A Dangerous Drift Toward Another Unnecessary War

Signals emerging from Washington point toward a trajectory the world has seen before: military escalation presented as strategic necessity. Reports that the United States is preparing for the possibility of sustained operations against Iran should prompt serious reflection, not only in the region but among policymakers who understand how quickly “limited actions” evolve into prolonged conflicts.

Military preparedness is routine; political judgment is decisive. Confusing the two is where danger begins.

At the heart of the debate lies an uncomfortable legal tension. Iran, as a signatory to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), retains the right to pursue nuclear technology for civilian purposes under international safeguards. Disputes over compliance are meant to be resolved through verification regimes and diplomacy. When the language of air strikes overshadows the mechanisms of inspection, the credibility of multilateral agreements erodes.

History offers sobering reminders. The 2003 invasion of Iraq, justified by intelligence later discredited, destabilized a fragile state and reshaped regional security in ways few architects anticipated. The 2011 intervention in Libya, backed by NATO, removed an entrenched regime yet failed to deliver sustainable governance. These episodes illustrate a persistent reality: regime change may be swift in execution but chaotic in consequence.

Renewed rhetoric about altering Tehran’s political order risks repeating this pattern. Externally driven transitions rarely produce the institutional stability advocates promise. More often, they generate power vacuums, factional conflict, economic collapse, and long-term regional spillovers.

Moral arguments, too, demand consistency. Criticism of Iran’s domestic policies carries greater weight when human rights principles are applied universally rather than selectively. Standards invoked abroad cannot appear negotiable at home without weakening their persuasive force.

Equally problematic is the inflation of threat narratives. Iran’s regional posture is assertive and frequently destabilizing, particularly through its network of non-state partners. Yet portraying it as an imminent global menace compresses complex geopolitical realities into a binary framework that leaves little room for diplomacy. For Israel, whose security concerns are genuine, long-term stability ultimately rests on deterrence, engagement, and regional balance — not perpetual confrontation.

The risks of a sustained conflict are neither theoretical nor remote. Iran’s missile capabilities, asymmetric tools, and retaliatory doctrine make escalation highly probable. States hosting American military installations could become unintended theatres of reprisal. Energy corridors, shipping routes, and civilian infrastructure across the Gulf would face heightened vulnerability. Even a carefully calibrated campaign could trigger consequences far beyond initial objectives.

Diplomacy is slow, imperfect, and politically inconvenient. War is swift, destructive, and rarely confined to its opening script. Strategic calculations must reflect that asymmetry.

One need not be a head of state to recognize the stakes. Even an ordinary citizen can observe that conflicts launched with confidence often conclude with outcomes no one predicted — except the families, economies, and regions left to absorb the costs.

After decades marked by intervention fatigue and strategic overreach, Washington faces a defining choice: reinforce diplomacy and international law, or drift toward another confrontation whose consequences may exceed its rationale.

Strategic patience is not weakness. In a volatile geopolitical landscape, it is the most credible expression of strength.

Election or Selection? Bangladesh at the Crossroads

The latest election in Bangladesh has delivered a result that few found surprising. The continuity of leadership has reinforced a long-standing perception: politics in the country remains shaped by dynastic gravity rather than competitive churn. This predictability has revived an uncomfortable question — was it an election defined by open contest, or a selection shaped by structural advantage?

Since independence, power has largely oscillated between two dominant political forces. Such concentration can project stability, yet it also risks creating democratic fatigue. When outcomes appear preordained and opposition participation limited, public trust in the electoral process inevitably comes under strain. Legitimacy in modern democracies is measured not only by victory margins but by the credibility of the contest itself.

However, Bangladesh’s political story cannot be separated from its geopolitical significance. The country sits at a strategic junction in South Asia, attracting the sustained attention of major powers.

For the United States, Bangladesh represents both an economic partner and a node in the Indo-Pacific calculus. Democratic standards, labour rights, and regional security form key pillars of engagement.

India views Bangladesh through the lens of neighbourhood stability, connectivity, and security cooperation. Political continuity in Dhaka often translates into policy predictability for New Delhi, particularly on trade routes and border management.

China’s expanding footprint reflects its broader Belt and Road ambitions. Infrastructure financing and investment ties have deepened, making Bangladesh an increasingly important partner in Beijing’s regional architecture.

Russia, while less visible, maintains interests in energy cooperation and strategic diversification, seeking relevance in a region marked by intensifying power competition.

This convergence of external interests complicates internal democratic debates. Stability is prized by international partners, yet excessive political closure can breed long-term fragility. A system perceived as exclusionary may preserve short-term order while quietly eroding institutional confidence.

The true test for Bangladesh is not merely electoral endurance but democratic resilience. Elections must be seen as credible mechanisms of choice rather than procedural formalities. Without broader participation and trust, even economic progress may struggle to anchor political legitimacy.

In the end, the question lingers: if elections secure continuity but weaken confidence, what exactly has been strengthened — governance, or doubt?

Intimidating Iran Best Pastime of United States

The recent decision by the United States to dispatch the USS Gerald R. Ford, the world’s largest aircraft carrier, from the Caribbean to the Middle East underscores a persistent pattern in Washington’s approach toward Tehran. The move places two US carriers in the region, with the Ford joining the USS Abraham Lincoln amid renewed tensions with Iran. Officially, the deployment is framed as a precautionary step to reinforce deterrence and preserve regional stability.

Yet beyond the language of deterrence lies a familiar policy reflex: the reliance on military signalling as a primary instrument for influencing Iran’s behaviour. This is hardly unprecedented. In 2012, reports of F-22 Raptor stealth fighters deployed to Al Dhafra Air Base in the United Arab Emirates carried similar assurances of routine scheduling and defensive intent. Strategically, however, the message was clear — project strength, signal readiness, and apply pressure without crossing into open conflict.

More than a decade later, the continuity is striking. Carrier deployments, advanced aircraft rotations, and calibrated rhetoric remain central to Washington’s Iran playbook. Such measures undoubtedly serve tactical objectives: reassuring allies, demonstrating capability, and maintaining leverage. But their long-term effectiveness invites scrutiny.

Iran has endured sanctions, diplomatic isolation, and repeated demonstrations of US military power for decades without fundamentally altering its core strategic posture. Pressure has, at times, produced limited concessions, yet it has just as often entrenched mistrust and reinforced Tehran’s security-centric worldview. Deterrence can prevent conflict; it does not automatically resolve the disputes that generate it.

There is also a broader risk. Persistent cycles of escalation and signalling narrow diplomatic space and increase the possibility of miscalculation. In a region already burdened by volatility, symbolism can easily harden into confrontation, even when neither side seeks direct war.

For policymakers and serious observers, the essential question is not whether the United States should maintain a credible security presence in the Middle East. It is whether intimidation-centric strategies yield diminishing returns when repeated without parallel diplomatic innovation.

A more sustainable path would balance firmness with structured engagement — linking military posture to transparent negotiation frameworks, confidence-building measures, and pragmatic channels of communication. History suggests that durable stability rarely emerges from coercion alone.

Power projection may shape headlines and influence short-term calculations, but it cannot indefinitely substitute for political imagination. Lasting progress will depend not on repeating familiar gestures, but on redefining the terms of engagement.

PSX benchmark index declines 2.5%WoW

Pakistan Stock Exchange (PSX) remained bearish during the week ended on Friday, February 13, 2026, on investors’ skepticism over political developments and recent domestic security incidents. These concerns coupled with delay in the financial close of Reko Diq, weighed on Oil & Gas sector, which recorded the largest index point pullback during the week. Overall, the benchmark index declined by 4,526 points or 2.5%WoW, ending the week at 179,604 points. Market participation strengthened during the week, with average daily trading volume rising by 8%WoW to 1.1 billion shares, from 983 million shares in the prior week.

The pressure was partially eased by supportive macro developments: 1) budget surplus of PKR542 billion or 0.4% of GDP in 1HFY26 as against a deficit of PKR1.5 trillion in the same period last year, 2) a 15%YoY rise remittances sent by oversees Pakistanis to US$3.5 billion in first month of current calendar year, and 3) auto sales reaching a 43-month high during the outgoing month.

Moreover, in MSCI’s February 2026 Index review, ABOT was deleted from FM Index. In addition, SEPL and ZAL were added to the MSCI FM Small Cap Index, while LPL was removed.

Foreign exchange reserves held by State Bank of Pakistan (SBP) increased by US$21 million to US$16.2 billion as of February 06, 2026. On the currency front, PKR appreciated by 0.03%WoW against the greenback during the week, closing the week at PKR279.62/ US$.

Other major news flow during the week includes, 1) UAE extends US$2 billion lifeline to Pakistan ahead of IMF talks, 2) Moody’s changes Pakistan banking outlook to stable, 3) US approves US$1.3 billion financing for Reko Diq project, 4) Pakistan, Indonesia take fresh steps to deepen trade and investment ties, and 5) GoP announces to invest US$1 billion in AI by 2030.

Vanspati & Allied Industries, Inv. Banks/ Inv. Cos./ Securities Cos., Pharmaceuticals, Chemical and Transport were amongst the top performing sectors, while Textile Spinning, Oil & Gas Exploration, Jute, Synthetic & Rayon and Technology & Communication were amongst the laggards.

Major buying was recorded by Mutual Funds and Individuals with a net buy of US$29.6 million and US$13.0 million, respectively. Foreigners and Brokers were major sellers with net sell of US$25.9 million and US$15.9 million, respectively.

Top performing scrips of the week were: AGP, SSOM, ENGROH, SCBPL, and CPHL, while laggards included: UNITY, PPL, PKGP, BOP, and TRG.

AKD Securities expects market to recover as domestic and geopolitical uncertainties subside, and investor focus is likely to remain on upcoming financial results and improving macros. It forecasts the bench mark Index to reach 263,800 by end December 2026.

Investors’ sentiments are expected to improve on the likelihood of foreign portfolio and direct investment flows, driven by improved relations with the United States and Saudi Arabia.

Top picks of the brokerage house include: OGDC, PPL, UBL, MEBL, HBL, FFC, ENGROH, PSO, LUCK, FCCL, INDU, ILP and SYS.

 

 

 

 

 

 

Iran’s Revolution Endures at 47

As Iran marks the 47th anniversary of the 1979 Islamic Revolution, the occasion invites more than ceremonial remembrance. It demands a sober assessment of how a political upheaval that toppled a monarchy evolved into one of the most enduring and debated state projects of the modern era.

For ordinary Iranians, the revolution’s legacy remains layered. In its formative decades, the Islamic Republic expanded literacy, strengthened primary healthcare, and extended infrastructure into rural regions long neglected under the Shah. Education enrollment surged, and social development indicators improved. Just as significantly, the revolution institutionalized a powerful narrative of sovereignty, independence, and resistance to external domination. Yet these achievements coexist with persistent challenges: sanctions-driven economic strain, inflation, currency volatility, and high youth unemployment. A younger, digitally connected generation increasingly measures progress through economic opportunity, social mobility, and personal freedoms—metrics that often fuel domestic debate and periodic unrest.

An important, often oversimplified dimension is contemporary support for the revolutionary system. While global commentary frequently highlights dissent, Iranian society presents a more complex picture. Many citizens—particularly within rural constituencies, state-linked sectors, and groups prioritizing stability and national autonomy—continue to view the revolution as a guarantor of independence and social order. Commemorations still mobilize participation. At the same time, support is rarely unconditional; it exists alongside criticism of governance, economic management, and civil liberties. This coexistence of loyalty and frustration reflects a society negotiating reform rather than uniformly rejecting the state’s ideological foundations.

Externally, the revolution has operated under the shadow of sustained US opposition. Decades of sanctions, diplomatic isolation, and strategic confrontation have sought to constrain Tehran’s regional influence and nuclear ambitions. The result has been paradoxical: economic hardship and technological constraints on one side, but also a reinforced Iranian emphasis on self-reliance, deterrence, and strategic patience.

Regionally, Iran’s emergence as a consequential power is unmistakable. Through asymmetric capabilities, calibrated alliances, and geopolitical persistence, Tehran has embedded itself deeply in West Asian security dynamics. Whether perceived as stabilizer, disruptor, or balancer, Iran today is central to regional calculations.

At 47, the Iranian Revolution stands neither as a frozen triumph nor a failed experiment. It is a living, evolving project—tested by economic pressures, shaped by generational change, and defined by a resilience that continues to confound predictions of its demise.

US Trade Deal Raises Questions Over Bangladesh Autonomy

Bangladesh’s newly signed trade agreement with the United States is being hailed as a step forward in bilateral economic relations. Yet beneath the surface of tariff reductions and textile concessions, the deal raises uncomfortable questions about Dhaka’s strategic flexibility.

The agreement highlights an enduring reality of global economics: trade deals are rarely just about trade. For emerging economies like Bangladesh, the challenge is not merely securing market access but preserving policy autonomy. Economic gains can be meaningful, yet the long-term cost of constrained strategic choices may prove far more significant. In a world shaped by intensifying great-power competition, smaller states must navigate carefully — ensuring that commercial cooperation does not quietly evolve into strategic dependency.

Signed on February 09, the agreement reduces Bangladesh’s reciprocal tariff rate with the US to 19%. In return, Bangladesh secures zero reciprocal tariffs on readymade garments exported to the American market — provided those products are manufactured using US-origin cotton and man-made fibre.

While the trade benefits appear attractive, the language embedded in the agreement suggests broader expectations. The version released by the Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR) includes a notable provision:

“Bangladesh shall endeavor to increase purchases of US military equipment and limit military equipment purchases from certain countries.”

The final text avoids naming specific nations, but earlier drafts reportedly included references to reducing defence imports from China. Even without explicit mention, the geopolitical undertone is difficult to ignore.

Beyond defence procurement, the agreement outlines substantial long-term commercial commitments. Bangladesh is expected to import more than US$15 billion worth of American liquefied natural gas (LNG) over the next 15 years. The deal also encourages increased imports of US automobiles and auto parts.

In aviation, Dhaka has agreed to purchase 14 Boeing civil aircraft along with associated components, with the possibility of additional acquisitions in the future.

Another clause requires Bangladesh to submit a “full and complete” notification to the World Trade Organization (WTO) detailing all subsidies within six months — a move that could expose domestic industrial policies to heightened scrutiny.

Individually, each component of the agreement can be defended as commercially rational. Collectively, however, they reflect a familiar pattern in US trade diplomacy: economic incentives intertwined with strategic alignment.

For Bangladesh, the agreement may indeed open new economic opportunities. But it also underscores a broader dilemma faced by smaller economies — when trade arrangements begin influencing defence sourcing, energy dependence, and policy transparency, the boundary between partnership and pressure becomes blurred.

The deal may strengthen US-Bangladesh ties. Whether it narrows Bangladesh’s room for independent strategic maneuvering remains the more consequential question.

Should Iran Stop Entry of Ships with US Flag in the Strait of Hormuz?

The Strait of Hormuz is not just another sea lane — it is arguably the most consequential chokepoint in global energy geography. At its narrowest, the strait squeezes to just over 21 nautical miles, with segments falling within what Iran views — and much of the world recognizes — as its territorial waters. Yet, Washington, despite a policy of “maximum pressure” against Tehran, insists its vessels must transit unimpeded through these waters. This contradiction lies at the heart of the current impasse.

Under international law, coastal states exercise sovereignty over territorial waters, typically extending twelve nautical miles from their shorelines. While the regime of “transit passage” over straits used for international navigation exists, it is not absolute — especially when strategic maritime access is leveraged amid acute political tensions. Iran asserts that a combination of sanctions, military threats, and economic strangulation amounts to coercion, undermining the spirit of norms meant to protect freedom of navigation.

The US “maximum pressure” policy — a blend of sweeping sanctions, tariffs on Iran’s trading partners, asset freezes, and diplomatic isolation — aims to squeeze Tehran’s economy and force it back to the negotiating table on Washington’s terms. It has undoubtedly inflicted economic pain: deep currency depreciation, elevated inflation, and a contraction in trade with global partners. Yet, the policy has not delivered the strategic outcomes Washington seeks.

Iran has not fully capitulated on its nuclear ambitions, nor has it ceased support for networks that counter US influence in the region. Indeed, analysts argue that the policy’s unrelenting coercion without a clear diplomatic exit has hardened Tehran’s posture rather than moderated it.

Critically, this pressure campaign has complicated the very objective it claims to uphold — ensuring stable maritime traffic. Rather than diminishing Iran’s leverage, sustained economic and military posturing risks escalating incidents around the strait. Maritime advisories urging US-flagged vessels to stay as far as safely possible from Iranian waters reflect this unease.

If the United States wants unrestricted passage for its vessels, it must reckon with the paradox of demanding rights while applying relentless pressure that invites resistance. A sustainable solution demands not just naval escorts and sanctions, but a calibrated diplomatic engagement that acknowledges Iran’s legitimate security concerns without compromising global trade imperatives.

In a narrow channel where diplomacy and deterrence meet, rigidity will only make a bottleneck worse.

Does Iran Have the Right to Enrich Uranium?

Iran’s right to enrich uranium for peaceful purposes is grounded in international law, not ideological sympathy. As a signatory to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), Iran is legally entitled to develop nuclear technology for civilian uses such as medical isotopes, electricity generation, and scientific research, provided it remains under international safeguards. Tehran has consistently maintained that it does not seek nuclear weapons. Distrust alone cannot nullify a treaty-based right.

For nearly five decades, Iran has been subjected to economic sanctions, covert operations, cyber sabotage, and targeted killings of nuclear scientists. These measures, justified in the name of non-proliferation, have failed to eliminate Iran’s nuclear capability. Instead, they have entrenched confrontation, weakened moderates, and institutionalized hostility as a policy tool.

Israel has played the most aggressive role in this strategy. Operating with implicit Western backing, it has repeatedly attacked Iranian assets and openly threatened pre-emptive strikes. Prime Minister Netanyahu’s recurring warnings of unilateral military action reflect a dangerous mindset: one that treats force as a substitute for diplomacy and assumes escalation can be controlled. History suggests otherwise.

Any military adventurism against Iran would not remain a limited strike. It would provoke retaliation across the region, destabilize already fragile states, disrupt global energy supplies, and risk drawing major powers into a wider confrontation. The Middle East is already burdened by overlapping crises; igniting a new war over speculative threat perceptions would be an act of strategic recklessness.

If the objective is to prevent nuclear weapons proliferation, coercion has proven ineffective. Verification, inspections, and negotiated limits offer far greater security than sanctions and bombs. The West must accept that peaceful enrichment under monitoring is safer than perpetual confrontation.

Equally important, Muslim countries must move beyond silence and ambiguity. Enabling or facilitating attacks on Iran, directly or indirectly, only accelerates regional self-destruction. Strategic autonomy demands collective restraint.

Enough is enough. Denying legal rights, normalizing aggression, and tolerating unilateral strikes will not bring stability. They will only push the Middle East closer to a conflict whose consequences no one—not even its architects—can control.

Targeting Pakistan’s Heart: Terror Beyond Sectarian Lines

The latest bomb blast at an Imam Bargah during Friday prayers must not be dismissed as yet another episode of sectarian violence. To frame it that way is misleading—and plays directly into the hands of those who seek to destabilize Pakistan. This was a strategic strike aimed at the state, social cohesion, and economic revival, not a spontaneous sectarian clash.

The choice of location is telling. An attack in or near the federal capital is a deliberate message: those entrusted with national security are being exposed as vulnerable. This is about demonstrating institutional weakness, not simply causing casualties.

Targeting Shias at a place of worship is tactically calculated to manufacture the illusion of sectarian conflict. Pakistan’s Shia and Sunni communities have coexisted for decades. By creating the perception of intra-Muslim hostility, the perpetrators hope to provoke mistrust, social fragmentation, and internal tension—classic tools to weaken a nation from within.

Timing is critical. After prolonged economic strain, Pakistan is showing early signs of recovery—stabilizing markets, cautious investor interest, and renewed trade activity. Terrorism at this juncture is meant to undermine confidence, discourage investment, and stall the revival.

The attack also feeds into the Afghan blame narrative. Linking violence to cross-border militancy or safe havens conveniently shifts attention from the real sponsors, strains Pakistan-Afghanistan relations, and disrupts the flow of Afghan transit trade—a vital lifeline for both economies.

To call this “sectarian killing” is to misdiagnose the problem. The reality is far more calculated: a foreign hand is striking at security credibility, social harmony, regional diplomacy, and economic momentum. The question is not who was killed, but who benefits. And the answer lies far beyond sectarian lines.

Pakistan cannot allow its narrative to be hijacked. Recognizing the true nature of these attacks is the first step toward ensuring that security, economic revival, and regional cooperation are not held hostage by external designs.

Bangladesh Election: In the Shadow of Power, Protest and External Pressures

Bangladesh’s forthcoming general election is taking place at an extraordinary political moment, shaped less by routine electoral competition and more by the aftershocks of mass unrest, institutional recalibration, and regional scrutiny. The vote is widely viewed as a test of whether the country can transition from prolonged political dominance to a more inclusive and credible democratic order.

The Bangladesh Army has emerged as a pivotal, though discreet, actor in this phase. During the upheaval that led to the fall of Sheikh Hasina’s government, the military refrained from using force against protesters and facilitated the installation of an interim administration. Officially, the army insists it has no political ambitions. Yet its role in maintaining security and stabilizing state institutions gives it considerable behind-the-scenes influence over the transition.

Equally significant is the role of the student fraternity. What began as protests against unemployment, corruption, and governance failures evolved into a nationwide movement that altered the political landscape. Some leaders of these protests have now entered formal politics, signaling a rare shift from street agitation to electoral participation. Whether this energy translates into sustained political organization remains an open question.

The Awami League, long synonymous with power under Sheikh Hasina, finds itself on the margins. Legal proceedings against its leadership and its exclusion from the electoral process have sparked debate about political accountability versus inclusivity. While supporters argue the measures are necessary to reset governance, critics warn that sidelining a major party risk narrowing democratic choice.

The opposition space is largely occupied by the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP). Following the death of former prime minister Khaleda Zia, leadership influence rests primarily with her son, Tarique Rahman, who continues to shape party strategy from abroad. The BNP faces the challenge of converting opportunity into coherence after years of political disruption.

Externally, India is closely watching developments, given its strategic, economic, and security interests in Bangladesh. The United States remains engaged through diplomatic pressure and advocacy for a transparent electoral process. By contrast, there is no credible evidence of direct Pakistani influence, despite occasional rhetorical references in domestic discourse.

Ultimately, this election is less about personalities and more about institutions. Bangladesh’s real challenge lies in whether power can be contested through ballots rather than barricades, and whether the promise of democratic renewal can outlast the politics of upheaval.

PSX: Geopolitics and internal security concerns mar performance

Pakistan Stock Exchange (PXS) trended upwards for most of the week before adjusting by 3,703 points on Friday’s session, wiping out earlier gains to close the benchmark index at 184,130pts, down 45 points or 0.02%WoW. The decline was triggered by escalating geopolitical tensions over US and Iran, alongside adverse domestic security developments.

Earlier in the week, sentiments were supported by Prime Minister’s industrial relief package, coupled with record high monthly exports of US$3.06 billion during January 2026, resulting in 7%YoY drop in trade deficit. Inflation reading during the month remained lower than expected at 5.8%YoY.

Cement sector’s offtakes hit 5-year high of 4.54 million tons, up 13%YoY, driven by higher sea-exports.

OMC offtakes also increased by 6%YoY to 1.35 million tons.

Banking sector deposits expanded by 0.7%WoW, providing a positive backdrop for the sector.

T-Bill and PIB yields rose by 15 to 40 bps, in the first auction following SBP’s decision to leave policy rate unchanged.

Despite improved sentiments, market participation weakened during the week, with average daily trading volume declining by 12%WoW to 1.2 billion shares, from 1.4 billion shares in the earlier week.

On the currency front, PKR appreciated by 0.02%WoW against the greenback during the week, closing the week at 279.71 PKR to a US$.

Other major news flow during the week included: 1) UAE rolls over US$2 billion Pak loan for a month, 2) GoP requests Saudi Arabia for two-year extension in oil facility, 3) Barrick reviews Reko Diq project amid security concerns, 4) FBR collection rose 16%YoY to PKR1,015 billion in January 2026, and 5) Private sector credit expands by PKR 589 billion in FYTD.

Power Generation & Distribution, Jute, Leather & Tanneries, Inv. Banks/ Inv. Cos./ Securities Cos., and Real Estate Investment Trust were amongst the top performing sectors, while Chemical, Engineering, Tobacco, Oil & Gas Exploration Companies and Cement were amongst the laggards.

Major buying was recorded by Mutual Funds, Brokers, and Companies with an aggregate net buy of US$32 million. Banks and Foreigners were major sellers with net aggregate sell of US$25 million.

Top performing scrips of the week were: KEL, ILP, SAZEW, HMB, and TRG, while laggards included LOTCHEM, PIBTL, PPL, GADT, and KTML.

AKD Securities foresees the positive momentum at PSX to continue due to improving macros and continuous focus on reforms amid political stability. The brokerage house forecasts the benchmark Index to reach 263,800 by end December 2026.

Investors sentiments are expected to improve on the likelihood of foreign portfolio and direct investment flows, driven by improved relations with the United States and Saudi Arabia.

Top picks of the brokerage house are: OGDC, PPL, UBL, MEBL, HBL, FFC, ENGROH, PSO, LUCK, FCCL, INDU, ILP and SYS.

Trump’s Iran Posturing Is Not Diplomacy, but Coercion

Donald Trump’s latest threat to attack Iran unless Tehran submits to his demands is not diplomacy, it is coercion masquerading as negotiation. Washington claims the upcoming Oman talks focus on Iran’s nuclear program. In reality, Trump is exploiting military pressure and Iran’s recent domestic unrest to force sweeping political concessions. His warning that Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei should be “very worried” reveals the real intent: intimidation, not engagement.

The starting point is simple. Trump himself tore up the 2015 nuclear agreement in 2018, despite Iran’s compliance verified by international inspectors. By walking away from an UN-backed deal, he forfeited any moral authority to dictate new terms. Having dismantled the framework, he now seeks to resurrect it with added demands — including Iran’s missile program, regional alliances, and internal policies. That is not renegotiation; it is strategic extortion.

If this were genuinely about uranium enrichment, talks would remain technical and narrow. Instead, US officials insist on expanding the agenda to missiles, proxy groups, and Iran’s domestic affairs. Tehran has rightly rejected this maximalist approach, agreeing only to discuss nuclear issues.

Trump’s reported preconditions — zero uranium enrichment, missile restrictions, and abandonment of regional partners — amount to demanding Iran’s strategic surrender. Zero enrichment alone violates Iran’s rights under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, which permits peaceful nuclear activity. Iranian officials have even signaled flexibility on enrichment levels, yet Washington insists on total prohibition.

Simultaneously, the US has deployed an aircraft carrier, warships, fighter jets, and thousands of troops to the region. Drones have been shot down, naval encounters are escalating, and oil prices are rising. This is classic gunboat diplomacy.

The irony is striking. Trump warns of nuclear danger while having destroyed the very inspection regime that restrained Iran’s program. He pressures Tehran under threat of airstrikes, while Israel — a non-NPT nuclear power — remains beyond scrutiny. The double standard is glaring.

Negotiations conducted under the shadow of missiles are not negotiations. They are ultimatums.

If Trump truly sought stability, he would rejoin the agreement he abandoned, remove preconditions, and restore inspections-based diplomacy. Instead, he is gambling with another Middle East conflict — one that could engulf the entire region.

This is not statesmanship. It is brinkmanship.

US$10 trillion a day global currency market becomes more volatile

The dollar, the world's No.1 reserve currency, is having a rocky ride as unpredictable White House policy moves and Federal Reserve independence concerns revive "Sell America" trades. While it is expected to weaken further, sudden rebounds in the greenback can catch traders out just as much as sudden sharp falls.

Having fallen almost 2% in one week in January to four-year lows, an index measuring the dollar's value against other major currencies then bounced back, causing metals market mayhem.

Here's a look at how dollar risks are rippling through world markets.

The dollar's rebound in the last two trading sessions, following US President Donald Trump's decision to nominate former Federal Reserve governor Kevin Warsh to replace outgoing Fed chief Jerome Powell has sparked a metals market meltdown.

Gold, which had notched up its best month in more than half a century in January, slumped 5% on Monday after its biggest daily fall since the early 1980s in the prior session - it regained some ground on Tuesday.

Traders had crowded into a popular currency debasement trade that relied on metals prices rising as Fed independence kept the dollar on a steady weakening path. That concept then dropped out of metals markets "at lightning speed," days, Societe Generale said in a client note.

US$10 trillion a day global currency market becomes more volatile.

A gauge of the most actively traded currency pair -- the euro/dollar exchange rate that measures expected volatility in three months' time, hit its highest since July last week.

According to Capital Economics, the dollar had become detached from traditional valuation metrics like the gap between US and Japanese or European interest rates.

Barclays has calculated a US policy risk premium for the dollar, meaning it is influenced by White House rhetoric and has become partly detached from the economic and growth forecasts that investors usually track. That could make stocks and bonds priced in dollars harder for foreign investors to hold and value.

While the indexes were lifted by gains in chipmakers, small caps also performed well, with the Russell 2000 jumping about 1%.

"The main question is whether people lose confidence in the US asset base," said Barclays global head of FX and EM macro strategy Themos Fiotakis.

Foreign investors own almost US$70 trillion worth of US assets, more than doubling their holdings in the last decade as Wall Street stocks boomed. European money managers are assessing their exposures.

A weaker dollar can boost US stocks by increasing the local currency value of companies' overseas earnings and often raises prices of Treasuries.

"But disorderly dollar decline could change this relationship," Bank of America analysts said in a note.

A disorderly drop would be a 5% monthly loss, BofA said, which could generate a "drastic sell-off of long-dated Treasuries," and tighten US financial conditions significantly.

A wider debasement trade, with the dollar falling in tandem with domestic assets, was also a risk, BofA said.

Courtesy: Reuters

 

Cuba another victim of US imperialism

As blackouts stretch through the night and food prices rocket by the week, Cubans are once again being tested to the limits of endurance. The streets of Havana—still lined with vintage cars and colonial façades—have rarely looked more fragile. Power outages now last up to twelve hours, fuel lines snake around blocks, and the peso continues to plummet. For many, survival has become the nation’s only industry.

The US government’s latest squeeze—threatening tariffs on countries supplying Cuba with oil—tightens an economic chokehold that stretches back decades. The collapse of Venezuela’s oil support and Mexico’s recent withdrawal have left the island gasping. Washington’s strategy may aim to force change, but the immediate result is predictable: ordinary Cubans bearing the cost of geopolitical rivalry.

Yet this is not a story of sudden collapse; it is one of cumulative exhaustion. Cuba’s aging power grid has long teetered on failure, and its post-revolution economy—built on rationing and resilience—has been stretched to breaking point. Housewives like Yaite Verdecia say, “There’s no salary that can cope with this.” Taxi drivers who once saw electric vehicles as their future can no longer find power to charge them. Lines for food and fuel have become an inescapable part of daily life.

Despite everything, the streets remain largely silent. A mix of repression, fear, and fatigue has subdued public protest since the brief outburst of 2021. Millions have left the island since the pandemic, draining its energy and voice. Those who remain, like 71-year-old Mirta Trujillo, cling to faith rather than politics: “I’m not against my country... but I don’t want to die of hunger.”

Cuba’s crisis today is not only about oil, inflation, or blackouts—it is about hope running on empty. While US sanctions may claim to pressure the regime, these are instead breaking the backs of its people. After six decades of survival against the odds, Cuba’s lights may dim again, but its will to endure—worn thin and weary—still flickers in the dark.

PSX witnesses extreme volatility but benchmark index declines 2.6%WoW

Pakistan Stock Exchange (PSX) trended downward for most of the week before rebounding by 1,836 points, with the benchmark index shedding 4,992 points or 2.6%WoW to close at 184,174 points. The decline was triggered by State Bank of Pakistan (SBP) keeping policy rate unchanged at 10.5%, against market expectations. It was followed by heightened geopolitical tensions between US and Iran, and lower than expected results from FFC for the final quarter. However, sentiment was upturned as geopolitical tensions began to ease. Banking sector recorded second highest annual growth in deposits, ending the year at PKR37.4 trillion. Moreover, SBP reduced average Cash Reserve Requirement for banks from 6% to 5%, aimed at stipulating private sector credit growth.

Market participation strengthened marginally during the week by 3%WoW, with average daily trading volume to 1.40 billion shares, from 1.36 billion shares a week ago. Foreign exchange reserves held by (SBP) increased by US$13 million to US$16.1 billion as of Jan 23, 2026. PKR appreciated by 0.03%WoW against the greenback during the week to close the week at 279.77 PKR/ a US$.

Other major news flow during the week included: 1) GoP has set 5.1% GDP growth target for federal budget, 2) Brent crude nears six-month high on Iran attack concerns, 3) SBP revises GDP growth upward up to 4.75% for FY26, 4) IMF chief praises Pakistan’s reform push, and 5) Circular debt flow declines to PKR75 billion in 1HFY26.

Property, Jute, Vanaspati & Allied Industries, and Automobile Assembler were amongst the top performing sectors, while Fertilizer, Chemical, Insurance, Paper & Board, and Textile Spinning were amongst the laggards.

Major buying was recorded by Individuals and Foreigners with a net buy of US$25.7 million and US$17.8 million. Mutual Funds and Banks were the major sellers with net sell of US$22.7 million and US$11.8 million respectively.

Top performing scrips of the week were: JVDC, 2) SAZEW, KEL, MTL, and PPL, while top laggards included: GADT, HCAR, FFC, AICL, and LCI.

AKD securities foresees the positive momentum at PSX to continue on improving macros and continuous focus on reforms amid political stability.

The brokerage house anticipates the benchmark Index to reach 263,800 by end December 2026.

Investors’ sentiments are expected to improve on the likelihood of foreign portfolio and direct investment flows, driven by improved relations with the United States and Saudi Arabia.

Our top picks of the brokerage house include: OGDC, PPL, UBL, MEBL, HBL, FFC, ENGROH, PSO, LUCK, FCCL, INDU, ILP and SYS.

 

Which is stronger lobby in the United States? munition makers or oil producers

In Washington, power rarely announces itself openly. It works through campaign donations, revolving doors, think tanks, and carefully shaped narratives. Among the most influential forces shaping US foreign and economic policy, two lobbies stand out: 1) defence-industrial complex and 2) fossil fuel industry. Both command enormous resources. Both influence war, peace, and prosperity. Yet when measured in reach, consistency, and policy outcomes, America’s arms manufacturers increasingly overshadow even Big Oil.

The oil lobby was once unrivalled. For decades, US foreign policy in the Middle East revolved around energy security. Oil giants funded campaigns, shaped environmental regulations, and enjoyed privileged access to policymakers. While they remain powerful—especially in blocking aggressive climate legislation—their dominance has gradually eroded. The rise of renewable energy, ESG pressures, and growing public awareness of climate change have constrained their room for manoeuvre. Oil companies now often find themselves playing defence.

The munition lobby, by contrast, is in expansion mode.

America’s major arms manufacturers—Lockheed Martin, Raytheon, Northrop Grumman, Boeing Defence, and General Dynamics—operate at the intersection of geopolitics and profit. Their influence is amplified by a permanent state of conflict or perceived threat. From Ukraine to Gaza, from Taiwan to the Persian Gulf, every escalation translates into fresh contracts, replenishment orders, and higher stock prices.

Unlike oil producers, defence firms benefit directly from instability. War is not a side effect of their business; it is their business model.

Their leverage rests on three pillars: 1) Defence contractors consistently rank among the largest donors to congressional campaigns, particularly to members of key committees overseeing defence spending. 2) Retired generals become board members, former Pentagon officials turn lobbyists, and corporate executives cycle into government roles. 3) Arms factories are spread across dozens of states, allowing lawmakers to justify military budgets as job protection rather than militarism.

This creates a self-reinforcing ecosystem. Threats are magnified. Military budgets grow almost automatically. Diplomatic options are sidelined, while weapon shipments become default policy tools.

Oil companies still shape energy policy, but they no longer dictate America’s strategic posture, defence firms do. Today, it is the arms industry that frames adversaries, defines security priorities, and normalizes trillion-dollar defence budgets with minimal scrutiny.

The implications are profound. A system driven by munition profits naturally gravitates toward confrontation. Peace becomes economically inconvenient.

If the oil lobby once pulled America into wars to secure energy routes, the munition lobby now sustains conflicts to secure revenue streams. That is a far more dangerous evolution—because it embeds war into the structure of governance itself.

The uncomfortable conclusion is this: in today’s United States, bullets carry more political weight than barrels.

Election or Selection in the United States?

The United States projects itself as the world’s leading democracy, promoting its political model while judging others against it. Yet a closer look at how power operates in Washington raises an uncomfortable question: does America still practice genuine elections, or has it quietly shifted toward managed selection?

Americans vote, campaigns are televised, and results are certified. But democracy is not merely about procedure—it is about meaningful choice. And that choice is shaped long before Election Day.

Today, candidates pass through an ecosystem dominated by money, lobbying, and media influence. Corporate donors, defence contractors, energy giants, and financial institutions determine who receives funding, visibility, and institutional backing. Those who challenge entrenched interests rarely survive primaries, while outsiders are systematically marginalized. By the time voters reach polling booths, the menu has already been curated.

This is where selection replaces election.

Campaigns now cost billions. Such sums cannot be raised without compromising political independence. Elected officials emerge indebted to donors rather than constituents. The revolving door between Congress, corporate boardrooms, and federal agencies further blurs the line between public service and private profit. Policy continuity across administrations—regardless of party—reveals where real power lies.

Foreign policy offers the clearest evidence. Presidents change, but wars persist. Military budgets expand almost automatically. Arms shipments grow. Sanctions multiply. Whether Democrat or Republican, Washington remains committed to confrontation-first strategies. This consistency reflects the priorities of powerful lobbies, particularly the defence industry, which profits directly from instability.

Domestic policy tells a similar story. Despite strong public support for healthcare reform, student debt relief, and financial regulation, progress remains limited. Meanwhile, defence spending and corporate advantages pass with remarkable ease. Popular will is routinely overridden by institutional inertia and corporate pressure.

Media consolidation deepens the problem. A handful of corporations shape national discourse, narrowing debate and manufacturing consent. Candidates who question militarism or corporate dominance receive limited coverage, while establishment figures dominate airtime.

To be clear, the United States is not a dictatorship. Elections occur, courts function, and civil liberties exist. But democracy has become conditional—operating within boundaries set by moneyed interests. Citizens vote, yet rarely determine strategic direction. That privilege belongs to donors, lobbyists, and unelected power centers.

The result is a managed democracy - ballots provide legitimacy, while selection ensures continuity. Until money is removed from politics and lobbying is meaningfully restrained, “government of the people” will remain more slogan than reality.

Muslim World at a Crossroads: OIC Must Act Before Iran Becomes the Next Battlefield

President Donald Trump’s increasingly belligerent rhetoric toward Iran should ring alarm bells across the Muslim world. Since Washington tightened its grip on Venezuela—effectively neutralizing its oil exports and political sovereignty—the White House’s tone on Tehran has grown markedly harsher. Today, threats of regime change, military strikes, and even targeted assassinations of Iran’s top clergy are being voiced with unsettling openness.

This trajectory is neither accidental nor unprecedented.

Recent Israeli and US operations against Iran succeeded largely because of access to regional airspace and ground facilities provided by neighboring Muslim countries. That cooperation—whether voluntary or extracted under pressure—proved decisive. There is little reason to believe the next phase, should it materialize, would be any different. On the contrary, Washington is almost certainly weighing which regional capitals might again be persuaded, coerced, or compelled to facilitate action against Tehran.

Herein lies the collective failure of Muslim leadership.

Individually, many states lack the political or economic resilience to withstand sustained US pressure. Collectively they possess enormous diplomatic weight, energy leverage, and strategic relevance. Yet this collective strength remains largely untapped, diluted by divisions and bilateral calculations.

This is precisely why the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) must immediately convene an emergency summit.

Such a meeting should not be symbolic. It must produce a clear, unified resolution rejecting any military action against Iran and warning against the use of Muslim territories, airspace, or infrastructure for attacks on a fellow Muslim nation. Silence or ambiguity will be interpreted as consent.

Muslim rulers must also confront a sobering reality: Iran is not the endgame. Washington’s broader strategy has long revolved around reshaping political landscapes in energy-rich Muslim countries, often replacing sovereign governments with compliant “puppet” regimes. Iraq, Libya, and Afghanistan offer painful reminders of how external intervention leaves behind fractured societies and enduring instability.

The argument here is not about endorsing Iran’s policies. It is about safeguarding regional sovereignty and preventing yet another war that would devastate Muslim populations while serving external geopolitical interests.

History will judge today’s leaders by whether they chose unity over expediency.

If the Muslim world fails to draw a firm collective line now, it risks becoming a revolving battlefield—one country at a time. An emergency OIC meeting is not merely desirable; it is an urgent strategic necessity.

China-India rapprochement not a good omen for United States

President Xi Jinping’s description of China and India as “good neighbours, friends and partners” may sound ceremonial, but the timing and context carry far greater geopolitical weight. His Republic Day message to Indian President Droupadi Murmu signals more than diplomatic courtesy. It reflects a calculated recalibration in Asia—one that should deeply concern Washington.

After years of tension following the deadly 2020 Himalayan clash, Beijing and New Delhi are quietly rebuilding bridges. The resumption of direct flights in 2025, expanding trade ties, and a series of high-level visits suggest both sides are determined to move beyond confrontation. Xi’s evocative metaphor of the “dragon and the elephant dancing together” underscores a strategic reality: Asia’s two largest powers are rediscovering the value of coexistence.

For the United States, this rapprochement is not a welcome development.

Washington has invested heavily in positioning India as a counterweight to China through frameworks such as the Quad and broader Indo-Pacific strategy. A warming China–India relationship weakens this pillar. If New Delhi chooses pragmatism over alignment, America’s carefully constructed containment architecture in Asia begins to fray.

More importantly, the implications extend far beyond South Asia.

A coordinated or even cooperative China–India posture diminishes US leverage across the wider Global South. Both countries are major energy consumers, influential voices in BRICS, and key stakeholders in Middle Eastern stability. As their economic and diplomatic coordination deepens, Washington risks losing its ability to shape outcomes from Tehran to Riyadh.

Weakening US hegemony in South Asia will also loosen America’s grip on the Middle East.

This is not theoretical. China already brokers regional diplomacy, from Saudi–Iran reconciliation to infrastructure investments under the Belt and Road Initiative. India maintains historic ties with Gulf states while steadily expanding its economic footprint. Together, they offer regional actors alternatives to Western security and financial systems—precisely at a time when US foreign policy under President Donald Trump appears increasingly transactional and unpredictable.

To be sure, structural mistrust remains between Beijing and New Delhi. Their 3,800-kilometre disputed border is still heavily militarized, and strategic competition has not vanished. Yet both sides now seem willing to manage disputes rather than weaponize them.

That pragmatism carries consequences.

A stable China–India equation accelerates the shift toward a multipolar order, reducing Washington’s ability to divide and influence Asian powers. For the United States, the message is clear: when the dragon and the elephant learn to dance, America no longer leads the orchestra.

The emerging alignment may be fragile—but even a cautious rapprochement marks another step away from US-centric global dominance.

PSX benchmark index closed at an all-time high of 189,167

Pakistan Stock Exchange continued upward movement during the week, with benchmark index gaining 4,068 points or 2.2% WoW to close at an all-time high of 189,167 on Friday, January 24, 2026. Market participation also improved by 8.7%WoW, with average daily trading volume rising to 1.3 billion shares, as compared to 1.2 billion shares in the prior week.

Momentum was supported by easing geopolitical tensions and a decline in T-Bill yields to single-digit levels for the first time in four years.

Moreover, positive economic partnerships with China, US, Britain and Saudi Arabia are expected to further boost Pakistan’s economy.

On the macroeconomic front, current account deficit was recorded at US$244 million for December 2025, while FDI outflows were recorded at US$135 million.

Power generation rose 8.8%YoY at December end, while IT sector recorded highest ever monthly exports of US$437 million, up 26%YoY.

Foreign exchange reserves held by State Bank of Pakistan (SBP) increased by US$16 million to US$16.1 billion as of January 16, 3026, as a result PKR appreciated against the greenback during the week, closing the week at 279.86 PKR/ US$.

Other major news flow during the week included: 1) Pakistan, China sign US$4.5 billion farm deals, boosting jobs and food supply, 2) Pakistan signs Trump-led Board of Peace charter, 3) GoP working on proposals to reduce industrial power tariff, 4) Pakistan-Philippines can boost pharma trade to US$1 billion, and 5) Foreign firms repatriate US$1.6 billion during 1HFY26.

Refinery, Fertilizer, Leather & Tanneries, Insurance, Property were amongst the top performing sectors, while Transport, Jute, Woollen, Technology & Communication, and Engineering were amongst the laggards.

Major buying was recorded by Mutual Funds and Individuals with a net buy of US$22.1 million and US$11.5 million, respectively. Foreigners and Companies were major sellers with net sell of US$21.1 million and US$10.4 million.

Top performing scrips of the week were: AICL, ATRL, FATIMA, SAZEW, and ENGROH, while laggards included: PIOC, KTML, TGL, SYS, and PAEL.

AKD Securities foresees the positive momentum at PSX to continue due to further monetary easing driven by improving external account position and continuous focus on reforms amid political stability.

The brokerage house anticipates the benchmark index to rise to 263,800 by end December 2026.

Investors’ sentiments are expected to improve on the likelihood of foreign portfolio and direct investment flows, driven by improved relations with the United States and Saudi Arabia.

Top picks of the brokerage house are:  OGDC, PPL, UBL, MEBL, HBL, FFC, ENGROH, PSO, LUCK, FCCL, INDU, ILP and SYS.