In Afghanistan, Washington had important advantages. Its
2001 military campaign relied heavily on the Northern Alliance, an indigenous
force opposed to the Taliban government. American airpower, special operations
forces and local allies rapidly brought down the Taliban regime.
Subsequently, Washington installed and supported a
government that provided the political framework for a prolonged American
military presence. Regional cooperation and access to supply routes enabled the
United States to sustain its operations despite Afghanistan being landlocked.
Yet, after two decades of intervention, the US-backed government collapsed in
August 2021, forcing American forces to withdraw.
Iran presents a different strategic equation. Washington has
no comparable indigenous force capable of readily replacing the Iranian
government, nor can it assume that military pressure will produce political
fragmentation. Iran possesses established state institutions, substantial
military capabilities and the geographical advantage of being positioned along
the Strait of Hormuz, a vital artery of global energy trade.
American military bases in GCC countries provide platforms
for repeated air strikes. However, the ability to attack Iran from neighbouring
territories is not equivalent to the ability to occupy its land, establish a
sustainable military presence or impose a political settlement. After months of
confrontation, the absence of an American ground presence inside Iran
underscores the difference between possessing overwhelming firepower and
translating it into control on the ground.
More importantly, external aggression can produce
consequences contrary to those intended. A nation divided over domestic
policies may still unite against a foreign adversary. Iran's national cohesion
should not be taken for granted, but neither should Washington assume that
military devastation will automatically trigger political surrender.
The ultimate test is not how many targets American forces
destroy, but whether Washington can achieve its declared objectives at an
acceptable military, economic and political cost.
Afghanistan demonstrated that military victory does not
guarantee a sustainable political outcome. Iran could deliver an even more
damaging lesson - a superpower may win battles, inflict enormous destruction
and still lose the strategic contest. If Washington cannot translate its
military superiority into a durable settlement on its terms, its eventual
outcome in Iran could prove worse than Afghanistan.
