As the United States focuses on its showdown with Russia in
Ukraine and its escalating competition with China, the Middle East has been
left to run its affairs the way it always has: with marriages of convenience
between rival powers. These are not Catholic-style ‘holy matrimonies’,
comprehensive and permanent, but coolly pragmatic deals to survive through
short-term relationships that fit changing strategic conditions. If only Israel
understood that.
Of course, one relatively constant factor—religion—does play
an important role in determining whether countries in the region are rivals or
allies. But the Sunni–Shia divide has been accorded excessive weight in
assessments of the Middle East’s diplomatic shifts. Geopolitical interests and
regime survival always prevail over religious identities. This helps to explain
why conservative Arab regimes have shown such a remarkable ability to withstand
both internal upheaval—exemplified by the resounding defeat of pro-democracy
forces during the Arab Spring—and external pressures.
The Gulf countries exemplify this hard-headed approach.
Business-oriented and living in the shadow of predator states like Iraq and
Iran, they are much more concerned with commerce and discreet security
understandings than with ideology. A particularly striking display of such
diplomatic pragmatism came last month, when Saudi Arabia, the leader of the
Sunni world and Shia Iran re-established relations.
Beyond the headlines trumpeting China’s role in mediating
the rapprochement, the logic driving the shift is clear. For Iran—desperate to
extricate itself from the economic and social crises that have fuelled popular
uprisings in recent months—Saudi Arabia is a much-needed lifeline. For the
Saudis, the failure of America’s ‘maximum pressure’ campaign against
Iran—thanks, not least, to its alliance with China and Russia—and Iran’s
imminent emergence as a nuclear state make détente a necessity.
Saudi Arabia was most likely also motivated by the prospect
of ending the war in Yemen, where it has suffered humiliating losses at the
hands of the Houthis, Iran’s proxies. Peace would enable the kingdom to focus
its attention on diversifying its economy away from oil and petrochemicals. As
a trade-dependent economy, Saudi Arabia can thrive only in a context of peace
and security.
Saudi Arabia’s opening with Iran is part of a broader
regional accommodation. The United Arab Emirates re-established diplomatic
relations with Iran last year, with Bahrain expected to follow suit soon.
Turkey has reached out to both Syria and Israel, and the Arab states seem to be
allowing Syria—with its distinctly secular and nationalist Ba’ath regime—back
into the fold. Last month, Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, long shunned as a
pariah, visited the UAE, and a Saudi reconciliation with the ‘butcher of
Damascus’ is now in the offing.
Here, too, pragmatism has been the guiding principle. Different
conditions call for different policies, and at a time when the US—Assad’s main
international nemesis—has become less assertive in the region, Syria has come
to seem like a legitimate partner.
But no one should expect that the Arab League will welcome
Syria back only if it pledges to reduce Iran’s military deployment on its
territory. A key feature of Middle Eastern marriages of convenience is that
they don’t entail policy changes that reflect the parties’ core interests. Iran
won’t downgrade its support for Hezbollah in Lebanon, whether it has embassies
in Saudi Arabia or not.
Likewise, the Saudi–Iranian rapprochement won’t change the
fact that the US is the ultimate guarantor of Saudi Arabia’s security. Nor does
it rule out a Saudi–Israeli peace agreement. The House of Saud is always keen
to diversify its strategic options.
Before a Saudi deal with Israel can happen, however, Israel
will have to put its domestic political house in order, avoid escalation in the
occupied territories, freeze settlement expansion and restore its relationship
with the US. More fundamentally, Israelis must comprehend what the Arabs, Turks
and Iranians already understand: pragmatic deal-making will do it a lot more
good than an impossible quest for total victory.
The 2020 Abraham Accords, which normalized diplomatic
relations between Israel and the UAE, Bahrain, Morocco and Sudan, were more a
product of American pressure than diplomatic savoir faire on Israel’s
part. And, in the eyes of its newfound Arab partners, Israel’s standing is
already deteriorating, owing not only to its domestic crisis, but also to its
refusal to rethink its Iran strategy.
While other Middle Eastern countries adapt to current
strategic conditions, Israel remains committed to its longstanding ‘shadow war’
against Iran, with its covert attacks, including drone strikes and cyberattacks,
as well as airstrikes against Iranian targets in Syria. Despite the region’s
recent surfeit of marriages, Israeli leaders’ lack of vision and courage
implies that they are unlikely to step up to the altar any time soon.
Curtesy: The Strategist
