Larijani is no outsider. A former speaker of parliament,
veteran nuclear negotiator and long-time power broker, he has operated at the
heart of the Islamic Republic for decades. In the weeks before Khamenei’s
death, he was reportedly entrusted with broader strategic responsibilities,
reinforcing his standing within the system. That positioning makes him one of
the few figures capable of navigating Iran’s complex factional landscape.
President Donald Trump, meanwhile, has sent mixed signals
about Washington’s ultimate aims — oscillating between suggestions of regime
change and more limited objectives focused on missiles, nuclear capability and
regional proxies. Such ambiguity may be deliberate, allowing room for
negotiation if outright systemic collapse proves too costly or destabilizing.
In that context, Larijani’s profile presents both
opportunity and risk. Critics describe him as deeply embedded in the regime’s
hard power structure, including close interaction with security institutions.
Supporters argue that precisely because of his establishment credentials, he
could command trust across competing factions — a prerequisite for any
controlled transition.
Still, Iran’s constitutional framework cannot be ignored.
The Assembly of Experts retains authority to select the next Supreme Leader,
and any interim arrangement would remain internally driven. External influence,
however significant, has limits.
The central question is not whether Washington can “pick”
Iran’s ruler — it cannot. Rather, it is whether US policymakers would prefer
dealing with a pragmatic insider capable of negotiation over a fractured and
unpredictable power vacuum. If stability and containment become the priority,
Larijani may appear to some in Washington as a workable, if imperfect,
interlocutor.
In geopolitics, choices are rarely ideal, these are
calculated.
