Pakistan’s Closed Borders: The Enormous Economic Cost

Pakistan shares borders with four countries: India, Afghanistan, Iran and China. Recent media reports have highlighted restrictions on cross-border movement, with China remaining an important exception. While security considerations may justify temporary closures, their economic consequences deserve much greater scrutiny.

The immediate impact is visible. Traders on both sides face delayed deliveries, stranded consignments and mounting financial losses. Perishable commodities are particularly vulnerable, as delays can destroy their value. Disrupted supplies also affect domestic prices, while shortages of essential goods impose additional costs on consumers. Transporters, logistics companies and workers dependent on cross-border commerce suffer as commercial activity comes to a standstill.

Yet an important question remains largely unaddressed: what is the total economic cost of closing Pakistan’s borders, and how much revenue does the government forgo?

Transit-related charges, customs services, port handling, warehousing and transportation generate economic activity and, where applicable, public revenue. Prolonged restrictions can disrupt these revenue streams while affecting employment, foreign exchange earnings and regional connectivity. The government should quantify these losses rather than treat border closures merely as administrative or security measures.

Afghanistan presents a distinct challenge because it is landlocked and depends on neighbouring countries for access to international markets. International transit arrangements recognize the importance of facilitating such movement, although the precise obligations and permissible restrictions depend on applicable agreements and laws. Pakistan should clarify how its border policy reconciles legitimate security requirements with its transit commitments.

Security is frequently cited to justify restrictions along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border. However, the effectiveness of prolonged closures in preventing cross-border terrorism deserves objective evaluation. If militant networks can exploit porous stretches of the frontier, restricting legitimate commerce may impose substantial economic costs without necessarily resolving the underlying security problem.

The Pakistan-Iran border raises another question. With tensions surrounding the Strait of Hormuz disrupting regional trade, Pakistan’s land routes have acquired additional strategic significance. Whether restrictions were intended to impede transit goods destined for Iran remains unverified. Nevertheless, the circumstances warrant transparency about the rationale, economic consequences and intended outcomes of such measures.

Pakistan needs a coherent border-management policy that combines effective security with the facilitation of legitimate trade. The government should publish the reasons for closures, their duration, estimated fiscal and commercial losses, and the criteria for reopening crossings.

National security is indispensable, but so is economic resilience. Before closing vital trade routes for extended periods, policymakers must assess both the security benefits and the economic costs. Without such an assessment, Pakistan risks sacrificing trade, revenue and regional connectivity without establishing whether the restrictions deliver commensurate benefits.

Netanyahu’s ‘Godfathers’ Still Working to Keep Him in Power

Benjamin Netanyahu’s marginal lead in Israel’s parliamentary election has not secured his political future. With neither major bloc reaching the 61 seats required for a majority, Arab-led parties have emerged as potential kingmakers. Their 19 projected seats could prove decisive, although ideological differences and opposition leaders’ reluctance to cooperate with Arab representatives complicate the formation of an alternative government.

The coming days may witness intense political bargaining. Netanyahu and his supporters will have strong incentives to prevent the opposition from assembling a majority. Political promises, incentives and pressure could all feature in negotiations, although any claim of coercion or attempts to buy political loyalty would require evidence. Arab representatives, meanwhile, have an opportunity to demand meaningful commitments on equality, public services and civil rights.

Yet Netanyahu’s political survival cannot be examined in isolation from his regional ambitions. His government has pursued policies aligned with Israel’s nationalist and Zionist constituencies while seeking to expand diplomatic normalization through the Abraham Accords. The question is whether these ambitions are strengthening Israel’s regional position or creating new strategic liabilities.

The UAE illustrates this dilemma. It invested heavily in becoming a secure, technologically advanced and internationally connected business hub. The regional conflict and threats to critical infrastructure have exposed the vulnerability of even sophisticated Gulf economies. Any perception that Israel’s actions have undermined the UAE’s security and standing could encourage other Gulf monarchies to approach normalization with greater caution.

Saudi Arabia has additional reasons to reconsider its strategic calculations. The Kingdom has traditionally relied on its partnership with Washington for security assurances. If Saudi leaders conclude that the United States has failed to protect their strategic assets, whether through deliberate restraint or serious security shortcomings, confidence in that partnership could suffer.

Consequently, Saudi participation in the Abraham Accords should not be taken for granted. Riyadh would have to weigh the benefits of normalization against credible security guarantees, regional stability and progress towards Palestinian statehood.

Netanyahu’s ‘Godfathers’ may continue working to preserve his political position, but keeping him in office is not the same as securing Israel’s long-term strategic interests. The real test is whether political survival at home can be reconciled with diminishing confidence among neighbouring Arab states.

Do Seven Sisters Fuel Conflicts Around the World?

The Seven Sisters, a group of seven major Western oil companies that dominated the international petroleum industry during much of the 20th century, symbolized the concentration of corporate power over energy resources. Today, a broader question deserves attention: do powerful commercial interests benefit so substantially from conflict that they have an incentive to sustain geopolitical tensions?

The military-industrial complex, Wall Street, media houses and shipping companies operate in different sectors, yet conflicts can create lucrative opportunities for all of them. Defence contractors may secure additional orders, financial markets experience heightened trading activity, media organizations attract larger audiences, and shipping companies charge higher rates to reflect security risks. Oil producers and traders may also benefit from rising prices, although others suffer substantial losses.

The US-Israel war on Iran, which began on February 28, 2026, provides a compelling case for examining this hypothesis. Disruptions to energy supplies and shipping through the Strait of Hormuz have intensified volatility in global oil markets. On October 26, West Texas Intermediate (WTI) crude settled at US$101.76 per barrel, while Brent crude closed at US$115.81. The resulting differential of approximately US$14 illustrates how geopolitical disruptions can reshape commodity markets. However, price movements alone do not establish manipulation or prove that commercial interests caused the conflict.

The more consequential question is whether these beneficiaries merely exploit wars or also influence decisions that prolong them. Answering it requires examining corporate lobbying, political financing, defence contracts, media ownership and the relationships between business interests and policymakers. Profiting from a conflict is not, in itself, evidence of having engineered it.

The human and economic costs of war are enormous. Ordinary citizens face higher energy bills, inflation, disrupted trade and insecurity, while particular companies may enjoy exceptional profits. These unequal outcomes raise legitimate questions about accountability and the influence of vested interests over public policy.

The Seven Sisters no longer exercise the same dominance they once did, but the wider relationship between corporate power and geopolitical conflict merits scrutiny. The essential question is not simply who profits from war, but whether those profits influence decisions about when wars begin—and when they end.

Will Netanyahu Accept Defeat?

Benjamin Netanyahu’s possible defeat would be more than the political downfall of Israel’s longest-serving prime minister. It could expose personal vulnerabilities, unsettle hardline allies, affect defence-related interests and challenge a wider network of political influence that I describe as “the syndicate.”

The first issue is Netanyahu’s personal future. Facing corruption charges since his indictment in 2019, he has a legal battle that losing office would not automatically resolve in his favour. Although imprisonment is not an inevitable consequence of electoral defeat, the prospect of losing political influence could make his future considerably more uncertain. His political survival and legal predicament therefore form an important part of the debate.

The second issue concerns Israel’s hardliners. Netanyahu has been central to the coalition politics that enabled right-wing and religious parties to exercise considerable influence over government policy. His departure could leave some of these allies without their principal political broker, forcing them to reconsider their strategy and search for alternative leadership.

The third dimension involves the military-industrial complex. Prolonged regional conflicts have sustained demand for weapons and defence technology. A change of government would not necessarily weaken Israel’s defence industry, but it could alter procurement priorities, strategic calculations and the political justification for military operations.

The fourth and most consequential dimension is what I call “the syndicate” - a wider network of political, strategic and economic interests whose objectives may overlap with Netanyahu’s continued leadership. His close relationship with Donald Trump adds an international dimension to this argument. Whether Netanyahu’s departure would constitute a setback for this wider network, however, depends on how far its interests are tied to him personally rather than to institutions and policies that could survive his departure.

The central question is whether Netanyahu would accept not only an electoral verdict but also the consequences of losing power. Israel’s parliamentary system makes coalition negotiations crucial, while the judicial process would continue to follow its own course.

Ultimately, Netanyahu’s political future will depend on voters, coalition arithmetic and the legal process. But the implications of his departure could extend well beyond one individual. The real test would be whether Israel’s political system can manage a change of leadership while holding its leaders accountable—and whether the interests built around Netanyahu could retain their influence without him.

Lula Victory or Defeat of Trumphology?

The re-election of Brazilian President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva could prove to be more than a domestic political victory. By defeating Flávio Bolsonaro, the son of former president Jair Bolsonaro, Lula has delivered a significant setback to a right-wing political movement aligned with US President Donald Trump. The question is whether this victory signals the beginning of a broader backlash against Trumphology.

During his second term, Trump has pursued an aggressive agenda encompassing a trade war with China, sanctions on Russia, unwavering support for Israel in its campaign against Hamas, efforts to dislodge Venezuela’s leadership and, most consequentially, the US-Israel war against Iran. These initiatives were intended to reinforce American power and advance Washington’s strategic interests. Yet their cumulative consequences have raised questions about the costs of confrontation and the damage to America’s international standing.

Lula’s victory suggests that Trump’s political influence is not irresistible. His support for ideologically aligned leaders does not guarantee electoral success. Brazil’s electorate has demonstrated that domestic priorities, democratic choices and national sovereignty can outweigh ideological alignment with Washington.

Some political observers speculate that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu could be the next leader to face a serious political setback. Others anticipate further upheaval in Venezuela, potentially creating an opportunity for the return of leadership previously displaced from power. These possibilities remain speculative, however, and depend on separate domestic and international developments.

The US midterm elections offer another important test. A setback for Trump’s Republican Party could constrain his legislative agenda, intensify domestic scrutiny and complicate the implementation of his foreign policy. Nevertheless, neither the scale of such a setback nor its consequences can be predicted with certainty.

It would be premature to interpret Lula’s victory as the beginning of the end of Trump’s political dominance. Brazil has its own economic, social and democratic considerations, and its voters were not necessarily casting ballots to influence American politics.

Nevertheless, the result carries a wider message: political power abroad cannot indefinitely substitute for domestic legitimacy, economic performance and diplomatic credibility.

Those who believe Trump has tarnished America’s image may celebrate Lula’s victory as an encouraging sign. Whether it becomes a turning point in global politics will depend on subsequent developments, not merely on the hopes of Trump’s opponents. Lula may have won an election, but whether this amounts to a defeat of Trumphology remains an open question.

 

US and EU Adapting Divergent Policies to Tackle Energy Crisis

The United States and the European Union appear to be pursuing divergent energy policies, exposing the tension between geopolitical commitments and economic necessities. While Washington is easing restrictions to facilitate Russian diesel supplies, Brussels is preparing another package of sanctions against Russian entities involved in the energy trade. Why are two Western partners responding so differently to energy insecurity?

The answer lies in their contrasting energy circumstances, domestic political pressures and strategic priorities.

The United States is facing a sharp rise in diesel prices, which reached US$6.32 per gallon on October 23, compared with US$3.63 a year earlier. With Brent crude approaching US$120 per barrel amid escalating Middle Eastern tensions, the pressure on President Donald Trump is mounting ahead of the November 3 midterm elections. His decision to facilitate Russian diesel supplies reflects an attempt to contain domestic fuel costs, even if it requires a pragmatic departure from the sanctions approach.

The first Russian tanker, carrying approximately 40,000 tons of diesel, is not expected to reach New York until November 7. Moreover, the shipment is too small to make a meaningful difference to a tight global diesel market. The agreement's immediate political significance may therefore exceed its practical impact on American consumers.

Interestingly, the US natural gas market presents a contrasting picture. Henry Hub futures have fallen to US$2.66 per million British thermal units (MMBtu), as abundant inventories, mild weather and recovering supplies outweigh strong liquefied natural gas demand. The United States faces expensive diesel even as domestic natural gas remains relatively cheap.

Europe, meanwhile, faces a serious natural gas challenge. Its benchmark TTF prices have climbed above €93 per megawatt-hour, their highest level since December 2022. Restricted Qatari LNG supplies, colder weather and storage levels below 75% have heightened concerns about winter energy security. Yet the EU is preparing further sanctions targeting Russian oil producers, refiners, traders and shipping entities.

This divergence reflects different calculations of economic necessity and geopolitical responsibility. Washington is prioritizing immediate domestic pressures, while Brussels remains committed to restricting Moscow's energy revenues following Russia's invasion of Ukraine. Both approaches involve trade-offs between strategic objectives and energy security.

Ultimately, energy markets do not respect political boundaries. If Washington is willing to reconsider restrictions when domestic needs demand it, Europe must also assess how its sanctions policy balances geopolitical objectives against economic resilience. The central question is whether political commitments can remain sustainable when the cost of energy security becomes increasingly difficult for consumers and businesses to bear.

US Faces a Worse Defeat in Iran Than in Afghanistan

The United States may be heading towards a strategic setback in Iran more consequential than its humiliating withdrawal from Afghanistan. The two conflicts differ fundamentally in their military, political and geographical realities. Afghanistan exposed the limits of American nation-building; Iran could expose the limits of American military coercion.

In Afghanistan, Washington had important advantages. Its 2001 military campaign relied heavily on the Northern Alliance, an indigenous force opposed to the Taliban government. American airpower, special operations forces and local allies rapidly brought down the Taliban regime.

Subsequently, Washington installed and supported a government that provided the political framework for a prolonged American military presence. Regional cooperation and access to supply routes enabled the United States to sustain its operations despite Afghanistan being landlocked. Yet, after two decades of intervention, the US-backed government collapsed in August 2021, forcing American forces to withdraw.

Iran presents a different strategic equation. Washington has no comparable indigenous force capable of readily replacing the Iranian government, nor can it assume that military pressure will produce political fragmentation. Iran possesses established state institutions, substantial military capabilities and the geographical advantage of being positioned along the Strait of Hormuz, a vital artery of global energy trade.

American military bases in GCC countries provide platforms for repeated air strikes. However, the ability to attack Iran from neighbouring territories is not equivalent to the ability to occupy its land, establish a sustainable military presence or impose a political settlement. After months of confrontation, the absence of an American ground presence inside Iran underscores the difference between possessing overwhelming firepower and translating it into control on the ground.

More importantly, external aggression can produce consequences contrary to those intended. A nation divided over domestic policies may still unite against a foreign adversary. Iran's national cohesion should not be taken for granted, but neither should Washington assume that military devastation will automatically trigger political surrender.

The ultimate test is not how many targets American forces destroy, but whether Washington can achieve its declared objectives at an acceptable military, economic and political cost.

Afghanistan demonstrated that military victory does not guarantee a sustainable political outcome. Iran could deliver an even more damaging lesson - a superpower may win battles, inflict enormous destruction and still lose the strategic contest. If Washington cannot translate its military superiority into a durable settlement on its terms, its eventual outcome in Iran could prove worse than Afghanistan.