Take the recent arrival of the Arctic Mulan in southern
China. On August 28, the sanctioned tanker unloaded liquefied natural gas from
Russia’s Arctic LNG-2 plant — a facility buried under Western restrictions.
That shipment, China’s first from the Siberian project, came just days before
Vladimir Putin’s state visit to Beijing. The symbolism is unmistakable: Beijing
is choosing energy security and strategic ties with Moscow over Washington’s
disapproval.
Washington’s own missteps reinforce the sense that sanctions
are losing their sting. In late August, President Donald Trump slapped a 25%
“secondary tariff” on Indian imports of Russian crude, doubling existing duties.
The gamble backfired. India not only kept buying Russian oil but also found
common cause with China — a troubling development for US strategists who once
counted on Delhi as a counterweight to Beijing.
The core problem is not intent but longevity. Sanctions work
best when they are broad, swift, and temporary — delivering a shock that
compels change before targets can adapt. But when restrictions drag on,
industries build workarounds.
Russia has done so with astonishing speed, channeling crude
through China and India, which now absorb 80% of its exports, and relying on
“dark fleets” of tankers to bypass Western oversight. Iran and Venezuela,
veterans of economic siege, have perfected similar tactics.
Meanwhile, the sheer scale of sanctions is undermining their
effectiveness. Since 2017, the number of international sanctions has surged by
450%, according to LSEG Risk Intelligence. After Moscow’s 2022 invasion of
Ukraine, EU sanctions on Russia jumped from zero in 2013 to more than 2,500 by
2025. Washington blacklisted over 3,100 new entities last year alone, most of
them Russian. The result, enforcement has become a bureaucratic quagmire,
draining multinational firms with compliance costs while Russia and its
partners adapt.
In short, the West is flooding the world with sanctions —
but the more it leans on this tool, the less powerful it becomes. Economic
warfare cannot be waged indefinitely without diminishing returns. If sanctions
are to remain credible, they must be recalibrated: fewer, smarter, and more
time-bound, backed by genuine multilateral coordination.
Otherwise, the very weapon once seen as a substitute for war
may become just another dull instrument in an increasingly multipolar world.
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