Iran’s Revolution Endures at 47

As Iran marks the 47th anniversary of the 1979 Islamic Revolution, the occasion invites more than ceremonial remembrance. It demands a sober assessment of how a political upheaval that toppled a monarchy evolved into one of the most enduring and debated state projects of the modern era.

For ordinary Iranians, the revolution’s legacy remains layered. In its formative decades, the Islamic Republic expanded literacy, strengthened primary healthcare, and extended infrastructure into rural regions long neglected under the Shah. Education enrollment surged, and social development indicators improved. Just as significantly, the revolution institutionalized a powerful narrative of sovereignty, independence, and resistance to external domination. Yet these achievements coexist with persistent challenges: sanctions-driven economic strain, inflation, currency volatility, and high youth unemployment. A younger, digitally connected generation increasingly measures progress through economic opportunity, social mobility, and personal freedoms—metrics that often fuel domestic debate and periodic unrest.

An important, often oversimplified dimension is contemporary support for the revolutionary system. While global commentary frequently highlights dissent, Iranian society presents a more complex picture. Many citizens—particularly within rural constituencies, state-linked sectors, and groups prioritizing stability and national autonomy—continue to view the revolution as a guarantor of independence and social order. Commemorations still mobilize participation. At the same time, support is rarely unconditional; it exists alongside criticism of governance, economic management, and civil liberties. This coexistence of loyalty and frustration reflects a society negotiating reform rather than uniformly rejecting the state’s ideological foundations.

Externally, the revolution has operated under the shadow of sustained US opposition. Decades of sanctions, diplomatic isolation, and strategic confrontation have sought to constrain Tehran’s regional influence and nuclear ambitions. The result has been paradoxical: economic hardship and technological constraints on one side, but also a reinforced Iranian emphasis on self-reliance, deterrence, and strategic patience.

Regionally, Iran’s emergence as a consequential power is unmistakable. Through asymmetric capabilities, calibrated alliances, and geopolitical persistence, Tehran has embedded itself deeply in West Asian security dynamics. Whether perceived as stabilizer, disruptor, or balancer, Iran today is central to regional calculations.

At 47, the Iranian Revolution stands neither as a frozen triumph nor a failed experiment. It is a living, evolving project—tested by economic pressures, shaped by generational change, and defined by a resilience that continues to confound predictions of its demise.

US Trade Deal Raises Questions Over Bangladesh Autonomy

Bangladesh’s newly signed trade agreement with the United States is being hailed as a step forward in bilateral economic relations. Yet beneath the surface of tariff reductions and textile concessions, the deal raises uncomfortable questions about Dhaka’s strategic flexibility.

The agreement highlights an enduring reality of global economics: trade deals are rarely just about trade. For emerging economies like Bangladesh, the challenge is not merely securing market access but preserving policy autonomy. Economic gains can be meaningful, yet the long-term cost of constrained strategic choices may prove far more significant. In a world shaped by intensifying great-power competition, smaller states must navigate carefully — ensuring that commercial cooperation does not quietly evolve into strategic dependency.

Signed on February 09, the agreement reduces Bangladesh’s reciprocal tariff rate with the US to 19%. In return, Bangladesh secures zero reciprocal tariffs on readymade garments exported to the American market — provided those products are manufactured using US-origin cotton and man-made fibre.

While the trade benefits appear attractive, the language embedded in the agreement suggests broader expectations. The version released by the Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR) includes a notable provision:

“Bangladesh shall endeavor to increase purchases of US military equipment and limit military equipment purchases from certain countries.”

The final text avoids naming specific nations, but earlier drafts reportedly included references to reducing defence imports from China. Even without explicit mention, the geopolitical undertone is difficult to ignore.

Beyond defence procurement, the agreement outlines substantial long-term commercial commitments. Bangladesh is expected to import more than US$15 billion worth of American liquefied natural gas (LNG) over the next 15 years. The deal also encourages increased imports of US automobiles and auto parts.

In aviation, Dhaka has agreed to purchase 14 Boeing civil aircraft along with associated components, with the possibility of additional acquisitions in the future.

Another clause requires Bangladesh to submit a “full and complete” notification to the World Trade Organization (WTO) detailing all subsidies within six months — a move that could expose domestic industrial policies to heightened scrutiny.

Individually, each component of the agreement can be defended as commercially rational. Collectively, however, they reflect a familiar pattern in US trade diplomacy: economic incentives intertwined with strategic alignment.

For Bangladesh, the agreement may indeed open new economic opportunities. But it also underscores a broader dilemma faced by smaller economies — when trade arrangements begin influencing defence sourcing, energy dependence, and policy transparency, the boundary between partnership and pressure becomes blurred.

The deal may strengthen US-Bangladesh ties. Whether it narrows Bangladesh’s room for independent strategic maneuvering remains the more consequential question.

Should Iran Stop Entry of Ships with US Flag in the Strait of Hormuz?

The Strait of Hormuz is not just another sea lane — it is arguably the most consequential chokepoint in global energy geography. At its narrowest, the strait squeezes to just over 21 nautical miles, with segments falling within what Iran views — and much of the world recognizes — as its territorial waters. Yet, Washington, despite a policy of “maximum pressure” against Tehran, insists its vessels must transit unimpeded through these waters. This contradiction lies at the heart of the current impasse.

Under international law, coastal states exercise sovereignty over territorial waters, typically extending twelve nautical miles from their shorelines. While the regime of “transit passage” over straits used for international navigation exists, it is not absolute — especially when strategic maritime access is leveraged amid acute political tensions. Iran asserts that a combination of sanctions, military threats, and economic strangulation amounts to coercion, undermining the spirit of norms meant to protect freedom of navigation.

The US “maximum pressure” policy — a blend of sweeping sanctions, tariffs on Iran’s trading partners, asset freezes, and diplomatic isolation — aims to squeeze Tehran’s economy and force it back to the negotiating table on Washington’s terms. It has undoubtedly inflicted economic pain: deep currency depreciation, elevated inflation, and a contraction in trade with global partners. Yet, the policy has not delivered the strategic outcomes Washington seeks.

Iran has not fully capitulated on its nuclear ambitions, nor has it ceased support for networks that counter US influence in the region. Indeed, analysts argue that the policy’s unrelenting coercion without a clear diplomatic exit has hardened Tehran’s posture rather than moderated it.

Critically, this pressure campaign has complicated the very objective it claims to uphold — ensuring stable maritime traffic. Rather than diminishing Iran’s leverage, sustained economic and military posturing risks escalating incidents around the strait. Maritime advisories urging US-flagged vessels to stay as far as safely possible from Iranian waters reflect this unease.

If the United States wants unrestricted passage for its vessels, it must reckon with the paradox of demanding rights while applying relentless pressure that invites resistance. A sustainable solution demands not just naval escorts and sanctions, but a calibrated diplomatic engagement that acknowledges Iran’s legitimate security concerns without compromising global trade imperatives.

In a narrow channel where diplomacy and deterrence meet, rigidity will only make a bottleneck worse.

Does Iran Have the Right to Enrich Uranium?

Iran’s right to enrich uranium for peaceful purposes is grounded in international law, not ideological sympathy. As a signatory to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), Iran is legally entitled to develop nuclear technology for civilian uses such as medical isotopes, electricity generation, and scientific research, provided it remains under international safeguards. Tehran has consistently maintained that it does not seek nuclear weapons. Distrust alone cannot nullify a treaty-based right.

For nearly five decades, Iran has been subjected to economic sanctions, covert operations, cyber sabotage, and targeted killings of nuclear scientists. These measures, justified in the name of non-proliferation, have failed to eliminate Iran’s nuclear capability. Instead, they have entrenched confrontation, weakened moderates, and institutionalized hostility as a policy tool.

Israel has played the most aggressive role in this strategy. Operating with implicit Western backing, it has repeatedly attacked Iranian assets and openly threatened pre-emptive strikes. Prime Minister Netanyahu’s recurring warnings of unilateral military action reflect a dangerous mindset: one that treats force as a substitute for diplomacy and assumes escalation can be controlled. History suggests otherwise.

Any military adventurism against Iran would not remain a limited strike. It would provoke retaliation across the region, destabilize already fragile states, disrupt global energy supplies, and risk drawing major powers into a wider confrontation. The Middle East is already burdened by overlapping crises; igniting a new war over speculative threat perceptions would be an act of strategic recklessness.

If the objective is to prevent nuclear weapons proliferation, coercion has proven ineffective. Verification, inspections, and negotiated limits offer far greater security than sanctions and bombs. The West must accept that peaceful enrichment under monitoring is safer than perpetual confrontation.

Equally important, Muslim countries must move beyond silence and ambiguity. Enabling or facilitating attacks on Iran, directly or indirectly, only accelerates regional self-destruction. Strategic autonomy demands collective restraint.

Enough is enough. Denying legal rights, normalizing aggression, and tolerating unilateral strikes will not bring stability. They will only push the Middle East closer to a conflict whose consequences no one—not even its architects—can control.

Targeting Pakistan’s Heart: Terror Beyond Sectarian Lines

The latest bomb blast at an Imam Bargah during Friday prayers must not be dismissed as yet another episode of sectarian violence. To frame it that way is misleading—and plays directly into the hands of those who seek to destabilize Pakistan. This was a strategic strike aimed at the state, social cohesion, and economic revival, not a spontaneous sectarian clash.

The choice of location is telling. An attack in or near the federal capital is a deliberate message: those entrusted with national security are being exposed as vulnerable. This is about demonstrating institutional weakness, not simply causing casualties.

Targeting Shias at a place of worship is tactically calculated to manufacture the illusion of sectarian conflict. Pakistan’s Shia and Sunni communities have coexisted for decades. By creating the perception of intra-Muslim hostility, the perpetrators hope to provoke mistrust, social fragmentation, and internal tension—classic tools to weaken a nation from within.

Timing is critical. After prolonged economic strain, Pakistan is showing early signs of recovery—stabilizing markets, cautious investor interest, and renewed trade activity. Terrorism at this juncture is meant to undermine confidence, discourage investment, and stall the revival.

The attack also feeds into the Afghan blame narrative. Linking violence to cross-border militancy or safe havens conveniently shifts attention from the real sponsors, strains Pakistan-Afghanistan relations, and disrupts the flow of Afghan transit trade—a vital lifeline for both economies.

To call this “sectarian killing” is to misdiagnose the problem. The reality is far more calculated: a foreign hand is striking at security credibility, social harmony, regional diplomacy, and economic momentum. The question is not who was killed, but who benefits. And the answer lies far beyond sectarian lines.

Pakistan cannot allow its narrative to be hijacked. Recognizing the true nature of these attacks is the first step toward ensuring that security, economic revival, and regional cooperation are not held hostage by external designs.

Bangladesh Election: In the Shadow of Power, Protest and External Pressures

Bangladesh’s forthcoming general election is taking place at an extraordinary political moment, shaped less by routine electoral competition and more by the aftershocks of mass unrest, institutional recalibration, and regional scrutiny. The vote is widely viewed as a test of whether the country can transition from prolonged political dominance to a more inclusive and credible democratic order.

The Bangladesh Army has emerged as a pivotal, though discreet, actor in this phase. During the upheaval that led to the fall of Sheikh Hasina’s government, the military refrained from using force against protesters and facilitated the installation of an interim administration. Officially, the army insists it has no political ambitions. Yet its role in maintaining security and stabilizing state institutions gives it considerable behind-the-scenes influence over the transition.

Equally significant is the role of the student fraternity. What began as protests against unemployment, corruption, and governance failures evolved into a nationwide movement that altered the political landscape. Some leaders of these protests have now entered formal politics, signaling a rare shift from street agitation to electoral participation. Whether this energy translates into sustained political organization remains an open question.

The Awami League, long synonymous with power under Sheikh Hasina, finds itself on the margins. Legal proceedings against its leadership and its exclusion from the electoral process have sparked debate about political accountability versus inclusivity. While supporters argue the measures are necessary to reset governance, critics warn that sidelining a major party risk narrowing democratic choice.

The opposition space is largely occupied by the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP). Following the death of former prime minister Khaleda Zia, leadership influence rests primarily with her son, Tarique Rahman, who continues to shape party strategy from abroad. The BNP faces the challenge of converting opportunity into coherence after years of political disruption.

Externally, India is closely watching developments, given its strategic, economic, and security interests in Bangladesh. The United States remains engaged through diplomatic pressure and advocacy for a transparent electoral process. By contrast, there is no credible evidence of direct Pakistani influence, despite occasional rhetorical references in domestic discourse.

Ultimately, this election is less about personalities and more about institutions. Bangladesh’s real challenge lies in whether power can be contested through ballots rather than barricades, and whether the promise of democratic renewal can outlast the politics of upheaval.

PSX: Geopolitics and internal security concerns mar performance

Pakistan Stock Exchange (PXS) trended upwards for most of the week before adjusting by 3,703 points on Friday’s session, wiping out earlier gains to close the benchmark index at 184,130pts, down 45 points or 0.02%WoW. The decline was triggered by escalating geopolitical tensions over US and Iran, alongside adverse domestic security developments.

Earlier in the week, sentiments were supported by Prime Minister’s industrial relief package, coupled with record high monthly exports of US$3.06 billion during January 2026, resulting in 7%YoY drop in trade deficit. Inflation reading during the month remained lower than expected at 5.8%YoY.

Cement sector’s offtakes hit 5-year high of 4.54 million tons, up 13%YoY, driven by higher sea-exports.

OMC offtakes also increased by 6%YoY to 1.35 million tons.

Banking sector deposits expanded by 0.7%WoW, providing a positive backdrop for the sector.

T-Bill and PIB yields rose by 15 to 40 bps, in the first auction following SBP’s decision to leave policy rate unchanged.

Despite improved sentiments, market participation weakened during the week, with average daily trading volume declining by 12%WoW to 1.2 billion shares, from 1.4 billion shares in the earlier week.

On the currency front, PKR appreciated by 0.02%WoW against the greenback during the week, closing the week at 279.71 PKR to a US$.

Other major news flow during the week included: 1) UAE rolls over US$2 billion Pak loan for a month, 2) GoP requests Saudi Arabia for two-year extension in oil facility, 3) Barrick reviews Reko Diq project amid security concerns, 4) FBR collection rose 16%YoY to PKR1,015 billion in January 2026, and 5) Private sector credit expands by PKR 589 billion in FYTD.

Power Generation & Distribution, Jute, Leather & Tanneries, Inv. Banks/ Inv. Cos./ Securities Cos., and Real Estate Investment Trust were amongst the top performing sectors, while Chemical, Engineering, Tobacco, Oil & Gas Exploration Companies and Cement were amongst the laggards.

Major buying was recorded by Mutual Funds, Brokers, and Companies with an aggregate net buy of US$32 million. Banks and Foreigners were major sellers with net aggregate sell of US$25 million.

Top performing scrips of the week were: KEL, ILP, SAZEW, HMB, and TRG, while laggards included LOTCHEM, PIBTL, PPL, GADT, and KTML.

AKD Securities foresees the positive momentum at PSX to continue due to improving macros and continuous focus on reforms amid political stability. The brokerage house forecasts the benchmark Index to reach 263,800 by end December 2026.

Investors sentiments are expected to improve on the likelihood of foreign portfolio and direct investment flows, driven by improved relations with the United States and Saudi Arabia.

Top picks of the brokerage house are: OGDC, PPL, UBL, MEBL, HBL, FFC, ENGROH, PSO, LUCK, FCCL, INDU, ILP and SYS.

Trump’s Iran Posturing Is Not Diplomacy, but Coercion

Donald Trump’s latest threat to attack Iran unless Tehran submits to his demands is not diplomacy, it is coercion masquerading as negotiation. Washington claims the upcoming Oman talks focus on Iran’s nuclear program. In reality, Trump is exploiting military pressure and Iran’s recent domestic unrest to force sweeping political concessions. His warning that Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei should be “very worried” reveals the real intent: intimidation, not engagement.

The starting point is simple. Trump himself tore up the 2015 nuclear agreement in 2018, despite Iran’s compliance verified by international inspectors. By walking away from an UN-backed deal, he forfeited any moral authority to dictate new terms. Having dismantled the framework, he now seeks to resurrect it with added demands — including Iran’s missile program, regional alliances, and internal policies. That is not renegotiation; it is strategic extortion.

If this were genuinely about uranium enrichment, talks would remain technical and narrow. Instead, US officials insist on expanding the agenda to missiles, proxy groups, and Iran’s domestic affairs. Tehran has rightly rejected this maximalist approach, agreeing only to discuss nuclear issues.

Trump’s reported preconditions — zero uranium enrichment, missile restrictions, and abandonment of regional partners — amount to demanding Iran’s strategic surrender. Zero enrichment alone violates Iran’s rights under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, which permits peaceful nuclear activity. Iranian officials have even signaled flexibility on enrichment levels, yet Washington insists on total prohibition.

Simultaneously, the US has deployed an aircraft carrier, warships, fighter jets, and thousands of troops to the region. Drones have been shot down, naval encounters are escalating, and oil prices are rising. This is classic gunboat diplomacy.

The irony is striking. Trump warns of nuclear danger while having destroyed the very inspection regime that restrained Iran’s program. He pressures Tehran under threat of airstrikes, while Israel — a non-NPT nuclear power — remains beyond scrutiny. The double standard is glaring.

Negotiations conducted under the shadow of missiles are not negotiations. They are ultimatums.

If Trump truly sought stability, he would rejoin the agreement he abandoned, remove preconditions, and restore inspections-based diplomacy. Instead, he is gambling with another Middle East conflict — one that could engulf the entire region.

This is not statesmanship. It is brinkmanship.

US$10 trillion a day global currency market becomes more volatile

The dollar, the world's No.1 reserve currency, is having a rocky ride as unpredictable White House policy moves and Federal Reserve independence concerns revive "Sell America" trades. While it is expected to weaken further, sudden rebounds in the greenback can catch traders out just as much as sudden sharp falls.

Having fallen almost 2% in one week in January to four-year lows, an index measuring the dollar's value against other major currencies then bounced back, causing metals market mayhem.

Here's a look at how dollar risks are rippling through world markets.

The dollar's rebound in the last two trading sessions, following US President Donald Trump's decision to nominate former Federal Reserve governor Kevin Warsh to replace outgoing Fed chief Jerome Powell has sparked a metals market meltdown.

Gold, which had notched up its best month in more than half a century in January, slumped 5% on Monday after its biggest daily fall since the early 1980s in the prior session - it regained some ground on Tuesday.

Traders had crowded into a popular currency debasement trade that relied on metals prices rising as Fed independence kept the dollar on a steady weakening path. That concept then dropped out of metals markets "at lightning speed," days, Societe Generale said in a client note.

US$10 trillion a day global currency market becomes more volatile.

A gauge of the most actively traded currency pair -- the euro/dollar exchange rate that measures expected volatility in three months' time, hit its highest since July last week.

According to Capital Economics, the dollar had become detached from traditional valuation metrics like the gap between US and Japanese or European interest rates.

Barclays has calculated a US policy risk premium for the dollar, meaning it is influenced by White House rhetoric and has become partly detached from the economic and growth forecasts that investors usually track. That could make stocks and bonds priced in dollars harder for foreign investors to hold and value.

While the indexes were lifted by gains in chipmakers, small caps also performed well, with the Russell 2000 jumping about 1%.

"The main question is whether people lose confidence in the US asset base," said Barclays global head of FX and EM macro strategy Themos Fiotakis.

Foreign investors own almost US$70 trillion worth of US assets, more than doubling their holdings in the last decade as Wall Street stocks boomed. European money managers are assessing their exposures.

A weaker dollar can boost US stocks by increasing the local currency value of companies' overseas earnings and often raises prices of Treasuries.

"But disorderly dollar decline could change this relationship," Bank of America analysts said in a note.

A disorderly drop would be a 5% monthly loss, BofA said, which could generate a "drastic sell-off of long-dated Treasuries," and tighten US financial conditions significantly.

A wider debasement trade, with the dollar falling in tandem with domestic assets, was also a risk, BofA said.

Courtesy: Reuters

 

Cuba another victim of US imperialism

As blackouts stretch through the night and food prices rocket by the week, Cubans are once again being tested to the limits of endurance. The streets of Havana—still lined with vintage cars and colonial façades—have rarely looked more fragile. Power outages now last up to twelve hours, fuel lines snake around blocks, and the peso continues to plummet. For many, survival has become the nation’s only industry.

The US government’s latest squeeze—threatening tariffs on countries supplying Cuba with oil—tightens an economic chokehold that stretches back decades. The collapse of Venezuela’s oil support and Mexico’s recent withdrawal have left the island gasping. Washington’s strategy may aim to force change, but the immediate result is predictable: ordinary Cubans bearing the cost of geopolitical rivalry.

Yet this is not a story of sudden collapse; it is one of cumulative exhaustion. Cuba’s aging power grid has long teetered on failure, and its post-revolution economy—built on rationing and resilience—has been stretched to breaking point. Housewives like Yaite Verdecia say, “There’s no salary that can cope with this.” Taxi drivers who once saw electric vehicles as their future can no longer find power to charge them. Lines for food and fuel have become an inescapable part of daily life.

Despite everything, the streets remain largely silent. A mix of repression, fear, and fatigue has subdued public protest since the brief outburst of 2021. Millions have left the island since the pandemic, draining its energy and voice. Those who remain, like 71-year-old Mirta Trujillo, cling to faith rather than politics: “I’m not against my country... but I don’t want to die of hunger.”

Cuba’s crisis today is not only about oil, inflation, or blackouts—it is about hope running on empty. While US sanctions may claim to pressure the regime, these are instead breaking the backs of its people. After six decades of survival against the odds, Cuba’s lights may dim again, but its will to endure—worn thin and weary—still flickers in the dark.

PSX witnesses extreme volatility but benchmark index declines 2.6%WoW

Pakistan Stock Exchange (PSX) trended downward for most of the week before rebounding by 1,836 points, with the benchmark index shedding 4,992 points or 2.6%WoW to close at 184,174 points. The decline was triggered by State Bank of Pakistan (SBP) keeping policy rate unchanged at 10.5%, against market expectations. It was followed by heightened geopolitical tensions between US and Iran, and lower than expected results from FFC for the final quarter. However, sentiment was upturned as geopolitical tensions began to ease. Banking sector recorded second highest annual growth in deposits, ending the year at PKR37.4 trillion. Moreover, SBP reduced average Cash Reserve Requirement for banks from 6% to 5%, aimed at stipulating private sector credit growth.

Market participation strengthened marginally during the week by 3%WoW, with average daily trading volume to 1.40 billion shares, from 1.36 billion shares a week ago. Foreign exchange reserves held by (SBP) increased by US$13 million to US$16.1 billion as of Jan 23, 2026. PKR appreciated by 0.03%WoW against the greenback during the week to close the week at 279.77 PKR/ a US$.

Other major news flow during the week included: 1) GoP has set 5.1% GDP growth target for federal budget, 2) Brent crude nears six-month high on Iran attack concerns, 3) SBP revises GDP growth upward up to 4.75% for FY26, 4) IMF chief praises Pakistan’s reform push, and 5) Circular debt flow declines to PKR75 billion in 1HFY26.

Property, Jute, Vanaspati & Allied Industries, and Automobile Assembler were amongst the top performing sectors, while Fertilizer, Chemical, Insurance, Paper & Board, and Textile Spinning were amongst the laggards.

Major buying was recorded by Individuals and Foreigners with a net buy of US$25.7 million and US$17.8 million. Mutual Funds and Banks were the major sellers with net sell of US$22.7 million and US$11.8 million respectively.

Top performing scrips of the week were: JVDC, 2) SAZEW, KEL, MTL, and PPL, while top laggards included: GADT, HCAR, FFC, AICL, and LCI.

AKD securities foresees the positive momentum at PSX to continue on improving macros and continuous focus on reforms amid political stability.

The brokerage house anticipates the benchmark Index to reach 263,800 by end December 2026.

Investors’ sentiments are expected to improve on the likelihood of foreign portfolio and direct investment flows, driven by improved relations with the United States and Saudi Arabia.

Our top picks of the brokerage house include: OGDC, PPL, UBL, MEBL, HBL, FFC, ENGROH, PSO, LUCK, FCCL, INDU, ILP and SYS.

 

Which is stronger lobby in the United States? munition makers or oil producers

In Washington, power rarely announces itself openly. It works through campaign donations, revolving doors, think tanks, and carefully shaped narratives. Among the most influential forces shaping US foreign and economic policy, two lobbies stand out: 1) defence-industrial complex and 2) fossil fuel industry. Both command enormous resources. Both influence war, peace, and prosperity. Yet when measured in reach, consistency, and policy outcomes, America’s arms manufacturers increasingly overshadow even Big Oil.

The oil lobby was once unrivalled. For decades, US foreign policy in the Middle East revolved around energy security. Oil giants funded campaigns, shaped environmental regulations, and enjoyed privileged access to policymakers. While they remain powerful—especially in blocking aggressive climate legislation—their dominance has gradually eroded. The rise of renewable energy, ESG pressures, and growing public awareness of climate change have constrained their room for manoeuvre. Oil companies now often find themselves playing defence.

The munition lobby, by contrast, is in expansion mode.

America’s major arms manufacturers—Lockheed Martin, Raytheon, Northrop Grumman, Boeing Defence, and General Dynamics—operate at the intersection of geopolitics and profit. Their influence is amplified by a permanent state of conflict or perceived threat. From Ukraine to Gaza, from Taiwan to the Persian Gulf, every escalation translates into fresh contracts, replenishment orders, and higher stock prices.

Unlike oil producers, defence firms benefit directly from instability. War is not a side effect of their business; it is their business model.

Their leverage rests on three pillars: 1) Defence contractors consistently rank among the largest donors to congressional campaigns, particularly to members of key committees overseeing defence spending. 2) Retired generals become board members, former Pentagon officials turn lobbyists, and corporate executives cycle into government roles. 3) Arms factories are spread across dozens of states, allowing lawmakers to justify military budgets as job protection rather than militarism.

This creates a self-reinforcing ecosystem. Threats are magnified. Military budgets grow almost automatically. Diplomatic options are sidelined, while weapon shipments become default policy tools.

Oil companies still shape energy policy, but they no longer dictate America’s strategic posture, defence firms do. Today, it is the arms industry that frames adversaries, defines security priorities, and normalizes trillion-dollar defence budgets with minimal scrutiny.

The implications are profound. A system driven by munition profits naturally gravitates toward confrontation. Peace becomes economically inconvenient.

If the oil lobby once pulled America into wars to secure energy routes, the munition lobby now sustains conflicts to secure revenue streams. That is a far more dangerous evolution—because it embeds war into the structure of governance itself.

The uncomfortable conclusion is this: in today’s United States, bullets carry more political weight than barrels.

Election or Selection in the United States?

The United States projects itself as the world’s leading democracy, promoting its political model while judging others against it. Yet a closer look at how power operates in Washington raises an uncomfortable question: does America still practice genuine elections, or has it quietly shifted toward managed selection?

Americans vote, campaigns are televised, and results are certified. But democracy is not merely about procedure—it is about meaningful choice. And that choice is shaped long before Election Day.

Today, candidates pass through an ecosystem dominated by money, lobbying, and media influence. Corporate donors, defence contractors, energy giants, and financial institutions determine who receives funding, visibility, and institutional backing. Those who challenge entrenched interests rarely survive primaries, while outsiders are systematically marginalized. By the time voters reach polling booths, the menu has already been curated.

This is where selection replaces election.

Campaigns now cost billions. Such sums cannot be raised without compromising political independence. Elected officials emerge indebted to donors rather than constituents. The revolving door between Congress, corporate boardrooms, and federal agencies further blurs the line between public service and private profit. Policy continuity across administrations—regardless of party—reveals where real power lies.

Foreign policy offers the clearest evidence. Presidents change, but wars persist. Military budgets expand almost automatically. Arms shipments grow. Sanctions multiply. Whether Democrat or Republican, Washington remains committed to confrontation-first strategies. This consistency reflects the priorities of powerful lobbies, particularly the defence industry, which profits directly from instability.

Domestic policy tells a similar story. Despite strong public support for healthcare reform, student debt relief, and financial regulation, progress remains limited. Meanwhile, defence spending and corporate advantages pass with remarkable ease. Popular will is routinely overridden by institutional inertia and corporate pressure.

Media consolidation deepens the problem. A handful of corporations shape national discourse, narrowing debate and manufacturing consent. Candidates who question militarism or corporate dominance receive limited coverage, while establishment figures dominate airtime.

To be clear, the United States is not a dictatorship. Elections occur, courts function, and civil liberties exist. But democracy has become conditional—operating within boundaries set by moneyed interests. Citizens vote, yet rarely determine strategic direction. That privilege belongs to donors, lobbyists, and unelected power centers.

The result is a managed democracy - ballots provide legitimacy, while selection ensures continuity. Until money is removed from politics and lobbying is meaningfully restrained, “government of the people” will remain more slogan than reality.

Muslim World at a Crossroads: OIC Must Act Before Iran Becomes the Next Battlefield

President Donald Trump’s increasingly belligerent rhetoric toward Iran should ring alarm bells across the Muslim world. Since Washington tightened its grip on Venezuela—effectively neutralizing its oil exports and political sovereignty—the White House’s tone on Tehran has grown markedly harsher. Today, threats of regime change, military strikes, and even targeted assassinations of Iran’s top clergy are being voiced with unsettling openness.

This trajectory is neither accidental nor unprecedented.

Recent Israeli and US operations against Iran succeeded largely because of access to regional airspace and ground facilities provided by neighboring Muslim countries. That cooperation—whether voluntary or extracted under pressure—proved decisive. There is little reason to believe the next phase, should it materialize, would be any different. On the contrary, Washington is almost certainly weighing which regional capitals might again be persuaded, coerced, or compelled to facilitate action against Tehran.

Herein lies the collective failure of Muslim leadership.

Individually, many states lack the political or economic resilience to withstand sustained US pressure. Collectively they possess enormous diplomatic weight, energy leverage, and strategic relevance. Yet this collective strength remains largely untapped, diluted by divisions and bilateral calculations.

This is precisely why the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) must immediately convene an emergency summit.

Such a meeting should not be symbolic. It must produce a clear, unified resolution rejecting any military action against Iran and warning against the use of Muslim territories, airspace, or infrastructure for attacks on a fellow Muslim nation. Silence or ambiguity will be interpreted as consent.

Muslim rulers must also confront a sobering reality: Iran is not the endgame. Washington’s broader strategy has long revolved around reshaping political landscapes in energy-rich Muslim countries, often replacing sovereign governments with compliant “puppet” regimes. Iraq, Libya, and Afghanistan offer painful reminders of how external intervention leaves behind fractured societies and enduring instability.

The argument here is not about endorsing Iran’s policies. It is about safeguarding regional sovereignty and preventing yet another war that would devastate Muslim populations while serving external geopolitical interests.

History will judge today’s leaders by whether they chose unity over expediency.

If the Muslim world fails to draw a firm collective line now, it risks becoming a revolving battlefield—one country at a time. An emergency OIC meeting is not merely desirable; it is an urgent strategic necessity.

China-India rapprochement not a good omen for United States

President Xi Jinping’s description of China and India as “good neighbours, friends and partners” may sound ceremonial, but the timing and context carry far greater geopolitical weight. His Republic Day message to Indian President Droupadi Murmu signals more than diplomatic courtesy. It reflects a calculated recalibration in Asia—one that should deeply concern Washington.

After years of tension following the deadly 2020 Himalayan clash, Beijing and New Delhi are quietly rebuilding bridges. The resumption of direct flights in 2025, expanding trade ties, and a series of high-level visits suggest both sides are determined to move beyond confrontation. Xi’s evocative metaphor of the “dragon and the elephant dancing together” underscores a strategic reality: Asia’s two largest powers are rediscovering the value of coexistence.

For the United States, this rapprochement is not a welcome development.

Washington has invested heavily in positioning India as a counterweight to China through frameworks such as the Quad and broader Indo-Pacific strategy. A warming China–India relationship weakens this pillar. If New Delhi chooses pragmatism over alignment, America’s carefully constructed containment architecture in Asia begins to fray.

More importantly, the implications extend far beyond South Asia.

A coordinated or even cooperative China–India posture diminishes US leverage across the wider Global South. Both countries are major energy consumers, influential voices in BRICS, and key stakeholders in Middle Eastern stability. As their economic and diplomatic coordination deepens, Washington risks losing its ability to shape outcomes from Tehran to Riyadh.

Weakening US hegemony in South Asia will also loosen America’s grip on the Middle East.

This is not theoretical. China already brokers regional diplomacy, from Saudi–Iran reconciliation to infrastructure investments under the Belt and Road Initiative. India maintains historic ties with Gulf states while steadily expanding its economic footprint. Together, they offer regional actors alternatives to Western security and financial systems—precisely at a time when US foreign policy under President Donald Trump appears increasingly transactional and unpredictable.

To be sure, structural mistrust remains between Beijing and New Delhi. Their 3,800-kilometre disputed border is still heavily militarized, and strategic competition has not vanished. Yet both sides now seem willing to manage disputes rather than weaponize them.

That pragmatism carries consequences.

A stable China–India equation accelerates the shift toward a multipolar order, reducing Washington’s ability to divide and influence Asian powers. For the United States, the message is clear: when the dragon and the elephant learn to dance, America no longer leads the orchestra.

The emerging alignment may be fragile—but even a cautious rapprochement marks another step away from US-centric global dominance.

PSX benchmark index closed at an all-time high of 189,167

Pakistan Stock Exchange continued upward movement during the week, with benchmark index gaining 4,068 points or 2.2% WoW to close at an all-time high of 189,167 on Friday, January 24, 2026. Market participation also improved by 8.7%WoW, with average daily trading volume rising to 1.3 billion shares, as compared to 1.2 billion shares in the prior week.

Momentum was supported by easing geopolitical tensions and a decline in T-Bill yields to single-digit levels for the first time in four years.

Moreover, positive economic partnerships with China, US, Britain and Saudi Arabia are expected to further boost Pakistan’s economy.

On the macroeconomic front, current account deficit was recorded at US$244 million for December 2025, while FDI outflows were recorded at US$135 million.

Power generation rose 8.8%YoY at December end, while IT sector recorded highest ever monthly exports of US$437 million, up 26%YoY.

Foreign exchange reserves held by State Bank of Pakistan (SBP) increased by US$16 million to US$16.1 billion as of January 16, 3026, as a result PKR appreciated against the greenback during the week, closing the week at 279.86 PKR/ US$.

Other major news flow during the week included: 1) Pakistan, China sign US$4.5 billion farm deals, boosting jobs and food supply, 2) Pakistan signs Trump-led Board of Peace charter, 3) GoP working on proposals to reduce industrial power tariff, 4) Pakistan-Philippines can boost pharma trade to US$1 billion, and 5) Foreign firms repatriate US$1.6 billion during 1HFY26.

Refinery, Fertilizer, Leather & Tanneries, Insurance, Property were amongst the top performing sectors, while Transport, Jute, Woollen, Technology & Communication, and Engineering were amongst the laggards.

Major buying was recorded by Mutual Funds and Individuals with a net buy of US$22.1 million and US$11.5 million, respectively. Foreigners and Companies were major sellers with net sell of US$21.1 million and US$10.4 million.

Top performing scrips of the week were: AICL, ATRL, FATIMA, SAZEW, and ENGROH, while laggards included: PIOC, KTML, TGL, SYS, and PAEL.

AKD Securities foresees the positive momentum at PSX to continue due to further monetary easing driven by improving external account position and continuous focus on reforms amid political stability.

The brokerage house anticipates the benchmark index to rise to 263,800 by end December 2026.

Investors’ sentiments are expected to improve on the likelihood of foreign portfolio and direct investment flows, driven by improved relations with the United States and Saudi Arabia.

Top picks of the brokerage house are:  OGDC, PPL, UBL, MEBL, HBL, FFC, ENGROH, PSO, LUCK, FCCL, INDU, ILP and SYS.

US “armada” heading towards Middle East

US President Donald Trump said on Thursday a naval “armada” was heading toward the Middle East, as he renewed warnings to Tehran against killing protesters or restarting its nuclear program.

“We’re watching Iran,” Trump told reporters on Air Force One on Thursday as he flew back from the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland.

“We have a big force going towards Iran,” Trump said.

“I’d rather not see anything happen, but we’re watching them very closely,” he said.

Trump’s announcement on the US naval buildup comes after he appeared to back-pedal last week on his threats of military action against Iran.

US officials said the aircraft carrier USS Abraham Lincoln and other assets would arrive in the Middle East in the coming days.

One official said additional air-defense systems were also being eyed for the Middle East, which could be critical to guard against any Iranian strike on US bases in the region.

The warships started moving from the Asia-Pacific last week as tensions between Iran and the United States soared following a severe crackdown on protests across Iran in recent months.

Trump had repeatedly threatened to intervene against Iran over the recent killings of protesters there but protests dwindled last week. The president backed away from his toughest rhetoric last week, claiming he had stopped executions of prisoners.

He repeated that claim on Thursday, saying Iran canceled nearly 840 hangings after his warnings.

"I said: 'If you hang those people, you're going to be hit harder than you've ever been hit. It'll make what we did to your Iran nuclear (program) look like peanuts,'" Trump said.

"At an hour before this horrible thing was going to take place, they canceled it," he said, calling it "a good sign."

The US military has in the past periodically surged forces to the Middle East at times of heightened tensions, moves that were often defensive.

However, the US military staged a major buildup last year ahead of its June strikes against Iran's nuclear program.

China’s muted response to US threats to attack Iran

China’s restrained reaction to fresh US threats against Iran is not a sign of indifference, weakness, or quiet acquiescence. Rather, it reflects a deliberate strategic calculation shaped by energy security, diplomatic doctrine, and Beijing’s evolving view of its role in the Middle East.

Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi’s recent phone call with his Iranian counterpart captured this posture succinctly. By opposing the “use or threat of force” and reaffirming dialogue over coercion, Beijing restated principles it has upheld for decades. What stood out was what China chose not to do: no sharp condemnation of Washington, no announcement of countermeasures, and no promise of tangible intervention.

This muted response is consistent with China’s long-standing policy of non-interference. Beijing has historically avoided entanglement in the internal politics of partner states, whether governed by hardliners or reformists. For China, regime type is secondary to sovereignty, stability, and continuity of cooperation. Iran is no exception.

Economic realities reinforce this caution. China buys over 80 percent of Iran’s oil exports and remains the world’s largest crude importer. Yet Beijing is acutely aware that overt political or security involvement could invite harsher Western sanctions at a time when it is already under pressure from Washington. Restraint, therefore, is not passivity but risk management.

Crucially, China has spent decades diversifying its energy sources precisely to reduce overdependence on politically volatile suppliers. As long as Iranian instability does not escalate into a blockade of the Strait of Hormuz or a collapse of Iran’s oil infrastructure, Beijing can absorb the shock. Iran’s reliance on shadow fleets and grey-zone trade has so far kept energy flows intact.

Beijing also appears relaxed about Iran’s internal political trajectory. A more pragmatic or even West-leaning leadership in Tehran would not necessarily undermine Chinese interests. Iran’s economic needs and China’s market size ensure a continued relationship, even if discounted oil disappears.

At a broader level, China is recalibrating its Middle East strategy. While its economic footprint is expanding amid a relative decline in US influence, Beijing remains unwilling to assume security responsibilities or confront Washington head-on. Verbal opposition, strategic ambiguity, and economic engagement remain its preferred tools.

In short, China is playing the long game. Its silence is not absence, but a calculated choice to protect interests without escalation — a reminder that in geopolitics, restraint can be as strategic as confrontation.

Japan a victim of US military industrial game

It is an uncomfortable but undeniable reality that a major driver of the US economy is the global sale of military hardware. Packaged as “security cooperation,” this system increasingly functions as a mechanism of dependency that serves America’s military industrial complex more than the security needs of its allies. A recent Nikkei Asia investigation into Japan’s undelivered US weapons orders exposes this imbalance with unusual clarity.

According to the report, Japan has placed 118 orders for US military equipment worth over US$7 billion that remain undelivered more than five years after contracts were signed. In several cases, the delays have forced Japan’s Self-Defense Forces to rely on aging platforms—the very problem these purchases were meant to address. This is not a bureaucratic mishap but a structural flaw in the US Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program.

Under FMS rules, buyers must pay in advance, while prices and delivery schedules remain estimates. Washington retains the right to prioritize its own military needs, a reality that has become more pronounced since the war in Ukraine. Weapons already paid for by allies can be diverted elsewhere, while client states are expected to wait patiently. The refund of surplus funds, often cited as evidence of fairness, does little to compensate for years of strategic uncertainty.

This arrangement increasingly resembles economic coercion. Countries are encouraged to replace “obsolete” systems even when existing hardware remains functional. The logic of modernization often aligns more closely with US defense contractors’ production cycles than with genuine threat assessments. The buyer’s ability—or even need—to deploy advanced systems becomes secondary.

Japan’s experience is particularly instructive. As a technologically advanced nation and a key US ally, Tokyo should, in theory, enjoy priority treatment. Its difficulties raise serious questions about the position of smaller or less influential buyers, for whom arms purchases can become sunk costs with limited security returns.

The Nikkei Asia findings should serve as a warning. Dependence on a single supplier whose economy is deeply tied to militarization carries inherent risks. Paying upfront for weapons that arrive late—or not at all—undermines both security and sovereignty. Japan’s US$7 billion backlog is not merely a logistical failure; it is a lesson in the real economics of buying American security.

Revoking Araghchi’s Davos invitation highlights blatant double standards

Iran’s Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi has slammed the World Economic Forum (WEF) for revoking an invitation to the annual meeting in Davos over his country’s crackdown on recent protests, accusing the forum of applying “blatant double standards” and succumbing to political pressure from Israel.

The WEF confirmed that Araghchi will not attend this year’s summit, running until January 23, saying that “although he was invited last fall, the tragic loss of lives of civilians in Iran over the past few weeks means that it is not right for the Iranian government to be represented at Davos this year.”

Araghchi said in a post on X on Monday night that the decision was made by WEF “on the basis of lies and political pressure from Israel and its US-based proxies and apologists.”

Araghchi had been scheduled to speak on Tuesday during the summit at the Swiss ski resort town.

The Iranian minister criticized what he called the WEF’s “blatant double standards” for keeping an invitation open to Israel’s President Isaac Herzog despite international accusations of genocide of the Palestinians in Gaza.

Araghchi said the forum’s decision came even though “Israel's genocide of Palestinians and mass slaughter of 71,000 innocent people did not compel it to cancel any invitation extended to Israeli officials whatsoever.”

The WEF's decision comes as stability has been restored across Iran following a period of foreign-instigated unrest.

What began as peaceful protests late last month gradually turned violent, as rioters rampaged through cities across the country, killing security forces and attacking public infrastructure.

The foreign minister stressed that the Iranian government had to defend the people against “armed terrorists and ISIS-style killings" openly backed by the Israeli spy agency Mossad.

The US and Israel have acknowledged their direct involvement on the ground, with former US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo tweeting, "Happy New Year to every Iranian in the streets. Also, to every Mossad agent walking beside them."

Germany, one of the United States' closest and strongest allies in Europe, also stated its opposition to extending an invitation to Iranian officials.

The Munich Security Conference on Friday said it was also withdrawing an invitation to Araghchi. 

 

Davos: Where Rich Perfect Art of Making Poor Poorer

Every January, Davos becomes the moral capital of the global elite. Wrapped in snow, security, and self-congratulation, presidents, billionaires, CEOs, and financiers gather to discuss the fate of a world they rarely experience firsthand. The World Economic Forum presents this annual ritual as a platform for global problem-solving. In truth, Davos has evolved into a carefully managed performance—where concern is expressed, responsibility is deferred, and power remains untouched.

The language of Davos is polished and predictable. “Inclusive growth,” “stakeholder capitalism,” “climate action,” and “global resilience” dominate the agenda. Yet behind this vocabulary lies a stubborn reality - inequality is not shrinking, poverty is not disappearing, and wealth is concentrating at a historic pace. If Davos were effective, the results would speak for themselves, which do not.

What Davos offers is not solutions but comfort—comfort to those who already control capital, technology, and policy access. It is a space where elites reassure one another that the system is flawed but fundamentally sound, that disruption must be managed rather than allowed, and that reform should never threaten ownership or privilege. The poor are omnipresent in speeches and PowerPoint slides, but conspicuously absent from decision-making tables.

The real conversations happen away from the cameras. While developing countries are advised to embrace austerity, fiscal discipline, and structural reforms, multinational corporations negotiate tax privileges, regulatory flexibility, and public subsidies. Workers are told to reskill endlessly, while capital moves freely across borders, protected by legal regimes it helped design. Climate change is acknowledged, yet fossil fuel interests remain deeply embedded in the very forum that claims to champion sustainability.

The return of Donald Trump to global relevance this year did not disrupt Davos—it exposed it. Trump’s blunt nationalism and transactional worldview are often portrayed as an aberration, these are not. He merely articulates openly what Davos practices quietly - power first, profit always, and principles only when convenient. Trump is not the enemy of the Davos mindset; he is its unfiltered expression.

For the Global South, Davos has long been a lecture hall. Countries facing debt, inflation, and political instability are prescribed reforms that protect creditors and investors, rarely citizens. Poverty is treated as a technical problem rather than a political outcome. Inequality is acknowledged, but redistribution remains taboo.

Davos survives because it offers the illusion of responsibility without the cost of change. It turns global suffering into a networking opportunity and moral concern into a branding exercise. Dialogue replaces action; panels replace policy.

The uncomfortable conclusion is unavoidable: In Davos, the rich do not seriously debate how to uplift the poor. They refine strategies to manage inequality in ways that preserve their dominance—making the poor poorer not by conspiracy, but by design.

Donald Trump Was Obvious — America’s Failure Was Not

For many outside the United States, Donald Trump was never a mystery. He was not a political riddle, nor an accident of history. He was obvious. What remains difficult to comprehend is how Americans—armed with vast media, institutions, and self-proclaimed democratic wisdom—failed so spectacularly to read a man who telegraphed his intentions from day one.

Trump did not corrupt American politics; he exposed it. His vulgar language, narcissism, and open contempt for norms were treated as shocking deviations, when in reality they stripped away the hypocrisy that had long defined the American political class. Previous presidents were better spoken, better groomed, and far more dangerous. Trump merely said aloud what others executed quietly.

America loves to boast of its wealth, power, and moral leadership. Yet it ranks poorly on almost every measure of social well-being among developed nations. Its middle class is shrinking, its prisons are full, its cities decay behind corporate skyscrapers, and its wars have left entire regions in ruins. Trump did not create this decay; he became its loudest symptom.

From South Asia and the Middle East, Trump’s worldview was instantly recognizable. We have seen strongmen before—men who confuse volume with authority and cruelty with strength. His Islamophobic travel bans, diplomatic bullying, and transactional foreign policy were predictable, not surprising. What was astonishing was America’s theatrical outrage, as if this behavior had no roots in its own imperial history.

The American establishment preferred to obsess over Trump’s manners rather than confront its own crimes. It was easier to mock his vocabulary than to admit that earlier administrations destroyed Libya, destabilized the Middle East, enriched corporations, and abandoned their own citizens—all while maintaining respectable language.

I could read Donald Trump because I was never seduced by the American myth. Many Americans were. Trump shattered that illusion, and instead of facing the mirror, they blamed the reflection.

That Donald Trump became president is troubling. That America still refuses to accept what he revealed about itself is far worse.

Trump's unenforceable red line with Iran

US President Donald Trump’s handling of Iran once again exposes a familiar pattern: aggressive rhetoric followed by strategic hesitation. By publicly assuring Iranian protesters that “help is coming,” Trump drew a red line that was emotionally charged but strategically hollow. As events unfold, it is becoming evident that this red line is unenforceable—not because of a lack of military power, but because of the absence of political clarity and regional consensus.

Having openly aligned himself with anti-government demonstrators, Trump boxed his administration into a dilemma. Either act militarily and risk a wider regional conflagration, or step back and invite accusations of weakness. Analysts rightly argue that this corner was self-created. Grand declarations, made without an executable plan, rarely translate into sustainable policy—especially in a region as volatile as the Middle East.

While the White House insists that “all options remain on the table,” reality suggests otherwise. The dispatch of the USS Abraham Lincoln carrier strike group is more symbolic than operational in the immediate term. By the Pentagon’s own assessments, the United States is not positioned for a sustained campaign against Iran anytime soon. Military capability, though abundant, does not automatically equate to political will or strategic wisdom.

More telling is the diplomatic activity behind the scenes. Key regional allies—Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Oman—are reportedly urging restraint, fully aware that a strike on Iran could ignite a multinational conflict with unpredictable consequences. Even Israel, often portrayed as hawkish, appears cautious about escalation without a clear endgame. Trump’s assertion that he “convinced himself” to pause action only reinforces the perception of impulsive decision-making rather than coordinated strategy.

Crucially, Middle East experts remain skeptical that limited military strikes would achieve Washington’s stated objective of regime change. Iran’s clerical establishment has historically thrived under external pressure, using sanctions and threats to consolidate internal control. Economic hardship has not fractured the regime; it has hardened it.

In the final analysis, Trump’s Iran policy reflects a dangerous imbalance—maximum rhetoric paired with minimum foresight. Red lines that cannot be enforced weaken credibility, embolden adversaries, and unsettle allies. In geopolitics, restraint backed by strategy is strength; noise without direction is not.

PSX benchmark index up 0.4%WoW despite volatility

Pakistan Stock Exchange (PSX) experienced volatility throughout the week, driven by geopolitical tensions. However, a positive momentum prevailed as geopolitical dust settled along with news of defence export deals with multiple regional partners and encouraging macro developments. The benchmark Index witnessed a weekly gain of 689 points or 0.4%WoW to close at 185,099 points on Friday January 16, 2026.

Market participation declined by 24.5%WoW with average daily trading slipping to 1.2 billion shares, from 1.6 billion shares in the prior week.

On the macroeconomic front, LSM index increased by 10.4%YoY in November 2025 while posting growth of 6%YoY during 5MFY26.

In the latest PIB auction, yields declined on all the tenors.

Fertilizer sector marked the highest ever annual urea sales in CY25.

Auto sales reported at 17,000 units in December 2025, down 6%YoY.

Foreign exchange reserves held by State Bank of Pakistan (SBP) increased by US$16 million to US$16.1 billion as of January 09, 2025.

PKR appreciated against the greenback during the week to 279.95 PKR/ US$.

Other major news flow during the week included: 1) Turkey confirms talks on defence pact with Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, 2) Petrol, diesel prices to remain unchanged for next fortnight due to the increase in Petroleum Levy, 3) Pakistan announces plan to develop Port Qasim into climate-resilient industrial complex 4) Pakistan, Saudi Arabia eye joint mining investments at Future Minerals Forum, and 5) Government announces plan 6,000 acre Export Processing Zone on Pakistan Steel Mills land.

Transport, Paper & Board, Oil & Gas Exploration Companies, Property, Automobile Parts & Accessories were amongst the top performers, while Synthetic & Rayon, Jute, Miscellaneous, Textile Weaving, and Textile Spinning were amongst the laggards.

During the week, major buying was recorded by Individuals and Mutual Funds with a net buy of US$16.1 million and US$12.8 million, respectively. Banks and Insurance Companies were major sellers with net sell of US$23.5 million and US$15.8 million, respectively.

Top performing scrips of the week were: ATLH, AKBL, LOTHCEM, OGDC, and JVDC, while laggards included IBFL, SAZEW, AICL, PABC, and YOUW.

AKD Securities foresees the positive momentum at PSX to continue due to further monetary easing driven by improving external account position and continuous focus on reforms amid political stability.

The brokerage house forecast the benchmark Index to reach 263,800 by end December 2026.

Investors’ sentiments are expected to improve on the likelihood of foreign portfolio and direct investment flows, driven by improved relations with the United States and Saudi Arabia.

Top picks of the brokerage house include: OGDC, PPL, UBL, MEBL, HBL, FFC, ENGROH, PSO, LUCK, FCCL, INDU, ILP and SYS.

 

 

 

 

Pentagon moving carrier strike group toward Middle East

According to The Hill, the Pentagon on Thursday said it is moving a carrier strike group from the South China Sea toward the Middle East as tensions between the US and Iran continue to rise. The USS Abraham Lincoln aircraft carrier and its strike group were spotted moving west away from the Indo-Pacific region. The movement of the carrier strike group — which includes fighter jets, guided missile destroyers and at least one attack submarine — is expected to take about a week. 

This movement comes as tensions between Washington and Tehran have spiked amid unrest in Iran over its economy and questions about whether President Trump will strike the country to aid mass protests challenging the autocratic regime.

Trump earlier this week encouraged Iranian protesters to continue pressuring the regime and vowed that “help is on the way,” signaling potential US intervention. But Tehran has pushed back with its own threats.

The president so far has held off on any strikes in Iran, continuing to monitor the situation in the country. He was also advised that a large-scale strike against Iran was unlikely to topple the regime and could instead set off a wider conflict.

Advisers informed Trump that the US military would need more troops and equipment in the Middle East to launch any large-scale strike while still protecting American forces in the region from potential retaliation, according to the Journal.

A senior US official also told The New York Times that Trump is waiting to see Iran’s next move as he considers striking such targets as ballistic missile sites and Iran’s domestic security apparatus, and that any attack “is at least several days away.”

Protests have escalated in Iran since late December in response to declining economic conditions. It’s not clear exactly how many people have died in the protests because of the Iranian government’s internet blackout across the country, but the Human Rights Activists News Agency said more than 2,600 people have been killed and more than 184,000 have been detained. 

Iran has largely been restricting information in and out of the country, and Wednesday it issued a “Notice to Air Missions,” or NOTAM, that flights in and out of Tehran have been restricted.

The US administration on Thursday also announced new sanctions against “the architects of the Iranian regime’s brutal crackdown on peaceful demonstrators” and the “shadow banking networks” alleged to be helping wealthy Iranians divert funds generated by the country’s natural resources.

The USS Abraham Lincoln has been deployed since late November, after it departed San Diego with no Pentagon announcement for where it would be sent. 

 

Why Trump Refuses to Accept Failure in Iran

Once again, Iran has moved to the center of global headlines, accompanied by renewed threats from US President Donald Trump and fresh speculation about regime change. The language may sound forceful, but the strategic reality is far less dramatic. Nearly five decades after the 1979 revolution, the world’s most powerful country has failed to dismantle Iran’s clerical system. This is not a matter of opinion; it is a matter of record. What remains puzzling is Washington’s persistent refusal to accept this failure.

Since the establishment of the Islamic Republic, the United States has employed every conceivable pressure tactic—crippling economic sanctions, diplomatic isolation, covert operations, cyber warfare and sustained political hostility through regional allies. If the objective was to topple the “Mullah regime,” the outcome is self-evident. The system remains intact, resilient and, in some respects, more consolidated than before.

Ironically, sanctions—long projected as a non-military means of forcing political change—have produced results opposite to those promised. Instead of empowering reformist forces, they have weakened Iran’s middle class, historically the most potent driver of political evolution. At the same time, state-linked institutions, particularly those associated with security and defence, have expanded their influence over the economy. External pressure has also enabled the ruling establishment to frame dissent as foreign-sponsored, thereby justifying tighter internal control.

Washington’s reluctance to admit strategic failure is understandable, though not defensible. Acknowledging defeat would challenge the credibility of sanctions as a global policy tool and expose the limits of American coercive power. Yet denial comes at a heavy cost. Persisting with a failed approach deepens instability, prolongs economic suffering and increases the risk of miscalculation—without delivering political transformation.

Even more alarming is the absence of any credible post-clerical roadmap. History offers sobering lessons. Iraq, Libya and Syria demonstrate what happens when regimes are dismantled without a viable alternative governance structure. Iran’s opposition remains fragmented—divided ideologically, geographically and socially, with much of its leadership disconnected from realities on the ground. There is no unified transitional plan, no agreed security framework and no consensus on state reconstruction.

In this context, calls to arm “rebels” or encourage violent uprising are deeply troubling. The militarization of dissent has repeatedly produced chaos rather than peace. From Syria to Libya, weapons fractured societies, empowered militias and destroyed state institutions. Iran, with its dense urban population and complex social fabric, would be particularly vulnerable. Street violence may dismantle authority, but it cannot build a stable political order.

If peace and stability are genuinely desired, policy must shift from illusion to realism. Political change cannot be imposed through threats or sanctions alone. Gradual economic engagement, calibrated sanctions relief and regional dialogue offer more sustainable pathways. Strengthening economic normalcy and civil society may not yield immediate results, but they create conditions under which internal evolution becomes possible.

The lesson is clear. Pressure has failed, and force will fail again. Peace in Iran—and across the region—will not emerge from regime-change fantasies, but from strategies grounded in historical experience, restraint and political realism.