US Faces a Worse Defeat in Iran Than in Afghanistan

The United States may be heading towards a strategic setback in Iran more consequential than its humiliating withdrawal from Afghanistan. The two conflicts differ fundamentally in their military, political and geographical realities. Afghanistan exposed the limits of American nation-building; Iran could expose the limits of American military coercion.

In Afghanistan, Washington had important advantages. Its 2001 military campaign relied heavily on the Northern Alliance, an indigenous force opposed to the Taliban government. American airpower, special operations forces and local allies rapidly brought down the Taliban regime.

Subsequently, Washington installed and supported a government that provided the political framework for a prolonged American military presence. Regional cooperation and access to supply routes enabled the United States to sustain its operations despite Afghanistan being landlocked. Yet, after two decades of intervention, the US-backed government collapsed in August 2021, forcing American forces to withdraw.

Iran presents a different strategic equation. Washington has no comparable indigenous force capable of readily replacing the Iranian government, nor can it assume that military pressure will produce political fragmentation. Iran possesses established state institutions, substantial military capabilities and the geographical advantage of being positioned along the Strait of Hormuz, a vital artery of global energy trade.

American military bases in GCC countries provide platforms for repeated air strikes. However, the ability to attack Iran from neighbouring territories is not equivalent to the ability to occupy its land, establish a sustainable military presence or impose a political settlement. After months of confrontation, the absence of an American ground presence inside Iran underscores the difference between possessing overwhelming firepower and translating it into control on the ground.

More importantly, external aggression can produce consequences contrary to those intended. A nation divided over domestic policies may still unite against a foreign adversary. Iran's national cohesion should not be taken for granted, but neither should Washington assume that military devastation will automatically trigger political surrender.

The ultimate test is not how many targets American forces destroy, but whether Washington can achieve its declared objectives at an acceptable military, economic and political cost.

Afghanistan demonstrated that military victory does not guarantee a sustainable political outcome. Iran could deliver an even more damaging lesson - a superpower may win battles, inflict enormous destruction and still lose the strategic contest. If Washington cannot translate its military superiority into a durable settlement on its terms, its eventual outcome in Iran could prove worse than Afghanistan.