Although Rouhani was still in power in 2020, by that time the United States had pulled out of the Iran nuclear deal, which was a signature policy of Rouhani and Khamenei had already decided to cut anyone other than hardliners out of future power.
For the 2020 Iranian parliamentary elections, Khamenei not only disqualified reformists, the closest Iran has to a group that believes in some Western values, who had been disqualified from running for years.
He started to also disqualify pragmatists, whose bedrock values were as anti-Western as Khamenei’s hardliners, but who believed that trying to reach deals with the West to improve relations was a tactical imperative.
This continued in the 2021 presidential election of hardliner and Khamenei favorite, Ebrahim Raisi, with the shocking disqualifications of top Iranian officials First Vice-President Eshaq Jahangiri and former parliamentary speaker Ali Larijani from running for office.
These moves and the banning of hundreds of other candidates, by Khamenei, or technically by his Guardian Council, which does his bidding in banning undesirable candidates from running, brought voter turnout down to record lows.
While some areas still reached 40% or more in voter turnout, some areas had single digit voter turnout, as compared to 70% voter turnout in 2017.
At a collective level, whereas Raisi lost the 2017 election to Rouhani (back when Khamenei was still allowing partially free elections) by around 23.6 million to around 15.8 million, Raisi’s victory in 2021 saw him only rise to 18 million.
In other words, had all the voters who voted in 2017 voted again, Raisi still would probably have lost by a couple of million votes.
He only won because he had no real opposition and an artificial coerced drop in voter turnout.
Many reformists and pragmatists have been critical of Iran’s role in Syria’s civil war during the 2010s and other adventurous violent moves, such as the recent missile attacks on adversaries in Iraq, Syria, and Pakistan.
If the pragmatists had remained in power, there probably would have been a renewed nuclear deal JCPOA 2.0 in mid-2021, given that the US and Iranian pragmatist negotiators had agreed on around 90% of the terms.
Israel would not have liked America relieving sanctions pressure from Tehran, but the fact is that once China and Russia made the strategic decision to ignore sanctions, mere sanctions from the United States and the European Union were going to be insufficient to force the Islamic Republic to change its terrorist proxies and nuclear behavior.
Under Raisi’s hardliners, this has meant a constant push for enriching record levels of uranium to get to the nuclear threshold for not only one nuclear weapon but potentially for an arsenal.
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