The rapid fall of the Western-backed government in Kabul — with which Tehran had sought to engage diplomatically to maintain stability along Iran’s eastern border — similarly caught the Iranian leadership off guard. This event as well as Assad’s toppling both underscore the volatility of regional alliances and the complexities Iran faces in navigating its foreign policy objectives amid rapidly changing political landscapes.
While Iran had at least prepared for a scenario of the Taliban’s return and established some contacts and exchanges with the group even before the latter returned to power, the collapse of the Assad regime, described as a key link in the Axis of Resistance, came more suddenly.
Only a few days before the fall of Damascus to the Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), Iran started evacuating its key assets and personnel, including high-ranking military advisors and members of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), to save critical resources.
It is vital for Iran at this point to secure a role in shaping the future of Syria’s political landscape to prevent an adversarial government and to be able to preserve some level of strategic influence in the region.
Although the common border with Afghanistan is perhaps the number one security concern for Iran to the east, Syria’s strategic value cannot be overstated when it comes to Iran’s western flank.
Syria was the heart of the resistance, which provided a direct link to Hezbollah in Lebanon and supported Iran’s deterrence against Israel. Thus, losing Syria not only disrupts the Axis of Resistance but also weakens Iran’s ability to project power in the region.
In the absence of Iranian proxies on the ground, the resulting power vacuum is likely to be filled by Turkey or Saudi Arabia, which in turn could force Iran to redirect its focus to defending its interests in other places.
At home, the legitimacy of the Iranian regime was severely damaged by its violent crackdowns on the Mahsa Amini protests in late 2022-early 2023. At the same time, Iran’s broad and substantial investments in Syria and elsewhere, which many Iranians saw as a costly miscalculation, intensified public criticism and political dissent over neglected economic issues.
Fears that their country could follow a path toward civil war, similar to those in Syria and Libya, deterred some from advocating for regime change at any cost. If Syria now descends into another civil war with further destruction, it could validate these concerns. However, if Syria manages to form an inclusive and stable government free of revenge, it could inspire Iranians.
In the aftermath of Assad’s collapse, Tehran will likely recalibrate its regional strategy, strengthening its militia networks, particularly Hezbollah and Shi’a militias in Syria and Iraq as the primary focus. These will need to serve as Tehran’s primary tool for projecting power in the absence of a friendly Syrian government.
Iran may also attempt to expand its regional alliances with Russia and China to sustain its ambitions. However, given the outcome of its previous reliance on Moscow to protect the Assad regime, Iran may need to recalculate the level of Russian support it can truly expect.
Rethinking its Syria policy may additionally encourage Tehran to shift from overt to covert approaches — a potentially challenging aim due to Iran’s over-stretched resources.
Assad’s downfall marks a significant setback for Iran’s regional strategy, disrupting the latter’s network of alliances and diminishing its influence in the Levant.
Courtesy: Middle East Institute
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