The year 2021 may prove to be an important milestone in the
evolution of strategic relations between Russia and India. On December 06, 2021,
Russian President Vladimir Putin flew into New Delhi on a one day state visit.
The one-on-one meeting with Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, which lasted
three and a half hours, was aimed at restoring confidence between the two
powers as time-proven and trusted strategic partners.
For Putin, the trip to India was only his second overseas
visit since the outbreak of the Covid-19 pandemic (the other was the first
meeting with his US counterpart Joe Biden in Geneva). That fact alone signifies
the importance of India to the Kremlin and the desire to keep relations close.
But Putin’s brief visit to New Delhi was just part of broader high-level
bilateral talks, which included an impressive entourage representing both
countries.
The last time Putin and Modi met was in 2019 during the
Eastern Economic Forum in Vladivostok. After that, the two leaders avoided
their interactions. The reason, they claimed, was the Covid-19 outbreak.
The relationship had been cooling long before Covid-19
struck. New Delhi felt that Moscow was taking advantage of India, playing upon
its fears of China. The case of India’s purchase of a modified Russian cruiser
turned aircraft carrier is one example. It led India’s comptroller and
auditor-general to lament that India had paid 60% more for a second-hand
aircraft carrier than a new one would have cost. Admiral Arun Prakash, a former
chief of the Indian naval staff, was equally scathing in his evaluation of
the Russian MiG-29K aircraft that were to be used on the aircraft carrier.
Russia, for its part, was unhappy with India’s growing ties
with the United States. Between 2007 and 2020, India spent more than US$17
billion on military purchases from the US. Russia was particularly unhappy that
India had entered into four ‘foundational’ security agreements with the US that
cover the transfer of military information, logistics exchanges, compatibility
and security.
At the same time, Russia’s relationship with China was
growing through the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and its ties to the
Collective Security Treaty Organization, which was established to ensure the
security of the Soviet Union’s successor states. Russia and China, seeing the
US as a common antagonist, collaborated on technology transfers, Russia’s sale
of energy products to China, and increased trade and tourism. They also engaged
in joint military exercises and naval and air patrols.
That said, there remains the suspicion that Moscow
is ‘passively facilitating’ New Delhi’s role in the Quad in order to restore
equality in its strategic relations with Beijing. That could help revive, in
turn, its stalled ‘new détente’ with the West.
India is suspicious of Russia’s developing relationship with
Pakistan. New Delhi worries that Moscow is hyphenating its relationships
with its two neighbouring enemies. That suspicion grew when Russia didn’t
invite India to a meeting it convened with China, Pakistan and the US on the
Afghanistan situation, a move that was seen as a deliberate snub in
New Delhi.
India needs the potential security that Russia can provide.
Little wonder, then, that it was prepared to purchase the S-400 air-defence
system from Russia despite US pressure not to, and to offer an invitation to
Putin to visit India, which he accepted.
The two countries launched ‘2+2’ ministerial consultations
involving their foreign and defence ministers, making Russia the fourth partner
with which India has the same format (the other three Quad members are
Australia, Japan and the US).
They also signed another 10-year agreement on joint
military–technical cooperation until 2031 and agreed to expand and deepen
bilateral defence cooperation. Adding to that, Russia has reaffirmed its
position as one of the principal providers of advanced military technology to
the Indian military. Since 1991, India has acquired a comprehensive suite of
weapons and platforms for all its fighting services worth some US$70 billion.
The current value of India’s defence contracts with Russia is
approximately US$15 billion.
Perhaps one of the most important outcomes for Russia was
India’s reassurance that it is not siding with US strategic plans to form a
regional political–military containment bloc. According to Russian Foreign
Minister Sergei Lavrov, the Indians ‘distanced themselves from the
AUKUS bloc’. He said, ‘They are part of the Quad group, which brings together
India, Japan, Australia and the US, and India … emphasises its interest in
economic infrastructure and transport projects within this framework.’
Clearly, the talks didn’t eradicate all contentious points
in the relationship. India is likely to remain concerned about Russia’s ties to
China, Pakistan and the Taliban. Despite ambitious goals, the bilateral
economic relationship won’t reach the levels of the ones that India enjoys with
the US and China.
Even in the defence cooperation sphere, which is at the core
of Russia–India strategic ties, some issues persist. For example, the two
countries failed to finalize the reciprocal logistics support agreement,
which was supposed to become an important stepping stone in closer
military-to-military interaction.
The meetings in New Delhi came less than a week after
the visit to Moscow of the president of Vietnam, a country with which
Russia developed a comprehensive strategic partnership a decade ago. Both
events highlight Russia’s more flexible approach towards its strategic
engagement in the Indo-Pacific, despite the centrality of China in Russia’s
Asia policy.
Putin’s meeting with Modi took place a day before the
Russian president had his second major interaction with Biden, and just days
before the US-led Summit for Democracy, to which Moscow was not invited.
For Putin, it was important to show Washington and Brussels that Russia has a
network of strategic partners it can call upon.
Recognizing that and Russia’s importance to India, New Delhi
has tried to show Moscow that it’s not drifting away from the relationship. New
Delhi recognizes that Moscow can’t fully trust Beijing, which makes the Indo-Russian
relationship all the more important. India’s purchase of the S-400 missile
system despite US pressure was meant to send exactly that message. The launch
of the 2+2 ministerial consultations is likely to ease Russia’s concerns that
New Delhi has been gradually drifting towards the US geopolitical orbit,
confirming that India is ‘not in anyone’s camp’.