Bangladesh becoming “Panipat ka maidan”

Despite formidable odds, Bangladesh managed to script an enviable economic story over the past decade. Consistent GDP growth, export-led industrialization anchored by the ready-made garments sector, improving social indicators, and relative macroeconomic stability placed the country among Asia’s fastest emerging economies. Ironically, this very success appears to have turned Bangladesh into a theatre for competing global and regional ambitions.

Much like Panipat in South Asian history—where decisive battles were repeatedly fought by rival powers—Bangladesh is increasingly being reduced to a battleground for influence rather than a partner in prosperity. India, the United States, China and Russia have all attempted to secure strategic leverage in Dhaka. Each power has pursued its own interests, but none has prioritized long-term economic stability for the country itself.

The United States’ regime-change initiative ultimately succeeded. However, Washington’s engagement has remained narrowly political. Unlike past global interventions that at least carried economic reconstruction frameworks, there is no visible recovery plan, stabilization package or trade-driven agenda for Bangladesh. Regime change, without an accompanying economic roadmap, has only amplified uncertainty.

India continues to view Bangladesh largely through a strategic and security lens, while China’s engagement remains infrastructure-focused, tied to connectivity and supply chains. Russia’s role is limited and transactional. Yet none of these actors has articulated a comprehensive, people-centric recovery strategy for a nation now facing political paralysis.

The recent killing of a student leader has pushed the country into a state of standstill. Historically, student movements have been central to Bangladesh’s political evolution. Today, unrest is unfolding amid intense geopolitical rivalry risks prolonged instability. Investor confidence is weakening, export momentum is under pressure, and economic continuity is increasingly fragile.

The irony is unmistakable. Every power eager to influence Bangladesh shows little willingness to assume responsibility for economic recovery. Bangladesh does not need to become another Panipat—where outcomes are dictated by external forces and costs borne by the local population. Without a credible recovery plan rooted in stability and economic continuity, this power contest will exact a heavy price from the Bangladeshi people.