Donald Trump will formally take charge as president of
United States on January 20, 2025. The strategic regions of the world are being
trapped in a situation known as "tactical wars". These conflicts do
not seek a definitive victory but rather aim to create a state of instability
and uncertainty in key areas vital to US global interests.
The "America First" slogan, central to Trump's
agenda, can only materialize if Washington succeeds in maintaining its hegemony
over the major geostrategic regions. However, this dominance is only possible
if one essential factor is guaranteed: an active and sustained military
presence in these regions.
In these sensitive territories, the United States faces
growing resistance from both local governments and popular movements demanding
the withdrawal of American troops. If Washington were to yield to these demands
and abandon Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, or the Persian Gulf; renounce its
intervention in Ukraine and the Caucasus under the pretext of NATO; or reduce
its activities in the South China Sea, it would risk becoming just another
power, unable to maintain its global hegemony.
The United States deems it necessary to maintain its
presence in these strategic regions to avoid the decline of hegemony. Its
military deployments, although costly and often unpopular, are seen as the only
means to ensure its position as a dominant power in an increasingly competitive
world.
As explained by Iranian diplomat Mohammad Rasoul Mousavi,
the strategy to preserve the United States' military presence is based on
fueling what are known as "tactical wars." These wars do not seek a
definitive resolution but rather aim to prolong the conflict. On one hand, they
weaken the countries involved, and on the other, allow the United States to
justify and impose its presence in those regions.
Mousavi
interprets the resurgence of the conflict in Syria as a clear manifestation of
the United States' strategic approach. In the current context, it is evident
how Washington is attempting to consolidate its presence in the region. Despite
avoiding responsibility for the war led by extremist militants backed by
Turkey, the United States insists that the solution to the conflict is
inevitably tied to its military presence in Syria— a presence that would be
difficult to justify without the conflict serving as a pretext.
Additionally, there is a clear contradiction in the United
States' stance. In the current offensive against the government of Bashar
al-Assad, the main units fighting alongside anti-Assad forces are primarily
affiliated with Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS). This group, which separated from
Al-Qaeda in 2016, has maintained a strong presence in Syria.
Since 2018, the US State Department has designated HTS as a
Foreign Terrorist Organization. HTS remains a central player in the Syrian
conflict, particularly in the regions of Aleppo and Hama. The group is led by
Abu Muhammed al-Golani, who previously led the Nusra Front, Al-Qaeda's
affiliate in Syria. In 2016, al-Golani announced HTS's separation from
Al-Qaeda, claiming a distance from the global terror network.
However, his ties with Al-Qaeda remain a burden,
continuously attracting international attention. For example, the US still
offers a US$10 million reward for the capture of al-Golani, reflecting the
ongoing mistrust toward the group and its ideology.
In general, Syria is a stage where various geopolitical
interests converge. In the case of Turkey, the potential fall of Bashar
al-Assad would have significant strategic implications. Through its allied
groups in Syria, such as the self-styled Syrian National Army and HTS, Turkey
could consolidate and significantly expand its power and influence in a
territory that was part of the Ottoman Empire from 1516 to 1918.
A withdrawal of Russia, its historical rival in the region,
would represent a key political victory for Recep Tayyip Erdogan, while
constituting a defeat for Vladimir Putin and weakening Russian influence in the
Middle East. Additionally, the weakening or elimination of Kurdish forces in
Syria, a constant point of friction for Ankara, would be one of Turkey's
primary strategic objectives.
Finally, once Syria was "pacified" by HTS and its
allies, Erdogan could seize the opportunity to facilitate the return of the
millions of Syrian refugees currently in Turkey, presenting Assad’s fall as the
end of the war. This measure could potentially boost support for the Justice
and Development Party (AKP) in future elections.
The potential fall of Bashar al-Assad would have profound
consequences for Russia, as it could redefine both its influence in Syria and
its projection in the Middle East.
The loss of its main ally in Damascus would signal the end
of its political influence in the country, marking a strategic defeat that
would alter the regional balance.
Additionally, Russia would be surpassed by Turkey, which
would solidify its power and influence in Syria, leading to a geopolitical
reshaping in favor of Ankara.
Russia's military presence, essential to its influence in
Syria, could be significantly reduced or even eliminated, representing a
substantial loss of power in the region.
Moreover, Moscow would lose control of the naval base in
Tartus, a strategic facility it has controlled since 1971 during the Soviet era
and it serves as its only permanent military base in the Mediterranean. The
loss of Tartus would deal a major blow to Russia’s ability to project power in
the Middle East.
The
potential fall of Bashar al-Assad would also bring a series of strategic
implications for Israel, directly impacting its security in the region.
For Iran, the fall of Bashar al-Assad would have political
and strategic consequences. First, Iran would lose a key ally in the region.
However, the rise of Turkey as a regional power would be a
blow to Iran’s interests, as it would witness its rival expanding its power
while Iran's own political and military presence in Syria and Lebanon crumbles.
This scenario would lead to the weakening of Shia interests in Syria, Lebanon,
and even Iraq, disrupting the regional balance and undermining Iran's influence
in these key countries.
Finally, for the United States, the fall of Bashar al-Assad
would have significant strategic implications. First, it would mean Russia's
withdrawal from Syria, which would considerably weaken Moscow's influence in
the region, reducing its projection of power in the Middle East.
Additionally, the United States would achieve a key victory
by seeing the fall of Assad's government, considered one of Iran's main allies,
with whom Washington maintains an openly adversarial relationship. This would
mark the end of a long struggle to displace a government that has been an
obstacle to US policy in the region, consolidating the influence of Washington
and its allies in Syria and the Levant.
