Al-Golani: Today's reflection of veni; vidi; vici,

History shows that the United States loves to create and then demolish the phantoms. There is a long list but the most recent creation is a big mystery. Abu Mohammed al-Golani is a perfect reflection of the phrase "Veni; vidi; vici" attributed to Julius Caesar. The sentence, which translates as "I came; I saw; I conquered," is a well-known quote from Ancient Rome.

The insurgency that brought down Assad this past weekend was led by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), which many Western governments have designated a terrorist group. The head of HTS, Abu Mohammed al-Golani, has a long history of militancy. After joining al-Qaida, he participated in the fight against US forces that invaded Iraq in 2003. He moved to Lebanon in 2006, where he supervised training for fighters for Jund al-Sham, a Salafist jihadi organization. He then returned to Iraq in 2008 to fight for the Islamic State group. The US Army briefly arrested him, and following his release, he moved to Syria after the 2011 uprising against Assad. He established the transnational jihadi al-Nusra Front, focusing on Iraq, Syria, Jordan and Lebanon.

After Assad regained control of Aleppo in late 2016, al-Golani changed the name of the group to Hayat Tahrir al-Sham. He settled in the province of Idlib and established the Syrian Salvation Government, abandoning the doctrine of transnational jihad to focus on Syria instead. He declared that his goal had shifted to eliminating the Assad regime and establishing Islamic rule in Syria, saying that his membership in al-Qaida and association with the Islamic State group were a thing of the past. He consolidated his authoritarian control over Idlib and marginalized other opposition groups, both religious and secular.

 

 

Cosco to fund QatarEnergy LNG carriers

The company has approved is wholly-owned subsidiary, Cosco Shipping LNG Investment (Shanghai) to jointly invested in the second phase project of Qatar Energy, which will purchase 50% stakes of six singe-vessel companies established by Japanese owner MOL to build six QC-Max LNG carriers together.  

The QC-Max vessels, which will be built at China's Hudong-Zhonghua Shipyard, are the largest LNG vessels ever built with a capacity of 271,000 cu meters each. 

Cosco Shipping Energy Transportation said that with enhanced fuel efficiency and reduced emissions, the vessels are engineered to meet the highest safety and environmental standards, representing a significant advancement in sustainable innovation.

Meeting the long-term transportation demands of Qatar Energy, the six LNG carrier’s investment will further improve the company’s profitability, the company commented.

Courtesy: Seatrade Maritime News

Syrian Interim Leader

Syria's new interim leader announced on Tuesday he was taking charge of the country as caretaker prime minister with the backing of the former rebels who toppled President Bashar al-Assad three days ago.

In a brief address on state television, Mohammed al-Bashir, a figure little known across most of Syria who previously ran an administration in a pocket of the northwest controlled by rebels, said he would lead the interim authority until March 01, 2025.

"Today we held a cabinet meeting that included a team from the Salvation government that was working in Idlib and its vicinity, and the government of the ousted regime," he said.

"The meeting was under the headline of transferring the files and institutions to caretake the government."

Bashir ran the rebel-led Salvation Government before the 12-day lightning rebel offensive swept into Damascus.

Behind him were two flags - the green, black and white flag flown by opponents of Assad throughout the civil war, and a white flag with the Islamic oath of faith in black writing, typically flown in Syria by Sunni Islamist fighters.

In the Syrian capital, banks reopened for the first time since Assad's overthrow. Shops also opened again, traffic returned to the roads, cleaners were out sweeping the streets and there were fewer armed men about.

Two sources close to the rebels said their command had ordered fighters to withdraw from cities, and for police and internal security forces affiliated with the main rebel group Hayat Tahrir al-Shams (HTS) to deploy there.

HTS is a former al Qaeda affiliate that led the anti-Assad revolt and has lately downplayed its jihadist roots.

US Secretary of State Antony Blinken said Washington fully supports Syria's political transition process and wants it to lead to inclusive and non-sectarian governance.

US Deputy National Security Adviser Jon Finer told Reuters Washington was still working out how it will engage with the rebel groups and added that as yet there had been no formal change of policy and that actions were what counted.

Finer said US troops in northeastern Syria as part of a counter-terrorism mission would be staying there, and the top US general responsible for the Middle East visited them on Tuesday, as well as US-backed Kurdish Syrian forces (SDF).

Israel launches heavy airstrikes on Syria

Israel unleashed a massive wave of airstrikes on Syrian military sites on Tuesday, targeting weapons and installations to prevent them from falling into hostile hands following the collapse of Bashar al-Assad’s regime. These strikes were among the most intense in the history of Israel’s operations in Syria, leaving significant damage across the country.

Syrian security officers and regional sources reported that Israeli strikes hit military bases, airfields, and Republican Guard assets, decimating dozens of helicopters, jets, and other military equipment. In Damascus, the Barzeh defense ministry research center—previously targeted by Western forces in 2018 for its alleged role in chemical weapons production—was reportedly destroyed.

The Israeli Air Force (IAF) has conducted over 300 airstrikes in Syria since the regime’s fall. Monday night, the Israeli Navy launched operations to destroy the former regime’s naval fleet, including vessels armed with sea-to-sea missiles at the Minet el-Beida bay and Latakia port.

“Israel is acting to ensure that advanced weapons and strategic assets do not fall into the hands of hostile forces amid the ongoing chaos in Syria,” said an IDF spokesperson.

After seizing control of the 1974 buffer zone in the Golan Heights, Israel denied reports of advancing beyond the zone or nearing Damascus. “IDF troops are present inside the buffer zone and at defensive positions close to the border to protect the Israeli border,” said Col. Avichay Adraee, the IDF’s Arabic-language spokesman.

Egypt, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia condemned Israel’s seizure of the buffer zone, with Saudi Arabia warning that it could destabilize Syria further. UN special envoy for Syria Geir Pedersen called on Israel to cease its operations, labeling the situation “extremely important” for regional stability.

Israel has consistently stated that it has no intention of intervening in Syria’s internal conflict and that its actions are defensive. “Limited and temporary measures” have been taken to protect Israel’s security, officials told the UN Security Council.

As the situation in Syria remains volatile, Israel has vowed to continue its strikes to neutralize threats while maintaining its defensive stance along the border.

 

Shattering of Axis of Resistance

The recent collapse of Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Syria marks a significant and unexpected development for Iran, comparable in its surprise to the Taliban’s swift takeover of Kabul in 2021. Iran has been a steadfast ally of Assad, who thought the cost of resistance is less than the cost of compromise. Tehran provided Damascus with substantial military and financial support throughout the Syrian civil war. The sudden downfall of Assad’s government not only disrupts Iran’s strategic foothold in the Levant but also challenges its influence in the broader Middle East region.

The rapid fall of the Western-backed government in Kabul — with which Tehran had sought to engage diplomatically to maintain stability along Iran’s eastern border — similarly caught the Iranian leadership off guard. This event as well as Assad’s toppling both underscore the volatility of regional alliances and the complexities Iran faces in navigating its foreign policy objectives amid rapidly changing political landscapes.

While Iran had at least prepared for a scenario of the Taliban’s return and established some contacts and exchanges with the group even before the latter returned to power, the collapse of the Assad regime, described as a key link in the Axis of Resistance, came more suddenly.

Only a few days before the fall of Damascus to the Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), Iran started evacuating its key assets and personnel, including high-ranking military advisors and members of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), to save critical resources.

It is vital for Iran at this point to secure a role in shaping the future of Syria’s political landscape to prevent an adversarial government and to be able to preserve some level of strategic influence in the region.

Although the common border with Afghanistan is perhaps the number one security concern for Iran to the east, Syria’s strategic value cannot be overstated when it comes to Iran’s western flank.

Syria was the heart of the resistance, which provided a direct link to Hezbollah in Lebanon and supported Iran’s deterrence against Israel. Thus, losing Syria not only disrupts the Axis of Resistance but also weakens Iran’s ability to project power in the region.

In the absence of Iranian proxies on the ground, the resulting power vacuum is likely to be filled by Turkey or Saudi Arabia, which in turn could force Iran to redirect its focus to defending its interests in other places.

At home, the legitimacy of the Iranian regime was severely damaged by its violent crackdowns on the Mahsa Amini protests in late 2022-early 2023. At the same time, Iran’s broad and substantial investments in Syria and elsewhere, which many Iranians saw as a costly miscalculation, intensified public criticism and political dissent over neglected economic issues.

Fears that their country could follow a path toward civil war, similar to those in Syria and Libya, deterred some from advocating for regime change at any cost. If Syria now descends into another civil war with further destruction, it could validate these concerns. However, if Syria manages to form an inclusive and stable government free of revenge, it could inspire Iranians.

In the aftermath of Assad’s collapse, Tehran will likely recalibrate its regional strategy, strengthening its militia networks, particularly Hezbollah and Shi’a militias in Syria and Iraq as the primary focus. These will need to serve as Tehran’s primary tool for projecting power in the absence of a friendly Syrian government.

Iran may also attempt to expand its regional alliances with Russia and China to sustain its ambitions. However, given the outcome of its previous reliance on Moscow to protect the Assad regime, Iran may need to recalculate the level of Russian support it can truly expect.

Rethinking its Syria policy may additionally encourage Tehran to shift from overt to covert approaches — a potentially challenging aim due to Iran’s over-stretched resources.

Assad’s downfall marks a significant setback for Iran’s regional strategy, disrupting the latter’s network of alliances and diminishing its influence in the Levant.

Courtesy: Middle East Institute

 

 

 

Iranian strategy to keep its influence intact in Middle East

According to Reuters, Iran has opened a direct line of communication with rebels in Syria's new leadership after the ouster of Bashar al-Assad It is an attempt to "prevent a hostile trajectory" between the countries.

The lightning advance of a militia alliance spearheaded by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, a former al-Qaeda affiliate, marked one of the biggest turning points for the Middle East in generations. Assad's fall removed a bastion from which Iran and Russia exercised influence across the Arab world.

Hours after Assad's fall, Iran said it expected relations with Damascus to continue based on the two countries' "far-sighted and wise approach" and called for the establishment of an inclusive government representing all segments of Syrian society.

There is little doubt about Tehran's concern about how the change of power in Damascus will affect Iran's influence in Syria, the lynchpin of its regional clout.

But there is no panic as Tehran seeks diplomatic avenues to establish contact with people whom one of the officials called "those within Syria's new ruling groups whose views are closer to Iran's".

The main concern for Iran is whether Assad's successor will push Syria away from Tehran's orbit, a scenario Iran is keen to avoid.

A hostile post-Assad Syria would deprive Lebanese armed group Hezbollah of its only land supply route and deny Iran its main access to the Mediterranean and the front line with Israel.

After losing of an important ally in Damascus and the return of Donald Trump to the white House in January 2024, this engagement is key to stabilize ties and avoiding further regional tensions.

According to Reuters, Tehran has established contacts with two groups inside the new leadership and the level of interaction will be assessed in the coming days.

Tehran was wary of Trump using Assad's removal as leverage to intensify economic and political pressure on Iran, either to force concessions or to destabilize the Islamic Republic.

After pulling the United States out of Iran's 2015 nuclear deal with six major powers in 2018, then-President Trump pursued a "maximum pressure" policy that led to extreme economic hardship and exacerbated public discontent in Iran. Trump is staffing his planned administration with hawks on Iran.

In 2020, Trump, as president, ordered a drone strike that killed Qassem Soleimani, Iran's most powerful military commander and mastermind of overseas attacks on US interests and those of its allies.

Iran is now only left with two options: fall back and draw a defensive line in Iraq or seek a deal with Trump.

The fall of Assad exposed Tehran's dwindling strategic leverage in the region, exacerbated by Israel's military offensives against Hezbollah in Lebanon and the Palestinian militant group Hamas in Gaza.

Iran's clerical rulers spent billions of dollars propping up Assad during the civil war that erupted in Syria in 2011 and deployed its Revolutionary Guards to Syria to keep its ally in power and maintain Tehran's "Axis of Resistance" to Israel and US influence in the Middle East.

Assad's fall removes a critical link in Iran's regional resistance chain that served as a crucial transit route for Tehran to supply arms and fund its proxies and particularly Hezbollah.

 

 

Syria: Opportunities and Pitfalls for Israel

The fall of Assad, an implacable foe of Israel who turned Syria into a staging ground for Iranian threats and weapons transfers to Hezbollah, is not something Israel would lament. With Syrian rebel forces rapidly advancing south toward Damascus after already taking Aleppo and Hama, the ground in Syria is shifting.

This shift is due in no small measure to the twin blows Israel dealt Hezbollah and Iran since the launch of Operation Northern Arrows in mid-September, aimed at returning displaced Israeli residents to their homes along the northern border.

In its war in Lebanon, Israel decapitated Hezbollah’s leadership, killed and wounded thousands of its fighters, and significantly degraded its missile and rocket capabilities. Hezbollah, which once fought in Syria to prop up the dictatorial regime of President Bashar al-Assad, is in no position to help Assad today as his regime has crumbled.

Iran also suffered blows at the hands of Israel – most notably the destruction of much of its air defense network and critical missile manufacturing infrastructure during Jerusalem’s retaliatory raid on October 26.

With Hezbollah severely weakened and Hamas in Gaza also no longer an effective proxy, Iran – which has made an art form of sending others to be killed to further its own interests – finds itself unable to provide Assad with the same level of assistance it once did. It also struggles to project the same regional power if wielded just a few months ago.

Assad’s other ally, Russia, whose intervention in the civil war in 2015 tipped the scales in his favor, is also unable to give Assad what it did in the past, preoccupied and overextended with its own war in Ukraine.

With Hezbollah, Iran, and Russia weakened – two of them due to Israeli action – Syrian rebels seized the opportunity to advance, launching their offensive on the same day a ceasefire was implemented in Lebanon. Hezbollah, weary and depleted, was in no position to counter the rebel advance.

The fall of Assad, an implacable foe of Israel who turned Syria into a staging ground for Iranian threats and weapons transfers to Hezbollah, is not something Israel would lament. However, the composition of the rebel forces threatening Assad’s regime is not an alliance that the Jewish state can applaud.

They are led by Sunni jihadists recently aligned with al-Qaeda and who remain on America’s list of terrorist organizations and also include Turkish-backed Islamists.

Israel has a clear interest in seeing Syria removed from Iran’s “Axis of Resistance,” ending its role as a host for Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps operatives and Iranian-sponsored militias and as a potential launch-pad for attacks against Israel.

Syria under Assad was a crucial pillar of Hezbollah’s strength in Lebanon, serving as the main conduit for smuggling missiles and advanced weaponry into the country. If Syria is taken out of the equation, Hezbollah – already reeling from Israel’s onslaught – will face even greater difficulties rebuilding.

This would be welcome news for many in Lebanon seeking freedom from Hezbollah and Iran’s stranglehold. One significant side effect of Assad’s fall could be a chance for the Lebanese to finally regain control of their own country.

While these developments are largely positive for Israel, they come with complications. Jerusalem has no interest in seeing its neighbor to the northeast taken over by Sunni jihadists of the al-Qaeda ilk or Turkish-backed Islamists. Israel’s experience with such groups – like Hamas in Gaza – has been anything but encouraging.

What happens in Syria will most definitely have an impact on Israel in the future that is why Jerusalem must keep a vigilant eye there, sending messages to all concerned that there are two developments it will not tolerate. The first is chemical weapons depots falling into the hands of jihadist or Islamist rebels, and the second is the mass deployment of Iranian troops into the country.

Those are redlines that, if crossed, would severely compromise Israel’s national security and would necessitate immediate Israeli action to prevent.

Beyond these redlines, Israel can do little to positively impact developments inside Syria, other than working behind the scenes with the US to establish channels with more moderate elements in the opposition, hoping they will emerge as a constructive force in shaping Syria’s future. 

Courtesy: The Jerusalem Post