Time for Muslims to take collective actions against Israel

For more than 700 days killing of Gazans has continued unabated, but the Muslim rulers have not gone beyond condemnation of Israeli attacks. Now, Israel has killed the political leaders of Hamas in the Qatari capital Doha on Tuesday and only condemnation in very soft words has come. Let us find why can't Muslim rulers go beyond condemnation of Israeli terrorism?

In our opinion, it is a pertinent and important question. The repeated condemnations without meaningful action by most Muslim-majority states in response to Israeli aggression—especially in Gaza—stem from a complex mix of geopolitical, economic, and internal factors. Some of the main reasons are:

Dependence on the West

Many Muslim countries, particularly in the Middle East, rely heavily on the United States and Europe for security, trade, investment, and military technology. They fear, taking decisive action against Israel risks sanctions, aid cuts, or political isolation.

Deep Split

The Muslim world is deeply fragmented—Sunni vs Shia, Arab vs non-Arab, monarchies vs republics. This has resulted in rivalries (Saudi Arabia vs Iran, Turkey vs Gulf monarchies) those prevent a unified front.

Normalization and Hidden Ties with Israel

Several Arab states (UAE, Bahrain, Morocco, and Sudan) have normalized relations through the Abraham Accords, and many others maintain covert cooperation.

Economic Vulnerabilities

Oil-rich states depend on stable exports, foreign investment, and dollar-based trade. Poorer Muslim countries (Pakistan, Bangladesh, Egypt, etc.) face IMF pressure and debt traps, limiting foreign policy freedom.

Fear of Internal Unrest

Leaders worry that pushing too hard against Israel, in other words the United States could invite political or regime change attempts. Authoritarian governments fear that pro-Palestine activism could spill over into broader dissent.

Lack of Unanimity

The Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) has been reduced to a symbolic forum, issuing statements but lacking enforcement mechanisms or collective security structures.

Strategic Silence

Some leaders prefer Israel as a silent partner in intelligence, cyber, and defense, especially against Iran, Hezbollah, or Islamist movements that threaten their regimes.

Therefore, Muslim countries remain stuck between public outrage and private interests. Condemnation is the safest path—it appeases their populations without risking ties with Washington or destabilizing their regimes.

Enough is enough, now the time has come to take concrete steps. Here are some realistic and concrete steps Muslim countries could take—short of direct war—if they truly wanted to go beyond mere condemnation of Israeli aggression:

Economic Measures

Oil & Gas Leverage:

Gulf states could coordinate an oil embargo or selective supply restrictions targeting Israel’s allies, similar to the 1973 Arab oil embargo.

Boycott and Divestment:

Governments could ban trade with Israeli firms and pressure companies operating in Israel to disengage.

Sanctions on Israeli Goods: Restrict imports of Israeli agricultural, tech, or defense products.

Diplomatic Pressure

Expel Ambassadors:

Muslim countries with relations (UAE, Bahrain, Morocco, Turkey, Egypt, Jordan) could downgrade or cut diplomatic ties.

Global Legal Action:

Refer Israel to the International Criminal Court (ICC) collectively, instead of leaving it to NGOs.

Block Normalization:

States like Saudi Arabia could halt normalization talks, signaling that Palestine remains a red line.

Political Unity

Revitalize the OIC:

Transform it from a talk shop into an action body: joint resolutions, emergency summits with binding decisions.

Joint Palestine Fund:

Pool resources into a sovereign fund for Gaza reconstruction and Palestinian self-sufficiency.

Collective Lobbying at UN:

Use numbers (57 Muslim countries) to push binding UN resolutions, even if the U.S. vetoes in the Security Council.

Strategic Non-Military Support

Humanitarian Corridors:

Use leverage with Egypt and Jordan to ensure permanent aid corridors into Gaza.

Technology and Cyber Support:

Provide Palestinians with communication tools, cybersecurity, and medical technology to resist siege conditions.

Intelligence Sharing:

Quietly pass on information that can protect Palestinian civilians from strikes.

Symbolic but High-Impact Moves

Suspend Flights to Tel Aviv:

Muslim-majority airlines could suspend services, disrupting Israel’s connectivity.

Cultural and Sports Boycotts:

Ban Israeli teams from participating in sporting events in Muslim countries.

Public Accountability:

Name and shame Muslim leaders who maintain cozy ties with Israel while condemning it publicly.

Israeli attempt to kill Hamas negotiating team in Doha a big dent to US credibility

Following Israeli assassination attempt to kill members of Hamas' negotiating team in Doha, Qatar on Tuesday, it appears that the Israeli military is now entering "full ethnic cleansing mode," in Gaza.

Israeli officials claimed responsibility and said it was aimed at assassinating the negotiators—but ultimately killed six people who were not involved with Hamas' team.

The Trump administration said Tuesday it had been aware of the attack before it was carried out and claimed it had warned Qatari officials—which Qatar denied.

Analysts suggested the lead-up to the bombing—with the US securing Hamas and Israeli support for a vague ceasefire proposal that was to be discussed in Doha—pointed to a scenario in which the US helped orchestrate the attack and aided "an attack on diplomacy itself," as Center for International Policy executive vice president Matt Duss said.

Duss, a former foreign policy adviser to US Sen. Bernie Sanders, warned the assassination attempt could cause long-lasting harm to the United States' reputation.

"This is an attack in the capital of a major non-NATO US ally in the midst of US-supported negotiations—against officials who were originally hosted there at the United States' request," said Duss.

"If it was conducted with the approval of the US, it's the latest nail in the coffin of President Donald Trump's claim to be a 'peacemaker.' This will have disastrous consequences for future peace efforts, and for US security."

The Trump administration's response to the attack was ambiguous, with press secretary Karoline Leavitt saying the bombing did not "advance Israel or America's goals" but adding that "eliminating Hamas... is a worthy goal."

The attack, said Duss, makes clear that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu intends to see Israel's accelerating campaign of ethnic cleansing in Gaza through to the end," and has no intention of reaching a ceasefire deal.

Gregg Carlstrom of The Economist said that as far as countries in the Gulf region are concerned, the question of whether Trump knew about the attack ahead of time "is somewhat irrelevant."

"If yes, he approved a strike on a country under an American security guarantee," said Carlstrom. "If no, he couldn't prevent said strike. Either way, the question for Gulf leaders is the same, what is the value of American security guarantees?"

Condemnation of the attacks poured in from global leaders including United Nations Secretary General António Guterres, who said Israel's actions were "a clear violation of Qatar's sovereignty and territorial integrity" and accused Israeli officials of "destroying" efforts for a permanent ceasefire.

Other countries including Algeria, Jordan, and Egypt also decried the attack on Qatar's "sovereignty" and accused Israel of undermining the talks.

The peace group CodePink asserted, "The US is fully aware of Israel's intentions and actively collaborates with it" to reach the "true objective" of "the ethnic cleansing of Palestinians."

"This collaboration is evidenced by the blatant plan to lure ceasefire negotiators into a single location under the pretense of peace talks, only to attempt to assassinate them," said CodePink.

"This is a complete rejection of a diplomatic solution—something Israel has no intention of reaching. This attack on foreign soil also serves as a direct challenge to Qatar, proving that neither its borders, laws, nor financial influence can deter Israeli strikes."

The assassination attempt proves, said the group, "Peace negotiations are essentially antithetical to Israel and a trap for more assassinations and attacks on sovereign nations."

"It is time world leaders take a principled stand in defense of the people of Gaza," said the group. "The more the international community fails to hold Israel accountable, the more brazen it becomes in their war crimes."

Spy agencies determining fate of Middle East

We are of the view that the geopolitics in the Middle East are basically driven by the top ace spy agencies CIA and MI6 due to their long presence and lust to attain dominance. Both the agencies often play complementary as well as opposing role. In the Middle East, both the CIA of United States and MI6 of Britain active, but their influence and power are not equal. Here’s a breakdown:

CIA (Central Intelligence Agency)

Stronger presence:

The US has far greater military, economic, and political involvement in the Middle East as compared to Britain, which gives the CIA wider reach.

Resources and scale:

Vast funding, technology, and manpower allow the CIA to operate with more depth — from drone surveillance to covert paramilitary operations.

Regional influence:

CIA has elaborate intelligence sharing agreements with Israel, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Egypt, and Gulf states. The CIA often leads in counterterrorism, cyber intelligence, and monitoring Iran.

Direct action capability:

CIA has carried out assassinations of Qasem Soleimani in 2020 with Pentagon support, regime-change operations in Iraq in 2003, and drone warfare across Yemen, Syria, and elsewhere.

MI6 (Secret Intelligence Service of Britain)

Smaller but skilled:

MI6 operates with fewer resources but has deep historical networks dating back to the colonial and post-colonial era.

Special niche:

It is strong in human intelligence (HUMINT), diplomatic channels, and discreet operations. Often complements CIA efforts rather than competing.

Influence through alliances:

MI6 maintains ties in former British-influenced states (Jordan, Oman, Gulf monarchies). Often acts as a bridge between US and regional players, sometimes preferred for backchannel talks where US involvement is too visible.

It may be concluded that CIA is stronger in raw power, funding, and reach. MI6 is smarter in specialized, discreet, and historic networks. In practice, they often work together, with CIA leading and MI6 supplementing in sensitive or diplomatic areas.

Still it may be of some interest to readers to compare their weaknesses in the Middle East (CIA’s visibility vs. MI6’s limited resources).

CIA Weaknesses in the Middle East

Visibility and Reputation:

The CIA is often seen as the symbol of American interventionism. Its role in the 1953 Iran coup, the 2003 Iraq invasion, and drone strikes has created deep mistrust among populations.

Over-reliance on technology:

Heavy dependence on satellite imagery, drones, and cyber tools sometimes weakens on the ground human intelligence (HUMINT). Local actors may feed misleading information (faulty Iraqi WMD intelligence in 2003).

Political Constraints:

The CIA operates mostly within US foreign policy ambit, which can change with administrations (Trump pulling out of Syria, Biden recalibrating Iran policy). This limits long-term consistency in operations.

MI6 Weaknesses in the Middle East

Limited Resources:

Britain’s budget and global presence are much smaller than that of the United States. MI6 often has to “ride on the back” of CIA logistics and surveillance infrastructure.

Reduced Global Clout:

Post-colonial decline means Britain no longer has the political weight it once held in the region. Many Middle Eastern powers see London as secondary to Washington.

Reliance on Alliances:

MI6 depends heavily on Five Eyes (United States, Canada, Australia, New Zealand) for intelligence sharing. Alone, it struggles to project force or influence in hostile zones (Iran, Syria).

Therefore it may be said that in the Middle East CIA is the heavyweight, but MI6 survives by being subtle and clever, often achieving results disproportionate to its size.

Adding Mossad of Israel to the picture really changes the balance of spy power in the Middle East.

Mossad (Israel)

Strengths:

Regional focus and expertise:

Unlike CIA and MI6, Mossad is laser-focused on the Middle East. It enjoys deep cultural, linguistic, and ethnic infiltration skills (especially in Arab states and Iran).

Human Intelligence (HUMINT):

Mossad is known for its daring covert operations that include kidnapping Eichmann (Argentina, 1960), assassinations of Iranian nuclear scientists, and cyberattacks like Stuxnet with CIA help. It uses diaspora networks, business fronts, and deep-cover operatives.

Operational daring:

Conducts high-risk missions the CIA or MI6 would hesitate to attempt due to political exposure.

Political backing:

Israel’s survival depends on intelligence; Mossad has a direct line to top leadership and can act fast.

Weaknesses

Limited global reach:

It operates best in Middle East, North Africa, and Europe; weaker footprint in Asia or Latin America as compared to CIA.

Overexposure:

Mossad’s assassinations and covert operations generate huge backlash; Arab states and Iran actively hunt Mossad operatives.

Dependency:

It relies heavily on CIA for satellite surveillance, funding, and advanced cyber tools.

The Strongest

CIA is the strongest in resources, global reach, and tech. It can topple governments, conduct drone wars, and pressurize allies.

MI6 is the best at diplomacy, subtle influence, and backchannel talks. It is trusted more in Gulf monarchies than the CIA sometimes, due to less heavy-handed reputation.

Mossad is the sharpest blade in the region itself. When it comes to Iran, Hezbollah, Hamas, or Syria — Mossad usually has the deepest, most actionable intelligence.

Netanyahu’s Unabated Gaza Campaign

It has been more than 700 days that Israel has continued military operations in Gaza. It is being said that Israel is doing this under the protection of the United States. However, it may also be said that even countries like Russia, China and Saudi Arabia just could not gather strength to impose any sanctions on Israel. We have the following observations:

US and Western Support

Israel is able to do this under the US and Western Shield. Washington has been providing steady arms supplies and political protection at the UN. The US has been vetoing or forces the presenters to soften resolutions that could force accountability.

Fragile Coalition Politics

Netanyahu’s survival hinges on ultra-right allies who demand maximal war goals. Ending the war could collapse his government and he could end up in jail under corruption charges.

Public Mood in Israel

Despite failure of the government to avert Hamas October 07, 2023 attack, unresolved hostage issue keeps much of society aligned with ongoing military action. Right-wing base still dominates the agenda, even as war fatigue grows.

Weak International Enforcement

The ICJ has ruled there is a plausible risk of genocide, but it has no enforcement arm. The ICC issued arrest warrants, but implementation depends on states unlikely to act against a US ally.

Climate of Impunity

Normalization of extreme rhetoric allows harsher military conduct without domestic blowback. International criticism often fades into symbolic statements.

Divided Opposition

Regional and Palestinian political fragmentation means no coherent alternative pressure strong enough to compel an immediate ceasefire.

Who will be the next prime minister of Japan?

With Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba poised to step down, attention now focuses on who will seek to lead the Liberal Democratic Party and possibly Japan in his place.

Two possible candidates are Agriculture Minister Shinjiro Koizumi, son of former Japanese leader Junichiro Koizumi, and Sanae Takaichi, a former economic security minister who could become Japan's first female prime minister. Both were strong contenders for the LDP presidency in 2024 but lost to Ishiba.

Whoever succeeds Ishiba as prime minister will need to find ways to work with opposition parties as the leader of a minority government.

Ishiba told a news conference Sunday that he would not seek reelection as LDP president. His standing in the party was undermined by the LDP's loss of a majority coalition in the July upper house election.

Ishiba listed dealing with US tariffs, establishing a disaster management agency and promoting wage increases as some of the areas in which he wants his successor to achieve results.

Candidates for party president need the endorsement of at least 20 LDP members of parliament. Beyond Koizumi and Takaichi, potential contenders include Takayuki Kobayashi, another former economic security minister; Chief Cabinet Secretary Yoshimasa Hayashi; and Toshimitsu Motegi, a former LDP secretary-general. All of them vied against Ishiba in the 2024 LDP presidential race.

Takaichi topped a Nikkei opinion poll last month on the question of who was fit to be the next prime minister, with 23% support, followed by Koizumi at 22%.

In her first bid for LDP leadership in 2021, Takaichi came in third with the backing former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe. She has a base of support among lawmakers who were aligned with the late Japanese leader.

In the 2024 LDP presidential race, Takaichi topped the first round of voting, only to be overtaken by Ishiba in the runoff. She was endorsed by LDP heavyweight Taro Aso, a former prime minister and leader of the party's only remaining faction.

After the election, she declined an offer to become chair of the LDP's powerful General Council and kept her distance from Ishiba's government.

Koizumi served as the party's election chief in the October 2024 lower house campaign but resigned after the LDP failed to keep its majority. The 44-year-old became agriculture minister after the previous one quit over a gaffe, and he has been working to lower rice prices by shaking up distribution. He finished third in the 2024 LDP presidential race.

Hayashi, who placed fourth, has served as chief cabinet secretary, a key post as the Ishiba government's top spokesperson.

Kobayashi holds some support among backbenchers. He finished fifth in the 2024 race.

"I want to consult carefully my colleagues about what I can do," Kobayashi said Sunday.

Motegi, the oldest of these contenders at 69, has a foothold among some members of the LDP's former Motegi faction. He placed sixth last time.

In the presidential election, each LDP lawmaker in parliament has one vote and, as a general rule, an equal number of local LDP members and supporters also cast ballots for a leader.

In special situations, voting can be held at a joint meeting of both houses of parliament in lieu of a party convention.

In the first round of voting in 2024, Takaichi received 72 lawmaker votes and 109 party member votes, while Koizumi received 75 and 61, respectively.

But whoever is elected LDP president in this race has no guarantee of being selected as prime minister by parliament. If all the opposition parties unite behind one rival candidate, the LDP contender cannot win.

The cooperation of opposition parties is also essential to passing a budget and legislation. To secure a majority in Japan's powerful lower house, the next prime minister will need support from the center-left Constitutional Democratic Party, the conservative Japan Innovation Party or center-right Democratic Party for the People in addition to the ruling coalition.

The next prime minister will first face the challenge of agreeing with opposition parties on a fiscal 2025 supplementary budget and a fiscal 2026 budget and tax reform-related bills.

Courtesy: Nikkei Asia

 

Red Sea cable damage disrupt internet in Asia and Middle East

According to media reports, internet access in parts of Asia and the Middle East was disrupted after undersea cables in the Red Sea were cut, experts said Sunday, though the cause of the incident remains unclear.

The outages have raised concerns about possible sabotage amid ongoing attacks by Yemen’s Houthis, who have previously denied targeting subsea cables.

Undersea fiber links form one of the backbones of global internet infrastructure, alongside satellites and land-based networks.

Microsoft said on its status website that the Middle East “may experience increased latency due to undersea fiber cuts in the Red Sea,” though it added that internet traffic not routed through the region was unaffected.

NetBlocks, an internet observatory, reported “a series of subsea cable outages in the Red Sea” degrading connectivity in multiple countries, including India and Pakistan. It said the failures affected the SMW4 and IMEWE cable systems.

Pakistan Telecommunications Company confirmed the cuts in a Saturday statement.

The affected cables are operated by Tata Communications and a consortium managed by Alcatel Submarine Networks. Both companies declined to comment.

Subsea lines can be damaged accidentally by ship anchors or intentionally in attacks. Repairs often take weeks as ships must locate and lift the cable before restoring service.

 

The New World Disorder

French historian Fernand Braudel identified three cycles of history. The shortest is the day-to-day flow of events; Braudel called them “fireflies” on the stage. Next up are paradigm shifts — like the end of the Cold War — that can play out over decades or longer. Finally, there’s the longue durée: the bedrock of climate and geography that shapes everything else and changes only over centuries or millennia.

Six months into US President Donald Trump’s second term, it’s clear that the course of events has changed. What’s the collective noun for a group of fireflies? Probably not “paradigm shift,” but in this case that’s what it adds up to. 

The US pivot from free trade and global security to a sharper focus on the national interest has the makings of a decades-defining transformation, reversing the global integration supercharged by the end of the Cold War.

In the decades after World War II, the US was the champion of free trade, the anchor for global security and the gold standard on governance. Now, it has raised tariffs to the highest level since the 1930s, told allies they need to pay for protection and crossed red lines on independence for the Fed and statistical agencies.

That’s a major break, and an important moment for the global economy, shifting patterns of growth and inflation, borrowing and debt.

The geopolitical landscape has shifted just as decisively. Jolting though it is, Trump’s focus on America First is a reflection of a new reality where the US is no longer the world’s sole superpower. Regardless of who occupies the White House next, the US allies and adversaries will continue to reorient around that new state of affairs.

How about Braudel’s longue durée — the slowest moving cycle of history on which everything else rests? Could even that be at an inflection point? Maybe.

Trump has pulled the US out of the Paris climate agreement, again. The global fight against climate change will continue, but without the world’s second-largest emitter, it gets harder. The arrival of artificial general intelligence could also prove an epochal shift.

“History,” Braudel wrote, “may be divided into three movements: what moves rapidly, what moves slowly and what appears not to move at all.” Right now, events are moving almost too fast to track and the slow-moving Pax Americana is heading rapidly toward the dustbin of history. If global temperatures rise much further or machines start thinking for themselves, there will be movement even in the cycle that appears not to move at all.