks like exhaustion.

The United States faces serious challenges — from economic restructuring to climate resilience and global leadership. Clinging to a leader defined by backfires, chaos, and personal vendettas is not just unwise; it is reckless. The time is not just ripe but urgent for Republicans, and for the country, to move beyond Donald Trump.

India alerts Pakistan about possible flood

Despite strained relations following the May 2025 standoff, India has formally alerted Pakistan about a potential flood in the River Tawi at Jammu that could affect the Pakistani territory.

According to a senior official, the Indian High Commission in Islamabad contacted the Foreign Office at 10am on Sunday, cautioning about a “significant flood situation.”

This marks the first major communication between the two countries since the May conflict, when bilateral ties deteriorated sharply.

Officials emphasized that the exchange was in line with the Indus Waters Treaty, which obliges both sides to share data on river flows and flood forecasts during the monsoon season.

Following the alert, the Government of Pakistan issued warnings to all relevant federal and provincial departments, including the National Disaster Management Authority (NDMA), irrigation departments and military engineering units.

The 1960 Indus Waters Treaty requires India and Pakistan to share flood-related data to help protect downstream communities and minimize damage from natural disasters.

While tensions remain high, officials described India’s latest move as a “positive gesture” under the treaty framework. The spokesperson for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was unavailable for comment.

 

Can there be an end to India-China animosity?

Relations between China and India are on a “positive trend” towards cooperation, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi told his Indian counterpart in New Delhi.

The world’s two most populous nations are intense rivals competing for influence across South Asia, and fought a deadly border clash in 2020.

India is also part of the Quad security alliance with the United States, Australia and Japan, which is seen as a counter to China.

Caught in global trade and geopolitical turbulence triggered by US President Donald Trump’s tariff war, the countries have moved to mend ties.

During talks on Monday with Subrahmanyam Jaishankar, India’s foreign minister, Wang said the two countries should “view each other as partners and opportunities, rather than adversaries or threats”.

He pointed to the resumption of “dialogue at all levels” and “maintenance of peace and tranquility in border areas” as evidence that bilateral ties were on a “positive trend of returning to the main path of cooperation”.

Wang is also expected to meet Prime Minister Narendra Modi during his three-day visit.

According to Indian media, Modi might visit China this month, which would be his first trip since 2018.

Relations have improved since October, when Modi and Chinese President Xi Jinping met for the first time in five years in Russia.

Chinese and Indian officials have said in recent weeks that the two countries were discussing the resumption of border trade, which has been halted since 2020.

Its resumption would be symbolically significant, and follows discussions to resume direct flights and issue tourist visas.

At this juncture it is necessary to examine the factors responsible for the confrontation between China and India.

Point blank it could be said that the omnipresent confrontation is rooted in a mix of historical, geopolitical, economic, and strategic factors.

While both the countries are major Asian powers and share a long border, their relations have been tense for decades. The reasons include:

Border Disputes

The 3,488 kilometers (2,167 miles) boundary between China and India is not formally demarcated. Two main disputed Areas are: 1) Aksai Chin (controlled by China, claimed by India) and 2) Arunachal Pradesh (controlled by India, claimed by China as “South Tibet”). Repeated standoffs (Doklam 2017, Galwan 2020) occur due to patrol overlaps and differing perceptions of the Line of Actual Control (LAC).

Historical Legacy

The 1962 Sino-Indian War left a deep scar. China defeated India and occupied Aksai Chin. India still feels betrayed, as relations before 1962 were publicly friendly under “Hindi-Chini Bhai Bhai” (India-China brotherhood).

Strategic Rivalry in Asia

Both nations see themselves as dominant Asian powers. China views India’s rise and its closeness with the US, Japan, and Australia (Quad alliance) as a counterbalance to Beijing.

Similarly, India sees China’s moves in the Indian Ocean (ports in Sri Lanka, Pakistan, and Myanmar) as strategic encirclement, often called the “String of Pearls.”

China–Pakistan Nexus

China is Pakistan’s closest ally, providing military, economic, and diplomatic support. The China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) passes through Gilgit-Baltistan, a territory claimed by India. This deepens India’s suspicion that China aims to strategically contain it.

Tibet and the Dalai Lama

India hosts the Dalai Lama and the Tibetan government-in-exile in Dharamshala. China sees this as interference in its internal affairs and a threat to its sovereignty over Tibet.

Economic Competition

India sees Chinese dominance in trade and technology as a threat. After the 2020 border clashes, India banned over 200 Chinese apps and tightened FDI rules from China.

Both China and India compete for influence in South Asia, Africa, and global institutions.

Military Build-up

Both nations are rapidly modernizing and militarizing their borders. China has built extensive infrastructure (roads, rail, and airstrips) along the LAC. India is catching up with new highways, forward bases, and troop deployments.

Nationalism and Domestic Politics

In both countries, leaders use nationalist rhetoric to project strength. In India, strong responses to China are politically popular. In China, the Communist Party portrays territorial claims as non-negotiable to maintain legitimacy.

Geopolitics

China is wary of India’s growing ties with the US (Indo-Pacific strategy, defense pacts). India distrusts China’s closeness with Russia and Pakistan. Both are competing in international organizations (UN, BRICS, SCO, and G20).

India: Calls to boycott US goods

From McDonald's and Coca-Cola to Amazon and Apple, US-based multinationals are facing calls for a boycott in India as business executives and Prime Minister Narendra Modi's supporters stoke anti-American sentiment to protest against US tariffs, reports Reuters.

India, the world's most populous nation, is a key market for American brands that have rapidly expanded to target a growing base of affluent consumers, many of whom remain infatuated with international labels seen as symbols of moving up in life.

India, for example, is the biggest market by users for Meta's WhatsApp and Domino's has more restaurants than any other brand in the country. Beverages like Pepsi and Coca-Cola often dominate store shelves, and people still queue up when a new Apple store opens or a Starbucks cafe doles out discounts.

Although there was no immediate indication of sales being hit, there's a growing chorus both on social media and offline to buy local and ditch American products after Donald Trump imposed a 50% tariff on goods from India, rattling exporters and damaging ties between New Delhi and Washington.

Manish Chowdhary, co-founder of India's Wow Skin Science, took to LinkedIn with a video message urging support for farmers and startups to make "Made in India" a "global obsession," and to learn from South Korea whose food and beauty products are famous worldwide.

"We have lined up for products from thousands of miles away. We have proudly spent on brands that we don't own, while our own makers fight for attention in their own country," he said.

Rahm Shastry, CEO of India's DriveU, which provides a car driver on call service, wrote on LinkedIn: "India should have its own home-grown Twitter/ Google/ YouTube/ WhatsApp/ FB -- like China has."

To be fair, Indian retail companies give foreign brands like Starbucks stiff competition in the domestic market, but going global has been a challenge.

Indian IT services firms, however, have become deeply entrenched in the global economy, with the likes of TCS and Infosys providing software solutions to clients world over.

On Sunday, Modi made a "special appeal" for becoming self-reliant, telling a gathering in Bengaluru that Indian technology companies made products for the world but "now is the time for us to give more priority to India's needs."