Judging from reports published during the second quarter,
one might assume that the greatest maritime security concerns for operators of
the merchant fleet in Asia are centered on the South China Sea’s Saint Thomas
Shoal and the Taiwan Strait.
As is
true on all the world’s waters, awareness of the potential threats amongst
vessel operators and crew is the best defence in mitigating all potential
consequences, whether great or small. While the threat levels in Asia are not
as significant as those in the Red Sea and Indian Ocean, the significance and
nature of the threats do change, and therefore require continued attention.
While the Chinese military forces do conduct significant
military exercises along the Taiwanese coast while the Chinese Coast Guard
continues its provocations aimed at the Philippines Navy, to date neither
activity has resulted with significant consequences for merchant shipping
plying these waters. Opportunistic armed robbers and thieves have maintained
their focus on the profits to be gained from stealing vessels’ equipment and
spare parts in areas farther to the south and west.
Risk
Intelligence, as part of its daily security incident analysis and monitoring
operations, tallied a total of 22 reported vessel boardings in Asian waters
during the second quarter, with half of these taking place along the
Singapore Strait. In a distant second place in terms of the number of vessel
boardings is Chittagong, Bangladesh, where two thefts and one inconsequential
boarding took place at the anchorage. Dumai with two boardings trailed
Chittagong, the site of one theft and one inconsequential boarding at the
anchorage, while armed robberies, thefts and inconsequential boardings were
also recorded at Vung Tau, Manila, Belawan and Balikpapan.
Chittagong’s second place standing behind the Singapore
Strait has drawn attention amongst stakeholders, including ReCAAP which in June
issued a special report that compared the single reported vessel boarding in Bangladeshi
waters during 2023 with nine reported boardings between January 01 and May 31 this
year.
While the dramatic nine-fold increase is cause for concern,
this year’s decline in the number of incidents from seven in Q1 to three in Q2
may be grounds for cautious optimism.
It is
also worthy to note that when the theft of property from vessels is promptly
reported to the Bangladeshi authorities, they have an admirable record of
apprehending the perpetrators and returning the stolen items.
Like all categories of crime, whether on land or at sea,
there is a significant degree of under reporting, therefore the tally of known
boardings does not represent the actual crime level within any straits,
anchorage areas or ports in Asia.
When
assessing such statistics, it is also important to bear in mind that the
generic term ‘piracy’ is now applied to a wide range of crimes, from vessel
hijackings and seafarer kidnappings to armed robberies and thefts, a practice
that can be misleading.
Similarly, the accuracy of the respective statistics hinges
on the severity of the crimes, with statistics for hijackings and kidnappings
being far more accurate than statistics for armed robberies and thefts.
A vessel operator is far more motivated to report a
hijacking or kidnapping during which the fate of vessels and seafarers is at
stake as compared to a theft of engine spare parts, for obvious reasons. With
that in mind, there is high confidence that an absence of reports of hijackings
and kidnappings in Asia reflects an actual absence of such crimes during Q2,
while the number of reports of armed robberies and thefts tallied in the same
period is unlikely to reflect the true scope of these less significant yet
still serious crimes.
Not all vessel types are targeted by criminals in Asia.
There have been no recorded incidents involving cruise ships, and no container
vessels have recently been targeted while navigating the Straits of Malacca and
Singapore.
Bulk
carriers continue to be the most frequently targeted ships, in particular when
reducing speed to transit the Singapore Strait, followed by tankers and barges.
Vessels with low freeboard such as OSVs and heavy lift vessels, both offering
easy access to perpetrators on sampans, also remain vulnerable.
The area with the highest frequency of vessel boardings
continues to be the Singapore Strait, with 50% of the boardings in the second
quarter taking place within the strait’s recognized International Hydrographic
Organization (IHO) boundaries. Here nine of the 11 incidents involved vessels
underway, while two involved ships situated at anchorages off Batam. Further
illustrating the strait’s position as the primary area of armed robberies and
thefts, June 2024 was the first month since May 2021 during which all reported
maritime security incidents in Southeast Asia took place within the boundaries
of the Singapore Strait.
As has been the case for several years regarding the
Singapore Strait, bulk carriers are most often targeted, followed by tankers
and barges. In Q2, seven of the 11 incidents involved bulk carriers, with the
remainder involving one heavy lift vessel, an OSV and two barges, from which
thieves seek scrap metal cargo.
Despite the frequency of Singapore Strait boardings, in most
cases the crew is unharmed, while the perpetrators focus on taking spare parts
and equipment that they can sell onshore. In a marked improvement from previous
years, at this time merchant shipping in Asia is not facing more significant
consequences stemming from hijackings or kidnappings.
Maritime security concerns in Asia are not limited to the
aforementioned geopolitical activities in the South China Sea and piracy in
the broader sense. While merchant ships navigate these waters they are
surrounded by a significant level of migrant smuggling with a dark fleet
seeking to operate under the radar, and drug and contraband smuggling.
Currently these activities have not had significant impact
on merchant ships, although monitoring this activity remains necessary in light
of potential future consequences.
In Asia
large tankers transporting sanctioned oil cargoes have sought to disguise their
activities by using the names and particulars of innocent traders in AIS
broadcasts, with implications for the operators of the vessels subject to such
identity theft. Smaller vessels illegally buying, selling and storing fuel
comprise another dark fleet.
Conventional cargo vessels are rarely impacted by their
operations, except when duped into purchasing fuel from such rogue traders.
The widespread smuggling at sea in Asia has not had
significant impact on the merchant fleet as the crime syndicates involved
primarily move their contraband on small boats, thereby circumventing
conventional ports, although there are occasional concealments discovered in
containerized cargo. Illegal movements of migrants and refugees is also done on
small boats, so far without the consequences similar to what has been seen in
the Mediterranean.
Courtesy: Seatrade Maritime News