ICJ Ruling: Greatest political dilemma for Joe Biden

In both a national and international context, the ICJ decision poses a huge problem for the Biden administration. White House and State Department officials took the absolute position immediately after South Africa filed their petition to the ICJ that the claim of genocide was meritless.

A close to unanimous court ruling that Israel’s assault on Gaza is plausibly genocidal — and with the singular US judge standing with the majority — that dismissive attitude, and related claims that ​the UN is biased against Israel will not get much traction.

“The much-anticipated decision by the International Court of Justice ​marks the greatest moment in the history of the court” says Richard Falk, a noted international law professor and former United Nations Special Rapporteur on Human Rights in the Occupied Palestinian Territory.

It strengthens the claims of international law to be respected by all sovereign states — not just some, Falk says about the ICJ’s ruling that South Africa’s magisterial presentation of evidence ​was sufficient to conclude Israel may be committing, conspiring to commit, or publicly inciting the commission of genocide against Palestinians in Gaza.

The ICJ decision gave new strength to South Africa’s groundbreaking accomplishment — demolishing the taboo against holding Israel accountable for its crimes. As South Africa’s foreign ministry put it, “Today marks a decisive victory for the international rule of law and a significant milestone in the search for justice for the Palestinian people.”

“The decision is a momentous one,” says the foreign ministry, noting how important the determination is for the implementation of the international rule of law. ​“South Africa thanks the Court for its swift ruling.”

The decision was a significant victory beyond what most observers hoped for — not only the recognition that Israel’s actions are plausibly genocidal, but because of the imposition of provisional measures based on measures South Africa requested in order to stop Israel’s actions that are continuing to kill and put Palestinians at risk. 

The ruling was also particularly important because of the overwhelming majority of judges who supported it, including the sole US judge on the court. When the president of the court, Judge Joan Donoghue, who was a longtime State Department lawyer before being elected to the ICJ, read out the provisional measures, she included the line-up of how judges voted on each one. And she was among the 15 or 16 out of 17 judges who supported every one. 

 

While judges serve as individuals and are not supposed to represent their governments, there is no question that national allegiances and other political considerations often emerge. In this case, only the judge from Uganda opposed all the court’s measures while the temporary Israeli judge opposed four out of six.

It should not have been a surprise that this preliminary finding recognized that Israel’s war against the entire population of Gaza may well constitute genocide.

The definition, under the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, says that two things are required to fulfill that definition: a specific intent to destroy all or part of a racial, ethnic, religious or other group (in this case the Palestinian population of Gaza), and the commission or attempt to commit any one of five specific acts to realize that intent.

South Africa presented evidence that Israel is already committing — and conspiring to commit and inciting commitment — of at least four of those acts: killing, seriously injuring members of the group, creating conditions that make survival of the group impossible, and preventing births within the group.

The ICJ decision was not a full determination of the facts and the law — as usual, those issues in international legal venues take years. This kind of initial finding requires a very low bar only that it is plausible that Israel’s military actions, the siege and more could plausibly be found to constitute genocide.

It took the court only two weeks to come to this ruling, though still too long given the numbers of people the Israeli military is killing on a daily basis. But it still represents a hugely important step that will play a major role in strengthening the growing, broadening movement for Palestinian rights that is now playing such an unprecedented role in U.S. and global politics.

And then the ICJ went further, imposing six provisional measures to try and ensure that the rights of Palestinians might be protected from those actions. The measures imposed by the court say Israel ​shall take all necessary measures to prevent the commission of any of the five acts named in the Genocide Convention, that it ensure that its military forces do not commit any of those acts, that it punish any public incitement to those acts, that it take all measures to provide humanitarian assistance, to prevent the destruction of evidence relevant to the charges of genocide, and to report to the court within one month on what Tel Aviv is doing to abide by the court’s ruling. 

The first measure was the only one weakened by the court. South Africa had requested the immediate suspension of military operations: a cease-fire.

The ICJ language refers only to taking all necessary measures to prevent the five genocidal actions, but without demanding an actual end to the military assault.

However, the Court’s second measure arguably answers that weaker language by keeping to the South African request that Israel make sure that the military does not commit any of the relevant acts — meaning that the IDF should stop killing people and be prevented from doing so.

Not just prevented from killing too many people, as President Joe Biden’s administration and others have urged, but prevented from killing any people.

Next Iranian Supreme Leader, Israeli Perspective

According to The Jerusalem Post, from 1997-2005 and again from 2013-2021, Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei experimented with Iranian presidents who were reformists and pragmatists, Mohammad Khatami and Hassan Rouhani respectively.

Although Rouhani was still in power in 2020, by that time the United States had pulled out of the Iran nuclear deal, which was a signature policy of Rouhani and Khamenei had already decided to cut anyone other than hardliners out of future power.

For the 2020 Iranian parliamentary elections, Khamenei not only disqualified reformists, the closest Iran has to a group that believes in some Western values, who had been disqualified from running for years.

He started to also disqualify pragmatists, whose bedrock values were as anti-Western as Khamenei’s hardliners, but who believed that trying to reach deals with the West to improve relations was a tactical imperative.

This continued in the 2021 presidential election of hardliner and Khamenei favorite, Ebrahim Raisi, with the shocking disqualifications of top Iranian officials First Vice-President Eshaq Jahangiri and former parliamentary speaker Ali Larijani from running for office.

These moves and the banning of hundreds of other candidates, by Khamenei, or technically by his Guardian Council, which does his bidding in banning undesirable candidates from running, brought voter turnout down to record lows.

While some areas still reached 40% or more in voter turnout, some areas had single digit voter turnout, as compared to 70% voter turnout in 2017.

At a collective level, whereas Raisi lost the 2017 election to Rouhani (back when Khamenei was still allowing partially free elections) by around 23.6 million to around 15.8 million, Raisi’s victory in 2021 saw him only rise to 18 million.

In other words, had all the voters who voted in 2017 voted again, Raisi still would probably have lost by a couple of million votes.

He only won because he had no real opposition and an artificial coerced drop in voter turnout.

Many reformists and pragmatists have been critical of Iran’s role in Syria’s civil war during the 2010s and other adventurous violent moves, such as the recent missile attacks on adversaries in Iraq, Syria, and Pakistan.

If the pragmatists had remained in power, there probably would have been a renewed nuclear deal JCPOA 2.0 in mid-2021, given that the US and Iranian pragmatist negotiators had agreed on around 90% of the terms.

Israel would not have liked America relieving sanctions pressure from Tehran, but the fact is that once China and Russia made the strategic decision to ignore sanctions, mere sanctions from the United States and the European Union were going to be insufficient to force the Islamic Republic to change its terrorist proxies and nuclear behavior.

Under Raisi’s hardliners, this has meant a constant push for enriching record levels of uranium to get to the nuclear threshold for not only one nuclear weapon but potentially for an arsenal.

 

 

Pakistan Stock Exchange gains 531 points

The week ending January 26, 2024 started on a positive note, riding the wave of optimism generated by the IMF's favorable review report. The benchmark index closed the week with gains of 531 points at 63,812.

Following this upbeat start, the E&P sector took center stage over developments on clearance of circular debt amounting to PKR1.2 trillion.

As the week drew to a close, conflicting narratives emerged, creating uncertainty around the viability of the circular debt plan. News reports, citing insiders, presented divergent stories—one suggesting the imminent presentation of the plan to the IMF and another reporting objections raised by the Finance Ministry. This uncertainty contributed to corrections observed in the last two trading days, with the likelihood of rate cuts diminishing.

Although discussions around rate cuts gained traction with reduction in cut-off yields in the last T-bills auction, the specter of persistent inflation, projected at 28% for Jan’23, tempered expectations of any rate cut.

The foreign exchange reserves held by State Bank of Pakistan witnessed a weekly increase of US$243 million. The inflow of US$700 million from the IMF was constrained by debt repayments.

Market participation remained cautious due to uncertainties surrounding the circular debt plan and the impending Monetary Policy Committee stance, with average daily traded volume exhibiting a decline of 16%WoW at 392 million shares from 467 million shares in the earlier week.

Other major news flows during the week included: 1) Pakistan and Kuwait to set up US$1 billion fund and 2) Cabinet body set to okay brown-field refinery policy.

Textile Composite, E&P, and Leather & Tanneries companies were amongst the top performers, while Automobile parts & Accessories, Transport, and Property were amongst the worst performers.

Major net selling was recorded by Foreigners with a net sell of US$22.7 million. Insurance absorbed most of the selling with a net buy of US$9.6 million.

Top performers of the week were: OGDC, ATLH, APL, LCI, and HMB, while top laggards included: HCAR, PTC, GADT, JVDC, PIBTL.

Market outlook hinges significantly on interest rate move scheduled to be announced on Monday January 29. While the status quo has already been factored into the market expectations, any surprise rate cut could likely trigger an immediate rally.

The resolution of the circular debt clearance plan in the upcoming week is anticipated to provide clarity to market participants, especially in the context of E&P stocks.

As the elections draw near, the settling dust is indicative of stabilization and with successful completion is anticipated to inject positive momentum into the market.

Investors are advised to seize every opportunity for the accumulation of blue-chip stocks.

 

USIP highlights Implications of Iranian attack on US Policy

While the US policymakers and the broader policy community are accustomed to Iranian aggression — mostly through proxies — across the Middle East, direct Iranian military strikes in Pakistan are a novel development for them.

The strikes will only reinforce US leaders’ perception of Iran as a reckless actor.

In line with that, the State Department issued a statement condemning Iran’s actions against Pakistan — and disputed the Iranian charge against Pakistan by calling Iran the “leading funder” of terrorism and instability in the region.

As for a Pakistan policy perspective, it is in United States’ interest that there is no further regional flare-up involving Pakistan which destabilizes the country at a time of economic and political stress.

Policymakers will also hope for a de-escalation to not jeopardize, or at least not disrupt, ongoing counterterrorism cooperation with Pakistan on Afghanistan.

Beyond the immediate standoff, some policymakers and US Central Command, which maintains strong ties with Pakistan, may see synergies with a Pakistan feeling threatened by Iran to balance Iranian military and proxy power in the region.

Iran-Pakistan tensions are not endemic, with incentives on both sides to maintain a functional relationship.

This basic diagnosis of Iran-Pakistan relations, combined with the United States’ Indo-Pacific priorities and uncertainty in Pakistan about working with the United States on Middle East issues, will put a ceiling on any cooperative agenda around nefarious Iranian activities in the region.

USIP rationale Iran attacked Pakistan

In a surprising turn on January 16, Iran launched missile strikes into Pakistan’s Baluchistan province, claiming it had hit two strongholds of anti-Iran insurgent group Jaish al-Adl (Army of Justice). Many Pakistanis are perplexed and just could not find the reasons for Iranian assault. Following is the logic offered by United States Institute of Peace (USIP) behind Iranian attack on Pakistan.

Iran’s calculus remains difficult to know — and Pakistan and other countries are left wondering what prompted Iran to take such a radical step against a more militarily powerful neighbor.

Iran’s logic of striking Pakistan remains opaque. On the face of it, Iran claims it struck terrorist cells of the Jaish al-Adl, which Iran says has a haven in Pakistan and implying also that the group has links to Israel.

Jaish al-Adl is a US-designated terrorist group fighting the Iranian regime with the goal of securing political and economic rights for the ethnic Baluch and Sunni in Iran.

On December 15th of last year, the group carried out an attack on a police station in the town of Rask, in Iran’s Sistan-Baluchistan province, killing several police officers.

Iranian logic that a preemptive strike against Jaish al-Adl is in response to the Rask attack doesn’t fully explain the attack.

Jaish al-Adl enjoying a haven in Pakistan with purported help from the external actors has been a long-standing Iranian complaint, but Iran has not struck Pakistan in cross-border raids before and hasn’t indicated an intent to undertake cross-border strikes of late.

There are two other possibilities for why Iran may have targeted Pakistan.

First, Iran may well be seeking to broaden the ongoing regional conflict and decided to draw Pakistan into the mix. If this is driving Iran, we may see more Iranian action in Pakistan.

Second, Iran may be attempting to force regional countries, including Pakistan, to rethink their preexisting alignment with the United States and to not offer further help that might allow the United States to counter Iran or its proxies in the region.

USIP view of Pak Iran relations

In a surprising turn on January 16, Iran launched missile strikes into Pakistan’s Baluchistan province, claiming it had hit two strongholds of anti-Iran insurgent group Jaish al-Adl (Army of Justice). Many Pakistanis are perplexed and just could not find the reasons for Iranian assault. Following is the narrative offered by United States Institute of Peace (USIP) on Iran-Pakistan relations.

Iran announced the attack in Pakistan concurrent to its strikes in Iraq and Syria. Less than two days later, Pakistan hit back with not only missiles but also fighter jets in Iran’s Sistan-Baluchistan province — claiming to target hideouts of anti-Pakistan ethno-nationalist insurgents operating from Iranian soil.

This sudden escalation and military hostilities between the two neighboring countries come at a time of heightened regional tensions, with Iranian-backed militias in Iraq carrying out near-daily attacks on bases with US forces in Iraq and Syria and escalation in the Red Sea due to another Iranian-backed entity, the Houthis, targeting global shipping.

Still the attack in Pakistan is unique. Relations between Iran and Pakistan have been generally peaceful and border skirmishes between the two sides have been minimal, or at least contained very close to the border and downplayed by both sides. This time, by announcing the attack, Iran broke from that trend.

Since the revolution in Iran in 1979, ties between Iran and Pakistan have been functional, and in periods warm, but ultimately not particularly strong. While Iran-Pakistan people-to-people exchanges are the strength of the relationship, there have been political grievances toward the other on both sides.

Iran’s Shia theocratic regime, for example, has felt ideologically discordant with Sunni-majority Pakistan. Pakistani leadership has also at times viewed the relationship through a sectarian lens, though the salience of the sectarian rift is much less acute compared to Iran’s ties with countries in the Persian Gulf region, as Pakistan has a sizable Shia minority.

Iran has also had a negative perception of Pakistan due to its strong relations with geopolitical forces opposed to Iran: the United States and Gulf powers, especially the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia.

For Pakistan’s part, it has seen Iran as a difficult and not very useful neighbor due to its pariah status in the West.

Iran has also had a closer relationship with Pakistan’s archrival India, and Pakistani leaders have long suspected Iran of supporting and providing haven to anti-Pakistan ethno-nationalist groups.

Axis of resistance as defined by western media

ran's role as leader of Axis of Resistance - which includes the Houthis, Lebanon's Hezbollah, Hamas and militias in Iraq and Syria - had to be balanced against avoiding getting sucked into a regional war over Gaza.

Tehran's messaging to - and about - the Houthis requires a measure of deniability about the extent of its control over them - but also an ability to claim some credit for their anti-Israel actions.

Strikes by United States and Britain on Houthi targets have failed to deter the group which controls a large chunk of Yemen including the capital Sanaa and much of the country's Red Sea coast by the Bab al-Mandab strait.

The Houthis, who first emerged in the 1980s as an armed group in opposition to Saudi Arabia in Yemen, are said to be armed, funded and trained by Iran and are part of its anti-West, anti-Israel Axis of Resistance.

As reported by Reuters, a senior US official informed that Washington had asked China to use its leverage with Iran to persuade it to restrain the Houthis, including in conversations Secretary of State Antony Blinken and National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan had this month with senior Chinese Communist Party official Liu Jianchao.

A senior Iranian official said while Chinese officials discussed their concerns thoroughly in the meetings, they never mentioned any requests from Washington.

On January 14, China's foreign minister Wang Yi called for an end to attacks on civilian ships in the Red Sea - without naming the Houthis or mentioning Iran - and the maintenance of supply chains and the international trade order.

Victor Gao, chair professor at China's Soochow University, said China, as the world's biggest trading nation, was disproportionately affected by the shipping disruption and restoring stability in the Red Sea was a priority.

Gao, a former Chinese diplomat and an adviser to oil giant Saudi Aramco, said Beijing would view Israel's treatment of the Palestinians as the root cause of the Red Sea crisis and would not want to publicly ascribe blame to the Houthis.

A diplomat familiar with the matter said China had been talking to Iran about the issue but it was unclear how seriously Tehran was taking Beijing's advice.

Two officials in the Yemeni government, an enemy of the Houthis, said they were aware that several countries, including China, had sought to influence Iran to rein the Houthis in.

Analysts Gregory Brew of Eurasia Group and Ali Vaez of the International Crisis Group said China had potential leverage over Iran because of its oil purchases and because Iran was hoping to attract more Chinese direct investment in future.

Both said China had so far been reluctant to use its leverage, for several reasons.

"China prefers to free-ride on the US safeguarding freedom of navigation in the Red Sea by bloodying the Houthis' nose," said Vaez, adding that Beijing was also aware that Iran did not have total control over its Yemeni allies.

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Houthi spokesman Mohammed Abdulsalam said on Thursday that Iran to date had not conveyed any message from China about scaling back attacks.

"They will not inform us of such a request, especially since Iran's stated position is to support Yemen. It condemned the American-British strikes on Yemen, and considered Yemen's position honourable and responsible," he said.

The stakes are high for Iran as China is one of the few powers capable of providing the billions of dollars of investment Tehran needs to maintain the capacity of its oil sector and keep its economy afloat.

China's influence was evident in 2023 when it facilitated an agreement between Iran and regional rival Saudi Arabia to end years of hostilities.

There are robust economic ties between China and Iran, Beijing's influence on Tehran's geopolitical decisions was not absolute.

Iranian state media says Chinese firms have only invested US$185 million since then. State media also said last year that Iranian non-oil exports to China fell 68% in the first five months of 2023 while Iran's imports from China rose 40%.

By contrast, Chinese companies committed last year to invest billions in Saudi Arabia after the countries signed a comprehensive strategic partnership in December 2022.

While China could not be ignored, Tehran had other priorities to consider and its decisions were shaped by a complex interplay of factors.

Regional alliances and priorities as well as ideological considerations contribute significantly to Tehran's decisions.

Iran has to adopt a nuanced strategy when it came to the Gaza war, as well as the Houthi attacks, and that Tehran would not abandon its allies.