Wednesday, 31 July 2024

What after Haniyeh killing?

The targeting of two senior militant leaders in two Middle Eastern capitals within hours of each other — with each strike blamed on Israel — risks rocking the region at a critical moment.

The strikes come as international mediators are working to bring Israel and Hamas to agree to a cease-fire that would wind down the devastating war in Gaza and free hostages. Intense diplomatic efforts are also underway to ease tensions between Israel and Hezbollah after months of cross-border fighting.

The assassination of Hamas’ top leader Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran and the strike against senior Hezbollah commander Fouad Shukur in Beirut could upend those painstaking attempts to defuse a Middle East powder keg. Iran has also threatened to respond after the attack on its territory, which could drag the region into all-out war.

Here’s a look at the potential fallout from the strikes:

Gaza cease-fire negotiations

Haniyeh’s assassination could prompt Hamas to pull out of cease-fire negotiations being mediated by the United States, Egypt and Qatar, though it has yet to comment on the issue.

But given Haniyeh’s role, a senior Egyptian official with direct knowledge of the negotiations said the killing will highly likely have an impact, calling it “a reckless act.”

“Haniyeh was the main link with (Hamas) leaders inside Gaza, and with other Palestinian factions,” said the official, who met with the Hamas leader multiple times in the talks. “He was the one we were meeting face-to-face and talking about the cease-fire.”

Qatari Prime Minister Mohammed Bin Abdul Rahman al-Thani condemned the attacks.

“How can mediation succeed when one party assassinates the negotiator on the other side?” he wrote on the social media platform X.

US Secretary of State Antony Blinken said he didn’t want to speculate on the effect, but the events renewed the “imperative of getting the cease-fire,” which he said they are working toward on a daily basis

Hezbollah has said that it will halt its fire on Israel if a Gaza cease-fire is reached.

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has argued that military pressure will prompt Hamas to agree to a deal, but previous killings of senior figures have not appeared to increase the chances for an agreement.

People in Gaza expressed sadness and shock over Haniyeh’s killing and worried that a cease-fire deal was slipping away.

“By assassinating Haniyeh, they are destroying everything,” said Nour Abu Salam, a displaced Palestinian. “They don’t want peace. They don’t want a deal.”

The increasingly desperate families of hostages held in Gaza urged for their loved ones to be released.

“I’m not interested in this assassination or that assassination, I’m interested in the return of my son and the rest of the hostages, safe and sound, home,” said Dani Miran, whose son Omri, 46, was kidnapped from Kibbutz Nahal Oz on October 07, 2023.

Risk of broader war

The strikes also raised alarm among some diplomats working to defuse tensions in the region.

“The events in Tehran and Beirut push the entire Middle East to a devastating regional war,” said one Western diplomat.

The diplomat — whose government has engaged in concerted diplomacy to prevent an all-out war between Israel and Hezbollah, but is not directly involved in cease-fire or hostage negotiations — called the killing of Haniyeh a “serious development” that has “almost killed” a possible cease-fire in Gaza, given its timing and location.

She said that Haniyeh’s killing inside Tehran while attending the inauguration of an Iranian president “will force Tehran to respond.”

The assassination in Tehran is not the first time that Israel has been blamed for a targeted attack on Iranian soil, but it’s one of the most brazen, said Menachem Merhavy, an expert on Iran from the Hebrew University of Jerusalem.

Israel hasn’t taken responsibility for the strike, though it vowed to kill all of Hamas’ leaders over the Oct. 7 attacks. Merhavy thinks it’s unlikely that Iran will respond directly to Israel, such as with the barrage of 300 rockets in April after a suspected Israeli strike in Syria that killed two Iranian generals in an Iranian consular building.

He believes Iran is more likely to send its response via Hezbollah.

“Iran knows that its capability of hurting Israel is much more significant from Lebanon,” said Merhavy.

The location of Haniyeh’s assassination was just as important as the strike itself, he said.

“The message was to Iran and the proxies, if you thought in Tehran you’re protected, we can reach you there as well,” said Merhavy. “Reconsider your relations with Tehran, because they cannot protect you on its own soil.”

Finding the replacement

Although Haniyeh’s name has more international recognition, the strike on Hezbollah commander Fouad Shukur, if successful, is “much more important from a functional point of view,” said Michael Milshtein, an Israeli analyst of Palestinian affairs at Tel Aviv University and a former military intelligence officer.

He said Shukur was involved in the day-to-day management of Hezbollah’s strikes on Israel, including, according to Israel, the rocket attack on Majdal Shams that killed 12 youths on Saturday. Israel said its hit in Beirut on Tuesday killed him but Hezbollah has not confirmed that.

“If Hezbollah is considering how to act or to respond, one of the main question marks is how they’re going to manage a war without Shukur,” said Milshtein.

Others said Shukur, if he is in fact killed, will easily be replaced.

“Hezbollah has thick layers of commanders and leaders, and the killing of 1 or 10 or 500 will not change the equation,” said Fawaz Gerges, of the London School of Economics.

Gerges said Haniyeh is a much more symbolic leader and is far removed from the day-to-day operations in Gaza.

“Even though the assassination of Haniyeh is a painful blow for Hamas, it will make no difference in the military confrontation between Israel and Hamas,” and Gerges.

He noted that Israel has a long history of assassinating leaders of Palestinian groups, but those strikes have little impact as the leaders are quickly replaced.

Courtesy: Associated Press

 

 

Tuesday, 30 July 2024

Iran: Pezeshkian sworn in as President

Masoud Pezeshkian was sworn in as Iran's new president on Tuesday, after winning an election earlier this month by promising to improve ties with the world and ease restrictions on social freedoms at home.

"We will pursue constructive and effective interaction with the world based on dignity, wisdom, and expediency," Pezeshkian told a parliament session attended by foreign dignitaries and broadcast live on state television.

According to Reuters, his victory has lifted hopes of a thaw in Iran's antagonistic relations with the West that might create openings for defusing its nuclear standoff with world powers.

Pezeshkian takes office at a time of escalating Middle East tensions over Israel's conflict with Hamas in Gaza and cross-border fighting with Hezbollah in Lebanon.

Iran, which backs the groups which describe themselves as the "Axis of Resistance" to Israel and US influence in the Middle East, has accused the United States of supporting what it calls Israeli crimes in Gaza.

"Those who supply weapons that kill children cannot teach Muslims about humanity," Pezeshkian said to chants of "Death to America," and "Death to Israel".

Leaders of Iran's Palestinian allies Hamas and the Islamic Jihad as well as senior representatives of Yemen's Tehran-backed Houthi movement and Lebanon's Hezbollah attended the ceremony.

Pezeshkian, who is expected to name his cabinet within two weeks, replaces Ebrahim Raisi, who was killed in a helicopter crash in May.

As the ultimate authority in Iran, Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei has the final say in all state matters, including foreign and nuclear policy.

He must also approve Pezeshkian's selections for key cabinet posts, such as the foreign, oil and intelligence ministers.

As well as mounting pressure from the West over Tehran's fast-advancing nuclear program, Pezeshkian faces the huge task of breaking Iran free of the crippling US sanctions, re-imposed after Washington ditched Iran's 2015 nuclear deal with major powers.

Indirect talks between Tehran and Washington to salvage the nuclear accord with six major powers have stalled since 2022, with both sides accusing the other of unreasonable demands.

"My government will never succumb to bullying and pressure ... Pressure and sanctions do not work ... and the Iranian people should be spoken to with respect," said Pezeshkian.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Russian crude drives dark fleet demand

Dark fleet tankers and risky Suez transits are having little impact on India’s soaring imports of Russian crude, now running at 20 times the volume shipped prior to the invasion of Ukraine.

Analysis by New York broker, Poten & Partners, has revealed that Indian imports of heavily sanctioned Russian crude have increased to almost 1.8 million barrels a day (bpd), up from just 88,000 bpd prior to the invasion in February 2022.

At that time, Russia ranked ninth on India’s list of oil suppliers, with Iraq, Saudi Arabia and the UAE supplying about 60% of the country’s crude. The three Middle East nations were followed by the US and Nigeria.

Prior to the invasion, Russian crude had not been attractive to Indian refiners because of logistical constraints. None of Russia’s main export ports in the Baltic, the Black Sea or the Far East can load VLCCs, Poten pointed out, so Russian cargoes were shipped aboard Aframax and Suezmax tankers.  

However, the picture changed dramatically following the 2022 invasion when western nations imposed sanctions on Russian crude. This was largely driven by price. Until the invasion, ‘Dated Brent’ and Urals crude had traded broadly in parity but, following sanctions, ‘official’ Urals prices were an average of US$10-20 lower. Since deals involving Russian crude are shrouded in secrecy, Poten’s analysis has revealed that actual discounts could be much higher, possibly as much as US$40 a barrel.  

Much of the new Soviet crude was bought based on spot prices and arranged by Russian oil traders, many of them in Dubai, who charge ‘significant commissions’ for their services. But over recent months, the discount of Urals to Brent crude has narrowed, making the crude less attractive.

Meanwhile, the tanker trade from Russia to India has become more challenging, Poten said. Sanctions now restrict the use of Western shipping services including owners, brokers, and insurers when the Soviet crude price exceeds the ‘price cap’ of US$60 per barrel. This has forced Indian importers to rely on tankers in the so-called dark fleet – ships that may be old, poorly maintained, with dodgy crews and questionable insurance cover.

The dangers of the dark fleet have been highlighted by the recent collision between the Sao Tome and Principe VLCC Ceres I and the Singapore-registered product tanker Hafnia Nile, where the VLCC later attempted to flee the scene of the accident.

The US and EU are trying to ‘tighten the noose’ around these sanctions-busting shipowners. The availability of suitable ships could soon become a problem, possibly even limiting Russia’s export possibilities. At the same time, conflict in the Middle East is making this worse.

The dark fleet tankers on the route from Russia to India often take the shortcut through Suez, Poten said, even though the Houthis are increasing their strikes against ships in the Red Sea and Bab Al-Mandeb Straits. But the voyage round the Cape takes far longer and is much more expensive.

Despite these setbacks, Poten reports that Indian refiners are now in dialogue with Soviet suppliers on term deals, rather than spot contracts. This could reduce transaction costs by cutting out the middlemen.

“It would also suggest that the boost in ton-mile demand that has helped trigger the sustained increase in tanker rates may be here to stay,” Poten concluded.  

Courtesy: Seatrade Maritime News

 

Monday, 29 July 2024

Wishes are horses and beggars are riders

Reportedly, Pakistan has sought the re-profiling of more than US$27 billion in debt and liabilities with friendly nations — China, Saudi Arabia and the UAE — to secure a 37-month IMF bailout package and ease energy sector foreign exchange outflows and consumer tariffs.

Finance Minister Muhammad Aurangzeb on Sunday said Islamabad had already asked the friendly bilateral trio of lenders to roll over its more than US$12 billion annual debt portfolio by three to five years to secure the IMF board’s approval for a US$7 billion economic bailout.

This is on top of Islamabad’s request to Beijing to convert imported coal-based projects to local coal and re-profile more than US$15 billion in energy sector liabilities to create fiscal space amid difficulties in timely repayments.

Pakistan has a peculiar financial arran­gement with these three countries in the shape of commercial loans and SAFE deposits that are rolled over every year and form major part of the IMF program in terms of external financing needs.

Pakistan has now requested the maturity period of these loans — US$5 billion from China, US$4 billion from Saudi Arabia, and US$3 billion from the UAE — to be extended to at least three years, offering greater predictability under the IMF program.

Speaking at a news conference after returning from China, Finance Minister said the Chinese side acknowledged Pakistan’s foreign exchange difficulties and wanted to help in new business ventures and the re-profiling of energy sector payments besides playing its role in supporting Pakistan’s case at the IMF board as one of the major stakeholders.

He said the process of debt and equity rescheduling had been started and would now go to the working groups with relevant financial institutions and sponsors of Chinese projects for which Pakistan was hiring local Chinese consultants.

“Between now and the IMF board meeting we have to ensure confirmation of external financing” from friendly bilateral partners, the minister said. However, he explained that the Chinese energy sector debt re-profiling had nothing to do with the IMF program as other prior actions had been completed and structural benchmarks were under implementation.

Minister said he was in contact with the Chinese, Saudi and UAE finance ministers for extension in debt rollover for three years and they had assured their support that would place Pakistan at a very comfortable position in terms of external financing gap.

“I can assure you we are at a very good place on external financing for the next three years, including year-one, year-two and year-three,” he said.

Without going into details, he said the IMF had worked out a financing needs assessment for three years that also included its own US$7 billion Extended Fund Faci­lity. After rollovers from friendly countries, the remaining external financing gap would become very manageable, he said.

Responding to a question, the minister said Pakistan was not seeking any incremental financing from friendly countries. “The only incremental thing is an extension in maturity period for three years instead of yearly rollovers,” he said.

Minister said that the issue of energy sector repayments was initially taken up by Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif with President Xi Jinping of Chian during his visit to Beijing and followed it up with formal letters to Prime Minister Li Keqiang.

As part of the process, Finance Minister along with Power Minister held meetings with Chin­ese finance and energy ministers and the governor of the Chinese central bank to understand the context of Pakistan’s ability to pay, economic stability and relief in energy tariffs.

He said the two sides discussed conversions of Chinese power projects to local coal and how to take their technical, logistical and financial parameters forward.

Secondly, financial re-profiling would also need to be discussed with banks and project sponsors one by one. “They have recognized this and the process would now move forward on that basis,” Minister said.

He said the re-profiling of CPEC debt was also discussed the governor of Chinese central bank and “we would need to go for project by project given the CPEC structure”.

“Very positive discussions have taken place from my perspective,” he said, adding the debt of Chinese independent power producers (IPPs) was manageable as their legal payments were being made, but the issue pertained to return on equity to project sponsors mainly because of foreign exchange which required to be rescheduled to create fiscal space.

Minister, however, clarified that Pakistan was seeking the re-profiling of payments and not “haircuts” — debt waiver or interest rate cuts.

He stressed the importance of long-term structural solutions for economic challenges. He acknowledged the difficulties faced by all segments of society due to high interest rates, energy prices, currency devaluation and increased tax burdens but emphasized the necessity of tough measures given the loss of fiscal space.

“We have no more choice of doing what we have been doing in the past for short-term relief and objectives.”

Responding to a question, the finance minister said Pakistan has moved forward with both the United States and China, aiming to advance the phase two of CPEC under which Chinese business were to relocate to Pakistan, while the US was Pakistan’s largest trading partner and the European Union had provided the GSP Plus status to help prop up Islamabad’s exports.

He said that during his visit to China, he also engaged with his counterpart and the central bank chief to explore opportunities in the Chinese capital market — the second largest in the world — through Panda bonds. He said Pakistan would register for the US$1 billion equivalent of Panda bonds but tap around the equivalent of US$150 million to US$200 million.

Minister said industrialists should also acknowledge that Paki­stan’s economy was such that it immediately ran into a foreign exchange crisis as it tried faster economic growth, and hence, it would be prudent not to fall again into the import restriction regime that could be more painful.

He hoped the stability in foreign exchange and macroeconomic indicators would soon improve Paki­stan’s credit rating and gradually move towards export-led growth, FDI creating exports and return to the international capital markets.

Past efforts for public sector rightsizing did not bear fruit because of large portfolios, the minister said, adding that he was pushing for “bite-size” restructuring by taking only five shortlisted ministries — Kashmir Affairs and Gilgit-Baltistan, Safron, Industries and Production, IT and Telecom, and Health — in the first instance while protecting the rights of workers and asset values.

 

 

Pakistan: SBP reduces policy rate by 100bps

At its meeting today, the Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) of State Bank of Pakistan (SBP) decided to cut the policy rate by 100 basis points to 19.5%, effective from July 30, 2024.

The Committee observed that the June 2024 inflation was slightly better than anticipated. The Committee also assessed that the inflationary impact of the FY25 budgetary measures was broadly in line with earlier expectations.

The external account has continued to improve, as reflected by the build-up in foreign exchange reserves held by SBP despite substantial repayments of debt and other obligations.

Considering these developments – along with significantly positive real interest rate – the Committee viewed that there was a room to further reduce the policy rate in a calibrated manner to support economic activity, while keeping inflationary pressures in check.

The Committee noted the following key developments since its last meeting:

First, the current account deficit narrowed sharply in FY24 and forex reserves of SBP reserves improved significantly from US$4.4 billion at end June 2023 to above US$9.0 billion.

Second, the country reached a staff level agreement with the IMF for a 37-month EFF program of about US$7.0 billion.

Third, sentiment surveys conducted in July showed a worsening in inflation expectations and confidence of both consumers and businesses.

Fourth, international oil prices have remained volatile in recent weeks, whereas prices of metals and food items have eased.

Lastly, with the ease in inflationary pressures and labour market conditions, central banks in advanced economies have also started to cut their policy rates.

Taking stock of these developments, the Committee assessed that, despite today’s decision, the monetary policy stance remains adequately tight to guide inflation towards the medium-term target of 5 to 7 percent. This assessment is also contingent on achieving the targeted fiscal consolidation, timely realization of planned external inflows and addressing underlying weaknesses in the economy through structural reforms.

Real Sector

Latest high-frequency indicators continue to reflect moderate economic activity. Auto and POL (excluding FO) sales and fertilizer offtake increased on MoM basis in June.

Large-scale manufacturing also recorded a sharp improvement in May 2024, mainly driven by the apparel sector.

The growth in agriculture sector, after showing a strong performance in FY24, is expected to slow down in this fiscal year.

Latest satellite images and input conditions for Kharif crops also support this assessment. However, activity in the industry and services sectors is expected to recover, supported by relatively lower interest rates and higher budgeted development spending.

Based on this, the MPC assessed FY25 real GDP growth in the range of 2.5 to 3.5 percent as compared to 2.4 percent recorded last year.

External Sector

After recording surpluses for three consecutive months, the current account posted a deficit in May and June, in line with the MPC’s expectation. These deficits were largely due to higher dividend and profit payments and a seasonal increase in imports, which more than offset a significant increase in exports and workers’ remittances.

Cumulatively, the current account deficit in FY24 narrowed significantly to 0.2% of GDP from 1.0% in the preceding year. This, along with the revival of financial inflows, helped build the SBP’s FX reserves. Looking ahead, the MPC expects a modest increase in imports, in line with the growth outlook.

At the same time, the continued robust growth in workers’ remittances, along with an increase in exports, is expected to contain the current account deficit in the range of 0 - 1.0 percent of GDP in FY25.

The Committee assessed that the expected financial inflows, including planned official flows under the IMF program, would help finance this current account deficit and further strengthen the FX buffers.

Fiscal Sector

The government’s revised estimates indicate improvement in fiscal balances during FY24, as the primary balance turned into a surplus and the overall deficit declined from last year. However, amidst a shortfall in budgeted external and non-bank financing, the government’s reliance on the domestic banking system increased significantly.

The Committee expressed concern on increasing reliance on banks for deficit financing, which has been squeezing borrowing space for the private sector. For FY25, the government has set the primary surplus target at 2.0% of GDP.

The MPC emphasized on achieving the envisaged fiscal consolidation and timely realization of planned external inflows to support overall macroeconomic stability, and build fiscal and external buffers for the country to respond to future economic shocks.

Money and Credit

The MPC noted that the trends and composition of monetary aggregates during FY24 remained consistent with the tight monetary policy stance. Broad money (M2) and reserve money grew by 16.0% and 2.6%, respectively, well below the growth in nominal GDP.

Almost the entire growth in M2 was led by bank deposits, while currency in circulation remained almost at last year’s level. As a result, the currency to deposit ratio improved, as it declined from 41.1% at end June 2023 to 33.6% at end June 2024. At the same time, the improvement in external account increased the contribution of net foreign assets in monetary expansion.

Meanwhile, the growth in net domestic assets of the banking system decelerated amidst subdued demand for private sector credit. The Committee viewed these developments as favorable for the inflation outlook.

Inflation Outlook

As expected, headline inflation rose to 12.6%YoY in June 2024 from 11.8% in May. This increase was primarily driven by higher electricity tariffs and Eid-related increase in prices, which were partly offset by the downward adjustments in domestic fuel prices.

Core inflation, meanwhile, has steadied around 14 percent over the past two months. The MPC assessed that while the inflationary impact of the FY25 budget is largely in line with expectations, the available information indicates that the full impact of these measures may now take some time to fully reflect in domestic prices.

At the same time, the Committee noted risks to the inflation outlook from fiscal slippages and ad-hoc decisions related to energy price adjustments.

On balance, after considering these trends – and accounting for the sufficiently tight monetary policy stance and ongoing fiscal consolidation – average inflation is expected to remain in the range of 11.5 to 13.5 percent in FY25, down significantly from 23.4 percent in FY24.

Sunday, 28 July 2024

Hezbollah denies targeting Golan Heights

Hezbollah has categorically denied what it said were claims made by the enemy that it had targeted an area in the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights. A projectile landed on a soccer field in Majdal Shams on Saturday killed 12 people, including children. 

Majdal Shams is an Arabic-speaking village populated by around 25,000 residents from the Druze community who have a Muslim background. The Golan Heights is a territory that belongs to Syria. It was captured by the Israeli occupation forces in 1967.

Amid ongoing Hezbollah operations against Israeli military positions, in solidarity with Gaza, the Lebanese resistance informed the UN that the Golan Heights incident was the result of an Israeli interceptor hitting the soccer field. 

This is not the first time Israeli missile batteries and Iron Dome systems have missed their targets and hit Majdal Shams.

A similar incident occurred on July 10, when Tel Aviv was quick to blame Hezbollah. 

Assessments later showed technical failure with Israeli defense systems was behind the Majdal Shams incident on July 10, despite Tel Aviv quickly shifting the blame to Hezbollah. 

The attack on Saturday on the Druze community, who also enjoy a large presence in Lebanon, has again raised suspicions due to the timing, the nature of the civilian target, and the size of the explosion.

It is inconsistent with ten months of daily operations by Hezbollah that have pounded Israeli military sites, and on occasions, Israeli settlements, in retaliation for deadly Israeli attacks on Lebanese civilians. 

Hezbollah confirmed its complete lack of involvement in the incident, refuting all the “false claims” being spread. 

Issuing a statement Hezbollah said, “The Islamic Resistance in Lebanon categorically denies the claims made by some enemy media and various media platforms about targeting Majdal Shams. It confirms that the Islamic Resistance has no connection with the incident whatsoever and unequivocally denies all false claims in this regard.”

The residents of Majdal Shams, located a few kilometers from Lebanon, are aware that their town, under the rules of war, was within a zone of peace and security. 

Hezbollah is also aware of this and of its wide range of military targets.

Experts say that between the determination, sincerity and transparency of the Lebanese resistance and the criminal history of the Israeli occupation, only one party has a track record of lies and that is Tel Aviv. 

Furthermore, the genocidal war waged by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and his military against the Gaza Strip, along with the international positions, judicial or political, strongly point to the real perpetrator.

In light of the accusations launched by Israeli officials and media after the Majdal Shams incident, Netanyahu cut his trip to the United States short by several hours and returned to Tel Aviv. 

Israeli media said he was to chair a meeting of the small ministerial council. Hebrew media also reported that Netanyahu held preliminary consultations with military officials.

Lebanese Speaker of Parliament Nabih Berri confirmed that Hezbollah’s denial affirms its commitment and non-responsibility, and that Lebanon is not responsible for what happened. 

During a call with a UN Coordinator in Lebanon, Joanna Wronecka, Berri stated that Lebanon, which has been subjected to continuous Israeli aggression for over nine months, with the Israeli military targeting civilians, agricultural areas, emergency crews, and media personnel with internationally banned weapons, remains committed to Resolution 1701 and the rules of engagement by not targeting civilians, despite these blatant Israeli violations.

Former Lebanese Druze Progressive Socialist Party leader Walid Jumblatt said, “In light of Hezbollah’s statement denying the Islamic Resistance’s involvement in what happened in Majdal Shams, we emphasize the warning and alert regarding what the Israeli enemy has been working on for a long time to ignite strife and fragment the region and its components.”

The veteran politician added, “We have previously thwarted this project, and while it is reemerging, we are prepared alongside the resistance and all those confronting Israeli criminality and occupation.”

Jumblatt pointed out that “the history and ongoing nature of the Israeli enemy is full of massacres committed against civilians relentlessly”. 

He added, "The call is for everyone in Lebanon, Palestine, and the Golan to avoid any slip or incitement within the framework of the enemy’s destructive project, with the need to prevent the expansion of the war and to stop the aggression and firing immediately, emphasizing the rejection and condemnation of targeting civilians, whether in occupied Palestine, the occupied Golan, or southern Lebanon.”

Meanwhile, the head of the Lebanese Democratic Party and political leader of the Druze community, Talal Arslan, underscored, “What happened is nothing but a vile and failed attempt to detach the Arab Syrian Golan from its geographical nature and familial extensions, which has always rejected collusion against its Syrian Arab identity.”

He said in a statement, “The Golan will not fall into the trap of Israel’s project to feign protection of minorities, which aims only to fragment the region into micro-states that protect its forged borders.”

He also stated that “all free people in the world and in the Arab homeland, especially the unified national Arab Druze, are wholeheartedly with our people in the heroic Golan. It is the depth of our honorable resistance and an inseparable part of the occupied territories, which will only return to its natural state through steadfastness and resistance.”

The UN special coordinator for Lebanon, Jeanine Hennis-Plasschaert, and UNIFIL force commander General Aroldo Lazaro warned that further intensification of strikes “could ignite a wider conflagration that would engulf the entire region in a catastrophe beyond belief”. 

They urged maximum restraint from all sides, adding they were in contact with both the Israelis and Lebanese. 

Axios cited a US official as saying that the Golan incident “could be the trigger we have been worried about and tried to avoid for 10 months”. 

Lebanon’s foreign minister, Abdallah Bou Habib, told Reuters that any significant attack by Israel would lead to a “regional war”. 

 

 

Netanyahu should resign and surrender

Jill Stein has been one of the loudest and clearest voices in the race for president demanding justice for Gaza, and that begins with Benjamin Netanyahu immediately resigning as Prime Minister and surrendering to authorities. Netanyahu is a war criminal who has been charged with the following crimes by the International Criminal Court (ICC);

·  Starvation of civilians as a method of warfare as a war crime contrary to article 8(2)(b)(xxv) of the Statute;

·  Willfully causing great suffering, or serious injury to body or health contrary to article 8(2)(a)(iii), or cruel treatment as a war crime contrary to article 8(2)(c)(i);

·  Willful killing contrary to article 8(2)(a)(i), or Murder as a war crime contrary to article 8(2)(c)(i);

·  Intentionally directing attacks against a civilian population as a war crime contrary to articles 8(2)(b)(i), or 8(2)(e)(i);

·  Extermination and/or murder contrary to articles 7(1)(b) and 7(1)(a), including in the context of deaths caused by starvation, as a crime against humanity;

·  Persecution as a crime against humanity contrary to article 7(1)(h);

·  Other inhumane acts as crimes against humanity contrary to article 7(1)(k).

Jill demands Americans should not support the Biden-Harris funded genocide, and they should never accept this forced alliance with a war criminal.